Samenvatting

The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter 'the CWC') and its implementation organ the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (hereinafter 'the OPCW or 'the Organization') were purposely created by states to overcome the mutual threat of chemical weapons on the global agenda. Despite countries becoming Member States to the OPCW, the struggles to maintain a balance of power amongst Member States still exist.

Particularly in the case of Libya, a Member State of the OPCW, this seems evident. Libya under Muammar Gaddafi's regime ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, however, after recent events in the Arab region it has been found that Libya deliberately failed to comply with the CWC requirements. As a result of this infringement, whether Libya's non-compliance with the CWC poses a threat to international security or not is in debate.

In this paper, Libya's case is analyzed from two different viewpoints on international relations theory: Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Realism. Therefore, this paper aims to provide an understanding of the risk of Libya's failure to comply with the CWC to international security from these two opposing theories. And to further provide an insight into the reality of international security in the 21st century that is still hardly guaranteed even under the umbrella of such widely adopted disarmament treaties such as the CWC.

It can be premature to determine the outcome of the work of the OPCW in Libya in achieving universal disarmament for collective security in the coming years. Likewise, predicting the behavior of the new government of Libya pertaining to its adherence to the CWC can be a risky endeavor. In spite of all the facts, however, an attempt to draw a conclusion on the potential risks to international security as a consequence of Libya's non-compliance with the CWC provides us (or the international community) an alarming message that the promises of guaranteed international security by the OPCW and Libya's compliance with the CWC is yet a roll of dice.