Samenvatting

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each asso-
ciated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes
unexpectedly and with player-specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating
the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who
suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem
with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic
resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these
games are not necessarily convex, do have non-empty cores, and are totally balanced.
The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm-Bawerk horse
market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the
resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class
of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our
results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.