Abstract This chapter examines the use of deterrence by President Putin of the Russian Federation against potential democratic revolts. It combines insights from the literatures on democratic revolutions and social movements on the one hand and deterrence and coercion on the other. This exploratory research …

The peace operations literature suffers from a narrow focus on battle fi eld deterrence. It ignores the need to deter actors beyond the battle fi eld from supporting the combatants using force, and analyses the use of military threats and force in peace operations in a vacuum without taking into account …

The use of sanctions is often associated with coercion and deterrence. The former implies that sanctions contribute to changing the behaviour of targets, while the latter suggests that the damage threatened by sanctions should discourage actors from embarking on certain policies. However, sanctions have …

Russian disinformation has thus far proven to be unconvincing for most Dutch target audiences. This is the conclusion of the present chapter. Information and disinformation have become effective weapons in international politics. This is part of a development where the weapons and concepts used in deterrence …

The question on whether and how deterring an adversary in or through cyberspace is feasible has provoked the minds of scholars and practitioners for decades. Today, cyber deterrence remains a quintessential anchoring concept for the political debates on cyber policy. However, does the concept of deterrence …

Offering a critical synthesis of extant insights into technological developments in AI and their potential rami fi cations for international relations and deterrence postures, this chapter argues that AI risks in fl uencing military deterrence and coercion in unique ways: it may alter cost-bene fi t calculations …

Commonly used game and decision theoretic models fail to explain the empirics of deterrence. This has unjustly led many theorists to criticize the (rationality and other) assumptions underpinning of such models. No serious game theorist will contend that his theoretic model will possibly take account …

Abstract Indeed, deterrence, as Freedman and Mazarr recount in this volume in respectively Chaps. 1 and 2, aims to dissuade an opponent from taking undesirable actions. Clear communication of demands (a red line for instance), coupled with a credible threat to in flict pain if necessary, and demonstration …

Deterrence is more than anything a psychological mechanism. It depends on emotions that orchestrate processes across organisms to deal with the challenges of the present and the future. However, deterrence scholarship has had a turbulent relationship with emotions. The main aim of this chapter is to …

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