Samenvatting

This dissertation conducts a comprehensive study on the motives of the Government of The Netherlands for its support of the proposal by the European Commission for an Investment Court System (ICS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement that is currently under negotiation between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). Moreover, it investigates to what extent the proposal has a negative impact on governments policy space. The study touches upon the academic field of Law and Economic, but only as complementary to the Political Science approach it adheres to. It conducts qualitative research in the form of desk research and empirical data collection through interviews. A theoretical framework outlines the boundaries and opportunities of the academic literature on investor-state protection. Through a discussion on literature on the design of international institutions, it presents the reader with a sensible point of departure. The body of this dissertation consists of four sections which explore and discuss relevant information in order to answer the central question of the study. Each section is concluded by an overview of the relevant empirical data that has been collected and an analysis of the content presented in each section. The first section thoroughly elaborates on the context of investor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS), the TTIP negotiations and the positions of the most relevant stakeholders. The second section explores the position of the Government of The Netherlands in relation to the ICS proposal. The third section explores the main benefits and costs related to ISDS provisions and it discusses arguments in favor and against ISDS in TTIP. The fourth investigates to what extent the ICS proposal limits government’s policy space. This approach contributes to a greater understanding of the reasoning behind the Dutch governments’ support for the ICS proposal and the potential effect of the ICS on policy space. The dissertation concludes that the Dutch government is of the opinion that the benefits of an ISDS mechanism in TTIP outweigh the costs. The Netherlands is a big player in the global field of investor-state arbitration through the maintenance of a large network of International Investment Agreements (IIAs). As the Dutch economy is heavily dependent on the general state of the world, mechanisms which are perceived to promote the rule of law would contribute to prosperity. Although the ICS bears the risk of limits to policy space, the creation of a permanent court of investment arbitration would solve many of the existing problems in the field of investor-state-dispute-settlement. Finally, it would also provide leverage in future negotiations with third countries by setting a global standard together with the US.