Samenvatting

The author compares Israeli and Hezbollah land warfare with the principles stipulated for this in Dutch Army doctrine. It reveals the difficulty any western regular army would have when faced with an adversary partially employing irregular war fighting methods. This asymmetry includes some more structural features, such as the fact that Hezbollah was better prepared, as it could more easily study its opponent on whom much more information can be found in the public information domain. As in any other western country, Israeli politics and military leaders as much as possible tried to avoid casualties of their own, minimising risks, but, by doing so, also limiting flexibility. Hezbollah could take the initiative, often had the advantage of surprise and unpredictability. He concludes that the Israelis underestimated their opponent, which also harbours a lesson for other armed forces, that less technologically developed and smaller adversaries can be as strong and effective as regular, western forces