Offering a critical synthesis of extant insights into technological developments in AI and their potential rami fi cations for international relations and deterrence postures, this chapter argues that AI risks in fl uencing military deterrence and coercion in unique ways: it may alter cost-bene fi t calculations …

Commonly used game and decision theoretic models fail to explain the empirics of deterrence. This has unjustly led many theorists to criticize the (rationality and other) assumptions underpinning of such models. No serious game theorist will contend that his theoretic model will possibly take account …

Abstract Indeed, deterrence, as Freedman and Mazarr recount in this volume in respectively Chaps. 1 and 2, aims to dissuade an opponent from taking undesirable actions. Clear communication of demands (a red line for instance), coupled with a credible threat to in flict pain if necessary, and demonstration …

Deterrence is more than anything a psychological mechanism. It depends on emotions that orchestrate processes across organisms to deal with the challenges of the present and the future. However, deterrence scholarship has had a turbulent relationship with emotions. The main aim of this chapter is to …

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