

A DYNAMIC COURTSHIP

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VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT

A DYNAMIC COURTSHIP

The Salvation Army and the Welfare State in the Netherlands
(1887-1990)

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“When, along the way, your Ph.D. study has not changed you in some way or another, something must have really gone wrong.”

This statement concluded a pleasant chat I had with a friend, sometime during the last weeks of my Ph.D. study. In a way, it describes how I have experienced the last four years of study, writing, and analysis, and the pleasurable experience that it has turned out to be. Not only has my knowledge on various subjects been enriched, but much more importantly, I have come to realize that it was not just ‘the answers’ that were of meaning in this process of writing a thesis. It was in fact mainly ‘the questions’ that dominated these last years. Questions inspired me to embark on this effort in the first place. And questions helped me to delineate the scope of my research and to deepen my thoughts on the subject. Questions fueled my motivation during the solitary hours of work, and eventually questions allowed me to decide that the toil had come to an end. And I am certain that sometime in the near future, new questions will entice me into similar undertakings.

A second reason why the above statement is exemplary to my research process is the fact that it was created in dialogue with someone else. Co-creation is another theme that has characterized my Ph.D. study. Even though this book bears the name of the author on its cover, it would not have set off, developed, matured and eventually solidified into the text that you are currently reading without the care and alertness of the many people that surrounded me during these years. Nor without their questions. It is my privilege to express my gratitude to all of them.

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INTRODUCTION

In the days before Christmas, as I hurry through the shopping mall area that connects the train station to the center of the city of Utrecht, I sometimes catch a glimpse of a man dressed in an impeccable uniform, standing beside a crimson kettle that hangs from a tripod, and singing Christmas carols while holding a bundle of brochures. The first image that this man invokes is rather common, for who does not recognize this man as a member of the Salvation Army? Almost simultaneously however, a myriad of other associations come to mind, for the Salvationist also calls forth images of military readiness and religious zeal together with the picture of a friendly face and a helping hand. This last association in particular, emphasizes the contrast that this Salvationist forms with the contemporary urban context of a crowded Utrecht shopping mall with individuals like myself heedlessly rushing by.

The military connotations that this Salvationist arouses with his uniform, also invokes feelings of discord with the Utrecht urban scene, for it heralds memories of bygone days when a uniform commanded admiration and awe, and even condemnation when combined with World War II or the anti-authoritarian 1960s. However, soon after all the associative dots are connected, there is one overall dominating feeling that floats up to the surface of this stream of consciousness: the Salvation Army as an important religious charity. For does the Salvation Army not hand out blankets and hot chocolate to those that try to live through another freezing city night? And does the Army not provide for Christmas banquets for the hungry and deprived? In that light, this Salvationist in the shopping mall seems to call our attention not only to his somewhat archaic appearance, but also to the reason for which he is prepared to spend his hours alongside the Christmas kettle: the social misery that is also very much an urban (and non-urban, for that matter) reality.

At the same time however, and especially during Christmas, his presence provides for us a way to be relieved from the feeling of guilt that may very well follow on laying eyes on him. Relief from a guilty conscience by putting some stray change into the red kettle. And thus, we yield to the combination of the urging confrontation with social misery that is strengthened by the Christmas spirit of 'doing a good deed', and the possibility of immediate relief from this moral claim as offered by the Salvationist. This combination urges us to gladly support the noble cause of this charitable organization that has a structural focus on helping society's poor and weak – maybe much in contrast with the occasional character of our own actions at the moment.

The fairly inadequate psychological interpretation of this 'Dickensian' image of the Salvationist is not meant to be of any professional quality, nor to be complete, but it aims to stress the fact that most people that pass this uniformed individual, recognize to a certain extent what he stands for and why. A premise that

needs some historical reading because the Salvation Army has been proactively present in the Dutch society for 125 years now. In 2012, the Dutch Salvation Army has been widely celebrating this honorable event.¹ In 1887, the Salvation Army opened its doors to the Dutch society, locating itself in the capital Amsterdam as a satellite of the London-based organization. After having overcome the initial mistrust of the Dutch people with regard to the Army, it grew to be one of the most widely acknowledged religious social charity organizations with an enduring positive image.² So, without much dispute, it can be stated that the Salvation Army has become a sympathetic icon of the Dutch urban scene.³

There is however much more to the Salvation Army than is reflected by the dedicated Salvationist with his Christmas kettle. To begin with, behind this uniformed individual we find a sizable international organization that is active in 121 countries, and offers services like residential programs for the elderly, children, women, the homeless and young mothers; day care programs, addiction programs, services to armed forces, emergency disaster response, community services to missing persons, prisoners, youngsters, the unemployed, indebted, hungry and even to students. Additionally, the Salvation Army provides for many medical and health services and educational programs around the world. In order to do this work, the organization relies on almost 30,000 officers and other staff worldwide, next to more than 1.1 million dedicated members, called soldiers. These are complemented by around 104,000 professional employees who are non-members.⁴ Within the Dutch ‘Territory’, as a national branch of the Salvation Army is called, this ratio between the Salvation Army’s own people (soldiers, officers) and ‘outside’ professional employees is rather different. Currently, the 59 Dutch corps (as the religious communities of the Salvation Army are called) are manned by 5800 soldiers and adherent-members, and are managed by about 140 officers. The Welfare and Health Care Department however, employs more than 5300 professionals that are aided by about 900 volunteers.⁵ In 2010 it offered services to about 51,000 people and in a variety of activities

¹The official name of the Dutch Salvation Army is *Het Leger des Heils in Nederland* (The Salvation Army in the Netherlands. See: <http://www.legerdesheils.nl/>). On September 1, 1921, a small group of Salvationists seceded from the Salvation Army and established the *Nederlands Leger des Heils* (Dutch Salvation Army) See for further details Chapter 5, Paragraph 7. In 2003 the Nederlands Leger des Heils stopped its religious activities while some of its members continued to gather under the newly established *Noordelijk Heilsleger* (Northern Salvation Army. See: <http://www.noordelijkheilsleger.nl/>). The social activities of the Dutch Salvation Army were accommodated in a separate foundation called: *Landelijke Instelling voor Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning en Rehabilitatie* (National Institute for Social Support and Rehabilitation. See: <http://www.limor.nl/>). For the sake of convenience and readability, I take the liberty to refer to the Leger des Heils in Nederland with different terms, like the Salvation Army, the Army, the Dutch Army and the Army in the Netherlands.

² According to the annual survey ‘Chari-barometer’ on public familiarity with charitable organizations, provided for by the Dutch research organization Mediad, in 2009 the Salvation Army ranked 10 on the list of about 30 organizations and in 2011 ‘between 10 and 12’.

³ This image is borrowed from Diane Winston who described the Salvation Army in the USA as an icon of urban religion (Winston 1999).

⁴ *The Salvation Army Year Book* 2011:29-30

⁵ *Jaarverslag Leger Des Heils* 2010:65

that covered a range of areas of the social work field like homelessness, elderly care, mental and physical care, youth care, substance abuse, probation services and prevention. Nevertheless, to any person that does not call upon the Army for help in any form, this array of professional social services might well remain unknown, making the association to charity a central feature of the Army's identity.

This feature is however, quite at odds with another characteristic element that defines the Salvation Army in the Netherlands, for it is not just our individual charitable contributions that provide for the necessary financial means for the Army to do its work. The annual amount that the Army needed in 2010 accumulated to a mere €290 million, and only a relatively small part of this amount was raised by Salvationists that were standing by their Christmas kettles. Even though all fundraising efforts of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands mounted up to a handsome €22,000,000, this only made up for about 8% of the total costs. Most of the other costs (90%) were paid for with public money in the form of subsidies, grants, government contracts, contributions from collective health insurances and Social Support Act stipends.⁶ This is quite a remarkable characteristic, especially when compared to the Army in other territories. In Germany for example, private donations to the *Heilsarmee* amounted to 18% of the annual total in 2009 and the government contracts on social work only generated 40% of the total annual income.⁷ In the United Kingdom, government support made up only about 17% of the budget in 2009, and in the United States of America it did not even exceed 10% in 2008.⁸ It is thus an interesting observation that even though the Salvation Army is equally recognized as a charitable social service organization in many countries, only the Dutch Salvation Army seems to be so largely dependent on government support.

The third important element of the Dutch Salvation Army is the fact that it consists of five legally separated organizational entities: four foundations and a church. At odds with many other territories in which it operates, the Salvation Army in the Netherlands has legally and organizationally separated its ecclesiastical and its professional social activities. This partition within the Salvation Army is of a relatively recent nature, as it was introduced in 1990 as the result of a fundamental reorganization. With this reorganization the Salvation tried to modernize the organization according to the current standards, but it also tried to settle a long-standing debate that revolved around the fundamental matter of identity: How was the Army to balance the two basic foundations of its mission: social aid and spiritual conversion?

With this quick glance behind the scenes of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands, it becomes clear that the Salvationist in the Utrecht shopping mall rep-

⁶ Idem:135

⁷ *Die Heilsarmee in Deutschland, Litauen und Polen Jahresbericht 2009:25*

⁸ *The Salvation Army's Annual Review 2009. UK Territory with the Republic of Ireland, 2009:18-19; The Salvation Army of The United States of America National Annual Report 2008:14-15*

resents much more than just a benevolent group of Christians trying to do good deeds. These short descriptions also imply that the Salvation Army does not operate in a social or political void. An observation that brings us to the main underlying presupposition of this study: as a faith-based social service provider, the Salvation Army is inherently related to other actors like the state and civil society. On the one hand, this relation can be characterized as dynamical because it has developed throughout the course of history, but on the other hand, it reveals a measure of continuity. By studying these characteristics I hope to offer valuable insights into the manner in which the Dutch Salvation Army shaped its identity in relation to its context. In order to explore these characteristics of the liaison between the Salvation Army and the Dutch state, the central focus in this study will be on the common theme that bound these actors together: social welfare.

The welfare state in the Netherlands

When we put the struggle between the state and civil society for primacy of social policy issues central to our view on the development course of the Dutch welfare state, roughly three phases can be discerned. These distinct phases are: 1) National government aloof, and a strong civil society until World War II; 2) a dominant (welfare) state between 1950 and 1980, increasingly interconnected with civil society; and 3) the ongoing struggle to transform the welfare state to a more activating form, the so-called participation state, with an altering role of civil society. Even though both the civil society and the state are prevalent in all three phases, it can be argued that their levels of dominance and influence differed throughout the twentieth century.

The emergence of the Dutch welfare state is closely connected to international developments. Germany, and to a lesser degree also the United Kingdom, had already during the nineteenth century been working on elements of what would later become the welfare state. An increasing interest of the state in matters that traditionally concerned charitable social relief organizations resulted in rudimentary financial arrangements that benefitted certain groups in society. For a large part this growing state interest can be interpreted as a reaction to the growing poverty problem as well as the lack of education.⁹

A strong civil society

In the Netherlands however, the industrialization process gained momentum relatively late compared to these countries. Just as in Germany and the United Kingdom, in the Netherlands too social work was provided for by numerous

⁹ Anderson 1972:181; Joll 1973; Peper 1978; Van Doorn en Schuyt 1978; Daalen 1999; Wilterdink en Van Heerikhuizen 1999; De Swaan 1996:194-204; Heerma van Voss 2000:388; Arts 2004; WRR 2006:46.

individuals, churches and charity organizations in the nineteenth century.¹⁰ Until the 1870s this ‘private initiative’ or civil society, had all the freedom it needed in order to bring relief to the people who were in need, and the government remained aloof with regard to social issues unless these civil society organizations were not able to cope with them.¹¹ Nevertheless, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Dutch government also started to show a sense of responsibility towards social issues like poverty, and in terms of legislation this interest was codified into the Constitution of 1848 (Art. 195) and the *Armenwet* (1854, Poor Act). However the responsibility of poor relief still vastly belonged to civil society.¹²

The effects of industrial and economic development during the second half of the nineteenth century showed that this position of civil society was rather delicate. Urbanization and early industrialization called for increasing state intervention on infrastructure and economics, and even though the primary responsibility for poor relief remained with civil society, around the year 1900 this came under pressure. Instigated by a more Christian-liberal point of view, the Dutch government began to show an increasing commitment to social issues.¹³ New legislation was created, that partly was based on the social-democrat and Christian ideas that the state had to support and protect the most vulnerable in society. This new legislative activity however, threatened to tip the balance in favor of the state assuming more responsibility for social issues, but at the same time, civil society organizations had begun to unite themselves within the contours of rising ideological social pillars. The vigor that accompanied this process of ‘pillarization’ consisted of a uniting force that not only brought together already existing groups and organizations in a sphere of kindred spirits, but the process of pillarization also contained an emancipatory drive that mutually defined the ideological groups. One of the consequences of the pillarization process was that it started to change the attitude of civil society towards the state from rather cooperative into an attitude of opposition.¹⁴ With this new attitude, the former implicit understanding of non-interference between both actors started to changed course.

In the wake of World War I (1914-1918) most European countries had introduced social legislation that covered areas like poverty, health, old age and unemployment. Even though the rapid expansion of state initiative that accompanied this change might imply otherwise, in order to be successful at combating these social problems, national governments still needed the civil society organizations to do the actual work.¹⁵ In the case of the Netherlands, the fact that the state remained auxiliary to the primary responsibility of private organizations

¹⁰ Van der Linde 2007; Van Doorn en Schuyt 1978:22

¹¹ Van der Linde 2007:149-150

¹² Van der Valk 1986:9

¹³ Van der Linde 2007:162-163

¹⁴ Blom en Talsma 2000; Van der Woude 2009

¹⁵ Anderson 1972:181

like churches, was in 1912 confirmed by a new *Armenwet* (Poor Act). This Act emphasized that the balance between the two actors remained unaltered, and it also meant that in disregard of the growing governmental activities, the actual responsibility of the care for the poor remained primarily in the hands of civil society.¹⁶ The tendency of increasing government intervention on social issues would however continue, alongside the persistence of civil society to combine forces by the creation of intermediate umbrella organizations in order to strengthen themselves against this influence.

State dominance on welfare

After World War II (1939-1945), the Dutch welfare state came to blossom. Based on new political vigor and inspiration from the developments in the UK on social policy, the Dutch state aimed to improve the care provision for its citizens. A postwar political consensus and a growing economy provided a breeding ground for new social legislation between 1948 and 1963. This creation of social welfare legislation indicated that the state interest in social issues had now taken a structural character. This was embodied in the existence of a *Ministerie voor Maatschappelijk Werk* (MaWe, Ministry of Social Work) which would prove to be a generator of much social policy to follow and also provided for accompanying funds.¹⁷

The introduction of the *Algemene Bijstandswet* (ABW, Social Assistance Act) in 1963 was seen as the primary tailpiece in the completion of Dutch social security because by then all citizens were guaranteed a minimum income, apart from being employed or not.¹⁸ For the first time in Dutch history every individual was guaranteed a basic level of social security, and poor relief was no longer an individual favor that was granted through charity or philanthropy, but had structurally changed into a fundamental right.

The introduction of the ABW also emphasized that the function of the Dutch civil society altered. Until then it was the private initiative that had provided for much of this material and non-material poor relief together with local government and local 'poor councils'. And now that the ABW officially replaced the Poor Acts of 1854 and 1912, it no longer acknowledged this vital position of civil society in the domain of poor relief. In fact, it put the primary responsibility for the material provision of poor relief in the hands of the Dutch national government, leaving only the non-material care to civil society.¹⁹ Viewed from this perspective the ABW can be appreciated as the symbol of a major shift in the position of civil society with regard to the state. But still, civil society would not and could not be sidetracked. These organizations were still regarded by the Dutch government as being responsible for the implementation of social policy,

¹⁶ Huetting en Neij 1985; Van der Valk 1986

¹⁷ Esping-Andersen 1990; Aerts *et al.* 1999:289; Van der Woude 2009

¹⁸ WRR 2006; Aerts *et al.* 1999

¹⁹ Van der Valk 1986:4-5

and therefore civil society was broadly subsidized. Moreover, by 1970 welfare had gradually become synonymous with ‘well-being’, a development that suggested a state-issued guarantee for everyone to enjoy life to the fullest through individual development, prosperity and good health. This ambition labeled the Dutch welfare state as a ‘caring state’. An expression that implicitly heralded the continuing and definitive dominance of the state over civil society.

Towards a participation state

During the 1960s and 1970s, the joint approach of social issues by the state and civil society was accompanied by a renewed emphasis on professionalization. New academic insights, new working methods and also a new era of self-realization, democratization and political awakening had taken professionalization to a new level. Accompanied by a decreasing religiosity within the Dutch society, a process of ideological erosion set in. Civil society organizations experienced an influx of new personnel with a professional outlook towards their work and gradually the traditional grassroots workforce was outnumbered; a workforce that often was ideologically motivated. This process is generally regarded to have induced a slow but sure drainage of the ideological foundations of many civil society organizations.²⁰

The two subsequent international oil crises of the 1970s slowed down the economic motor driving the Dutch welfare state. Because of elevated unemployment rates and a growing lack of finances to accommodate this problem, certain ‘cracks’ in the welfare state were revealed, unleashing a fundamental political and academic debate. Main themes in this debate were the welfare state’s financial and moral tenability, the definition of the welfare state and thus its origins, its expansion, purpose and function; its alleged ideological foundations; its would-be internal logic and of course its social effects.

With regard to civil society, it was argued that the larger and all-encompassing the welfare state had become, the more were its destructive effects on the Dutch civil society. Now that the ideologically weakened civil society had increasingly become a part of the Dutch administrative structure by placing itself in the service of the welfare system, many of these organizations ended up being reduced to mere administrative organs of the Dutch government - a process that has been called *verstatelijking*.²¹ This position of increasing

²⁰ Aerts *et al.* 1999:289-291; De Boer en Duyvendak 2007; Zijdeveld 1983:205-213

²¹ Schuyt 1981; De Swaan 1982; Zijdeveld 1988; De Boer en Duyvendak 2007. The Dutch word *verstatelijking* has no direct equivalent in (American) English. Even though the term ‘statization’ comes rather close, it could use some clarification in order to understand its significance in Dutch. The term *verstatelijking* refers to the process in which civil society organizations become increasingly dependent on government. The typical Dutch connotation with this term however, is that because many of these civil society organizations had been faith-based since their beginnings, during this process of incorporation in the governmental realm, they have lost their religious or ideological identity. In this sense, in the Netherlands, the term *verstatelijking* is multilayered. Even though the concept has been widely accepted by the academic realm, it has barely been elaborated upon from a historiographical point of view. In the case of Dutch historiography, there are many monographs that touch upon the subject of *verstatelijking* and many

dependency of civil society in relation to the state confronted it with three options: 1) to stop, 2) to modernize into transparent and democratic professional organizations, or 3) to merge into larger ideologically neutral (also called ‘general’) cooperative bodies and *de facto* lose its individual ideological and organizational identity.²² A trilemma that now painfully confirmed the state’s dominance over civil society in welfare matters.²³

As a result civil society seemed to have lost much of its political legitimization. The government itself, however, did not have any means to implement social policy, and with the increasing lack of funds and ideological legitimization for social policy, the door was set ajar to the market. Economic liberalism and a retrenching state would have to incite citizens to take responsibility for their own well-being and that of their fellow citizens. The direction was clear: the Dutch people had to be motivated to come into action and in policy terms the word ‘participation’ was complemented with ‘responsibility’. In order to make this new idea effective in practice, the government had to retrench from public policy in accordance with the idea: more market, less government. This approach would continue until current times. Since the 1980s the Dutch welfare state has been ‘under construction’ and, in many different ways, efforts were made to combine less expenditure together with activating the Dutch citizens. However, it was still the government that retained primacy on welfare issues.

A courtship between the Dutch state and the Salvation Army

This description of the struggle between the government and civil society for primacy in the field of social welfare shows that the Dutch state and civil society have been attracted towards each other for a long time. The government lacked the actual striking power to reach its social policy goals and thus battle social wrongs, and civil society made abundant use of governmental support in its

of these accept it as a fact. The concept of *verstatelijking* however, can also be approached as a process. Then it can be argued that the formation of the government has been the result of continuous rationalization of social ordering, with the ultimate result being a welfare state. This form of rationalization can be perceived in other processes like mechanization, industrialization, urbanization, democratization, bureaucratization, professionalization, secularization, and thus also ‘verstatelijking’ and later *vermarkting* (‘marketization’). See also Arts 2004:11. This line of thought is recognizable with sociologists Adriaan-ans en Zijdeveld (1981:70-71) who explained the coming of age of the welfare state from the rationalization of care. Zijdeveld in his turn, continued on this idea with an account on the process of *verstatelijking* of the Dutch social midfield (Zijdeveld 1988:47-53; Zijdeveld 1999:15-43). Since the 1990s a growing academic attention for historical description of civil society organizations is detectable (see for example: Nijenhuis 1987; Verheul en Dankers 1990; Wijnen-Sponselee 1997; Van Heijst 2002; Ringelberg 2005). Too often however, the idea of *verstatelijking* is not explicitly explored within these narratives. And when it is, the process is often primarily related to secularization (see for example Simonse 1997). However, more recently, historian Beekers made a successful attempt to explore *verstatelijking* in a more empirical manner in his dissertation on the public housing movement in the Netherlands (Beekers 2012).

²² De Boer en Duyvendak 2007

²³ De Beer 2007:127

effort to do exactly that, be it from its own perspective, and often supplemented with its own good deeds. On the other hand, as this study will show, both actors also demonstrated reluctance with regard to this cooperation. Even though they were bound together by mutual dependency, this relation seems to have been interspersed with an alternating pattern of attraction and rejection in which both actors presumably have their own, also changeable, preconditions. A pattern that resembles a courtship. This study aims to shed light on the dynamics that are perceptible in this relationship and therefore we will put our focus on an organization that has had such an relationship with the Dutch government for a long time: the Salvation Army.

Within a time span of a mere 120 years the public approach towards poor relief changed from a voluntary manifestation of care, often based on charity, into a structural public service, mainly organized and subsidized by the government. During this entire period, the Salvation Army has not only been a witness to this development, but it has also actively taken part in the process as an actor. This means that studying the development of the Salvation Army can shed new light on how the above described changing welfare system impacted the religiously motivated civil society in the Netherlands, for whereas many of these organizations lost their identity during the 1970s and 1980s, the Salvation Army has been able to avoid this fate as it is still a major player in the field of social work, and with an explicit religious identity. This implies that next to the dynamics between the two actors, we can also speak of internal dynamics within the actors, for next to a mutual attraction, both parties also showed a certain amount of hesitation towards each other. Therefore it is important to recover to what extent these external dynamics interrelated with the Army's internal process of identity. A process that proved to have a dynamic of its own. The fact that the Army has been able to maintain its faith-based character while being a publically funded social service provider, hopefully sheds a new light on the process of *verstatelijking*.

The central research question of this study is therefore: What are the perceptible dynamics in the relation between the state and the Salvation Army in the Netherlands with regard to social policy between 1890 and 1990 and what do these dynamics reveal about the changing Dutch welfare state, the faith-based civil society in the Netherlands, and how they affected the identity of the Salvation Army itself? This complex question can be unraveled into more concrete derivative questions like: What were the social policy goals and their underlying principles from the perspective of the government? How did these goals function in the cooperation with regard to the balance of power and the measure of dependency between both actors? What were the main issues in the relation with the government that pressured the Salvation Army and what mechanisms sprung into action within the Salvation Army in order to control these external influences and to maintain its autonomy and identity? In order to be able to answer these questions, I will first have to be more specific about how I approach the concepts that are referred to in this study. Subsequently, I will elaborate on the methodological approach of these questions.

Conceptual approach

The welfare state as a historical process

The above used term ‘welfare state’ has to be regarded as a hybrid concept with dissimilar images that are all connected with local and thus specific historical developments. However there are also manifest international parallels such as the shared idea of the state acting as a re-distributor of resources in order to aid the most vulnerable within society. Within this image, the most important variables that mark the difference between the types of welfare states can be pinpointed as the role that the different actors play within the policy force field that the welfare state incites, for who redistributes what? Is it a nation’s central government that reallocates levied taxes to those groups it regards as the most eligible? Or are the civil society organizations the redistributors that use offered (volunteered) time and finances to provide for (non-)material aid-programs to the helpless? And what is the role of the individuals themselves, whether or not organized in larger groups; to what extent is an able-bodied person expected to contribute to the well-being of others by offering a part of his income based upon solidarity? These and more variables have made the definition of the welfare state concept a subject of ongoing debate. A debate that especially fanned up during those times when the welfare state came under pressure because of economic decline or a lack of public support, as was the case during the 1970s and 1980s.

Viewed from the matter of how the welfare state was to function, social scientists debated the differences and similarities between different types of welfare states from World War II on. Already during these early years of the welfare state, the British sociologist Thomas H. Marshall considered the ascendancy of the welfare state against the background of the development of citizenship. After the subsequent obtainment of civil rights during the 18th century and political rights in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century witnessed the acquirement of social rights in the emergence of the welfare state.²⁴ Richard Titmuss, also a British sociologist, viewed the welfare state not so much from the standpoint of non-material political emancipation however, but considered the function of providing for basic material needs central. By doing so, he was able to discern two types of welfare states. The ‘residual’ type provided for minimal welfare arrangements and served as a safety net for those who were not able to provide for themselves. The contrasting type according to Titmuss, was the institutional type that guaranteed a basic level of welfare to every member of society and not to just a small group of the most vulnerable.²⁵ Decades later, the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen placed the welfare state concept in the context of capitalism by focusing on decommodification, or the measure in

²⁴ Marshall 1950

²⁵ Titmuss 1959

which individuals could withdraw from employment. He concluded that the Bismarckian class-based welfare state model showed a great amount of corporatism, but had at the same time only an average effect on work participation. According to Esping-Andersen, the 'Beveridge type' of welfare was the most decommodifying type, for it offered equal state support for all. The least decommodifying welfare state model according to Esping-Andersen, was the Anglo-Saxon model because, especially in the United States, the government provided for universal support only in a very modest way and instead allowed the market to react to the demand for social welfare.²⁶ These different examples of how to assess the welfare state shows that the phenomenon is not quite as univocal as the term implies, an observation that will be substantiated when we turn our attention to the Netherlands.

Related to the perspective of Titmuss, the development of the Dutch welfare state can be divided into three phases, for it has changed from being residual before World War II into rather institutional especially in the 1970s, and then again returned to a more residual functioning safety-net system from the 1980s onwards. When compared to the model of Esping-Andersen, two phases become visible, for the Dutch welfare state seems to have evolved from a classic corporatist model in which a religious worldview and the central role of the nuclear family slowly gave way to a more liberal form in which a free-market logic was to fill the gap that was left open by a government presumed to be retrenching.²⁷ Yet another view on the Dutch welfare state has come from the classification proposed by the French economist Michel Albert. In his theory, the Dutch welfare state can be classified as an example of the Rhineland model of capitalism, placing the Netherlands in the same category as Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden.²⁸ In contrast with capitalist market economies as Reagan and Thatcher promoted during the 1980s, the Rhineland model was based on market regulation and a relatively high degree of social partnership between employers, employees (labor unions) and the state. This collective bargaining and consensus policy would become one of the distinctive features of the Dutch welfare system, internationally acclaimed as the *polder model*.²⁹

Next to being aware of the fact that the notion of welfare state has different classifications, it is also relevant to reflect on the way in which it is thought to have originated and developed. Many different scenarios are conceivable, for though the beginning of the Dutch welfare state can be retraced to the approval of the first social law in 1901 with the Industrial Injuries Act, Dutch liberal politicians will probably argue that the *Kinderwet* (Children's Act) of 1874 formed the starting point.³⁰ Others however, will remark that the modern Dutch welfare state was formed after 1945 as a result of the growing government influence on

²⁶ Esping-Andersen 1990

²⁷ Wilterdink en Van Heerikhuizen 1999:313-317

²⁸ Albert 1993

²⁹ Visser en Hemerijck 1998

³⁰ Berghman *et al.* 2003

the redistribution of labor, income and well-being that was facilitated by the crisis of the 1930s and subsequent war.³¹ So, instead of focusing on the exact origins of the welfare state, the question of its development might prove more constructive, especially in light of the matter of identity that is central to this study. For then other questions arise: Is the welfare state the product of a pre-conceived idea, a grand scheme that formed the blueprint for its emergence and development? Or is it rather the result of a coincidental order of discursive manifestations and their actions by actors that coagulated successively into a coherent pattern?

In order to arrive at possible answers, drawing a parallel with organizational theory can help. In his work on strategy change within an organization, Henry Mintzberg, expert in (public) management studies, specified in 1996 how delicate the process of fundamental strategy alteration can be, because of the interconnectedness with other organizational elements like structure, people and processes. Therefore, most organizations take fundamental change very slowly – consciously searching for a balance between all related elements. Arguing in line with Charles Lindblom though, according to Mintzberg this organizational evolution or incrementalism is the usual *modus operandi* for an organization, in contrast to revolution which he regarded as a thorough intervention that is forced upon an organization by usually external factors like e.g. economic decline. But, Mintzberg argues while referring to Lindblom, incrementalism is not just muddling through – it has a logic of its own: it is “conscious, purposeful, active, good management”.³²

Incrementalism defies the idea of a preconceived design. Organizations are shaped over time, and elaborating on this idea Mintzberg argued that the coming of age of welfare states was also more of an incremental nature than the result of a preconceived design. It was the result of a continuing bureaucratic process of debate, consensus and compromise. This idea of gradualism was also to be recognized in the realm of economic theory by means of the concept of ‘path dependence’, and was also adopted by social and political sciences since the 1990s.³³ This concept of historical causation implies that the character of an organization does not change very abruptly, and is probably not inclined to follow alternative roads to the ones taken before. Continuity and conservatism seem to be strong forces within an organization.³⁴ When compared to the development of the Dutch welfare state, these organizational features imply that this development is also more of an evolutionary kind than revolutionary, characterizing the Dutch welfare state as a ‘historical product’ with a long and slow development process, and not so much as the result of a ‘grand design’.³⁵ In this

³¹ Heerma van Voss 2000

³² Mintzberg *et al.* 1996:186; Lindblom 1959; Lindblom 1979

³³ See for example Nelson and Winter 1982; Berins and Collier 1991, and Pierson 2000

³⁴ Duyvendak en Otto 2007:18-20

³⁵ WRR 2006:25

study about the developing Dutch welfare state both evolution and revolution will be attended to.

The mystery of civil society

During its modern history, Dutch society produced a myriad of small and larger voluntary organizations and groups that pursued goals varying from political representation, child education and health care, to providing for night shelter for the homeless and also mere proselytizing. The Salvation Army regarded itself as an active member of this amalgam of organizations that is now often called ‘civil society’. As will be explored in this study, the Salvation Army was interconnected with many other civil society organizations, often by means of a shared network or when taking up an active role in a collective of kindred organizations, a so-called umbrella organization.³⁶ This however raises the question, not just of relevance to this study but also in general: How can this concept of civil society be understood?

The modern term civil society was applied during the end of the 1980s when the diminishing state power of the USSR called forth a debate on how to strengthen any democratic potential within already existing social structures. Since then many different views have been proposed on the definition of the concept of civil society: private initiative (without capital letters, referring to the social bonds between people); Private Initiative (with capital letters, referring to the institutionalized form of these social bonds); charitable organizations; third sector; social midfield; the 5th power; non-governmental organizations (NGO) with their religious (RiNGO) and quasi-NGO (QuaNGO) varieties; non-profit organizations (NPOs) and not-for-profit organizations.³⁷ For the Dutch case, historian Van der Woude aptly paraphrased the discursive phenomenon of civil society as “the mystery of the social midfield”, referring to those organizations that occupied the space (midfield) between or even overlapping government, the public and the market.³⁸ The direction of the debate depends largely on the parameters that are applied, and just as with the concept of the welfare state, these can be manifold. For example, the different definitions that are used can be explained from a historical point of view and can be classified by the manner in which the civil society positioned itself towards the state: 1) in contrast to the state; 2) as intermediary between the state and other parties or 3) as alternative to the state.³⁹ On another level, the homogeneity that the term civil society im-

³⁶ Examples of umbrella organizations of which the Salvation Army has been, or still is a member, are: *Stichting Welzijnszorg en Maatschappelijke Dienstverlening* (Welfare and Social Services Foundation); *Vereniging Landelijk Overleg Slachtofferhulp* (National Association for Aid to Victims); *Landelijke Stichting voor Thuislozenzorg* (National Foundation for the Homeless); *Koningin Juliana Fonds* (Queen Juliana Fund); *Nationale Raad voor het Maatschappelijk Welzijn* (National Council for Social Welfare) and the *Raad van Kerken* (Council of Churches).

³⁷ Dekker 2002; Tjeenk Willink 2002

³⁸ Van der Woude 2009:24

³⁹ Dekker 2002

plies does not mean that this is actually the case. The perceived amount of coherence between these organizations is in essence formed by the eye of the beholder, as Werkman and Van der Woude suggest in their study of the Dutch Christian-Social movement as a part of civil society. They argue that it is exactly the measure of organizational diversity within this movement that justifies a focus on variety, rather than approaching the movement as a homogenous unity.⁴⁰ Even stronger, as is suggested by Kennedy, in such a sense, civil society can also be regarded to be a transnational phenomenon.⁴¹

Next to all its possible nuances, a commonly accepted theoretical point of departure is that the civil society is formed of voluntarily organized groups of people that are positioned in the space between the spheres of the state, the market and the private domain.⁴² But from that point on, the discursive paths differ. The traditional civil society – private initiative – consisted of many different church-related or private charity organizations that were active on social issues like education, health, labor and income, often combined with religious revival, and they were usually not perceived as a unity.⁴³ However, when looking at their principles, many of them were strongly inspired by shared religious values and somewhat later by doctrines like ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘sphere sovereignty’.⁴⁴ Since the last decades of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, the increase in the number of civil society organizations and their degree of organization made it possible for organizations of a kindred ideology to unite into platforms that started to function as intermediaries between the government and the grassroots level. This contributed to the emergence and consolidation of the above-mentioned ideological pillars. This form of institutionalization is referred to as Private Initiative, with capital letters, as opposed to the private initiative (without capital letters) that was less institutionalized and referred to actual initiatives that were commenced and run by private persons or groups.⁴⁵ With the incorporation of the Private Initiative in the development of the Dutch welfare state as a result of the amalgam of subsidization and professionalization, the broader term ‘social midfield’ came into use. As the term implies, the dominant characteristics of this concept were that it had an intermediary position between the government and individual citizens rather than being positioned in contrast to the government. This intermediary position seems to have facilitated its growing interlacement with public administrative structures.

As mentioned before, during the 1980s this group of organizations was termed civil society referring to a social sphere of voluntary associations as a counterforce to the state and market by the formation of NGOs and NPOs.⁴⁶ In

⁴⁰ Werkman en Van der Woude 2003:45

⁴¹ Kennedy 2007

⁴² Zijdeveld 1989:176

⁴³ Van Dijk 2008:30

⁴⁴ Van Thijn 2007:56; Van Doorn 1978:26; Buijs 2009:35-40

⁴⁵ Tjeenk Willink 2002:30

⁴⁶ Buijs, Dekker en De Hooghe 2009:10

addition, it is argued that the concept of civil society is basically a different concept from the idea of social midfield in its emphasis on voluntarism. Taking part in political or social associations sprung from personal conviction or involvement and revealed itself in, for example, voluntary work.⁴⁷ For example: an organization can be characterized as a quasi-NGO (QuaNGO) because its dependence on market mechanisms makes it semi-public.⁴⁸ Reversely, a church can be excluded from the concept of civil society because of its private character, unless it publically advocates the social and economical well-being of its (potential) members.⁴⁹

In this study, the Salvation Army is regarded to be a part of that segment within civil society that consists of organizations that are explicitly motivated by their religious (Christian) or political convictions. In the Dutch tradition, these organizations are often called *levensbeschouwelijk* – a term that I apply in this study as equal to the internationally accepted term ‘faith-based’, although the Dutch term has a somewhat broader meaning. Also, even though the Salvation Army has its limits as a *pars pro toto* for the whole of faith-based civil society, in this study I hope to make clear that an investigation of its history actually brings to the forefront the presumed field of tension regarding the governmental attitude towards this group of organizations.

Dynamics of relations

From the above exposé on the concepts of welfare state and civil society, it becomes clear that both ‘actors’ operate on a common ground: both aim to counteract poverty and its distressing social effects. However, this common interest also seems to have brought about a demarcation dispute on the primacy of social care, underlining the idea that both actors are separate entities with separate characteristics, and when taken to the extreme, with separate identities. In this sense both can be considered as ‘others’. However, in a more constructivist sense, another image rises, for it can also be argued that the above narrative of the welfare state development exists only by the grace of the inescapable presence of civil society – an observation that some have characterized as “a complicated process of increasing entanglement of state and society”.⁵⁰ From this it follows that both actors, the state and civil society, define each other as well as themselves and they do so within the framework narrative of the welfare state. In this study I will therefore approach the relation between the Dutch state and civil society as an intertwined political collaboration on matters of welfare and in this relation I will subsequently search for coherent patterns that characterize the dynamics between these actors. For this I will turn my focus to their ability or willingness to act on aligning or diverging goals.

⁴⁷ Dekker 2002; De Liagre Böhl 2007:338

⁴⁸ Van Ewijk 2010:26

⁴⁹ Van Munster, Van den Berg en Van Veen 1996:14

⁵⁰ Aerts *et al.* 1999:295

A basic presupposition in this approach is that the alignment of goals between the state and civil society enforced a growing interdependency on each other's resources like labor and capital. In contrast it can be argued that when other, less compatible goals would come into play, this interdependence would provide a recipe for conflict. The American political scientist Donald Kettl refers to this dynamics in his theory of "government by proxy".⁵¹ In the United States, the term 'proxy-organization' is used to indicate that an organization has become a default public service organization to the United States government. These 'proxies' enjoy a preferential status when it comes to appropriating government contracts, grants, tax cuts or loans on public services concerning social work, education and other social issues. Typical examples of American proxy-organizations are: Lutheran Social Services, Catholic Charities, Jewish Federations and the Salvation Army.⁵² In his elaboration of the subject, Kettl refers indirectly to the influence that this proxy-position might have on the identity of the proxy organization itself. The cooperation between the government and, for example, civil society organizations is situated in a field of tension that, according to Kettl, seems to inherently lead to conflicting policy goals, because even though the primary aim of both actors is to synchronize their public goals in order to work together, at the same time there are always other, more private goals that seem to be impossible to match. Elaborating on what system-theorist James D. Thompson calls "the paradox of administration", Kettl describes this field of tension in terms of "certainty and flexibility".⁵³ First of all, both the state and proxy-organization want a degree of certainty. The government is aiming for results in the work area on which their policy efforts are focused and the proxy-organization wants a predictable flow of money to at least support their efforts to implement these policies. But in return, both actors also want a certain degree of flexibility from the other: the government is hoping for an easy concurrence by the proxy-organization with new policy shifts that result from social or political developments. The proxy-organization in its turn preferably wants a *carte blanche* on how to reach those shared aims, and maybe even room to try to reach its more private goals.

Even though Kettl does not refer to explicitly faith-based organizations or churches, a possible field of tension seems to present itself here. For example, a church that provides for social services might be supported by the government because these programs are in line with government policy objectives. From the perspective of the church however, providing for social aid is an intrinsic part of its biblically derived mission, and in that light it is not unthinkable that the vision of the church is that the best social aid people could get is by conversion to Christianity. In such a case, the church might hope for flexibility from the side

⁵¹ Kettl 1988

⁵² Winston 1999; Formicola, Segers and Weber 2003; Heclio and McClay 2003; Dilulio 2003; Black, Koopman and Ryden 2004; Rogers and Dionne Jr. 2008

⁵³ Thompson 1967; Kettle 1988:17-18

of the government to organize social care accordingly. This example shows that even though both actors have a shared goal, the need for flexibility by the one will not always be met by the other, for when the government upholds the idea of separation of church and state it will not actively support evangelization. Therefore the state will most probably not support the church financially and at the same time allow it to exert its discretionary powers to mould its help-program to its own liking.

Kettl's theory of proxy-organizations shows that governments are in need of organizations in order to put their public policy into daily practice, and in the process of building these proxy-relations, governments become dependent on their proxies. On the other hand, the proxies are bound to act by government rules and regulations, and may additionally also become increasingly dependent on government funding. This works well when alignment of (shared) goals occurs. But, when the divergence of (private) goals forces both actors to find a balance in their efforts to cooperate on their shared public goals, in order to avoid obstructing conflicts, it is not unthinkable that an actor decides to take drastic measures like e.g. reorganization, in order to be able to meet the requirements. This thought brings us to an interesting element of Kettl's theory, for he implies that it is often the proxy-organization that gives in when diverging goals threaten to escalate into conflicts of policy, because they lack the means to influence the balance of power to their advantage.⁵⁴ And even though Kettl himself refrained from further empirical study of this presumed effect, this assumption provides for an interesting basis for the study of the effects of the relationship of the Dutch government with its proxy-organization, the Salvation Army. But in order to study these dynamics properly, another issue must first be addressed: How can we understand a concept like organizational identity?

Dynamics of organizational identity

When we speak of an organization like the Salvation Army all kinds of different images pop up in our minds depending on our personal experience with the organization. Is it a church, a probation organization or is it a charity for the homeless? How can we identify 'the Salvation Army'? In order to come to grips with this matter, we will have to explore the notion of organizational identity.

The illusive character of the idea of organizational identity is rather evocatively demonstrated by organizational theorist Weick: "The word *organization* is a noun and it is also a myth. If you look for an organization you won't find it".⁵⁵ According to Weick, an organization is intangible except for the walls that surround it. This notion is deep-rooted in the present-day academic debate on the issue, as Weick's concept of organization shows: "the organization consists of

⁵⁴ Kettl 1988:1-19

⁵⁵ Weick 1969:88

plans, recipes, rules, instructions, and programs for generating, interpreting, and governing behavior that are jointly managed by two or more people”.⁵⁶

A more social-constructionist view in this line is offered by Morgan who states that when you look at an organization, you automatically search for comparison with images already known to you. Morgan argues that even though the existence of organizations seems to be self-evident, when wanting to observe them we see what we want to see: “Think ‘structure’, and you will see structure. Think ‘culture’ and you will see all kinds of cultural dimensions”.⁵⁷ Like Weick, Morgan states that organizations might be a fact in the day-to-day experience of people, but when you want to touch an organization for example, it becomes fictional because then you will have much trouble finding one. This Fata Morgana-like character of organizations suggests that they merely exist in the minds of people. Elaborating on this thought, he argues that the use of metaphor helps us to ‘see’ certain aspects of the organization. For instance, when viewed through the looking-glass of ‘organization as a machine’, we begin to see an organization as created by and constructed around mechanistic thinking, as being a “rational enterprise, designed and structured to achieve predetermined ends”.⁵⁸ But when we encounter the same organization with the metaphor of ‘organization as brains’, we will most probably be focused on its capacity to learn and therefore develop. This application of metaphors adds meaning to the concept of organization, but Morgan is quick to admit that however useful this view can be to managers in search of diagnostic tools or inspiration, it also has its limitations. According to Morgan the use of metaphor “invites us to see the similarities, but ignore the differences”, for its power lies in the confirmation of overlapping qualities.⁵⁹ Another limitation of this approach is that it invokes a perspective that focuses on the organization as a given constant. This way certain developments within organizations that occur over time possibly remain unappreciated, so, in order to take into account organizational changes, an historical approach is needed.

These views on the organization make clear that the idea ‘organization’ is rather discursive. However, in this constructivist view Weick and Morgan seem to ignore certain important elements that make an organization more factual than they argue. For instance, an organization can be a legal person and thus is rather ‘real’ in terms of legal consequences for the people that are bear responsibility for such an organization. Additionally, the structure of an organization might not be tangible, but that does not make it less existing. The organizational structure can play a dominant role in the everyday experience of the people that have to deal with these structures. Also organizational structure can be a force in its own, creating certainty, predictability, and continuity. It can even be a part of

⁵⁶ Idem:235

⁵⁷ Morgan 1998:8

⁵⁸ Idem:17

⁵⁹ Idem:6-11

the organizational identity for when for example the workforce might change, the structure of an organization might very well stay the same. So, even though the organization in itself is hard to pin-point, the organizational structure is actually an important feature that relates to the identity of the organization.

When we regard organizational identity to be not just a fixed and coherent constant, we are at liberty to think of an organization as fragmented, multiple, ambiguous, dynamic and adaptable. All characteristics that are opposite to the idea of a more constant process “which involves societal factors, psychological factors, interaction, reflection, practice and performance”.⁶⁰ According to organization theorists Pullen and Linstead, identity has to be regarded as a process that takes place on a timeline and therefore inherently incorporates the past and the future. It is constantly on the go, but not without its past and potential. This process is characterized by ontological uncertainty that is often the result of its response to the ‘other’, for Pullen and Linstead discuss this process of identity in terms of “a demarcating self”. The presence of the other, whether it is a rival; a colleague; or in the case of this study even a government, is one of the elements of what Pullen and Linstead call “identity capital” and it contains “material, socio-economic, symbolic or discursive resources” from the past, present and even future. All these contextual features are resources that are drawn from the process of shaping an organizational identity – a ‘self’.⁶¹

This process of identity-forming can also be considered as the result of a narrative rather than something tangible or even factual. From this perspective, HRM-expert Peter Hamilton describes the identity of an organization as primarily a rhetorical process, a discourse.⁶² In his view, organizational symbols like logos and flags play an important part in this rhetoric of identity and have the specific aim of generating employee support. Therefore these rhetorical elements are important ritualistic generators of identity and are useful in “constituting and promoting community”.⁶³ But next to these more palpable forms, another generator of identity is the mission statement of the organization. According to Hamilton, mission statements reflect the organization’s inner values, purpose and *raison d’être*, all referring to its identity. Critics often state that mission statements are “mere rhetoric” and generate nothing more than employee skepticism towards the organization.⁶⁴ But Hamilton argues that mission statements are inherently rhetorical and therefore important in “trying to generate audience identification with the organization through promoting a sense of community by evoking various values which are often implied to be in the interests of that community, which therefore should be lived up to and followed.”⁶⁵ Thus in Hamilton’s view, when the process of identity is viewed as a narrative that is

⁶⁰ Pullen and Linstead 2005:3

⁶¹ Idem:1-4.

⁶² Hamilton 2005:14

⁶³ Idem:162

⁶⁴ Idem:166-176

⁶⁵ Idem:176-177.

constructed to (re)generate a process of identification, rhetorical elements like mission statements are not to be overlooked. So how does this above described approach reflect on the case of the Salvation Army?

Soon after the Salvation Army started out in the Netherlands it developed into a rather sizable social work organization that based its actions on a Christian philosophy that is often characterized as a “practical religion” or, even stronger, a “theology of service”.⁶⁶ As will be elaborated further on in this study, this philosophy is based on a two-pronged mission of providing for social and spiritual care. The Salvation Army itself often refers to this dual mission as ‘two sides of the same coin’ and as a well-known Army motto goes, these sides may be discernible, but they are also inseparable. This dual mission is not a unique feature of the Salvation Army. In his work on the Dutch diaconate, Erik Sengers acknowledged that such a double objective was present in many charitable organizations in both the Catholic and the Protestant segments of Dutch society. Furthermore, Sengers made a plea to reintroduce the original Latin term *caritas* (charity) instead of diaconate, for *caritas* emphasizes the connecting force between the biblical expressions ‘love’ and ‘doing good deeds’, whereas the word diaconate had come to focus merely on the latter. Charity means both ‘word and deed’ and, according to Sengers, thus is the most appropriate term for the combining force between the two parts of the dual mission of many charitable organizations.⁶⁷

This dual mission has also been the subject of a long-standing and multifaceted debate within Army ranks. The profoundness and longitude of this debate, that also will be a subject of study, implies that the identity process of the Salvation Army is also of a highly narrative character and this observation underlines the idea that organizational identity is hardly a fixed constant, but is always in flux. Additionally, this creation of a ‘self’ by the Salvation Army implies that an ‘other’ is also present. The context of the developing welfare state presents the Dutch government as one of the most prominent ‘others’ and therefore the relation between the government and the Salvation Army is central to this study. In this study I will search for “patterns of shared meaning that guide organizational life” and that occur within the Salvation Army.⁶⁸ Because it presented itself as a value-driven organization, it is exactly these internal patterns of shared meaning that may reveal how the relation between the Army and the government is interconnected to the Army’s identity process. This brings us now to the question of how I approach the concept of ‘government’ in this study.

Government and public policy

Relevant to the relationship between the Dutch government and civil society is the manner in which the government tried to encourage these organizations in

⁶⁶ Winston (unpublished paper):5; Watson and Brown 2001

⁶⁷ Sengers 2012:30-33.

⁶⁸ Morgan 1998:11.

order to implement public policy. Within the narrative framework of the welfare state, this means that I will search for possible coherence within social policy ideas that are designed to contribute to this change in organizational behavior. Because the issues that will be addressed in this study are basically initiated and formed on a national level, I will focus on national manifestations of public policy on the matter of social work and welfare.

In the Netherlands, from the early 1950s onwards, the governmental view on social work and welfare was translated into policy by the Ministry of MaWe.⁶⁹ According to some, the ministry was even positioned “in the heart of the welfare state”.⁷⁰ While widening its reach on social welfare problems, the ministry encountered the mores and practices that had been persistent in this area of the work field for decades, and that had been co-created by civil society. Together with ongoing social change, the view on welfare also altered and subsequently led to new efforts in order to entice, press or curb civil society organizations to act according to the view of the government. In order to influence civil society organizations, the government had certain means at its disposal: policy, grants and regulations, all often used adherently. Because these means are deployed in order to achieve political aims it can be assumed that their application is based on political choices. Consequently, the underlying concepts of the social policy of the ministry can be a point of departure in the search for coherent elements on this subject, especially when taken into account that these concepts were the driving force of this ministry in its effort to influence civil society organizations that were active in this area of the work field. So from the perspective of the government, the central question will be: What dominant policy concepts can be retraced in the history of the Dutch welfare system and what underlying values did these concepts represent?

This question however, needs further thought on two important concepts with regard to the matter of policy: policy implementation and policy instruments. In order to come to grips with the dynamic process of policy implementation, many scholars have sought to classify the process based on the assumption that to a certain extent any implementation of policy creates winners and losers. In 1972, T.A. Lowi specified four kinds of policy: distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent policy. The first aimed at distributing of new resources; the second aimed at shifting the distribution of existing resources; the third focused on regulative efforts; and the last type aimed at establishing or reorganizing organizations.⁷¹ Even though such a classification provided for an interesting view on the different aims of policy, according to public policy

⁶⁹ This ministry started out under the name Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk (MaWe, Social Work, 1952-1965) but changed over time into the Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk (CRM, Culture, Recreation and Social Work, 1965-1982), Ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur (WVC, Social Welfare, Public Health and Culture, 1982-1994) and Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (VWS, Public Health, Social Welfare and Sports, 1994-current date).

⁷⁰ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:102-104

⁷¹ Lowi 1972

scholar Michael Hill, this subdivision was not tenable because it did not comply with policy efforts on education being (re)distribution of knowledge, or warfare, for example. Also the distinction between a distributive policy and a regulatory policy for example, seemed hard to make, for often these were combined in practice. Instead, Hill presented an overview of typification efforts of public policy implementation by including the measure of resistance of relevant actors.⁷² Others observed that the difference between distributive and redistributive policy was hardly distinguishing. Ripley and Franklin tried to solve this by adding that the redistributive policy did not so much make use of existing resources, but aimed primarily at shifting “resources from the advantaged to disadvantaged groups”.⁷³ They also added that contrary to other policy types, redistributive policy revealed a very high degree of ideology in the debate between the actors on its implementation.⁷⁴

Any form of typological classification tends to oversimplify, but that does not mean that such a magnification of specific characteristics can not be useful in helping us understand how various aspects of a complex process like policy creation and implementation interrelate. Therefore, I place the Dutch social policy efforts in the context of this typology. In their classification, Ripley and Franklin indicate that when this policy process is approached as being “redistributive”, one might gain insight on how ideology has played a part in the process. Since I will make an attempt to determine the government policy lines and their underlying themes and how this affected the redistribution of income towards the society’s disadvantaged, this systemic approach seems to provide for a useful lens.

This elaboration brings forth the question of means and instruments, for how were these policy implementation efforts put into practice? Just as with the policy implementation process, many scholarly efforts have been made to define and list the tools or instruments that the government has at its disposal in order to implement policy.⁷⁵ These classifications vary from very fine-meshed to rather large indicative units.⁷⁶ This study however, is not about testing any of these classifications, but instead aims to describe the dynamics in the relationship between the government and the faith-based civil society organization the Salvation Army. And in that case this approach can be rather useful, for the studied relation between government and civil society does revolve around policy themes. Especially with regard to the figurative idea of courtship, or more concretely, in relation to the balance of power between two actors in the public domain, the provided spectrum of Howlett and Ramesh offers an interesting starting point in further analysis. Howlett and Ramesh specify three forms that may have the potential of a policy instrument: 1) voluntary structures like fami-

⁷² Hill 1997:137-139; Hill and Hupe 2002:76-77

⁷³ Ripley and Franklin 1982; Hill and Hupe 2002:76

⁷⁴ Ripley and Franklin 1982:193

⁷⁵ Bruce Doern and Phidd 1983; Hood 1986; Linder and Peters 1991

⁷⁶ Howlett 1991; Howlett and Ramesh 2003

ly, community, voluntary organizations and private markets; 2) mixed instruments like information, subsidies, auction/property rights and tax/user charges and 3) compulsory instruments like regulation, public enterprise and direct provision.⁷⁷ Eventhough it is rather debatable whether ‘family’ or ‘community’ can be regarded to be policy instruments, the other two varieties offer rather interesting categories, because Howlett and Ramesh base their classification on the measure of resistance that might be expected between the government as policy maker and other actors that undergo such policies. In this study I will especially pay attention to the latter two forms of policy: inviting or compulsory policy.

In the case of the developing Dutch welfare state, De Haan and Duyvendak studied the instruments that the Dutch government applied in its policy-making process in order to get civil society organizations to cooperate. Already during the early years of the Ministry of MaWe, it became clear that subsidies would be an important tool – a tool that has been of great influence on the relation between both actors.⁷⁸ According to the Catholic Minister of Social Work, Klompé (KVP, 1965-1963 and 1966-1971), this strategy aimed “to further and support private initiative to such an extent, that it can be responsible for fulfilling its tasks with due regard for its own character and responsibilities.”⁷⁹ According to De Haan and Duyvendak, the government applied a mixture of instruments with regard to the welfare sector: legislation (be it scantily), coordination, research and, most of all, direct and indirect subsidies.⁸⁰

A study in three parts

The main research question of this study is: What are the perceptible dynamics in the relation between the state and the Salvation Army in the Netherlands with regard to social policy between 1890 and 1990? What do these dynamics reveal about the developing Dutch welfare state and faith-based civil society and how did they affect the identity of the Salvation Army itself? What I shall specify next is how I will approach these questions here. To begin with, because this study rests on a historical approach, I will elaborate briefly on the view that I take on the historical *métier*. In my opinion, a historian attempts to describe historical events in their context. Therefor the core of the historical profession is formed by interpretation and decription, a process that is also called the hermeneutical process. This approach is also quite common to other classical research traditions like the study of religion, of law and more recently of the social sciences.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Howlett and Ramesh 2003:92; Hill 1997:141

⁷⁸ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:83

⁷⁹ “(...) het PI zodanig te bevorderen en daaraan bijstand te verlenen, dat dit met inachtneming van zijn eigen aard en verantwoordelijkheid kan zorgdragen voor uitvoering van taken.” Quoted in: De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:32.

⁸⁰ Idem:348

⁸¹ See also:Gadamer 1975

The etymology of the word ‘hermeneutic’ points to the Greek equivalent for ‘to translate’ and was derived from the mythical character Hermes who had the burdening task of translating the riddled messages that were sent from the gods on Olympus to the Greek people. In this sense, hermeneutical understanding stands for translation of meaning from one world to another.⁸² In historical practice this amounts to interpretation of various representations of historical events, as presented to us through primary sources like documents, artifacts and oral tradition. Consequently, as interpreter of these manifestations, the historian will create ‘facts’ that seem relevant for constructing a valid bearing surface for his particular interpretation which helps to shape his narrative – his version of the historical events. I deliberately put the word ‘fact’ between inverted commas in order to stress the notion that the presented ‘facts’ are merely the creation of an individual as an observer and *de facto* interpreter. This makes these ‘facts’ highly personal and therefore subjective and debatable. The notion of facts (without inverted commas) refers to the presumed existence of an objective reality, but because of the multitude of individual observers and interpreters, in my opinion, we will never be able to find out whether or not there is one reality. At least there are as many realities as there are observers. Therefore facts (without inverted commas) are unavailable to us.⁸³ Following from this argument is that in historical research the focus is on selected but apparently coherent moments, events or more longitudinal presumed developments in history, and by doing so the historian creates a conceptual lens through which he views history. In her ethnographic approach of organizations, social scientist Berendsen calls this process the (re)production of coagulated (repetitive) patterns that form the context of social interaction.⁸⁴ This approach inherently excludes the possibility of being complete because the result – a historical narrative – will be one of many possible narratives, but on the other hand, the division between inclusion and exclusion has to be accounted for by the historian in order to sustain any claim on validity of any historical narrative. So, a historian will have to give an account of his conceptual lens – the looking glass through which he assesses the value of particular historical manifestations. He will also have to account for his research methods.

This study consists of three parts that offer different perspectives on the relation between the government and the Salvation Army. One of the main pillars of the relation between the government, faith-based civil society and the Salvation Army was formed by their common interest in social welfare issues. These issues were addressed in an increasingly structural and comprehensive way during the twentieth century as the result of a cooperative effort between civil society and the government.

⁸² Bersselaar 1997:104

⁸³ Compare with Carr 1961; Lorenz 1987 and Dunn 2008.

⁸⁴ Berendsen 2007:28-30

In Part I, the following questions will put the focus on the relationship between these two actors: What were the social policy themes that played an important role for the government? How did these themes develop over time? On what underlying values were these themes based? And how did these developments affect the Dutch faith-based civil society? The results of this effort will constitute a contextual narrative for the Salvation Army's operational environment. The reconstruction of these developing goals and values is based on analysis of various primary and secondary sources. The reconstruction of the long-term developments on policy goals is based on the rather uniform and informative source of the explanatory memorandum to the annual social policy budget proposals by the Ministry of MaWe and its successors. When studied in a longitudinal manner, these explanatory memoranda give insight into how certain governmental policy intentions have been pursued, achieved and also sometimes abandoned over time. These findings are subsequently put into their political context by the study of relevant parliamentary policy documents and parliamentary records as well as by a thorough analysis of secondary sources like historical case studies of other (faith-based) civil society organizations in the social welfare work field; descriptive accounts of social work field developments like the history of the Ministry of MaWe and its successors; the historical development of probation work in the Netherlands; and standard textbooks on Dutch political and welfare state history.

In Chapter 1, I will describe the emergence of what I call the 'social policy system' in which I place the government and civil society in a systemic context of interdependency based on a shared effort on certain policy goals. This systemic approach is useful in studying the mutual understanding between the two actors for utilizing each other for shared or diverging aims. During this chapter it becomes clear that civil society at first gradually became a valued partner of the government, but as shown in Chapter 2, during the 1970s this position changed when the social policy system started to falter. By then civil society seemed to have lost much of its allure for the government; a process that resulted in the repositioning of these organizations towards the government. This description of the social policy system forms the backdrop of the development of the Salvation Army identity process during the twentieth century, because the Army had also become part of this system.

Therefore in Part II, I shift the focus to the Salvation Army. Through the thematic lenses of interdependency, legal incorporation, and professionalization, I describe how the developments in the social policy system impacted the relation between the government and the Salvation Army and what that meant for the Army's identity process. With regard to the Army's sense of history, an interesting observation is that even though the Salvation Army thinks of itself as a rather practical organization that has no strong focus on the conservation of its history or its archives of policy records and other possibly historical relevant paperwork, it has a rich tradition of history writing of its own. Next to many volumes of different types of internal magazines (e.g. *Strijdkreet*, *De Officier*), parts of the Army's history has been well-documented by Ringelberg and Van

der Vlucht. As a former Army communication officer, Ringelberg has written a dissertation on the history of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands until 1945, and Major Van der Vlucht is responsible for the archives of the Salvation Army church in the Netherlands. Additionally, other Salvationists have shown a serious interest in the preservation of the Army history, as the historical accounts of Spaan, Maris, Voorham and Van Teijlingen show. Because of these available sources, Part II of the study is extensively based on primary records. The available records of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands that are kept in the public archives contain many annual financial reports, minutes of deliberative organs of the Army and relevant correspondence between Army leaders. This paper trail is put into perspective by means of the publications of and interviews with key-persons that witnessed or even influenced the Army's process of identity at the time. The narrative that rises from these primary sources is contextualized by parliamentary records, reports and of course, other secondary literature on relevant subjects that determine the Army's operational context.

By means of this *modus operandi* the above mentioned themes of interdependency, legal incorporation, and professionalization are elaborated in four subsequent chapters each having a chronological structure of its own. The start of this study is 1887 – the year that the Salvation Army opened its doors in the Netherlands. The end of the empirical part of this research will be in 1990 because by then the Salvation Army had been fundamentally reorganized into new legal and organizational entities. Chapters 3 through 5 however, will end before 1980 because in the subsequent decade the themes of interdependency, legal incorporation, and professionalization have become too intertwined to describe on a separate basis.

In Chapter 3, I describe how the development of the financial relations between the Salvation Army and the Dutch government affected the balance between the Army's two-fold mission of social and religious work. Therefore, a thorough analysis of the Army's mission is followed by an account of the growing reliance of the Army on government support. That this dependency had its consequences for the organization will be illustrated by the case study of the Army's probation department, as it was this department that was the first within the Salvation Army that was confronted with growing government regulation and consequently experienced a change in internal culture. On the other hand, this relation also had its consequences for the government, as this dependency also – to a certain degree – seemed to apply to the government.

The second relevant theme that will be addressed in this study is a field of tension issue that was reduced by the Army to a mere question: Are we a church or a foundation? A thorough historical account of the internal debate on this issue has already been provided by historian Ringelberg.⁸⁵ However, whereas Ringelberg described the debate with a strong focus on the ideas and strategies of the individuals that played a part in this debate, in Chapter 4, I will place this

⁸⁵ Ringelberg 2010

internal debate in the context of the relationship between the Army and the government. In this chapter two storylines will be distinguished: 1) the narrative of what the Salvation Army wanted to be and 2) that of what it was actually able to be, according to Dutch law and customs. Inherent to this matter is a question that is once again related to the Army's twin mission: Should the Army's social objective be regarded as auxiliary to the spiritual objective, since the alleviation of social problems would only have temporary meaning and spiritual redeeming would be of eternal value? Or was it just the other way around? Even though the Army itself dismisses this reorganization officially as a solution of a mere legal problem, the context of the relationship with the Dutch state seems to shed a more differentiating light on the issue.

In Chapter 5, I will explore how the growing financial dependence and the balancing of the dual mission in legal terms were interconnected to the Army's process of modernization, for this touched on an essential contributor to the Army's identity process: its workforce. The increasing emphasis on professionalization has given the organization the opportunity to hire more people, but it also might have made the Army more vulnerable to government intervention in the area of personnel policy, a point that, once again, will be proven with the example of the Army's probation department. The Army increasingly lacked internally-trained staff. This situation opened the doors for external employees, and also to the training of the Army's own people which made way for professional opinions that were new to the Army's mental legacy. This development of the professional also incited a tension between the volunteers who were traditionally committed to the Army's work and the new salaried professionals. The influx on the professional front seemed to bring with it another element that exerted pressure on the Army's identity: democratization. Due to external pressure, the Army was obliged to allow its workers to have a democratic say by means of works councils. This also meant that to a growing extent, non-Army people started to exercise influence on Army policy and thus on the Army's identity process.

During the 1980s the issue of identity became a major point of discussion within and outside the Salvation Army. The above sketched thematic narratives of interdependency, legal incorporation and professionalization flowed together during this decade and called for a fundamental solution – a process that is described in Chapter 6. For not only the Dutch government started to question the Army's identity, but also the Army itself appeared to be in dire need of defining its own identity; how could the Army distinguish itself within the new force field of the market. In this decade the Army started to re-evaluate its identity, resulting in a thorough reorganization that aimed to prepare the Army for the coming decades and conserve its core values that were dear to its identity.

This description of how the Army lived through and shaped its identity process in the light of the changing Dutch welfare state ends with a cliffhanger as its reorganization in 1990 forms a relevant finale to the Army's identity process during the twentieth century. This finishing point however, does not give us a chance to evaluate the choices that were made by the Army during this period. It

leaves us with questions like: To what extent was the new organizational structure a success, and where did it fail to meet expectations? And how did this renewed positioning towards the government within the social policy system reflect on the Army's identity? Therefore, in Part III (Chapter 7) I will start with an evaluation of the developments concerning the social policy system and what these developments meant for faith-based civil society and its central feature: identity. Subsequently, I will make a recapitulating evaluation of how the Salvation Army's identity process unfolded within this social policy system. These assessments will lead to concluding remarks with regard to the central research question of this study. But in order to assess the value of these observations, in the closing chapter of this book, Chapter 8, I will contextualize these outcomes with a sketchy interpretation of the period 1990-2010. In this part, I will put the Salvation Army in the context of the current social policy system and describe what internal (policy) struggles the Army went through. Because this chapter has the character of an epilogue, I will allow myself to be more interpretative here than in other parts of the book. Especially with regard to how the Salvation Army was able to shape its identity with regard to its twin mission – its 'coin with two sides'.

PART I

THE SOCIAL POLICY SYSTEM IN THE NETHERLANDS

CHAPTER 1. EMERGING SOCIAL POLICY THEMES (1854 - 1974)

1. Overture to the Dutch welfare state

As is described in the Introduction, the emergence of the welfare state is retractable to the modernization process of the western world, in which industrialization, urbanization and emancipation of the people through education were especially important forces.¹ Also, the coming of age of the Dutch welfare state is inextricably connected to political and cultural unification and growing social dismay as result of a comprehensive industrialization process, for it was one of its unforeseen and unwanted results – the ‘social question’ – that cranked up the motor of the welfare state *avant-la-lettre*. Diseases, industrial perils, insecurity of income and a need for education, urged national governments to act on behalf of their citizens.² Collective and reciprocal care mechanisms were created and enforced by the state, showing an increase in government interference in what was traditionally regarded to be the domain of ‘private initiative’, now often called civil society (see Introduction for further explanation). Large-scale public protest however, failed to occur. Due to international rivalry between the young nation states during the second half of the nineteenth century, caused by the tension between national self-determination and international unity, the mobilization of nationalistic sentiments seemed to have widened the social acceptance of this top-down approach to politics.³

While taking advantage of the spirit of the times, between 1871 and 1889 German chancellor Bismarck introduced a series of social insurances in order to secure an income for workers in case of industrial accidents, deteriorating health, pension and disability. When workers had contributed to the economic system through their labor, they would be eligible for this type of financial support by the state. By creating a certain level of income security for the German working class, Bismarck hoped to win their loyalty and commitment to the emerging German state.⁴

A few decades previously, a more general approach was employed in the United Kingdom in relation to workers’ welfare. The destructive effects of industrialization with regard to health, housing and safety were also heavily suffered by the working class throughout the United Kingdom. But in this case, it was exactly this correlation between industrial development and the demise of the workers that gradually brought about a change in the view on how to cope with poverty. In The Poor Law of 1601, two categories of the poor were drawn up: one could be a deserving poor or an undeserving poor. The deserving poor

¹ Arts, Entzinger en Muffels 2004; Peper 1978

² Daalen 1999

³ Joll 1973

⁴ Anderson 1972:181; De Swaan 1996:194-198; WRR 2006:46

were those people who were regarded to be internally motivated to provide for themselves, but were not able to because of disability or other external reasons for their unemployment. These people deserved to be helped. The undeserving poor on the other hand, were to blame for their poverty themselves. They were regarded as able but unwilling to change their situation. The new poor that suffered from the effects of industrialization were increasingly regarded as ‘deserving poor’ and consequently the thought gained ground that their social problems had to be diminished. This shift in ideas were codified into the New Poor Law of 1834. It would however take until the first decade of the twentieth century for material social care to become available in the United Kingdom to more groups of people than just the working class. Nevertheless, it was the swiftly expanding middle class that had to produce the main part of the necessary funds, making this form of solidarity a rather peculiar one, because whether or not the middle class supported this view, they were still obliged to pay.

Both in the United Kingdom and in Germany, the state started to show a certain interest in social issues during the nineteenth century. This new role assumed by the state had its consequences for the groups and organizations that were traditionally committed to offering social relief and that regarded this work as an inherent part of their mission. At first, this new governmental approach resulted in nothing more than a supplementary contribution to the work that had already been initiated by these civil society organizations. Only in some minor cases, social work activities were actually taken over.⁵ However, the governmental attitude in the United Kingdom and in Germany towards poverty had gradually changed from that of standing aloof to a certain degree of involvement.

2. Balancing the state and civil society

In the case of the Netherlands, the dominant approach of the government was that of the liberal ‘night watch state’. This meant that the government was only to come into action in case of a threat to the public order or health. Otherwise, it would abstain from any interference with activities that were developed by often local private initiatives in cooperation with the local government. In case of poverty, this meant that the national government would only act in those instances when there were no alternatives or no financial means available.⁶ The Dutch central government thus, kept its distance. At least until the wave of modernization began to sweep across the Netherlands as well.

Compared to welfare states like Germany and the United Kingdom, the Dutch welfare state emerged rather late. Social scientist Abram de Swaan even framed this process as “a long hiss with a delayed bang”.⁷ A first indication of a

⁵ De Swaan 1996:200-204; Heerma van Voss 2000:388

⁶ Van der Linde 2007:149-150

⁷ De Swaan 1996:217-224

changing governmental view on the issue of poverty can be found in the new *Grondwet* (Constitution) of 1848. In a single sentence it was announced that poor relief would from then on “be an issue of continuing care by the government” and had to be “regulated by law”, implying that the Dutch government thought itself to be at least partly responsible for poor relief.⁸ The roots of this notion can be retraced to the conviction that the state had increasingly become accountable for the material and physical well-being of its citizens, because poverty was no longer regarded as merely one’s own fault. Nevertheless, the Dutch poor relief constellation of local municipalities and civil society, proved to be hard to change. This was reflected by the *Armenwet* (Poor Act, 1854) for it explicitly confirmed that the responsibility for poor relief belonged primarily in the hands of civil society. Nevertheless, the first signs of government interest in poverty matters were visible.

While referring to this relation between the government and civil society, historian Van der Woude characterized the following decades as a period of liberal government rule. The prime responsibility for social care would remain with private charity organizations between 1850 and 1880, even though civil society was fragmented and therefore relatively weak compared to the expanding Dutch government. The amount of freedom from political interference was exchanged for the often implicit understanding that civil society was to waive any political activity.⁹ This implicates that the two parties also agreed on their proximity.

The introduction of the so-called *Kinderwet* (Child Act, 1874) announced a change in the attitude of the government with regard to social issues. The Act focused on the protection of the most vulnerable workers: children under the age of 15, and women. In 1889, another curtailment of possible exploiting effects of industrialization was offered by the *Arbeidswet* (Labor Act): regulation of the working hours and forbidding work on Sundays and during nights. This governmental interest was substantiated with the rise of the social-liberals in the parliament at the turn of the century. The liberal concept of individual freedom and personal responsibility remained a central characteristic of government politics, but because of the growing awareness of the social question it was acknowledged that individual freedom was, more than often, curtailed by sickness, poverty, ignorance and age. Thus, according to the social-liberal view that surfaced during these years, the most vulnerable within society had to be supported in order to be free and the state was responsible for reducing these barriers, or at least compensating for them.¹⁰ A first result was the *Leerplichtwet* (Compulsory Education Act) of 1900, but there was subsequently much more legislation spanning areas like housing (*Woningwet*, Housing Act, 1901), health,

⁸ Van der Valk 1986:9

⁹ Van der Woude 2009

¹⁰ Van der Linde 2007:162-163

safety (*Ongevalwet*, Accidents Act, 1901) and childcare (*Kinderwetten*, Child Acts, 1901).¹¹

During World War I (1914-1918), the Netherlands remained politically neutral and as a result, was sidelined during the conflict. Its political landscape however, changed profoundly during these first decades of the twentieth century. The introduction of universal suffrage for men in 1917 and for women in 1920 fostered the process of pillarization, because it instigated a broad political emancipation of the (mostly religious) masses. A political power bloc of the so-called *confessionelen* (confessionals) emerged.¹² Political scientist Van Doorn described this as the “inescapable presentation of the confessionals”, because they were interlaced with the Dutch political history: “Through the fabric of Dutch history runs a thread that has never been broken: a Christian thread.”¹³ Even though the Catholics and Protestants were sharply divided, from the 1880s onwards, these confessionals started to take a structural interest in active politics. Faith-based political parties were formed, like the Protestant *Anti-Revolutionaire Partij* (ARP, Anti-revolutionary Party, 1879), the *Christelijk-Historische Unie* (CHU, Christian-Historical Union, 1908) and the Catholic *Algemeene Bond van RK-Kiesverenigingen* (RK, General Society of RC-electoral associations, 1904). These faith-based parties seized political power and dominated the political force field for decades to come.¹⁴

This political emancipation also resulted in an increasing overlap between the government and civil society. Civil society did not just position itself in contrast to the state, for both sides were increasingly staffed by representatives of the same pillar. This provided for a mutual confessional base that gave way to possible cooperation and ultimately led to a shift in the political constellation in which civil society placed itself as an intermediary between its grassroots and the national government.¹⁵ The pillarization process was not typically Dutch, for this development was perceptible in Germany and Belgium as well. In the Netherlands however, because of the dominant role of the confessionals, the ideological segmentation of society into four ideological pillars seemed to have been remarkably successful.¹⁶ It is even argued that in the Dutch case, it would be

¹¹ An overview of the most important legislation with regard to the functions of the Dutch welfare state can be found in Appendix A.

¹² The term *confessionelen* is a Dutch term that refers to political parties that base their views on a Christian conviction. A contemporary equivalent of the term confessional is ‘faith-based’. The first confessional parties in Dutch politics were ARP, AB and CHU. There were also other political parties that emerged during the same period, but because their main organizational principles were not religious but for example socialist (Sociaal-Democratische Bond, SDB, 1882) or libertarian (Liberale Unie, 1885), these were not indicated as being confessional. See for further details: De Beus, Van Doorn en De Rooy 1989 and Lademacher 1993:378.

¹³ “Door de Nederlandse geschiedenis loopt een draad die nooit is gebroken: de christelijke.” Quoted in: Van Doorn 1989:98

¹⁴ Van Doorn 1989:112; Hoogenboom 2004

¹⁵ Van der Woude 2009:30

¹⁶ Lademacher 1993:328

more appropriate to speak of a “land of four streams” rather than of a nation.¹⁷ So how does this overture to the Dutch welfare state relate to, often, faith-based charities that were commenced by benevolent individuals or groups within churches, communities or other social structures, or in other words, to civil society?

3. Seeking rapprochement (1900-1945)

3.1. Opening moves

It was not only the state that showed interest in cooperating on social issues, but both parties were initiators. In 1911 for example, the Amsterdam based ‘Toynbee’ youth and community center organization *Ons Huis* (Our Home) concluded after internal deliberation that its financial situation was so weak that it had to put in a request with the Amsterdam municipality for financial support.¹⁸ The municipality however, showed much reluctance and denied the request; *Ons Huis* had to solve its own problems. And indeed, *Ons Huis* looked for a creative solution to its financial problems and since one of its most prominent aims was to contribute to the moral and social development of young people in Amsterdam, it decided to start a holiday school for mischievous youth. In order to be able to start this project, *Ons Huis* once again called upon the Amsterdam municipality for financial support, and this time with success for in 1914 it received a subsidy of fl.1,500.¹⁹

The strategy of *Ons Huis* was to find compatible goals between its own organization and the Amsterdam municipality. The nuisance that this group of children caused seemed to provide for such a common ground. In addition, *Ons Huis* addressed the financial burden that these ill-behaved children created for the city and as a result, the Amsterdam municipality seemed to regard the subsidization of *Ons Huis* as a kind of investment. Supporting *Ons Huis* could prove to be cheaper than accepting the social problems.²⁰ Therefore, the city was helped. As was *Ons Huis*, for now it had successfully obtained its desired financial support.

In this case, it was a civil society organization that initiated the cooperation with the local municipality, but in other cases, the government sought a rapprochement. For example, after having started their cooperation, the Amsterdam municipality urged *Ons Huis* to take an active interest in female factory-employees who worked long hours and afterwards looked for social diversion

¹⁷ Aerts *et al.* 1999:199

¹⁸ ‘Toynbee work’ stands for the social work method that was developed by Arnold Toynbee (UK, 1852-1883) and was introduced during 1890s in the Netherlands by Helene Mercier. Toynbee work aimed at (moral) edification of the people by creating community centers in which volunteers organized all kinds of cultural activities (drama, music, sports, et cetera) See also: Van der Linde 2007:30, 168-169.

¹⁹ Nijenhuis 1987:74; Veldheer en Burger 1999:11

²⁰ Nijenhuis 1987:75

that was regarded to be of an immoral kind. Sometime later, the municipality also persuaded *Ons Huis* to offer boxing-lessons for the youth – an activity that was considered even by *Ons Huis* to be rather outside its core business of moral edification. Nevertheless, *Ons Huis* complied in both cases.²¹ And additionally, *Ons Huis* answered the call note of the government on a national level. As a result of the economic crisis of the 1930s, the unemployment rates skyrocketed to 20% of the labor force. The government issued a grant for those organizations that were willing and able to provide care to the unemployed.²² *Ons Huis* applied successfully, and so, even though *Ons Huis* had hardly any experience with finding employment, it also became an employment intermediary – a position that nobody would probably have imagined a few years earlier. According to historian Nijenhuis, this broadening of its work area by *Ons Huis* was based on the fact that the organization did not want to strain its good relations with the government, indicating that *Ons Huis* had started to growingly appreciate this form of cooperation, presumably due to the fact that the government provided for the bulk of its finances by 1936.²³

3.2. A reciprocal agreement

In the area of probation work as well, the government started to show increasing interest in its relation with civil society. During the term of Cabinet-Kuyper (1901-1905), the Catholic Minister of Justice, Loeff (1901-1905) made incidental subsidies available for civil society organizations that were active in the rehabilitation work of released prisoners. These subsidies were mainly allocated to those probation groups that had united into the *Nederlandsch Genootschap tot Zedelijke Verbetering der Gevangenen* (The Dutch Fellowship for Moral Reformation of Prisoners, 1823). Also, a small part was allocated to the Salvation Army, even though it had been closely cooperating with the *Genootschap*. Nelissen (1908-1910), a successor of Loeff, changed this incidental subsidy arrangement in 1910 into the *Reclasseringsregeling* (Probation Order). By doing so, he called upon organizations that were already active in the field of probation and to commit to a structural form of cooperation with the government. In return, the Ministry of Justice demanded a so-called “declaration of willingness”, stating that the organization was prepared to subject itself to the stipulations of the *Reclasseringsregeling* and thus declare to be in line with government goals. In exchange for the financial support, the government wanted to have a certain amount of influence over how these subsidies were spent, and after much deliberation, many probation organizations, including the Salvation Army, eventually complied.²⁴ Therefore, in contrast with the incidental financial support that community center organizations received in 1910, on the matter of probation,

²¹ Idem:62,79

²² Aerts *et al.* 1999:214; De Rooy 2002:184; Nijenhuis 1987:62

²³ Nijenhuis 1987:62

²⁴ Heinrich 1995:16. This subject will be elaborated further in Chapter 3.

the government aimed actively at the creation of more continuous and secure relations, based on a more structural flow of subsidy.

With regard to the governmental approach on social matters during the end of the nineteenth century, the liberals aimed at increasing the influence by an ideologically neutral state. The confessionals however, wanted to curb this possible neutralization by means of strengthening the position of Dutch civil society. Civil society could therefore serve as a buffer between the state and the citizens.²⁵ With the growing political dominance of these confessionals, both government and civil society changed their initial attitudes towards each other from being mutually reluctant towards a clear inclination for a more structural cooperation.

In addition, both sides clearly showed a certain amount of flexibility. The government seemed to be increasingly willing to provide financial support and even invited civil society to make use of the available funds, something that would have been rather unthinkable 50 years ago. Flexibility was shown from the side of civil society as well. *Ons Huis*, for example, seemed to be quite prepared to adapt its operational scope to the wishes of both the local and national government. To a certain extent, it can even be argued that *Ons Huis*, and other civil society organizations showed willingness to recalibrate their own goals to those of the government, and in return, the government valued their services. Part of the changes that seemed to occur in the relation between the government and civil society was this inclusion of reciprocity based on the exchange of services for money.

3.3. Supplementarity

This reciprocal agreement however, was not realized overnight, for many organizations that considered grant applications experienced an urgent sense of ambivalence. On the one hand, the individual and often altruistic public financial support at the grassroots of these organizations was very uncertain and resulted in an irregular flow of money. This combined with the increase in social problems, made the prospect of a more secure structural supplementation from the side of the government seem inviting. On the other hand, however, the fear for government influence was very much alive within civil society as well as within the government itself. This was reflected by the maxim that formed the basis of many initial subsidy arrangements: supplementarity. As a result of the combination of the Catholic political philosophy of ‘subsidiarity’ and the Reformed principle of ‘sphere sovereignty’, the Dutch government regarded interference with civil society as an undermining of its effectivity and even as endangering its existence. So, governmental financial support was supposed to be auxiliary to the organization’s finances, and was provided on a temporary basis. In this manner, government support was based on the idea of supplementarity.

²⁵ Idem:62-63

From the side of civil society as well, the fear for dependency on government funding and possible accompanying government interference was duly felt. The general idea was that when a subsidy was allocated, the government wanted to have a say in how to spend this money. Even though the government seemed to respect the principles of sphere sovereignty and subsidiarity, this influence still felt like a limitation to the organizational freedom in policymaking. So, “how would that affect the autonomy, and even worse, the identity of the organization?” the Protestant community-center organizations wondered.²⁶ The Catholic home-care and district nursing organization *Wit-Gele Kruis* (White-Yellow Cross, 1916) also struggled with this matter. The organization consisted of various small and relatively autonomous branches across the Netherlands, but in 1923, two important reasons drove them to combine forces in a federation. The first reason was that by doing so, the *Wit-Gele Kruis* could become a full-blown intermediary for its grassroots levels. The second reason was that, as an intermediary, it could lobby with the government in order to create relevant policy and to appropriate the necessary financial means to implement such policy.²⁷ Therefore, by unification into one organizational body, the *Wit-Gele Kruis* organizations tried to strengthen their position towards the government, while at the same time being able to receive government funds. In return, it was prepared to accept the loss of the individual character of the organizations.²⁸ This theme was also discussed within the new umbrella organization of the probation area of the work field, *Vereeniging van Reclasseeringsinstellingen* (VvRI, Association of Probation Organizations, 1912). Once again the government itself concluded that even though it wanted to have some say on the material side of the work (e.g. how was the allocated money spent?), it abstained from influence on the non-material side of the work. This part was regarded to be the realm of the organizations themselves, because they represented the ideology of their grassroots. For this reason, the after-care for released prisoners was left entirely to the probation organizations.²⁹

3.4. Preliminary professionalization and harmonization

With regard to the policy content that formed the basis for this preliminary cooperation, public health issues like tuberculosis or the mortality rate of newly born, combined with issues of public moral, such as the example of the rowdy Amsterdam youth shows, often formed incentives for the government to search for cooperation with civil society organizations. These were problems of a usually incidental nature that also called for solutions of a temporary kind.

On another level however, a long-term perspective seemed perceptible. In 1922, the Amsterdam municipality demanded that the work it subsidized for *Ons*

²⁶ Nijenhuis 1987:77

²⁷ Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:32-33

²⁸ Idem:55

²⁹ Heinrich 1995:39, 83

Huis be done by trained youth leaders.³⁰ This demand for a schooled staff was hard to ignore because the organization had been successfully working together with the Amsterdam municipality, and in order to preserve this relationship and the accompanying regular flow of income that it had been receiving during this period, *Ons Huis* complied. This professionalization was also perceptible on another level. During the 1920s the government increasingly demanded verification of the correct application of the allocated public funds. In order to induce subsidized organizations to comply with this need, stipulations were added to the subsidy arrangements that required these organizations to keep their books and to file reports on their activities.³¹ During the 1930s more types of subsidy would require this form of accountability and as a result these stipulations also contributed to the professionalization of the organization.

This attention for professionalization was accompanied by another motivation that seemed to drive the government during this period. One of the results of the pillarized Dutch social landscape was that the social work field had expanded. This had led to a fragmented and compartmentalized organizational hotchpotch.³² In the area of poor relief alone, there were about 7500 active organizations in 1900.³³ Its increasing interest in social issues confronted the government with this wide variety of organizations, and any coordination effort seemed to be quite impossible and expensive. Therefore, the government stimulated the already ongoing process of the clustering of these organizations. This so-called “harmonization” could be realized in different ways. For instance, the *Wit-Gele Kruis* federations of Den Bosch and Breda were forced in 1929 to merge into a provincial institute, as the national government had adjusted the former subsidy stipulations accordingly.³⁴ Especially within the realms of the ideological pillars, harmonization was further stimulated. In 1923, for example, the Amsterdam municipality made clear that the Catholic community-center work that was provided for by *Sint Fransiscus Liefdewerk* (St. Francis Charity, 1894) would continue to receive a subsidy only when they would become a member of the federation of the Roman Catholic youth groups.³⁵

Now that the government and civil society had started out on a cooperative journey, the emerging policy themes of professionalization and harmonization seemed to have added another dimension to this relation. From the side of the government, there was an increasing awareness of subsidy being an effective instrument to stimulate civil society. Still, the reluctance that civil society displayed with regard to cooperation with the government by accepting subsidies proved not to have been groundless, for certain consequences of this developing relationship were not anticipated.

³⁰ Nijenhuis 1987:76; Veldheer en Burger 1999:12

³¹ Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:35

³² Veldheer en Burger 1999:19

³³ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:34

³⁴ Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:32

³⁵ Nijenhuis 1987:154

3.5. Unforeseen consequences

The possibility to tap into governmental financial sources seems to have been an incentive to establish new organizations. This process was strongly tied to the process of pillarization as is exemplified by the establishment of the Catholic *Wit-Gele Kruis*. According to sociologist Wijnen-Sponselee, the most important drive to establish these Catholic Cross-organizations seems to have been the probability that the already existing ‘general’ home-nursing service organization *Groene Kruis* (Green Cross, 1901) would snap up the available subsidies.³⁶ Therefore, even though it was not really anticipated, the increase in home-nursing organizations from a mere 13 in 1880 to 840 in 1920, is hardly surprising.³⁷

Another unforeseen consequence was that even though many subsidies were granted on a temporary basis, a part of them would eventually prove to be of a more structural nature. This strongly depended on the persistence of the problem that the subsidy addressed. For example, the money that was earmarked to counter tuberculosis amounted in 1903 to approximately fl.10,000 and its allocation was based on a temporary arrangement. However, fifteen years later the TBC bacteria were still strongly persistent, forcing the government to increase its financial support to this cause to an annual amount of fl.220,000.³⁸

This structural character of some of the arrangements led to a growing sense of habituation among the organizations that benefitted from them, as was exemplified by the provincial home-nursing organization. After having received subsidies since 1933, the balance sheet of the organization showed a surplus in 1936. Based on the argument that this was proof of the fact that the organization was able to control its costs, the provincial administration revoked the subsidies amounting to fl.3,600 on a total balance of fl.7,600. That this would result in an immediate and serious deficit for the home-nursing organization came probably as a surprise to the province, for in 1939 it reinstated the subsidies.³⁹ However, although the provincial home-nursing organization had now experienced the possible consequences of its financial dependency on the Dutch government, it did not refrain from further grants. On the contrary, by 1939 the grants had slowly but surely grown from a supplementary status to the organization’s main financial source of income.⁴⁰ The provincial home-nursing organization seemed to have attached enough importance to this financial arrangement to let this detail slip by.

Even though the government showed an increasing interest in social issues by means of legislation, accompanied by a possible threat of infringement of the domain of civil society, it also showed great willingness to work together with

³⁶ Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:25

³⁷ Veldheer en Burger 1999:3

³⁸ Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:93

³⁹ *Idem*:57, 199

⁴⁰ *Idem*:54

civil society organizations. Civil society in its turn, acted upon both the fear of government interference as well as its financial need, and not only increasingly agreed on such a cooperative effort, but it also started to acknowledge and sometimes even initiate it. With the legal confirmation that civil society organizations maintained their primacy in the domain of poor relief, another period of hardship announced itself in the form of World War II.

4. A social policy system in the making (1945-1960)

4.1. Restoration and renewal

During World War II, the seed of a new development sprouted as an internationally shared course was set off in order to create a basic level of social insurance for all people. The idea that underpinned this process was that governments were to take structural action to counterbalance the possible destructive effects of economic and (international) political developments, because if they failed to do so their citizens would remain too vulnerable, as had been demonstrated by the turmoil during the first half of the century. In *Social Insurance and Allied Services*, Sir William Beveridge sketched the outline for such an universal social security system in the United Kingdom, once again based on the idea of solidarity.⁴¹ The ultimate result would be social security ‘from the cradle to the grave’, that materialized into, for example, the collective provision of free medical services in the UK through the National Health Service.⁴² In his proposal, Beveridge displayed a combination of the liberal notions of personal responsibility and freedom with the more socialist view on government planning and support.⁴³ The socialist component also became perceptible by the compulsory character of the arrangement, for again it would be the national government that was urged to initiate and create these social arrangements.

These innovative policy concepts did not fall on deaf ears and were heard also in the Netherlands. However, their actual implementation would need more time because with the rising of the dust cloud of World War II it became clear that the Dutch political, social and material infrastructure had suffered severe damage. A month after the surrender of the German army in 1945, Prime Minister Schermerhorn (1945-1946, VDB) announced that it was time for restoration and renewal:

“Restoration of everything material that our nation needs, restoration also of everything and all institutions that determine our intellectual and spiritual atmosphere and that were valued by our people. And also renewal. A word

⁴¹ Beveridge 1942

⁴² Joll 1973:443

⁴³ Sewandono 1978

that expresses the perception that in our national life all kinds of needs were suffered, raising desires and strengthening the will to improve.”⁴⁴

In order to realize this, the government found a willing partner in the Dutch civil society. Potential policy conflicts were avoided as much as possible because a mutual consent on postwar reconstruction seemed to align the goals of both parties, and a reconstruction-alliance was formed that lasted throughout the first postwar decades. Self-control, frugality and toil were commonly understood principles, especially within the realms of the political elite that decided to cooperate.⁴⁵ Renewal occurred, for instance, in the area of economics when a Keynesian economical demand-management system was supported by the politics of ‘planned wages’ and a growing web of social security arrangements. On a political level, reconstruction was visible in terms of the reinstallation of the prewar pillarized political power structure. This however, in its turn spurred another drive for renewal, as was embodied in the establishment of a Dutch labor party *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) in 1946. Next to the aim of becoming the representative party of the Dutch labor force, the PvdA aimed at the uprooting of these prewar pillars.⁴⁶

This consensus on reconstruction and renewal resulted in an intensified cooperation between government and private organizations like unions, and led to, what many have called, a period of corporatism.⁴⁷ Inspired by the ideas of Beveridge, the Dutch governmental Committee-Van Rhijn sketched the foundations for a Dutch version of social security.⁴⁸ With the corporatist consensus holding the doors open for new policy on social matters, Minister of Social Affairs, Drees (1945-1948, PvdA) took this train of thought further by creating the legal fundamentals of what has been called the Dutch welfare state.⁴⁹ In 1947 Drees introduced the *Noodwet Ouderdomsvoorziening* (Emergency Elderly Act) that would later be reformed into a pension guarantee for everyone, called the *Algemene Ouderdomswet* (AOW, General Elderly Act, 1956), and a basic income for involuntary unemployed workers was guaranteed in 1949 by means of the *Werkloosheidswet* (WW, Unemployment Act).

Between 1958 and 1973 the Dutch political landscape was dominated by the confessional parties. The two largest Dutch confessional parties KVP and ARP took the political lead, and in alternating coalitions with the liberal-democrats (VVD) and the PvdA, important social welfare legislation was created. This

⁴⁴ “Herstel van al hetgeen ons volk voor zijn materieele bestaan noodig heeft, herstel ook van alles en van alle instellingen, die ons geestelijk klimaat bepaalden en die ons volk dierbaar waren. Daarbij tegelijk de vernieuwing, in welk woord uitgedrukt wordt, dat in ons nationale leven op allerlei punten ook tekorten werden gevoeld, die verlangens hebben gewekt en de wil tot verbetering hebben gesterkt.” Schermerhorn, June 27, 1945.

⁴⁵ Aerts *et al.* 1999:275

⁴⁶ De Beus, Van Doorn en De Rooy 1989:158-162

⁴⁷ Esping-Andersen 1990; Aerts *et al.* 1999:289; Van der Woude 2009

⁴⁸ Commissie-Van Rhijn 1945

⁴⁹ Aerts *et al.* 1999:284, 275; Kappelhof 2004

‘safety net’ consisted of the *Algemene Kinderbijslagwet* (AKW, Child Allowance Act, 1962), the *Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering* (WAO, Employment Disability Act, 1967) and the *Algemene wet bijzondere ziektenkosten* (AWBZ, Additional Health Assurance Act, 1967). The symbolic crown jewel of the Dutch welfare state and the most fundamental universal social security arrangement was formed, however, by the *Algemene Bijstandswet* (ABW, Social Assistance Act, 1963), for with the ABW the fundament of the Dutch social security was formed. Now all citizens were guaranteed an income.⁵⁰ Together with the correlation of social security to the minimum wage in 1969, a collective basic level of subsistence was created.

4.2. Institutionalization: Ministry of Social Work

The relation between civil society and the government also showed its developing dynamics when during this postwar period, the government seemed to become more and more responsible for the material side of social care by providing for subsidies and social security. Additionally, civil society was increasingly confronted by the reduction of its responsibility to the alleviation of non-material needs only.⁵¹ On the other hand, both civil society and the government were conscious of the possible weakening effect on civil society and both wanted to guard the balance between the two actors.

This balance was also one of the assignments of the new Ministry of Social Work (MaWe) that was established in 1952. During the formation of the third Cabinet-Drees (1952-1956), the Catholics – that like the Social Democrats had reorganized themselves into new a political party called *Katholieke Volks Partij* (KVP, Catholic People’s Party, 1946) – aimed to counterbalance the political influence that the Social Democrats had gained by means of their traditional claim on the Ministry of Social Affairs. It was not unthinkable that this social-democrat influence could result in an increasing state influence in the social policy domain. According to the KVP however, the state had to keep its distance because it had to enable civil society to provide for care to its grassroots. And this could very well be realized by subsidization. Eventually, Prime Minister Drees (1948-1958, PvdA) yielded. The Ministry of MaWe was established and the KVP provided for its administration and management.⁵²

By establishing a separate political institution for social welfare matters, the importance of the idea of the government providing for the general well-being of all its citizens was underlined. This ministry also provided for a means for the KVP to increase its influence on national policy issues. Additionally it secured the position of civil society with regard to the state, because by means of this ministry, the state would be able to make a coordinated effort to create coherent policy on social issues and at the same time confirm the role of civil society in

⁵⁰ WRR 2006; Aerts *et al.* 1999

⁵¹ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:51, 66

⁵² *Idem*:56-63

this field.⁵³ On the other hand, by means of the Ministry of MaWe the Dutch state also disposed of an institutional structure to continue the prewar endeavor to do something about the myriad of organizations that were active in social services and to encourage these organizations to improve their services by means of professionalization.⁵⁴ The underlying idea was no different from in the prewar era: by means of a ministry, cooperative efforts could be channeled and coordinated. Harmonization of the work field would help to increase efficiency as well as enhance the quality of the organizations and their services.⁵⁵

One of the characteristic differences with the prewar era however, was that with the establishment of this ministry, the creation of new policy would expand enormously, as would the accompanying subsidies. Prior to its establishment, Drees had already revealed its reserve towards the existence of the ministry by calling it “the spending ministry”.⁵⁶

4.3. Identity and representation as principles of organization

The prewar policy theme of harmonization was embarked on with vigor by the Ministry of MaWe. Harmonization however, was not only supported by government, but also by civil society organizations because now both parties could benefit from the formation of a more coherent organizational structure.⁵⁷ In order to achieve this, the ministry functioned like a spider in the social work web, aiming for further harmonization. At the same time, the ministry provided funds for civil society to continue its unification process into umbrella organizations.⁵⁸

This harmonization process revealed that the government specifically valued one traditional feature of civil society: its faith-based or ideological identity. The social segmentation along the demarcation lines of the common ideological denominators, called forth a clustering of this work field. In order to strengthen this perceived development, in 1955 the ministry issued a subsidy arrangement that was called *Samenwerkingsorganen op neutrale of levensbeschouwelijke grondslag* (Cooperative bodies on a neutral or faith-based ground). One of the expected results was the scaling-up and a subsequent improvement of efficiency that would strengthen the constellation of the pillars.⁵⁹ Therefore the arrangement provided for salaried professionals that were to coordinate the cooperation of relevant organizations that were active within the same pillar.⁶⁰ In this view,

⁵³ *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2:6 (MvT)

⁵⁴ *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1955/56*, 4100, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1957/58*, 4900, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁵⁵ *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1957/58*, 4900, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁵⁶ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:60

⁵⁷ Idem:34

⁵⁸ *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1957/58*, 4900, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁵⁹ *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁶⁰ *Kamerstukken II 1955/56*, 4100, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1957/58*, 4900, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1958/59*, 5300, nr. 2 (MvT)

the main ordering principle was formed by the shared identity of certain groups of civil organizations, and according to the first Minister of Social Work Van Thiel (KVP, 1952-1956) it was by reinforcement of this binding capacity of identity that the influence of the state on civil society would be curbed. This was important for Van Thiel, because now that social work had a serious impact on the lives of an increasing group of people, the idea that by means of these social services the influence of the state could reach into this private realm, was unacceptable by both civil society organizations as well as the Catholic minister himself.⁶¹ The varied ideological world-views of these organizations were recognized as essential, because it was the personal and private nature of social work that made “social work based on an ideological foundation of the utmost importance.”⁶² This point of view would however make an equal support of organizations of all different pillars unavoidable. For example, in order to do justice to this diversity of the Dutch ideological segmented work field, representatives of all ideological currents had to be accounted for in the main deliberative bodies that were concerned with policy matters.⁶³

4.4. Participation through shared responsibility

The emphasis on the identity of civil society was also detectable in the efforts of the ministry to involve civil society organizations in the policymaking process. Under the label of “social planning” the ministry wanted to increase the involvement of the Dutch people in the policy process by including their representative organizations. Based on joint social research activities, the relevance and effectiveness of social policy could be enhanced.⁶⁴ This approach on policymaking was inspired by the American concept of ‘community organization’. After a work visit to the United States in 1954, a group of ministry officials became acquainted with this concept that propagated the idea that in order to stimulate the public to take responsibility for improvement of their own social situation, local private initiative had to be activated by means of a continuing dialogue with the government. This approach was expected to create a sense of shared responsibility because when civil society organizations would be actively involved in the policy process, this involvement would generate public support in itself.⁶⁵

The concept of shared responsibility would also be implemented on another level than representation. For instance, whenever the Ministry of Social Work granted a subsidy, the organization in question would also have to contribute in a financial way. According to the ministry, by doing so “the people express their

⁶¹ *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁶² “(...) een op levensbeschouwing berustende fundering van het maatschappelijk werk (...) van essentieel belang.” *Kamerstukken I 1952/53*, 2800, nr. 131a:4

⁶³ *Kamerstukken II 1953/54*, 3200, nr. 2 (MvT); De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:57, 76-77

⁶⁴ *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1957/58*, 4900, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1961/62*, 6500, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1962/63*, 6900, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁶⁵ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:32, 76-83

joint responsibility for their fellow men.”⁶⁶ In addition, the idea of shared responsibility was connected to the role of the volunteer in social work activities. Professionalization was necessary in order to create a certain measure of quality, but on the other hand, as Van Thiel’s successor Minister Klompé (KVP, 1965-1963 and 1966-1971) stressed, the mobilization of the volunteer would also have to become one of the mainstays of the ministry’s policy of social work, for “after all, the work of the volunteer is the proof of the willingness of the population to carry out this work.”⁶⁷

Boosted by the establishment of the Ministry of Social Work, the government converted its recognition of the value of the identity of civil society into new policy initiatives. As representatives of their specific grassroots, civil society organizations had expertise on the needs and deficits of their people and thus would know best how to allocate the money that the ministry put at their disposal. The idea of representation resonated within many civil society organizations, but it did not seem to detract much from the risk of government interference with what was perceived as being the affairs of civil society.⁶⁸ Any government intrusion could mean diminishing autonomy for civil society. However, the government shared the same reluctance and the ministry explicitly underlined that in order to be effective, the autonomy of civil society was indispensable, and with the aim of guarding this autonomy the ministry had, by all means, to be auxiliary to the well-appreciated social work of these civil society organizations.⁶⁹

4.5. Initial effects

By the end of the 1950s, the first effects of the expanding policy effort on social work became visible. In the relatively underdeveloped work field of elderly care for example, the number of organizations that were subsidized had risen from 7 in 1954 to 79 in 1959 - a trend that the minister described as being sound.⁷⁰ This growth, however, was rather unforeseen, and it started to have its consequences for the budget. In 1959 minister Klompé indicated that not all of the subsidy applications could be granted.⁷¹ On the other hand, the minister explicitly stressed that in the social work areas that lacked an effective approach, extra subsidy was needed.⁷² This rationale indicated that the ministry started to realize

66 “(...) geeft de bevolking uiting aan haar medeverantwoordelijkheid voor de medemens.” *Kamerstukken II 1957/58*, 4900, nr. 2:5 (MvT)

67 “(...) acht dit een noodzakelijke voorwaarde om het werk uiteindelijk de vrucht te doen dragen, welke men zich voorstelt. Immers, juist het werk der vrijwilligers is het bewijs, dat de bevolking zelve dit werk wil dragen.” *Kamerstukken II 1957/58*, 4900, nr. 2:6 (MvT)

68 *Kamerstukken II 1953/54*, 3200, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT)

69 *Kamerstukken II 1952/53*, 2800, nr. 1 (VV); *Kamerstukken II 1953/54*, 3200, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT)

70 *Kamerstukken II 1954/55*, 3700, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1955/56*, 4100, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1959/60*, 5700, nr. 2 (MvT)

71 *Kamerstukken II 1959/60*, 5700, nr. 2 (MvT)

72 *Kamerstukken II 1957/58*, 4900, nr. 2 (MvT)

its controlling power. The use of subsidy was now openly confirmed as a public policy instrument. In 1962, for example, the ministry stated that the two pillars of its policy were research of social developments and stimulation of civil society by means of subsidies in order to respond appropriately to the outcome of these studies.

However, not all policy initiatives had the effects that were aimed for. In 1960 the ministry indicated that an unwanted development of what was called “an ongoing formalization and institutionalization in society” was going on, possibly leading towards a gap between the government and civil society organizations on the one side and the Dutch population on the other. An adjustment of policy was made, for according to the ministry, civil society had to “communicate” more with its grassroots in order to create a sense of shared responsibility and bearing surface for proposal for social policy, and to strengthen their mutual bonds.⁷³ Civil society organizations were also called on to improve the measure of “self-activation” of their clients.⁷⁴ This meant that the subsidies were increasingly aimed at efforts on the part of civil society to encourage the initiative and independence of the Dutch citizens. Additionally, local governments were enticed to contribute to this aim by means of decentralization of policy responsibilities – a train of thought that would remain recognizable for the coming decades.⁷⁵

With regard to the position of civil society, the Ministry of Social Work continued to underline the value of civil society as a partner in the realization of policy aims. In 1963 in a statement, the ministry affirmed that by a cooperative effort the government and civil society had contributed to the prosperity of the people as well as their well-being. According to the ministry, many civil society organizations had actually shaped government policy, and had done this in a structural manner.⁷⁶ In addition, it was acknowledged that this had also had its effects on civil society itself, and that because of the close cooperation between government and civil society, some tasks had shifted sides from civil society to the government. This required organizations to reorientate towards other new tasks and it altered their place in the constellation.⁷⁷ As stated before, the mutual commitment of the government and civil society to policy themes like harmonization, professionalization, and now participation and quality as well, was largely based on a strategy of supplementarism: the government provided for money and preconditions; civil society for knowledge, increasingly skilled professionals and public legitimacy for government policy. At the turn of the 1950s this swapping of public revenues in return for the commitment of civil society had revealed to be of a repetitive, systematic character, and by then the contour of a

⁷³ *Kamerstukken II* 1960/61, 6100, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁷⁴ *Idem.*

⁷⁵ *Kamerstukken II* 1961/62, 6500, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁷⁶ *Kamerstukken II* 1962/63, 6900, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁷⁷ *Idem*

structural and rather systematic relationship between both actors had become perceptible on the matter of policy – a social policy system.

5. Crystallizing policy themes (1960-1974)

By 1960 the Netherlands had become an affluent nation. A huge supply of natural gas was discovered under the northern part of Holland, which boosted its position in the international market. Employment rates skyrocketed to about 98% of the labor force, and additionally, an intricate web of social security arrangements was woven, forming a “safety net” for all that might come to need it. Nevertheless, 1960 also seemed to herald the end of the era of political collaboration. Discontent rose within the realm of the labor force because they felt overlooked in the allotment of the benefits of this new prosperity and in support of their demand for higher wages, in 1963 strikes were initiated. Material well-being seemed to increasingly supersede the previously more important non-material well-being; a change in the atmosphere in the public realm that would also have its political consequences.⁷⁸

In 1963 the Social Assistance Act (ABW) was ratified. The originator of this Act, minister Klompé, aimed to disconnect the moral bonds between material care and non-material care. In neighboring countries, for instance, citizens had a fundamental right to a government-guaranteed level of subsistence, but in the Netherlands this material care was still connected to the possibility of a conditional sale with non-material care. So, when the government would become responsible for the material part, the care for the non-material aid would have to remain with civil society, because this way, any undesired state interference with private matters was prevented.⁷⁹ This meant that next to the enormous importance that the ABW had for many Dutch citizens in terms of income security, it also had its consequences for the civil society organizations. Civil society would have to give up a part of its traditional focus on poverty and some of its influence as well. However, a massive protest from the side of civil society organizations failed to occur. Civil society had been consulted intensely during the ratification process, and in the end a broad support for the ABW was obtained amongst civil society organizations.⁸⁰

Even though the government was very much aware of the fact that the ABW would change the position of civil society, the Ministry of Social Work (renamed in 1965 as the *Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk*, CRM, Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work) stood aloof and awaited the outcome of the repositioning process that civil society organizations were about to be engaged in.⁸¹ This attitude did not however mean that the min-

⁷⁸ Aerts *et al.* 1999:291-293; De Rooy 2002:262

⁷⁹ *Kamerstukken II* 1957/58, 4900, nr. 2 (MvT); De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:88-91

⁸⁰ *Kamerstukken II* 1964/65, 7800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁸¹ *Kamerstukken II* 1965/66, 8300, nr. 2 (MvT)

istry did not value any further cooperation with civil society. On the contrary, it continued its close collaboration with civil society, because the ministry itself lacked the resources that were traditionally available to civil society.⁸² Additionally, close cooperation with civil society also secured public support for governments policy ambitions. With regard to civil society however, in this cooperation the element of identity seemed to have been narrowed down to the provision of non-material aid only.

5.1. Quality and participation

As the representative of its grassroots, civil society had proven its value to the government on different policy themes. Themes like professionalization, harmonization and shared responsibility provided for enough common ground for both actors to work together. On the level of the organization and its employees, the development of professionalization of the civil society organizations continued in the form of adjustment of the internal administrative process, serving the purpose of accountability – a prerequisite that grew more important with the further development of the postwar subsidy system. A second important aspect of professionalization was the education of employees. The need for education had already grown long before World War II, but also during the 1960s further training, education and schooling was marked as one of the main goals of the government in order to professionalize civil society organizations.⁸³

The concept of shared responsibility was developed into the provision for a structural subsidy flow. By doing so, the government tried to establish a constructive and qualitative relationship with civil society, aiming to create a mutual view on different problem areas instead of a mere focus on the amount of subsidy an organization was able to receive.⁸⁴ During the first years of the 1960s, the concept of shared responsibility also expanded to other, more local governmental levels. Stressing the principle of subsidiarity, the ministry aimed to allocate social responsibilities as close as possible to the people that experience their consequences.⁸⁵ This decentralization of policy responsibilities would mean that subsidies would be granted on a lower governmental level than just on a national level, because it was in fact the local governments that were supposed to have better oversight over the social problems that were present and therefore would know better how to allocate the money than the national government would. Analogous to the additional funds that civil society had to raise in order to become eligible for national grants, now the local governments also had to raise a part of the subsidy total that was allocated. This governmental policy ambition meant that civil society organizations were to increasingly deal with different

⁸² *Kamerstukken II 1965/66*, 8300, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1966/67*, 8800, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1969/70*, 10 300, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁸³ *Kamerstukken II 1962/63*, 6900, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁸⁴ *Kamerstukken II 1962/63*, 6900, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁸⁵ *Kamerstukken II 1962/63*, 6900, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1965/66*, 8300, nr. 2 (MvT)

governmental levels in different locations at the same time, instead of dealing with one ministry at the national level. By 1967 the ministry concluded that the position of many municipalities was improved because local governments had increasingly gained the responsibility to provide for the necessary social care for their community and to do so they could call in local civil society organizations.⁸⁶

However, even though this effort for shared responsibility aimed to create public support for social policy, the grassroots of civil society seemed to care less. Different reports on social change suggested a correlation between growing material wealth and decreasing happiness, that subsequently led to a growing lack of interest for the public cause. This change in the public perception of the welfare state seemed to influence the legitimization of social policy during the first years of the 1960s. Therefore, in order to regain this much-needed public support, the Ministry of Social Work concluded that the idea of welfare had to be redefined. Because the material concept of welfare was increasingly associated with the spirit of consumerism – a hot topic of debate during the 1960s – it was decided that its non-material side of well-being was to be emphasized in the policy lines of the ministry; non-material well-being in which personal development and social renewal were placed at the center.⁸⁷ This readjustment of the idea and concepts of social policy made individual and cultural development the center of the ministry's focus with the relatively new subculture of the younger generation as a hallmark.⁸⁸

The development of a youth subculture that reacted against the traditional social structures and the culture of their parents, had also resulted in a call for a democratic influence within the same structures. This combination of democratization and individual development seemed to result in “a growing desire to carry one's own responsibility”.⁸⁹ These social trends were observed not just on an individual basis, they also seemed to seep through all of society, for it was also observed that many civil society organizations were not quite up to date with regard to democratization.⁹⁰ That, however, was not the only peril that seemed to approach civil society. Another problem was that the enduring ambition for professionalization seemed to have put the volunteers in a tight spot. Traditionally these volunteers had been invaluable for civil society because they formed the core of their grassroots. However, because of the influx of professionals that also took over the work, the position of these volunteers had gradually changed from being the regular core of the social work staff to mere assistants to the professionals, a position that curbed the creativity and self-

⁸⁶ *Kamerstukken II* 1966/67, 8800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁸⁷ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:98-99

⁸⁸ Righart 1995

⁸⁹ “Naast een sterkere behoefte om meer van hun leven te willen maken is bij velen tevens ontstaan een groeiend verlangen om hiervoor zelf verantwoordelijkheid te dragen.” *Kamerstukken II* 1968/69, 9800, nr. 2:3 (MvT)

⁹⁰ *Kamerstukken II* 1968/69, 9800, nr. 2 (MvT)

motivation of these volunteers. Moreover, this loss of social capital of individual and altruistic commitment was contrary to the government goal of individual participation and shared responsibility.⁹¹

In order to respond to the developments of democratization and individualization, government policy had to be adjusted, and the core strategy of social planning was joined by a more activist notion of ‘social reform’, being a collective term for quality of life, social ability, social action, permanent education and participation.⁹² In 1967 the Ministry of CRM took a critical stance towards the “empty pleasures of the consumer society” and a counterbalance was found in the prominence of individual development by emphasizing that people had to participate in matters that played a part in their own lives, for example politics.⁹³ Increasing focus was placed on the education and moral elevation of the public by raising the subsidies for popular education, arts, archaeology, nature conservation and recreation, and people were to take active part in these “essential elements of life”.⁹⁴

In 1970 the Minister of CRM, Klompé put this idea of participation at the center of the social policy by setting the focus on democratization and “self-activation”. According to the minister, next to the possibility of being actively involved in a democratic society, the individual citizen did actually have the responsibility to participate in the realization of the well-being of his or her fellow citizens. Civil society organizations would have to create the necessary conditions to activate their grassroots, which once again confirmed the intermediary function of the organization.⁹⁵ Klompé also suggested that one of these conditions might very well be increasing harmonization and even reduction of the many civil society organizations, because that might well improve the accessibility of the welfare arrangements for the citizens.⁹⁶

5.2. Manageability

Next to these efforts on quality and participation, the government continued to further harmonize social work organizations during these years. The idea of combining different organizations into large-scale forms of cooperation was particularly relevant for the Dutch rural areas, but for the urbanized areas the varied presence of organizations that were based on different ideologies was still much valued. Therefore, the government also continued to strengthen the bonds between civil society organizations and their grassroots. In 1964, the liberal Minister Schouwenaar-Franssen (VVD, 1963-1965) even decided that in order to be eligible for certain subsidies, minimum requirements be included with

⁹¹ *Kamerstukken II* 1968/69, 9800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁹² *Kamerstukken II* 1966/67, 8800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁹³ *Kamerstukken II* 1966/67, 8800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁹⁴ *Kamerstukken II* 1965/66, 8300, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁹⁵ *Kamerstukken II* 1969/70, 10 300, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1970/71, 10 900, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁹⁶ *Kamerstukken II* 1970/71, 10 900, nr. 2 (MvT)

regard to cooperation with other organizations and the government.⁹⁷ In 1966 minister Klompé had returned to the supervision of the ministry that by then was called CRM. Two years later she suggested a check on the measure in which civil society organizations aligned with the government goal of effectivity. This check was inspired by the notion that some of the work was done twice or without an actual need for it. So a clarification on the effectivity was supposed to lead to a closer cooperation between organizations, even to a point where organizations might consider mergers.⁹⁸ Therefore, by the end of the 1960s the Ministry of CRM showed a more explicit and active attitude towards improvement of manageability of the work field by further harmonization.

In the first part of the 1970s, the ministry's harmonization effort received support in an unexpected way. As a result of the oil crisis, the economic climate started to lose its vigor, and in an effort to shield the ministry from inevitable cutbacks, Minister Engels (KVP, 1971-1973) hurried to re-emphasize the rationale of the ministry's existence by stating that social-cultural policy was at least of the same value as social-economic policy:

“He who thinks (...) that social-cultural activities can only cost money when the social-economic needs are met, reduces these activities to a mere ornament of a collective or individual welfare situation.”⁹⁹

In addition, in order to support this rhetorical image he presented concrete actions: the economic situation seemed to ask from civil society organizations to make larger contributions, and additionally to reorganize into the most effective organizational mold available, including an effective deployment of personnel; actions that were very much in line with the ministry's policy on shared responsibility and harmonization.¹⁰⁰

5.3. Unforeseen effects

These developments have had their impact on the forming of social policy concepts. Professionalization had been regarded as one of the guarantees for improving the quality of social work, and therefore by 1970 professionalization had become a standardized stipulation in many subsidy arrangements. This emphasis on professionalization however, seemed to form a field of tension with another emerging underlying value: participation, represented by the policy concept of shared responsibility.

⁹⁷ *Kamerstukken II* 1964/65, 7800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁹⁸ *Kamerstukken II* 1967/68, 9300, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁹⁹ “Wie meent dat dit niet het geval zou moeten zijn en dat sociaal-culturele activiteiten pas geld mogen vergen als aan de sociaal-economische verlangens tegemoet is gekomen, verlaagt die activiteiten tot versiersels in een collectieve of individuele welvaartssituatie en ontkent aldus het hierboven geschetste wezenlijk belang ervan.” *Kamerstukken II* 1972/73, 12 000, nr. 2:4 (MvT)

¹⁰⁰ *Kamerstukken II* 1972/73, 12 000, nr. 2 (MvT)

Since the emergence of the social policy system an important incentive to induce civil society to take action was public money and subsequently various subsidy arrangements were created for different aims. This myriad of subsidies however, also had its organizational downside, because they were increasingly experienced as inconveniently arranged and impossible to gain an overview of, as if they were without system and efficiency.¹⁰¹ Another consequence of this growing policy system was that, as observed before, the allocated subsidies created a new demand for even more subsidies, because the expansion of civil society organizations demanded for additional funds in order to support the organizational and administrative structures. The policy on professionalism had increased the costs for civil society organizations, and combined with the developments of rising wages and market prices these costs had increased to such levels that the organizations themselves were not able to bear them. In reaction to this difficult situation, Minister of CRM Vrolijk (PvdA, 1965-1966) notified in 1965 to being prepared to step in with additional funds and also to decrease the percentage of the organization's contribution to the costs.¹⁰² By doing so, however, a central feature of the subsidy system as the confessionals had envisioned was endangered because this approach was directly at odds with the idea of shared responsibility. So even if the social policy system had its advantages with regard to policy reaction and implementation, it also had its unforeseen effects. And some of these would soon become the center of attention.

¹⁰¹ *Kamerstukken II* 1963/64, 7400, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1967/68, 9300, nr. 2 (MvT) *Kamerstukken II* 1968/69, 9800, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1969/70, 10 300, nr. 2 (MvT)

¹⁰² *Kamerstukken II* 1965/66, 8300, nr. 2 (MvT)

CHAPTER 2. FROM INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION TOWARDS INDIVIDUAL ACTIVATION (1974-1990)

1. Pinpointing the problems

At the beginning of the 1970s it had become clear that the total of subsidy arrangements and the number of civil society organizations that laid a claim on them, had created a complex and even problematic whole. This complexity diminished the accessibility of the arrangements for those who were in need, and thus these subsidies also lost some of their effect as a governing tool. Therefore attempts were made to come to a more univocal arrangement of the various subsidies, and in 1973 a committee was appointed to see how such a system could be forged: *Beraadsgroep Harmonisatie Welzijnsbeleid en Welzijnswetgeving* (Committee on Harmonization of Social policy and Welfare legislation). In May 1974, the committee finished its work and presented its first explorations.¹ In this report, that would soon become known as the *Knelpuntennota* (bottleneck report), the alleged social policy troubles were structurally analyzed.

The committee had audited the social policy and practice by means of five criteria: coherency of welfare provisions; public accessibility of these provisions; measure of democracy within the organizations that provided for these activities; measure of flexibility within these organizations; and the legal status of the organizations, their employees and their clients. The general outcome was that improvement was considered necessary on all levels. In that sense, the report was uncompromising in pinpointing many of the presumed inherent defects, tensions, contradictions and problems of the social policy system that had become visible during recent years. Also, the report seemed to be especially harsh on civil society.

The key word in the title was harmonization, which referred to the perceived discord between current social policy and its practical implications. The rapidly changing legitimization of social welfare during the 1960s had made social policy a repository for divergent issues, and in combination with a growing habituation towards the financial support of civil society organizations, the result was, according to the committee, an unmanageable combination of policies and organizations. The report put this “unbridled growth of activities, provisions, organizations, regulations, institutions, projects and subsidies” in a historical perspective and also made suggestions for improvement.²

On a macro level, certain elements that seemed to have caused this expansion were defined: economic and demographic expansion, development of sciences, a changing social awareness and fundamental criticism of the modern technological-industrial society. A second level of contributing factors had to do with the

¹ Beugels en Peper 1974

² “De onbeheerste groei van activiteiten, voorzieningen, organisaties, regelingen, instituties, projecten, subsidies (...)” Beugels en Peper 1974:10

stimulation of welfare as a result of government policy. Here, the report referred to the increasing growth of organizations within the ideological pillars and the subsequent variety in and between services. In addition, the emphasis on professionalism was regarded to be a part of the problems, as the report interpreted “professionalism” as “the replacement of the volunteer by the professional”.³ A third important element that contributed to this “unbridled growth” was the emphasis that government put on the availability of social provisions by means of financial support and other managerial instruments.

1.1. Counterproductive government policy

The problems that the committee pinpointed were complex in the sense that they were not to be attributed to just one single actor in the field of social policy. According to the report, they could be ascribed to the collective responsibility of different social work stakeholders: the national government, provincial and local governments and even the Dutch people, represented by their civil society organizations. The main problem concerning the government was that the balance between the different government levels seemed to invoke tensions. The effort by the national government to centralize policymaking in the form of harmonized welfare legislation was contrary to the growing need for decentralization and democracy within Dutch society. Another example was the fact that the subsidy arrangements were created on a national level, while citizens would hold their local municipality accountable for any lack of coherence.⁴ According to the report, a third problem on the level of the government was the assertion that the different areas of social policy were divided among different ministries and this diminished the managerial clout of the Ministry of CRM. Conclusively, some of the policy efforts that the government aimed at seemed to result in counterproductive effects.

This conclusion was also based on the analysis of a concealed development within civil society. According to the committee, one of the main forces that caused the myriad of organizations and the multitude of financial provisions had been strong specialization within the different areas of social work. The report interpreted this process of “functional pillarization” to be a substitute to the “crumbling ideological pillarization”. The fact that this development had been possible at all was, according to the report, due to the lack of deliberate and systematical central planning by the government, which had to be based upon a mutual consent with civil society.⁵ Although a clear social-democratic influence was visible in this phraseology, the study group stated that it could not be said that the government did not plan at all - it did, but in a non-coherent way.⁶ This

³ Beugels en Peper 1974:8

⁴ Idem: 12-16

⁵ Idem: 10

⁶ The committee was established under the rule of the social-democrat Cabinet-Den Uyl (PvdA – PPR – D’66 – KVP – ARP). This Cabinet was in charge from 1973 until 1977.

would not have been such a problem if the accompanying costs had not increased too much. However, they did. The total of costs for the Ministry of CRM as part of the national budget rose from 4.2% in 1966 to 9.4% in 1974 and the percentage of the budget of CRM that was earmarked for social work rose from 40% in 1966 to 74% in 1974, and thus strongly influenced the focus of the ministry.⁷ These expanding costs however, exposed another problem: inadequate control of the quality and coherence of the provided services by the civil society organizations.

1.2. Deficiencies of civil society

The *Knelpuntennota* was merciless on civil society. The characteristics of identity and representation that made civil society organizations valued partners to the government, appeared to have become deficient over time. One of the conclusions of the report was that especially in the case of “identity organizations”, the citizens, who paid for all these provisions and social welfare arrangements, hardly had any democratic influence on these organizations that represented them. The current system lacked any structural form of joint decision-making, and consequently had, according to the report, a negative effect on the measure of participation of the people to whom these arrangements applied. The report stated that during its development, civil society had lost much of its original core-strength of being in direct contact with its grassroots. It had lost its social *qui vive* and as a result many civil society organizations had become introspective and lacked any democratic influence on the part of their members on policy matters. “So”, the committee posed the rhetorical question, “how ‘private’ is the private initiative?”. Within this context of democratization, the committee made another interesting remark that directly touched on the more traditionally structured civil society organizations. It stated that some forms of public management were based upon archaic conceptions of hierarchical structure. These conceptions often tended to block the process of internal democratization and successively led to mere lip service being paid towards democratization, without any actual internal consequences.⁸

It was crystal clear that civil society was in a tight spot. Despite the positive intentions behind the creation of social policy by the government, the actual effects of that policy, according to the committee, seemed to work out contrarily, especially for civil society. The undetected problem of functional pillarization was worsened by the availability of new grants to accompany new regulations. On one side, this helped civil society to swiftly act on new kinds of social needs, but on the other hand, it seemed to create a lot of new specializations and organizations. This expansion paradoxically, diminished accessibility of these arrangements for their clientele by creating a chaotic range of services. Addi-

⁷ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:371-372

⁸ Beugels en Peper 1974:16

tionally, the growth in subsidies brought about considerable expenses, and even led to legal inequality between the different types of organizations that were active in different areas of the social work field and were held accountable in different ways. In addition, it was often not certain how much an employee would get paid until the government had decided on the amount and stipulations of the relevant subsidy. Therefore, next to functional pillarization, the extensive subsidy system also seemed to have led to greater insecurity for the organizations and their employees concerning their legal status. A third effect of the almost unlimited system of subsidization was that it had allowed for organizations to change into closed, undemocratic institutions, estranged from their grassroots. This policy effect also reflected in the area of personnel, for the policy aim of enhancement of quality was largely being accomplished by hiring well-educated professionals. The report implied that this emphasis on professionalization had an important negative side effect: the traditional driving force of civil society, the volunteers, faced marginalization, thereby further estranging civil society organizations from their members. Next to the influx of more professionally dedicated personnel replacing the more ideologically driven workers, the ongoing functional specialization and the scaling up of the many fragmented organizations into more coherent umbrella organizations contributed to the introversion that the study group detected among many of the civil society organizations. They had become undemocratic and therefore unrepresentative organizations that had drifted away from their original grassroots supporters.

2. Directions for improvement

In accordance with their assignment, the committee also made suggestions for an improvement of the situation that civil society found itself in. These so-called “keystones” were meant to set afloat the process of further harmonization.

2.1. Further decentralization

The main policy goal of welfare, being the advancement of cultural, social, physical and mental well-being, remained unaffected, and in order to achieve this goal, the pillarized social work field had to change into a more horizontally oriented structure. This meant a thorough reshuffling of the traditional structure of cooperation between different levels of government and also between government and the civil society.⁹ A main ingredient of this “horizontalization” would be further decentralization of policy planning and finances towards lower government levels. This rearrangement of responsibilities implied that the national government would ultimately remain responsible for the implementation of policy. The concrete planning however, would be handed over to lower governmental levels like provinces and municipalities together with relevant civil

⁹ Idem:20

society organizations, because they would be the ones to translate these policy efforts into concrete services. This inclusion of civil society in deliberations on a lower level was especially relevant because the proposed measure of decentralization meant that these organizations would no longer be funded by central government grants, but on a more local level, by community grants. In order to formalize this consultative structure, the suggestion was made to establish a so-called “point of crystallization”: a commission in which all relevant civil society organizations were represented.¹⁰

This new liberty of policymaking on a local level however, had the downside of possible legal inequality. Local differences between communities could easily be formalized into diverging regulations because the communities were able to enforce different standards upon civil society in order to be eligible for their grants. To avoid this, the central government would have to remain responsible for a balanced accessibility of basic provisions in the areas of care, culture and education.

2.2. Representation and harmonization

Even though the committee had defined the problem of a democratic deficiency within the civil society organizations, it did not suggest a direct solution. The committee however, did speak its mind on the issue of representation within the social work field in a broader sense. Representation would not only be expressed by the structure of the proposed commissions (crystallization point), but much more by the way these groups worked together.¹¹ With this, the study group envisioned a regular conference of representatives of all relevant actors in the policymaking process. The traditional principle of representation, which referred to the presence of all the different pillars in such meetings, was deemed “fiction” because of the supposed lack of democracy within these private organizations. Therefore, by introducing this view on representation of civil society by forcing it into a process of collective decision-making and thus furthering harmonization without much respect for its ideological diversity, the committee suggested a collision course towards the already crumbling pillarized consultation structure within the public sector.

Harmonization was also proposed for the area of policy. Like in its initial assignment, the committee underlined that the idea of creating a framework law that included all welfare legislation, could quite well help to provide for the desired unambiguous legal basis for the broad area of social welfare. Within this framework law, called *Kaderwet Specifiek Welzijn*, diverse elements of social welfare could be clustered and reorganized based on criteria like coherency, accessibility, democracy, flexibility and legal security. Though such an idea was

¹⁰ Idem:24

¹¹ Idem:25

presented previously, it now seemed to have found new support in the *Knelpuntennota*.

In order to realize these ideas, planning, organization, regulation and subsidy grants were suggested as the most effective policy instruments, but even though many of the suggested improvements were not quite new, they could gain renewed momentum in their implementation. This all depended on how the *Knelpuntennota* would be received by its political initiators.

3. The government's reaction

The confluence of the economic recession that was felt in its depth by the mid 1970s and the publication of the *Knelpuntennota*, seemed to reinforce the government's intention to revise the *modus operandi* with regard to civil society. To a certain extent, the report did not reveal new things because many of the described weaknesses of civil society were already known to both civil society itself as well as to the government. The actual impact seemed to come from the fact that now, any presumed structural weakness of civil society had actually been put into writing. Traditionally, civil society had been the provider of all kinds of social services, and because these services were fostered by the grand concept of welfare after World War II, civil society had become an extension of national social policy. The advantage of this position was that civil society had been able to influence the policy process, and additionally, as part of government's palette of tools, it had also been able to profit from the structural government support. The negative side of this position however, was that civil society also suffered from the diminishing legitimization of social policy itself, which negatively influenced the status of the related civil society organizations. With the *Knelpuntennota* in hand, the government now had a tool to come to a constructive policy with regard to civil society.

In their first official reaction on the report, Prime Minister Den Uyl (PvdA, 1973-1977) and Minister of CRM, Van Doorn (PPR, 1973-1977) stated that even though the conclusions were drawn on behalf of the committee, and although the government had yet to reflect on its position towards the outcome, they themselves found the description of the specific problems to be an appropriate starting point for further policy development.¹² The idea of decentralization of policy responsibilities and implementation especially, was given much attention in their letter to the parliament. In accordance with their social-democratic view however, Den Uyl and Van Doorn stressed the pivotal role of the central government in this process because according to them, the government would continue to have the ultimate responsibility for this field. On the other hand, the ministers acknowledged that the main idea behind decentralization – subsidiarity – was quite significant, because the replacement of responsi-

¹² *Handelingen II* 1973/74, 12 968, nr. 1

bilities on a local level would improve visibility and accessibility of any policy effort.¹³ With that in mind, the central government would only intervene, according to these social-democratic ministers, when the local government did not live up to its responsibility and seriously neglected its tasks. Or, secondly, when the national or supra-local interests would prevail over local interests.¹⁴

This continuation of decentralization as a policy theme implied that things would also change between the government and civil society. With the transfer of policy power and subsidy jurisdiction, cooperation with civil society was also assigned to lower administrative levels. The ministers openly acknowledged that the proposed continuation of decentralization meant a disruption of the current situation. Now that local or regional governments would become the main subsidizers, a renewed orientation of civil society towards the government seemed inevitable.¹⁵ Instead of doing business with one central institute like a ministry, civil society would from now on have to focus on different local situations. What remained the same however, was the central role of the national government in determining a guiding policy that contained elements like quality, legal security, measure of need, diversity and financing. The *Knelpuntennota* suggested continuing the use of policy instruments like planning, organizing, subsidizing and regulation, and even though the responsibility for its results would increasingly be attributed to the local governmental bodies, the scope and direction of the policy that local governments would complete would still be determined by the national government.

Also unaltered was the importance that the government attached to the cooperation with civil society. The process of planning for social policy and decentralization required not only national and local governments to carefully work together, but also civil society organizations to be involved in order to align and coordinate their activities and services. The report stated that the assumed professional pillarization had induced a compartmentalization of services within the whole of civil society, which had resulted in a great amount of fragmentation, insecurity and a lack of transparency in who was doing what. In accordance with this observation, the ministers proposed to create a coherent program to come a reallocation of subsequent activities and tasks.¹⁶ In combination with the proposed decentralization, the different governmental bodies would continue to have the ultimate responsibility, but with the explicit stipulation that this would not affect the functioning of civil society organizations.

¹³ *Handelingen II* 1973/74, 12 968, nr. 1:2

¹⁴ *Idem*

¹⁵ Letter from the Prime Minister Den Uyl and Minister of CRM Van Doorn to the Second Chamber, *Handelingen II* 1974/75, 12 968, nr. 3:2

¹⁶ *Idem*:8

3.1. First decisions

The suggestion that was made in the *Knelpuntennota* on further decentralization was conceptualized by the Ministry of CRM by creating a new subsidy arrangement that also supported the earlier efforts of work field harmonization. The national subsidy system in which the national government allocated grants to civil society organizations, would in the near future be replaced by a contribution system in which the national government allocated lump sums to local governments. This local approach aimed at improving the effectivity of the allocated funds. In addition, harmonization of social policy would be addressed in a more constructive manner. The committee that wrote the *Knelpuntennota* suggested the establishing of an ‘umbrella’ Act – a sort of enabling legislation that formed the framework within which all relevant social subsidy arrangements and their legislation would be gathered.¹⁷ Additionally, and in line with the government approach to shared responsibility, this umbrella act would help to structurally decentralize many of these arrangements to lower administrative levels, and in turn, it would strengthen public involvement. From 1976 onwards, the government set out to realize such legislation, in close consultation with civil society.¹⁸

On the matter of democratic deficiency within civil society, another committee was established: *Commissie van advies inzake het Democratisch en Doelmatig Functioneren van Gesubsidieerde Instellingen* (Advisory Committee on the matter of Democratic and Effective Functioning of Subsidized Institutions). This committee, whose name was swiftly abbreviated to ‘DDF’, was burdened with the task of studying the possibilities for democratic participation of the employees in organizations that received government grants. This was partly a matter of legal incorporation, because the government wanted to know which legal form (foundation or association) seemed to be most relevant to civil society organizations. Maybe even a new legal form would have to be created in order to accommodate these organizations.¹⁹ The relevancy of this particular matter was clear because at that time the second book of the Dutch Civil Code was in the making, and herein, rules were laid down with regard to legal incorporation. In 1977 the DDF-Committee presented its report and it was only in 1984 that its successor *Stuurgroep Democratisch en Doelmatig Functioneren van gesubsidieerde instellingen* (Steering Committee Democratic and Effective Functioning of Subsidized Institutions), also called *Interdepartementale Stuurgroep Dijk* (Interdepartmental Steering Committee Dijk), produced a rough draft

¹⁷ Beugels en Peper 1974:29-30.

¹⁸ *Kamerstukken II 1975/76*, 13 600, nr. 2 (MvT); De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:124-130

¹⁹ *Commissie-Van der Burg 1977*

of legislation. This sketch was however not codified, but was divided between two separate Acts in the mid-1990s.²⁰

4. New policy lines: towards individual activation

Due to the economic decline, a growing unemployment, and an erupting discontent with the welfare system itself, during the second half of the 1970s a profound debate started on the tenability of the welfare state. In 1978 sociologists Van Doorn and Schuyt made a comprehensive analysis of many different aspects that were deemed wrong with the Dutch welfare state. In *De stagnerende verzorgingsstaat* (The stagnating welfare state) they argued that the welfare state lacked any “wellfounded reasoning”. Any adjustment of the “technocratic redistributive machine” that the welfare state had become, had to create better accessibility of welfare provisions for all that needed it.²¹ Sociologists Adriaansens and Zijdeveld added fuel to these flames. While Van Doorn and Schuyt had addressed the problem of the immobilizing effect of “welfare consumerism”, Adriaansens and Zijdeveld reacted more strongly. In their opinion, the welfare state robbed the citizens of their individual responsibility for their own welfare, invoking an “immoral ethos”.²²

4.1. Participation: civil society as supportive structure

In 1976 however, the government still openly appreciated cooperation with civil society, be it increasingly on a local level, the intention to decentralize only seemed to weaken the position of civil society in the social policy system; a shift that can even be interpreted as a subtle vote of no confidence from the side of the government. In terms of identity and representation, civil society seemed to have lost part of its relevance as a government instrument, but not all of it. Minister Van Doorn claimed that civil society was still functional to the implementation of social policy work, but only when it was prepared to consider taking up more than merely being representative of its rank and file.²³ In order to pave the way, Van Doorn suggested a new role for civil society.

The traditional form of civil society with “all kinds of institutions that have too little connection with their grassroots or in which their grassroots can hardly monitor the run of things”, had served its turn.²⁴ The new function that Van

²⁰ Wet medezeggenschap cliënten zorginstellingen (29 februari 1996, *Staatsblad* 1996, 204) and Wet klachtenrecht cliënten zorgsector (29 mei 1995, *Staatsblad* 1995, 308). For further elaboration on this subject see: Chapter 5.6.

²¹ Van Doorn en Schuyt 1978:11-13.

²² Adriaansens en Zijdeveld 1981:103-124

²³ The person of the Minister Van Doorn (Harry) is not to be confused with the above mentioned sociologist Jacques van Doorn.

²⁴ “(...)allerlei instellingen, die te weinig verbinding hebben met een achterban of waarbij de achterban nauwelijks de gang van zaken kan controleren.” *Kamerstukken II* 1975/76, 13 600, nr. 2:6 (MvT)

Doorn suggested, was one of individual activation: “Private initiative in the sense of self-activation and personal responsibility of citizens.” This was the new kind of civil society that, according to Van Doorn, was to form the backbone of welfare work.²⁵ This idea made a clear distinction between the former idea of civil society as institutions that represented homogenous groups in society, and a new individualistic approach where the idea of self-activation was proclaimed to be the new panacea for the lack of public participation. This idea fit the spirit of the 1970s very well. As a result of the emancipatory vigor of the preceding decade, an awareness of personal individuality had grown, which for the younger generation seemed to have been formalized into several subcultures that were often linked to different popular music scenes. On another level, democratic influence, anti-statism, and a growing suspicion of a dominant government gave rise to a more individualistic society. In combination with the economic slowdown that had become perceptible during the mid-1970s and its subsequent unemployment problem, this governmental claim for self-activation was quite understandable.

4.2. Participation: revaluation of the volunteer

This new approach was made even more explicit by minister Van Doorn. Professionalization was to remain one of the continuing policy aims in order to improve the quality of service. To this end, the *Knelpuntennota* suggested that certain requirements of competence and suitability be applied for the personnel of the organizations that provided social services. Nevertheless, with this consolidation of the role of the professional in order to increase the quality of the organizations and their services, the volunteers had started to become marginalized. This process of marginalization had previously been acknowledged and even partly accepted by the government, and until 1973 the Ministry of CRM even supported this development by stipulating certain conditions that the volunteer had to meet: volunteers were no longer the core of the staff, but had to fulfill a complementary role to the professional. They also had to be screened for personal aptitude and show some willingness to undergo education and training.²⁶ After the publication of the *Knelpuntennota* however, the governmental attitude towards volunteers seemed to have changed course. In 1976 the Ministry of CRM decided to make money available for the development of the role of the volunteer within social services – a first time occasion. In order to legitimize this approach, minister Van Doorn argued that the motivating force of the volunteer was his or her identity:

²⁵ “Het particulier initiatief in de zin van zelfwerkzaamheid en eigen verantwoordelijkheid van de burgers (...)” *Kamerstukken II 1975/76*, 13 600, nr. 2:6 (MvT)

²⁶ *Kamerstukken II 1973/74*, 12 600, nr. 2 (MvT)

“Volunteers often organize themselves in organizations of all sorts (playground-associations, national youth work organizations, action groups, playgroups, etc.) with a distinct identity. This individual characteristic plays a large role in the measure to which volunteers are prepared to commit themselves.”²⁷

This statement can be interpreted to mean that the volunteers were not only the bearers of the organizational identity, but that this “identity” also provided for an intrinsic motivation for these volunteers to do their jobs.

Also, the economic hardship had awakened interest for inventive and especially cheaper ways of work. Throughout the country, innovative local activities on social work were initiated and some had caught the eye of the ministry. At the same time that the role of the professional became the subject of debate in the academic realm, the ministry also acknowledged that the position of the volunteer towards the professional was quite vulnerable and more attention would have to be given to the professional encouraging the volunteer instead of dominating him or her.²⁸ The volunteer was increasingly regarded to be important to the welfare work, so, “rehabilitation of the volunteer is [sic] necessary in order to develop solidarity to the fullest, without which good welfare work cannot thrive”.²⁹ As an additional argument however, the minister stated that the increasing costs that accompanied the growing number of professionals urged to look for alternative and cheaper labor, and volunteers provided a convenient solution to this problem.³⁰ Therefore, next to emphasizing the importance of the volunteer in forming a part of the organizational identity as an intrinsically motivated worker, now a more economic perspective of reducing labor costs also seemed to gain ground. Even the apparent moral argument of the commitment of the volunteer based on his or her identity seemed to be part of an economic reasoning: the greater the presence of intrinsic commitment, the more this would turn into a drive to work and do better.³¹ Therefore, the Ministry of CRM stated that the strengthening of the role of the volunteer had become one of its priorities.³²

²⁷ “Vrijwilligers organiseren zich vaak in organisaties van allerlei aard (speeltuinenverenigingen, landelijke jeugdwerkorganisaties, actiegroepen, peuterspeelzalen etc.) met een duidelijke eigen identiteit. Die eigenheid speelt een grote rol in de mate waarin vrijwilligers bereid zijn zich in te zetten.” *Kamerstukken II 1976/77*, 14 100, nr. 2:65 (MvT)

²⁸ In Chapter 5 the academic debate on the role of the professional will be elaborated on.

²⁹ “Een eerherstel van de vrijwilliger is nodig om in het welzijnswerk solidariteit in zijn volle omvang te brengen, zonder welke goed welzijnswerk niet kan gedijen.” *Kamerstukken II 1977/78*, 14 800, nr. 2:5 (MvT)

³⁰ *Kamerstukken II 1977/78*, 14 800, nr. 2 (MvT)

³¹ *Kamerstukken II 1978/79*, 15 300, nr. 2 (MvT)

³² *Kamerstukken II 1979/80*, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1980/81*, 16 400, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II 1984/85*, 18 600, nr. 2 (MvT)

4.3. Individual activation: towards a ‘caring society’

The economic climate had hardened during the second part of the 1970s. In 1978, the Dutch Cabinet - Van Agt I (1977-1981) presented a memorandum called *Bestek '81* in which thorough economization was announced and in which the cabinet revealed the contours of its view on how the market could play a part in this process.³³ Nonetheless, by 1982 the unemployment rate had increased to 13.5% of the labor force and the budget deficit had increased to 8.2% of the national income.³⁴ The general assumption was that the preferred Keynesian approach of demand management had failed to resist the incidental (inter)national pressures that had added to the crisis. This was not regarded as a problem caused by cyclical fluctuations in the market, but as a predicament of a more structural nature that was no longer to be resolved by a Keynesian approach.³⁵ An alternative was found however, in the idea of yet another structural counterforce that seemed to be provided for by the “free market”.³⁶ No longer would the market be strongly regulated by the government, now government policy had to become subservient to market developments.³⁷

This new approach to economic liberalism seemed to have interpreted the liberal concept of freedom quite differently from how it was formed during the second half of the eighteenth century. The original idea of liberalism was directed against the feudal system of the French *Ancient Regime* and aimed to create a state apparatus as a neutral buffer between the whimsical power of the French monarchs and the French people. This “buffer state” had expanded swiftly during the advancement of Dutch welfare in the twentieth century and it was exactly this extensive welfare state to which the so-called neoliberals reacted against during the 1980s. The neoliberal interpretation of the concept of freedom had thus changed from aiming for freedom guaranteed by the state, into freedom from state interference.³⁸ One of the consequences of this new approach was the emergence of a new political culture of a businesslike and sober nature – “non-sense politics” – that was personified in the subsequent Cabinets-Lubbers (Lubbers I: 1982-1986, CDA-VVD; Lubbers II: 1986-1989, CDA-VVD; Lubbers III: 1989-1994 CDA-PvdA) and would be recognizable well into the 1990s.³⁹

On many of the above policy issues, close consultations with institutional civil society was still the motto during the 1980s, even though the governmental level on which it occurred was increasingly changing from the national to local

³³ *Bestek '81, Hooflijnen van het financiële en sociaal-economische beleid voor de middellange termijn* 1978

³⁴ Aerts *et al.* 1999:318

³⁵ WRR 2006:34

³⁶ De Rooy 2002:268

³⁷ Aerts *et al.* 1999:319

³⁸ Reijngoud 2012

³⁹ Aerts *et al.* 1999:321

or provincial levels. On this front, civil society was not only asked for its opinion, but also for its approval of many new policy lines. This was exemplified by the involvement of civil society organizations in the discussions on the effects that certain cutbacks would have on the organizations that would be affected by them.⁴⁰ The power of civil society to generate public support for such unpleasant measures was very much welcomed by the state.⁴¹

The previously launched effort to increase both the manageability of the social work field and the social policy arrangements, was further developed during the 1980s. To a growing extent, rhetoric on “public participation” and “effectiveness of civil society” was combined with the policy lines of decentralization⁴² and supporting the volunteer.⁴³ This combination was also perceptible in the government effort to create comprehensive enabling legislation, such as the afore mentioned *Kaderwet*. Moreover, in terms of organizational harmonization, further unification was desired.⁴⁴ This however, also meant that if it wanted to remain a relevant player in the field of social welfare, the institutionalized civil society had to modernize thoroughly in terms of democratization and effectiveness.⁴⁵ The summarizing term that the government coined to voice these main policy aims was “responsible society”:

“Decentralization, democratization, room for private initiative, volunteer commitment (...) are all instruments for development of human possibilities. (...) Development of individuals is a prerequisite to come to a ‘responsible society’.”⁴⁶

According to the Catholic Minister of CRM Gardeniers-Berendsen (CDA, 1977-1981, 1982 a.i.), the main driving force of this responsible society had to be the public itself:

⁴⁰ *Kamerstukken II* 1988/89, 20 800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁴¹ *Kamerstukken II* 1978/79, 15 300, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1982/83, 17 600, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1983/84, 18 100, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1984/85, 18 600, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1989/90, 21 300, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁴² *Kamerstukken II* 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1982/83, 17 600, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1983/84, 18 100, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁴³ *Kamerstukken II* 1977/78, 14 800, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁴⁴ *Kamerstukken II* 1977/78, 14 800, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1983/84, 18 100, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁴⁵ *Kamerstukken II* 1977/78, 14 800, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1978/79, 15 300, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁴⁶ “Decentralisatie, democratisering, ruimte voor het particulier initiatief, inzet van vrijwilligers, (...) zijn evenzovele instrumenten ter ontplooiing van de menselijke mogelijkheden. (...) Ontplooiing van de individuele mens is een voorwaarde om tot een “verantwoordelijke maatschappij” te komen.” *Kamerstukken II* 1978/79, 15 300, nr. 2:7 (MvT)

“To accomplish this, we want to point to the citizen his responsibility for society and his solidarity with his fellow citizen, often based on ideology or world view.”⁴⁷

Therefore, even though worldviews and ideologies were still valued by the government on the level of the individual citizen, the civil society organizations that had traditionally represented these, seemed to have lost their prominence in this process.⁴⁸ As was already indicated by Van Doorn in 1976, it would now be the turn for a new individualistic version of civil society, and the government had set its intentions on shifting at least some of the responsibility for a general well-being on to the public itself. It was exactly this new support for individual activation of citizens, for instance in their role as volunteers, that offered civil society a chance to once again align its goals with the government and to give itself new meaning and relevance.⁴⁹

This line of thought on individual activation of citizens was also attuned to the assumed increase of dependency on welfare provisions, for “the availability of welfare provisions is believed to have created its own demand”.⁵⁰ Now the tendency of habituation to state provision had become visible on both the meso-level as well as on the micro-level. By once again stressing the importance of individual self-help capacity, availability of a social network and voluntary contributions from individuals to society, the Ministry of CRM concluded that:

“These developments are also the result of social isolation and alienation and the associated decreasing availability of spontaneous voluntary aid.”⁵¹

However, the government also took some responsibility. Minister of CRM De Boer (CDA, 1982) acknowledged that during the last two decades, the government had taken over certain diaconal and charitable tasks on the matter of social care from civil society, which had not only led to a boost in professional care, but it might very well have nourished the idea that the government was responsible “also in cases in which aid was needed on the basis of mutual responsibility”.⁵²

⁴⁷ “Daartoe willen wij de burger aanspreken op zijn verantwoordelijkheid voor de maatschappij en zijn solidariteit met de medeburger, veelal stoelend op levens- of wereldbeschouwing.” *Kamerstukken II* 1979/80, 15 800, nr. 2 (MvT); compare to *Kamerstukken II* 1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2 (MvT); *Kamerstukken II* 1982/83, 17 600, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁴⁸ *Kamerstukken II* 1980/81, 16 400, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁴⁹ *Kamerstukken II* 1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁵⁰ “(...) het aanbod van voorzieningen zou de vraag ernaar hebben geschapen (...)” *Kamerstukken II* 1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2:4 (MvT)

⁵¹ “Deze ontwikkelingen zijn mede een gevolg van vereenzaming en vervreemding en de daarmee verbandhoudende afnemende beschikbaarheid van spontane vrijwillige hulpverlening.” *Kamerstukken II* 1981/82, 17 100, nr. 2:4 (MvT)

⁵² “(...) ook in situaties waarin hulpverlening op basis van verantwoordelijkheid voor elkaar geboden was.” *Kamerstukken II* 1982/83, 17 600, nr. 2:3 (MvT)

In 1983 CRM was renamed as the *Ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur* (WVC, Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture) and its first head, minister Brinkman (CDA, 1982-1989), continued on this *mea culpa* by tying together the two lines of voluntarism and the undesired dependency on government care. In addition to increasing opportunities for the free market system, minister Brinkman focused on mobilization of the sense of social responsibility within the Dutch society. By introducing his concept of ‘caring society’, he presented his solution to the problems with which the ‘welfare state’ was associated.⁵³ From that moment on, according to Brinkman, the Dutch public had to become aware of the fact that one had to take responsibility for his or her own life and those of his or her fellow men.

Referring to the report *Herwaardering van Welzijnsbeleid* (Reassessment of Social policy) by the *Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid* (WRR, Scientific Council for Government Policy), Brinkman argued that the citizens were not to become too dependent on professional care, for they might, as a consequence, lose awareness of their own capabilities and responsibilities.⁵⁴ Brinkman added:

“And in continuation of that idea, in my opinion more room has to be given to the individual responsibility and initiative of citizens. Because of that, volunteer work and its advancement has to take a prominent place in the policy.”⁵⁵

But next to solidarity with fellow citizens, Brinkman emphasized another motive in the ministry’s promotion of volunteer work – a motive that had surfaced before in times of economic hardship. For, especially with the current rate of unemployment, volunteer work offered an interesting alternative to paid labor.⁵⁶ So, by 1985 the ministry had put the individual activation and responsibility of citizens as central to the idea of welfare by developing notions such as ‘self-care’, volunteer aid for people close by (in Dutch: ‘mantelzorg’), and volunteer work in other areas. Other policy aspects were effectivity, cost reduction, strengthening of internal cohesion and restructuring. The management philosophy of the ministry was to merely stimulate rather than to regulate on matters of organization, development of methodology and other innovation. Therefore, besides its conditional and supportive role, the government was to stay aloof.⁵⁷

⁵³ Brinkman 1989; *Kamerstukken II* 1987/88, 20 200, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁵⁴ WRR 1982

⁵⁵ “In het verlengde van die opvatting ben ik van mening, dat meer ruimte moet worden gegeven aan de eigen verantwoordelijkheid en het eigen initiatief van burgers. Daarom dient het vrijwilligerswerk en de bevordering daarvan een belangrijke plaats in te nemen in het beleid.” *Kamerstukken II* 1983/84, 18 100, nr. 2:22 (MvT)

⁵⁶ *Kamerstukken II* 1984/85, 18 600, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁵⁷ *Kamerstukken II* 1985/86, 19 200, nr. 2 (MvT)

On the matter of harmonization, the ministry reacted with much more interference. According to minister Brinkman, there were too many national civil society umbrella organizations and they were too diverse. So, once again, a thorough restructuring was announced: *Herstructurering Landelijke Organisaties* (HLO, Restructuring National Organizations). In this new harmonization effort however, the matter of identity was pushed to the back by a new emphasis: from now on, organizations were to be clustered by functions that were relevant to the social work demand.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Brinkman substantiated the government's stance of aloofness in 1987 by emphasizing the argument of the responsible society. Financial and administrative arguments pressed for a less active role of the government in expenditure and regulation of welfare. But the increase in responsibility, strengthening of the position of civil society by freedom in policymaking, and a better division of responsibilities and tasks between different governmental levels and the civil society, would stand in as reinforcements to substitute for the role that the government had supposedly occupied.⁵⁹

This freedom in policymaking was to be created by a decrease in regulations and loosening of the relation between the civil society organizations and the ministry. The subsidy system would have to be changed from an output oriented system towards one based on budgetary funding. Thus in order to improve the effectivity of the organizations, research was being executed on the possibility to replace the structural annual subsidies by a system of budget-grants. That meant that instead of being able to count on a regular and predictable flow of income, every organization would have to base its budget on an annual business cycle of planning and reporting. The allocated amount of money would become more dependent on the organization's vision, plans, and results, than before.⁶⁰ This would contribute to the self-sufficiency of civil society, and according to the minister, this policy approach would help 'private initiative to focus on the question of public support and the identity and quality of its work'.⁶¹

The results of this 'no-nonsense' policy of retrenchment and neo-liberalization became clearly visible during the 1990s, when privatization of government activities like the national mail service PTT (1989) and the national railroad company NS (1993) started to take place. In addition, social welfare arrangements were curtailed and reorganized. The social welfare expenditures were reduced by cutbacks in the allowances and limitation of the possibilities for qualification for a disability benefit. This was the first time since World War II that the expansion of the Dutch welfare state arrangements was actually halted.⁶² A renewed emphasis on economization of social policy areas like care, educa-

⁵⁸ *Kamerstukken II* 1986/87, 19 700, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁵⁹ *Kamerstukken II* 1987/88, 20 200, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁶⁰ *Kamerstukken II* 1986/87, 19 700, nr. 2 (MvT)

⁶¹ "(...) zal het particulier initiatief ook meer bepalen bij de vraag naar het maatschappelijk draagvlak en de identiteit en kwaliteit van het werk." *Kamerstukken II* 1988/89, 20 800, nr. 2:14 (MvT)

⁶² De Beer 2007:128

tion, and social welfare gained visibility in terms like *doelmatigheid*⁶³ and formed a structure of incentives to activate individuals. The result was the closure of two “escape routes from the labor market”, by reducing the allowances and rendering the application for social benefits more difficult.⁶⁴ While overall, this policy resulted in a retrenchment of the budget deficit, in terms of employment promotion, the government waited for the market to contribute.⁶⁵

The charting of this course from the welfare state towards the participation or activation state was accompanied by another important development that had already begun. During the 1980s the government’s intention to decentralize policy power, the conferment of grants and its subsequent responsibilities to lower (provincial and municipal) administrative levels was taking formal shape. Its aim was to close the gap between the administrative hub in ‘The Hague’ where the seat of the Dutch parliament and the government was located, and the Dutch people. Local municipalities were seen as being capable of allocating money to where it was deemed most necessary. Additionally, efficiency and effectivity were expected to increase. In order to regulate this development, in 1985 a financial arrangement regarding social welfare was made with the four largest Dutch cities. The cities entered into a covenant with the Dutch government and thus obtained liberty of policy under government supervision.⁶⁶ These ‘covenant-cities’ were Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam and Utrecht, and in 1994 this cooperation was formally instated as the G4-agreement. This development however, did not do much to change the position of civil society towards the government. Even though policymaking efforts were decentralized to lower levels, it was still the government that remained dominant in this field of social welfare issues. Civil society had only to change its focus with regard to the administrative levels with which it had to deal, but, as implied by the term itself, with the transition from the welfare state towards the activation state, it would still be the state that was in control.

5. Summarizing overview of social policy themes

Through this account of how the Dutch state and civil society related to one another with regard to welfare issues, three main policy themes come to the fore: quality, participation and manageability. The interpretation of these themes in terms of social policy lines, however, slowly altered throughout the different phases of the developing Dutch welfare state. Additionally, two other elements

⁶³ The Dutch word *doelmatigheid* has to be translated as a combination of ‘efficiency and effectiveness’. In Chapter 5.6.2. more attention will be given to this word and its policy implications.

⁶⁴ Visser en Hemerijck 1998:30; WRR 2006:34

⁶⁵ Aerts *et al* 1999:323

⁶⁶ This financial arrangement was called: *Financieringsregeling Welzijnsovereenkomst vier grote gemeenten* (Financial Arrangement on Welfare Four Large Cities). ‘Besluit nr. 634 “Aangaan subsidierelatie met de Amsterdamse instellingen voor gezinsverzorging.”’, *Gemeentebled Amsterdam*, April 8, 1986.

seemed to have defined the relation between civil society and the state. The first was the matter of state interest in social welfare issues and matter of prime responsibility for welfare, and the second was how the matter of identity was valued.

During the prewar decades, the government started to show an increased interest in welfare issues. Social policy was created on a national scale, and the traditional mutual distance between the government and civil society changed into a tentative, but increasingly structural, form of collaboration. For civil society this collaboration meant a new source of income and an increase in their security of existence. For the government, this collaboration meant that by providing for the necessary resources and regulations, it now had a partner that was willing to implement its policies. The prime responsibility for poor relief however, remained with civil society, as was re-emphasized by the 1912 Poor Law.

With regard to social policy themes, the theme of quality of the work was interpreted along the policy lines of professionalization, during the prewar era. Professionalization of civil society organizations was to be brought about by improvement of the administrative accountability and education of the involved workers. The need for manageability of the fragmented work field called forth an emphasis on harmonization within the dominant social structure of pillarization. The ideological identity of civil society organizations became an increasingly important factor in the positioning of civil society towards the state, especially with regard to its binding capacity within these pillars.

However, already during the first decades of the twentieth century, this newly defined relationship between the Dutch state and civil society led to some unexpected and even contradicting consequences: an increase in the number of organizations; growing gaps between the pillars within certain areas in the work field and consequential strengthening of the ideological pillars; and a preliminary dependency on and habituation to government support.

The budding social policy system came under fire after World War II. The Dutch welfare state developed, and with the establishment of the Ministry of Social Work, the government showed that it took its social responsibilities very serious. The result was a structural government interest in social welfare issues through legislation, regulation and financial support for the civil society organizations that implemented government policy. In addition, civil society showed a growing interest in this collaboration and it made increasing use of subsidies. At the same time it gained policy influence.

During the first postwar decades, the policy theme of quality continued to be emphasized in terms of professionalization of the organization and its staff. Administrative streamlining and employee education were now not just required, but were also facilitated financially. The theme of manageability was also continued in policy lines. Harmonization of the work field was increasingly shaped by the creation of umbrella organizations. On the other hand, more and more types of social work and organizations came into existence, and therefore it became even more difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of the work and sub-

sequently of the financial arrangements. Additionally, three new government strategies on manageability became visible at the beginning of the 1960s: 1) decentralization of policy responsibility to more local governmental levels; 2) a need for consolidation of the work field by a more univocal social policy; and 3) strengthening of individual ability to provide for oneself. In this policy process, the characteristic of the organizational identity of civil society continued to be valued because of its binding capacity, and as the representative of its grass-roots, civil society remained an important partner to the Dutch state on matters of social welfare. In addition to the policy themes of manageability and quality, a third social policy theme emerged during the postwar decades: participation. Already in 1955, the government aimed to create a sense of shared responsibility with the representative organizations of the people, that is to say, with civil society. This idea came to be a structural part of the government's policy approach since the mid-1950s. Public participation in politics as well as with regard to their own well-being, had to be increased through community organization and social planning, but also through spurring volunteer work.

With the introduction of the ABW in 1963, however, civil society lost an important function of providing for material social work to the government. On the other hand, the non-material side of civil society still made it a valued partner for the government. In its legitimization for the deployment of civil society organizations, the government stressed that both their identity as well as their representational function were important assets, especially with regard to participation of the public. This made civil society organizations important instruments in the effort to create public involvement through shared responsibility. Another complementation to the effort to create public involvement was made during the second half on the 1960s when a growing emphasis on democratization and the volunteer was observed.

With the beginning of the 1970s, a slow but fundamental change with regard to social welfare was visible. Economic decline, the *Knelpuntennota*, academic and public debate of the tenability of the Dutch welfare state, all reflected on the role of civil society. Counterproductive effects of the social policy system were pinpointed, and civil society was no longer regarded as representing its grass-roots, because the organizations had been estranged from their grassroots as a result of secularization and a lack of democratic participation. So, in line with the spirit of democratization and emancipation, the government once again, but now much more explicitly, emphasized the important role of the volunteer as a possible panacea for reviving the sense of shared responsibility on an individual level. In addition, the volunteers were a lot cheaper. Civil society now had lost much of its worth as a partner to the government because it was 'closed', 'introverted', and focused on raking in subsidies, instead of achieving effectivity. Thus civil society faced the threat of being sidelined unless it was able to reinvent its function. On the other hand, the government needed civil society, for who else could implement the necessary social policy?

These galling bonds were not easy to loosen. However, minister Van Doorn suggested a way out. Shared responsibility started to change into personal re-

sponsibility, as was reflected in the social policy themes, and in 1976 Van Doorn distinguished a possibly new and more relevant interpretation of individualized civil society as a replacement of the traditional and now obsolete form of institutionalized civil society. In the role these organizations could play in reinstating the value of the volunteer, civil society was offered a chance to retain its relevance to the government.

PART II

THE SALVATION ARMY'S IDENTITY PROCESS

(1887-1990)

CHAPTER 3. THE SALVATION ARMY AND THE SOCIAL POLICY SYSTEM

1. The Salvation Army's two-fold mission

1.1. Religious propagation

The Salvation Army was established in 1878 in the poverty-stricken area of East-London. In a blend of social disruption that resulted from the sweeping industrial revolution, and an atmosphere of spiritual reawakening fanned by evangelists like Finney and Moody, founding father William Booth brought his Christian Mission to the next level and tightened the organizational reins. At first Booth envisioned his organization to be an evangelization movement that found its *raison d'être* in converting as many people to Christianity as possible. An important principle that Booth stood by, was that if a person would experience inner spiritual change, he would also change his behavior in a structural way and thus be able to find his way out of this misery, and if not, any social care would eventually be in vain.¹ Within the ranks of the Salvation Army, this ideology of self-activation was supported by figurative rhetoric like the metaphor of the derailed train: if a wrecked train was put back on its tracks unrepaired, it would very likely be wrecked again sooner or later.² Compared to the Christian Mission, the most important feature of the novel Salvation Army was the rich imagery. It derived its name from the idea of an army of soldiers battling the spiritual evil of the times. Also, its organizational configuration resembled the structure of a standing army.³ Other features remained the same. Preaching the gospel of salvation remained the core business and the organizational structure to provide for the necessary spiritual care for converts was embodied by a 'corps'. These corps were often small, local groups that held religious Sunday services and also incidentally offered social services for its members and the local community.

The military rhetoric that was used within these corps suggested a certain amount of aggression in its approach of corps planting: "During the past year we went over to the offensive and we have opened fire on fifteen other cities and villages."⁴ But this belligerent style was more symbolic than anything else, for corps were mostly started up randomly, and above all this happened without any violence from the side of the Army. In order to start a new corps the local population had to officially put in a request with the Salvation Army. The Army then

¹ Booth 1890

² Maris 1991:102

³ Ringelberg 2005:21-50

⁴ "Gedurende het afgelopen jaar zijn wij den aanval begonnen en hebben wij het vuur geopend in 15 andere steden en dorpen." *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1890:7

assessed whether there was a certain measure of non-religiousness and a social need in that particular area. Only if these requirements were met, a new corps could be established.⁵ When the approval to start a new corps came through, a Salvation Army officer would become responsible for its management. Nevertheless, the local community itself had to provide for a suitable building that could function as the community center. Additionally, the corps had to generate enough financial means in order to support its own activities and the commanding officer. Soup kitchens, handiwork activities, coffee, an occasional meal, paid labor and collection of second hand clothing – these activities could be part of the palette of social activities a corps offered. Activities that were often larded with spiritual advice. However, even though the structure of a corps might imply otherwise, the Salvation Army had no intention of becoming a church by itself. Instead it acknowledged being a part of the worldwide church of Jesus Christ. In fact the Army was in the habit of referring converts to other traditional local churches for their spiritual education.⁶

The spectacular increase in the number of corps in the United Kingdom during the first few years of the existence of the Salvation Army, exemplified its success. The Army grew from 50 corps in 1878 to more than 1000 in 1886. Also on an international level its success became perceptible: by 1883 the Salvation Army had opened new branches in The United States, Puerto Rico, Australia, France, India, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, South Africa and New Zealand. In 1887, the first Salvation Army corps in Amsterdam opened its doors to the somewhat suspicious Dutch public.

1.2. Social care

By then however, after 40 years of preaching the gospel in the most destitute areas of London, Booth had once again changed course, though on a fundamentally different level. From his many years of experience in the London slums, Booth concluded that “a hungry stomach doesn’t have ears”⁷ and thus he acknowledged that social aid was indispensable in order to prepare the hearts of people for the gospel:

“But what is the use of preaching the Gospel to men whose whole attention is concentrated upon a mad, desperate struggle to keep themselves alive? You might as well give a tract to a shipwrecked sailor who is battling the surf (...) and threatens to drown him. He will not listen to you. Nay, he cannot hear you anymore than a man whose head is underwater can listen to a sermon.”⁸

⁵ Ringelberg 2005:99

⁶ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1892:7; Ringelberg 2010:57

⁷ This commonly used expression within Army ranks is generally ascribed to Booth.

⁸ Booth 1890:63

So in order to make people susceptible to the message of redemption, their social needs also had to be met, and thus Booth set out the boundaries for what would be called his 'social plan'. In his work *In Darkest England and The Way Out* (1890), Booth analyzed the social misery that had permeated a significant part of the English society.⁹ He presented a three phase system of care on the basis of outreach activities that could bring relief to those who had no helper. The first phase would be to actively search for people in need, by actually living in the poorest neighborhoods and being in touch with as many people as possible. Usually the members of the corps were charged with this duty and when possible, help was offered on the spot. However, others that could not be helped at the moment were referred to Army shelters, called "city colonies". This was part of the second phase. After a period of time these people would hopefully be re-socialized and able to return to their former place in society. Those who were not yet able to do so could learn a trade or other handiwork skills in a so-called "farm colony" or "land colony". If that too did not help them to find their way back into society, they would qualify for the third phase: a fresh start in a so-called "overseas colony", far away from the troublesome situation of which they had such bad memories. Elaborating on his three phase plan, Booth had sketched clear outlines for other methodic forms of aid concerning various groups that needed social assistance: alcoholics, pauperized young boys and girls, elderly people living in the streets of London, criminals that were to be released from prison and also people suffering from psychological disorders. For all these groups different approaches were suggested, and above all, the social services that Booth described were saturated with religious edification. In fact, preaching and practicing were to go hand in hand, as depicted in Booth's description of the work of a "slum sister":

"The Slum Sister is what her name implies, the Sister of the Slum. They go forth in Apostolic fashion, two-and-two living in a couple of the same kind of dens or rooms as are occupied by the people themselves, differing only in the cleanliness and order, and the few articles of furniture which they contain. Here they live all the year round, visiting the sick, looking after the children, showing the women how to keep themselves and their homes decent, often discharging the sick mother's duties themselves; cultivating peace, advocating temperance, counseling in temporalities, and ceaselessly preaching the religion of Jesus Christ to the Outcasts of Society."¹⁰

So, twelve years after the establishment of the Salvation Army in the UK, Booth supplemented his theology with the ideology of social action, making both activities the two fundamentals on which the Salvation Army would build its organization in England, as well as internationally.

⁹ In his opinion this was about 10% of English society.

¹⁰ Booth 1890:180

1.3. The Salvation Army in the Netherlands

Booth's *In Darkest England* was rapidly translated for the international market and when already in 1891 a Dutch version was published, a swift adjustment of focus was demanded from the 37 Dutch corps. An adjustment that, according to Salvation Army historian Johan Ringelberg, would be facilitated by the bitterly cold Dutch winter of 1890-1891 that offered the Salvation Army a chance to put its new social work ideas into action with effect.¹¹ In Amsterdam the Army opened its doors for people seeking refuge from the cold, and *de facto* the first of the Dutch Army's structural social services was created: "refuges".

The Salvation Army was not the only type of social work, stemming from the UK that rooted in the Netherlands, as the example of the Toynbee work shows.¹² The Army too, was able to create a durable position in the Dutch society, at least partly due to this combination of social and religious activities. This was reflected by the growth in the number of corps from 37 in 1890 to 48 in 1892, in combination with the fact that the social work activities of the Army needed their own balance sheet in the 1892 annual financial report.¹³ In this report the Salvation Army emphasized that its social activities were born from distress that was caused by the harsh winter and no mention was made of the new insights of General Booth. Nevertheless, the Dutch territory agreed with Booth's view on the double mission of social work and religious salvation:

"We realized that if we wanted to inspire the soul, we had to do a lot for the body; we discovered that they were not able to comprehend a gospel that stated: "go hence, be warm and replete, before we had offered them a bed to rest their tired limbs and had helped them into a condition in which their thoughts would not be occupied entirely by physical needs to such an extent that they would lack the time to contemplate higher things."¹⁴

However, as this quote underlines, social work alone would not suffice. The ultimate solution to material and social misery could only be found in spiritual conversion. Therefore the main endeavor of the Salvation Army would be the winning of souls.

Soon after the harsh winter of 1890, the number of corps grew and the scope of their social work activities widened. Only five years after the introduction of Booth's social plan, the Dutch Army had opened 74 corps. Numerous social work activities were set up at quite an impressive rate. Already in 1895, the

¹¹ Ringelberg 2005

¹² See Chapter 1.3.1.

¹³ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1892

¹⁴ "Wij zagen, dat als wij de ziel wilden bereiken, wij moesten beginnen veel te doen aan het lichaam; wij ontdekten, dat zij een Evangelie, dat zegt: "gaat henen, wordt warm en wordt verzadigd", niet vatten konden, aler wij hen een bed hadden verschaft, om er hunnen vermoeide leden op uit te strekken en hen in een toestand gebracht, waarin niet de zorg voor het lichaam al hunnen gedachten zoodanig bezighield, dat zij geen tijd hadden om aan iets hoogers te denken." *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1892:21

Salvation Army was responsible for 9 refuges for the homeless; 2 refuges for women, 1 elderly home, 2 slum posts, 2 training schools, 1 land colony, a trade office and national headquarters.¹⁵ In 1890, these corps and the various social activities were managed by 233 officers who were answerable to the national leader, called Territorial Commander (TC). The commander was appointed by the General in London, a constellation that secured the identity of the rapidly expanding international Salvation Army. On January 25, 1896, the 'Foundation The Salvation Army' was established.¹⁶

The organizational development of the Dutch Army continued into the first decades of the 20th century. By 1913, for example, the Army had started "industrial homes" in order to help the homeless and unemployed to make themselves useful. These industrial homes recycled all kinds of waste, like paper and broken furniture that was gathered from the cities. The refurbished goods were sold in the local thrift stores that were also managed by the Army corps. There were also homes and sanitariums for children and over time, the Army had developed a successful national probation program.¹⁷ Among all the different social services that the Salvation Army developed in the Netherlands, the two sides of its mission (spiritual and social work) were most visible in the Army's "Goodwill centers". Of the three Goodwill centers that the Salvation Army would open in the Netherlands, Amsterdam was the oldest and largest. In an effort to help the poor, the homeless, prostitutes and other needy people in the poorest areas of Amsterdam, social programs and spiritual aid were combined in activities like, for example, a women's shelter, a men's shelter (*De Gastenburgh*), an elderly home (*De Goodwillburgh*) and family care activities. During the twentieth century, these Goodwill centers would become rather exemplary of the Army's approach towards urban social problems. An example is Major Bosshardt¹⁸, the driving force behind the Amsterdam Goodwill center between 1948-1978, who transparently expressed her view on the way this work could be most effective as follows: "If we don't preach the gospel any more, we might as well hand over the lot to an undenominational organization."¹⁹ This resonated with her view on staffing: no social work without the involvement of soldier-volunteers, for in Bosshardt's view they were the bearers of the Army's identity as they embodied both sides of its mission. In this way, the Goodwill centers were working exam-

¹⁵ *De Wijde Wereld*, No. 9, September 15, 1895 (UA 1128 inv.nr. 1)

¹⁶ *De stichting "Het Leger des Heils"*. Extract uit de *Acte van Stichting* (date unknown) Amsterdam: Salvation Army (UA 1182, nrs.171 and 172)

¹⁷ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1812/13

¹⁸ Even though A. Bosshardt is known by the Dutch people as Major Bosshardt, she was in fact promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

¹⁹ "Als wij het evangelie niet meer brengen, laat dan een neutrale instelling de boel maar overnemen." Quoted in: Harm en Polman 1982:39

ples of the practical religion that resulted from the two-pronged strategy of the Salvation Army.²⁰

1.4. Two branches of the same tree?

In its own exegesis of its two-fold mission, the Salvation Army stressed that the equilibrium of spiritual and social relief originated from the love of Christ:

“Between both, religious and social work, exists an immediate connection. They spring from the same source. Both are branches of the same tree.”²¹

Viewed from this perspective, the shared roots of spiritual and social care make both missions equally important. However, in the elaborate description of the Army’s social work activities that filled the 1913 annual report, the Army did not miss a chance to accentuate that everything that the Salvation Army endeavored was done in order to win new souls, a predominance that was justified by Booth’s argument that people would no longer be inclined to do wrong when delivered from sin:

“The Salvation Army believes (...) that when a man is relieved from his sins, he no longer steals, no longer drinks, no longer squanders his money, nor neglects his family. And more significantly, he himself becomes a serious opponent of all this evil. Hence seeks the Salvation Army in all its works the conversion of people’s hearts towards God.”²²

So, even if both objectives were seen as branches of the same tree, their function differed as they showed “no difference in principles, nor in aspirations, but in methods”.²³ Nevertheless, the social objective seemed to be instrumental to the spiritual one, because in the Army’s view, alleviation of social and material needs was considered a prerequisite for possible spiritual conversion. Thus, even though the Army seemed to value both parts of its missions equally, they both served a higher goal: conversion. But though the Army’s social activities aimed at the winning of souls, Booth had placed his ideas on social work in an explicit framework of impartiality and voluntariness. When people entered the Salvation Army programs, they would encounter an open-minded organization:

²⁰ By 1982, the Amsterdam Goodwill Center had developed into a professional social work organization employing 130 people, many of who were social workers. See: Harm en Polman 1982:39

²¹ “Tusschen beide, geestelijk en maatschappelijk werk, bestaat een onmiddelijk verband. Zij komen uit dezelfde bron voort. Beide zijn taken van één boom.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1912/13:113

²² Het Leger des Heils gelooft (...) dat als een man verlost is van zijn zonden, hij niet meer steelt, niet meer drinkt, geen verkwister meer is, noch zijn gezin veronachtzaamt. En wat meer zegt: hij wordt zelf een ernstig bestrijder van al dat kwaad. Daarom zoekt het Leger des Heils in al zijn werk voor alles de bekeering van ‘s menschen hart tot God.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1912/13:8-9

²³ Geen verschil dus in beginsel, noch in doel, maar in werkwijze.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1912/13:115

“(...) no compulsion will for a moment be allowed with respect to religion. The man who professes to love and serve God will be helped because of such profession and the man who does not will be helped in the hope that he will, sooner or later, in gratitude to God, do the same; but there will be no melancholy misery-making for any. There is no sanctimonious long face in the Army. We talk freely about Salvation, because it is to us the very light and joy of our existence.”²⁴

Although prayer, singing and attending religious gatherings were core activities of the Army's corps, this was never obligatory for those who sought help from the Army. If, for example, a “Colonist” did not want to attend a religious Sunday service, he was allowed to spend the Sunday as he pleased, except for doing his regular work, because the other rules regarding the Sabbath were still strictly observed. So, according to Booth, “it will be the fault of the Salvation Army if they do not find our Sunday Services sufficiently attractive to command their attendance”.²⁵ It also did not matter which denomination one belonged to, or even whether you were a believer at all. Anyone that knocked on the doors of the Salvation Army had to be welcomed in without prejudice:

“Now that we have happened upon more fortunate times, let us recognize that we are our brother's keepers, and set to work, regardless of party distinctions and religious differences, to make this world of ours a little bit more like home for those whom we call our brethren.”²⁶

Notwithstanding Booth's accent on the tolerant character of the Army's social aid, the Army officers, on the other hand, were trained evangelists, and not without reason. Those who worked in the children's homes, for example, were made aware of their first and foremost task: “(...) to bring the boys that are trusted to their care to the faith”.²⁷ So, even if the twofold objective of the Salvation Army was proverbially described as two branches of the same tree, or put in Army terms ‘two sides of the same coin’, the fact that the social dimension was appreciated as instrumental to the spiritual one would soon prove its worth. It would be precisely these social fruits of the Army's work that would become visible to the Dutch society, creating an image of a social charity that seemed to determine the outline of the Army's public identity.

²⁴ Booth 1890:134

²⁵ Idem:163

²⁶ Idem:105-106

²⁷ “(...) de aan hun zorg toevertrouwde jongens te brengen tot het geloof in Christus.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1912/13:50

2. Reciprocity and instrumentalism (1887-1940)

2.1. Initial income and expenditure

Even though it was not required by the Dutch government yet, the Salvation Army kept its books almost from the start. Even though there are no sources available to support this suggestion, it is plausible to assume that this was partly the result of a demand by its English alma mater in order to gain insight on the annual progress of the Dutch territory.²⁸

Another reason might have been to secure the trust of its grassroots, as from the very beginning the Army made an appeal to its supporters in its financial reports: “Thou who reads this, help us to defray the pecuniary consequences of our battle.”²⁹ As stated above, soon after the publication of Booth’s *In Darkest England*, the structure of finances of the Salvation Army reflected its two-pronged mission, because it had created separate bank accounts for its religious and social work activities in order to keep the flows of these funds apart. This strict separation of finances was regarded as very important in winning the confidence of the Dutch public, as was emphasized in the Army’s annual reports: “The funds allocated for the social activities will be used for that work only, and cannot be used for another purpose.”³⁰ So, in order to encourage the public in their benevolent contributions, the Salvation Army described how the donations were appropriated:

“The foundation ‘The Salvation Army’ shall gratefully receive Bequests or Donations for its labor, that it performs night and day, the whole year round, for the spiritual and social uplifting of the people. Funds donated for ‘General Maintenance’ will be employed for the general preservation of the work; and those specified for “Social Work” will go to one of the following tasks of our work: rescue homes for women, slum posts, children’s homes, boys homes, girls homes, mother homes, land colony, industrial homes for men, refuges for men, and the same for women and children, and for the soon to be opened evening home for the elderly”.³¹

²⁸ A suggestion made by the Army’s former manager of finances, K. van Teijlingen, interview August 18, 2010.

²⁹ “Gij die dit leest, help ons in het dragen der geldenlijken gevolgen van onzen strijd”. *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1890:22

³⁰ “Het geld voor het maatschappelijke werk bestemd, wordt uitsluitend voor dat werk gebruikt en mag niet voor een ander doel worden gebruikt.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1892:23

³¹ “De Stichting ‘Het Leger des Heils’ zal met dankbaarheid ontvangen Legaten of Giften voor zijn arbeid, die dag en nacht, het heele jaar door, wordt verricht voor de geestelijke en maatschappelijke opheffing van het volk. Gelden die gegeven worden voor “Algemeen Onderhoud”, zullen worden aangewend voor de algemeene instandhouding van het werk; en die, welke voor het “Maatschappelijk Werk” worden gegeven, komen ten bate van den een of andere van den volgende taken van ons werk: reddingshuizen voor vrouwen, barmhartigheidsposten, kinderhuizen, jongenshuizen, meisjeshuizen, moederhuis, landskolonie, industrieële tehuizen voor mannen, toevluchten voor mannen, idem voor vrouwen en kin-

So by means of the annual reports, the Army showed its willingness to be transparent to its contributors. For after all it was the Dutch public, together with the swiftly growing sales department, that generated the bulk of the Army's income during the first years of its Dutch conquest. This way, even though separate accounts were created for the two branches of the activities of the Army, the general drive behind its work was openly confirmed: to spiritually and socially educate the people.

This approach paid off. As the development of the Army's expenditures indicate, the social objective of the Army had been maturing gradually during its first two decades in the Netherlands. Until 1900, the costs of the religious activities exceeded the expenses incurred on social activities. But by 1908 the social mission had gained ground, because by then, approximately the same amount of money was spent for both missions. By 1910 the social objective accompanied the religious mission of the Army on an equal basis and the 'two sides of the coin' were in balance. From then on, however, the source of their growth would start to diverge increasingly. The religious activities would be supported by private income that was generated by donations and other public fundraising activities. The social activities on the other hand, would increasingly be supported by subsidies that were issued by the national and local governments.

2.2. Probation services of the Salvation Army until 1945

One of the most structural social services of the Salvation Army was its probation program for ex-prisoners. In the United Kingdom, this service had formed a part of the Army's palette of social care since its very beginnings. Based on his own experiences during a three month detention, William Booth concluded that imprisonment was not a very successful approach to resocialize people. Even worse, it led to social bonds being severed and the return into society especially, was often a period of strong disorientation that was interlaced with non-acceptance by the very society these people tried to rejoin. So in order to help released prisoners to adjust to their new environment, the Salvation Army started the prison gate houses. These houses were located, literally, as close as possible to the exit of the penitentiaries, and Salvationists were on the look-out for released prisoners to offer them "bread, bed and a bath". Additionally, they offered a possibility to work or to take part in some other activity to help them to get used to society again. As part of this program in the Netherlands, some of the men were sent to the farm colony *Groot Batelaar* in Lunteren. This work-community was situated in the Dutch woodlands called the Veluwe and aimed to offer ex-prisoners a non-urban working environment. Additionally, the Salvation Army used these remote and secluded accommodations for alcoholics to dry out. The importance of this work for facilitating the resocializing of released prisoners was stressed by the fact that it was regarded to be an obligation for all "social

deren en voor het weldra te openen Avondstond-tehuis voor ouden van dagen." *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1919/20:27

officers of the Salvation Army” as laid down in their orders and regulations.³² However, long before the Salvation Army started its own probation department, some Salvationists were already active visitors of prisoners, be it on account of the *Nederlandsch Genootschap tot Zedelijke Verbetering der Gevangenen*.³³ This however, was not the only probation organization in the Netherlands, for during the first decade of the twentieth century approximately 80 probation organizations were active. These were often small and locally orientated groups and only four of these organizations were active on the national level, one of which was the Salvation Army.

Financial development

In 1905 the Army showed the first signs of organizational professionalization when it grouped all its social activities into the Army’s Department of Social Work amongst Men, which was headed by G. Maste. And also with regard to the Army’s probation work, changes were forthcoming. Until 1902 the probation work was based entirely on public charity. This meant that that the Army had to pay for its own probation activities.³⁴ This changed during the first years of the 20th century as Minister of Justice, Loeff (1901-1905, *Algemeene Bond*) made the first subsidy available for probation work. In 1905 the Salvation Army’s probation department received its first government grant as part of a bulk grant to the *Genootschap*. This money was earmarked to support the aftercare for released prisoners as was provided for by Groot Batelaar. These initial government grants however, were far from substantial. From 1906 onwards, both the *Genootschap* and the Salvation Army received fl.1,500 and the rest was divided amongst the other organizations. In 1908 this had amounted to fl.2,500. Next to the total of fl.526,501 that was reserved by the Army itself for all of its social activities of 1911, the amount of national subsidies of fl.2,000 seemed to be a pittance (about 0.4%). Five years later however, this subsidy offered by the Ministry of Justice had increased to 3% (fl.5,000) of the Army’s social service expenditure and by 1925 this fund already covered about 9.5%.³⁵ Even though the state interest in supporting civil society with regard to probation work grew, the actual funds were rather modest, also when viewed from the perspective of the government. In 1913, for example, out of a total budget of fl.10,000,000, the Ministry of Justice had reserved a mere fl.7,500 for probation activities on the nationwide level.

³² Maris 1991:27

³³ The first entry in the annual financial reports on account of probation activities can be found no sooner than 1908, implying that until then, the Salvation Army operated mainly under supervision of the *Genootschap*. Also, the *Het Nederlandsch Genootschap tot Zedelijke Verbetering der Gevangenen* changed its name in 1930 into *Nederlands Genootschap tot Reclassering*. During this study I will use the term *Genootschap*.

³⁴ Regrettably, the lack of relevant sources in the Salvation Army’s archives makes a reconstruction of these local funds impossible.

³⁵ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1910/11; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1915/16; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1925

One of the results of this state support was that it sparked a discussion within the ministry on the issue of accountability, because the government had no means to ascertain how the money was spent.³⁶ This lack of accountability was also one of the reasons for Catholic Minister of Justice Nelissen (1908-1910, RKSP) to bring into force the so-called *Reclasseringsregeling* (Probation code) of 1910.³⁷ The main goal of this order was to allow the “free organs in society” to execute their probation work. Its secondary aim, though not less important, was to ensure a certain measure of government control on the quality of the probation work that it was paying for. Already at the very beginning of the twentieth century, and soon after the first subsidies were issued, it became clear that the government aimed at more than just offering support to civil society to expand its work. It also wanted to improve the quality of the work that these organizations carried out.

Hesitations

The debate within the Ministry was not the only discussion that was sparked by the emerging state support. Also within the *Genootschap*, this support and its possible consequences were discussed. One side of the board suggested that in order to ensure the independence and freedom of the *Genootschap* to make its own policy, it would be best for it to work apart from the government. Others argued that this would only take the *Genootschap* to an isolated position and would not contribute to the work of the organization. Eventually, the *Genootschap* reached an internal compromise that after having participated in the probation system for a year, an evaluation of its results and effects would follow. The decisive argument that concluded the debate clearly reflected the awareness of the organization’s position towards the Dutch government: the *Genootschap* was in dire need of funds, which made cooperation with the government “unavoidable”.³⁸

The Salvation Army showed even more reserve as it clearly hesitated in its decision to join the arrangement. For the Army too, compliance with the *Reclasseringsregeling* would mean that it would be obliged to inform the minister on a regular basis by reporting on the progress of the to-be-released prisoners. Through this bureaucratic prerequisite, the ministry not only wanted to exert control over the quality of the work, but additionally, the probation organization would only be paid for its services upon the actual release of the prisoner.³⁹ So, with this system of payment in arrear, the Salvation Army had to invest first, but without the certainty of reimbursement. This forced the Army to scrutinize the effectiveness of its methods. Nevertheless, even though the *Genootschap* submitted its declaration of willingness to the Minister of Justice in early 1911, it

³⁶“het (ontbrak) de Regering ten enen male aan gelegenheid na te gaan op welke wijze het geld werd besteed” Maris, 1991:31

³⁷ *Reclasseringsregeling* 1910, *Staatsblad* 374, December 24, 1910.

³⁸ Heinrich 1995:79-80

³⁹ *Idem*:89

would take until 1912 for the Army's Territorial Commander to comply. The available historical sources do not reveal the cause of this delay, but Ringelberg suggested that part of this delay was caused by the Army's International Headquarters that, seemingly without any motivation, blocked the application by withholding its approval.⁴⁰

However, by 1912 the Army had decided to send in the application. This choice may well have been facilitated on a personal level as the inspector in question with the Probation Office of the Ministry of Justice, Veenstra, was an active member of the Salvation Army. And as a Salvationist, he was most probably well-informed on both the probation activities of the Salvation Army and the possibilities to gain support for this effort from the government.⁴¹ It is even suggested that both Veenstra and the chairman of the *Genootschap*, Fentener van Vlissingen, repeatedly urged the Army command to comply with the grant system.⁴²

On December 13, 1912, the Salvation Army was acknowledged as an official association for the care and resettlement of prisoners, and therefore it had become eligible for structural subsidy which made the probation work was the first Army activity that was structurally subsidized by the Dutch government.

Pillarization and harmonization

Also on a national scale, the *Reclasseringsregeling* of 1910 had an important effect, for it stimulated the increase in probation organizations and their cooperation. In the light of the ongoing process of pillarization, this expansion nourished the need within the work field for far-reaching cooperation between the various probation organizations. In order to further this intention, in 1912 the *Genootschap* and other probation organizations combined forces under an umbrella organization: *Vereeniging van Reclasserings Instellingen* (VvRI, Association of Probation Societies).⁴³ This process of harmonization within the pillars continued during the decades that followed. In 1917, the Catholics founded their *Roomskatholieke Reclasseringsvereniging* (RKRV, Roman Catholic Probation Organization, RKR) and in 1928, the Calvinist Protestants *Christelijk Reclasseringsvereniging* (PCRV) was established. These organizations formed the umbrellas for their particular grassroots, and with the Protestant branch opening its doors, the ideological segmentation of the probation field had become a fact.

The Salvation Army regarded this development from the sideline. In the opinion of the Army, there were only two sorts of probation organizations: non-religious institutes and religious, pillarized ones.⁴⁴ However, the Army regarded itself as a third, non-partisan alternative to this classification. This position was

⁴⁰ Ringelberg 2005:177

⁴¹ Ringelberg 2010; Fijn 1990:17

⁴² Heinrich 1995:79

⁴³ Idem:100

⁴⁴ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1929

based on the target group they chose to focus on, for theoretically, the to-be-discharged prisoners were allowed to choose a probation organization that suited them best according to their personal philosophy. In practice, however, the Catholic and Protestant organizations had been focusing mainly on “their own” people.⁴⁵ The Salvation Army however, traditionally focused on the deprived, homeless and vagrants, irrespective of their personal beliefs.⁴⁶ So, within the context of a pillarized Dutch society, the Salvation Army probation service was the only available institute for people who did not (want to) have a connection with an established religious denomination, but nevertheless wanted help from a faith-based probation organization. Additionally, as Ringelberg observed quite saliently, serving this type of clients also opened the door to obtain government grants.⁴⁷ So with regard to the probation work field, the Salvation Army had begun to define its own place within the pillarized Dutch society. By refusing to be confined to a certain denominational part of the Dutch public, it aimed to enlarge its possible work field. On an organizational level however, the Salvation Army decided to follow a strategy of cooperation. At the time of its establishment in 1915, the Army joined forces with the ‘general’ probation umbrella organization VvRI, and to ascertain its influence in this new form of cooperation, Salvation Army’s Head of the Department of Social Work Amongst Men, Maste, was appointed as an executive member of the board of the VvRI.⁴⁸

By 1928, the organizations that were active in the field of probation had divided themselves in three parts: faith-based (umbrella) organizations amongst which were the RKRK, the PCRK and the Salvation Army’s Probation Department; the Ministry of Justice; and the VvRI with its central bureau that managed many local probation programs. Additionally, all these entities worked more or less under the coordination of the *Genootschap*. This structure however, was expensive and complex, as indicated by the head of the *Genootschap*, N. Muller; it was an “organizational monstrosity”.⁴⁹ So, reorganization and further harmonization seemed imminent.

Reciprocity and instrumentalism

The initial cooperation with the Ministry of Justice soon revealed its consequences for the Army. In 1913, officers were appointed to start up and coordinate probation services within the 40 Army corps. The government grant, because of its stimulating effect within the Army corps, had started to become quite welcome.⁵⁰ In the wake of World War I however, the first signs of dependency on these finances started to show. The economic hardship that followed the war forced the Dutch government to economize, but even though

⁴⁵ Ringelberg 2010:175; Heinrich 1995

⁴⁶ Maris 1990:142

⁴⁷ Ringelberg 2010:173-175

⁴⁸ Fijn 1990:18, Maris 1991:38

⁴⁹ Heinrich 1995:140

⁵⁰ Maris 1991:31-33

large cutbacks were held off, the increase in subsidies halted. At first glance this was not a problem for the Army, however, the leveling of the grants was combined with two other developments, which together actually did create a financial retrenchment during the second half of the 1920s. The first development was that the number of probation organizations that applied for financial support grew consistently, so now the same amount of money was to be divided amongst a growing number of organizations. The second development was that in combination with the leveling in income, the probation caseload for the Salvation Army grew from 1392 clients in 1927 to 3140 clients in 1937.⁵¹ As a consequence, the administrative pressure multiplied as every client had to be screened and extensively reported by the probation officer. This work pressure resulted in an increasing need for a larger staff, for which now even less government money was available.⁵²

In order to curb this negative effect of its participation in the budding social policy system, the Salvation Army fell back on a more or less implicit strategy. Together with the VvRI and the *Genootschap*, the Salvation Army protested against this growing economic pressure on their organizations. For this, an economic argument was used: “The probation service has saved the state thousands of guilders.”⁵³ By stressing this economic effect of reciprocity, the Salvation Army sought to create a sense of added value, and with success, for subsequently the Dutch parliament provided for a temporary increase in the subsidies.

This strategy of reciprocity was not new to the Salvation Army, however. The Army had never hesitated to stress its added value to the state by presenting itself as an almost indispensable partner. In fact, it had been applying this strategy since its very start in the Netherlands:

“(…) and it is not less certain that the Army is a blessing to the state and not a small asset to the authorities, who often express the highest praise and appreciation for our work. A shallow view on our work already reveals (…) how this crowd, - of drunks, of bad fathers and husbands, of people that never visit a church, of unfortunates cast aside by society, this ominous and growing army of malcontents, - once a threat to the state and a burden to the community to which they belong, now converted, fully changed for the better, taking care of their wives and children, whom they abused and left to starve, now a pride of the nation, which they used to disgrace – in all regards has become an asset to the state.”⁵⁴

⁵¹ Ringelberg 2010:174-176

⁵² Maris 1991:40-41

⁵³ “De reclassering heeft voor het Rijk duizenden bespaard”, Maris 1991:40-41; Heinrich 1995:132

⁵⁴ “(…) en niet minder zeker is het, dat het Leger een zegen is voor den Staat en geen geringen hulp voor de overheden, die zich dikwijls met den grootste lof en de meeste waardering over ons werk uitlaten. Reeds ene opperlvakkige beschouwing van ons werk doet zien (…) hoe deze meenigte, - van dronkaards, van slechte vaders en echtgenooten, van menschen, die nooit eene kerk bezoeken, van ongelukkigen door de maatschappij uitgeworpen, dat dreigende en steeds aangroeiende leger van ontevredenen, - eens een

By 1918, the Salvation Army had become even more self-confident on its position towards the Dutch government, for in its own view it had become “an important factor in the system of social instruments, of which the government makes use of increasingly to fight social deterioration.”⁵⁵ In these terms, the Army actively put itself at the disposal of the state as one of the available instruments to obtain shared policy aims. On the other hand, this rhetoric also seemed to emphasize that the national government in its turn was quite dependent on private organizations like the Army in order to fight social misery.

The developing liaison between the Salvation Army probation department and the Ministry of Justice helped to make a structural and professional probation service possible. For the corps this meant that structural social work activities came into being, and at the same time probation work was consolidated and began to form a recognizable unit within the Army. These internal Army developments were closely related to the context of the changing probation work field. The Salvation Army probation department seemed self-willed in its position within the Dutch pillarized society. However, its structural liaison with the government seemed to stimulate a different organizational dynamics than for the other social activities provided for by the Army. With World War II looming up on the horizon, the contour of an organization within an organization became visible, because while the other social services were still relatively undeveloped, the Salvation Army probation department had shaped the foundations for a semi-professionalized organization. In this regard, the probation department was way ahead of its time compared to the rest of the Salvation Army. Nevertheless, towards the close of the antebellum, the Salvation Army had seemed to have proven its relevance to the Dutch society and the government. In its rhetoric, the Army had emphasized its added value in terms of reciprocity and even as an instrument for the government to work with. In practice, its social work branch operated three children’s homes; two boys’ houses and one girls’ house; one motherhouse; two shelters for women; three refuges for women and children and five for men; eight slum posts; three old people’s homes for women and one for men; one rest-home for women and two nursing homes; three hotels; four city colonies (called *Metropool*) and a farm colony called *Groot Batelaar*.⁵⁶

gevaar voor den staat en een last voor de gemeente, waarin zij thuis behooren, nu bekeerd, geheel veranderd en verbeterd, zorg dragende voor hunnen vrouwen en kinderen, die zij vroeger mishandelden en lieten verhongeren, nu een sieraad van de natie, die zij vroeger tot schande verstrekten – in alle opzichten een aanwinst voor den staat is geworden.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1892:7

⁵⁵ “(...) een meetellende factor (geworden) in het samenstel van sociale middelen, waarvan de Regeering zich in toenemende mate bedient ter bestrijding van maatschappelijke achteruitgang.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1917/18:3

⁵⁶ Ringelberg 2005:169

3. The Salvation Army: a valued partner (1945-1980)

3.1. The Army's attitude of supplementarity

World War II also left its mark on the Dutch Salvation Army. In March 1941, the German occupiers forbade the Army to continue its activities.⁵⁷ It did continue nevertheless, but under different circumstances. Also on a material level, the Army suffered damages. This destruction of Army property and disruption of its social and religious activities was sketched by the Dutch Army Territorial Commander Durman (1946-1950) as follows:

“A number of church halls were destroyed by the acts of war; numerous homes for social labor were raided and ransacked; the nursing home at the Land Colony in Lunteren was completely demolished; the farmlands neglected; the valuable livestock was deported to Germany; the camp houses of our youth center in Lunteren were also taken down and the available materials were used for other purposes; valuable printing presses and typesetting machines of our printing house ended up in the Russian Zone. Our work in Rotterdam suffered great damage because a number of buildings for social and spiritual work were destroyed.”⁵⁸

The costs of this restoration of buildings and services were estimated to be about fl.3,500,000, an amount that clearly exceeded the almost penniless treasury of the Salvation Army. The Dutch public however, showed its appreciation for the Army and by means of the annual National Collection in 1946, the Army gathered a handsome amount of fl.365,000. This was a large sum, especially when taking into account the postwar economic and material deficiencies that many Dutch people suffered. In that light, this display of public generosity demonstrated the popularity of the Salvation Army among the Dutch people. Nevertheless, this amount would not suffice by far, and so the Army's International Headquarters came to their help with an annual contribution to further the restoration of the Dutch Army's territory. Additionally, new legislation was issued to help churches and other religious institutions with their material recovery. According to the Army, this was not a sudden gesture, but was inspired, at least for a part, by the postwar increase in public religiosity. World War II seemed to have awakened a certain spiritual need amongst the Dutch people, as was observed in the sudden influx of people during the weekly Army gatherings. In

⁵⁷ For further exploration of this period, see Chapter 4.1.4.

⁵⁸ “Een aantal kerkzalen werd door de oorlogshandelingen verwoest; tal van Tehuizen voor Sociale Arbeid werden leeggeroofd en uitgeplunderd; het Verpleegdenhuis op de Landkolonie te Lunteren werd geheel afgebroken; de landerijen verwaarloosd; een kostbare veestapel naar Duitsland weggevoerd; de Kamphuizen van ons jeugdcentrum te Lunteren werden eveneens gesloopt en de vrijkomende materialen voor andere doeleinden gebruikt; drukpersen en zetmachines onzer drukkerij tot een grote waarde kwamen terecht in de Russische Zone. Ons werk in Rotterdam leed grote schade, doordat een aantal gebouwen voor sociale en geestelijke arbeid werd verwoest.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1946:1*

order to meet this spiritual demand, the Army intended to increase the number of corps from 99 in 1946 to 150 before 1950.⁵⁹ So, in disregard of its urgent material need, the Salvation Army displayed clear ambitions to undertake new activities and expand its reach on social problems. In addition to the existing 49 homes and shelters for women, youngsters, children and elderly, 18 new homes were planned and new officers were needed in order to staff these new accommodations and programs.⁶⁰

The atmosphere of restoration was also reflected in the attitude that the Army's General, Albert Orsborn (1946-1954) showed towards the Salvation Army in the Netherlands when, next to visiting the Dutch territory, Orsborn also offered financial support. During this first postwar visit in 1946, Orsborn also keenly observed a change in the governmental attitude in the Netherlands towards the idea of providing for a basic social security. Orsborn noticed that the state was increasingly taking social matters in its own hands, but according to him that would not mean that the Army would no longer have a place in the social work area. The Dutch Army would have to show flexibility and look towards adapting to its new position:

“The social services that the Salvation Army wants to offer the public, keep pace with the social developments. As the social development makes progress and governments start to do all kinds of things that were provided for by the Army in the past, we change our tactics.”⁶¹

Additionally, Orsborn expressed his views on how this repositioning could affect the work of the Salvation Army's:

“It is a fallacy to assume that in a socially highly-developed society there would be no room left for the social work of the Army. The contrary is proved. In countries where governments have implemented far-reaching social measures, the supplementary services of the Army are appreciated all the more. The Army asks itself: what is necessary, what has to be done; how can the Army place itself in the service of society and the country in which it operates, and depending on the answer the social services will be organized and performed.”⁶²

⁵⁹ This ambition would never be actualized. In fact, until the 1990s, the total number of corps would hardly rise above the 110, and in 2007 it had diminished to 70.

⁶⁰ Spaan 1947:17,102-105

⁶¹ “De sociale diensten, welke het Leger des Heils aan de menschen wil bewijzen, houden gelijken tred met de sociale ontwikkeling. Naarmate de sociale ontwikkeling vordert en de regeeringen allerlei zaken gaan doen, die voorheen door het Leger werden verricht, veranderen wij onze tactiek.” Spaan 1947:100-101

⁶² “Het is een dwaling te meenen, dat in een sociaal hoogontwikkelde maatschappij geen plaats meer zou zijn voor maatschappelijk werk van het Leger. Het tegendeel is gebleken. In landen, waar de regeeringen verstrekkende sociale maatregelen hebben ingevoerd, worden de aanvullende diensten van het Leger juist te meer gewaardeerd. Het Leger vraagt zich af: wat is er nodig, wat moet er gedaan worden; hoe kan het

This depiction of the Army's working rationale confirmed the basic attitude of the Army towards the state as it presented itself as being supplementary to the government. These words of Orsborn reflect a great amount of responsiveness to political and social developments, and in his view national governments were increasingly taking over the work that traditionally had belonged to civil society organizations like the Salvation Army. This development directly affected the position of civil society, as a degree of marginalization seemed to be inevitable. The government appeared to be increasingly in control of the playing field on which different parties were present.

This did not intimidate Orsborn judging by his reaction: "we'll change our tactics". However, the rather pragmatic attitude towards this issue was not new as the idea of supplementation had been a part of the Army's attitude towards the government since its beginnings. In fact, it can be argued that the Salvation Army derived the very rationale of its existence from this position, because after all, the shortcomings of the UK government on social issues were Booth's main incentives to publish *In Darkest England*. However, in extension of this attitude, the Army also had to be flexible and responsive, characteristics that also defined the Army's organizational culture and identity.

3.2. Organizational expansion and sources of income

For the Salvation Army, restoration swiftly turned into growth and development according to its financial balance. Within 10 years since the end of World War II, the budget of the Army had doubled from fl.3,623,144 in 1946 to fl.7,042,711 in 1955. That this expansion was of a structural character, was proven 10 years later when once again the Army had more than doubled itself, realizing an exponential growth until the 1970s.⁶³ This rise of income had different sources. First of all, the public support grew. As stated before, in 1946 the Dutch people donated as much as fl.365,612 during the National Collection. Additional individual donations and bequests made up for another fl.252,672, taking the public contribution to a grand total of fl.618,284 in 1946.⁶⁴ By 1960 this amount had almost doubled to fl.1,118,751, and in 1980, almost 35 years after World War II, the contribution of the Dutch people in support of the work of the Salvation Army increased eighteen-fold to fl.10,991,347, thus elevating the income curve of the Army spectacularly.⁶⁵

Even though in absolute terms this increase in public contribution was remarkable, it was not the Army's main source of income. The operating result of the Army not only increased much faster, but also to a much larger extent than the public contributions. In 1946 the operating result amounted to fl.3,623,144,

Leger zich ten dienste stellen van de gemeenschap, het land, waarin het werkt en naar gelang van het antwoord op die vraag worden de sociale diensten ingericht en uitgevoerd." Spaan 1947:100-101

⁶³ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1946; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1955; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1965

⁶⁴ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1946

⁶⁵ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1960; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1980

and by 1955 this had almost doubled to fl.7,042,711,. Ten years later, it had increased tenfold to fl.73,391,010, and by 1985 the operating result had reached a total of fl.219,489,233.⁶⁶

One of the sources of income for the Army was recycling of goods. Like many of the other activities of the Salvation Army, recycling started out as an order from William Booth. In his opinion, collecting the discarded but still useful remnants of clothes, furniture and paper contributed to turning the city into a better and healthier place to live in. Subsequently, these goods were to be repaired or recycled into other useful products, and resold. This would generate a healthy supplement to the Army's income and also provide for a form of meaningful occupation for the unemployed. Until the 1970s, these recycling activities were operated on the relatively fragmented level of the corps, and were also incorporated in social programs like the industrial homes. With the increase in consumption during the 1950s and 1960s however, the amount of waste grew. In the clothing branch especially, consumption increased as the demand for cheap ready-to-wear clothes grew. Clothes turned from being a mere necessity into a reflection of the person's social status and individuality, and were also more easily disposed of.⁶⁷ In 1979 the diverse Salvation Army recycling activities were centralized in the recycling department *Herbestemming van Goederen* (reallocation of goods), turning the Salvation Army into the largest collector of used clothing in the Netherlands, according to its manager Van Teijlingen (1979-1990).⁶⁸ This modernization facilitated a coordinated approach towards the activities of collection and reselling. As a result, the recycling department became a significant source of income for the Salvation Army, by 1980 it generated a turnover of fl.13,102,266 with a surplus of fl.3,722,823.⁶⁹

The main contribution to the Army's financial growth between 1946 and 1989 is however, the increasing rise in property value, in combination with a growing return on investments. To a much smaller extent, these resources were complemented with inventory, stock, short-term debts and liquid assets. These assets were financed with liabilities such as capital - including some government grants for real estate - reserves, long-term debts and some government funding in terms of social premiums that were work, age or health-related. On the level of the Salvation Army real estate, restoration and renewal was in full progress. The Salvation Army had developed new building projects and initiated real estate purchases. For instance, some corps had the opportunity to construct new buildings. The expansion of the probation department and the department of recycling also demanded new office buildings. Additionally, the antiquated accommodations for the elderly, children and homeless were planned to be replaced with new buildings as well.

⁶⁶ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1946; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1955; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1965; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1985

⁶⁷ Van Teijlingen 2004:1-15

⁶⁸ *Idem*:51

⁶⁹ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1980

Interestingly enough, an important impetus to these plans came from the Dutch government. In its ambition to restore the Dutch postwar society and infrastructure, the Dutch government created several ‘repair programs’ of which the *Oorlogsschadeherstel programma* (war damage repair program) was very influential, and the Salvation Army also benefited from these arrangements. For its material loss in Rotterdam, for example, the Salvation Army received government grants to rebuild their demolished properties. These damage repair contributions started in 1946 with a grant of fl.40,000 and the program continued on till 1965.⁷⁰ With this money, the Salvation Army rebuilt their scouting-homes in Lunteren and constructed a social center in Rotterdam.⁷¹ Additionally, the Salvation Army was eligible for grants on church buildings. For example, for its construction of a corps building in Beverwijk, the Army received a church building grant of fl.37,248 on a total of fl.118,561, covering one third of the costs.⁷² In Nijmegen, a municipality grant for the construction of a new corps building covered about half of the costs of fl.137,639, and still more subsidy was to be expected on the architect’s bill.⁷³

3.3. Habituation

In its turn, this development of the finances and organization of the Salvation Army generated an internal need for control. At the beginning of the 1960s the advisory board to the TC, the *Territoriale Financiële Raad* (TFR, Territorial Financial Council), issued an order that stated that all different plans for renewal, restoration and construction that were developed within the Army, had to be approved of by the TFR. The Army command was well aware of the diversity of the flows of money that streamed through the organization on a more local level, and over which the command apparently had no control. So, in order to make more efficient use of these structural and incidental government grants, coordinated action was deemed necessary. This action was also generated by the fact that the Army’s real estate in the Netherlands was officially the property of the General, who was based at the International Headquarters (IHQ) of the Salvation Army in London. As was regulated by the statutes of the Army, the IHQ had to approve of most of the interventions on the matter of real estate, and by centralizing the applications for related government grants, the TFR had both the ability to report to the IHQ on these matters and at the same time supervise this flow of government money.⁷⁴

At other moments, the Army started to show a growing skill with regard to the acquisition of government money. In October 1964 for example, *Financieel Secretaris* (FS, Financial Secretary) Verwaal announced the drafting of an aide-

⁷⁰ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1946:9; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1965

⁷¹ *TFR* (minutes) March 14, 1961; *TFR* (minutes) April 4, 1961; *TFR* (minutes) December 12, 1961

⁷² *TFR* (minutes) June 11, 1963

⁷³ *TFR* (minutes) October 10, 1961

⁷⁴ *TFR* (minutes) July 3, 1962; *TFR* (minutes) November 20, 1962; *TFR* (minutes) November 26, 1962

memoire that would help the Salvation Army youth department to capitalize government grants as much as possible: “(...) so that the Salvation Army’s youth work will also be able to profit as much as possible from government subsidies.”⁷⁵ This dexterity was also refined in other, more indirect but not less structural flows of government money. Traditionally the Army provided for housing and essentials for its officers, but with the introduction of social security arrangements during the postwar decades, the Salvation Army balanced its contributions to its officers against the increasing benefits and allowances that the Dutch government provided for. For example, when the state pension (AOW) of the officers exceeded 70% of the internal Army pension allowance, the surplus was reclaimed from the officers.⁷⁶ The same applied to the supplement income that the state provided since 1959 for widows and orphans (AWW).⁷⁷ This however, did not mean that the Army abandoned its function as financial safeguard for its personnel, and while it was obliged by law to pay the AOW and AWW premiums for its employees, when the premiums on the public health insurance rose, the Salvation Army would raise its financial compensation accordingly.⁷⁸

This structural availability of government money not only opened the door for the Salvation Army to restore its social and spiritual work in the Netherlands, but also offered the Army the opportunity to factor in the amount of subsidy it might avail. For example, in 1959 plans were made to build a new children’s home in Assen, and out of the total estimated costs of fl.414,600, the Salvation Army took into consideration an “expected subsidy” amount of fl.269,100 that was yet to be granted by the Ministry of Justice.⁷⁹ This amount made up for more than half of the anticipated costs, so the risks that the Army was prepared to take were quite sizable. The fact however, that the Army nevertheless anticipated the subsidy and accounted for it in its calculations, makes clear that the flow of subsidy had become rather predictable to the Army. This was also confirmed by the example of the restoration of the Amsterdam Goodwill building at the Oudezijdse Achterbrugwal. The national government was willing to contribute fl.25,000 which was to be supplemented by the Amsterdam municipality with a sum of fl.33,900. Even with these contributions, the Salvation Army lacked fl.20,000 to cover the total costs, but instead of just chipping in, the TFR decided to wait to see what amount of subsidy the *provincial* government would come up with, for then it would only have to cover the remaining deficit from its own finances.⁸⁰ This strategic attitude sometimes also took a more proactive turn, as was observed from the plans made in the same period for a new work therapy barrack for the Land Colony Groot Batelaar. The Salvation Army decid-

⁷⁵ “(...) dat ook het Leger des Heils-jeugdwerk zoveel mogelijk zal kunnen profiteren van overheidssubsidie.” TFR (minutes) October 13, 1964

⁷⁶ TFR (minutes) Januari, 1959; TFR (minutes) September 6, 1960

⁷⁷ TFR (minutes) December 29, 1959

⁷⁸ TFR (minutes) Februari 2, 1960

⁷⁹ TFR (minutes) October 6, 1959

⁸⁰ Idem.

ed to only start construction when the finances would be “acceptable”, but the Army did not just wait and see when this was possible. Instead, this time an Army delegation consisting of Colonel Ramaker, the Financial Secretary and some other members of the TFR contacted the Head of the Office of Public Administration of the Ministry of Justice to try to ensure a sufficient amount of financial support from the Dutch government.⁸¹ And with success, because three weeks later the Ministry of Justice had indeed promised a grant of fl.42,000, which was enough to start construction.⁸² On a much more structural level, the *Ministerie van Onderwijs, Kunsten en Wetenschappen* (OKW, Ministry of Education, Arts and Sciences) promised an annual grant for the outdoor center for the youth on the premises of Groot Batelaar. In addition, it was remarked that this flow of money would be guaranteed for the coming 40 years...⁸³

The structural and thus predictable availability of government money also exerted influence on the policy decisions of the Army. In 1962, the national grant arrangement on (re-)building of custody care homes was revised, promising financial support for the coming years ranging from 75% of the total costs up to 90% in some cases. This new arrangement did not only reinforce the financial expectations of the Salvation Army, but it also in fact altered some of its plans for the restoration of old buildings into completely new development. For example, instead of renovating the antiquated boys home in Haarlem (costs fl.500,000), according to this new grant scheme, it had now become cheaper to build a totally new building, as was decided.⁸⁴

The Salvation Army began to incorporate this predictable government support in its operational strategies and policies to a growing extent. This meant that it would become much harder to do without these government funds. The first instance when the Army was confronted with this limitation was between 1960 and 1964, when the Salvation Army had to deal with rising costs, and especially wages, on a national scale. The *Federatie van verpleeginrichtingen* (Federation of Nursing Institutions) had lobbied for an increase in wages for its personnel, and as result, a wage increase seemed imminent for the Salvation Army employees belonging to this particular work field or federation.⁸⁵ The reaction of the Army command to this matter, however, hardly showed any concern about possible cutbacks or any other disadvantage of the growing dependency on government support. In the opinion of the TFR, the burden of this increase in wages would not be too much of a constraint on the subsidized social work sectors of the Army, because it anticipated the government habit of supplementing these extra costs.⁸⁶ Furthermore, the Salvation Army seemed not only to grow accustomed to the structural flow of money, but it even displayed a proactive attitude

⁸¹ *TFR* (minutes) June 6, 1961

⁸² *TFR* (minutes) June 28, 1961

⁸³ *TFR* (minutes) March 7, 1964

⁸⁴ *TFR* (minutes) November 20, 1962; *TFR* (minutes) November 26, 1962

⁸⁵ *TFR* (minutes) April 5, 1960

⁸⁶ *TFR* (minutes) Februari 3, 1964; *TFR* (minutes) Februari 5, 1964

in order to create new subsidy possibilities. For instance, in 1963 it applied for an incidental subsidy in order to buy a new hot water boiler (fl.7,000) and in this case the Army made clear suggestions for how this money could be accounted for, because these costs could be granted in the form of an additional fare on the regular accommodation costs.⁸⁷

When General Orsborn mentioned the Army's idea of supplementarity to the Dutch state in his speech to the Dutch branch in 1946, he probably had not envisioned the way in which the Dutch Army had reacted to state incentives like subsidies. However, slowly but certainly, the Salvation Army seemed to change its attitude towards the Dutch state by accepting more and more financial support in order to facilitate its own ambitions. This attitude of the Dutch branch however, led to a growing habituation on government resources, a development that seemed to have been particularly the case with the swiftly changing probation department of the Salvation Army after World War II.

4. Probation work of the Salvation Army (1945-1980)

In 1939 the probation work showed a total balance of fl.64,990 and made up for about 12% of the total operating result of the Salvation Army. Less than one third of the probation work was paid for by private donations (fl.14,720) and government grants had accumulated to fl.50,270 on annual basis. During the first postwar decades, the private donations for probation work increased quickly from fl.40,197 in 1946 to fl.234,536 in 1965. On the other hand, government grants increased even more rapidly. In 1946 the input of the state (fl.19,200) did not even countervail the public contributions (fl.40,197) but hardly 10 years later, the tables had turned drastically. In 1955 the private contributions of fl.57,803 were four times outnumbered by government grants (fl.211,940), heralding a development that would prove to be decisive for the position of the Army's probation department towards the government and also within the organization of the Army itself. In 1965 the Dutch state contributed fl.1,141,904 to the Army's probation department, compared to fl.234,536 in private gifts, and ten years yet later, the Dutch public seemed to have financially forsaken the probation work, for in 1975 the private donations had dropped to a mere fl.6,356, government contributions however had risen to fl.6,048,168 in the same year. These incomes made up for almost 14% of the total operating result of the Salvation Army that year. This development shows both the speed and the degree to which the financial dependency of the probation department on government support grew. That this dependency would have certain consequences with regard to the position of the probation work towards the government thus seemed imminent.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ *TFR* (minutes) June 11, 1963

⁸⁸ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1939; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1946; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1955; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1965; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1975

In 1970, a group of probation professionals of different organization wrote an “open letter” to the Dutch government, addressing the organizational and managerial problems of the work field. This explicit call for improvement urged the VvRI to establish a committee that had to examine the possibilities for further harmonization of the probation work field.⁸⁹ At the same time the Salvation Army made clear to the VvRI that even though it was willing to examine the possibilities to come to a more effective and less fragmented organizational structure, it would resist a merger into one large bulwark of probation organizations because it was unthinkable for the Salvation Army to give up a part of its work, and especially the probation work, that had formed the core of the Army’s social activities long before the Dutch territory was established. It became clear however, that a large scale merger was exactly what the VvRI committee advised, and the Army’s probation department feared for its existence because it had little room to manoeuvre within the social policy system. So, the Army turned to other means and in order to ensure that the State Secretary of Justice, Wiersma (VVD, 1970-1971) would decide not to follow suit but leave room for the Army to exist, Army representatives went to The Hague in 1970 to meet with Wiersma. The outcome of this meeting was that Wiersma did actually express that a possible discontinuance of the Salvation Army’s probation work was undesirable and that a solution should be found for the Army to continue its valued work.⁹⁰ Now that the Army had succeeded in getting the support of the government, the pressure seemed to have reduced.

On the other hand however, the harmonization process also continued and in 1973 the *Stichting Samenwerkende Reclasseringsinstellingen* (SRI, Foundation of Cooperating Probation Organizations) was established. The SRI was a combined effort of 4 of the 6 organizations that offered probation services on a national scale: the *Genootschap*, the *Katholieke Reclasseringsvereniging* (KRV, Catholic Probation Association), the *Protestants-Christelijke Reclasseringsvereniging* (PCRv, Protestant-Christian Probation Association) and the Catholic *Meijersvereniging* (Meijers Association). In 1976 the SRI was reorganized into the *Algemene Reclasserings Vereniging* (ARV, General Probation Association) and with this, a fundamental process of harmonization of the probation work field was concluded for the time being. There were however two organizations that retained their independent positions: the Salvation Army and the *Consultatiebureaus voor Alcohol en Drugs* (CAD, Clinics for Alcohol and Drugs). Both organizations had made clear that their specific target groups needed the existence of specific organizations. The CAD focused on people with a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and in turn also the Salvation Army had to prove its right of existence by defining their added value. This added value had especially become an important issue, because in the process of becoming part of the general SRI, the KRV and the PCRv seemed to have lost much of their

⁸⁹ Fijn 1990:24

⁹⁰ Maris 1991:98-102

faith-based identity. This was exactly what worried the Army. The underlying rationale of the Army's probation work had always been that the ultimate corrective influence on behavior would not be imprisonment, but salvation. So, when the Army would also lose its Christian identity, how was it able to perform its work? The developments on the matter of professionalization did not seem to help either: social work organizations and their workers were increasingly pressed by the government to operate on a general basis, especially because since the 1960s spiritual conversion could neither be the primary nor the hidden, secondary goal of any social work.⁹¹

Nevertheless, since it was regarded to be a main reason for existence after a possibly inescapable merger or another form of reorganization, the probation department of the Army had to look for ways to define its identity. The question that was posed was: "Do we look for a pastor to complement the team - or will justice and the ecumenical social idea of Christian unity, be a leading motive?"⁹² Even though actual answers would not be found any time soon, an important parameter had become clear: that social work was never to be severed from its religious roots, or phrased by Army General Coutts (1963-1969): "What has been united by the gospel, will not be separated by the Salvation Army".⁹³ This newly defined assignment would become a main part of the work of the manager of the Army's probation department, Fijn (1973-1988), who took up office in 1973. In his view, the probation department had to show the biblical notions of justice and righteousness in its policy and daily practice by helping those in need to form individual humanity, and this was how the God ordained assignment of the probation work could be interpreted. Fijn established an internal think tank that was responsible for creating policy that gave the probation department of the Salvation Army a clear added value with which it could position itself in relation to the SRI and prove its quality as a work field partner. This think tank operated on the belief that: "by definition, being at peace with God means being at war with the world", thus forming a new understanding within the probation department with respect to its position towards the now unified work field and the Ministry of Justice. For the Army this axiom meant that next to witnessing salvation and doing good by means of probation work, social action was also needed. This criticism would be directed towards the restrictive and punitive measures for prisoners that the Ministry of Justice heralded, because the Army itself favored more humane approaches like prevention and alternative sanctions.⁹⁴ So now, next to having become rather dependent on government support, the Salvation Army's probation department showed a will of its own. Its stance on social action was in line with the emancipatory vigor of the 1960s and 1970s, but within the ranks of the Army itself, this attitude was not understood

⁹¹ Idem:102-103

⁹² Fijn 1990:26

⁹³ "Wat het evangelie heeft samengevoegd, scheidde het Leger des Heils niet." Quoted in Maris 1991:104

⁹⁴ Maris 1991:105-108

widely. Especially with regard to its dependent position towards the government, for should one bite the hand that feeds him? Or was the Army maybe less dependent on the government as might be concluded from the above?

5. A hint of interdependency?

According to the Dutch parliament, the Salvation Army was a respected organization that had earned its reputation in the field of youth work, care for the homeless, and of course, probation.⁹⁵ Also, the Army's reputation as a first-responder organization was unrivaled. For example, during calamities like the 1953 flood disaster and the largest railroad crash in Dutch history (January 1962), the swift reaction and immediate presence of the Salvation Army at the scene, were important determining factors for its positive public image.⁹⁶ The Salvation Army seemed to also have won its spurs as a religious organization. It was clear to the parliament that much of the social work that the Army practiced was based on religious motivation, but especially interesting was the position that the Army took on the Dutch pillarized society. From its start the Salvation Army had positioned itself alongside the mainstream churches, and at the same time it had tried to steer away from the inclusive and exclusive forces that were at work in the system of pillarization. The strategy that the Army followed was that of impartiality, for the Salvation Army was explicitly willing to serve the Dutch community as a whole, disregarding the dividing lines of pillarization. It expressed however to focus on the socially excluded, whereas the Catholic and Protestant charities were mainly focused on serving their own members. It was especially this non-partisan stance that was noticed by the parliament.⁹⁷ The Salvation Army even became a rhetorical point of reference in the debates at the Second Chamber. In a debate, for instance, on how to curb the popularity of the subsidy arrangement on the improvement of houses and other residential buildings, it was argued that "this home improvement has become so popular that it can be compared with the Salvation Army: everybody favors it, and when there is a deficit, we'll cough up the rest."⁹⁸

On another level, the appreciation by the government of the Salvation Army also became clear, although it was much more subtle than the above rhetorical examples. During the 1960s, the Salvation Army started to feel the external pressure to modernize its administration:

⁹⁵ This conclusion can be drawn from the number of positive remarks made on the Salvation Army by members of the Dutch parliament.

⁹⁶ *Handelingen II*, 1961/62, 42:2409, 2414; *Handelingen II*, 1967/68, 18:716

⁹⁷ *Handelingen II*, 1953/54, 25:2166, 2172; *Handelingen II*, 1955/56, 8:2094; *Handelingen I*, 1955/56, 48:2321; *Handelingen I*, 1959/60, 26:2190

⁹⁸ "Deze woningverbetering is zo populair geworden, dat zij kan worden vergeleken met het Leger des Heils: iedereen voelt ervoor, en als er een tekort is lappen wij het bij." *Handelingen I*, 1967/68, 57:2529

“It goes without saying that in these swiftly and often thoroughly changing times in all parts of society, the demands that are made on our work are also higher than ever. The reputation that the Salvation Army enjoys as a spiritual and social institution for many years standing, imposes on us an obligation to meet these requirements to the best of our ability with regard to the past, as well as to the present and the future. In order to be able to meet the need that we feel to be informed regularly and short term so that we can take policy decision on matters of management, within the current, swiftly evolving financial structure of society, we have ordered the accountant to make an inquiry into the effectiveness of the administrative organization, as a result of which it has been decided to switch over to a mechanized bookkeeping system by January 1, 1967, of what we expect to improve its effectivity as much as possible.”⁹⁹

Apparently the Salvation Army was afraid to lag behind the times, and efficiency and effectiveness seemed to be the primary goals behind this professionalization of the Army’s financial bookkeeping system. Also, the improvement of the short-term availability of financial information was necessary in order to be able to take policy decisions. In addition to these arguments, a third, more concealed issue was at stake. An issue that seemed to have been induced by the ongoing decentralization of policy capacity from the national level to the local level. In the preceding years the Salvation Army youth department in Utrecht had been entangled in an administrative tussle with the financial department of the Utrecht municipality. In 1959, the financial verification office of Utrecht municipality had expressed its concern with the quality of the bookkeeping of this particular Salvation Army unit. Its financial records were not sufficiently subdivided, so it was impossible for the office to discern between various flows of funds. The Salvation Army had received subsidies for its youth work on an annual basis for a few years, but now Utrecht municipality asked for a more accurate account of the ends to which the money was spend. This particular information was hard to retrieve from the current reports that the Salvation Army handed in, accompanying their grant applications.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ “Het behoeft nauwelijks betoog dat in deze tijd van snelle, vaak ingrijpende veranderingen in vrijwel alle sectoren van de maatschappij, ook de eisen die aan ons werk worden gesteld, zwaarder zijn dan ooit. De jarenlange reputatie die het Leger des heils als geestelijke en sociale instelling geniet, legt ons, zowel ten aanzien van het heden, als het verleden en de toekomst, de verplichting op, naar ons beste vermogen aan deze eisen tegemoet te komen. Teneinde te kunnen voldoen aan de door ons gevoelde behoefte in de huidige, snel evoluerende financiële structuur van de maatschappij, voor de door ons te nemen beleidsbeslissingen voor het beheer, tussentijds en op korte termijn geïnformeerd te zijn, hebben wij de accountant opdracht gegeven, een onderzoek in te stellen naar de doeltreffendheid van de administratieve organisatie, als gevolg waarvan besloten is met ingang van 1 januari 1967 over te schakelen naar een gemechaniseerde boekhouding waarvan wij verwachten dat zij de efficiency in hoge mate zal bevorderen.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1965:1

¹⁰⁰ Letter from the Utrecht Municipality to the Salvation Army management on the subsidy application for the years of 1985-1959 and 1959-1969, date: 23-02-1961 (UA 1007-3, nr. 25674 and 30913)

On February 23, 1962 the Utrecht verification office repeated its request to the Salvation Army and asked them to act on the matter adequately.¹⁰¹ Apparently the Utrecht municipality did not receive an answer swift enough, because a week later a second letter followed. In this letter the verification office offered advice in the matter, but at the same time it increased the pressure: “If no improvement of your accounting can be established, we will have to take a closer look at our position on your youth work.”¹⁰² A year later this mild but explicit threat to hold back the subsidy in case the Salvation Army would not act on this stipulation, was repeated twice.¹⁰³ However, now the Utrecht municipality showed its goodwill towards the Salvation Army by explaining in full why improvement of their accounting was necessary: “the control on our part has become very time-consuming, because we have to make a subdivision into different accounts”.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, the Salvation Army again did not react adequately, so the verification office changed its tone. Its letter of January 31, 1964 did not start off with the usual confirmation of the grant approval, but instead the dispute was directly addressed. Clearly, the verification office had become irritated with the whole matter, especially because the Salvation Army’s bookkeeping had not improved, but worsened: “Instead of improvement, we have observed a deterioration of the administration. We consider this an unsatisfactory situation.”¹⁰⁵ The Utrecht office indicated that in future cases it would no longer verify the unspecified Army accounts, but just return them to the sender. This way the issue of whether or not to grant the subsidy was avoided by the Utrecht municipality and instead the problem was put back on the plate of the Salvation Army.

It would take the Army about another year before it promised to rearrange its administration according to the request of the Utrecht verification office, and the Army announced that implementation of these changes would start to become visible with the financial accounts of 1965.¹⁰⁶ However, this promise soon proved to be untenable. In fact it took until 1967 for the new administrative

¹⁰¹ Idem.

¹⁰² “Mocht er evenwel geen verbetering van uw administratie te constateren zijn, dan zullen wij ons standpunt ten aanzien van de subsidiëring van Uw jeugdwerk nader onder ogen moeten zien.” Letter from the Utrecht Municipality to the Salvation Army management on the subsidy application for the years of 1960-1961, date: 28-02-1962 (UA 1007-3 inv.nr 25674 and 30913)

¹⁰³ Letter from the Utrecht Verification Office to the Salvation Army management on the subsidy application for the years of 1961-1962, date: 05-03-1963 (UA 1007-3 nr. 25674 and 30913)

¹⁰⁴ “De controle dezerzijds is daardoor zeer tijdrovend, omdat dezerzijds een splitsing naar diverse rekeninghoofden gemaakt moet worden (...)” Letter from the Utrecht Municipality to the Salvation Army management on the subsidy application for the years of 1961-1962, date: 17-04-1963 (UA 1007-3 nr. 25674 and 30913)

¹⁰⁵ “In plaats van een verbetering hebben wij zelf een achteruitgang in de administratie geconstateerd. Wij achten dit een onbevredigende toestand (...)” Letter from the Utrecht Municipality to the Salvation Army management on the subsidy application for the years of 1961-1962, date: 31-01-1964 (UA 1007-3 nr. 25674 and 30913)

¹⁰⁶ Letter from the Utrecht Verification Office to the Salvation Army management on the subsidy application for the years of 1963-1964, date: 23-02-1965 (UA 1007-3 nr. 25674 and 30913)

process to be brought into effect.¹⁰⁷ Because it foresaw trouble with the Utrecht municipality, the Salvation Army, through its accountant Crop, had asked for clemency in this matter because the Army had deemed it to be imperative to reorganize on a greater scale in order to provide for the necessary financial information to national and local administrations.

By 1967 the controversy seemed to have come to a satisfactory end for both parties involved, as the Salvation Army complied with the municipalities stipulations. However, the Army waited for a convenient time to comply with these demands for it concluded that this reorganization of its administration on a local level could serve the organization on the national level as well. This discussion however, took quite a long time: 8 years. Utrecht could have very well shortened this period by executing its threat of revoking the grant, but it did not do so. At first glance this matter seemed to be a mere administrative issue, but while unfolding, the issue revealed an interesting dynamic, for both the Utrecht municipality and the Salvation Army did not seem to want to bring the matter to a head. This indicates that both parties were well aware that by preserving their relation they would benefit more than by putting it to the test, or, even worse, by ending it. The threat of Utrecht to withdraw the financial support to the Salvation Army's youth work was a strategy that would have been quite effective, concerning the growing dependency of the Salvation Army on government subsidies. Utrecht in fact hinted on the Army's growing dependency on government funding, as it applied the corrective force inherent to the subsidy system, and by doing so, it showed that it had the means to exert power over the Salvation Army.

The Salvation Army in its turn, did not blink until the matter seemed to play up on a greater scale in the internal organization as well. Until that time the Army held its grounds, regardless of the threats Utrecht made. This might imply that the Army did not think Utrecht was going to act upon its threats. And actually, this assumption was confirmed over time. Utrecht never suited any action to its words in this case. It allowed the Salvation Army a distinct amount of time in order to react to its demands in a proper way. This implies that the Utrecht administration was not keen at all on losing the services rendered by the Salvation Army to its youth residents. It was not only the Salvation Army that needed the government, but the dependency lay just as much the other way round as well: Utrecht had come to rely on the Army services as much as the Salvation Army had become dependent on the public funds. The social policy system had rendered both actors interdependent.

¹⁰⁷ Letter from the Salvation Army's accountant Crop & de Kleuver to the Utrecht Accountants service, date: 28-09-1966. Letter from the Utrecht Municipality to the Salvation Army management on the subsidy application for the years of 1985-1959 and 1959-1969, date: 23-02-1961 (UA 1007-3 nr. 25674 and 30913)

By 1980, the Salvation Army had become a valued partner to the government within the Dutch social policy system. With regard to the changing social policy goals, the Salvation Army proved to be flexible and positioned itself as supplementary to governmental policy aims. The Army rather quickly learned the rules of this system and showed skill in applying them, even to the extent that it started to push the limits, as the Utrecht case showed.

The Army however, was only able to push these limits because the relationship between the government and the Army was not only based on a lopsided balance of power, but it was exactly this reluctance by the Army in the Utrecht case that revealed the government dependency on the Salvation Army itself, at least to a certain degree. Both actors made no real effort to break up their relationship. On the other hand, this becoming a part of the social policy system also influenced the Army's identity process, because from 1910 onwards, the balance between the Army's double mission changed. Due to the government support for the Army's social services, this part of the Army's mission developed very quickly. During this process the Army had started to become dependent on this external support in order to maintain its growth. This dependency would not have been a problem to the Army if it had no consequences for another matter that defined its identity: legal incorporation. A subject that we will explore in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4. THE ‘CHRONIC PROBLEM’ OF LEGAL INCORPORATION

1. The roots of the Army’s chronic problem

The first working day of 1990 was a momentous day in the history of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands. From that day on, the struggle with a so-called “chronic problem” had taken a decisive turn. This chronic problem, labeled as such by Commander Schurink (1986-1992), referred to the ambiguity of the legal status of the Salvation Army. The question: “What is the Salvation Army? A foundation or a church?” phrased the issue and would become the basis of many discussions – a debate that culminated in a fundamental reorganization in 1989.¹ The discussion revolved around the question of which corporate body suited the organization best within its altering social and political context. By portraying this matter as a mere legal question, Ine Voorham, the CEO of the Army’s Foundation for Welfare and Health during the period 2000-2012, continued on the line of thought that was commonly accepted within the Army management ranks.² However, if it were ‘just’ a legal problem, an organizational overhaul of the extent that took place during the 1980s would not seem likely. So what happened? What shaped this chronic problem and what made it a problem for the Salvation Army? Moreover, how did the Army cope with this matter and what sort of dynamics did this process reveal with regard to the Army’s identity process? However, in order to understand the way in which organizations were able to legally incorporate in the Netherlands, we will turn to this matter first.

1.1. Legal incorporation in the Netherlands

In Europe, during much of the twentieth century, religious communities could be incorporated in three forms of legal identities: foundation, association and church. In the case of the Netherlands however, this latter form also offered the opportunity to create an ‘ecclesiastical foundation’. Chapter 6 of the Constitution of 1848 acknowledged a certain degree of separation of church and state. In 1853, this legal position of churches was developed further and codified in the Church Act.³ This Act stipulated that in order to be considered a church, a religious community had to be registered with the Ministry of Justice. In order to do so, it had to submit its articles of association, statutes or bylaws. The ministry would thereupon supervise whether or not these organizations violated the public order or public decency. Van der Ploeg, specialist on corporal legislation,

¹ *Decision for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:37

² Voorham 1999

³ Wet tot regeling van het toezigt van de onderscheiden kerkgenootschappen, dd. 10 september 1853

concluded from the diversity of churches that had applied for registration, that the ministry carried out this task in quite a passive manner by hardly scrutinizing the applicants. Additionally, the ministry acted without regard for the various religious beliefs of these applicants. According to Van der Ploeg, this was exemplified by the fact that next to mainstream denominations, even secular foundations were submitted as churches.⁴ Furthermore, religious communities were actually not obliged to register with the ministry in order to exist. Also without this registration they were usually regarded by the government as “accepted moral bodies”.

For a church, legal incorporation seemed to be most of all a formal recognition of its existence because its private character offered complete freedom of how to form its own administrative and managerial constellation. Except for sending in the articles of association, no government requirements were to be met and compared to fulfill the process of becoming a foundation or association, there was no individual (like a notary) that actually acknowledged its legal status. All that existed was a system of passive supervision on the part of the government. Therefore, as Van der Ploeg remarks, a longstanding practice had developed on the matter: those who had the courage to proclaim to be a church, actually were regarded as a church. Only a judge could deny that status to a self-proclaimed religious group.⁵

This uncertainty of a possible negative judicial decision, made some religious groups turn to an alternative legal form, found in a (secular) ‘foundation’ or an ‘association’. Both forms had prescriptive organizational rules and regulations, to which the group was bound. For example, at odds with a church, a foundation was not allowed to have members. Additionally, a foundation might be required to provide for democratic participation of its adherents, or control by an executive committee.⁶ An association had an even more democratic character because the members or its grassroots could impeach its management, an option that a regular foundation did not offer. So, for a religious community that esteemed democratic values, the association would be the preferred legal body. On the other hand, this would bring with it the risk of political fractioning or even a coup. In cases where this might be expected, or when the grassroots were already rather homogenous, the legal form of foundation was the most convenient.

While this distinction between incorporation as a church, foundation and association was customary in many European countries, in the Netherlands a fourth hybrid form existed.⁷ At the close of the nineteenth century, it became habitual for churches to organize their charitable activities in separate organizational units that were often incorporated as foundations. These foundations were explicitly placed under the rule of a church or religious congregation and were

⁴ Van der Ploeg 2009:29

⁵ Idem:29-30

⁶ Van der Ploeg 2009:125

⁷ Idem:117

thus called an ‘ecclesiastical foundation’. The function of the ecclesiastical foundation was to facilitate the raising of public funds for the charitable social services, and to provide for a possibility to create a separate financial account. This would help to give the donor (be it a private person, or the government) insight into what happened with their particular finances. In addition, this legal form would restrict possible government influence to that particular part within the larger organizational body and not influence the religious community. During the course of the twentieth century, the ecclesiastical foundation would become a very popular instrument for religious organizations like churches to collect government and public funding. For the Salvation Army too, this structure seemed to provide for certain opportunities.

1.2. The Army’s structure of command

As the use of the military terms implies, the Salvation Army appeared to aim for maximal responsiveness in its organizational structure: a hierarchical chain of command with its apex in the IHQ in London, UK. The leadership of the international organization was (and is) formed by one person, the General. As the leader of the worldwide organization of the Salvation Army he, or she⁸, had the final say on all matters concerning international policy and organization development. The influence of the General was codified in the power to appoint the national leadership, Territorial Commander, and the General was aided by the Chief of Staff and an advisory council consisting of Territorial Commanders.

On a national level, the Commander personified the pivot of power, having decisive say in religious matters and matters of social work in his or her territory.⁹ The communication of the Commander with the IHQ consisted of a yearly report on the condition of the territorial branch, and in the Dutch case also, on matters concerning the Salvation Army legal identity, which often pinpointed a change in the articles of association of the Dutch branch. But for other national matters the Commander was the ultimate person in charge and formed in fact a one-headed leadership on the national level. In the Netherlands, the Commander was flanked by an advisory committee of three officers: the second-in-command, Chief-Secretary (CS), the Assistant-Chief-Secretary (ACS) and the Financial Secretary (FS).

In the decades preceding World War II, the Chief-Secretary presided over the three ‘operational’ secretaries who were responsible for the social work amongst men, the social work amongst women and the ‘field department’ (the official

⁸ The fact that I refer to the General and other ranks within the Salvation Army with the male ‘he’, doesn’t at all mean that these functions are only held by men. On the contrary, the Salvation Army has held from its very beginning a explicit non-discriminatory view and practice on the matter of staffing. The use of the word ‘he’ in these cases, is based on nothing more than reasons of efficiency.

⁹ In case of the Dutch Salvation Army, the national headquarter (HQ) is currently located in Almere. It started out at Rapenbrug 44, by 1895 was moved to Prins Hendrikkade 131; by 1888 to the War-moesstraat 34, and by 1907 to Prins Hendrikkade 49-51. In 1970 moved to Damstraat 15 until the reorganization of 1989.

name for the collective of corps). At this point in the organization chart, a clear division was made between the spiritual part of the Army's organization (corps) and its social work part. The linking pin between these two was the Chief-Secretary. The two social work sectors (women and men) were presided over by a different manager and staffed by officers and soldiers, and also by volunteers and even external employees. These latter two groups could also contain Salvation Army soldiers, but then they were not salaried (volunteers) or not professionalized in terms of being a trained officer. The corps were led by the field secretary who was, by 1939, in charge of 112 local corps that were subdivided into 4 divisions. Every division was headed by a division officer, and in their turn, the corps were run by corps officers.

1.3. Codification of the Salvation Army's two-fold mission

The first nine years that the Salvation Army was active in the Netherlands, it had done without any form of legal incorporation. This meant that the English statutes were also applicable for the Dutch territory. Especially during the first five years of its presence in the Netherlands, the Salvation Army had often presented itself as a religious group because its main objective was, after all, religious salvation. A very important part of the Salvationists' work was to sell the *Strijdkreet* and invite people to their religious Sunday meetings. The similarity of these activities to the methods of other churches was obvious, but after a few years, the Salvation Army decided to be legally incorporated, and on January 25, 1896, the 'Foundation The Salvation Army' was established.¹⁰ The legal form that the Army chose – foundation – might have been based on the analogy to the Army's situation in the United Kingdom, for since the introduction of the social objective, the Salvation Army in England had established a separate legal entity for these activities and their subsequent flow of money: The Darkest England Trust Deed (1891). In this way, they were able to secure the indispensable financial support by the English people.¹¹

The direct connection between the Dutch Salvation Army and its English alma mater was clearly visible in, for example, the matter of real estate because General William Booth himself had to authorize the Dutch Commander every single time he wanted to purchase real estate. In the case of the purchase of the Amsterdam building *De Vrede*, this meant that first a partnership of Dutch Salvationists had to be established, including William Booth as a member and thus co-owner.¹² In addition, General Booth preserved his influence on the Dutch territory by securing his right to appoint the TC and other staff on key positions. Therefore, even though the Dutch branch of the Salvation Army would incorporate into Dutch law, in line with the Army's hierarchical principles, its statutes

¹⁰ *De stichting "Het Leger des Heils"*. Extract uit de *Acte van Stichting* (date unknown) Amsterdam: Salvation Army (UA 1182, nrs.171 and 172)

¹¹ Ringelberg 2005:133

¹² *Idem*:133-134

confirmed that the General was still ultimately responsible for the Dutch territory. On the other hand, the Dutch Salvation Army clearly presented itself as independent from its alma mater in the United Kingdom. Referring to the statutes of 1896, this was brought to notice once again in the Annual Financial Report of 1913:

“Although the cradle of our organization stands in England, it would be wrong to call the *Leger des Heils* an English Institution. That would be chauvinism of the worst kind. The Salvation Army adapts to England, the *Leger des Heils* to the Netherlands.”¹³

Even though the English Salvation Army was recognized as a church, the Dutch Salvation Army chose for the legal form of foundation. As Ringelberg suggests, this choice might very well be inspired by the Army’s need for an organizational form in which it could manage its properties.¹⁴ On the other hand, in the light of the English Salvation Army being an official church, the choice for establishing a Dutch branch of the Salvation Army as an ecclesiastical foundation also seems to have been an option, for under Dutch law any church could form an ecclesiastical foundation in order to accommodate its social activities. Nevertheless, the actual addition of the term ‘ecclesiastical’ to ‘foundation’ was not used in official utterances of the Salvation Army.

The establishment of the Foundation The Salvation Army, did not mean that the Army refrained from any religious activities. On the contrary, the statutes of this new foundation clearly stated that the main goal of the Army was to promote the gospel:

“Article 1: The Foundation aims to promote and foster religious fraternization; preach the blessings of the Gospel to those who are usually not under the influence of religious edification, or suffer great poverty because of vice or misfortune.”¹⁵

In the second Article, the religious doctrines of the Army were presented followed by the foundations on which Article 1 was to be realized:

¹³ “Ofschoon de bakermat van onze organisatie in Engeland staat, zou het verkeerd zijn het Leger des Heils een Engelsche Instelling te noemen. Dat zou chauvinisme zijn van het ergste soort. De Salvation Army past zich aan Engeland aan, het Leger des Heils aan Nederland” (Italics mine) *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1912/13:111

¹⁴ Ringelberg 2005:134

¹⁵ “Artikel 1. De Stichting heeft ten doel het bevorderen en doen genieten van godsdienstig, broederlijk verkeer; het brengen onder de prediking en de zegeningen des Evangelies, van zoodanige personen, als gewoonlijk niet onder den invloed van godsdienstige leering zijn, dan wel door ondeugd of door ongeluk in groote armoede verkeeren.” Quoted in: *De stichting “Het Leger des Heils”. Extract uit de Acte van Stichting* (date unknown) Amsterdam: Salvation Army (UA 1182, nrs.171 and 172) 2

“The Foundation will try to reach the aim as presented in Article 1, by all legally available means, such as: a) organizing religious gatherings, performing house calls, publication and distribution of literature, et cetera.; b) by implementation of such principles and methods as are explicated by founder William Booth in his book “Orders and Regulations for Social Officers of the Salvation Army”, like the Slum Work, Rescue work, the Work amongst Children, the Work amongst the Homeless, the Work amongst Prisoners and Released Prisoners, in general the nursing, care and education, be it in and outside the Homes, Institutions and Organizations, of those persons who fell victim to, or might fall victim to, material or mental misfortune, to sin, vice or crime, and bring them back into society; c) the durable care of underage people who are consigned to the Foundation and the education and upbringing according to its principles. In general, according to the judgment of the Director, all such means can be applied in order to achieve the goal as mentioned in Article 1 of these Statutes.”¹⁶

By means of these two articles, a clear classification of the two parts of the Army’s mission became visible. The first priority of the Salvation Army was to save souls, and in order to obtain that objective, social activities were realized. So, irrespective of the Army trying to balance its two-pronged mission, this particular phrasing posed the Army’s social activities as merely instrumental to its religious aim, thus giving shape to the foundations of the Army’s identity.

1.4. Legal status in trying times: World War II

A few times during the first decades of the twentieth century, the statutes were adapted to adjustments in the Dutch legal system.¹⁷ These adaptations were of minor significance and until World War II as nothing changed fundamentally. A few months after the outburst of the war and before the actual invasion of the Netherlands by the German army, the Territorial Commander of the Dutch Salvation Army, Benwell (1939-1940) foresaw that the international origins and organizational structure of the Dutch territory could very well become a problem

¹⁶ “De Stichting zal het in artikel EEN genoemde doel trachten te bereiken, door alle mogelijke wettige middelen, zoals: a) door het houden van samenkomsten, het doen van huisbezoek en verspreiden van literatuur, enzoovoorts; b) door toepassing van zulke beginselen en methoden als door haren stichter WILLIAM BOOTH zijn uiteengezet in zijn boek “Orders and Regulations for Social Officers of the Salvation Army”, zoals het Achterbuurtswerk, het Reddingswerk, het Werk ten behoeve van Kinderen, het Werk ten behoeve van Dak- en Werkloozen, het Werk onder Gevangenen en Ontslagen Gevangenen, in het algemeen, het verplegen, verzorgen en opleiden, zoo in als buiten Tehuizen, Gestichten of Instellingen, van zulke personen, die aan stoffelijke of geestelijke ellende, aan zonde, ondeugd of misdaad ten prooi zijn of zouden kunnen worden, en het terugbrengen van dezulken in den samenleving; c) de duurzamen verzorging van minderjarige personen, die aan de Stichting toevertrouwd worden, en derzelver opleiding en opvoeding in overeenstemming met hare beginselen. In het algemeen door al zulke middelen als naar het oordeel van den Bestuurder der Stichting kunnen trekken om het in artikel EEN van deze Statuten genoemde doel te verwezenlijken.” Quoted in: *De stichting “Het Leger des Heils”*. Extract uit de *Acte van Stichting* (date unknown) Amsterdam: Salvation Army (UA 1182, nrs.171 and 172) 4

¹⁷ These adjustments took place in September 1908, April 1910 and February 1931.

to the Germans, especially because since the occupation of Poland, the United Kingdom had declared itself at war with Germany. Therefore, in order to dispel any suspicion, Benwell proposed to the General that in the case of a German invasion he would be succeeded by the Dutch Commander Vlas (1929-1939), who had recently retired. By doing so, Benwell showed great strategic insight, and when the actual invasion of the Netherlands occurred on May 10, 1940, Vlas actually did become TC once again.¹⁸ However, that was not enough to convince the Germans that the Salvation Army was a Dutch organization and not British.

Due to the German occupation, the Netherlands lost its self-governance. Most governmental structures remained intact, but Hitler appointed *Rijkscommissaris* Seyss-Inquart at its apex. The idea behind this political constellation was that the German occupiers would work out new policies to further their idea of a 'Third Reich' and make the existing Dutch administrative constellation responsible for its implementation.¹⁹ On an ideological level, the German aim was to incorporate the Dutch people into the greater German culture, concurrent to the ideology of Nazism. This idea of *gleichschaltung* was expressed in the disbandment of political parties and other public groups and organizations that did not resonate with the Nazi-ideology and its Dutch political exponent, the NSB.²⁰ In fact, some religious organizations were also forbidden to show any activity.

As described in Chapter 3, during the first year of the war the Army lost some of its properties and buildings in the bombings of Rotterdam and during the battles of the Grebbergen and in the province of Zeeland. Additionally, some Salvationists were also killed. Seyss-Inquart however, showed no interest in the Salvation Army at that time. Nevertheless, being suspicious of Seyss-Inquart's motives, Vlas decided it was better to be safe than sorry, and started out for a change in the statutes of the Dutch Army in order to make sure that the Dutch branch was undeniably officially Dutch. His argument was that if every formal connection to the English Salvation Army Headquarters would be severed, the Germans might not be troubled by it. The place of the General would be taken by a Dutch Supervisory Board, which made the matter of high-level appointments an important substitute responsibility.²¹

Nevertheless, Vlas's effort came too late. Just weeks before the adjusted statutes would become effective, the Germans issued two ordinances that required all non-economic fellowships to grant inspection of their statutes, possessions and accounts. Now that the Germans were to audit the Dutch Salvation Army based on the still applicable statutes of 1931, it was only a matter of time before the organization would be directly linked to England. On top of things,

¹⁸ Ringelberg 2005:221-222

¹⁹ De Rooy 2002:197-198

²⁰ Lademacher 1983:480-482; De Rooy 2002:196-201

²¹ Ringelberg 2005:224-225

all public collections that were made (besides the German-initiated program called *Winterhulp Nederland*) were regarded illegal. This added another burden to the feeble financial situation of the Salvation Army, because only churches with explicit permission by Winterhulp were allowed to make collections. The director-general of Winterhulp, Piek, however, regarded the Salvation Army as “an international body, oriented towards the West”, convincing him that the Salvation Army was rather an international (English) organization than a Dutch church or charity. Based on this international connection Piek refused to allow the Army to hold collections.²²

In March 1941, another directive was issued, stating that the Rijkscommissaris now held the power to change the statutes of associations and foundations. In addition, he was now also authorized to dissolve them, a fate that now seemed unavoidable for the Dutch Army, given it was viewed as an international organization and a possible instrument of English political propaganda.²³ Indeed, Vlas’s initial fears became a reality: “the blow has [had] been dealt”.²⁴ A few days later, on March 19, 1941, a letter from Seyss-Inquart gave notice of the liquidation of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands. Vlas’s efforts to sever all ties with London in the hope of preventing this imminent disaster had been in vain. At first, religious gatherings were forbidden and assembly halls and offices were closed. The use of the Army’s uniform, an indispensable symbol of the Army’s identity,²⁵ was banned, as was the circulation of any printed material like the *Strijdkreet*.²⁵ With this fundamental denial of any legal status by the German oppressors, it looked like the final curtain had dropped for the Salvation Army in the Netherlands.²⁶

Receiver J.H. Krafft was in charge of enforcing the liquidation. His initial actions in closing down the organization came to a hold when he was successfully convinced by Vlas that the latter had taken profound measures to dissociate from London, even though in fact the separation from the IHQ was halted. Vlas was also able to convince Krafft of the fact that the corps activities were non-political and hardly different from any mainstream church activities. As a result, Vlas announced, already during the second week of April 1941, that the Salvation Army was allowed to continue its spiritual work and that religious meetings could be continued.²⁷ Therefore, because of Vlas’s swift action, the Army could now at least carry on its religious activities.

²² Idem:227

²³ De Jong, 423

²⁴ “De slag is gevallen”, Quoted in Ringelberg 2005:230

²⁵ Idem:230-232

²⁶ The Salvation Army unit present in the Dutch colony of Indonesia was forbidden in 1942 by the Japanese government. At the end of 1942 the Army’s commander and officers were imprisoned in a so-called internment camp. Nevertheless, some Army officers and soldiers managed to continue the Salvation Army’s work illegally. See: De Jong: 263, footnote 2.

²⁷ Ringelberg 2005:233

The Army's illegal status combined with the continuance of its church activities urged Vlas to draft a new 'code of rules'. This code was partly derived from the doctrine that had formed the statutes of the foundation since 1931 and aimed to formalize the new position that the Salvation Army occupied since its liquidation. This meant that instead of a foundation, the Dutch Salvation Army would become a church, with its head office in Amsterdam instead of in London. On September 15, the first meeting of the congregation was held and attended by 39 members and Army notary Warmelink, where they accepted the new code. Vlas appointed Jacob Smael (1941-1945) as the first general manager of this community of faith, but with the guarantee that within two months a successor would be elected by the leaders of the various Army sections. Upon being requested, in November 1941, the Ministry of Justice confirmed this new status by adding the Salvation Army to the official list of Dutch churches as *De Nederlandsche Geloofsgemeenschap Het Leger des Heils* (The Dutch Community of Faith of The Salvation Army).²⁸

The acknowledgement of the Salvation Army as a church however, did not mean that everything was back to normal. By the end of 1941, it was still forbidden to wear the Salvation Army uniform and to release any publications. Additionally, the social services of the Army were organized differently. For the time being, the probation services were accommodated under the probation umbrella *Genootschap* (see chapter 3). The social services to men were organized in a separate and new foundation: *Werkgemeenschap de Industriële Inrichting* (Working Community The Industrial Institution) and its management consisted of officers from the Army's corps in order to guarantee the interrelation between these now divided parts of the Salvation Army. With regard to the social services for women and children, some parts were taken over by the *Nederlandse Volksdienst* (Dutch Public Service) and the remaining parts would continue their work on an illegal basis.²⁹

During the last year of the war, it became clear that the new organizational structure of the Army worked quite well. The German occupiers appeared to be satisfied with the Salvation Army's intention to break with London, but an actual realization thereof was not actually demanded. Therefore, in August 1944 the Army took matters in its own hands, and with the course of the war turning for the better, a notary deed was drawn up to halt the implementation of the change of the statutes, as was proposed in December 1940. In effect, the legal connection of the Dutch territory of the Salvation Army to its British alma mater remained intact, but internally the wartime developments had forced the Salvation Army to revert to its elemental nature. In order to survive its total liquidation, the Army fell back on its religious core by emphasizing that it was actually a

²⁸ Idem:235

²⁹ The Nederlandse Volksdienst was a German initiated organization that aimed at the Nazification of the Dutch social work. The Salvation Army youth work was adopted by the NVD and supposedly used by the Nazis to recruit young boys for the Jugend Sturm. See: Ringelberg 2005:248-252

church. This however meant that in a legal sense by 1945, the Army consisted of two legal entities: a church *and* a foundation.

1.5. A church-foundation

After the German surrender in May 1945, the legal status of the Salvation Army became a matter of significant interest to the organization itself, as well as to its surroundings. On November 15, 1945, the *Raad voor het Rechtsherstel* (Dutch Council for Legal Rehabilitation) decided to annul the liquidation of the Salvation Army.³⁰ The aim was to restore the legal situation as it had been at the time of its liquidation, meaning that the Army's most recent prewar statutes would be reinstated. This however seemed to reduce the Army's legal status to that of a foundation once again, as it had been on February 7, 1931, because in its decision-making process however, the Raad appeared to only have considered the actions that were taken by the German oppressor and apparently failed to take into account the fact that the Army itself had chosen to attain the legal status of a church – a status that was also officially confirmed by the Dutch government. This emphasis on being a foundation did not do justice to the Army's desire to also be a church, for as Ringelberg keenly observed, the compelled separation of social work and religious activities during the war had not only given impetus to change the religious branch into an official church, but it had also internally emphasized the importance of being a religious community. Additionally, being a church also produced some other advantages, as the legal advisor of the Salvation Army, Warmelink, underlined: as a church, the Salvation Army was able to officially take part in interdenominational forums, and ministers of churches (like Salvation Army officers) were also exempt from military duty as they often had the spiritual (and material) responsibility for their communities of faith. A third argument in favor of being a church was that the Salvation Army would be protected from future and possible destructive government intrusion, and because a church was also not obliged to keep separate books for ecclesiastical and social work donations, the legal status of a church might safeguard the Army's identity as well as secure its existence on a more fundamental level.³¹ Even though the Salvation Army had also been incorporated as a foundation, based on the acknowledgement of the Army's church-like character in jurisprudence with the Dutch High Council, Warmelink opined that it could very well also be recognized as a church.³²

In order to solve this ambivalent legal position of the Salvation Army, Warmelink suggested three possible organizational forms. The first possibility

³⁰ This council represented the preliminary Dutch government and was set up to annul any organizational liquidations and restore all properties that were confiscated by the Germans.

³¹ Ringelberg 2005:271; Roelvelde 1958

³² 'High Council Arrest', *Weekblad van het Recht*, 61 (1899), nr. 7261:2, Quoted in Ringelberg 2005:270-271

was to preserve the current postwar status quo as being a church separate from the foundation, but both tied together by a common ideology represented by a shared staff. The main downside here was that this would mean an internal organizational division of the Salvation Army with a possible lack of unity. The second possibility was one that would indeed strengthen the unity within the Army by creating a new church that included the old church and the social work foundation. In that case, the foundation could probably be regarded as an official ecclesiastical foundation. The third possibility was to accept the prewar situation of the statutes of 1931 (Salvation Army as a foundation), but then with the “qualification of being a church”. The difficulty in this case was that a change of the Dutch law seemed to be required.³³ It was nevertheless, exactly this last possibility that fitted the Army’s ambition, to remain a church *as well as* a foundation, best and in a slightly customized manner, and hence this third option was chosen.

Remarkably, the choice seemed to be based on a more pragmatic than ideological argument. Because the Salvation Army in the Netherlands had been a foundation ever since its start, and was recognized as such, a complete change of legal form could lead to “complicated situations in cases of property liabilities or legacies”.³⁴ Therefore, at first glance it appears as if these practical financial considerations made the Army decide to reject the options of becoming an ecclesiastical foundation or a separate foundation and church. But next to pragmatism, the Salvation Army also showed its vision, because even though it was very well aware that the preferred option lacked any legal basis, the Army nonetheless wanted to maintain a close connection between the two parts of its mission and there was no law that exactly fitted this envisioned coherence. Therefore the Army chose to explore the boundaries of the existing Dutch legal situation and a new article was added to the 1931 statutes of The Foundation Salvation Army, presenting the foundation *as a church*:

“The Salvation Army is a church in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Law of September 10, 1853.”³⁵

After approval of this change of statutes by the General, the 1941 *Geloofsge-meenschap* was dissolved and on June 19, 1946 the Dutch Salvation Army had in fact become a “church in a secular robe” – a position that fitted the Army’s double mission perfectly.³⁶ From then on, the Army would present itself as “Foundation Salvation Army, Church”, confronting the Dutch law with a unique

³³ Ringelberg 2005:271-272

³⁴ Idem:272 footnote 658

³⁵ “Het Leger des Heils is een kerkgenootschap in den zin van Artikel een, alinea twee der Wet van tien September achttien honderd drie en vijftig (Staatsblad 201)” in: *Uitreksel uit de statuten van het Leger des Heils zoals deze luiden na de wijziging van 19 juni 1946* (UA 1182, nrs.171 and 172)

³⁶ Ringelberg 2005:270-273

hybrid legal form of the ecclesiastical foundation. Only in a footnote, a referral was made to its original legal status: foundation.

In order to make this new form official, the new statutes had once again to be accepted by the Ministry of Justice. This however, was not going to be easy because the Army's statutes were still regarded to be those of a foundation instead of those of a community of faith. The reaction of the ministry confirmed the Army's fears, for according to the ministry, the adjustment of articles had not transformed this legal document of a foundation into the required rules and regulations of a church. Therefore, once again it looked as if government officials thwarted the freedom, and in this case even the desired identity, of the Salvation Army, and on receiving this message of disapproval, Warmelink went to the ministry to discuss the issue. Warmelink's attempt however, still failed to resolve the issue and the subsequent insecurity lasted for about a year. In the spring of 1948 however, the Ministry of Justice seemed to have figured out where exactly the problem was, and asked for a declaration by the members of the Salvation Army that would accredit the statutes as a church code. A foundation was not required to have members, but a church was. Uncomfortable as the Army was with democratic involvement, the Army command rallied 24 'members' that thereupon would endorse the code, just like was done during the war, and on December 4, 1948 the Salvation Army was registered as church number 65.³⁷ By 'daring to be a church', the Salvation Army had suggested a fourth form of legal incorporation. According to the Dutch law, the Salvation Army was acknowledged to be a foundation and a church. However, in its Articles of Association of 1948, the Army presented itself as a new hybrid form. It was not just a foundation, neither was it just a church, nor did it declare to be an 'ecclesiastical foundation'. It was more than that - it was a church-foundation.

2. The 'secular robe' in practice

This hybrid legal form made very clear how the Army valued the balance between both goals. Based on the idea of being a 'church in a secular robe', the Army acknowledged the religious mission to be its core value. Whether or not this philosophy could serve as a solid foundation to the Army's legal future, was still to be put to the test as the Salvation Army became a valued partner to the Dutch government within the social policy system. So, how did the Dutch government perceive the Salvation Army and how did this secular robe function with regard to the Army's dual identity?

2.1. A social service organization

As part of the financial support to the postwar reconstruction of the Dutch infrastructure, the Dutch government set up a grant system called the *Wet op de Ma-*

³⁷ Idem:273

teriële Oorlogsschade (Law on Material War Damage).³⁸ A list of eligible institutions and organizations was drawn up, which included the Salvation Army. The presence of the Salvation Army on this list indicates that the organization had attained certain significance within Dutch society on a national scale. However, this relevance did not appear to bear reference to the Army as a ‘church’, as the classification of organizations on the list shows, because after starting out with enumeration of the buildings of the main churches, the classification continued with hospital buildings and buildings for youth activities. It was not until the catch-all category “*Andere Instellingen Ten Algemeenen Nutte*” (Other Institutions for the Common Good) was formed, that the Salvation Army was mentioned. In this category, the Army was equated with private schools, public service corporations and utility companies.³⁹ Therefore, regardless of its legal confirmation as a church, by 1949 this status had not quite sunk in with the political realm.

Even though within the scope of the *Wet Oorlogsschade* the Salvation Army was not regarded as a church, it was acknowledged as a religious organization by the Dutch parliament, as a debate on the 1950 annual budget for the Ministry of OKW shows. A part of the debate was about the allocation of grants for youth organizations, and during the debate, the Salvation Army became a *pars-pro-toto* within a dispute over words, on the issue of whether or not it was “predominantly” or “also” a religious organization. The grant program stipulated that organizations that had “predominantly political-religious or political goals” would not be eligible for these grants.⁴⁰ In order to ascertain whether this was the case, the statutes of the applicants would be assessed, and as a result, the communist-oriented *Algemeen Nederlands Jeugd Verbond* (Common League of Dutch Youth - ANJV) was denied such subsidies. Subsequently, Member of Parliament Hoogcarspel, who was also member of the Dutch Communist Party (CPN), tried to obtain a renewed financial commitment for the ANJV. Hoogcarspel argued that neither from the statutes, nor from its public record, could it be concluded that the ANJV was “predominantly” a political organization. In support of his argument, he compared the ANJV with religious organizations like the Salvation Army and the Catholic youth movement. According to Hoogcarspel, although the names of these organization led to it being deduced that they were very much focused on “separation, keeping apart from others”, these organizations nevertheless were eligible for grants. Additionally, they were “also” acting on a religious basis, so if these organizations were eligible for grants, why then, Hoogcarspel wondered, was this not the case for the ANJV?⁴¹ In his reply, Minister of OKW, Rutten (KVP, 1948-1952) only partly endorsed the argument of Hoogcarspel. He acknowledged that the word “also” was exactly

³⁸ *Wet op de Materiële Oorlogsschade*, *Staatsblad* K 31, 5 februari 1950

³⁹ *Kamerstukken II* 1948/49 Nr. 705-6:104 (MvA)

⁴⁰ “met overwegend politieke godsdienstige of politieke doelstellingen” *Handelingen II* 1949/50, 38, 1400:1121

⁴¹ “(...) separeren, het zich scheiden van anderen” *Handelingen II* 1949/50, 38, 1400:1121

the right term because as soon as an organization would “predominantly” strive after religious or political aims, as was done by the ANJV in his view, it would not be eligible for such grants.

Even though the Salvation Army openly stressed in its statutes that it was a church, the minister came to a different conclusion in its case, thus implying that the balance between the two missions tipped towards the social mission. A possible explanation for this suggestion was that the KVP-minister might have had more affinity with these faith-based organizations than with the communist-oriented group during these years in which the Cold War started to show its teeth, and conveniently closed his eyes to the ambiguity that the Salvation Army revealed. However, it might also be indicative of the fact that the Army’s ‘secular robe’ functioned quite well, for this image of the Salvation Army being ‘not predominantly religious’, was again politically confirmed during the 1950s.

During the first years of this decade, the Dutch Second Chamber debated the possibilities of establishing an advisory council to the minister of OKW on the social development of the Dutch youth (*Raad voor de Jeugdvorming* - Council for Youth Education). Because this council was to advise on issues that would probably touch upon the private sphere, like education and moral development, it was fundamental that the staffing of the council was to reflect the diversity in the work types as well as the ideological background of organizations that were active in this work field. The debate took place in 1953 in a political constellation of which the Dutch labor party PvdA formed the political core of the government, and was closely encircled by the three main confessional parties KVP, CHU and the ARP, of which the latter had taken the place of the liberal VVD. The orthodox-protestant PvdA-MP Nico Stufkens sought the cooperation of the opposition party VVD in person of MP Jeanne Fortanier-De Wit. Stufkens’ aim was to ensure that the diversity of the organizations was guaranteed as so this new council had to represent more than just the three main ideological pillars that were active in this field. Elaborating on this idea, Stufkens and Fortanier-De Wit explained that this work field consisted of a variety of organizations like: *Nederlandse Padvinders* (Dutch Scouting), *Nederlandse Jeugdbond voor Natuurstudie* (Dutch Youth League for Study of Nature), *Zonnebloemwerk* (Sunflower Work), *Leger des Heils* (Salvation Army), and *Nederlandse Jeugdherbergcentrale* (Dutch Youth Hostel centre). Therefore, the new council would have to reflect this variety of organizations and identities.

This enumeration shows once again that the Salvation Army was regarded more as a social service provider with national relevance and based on a religious philosophy, than a primarily faith-based organization like a church. This particular representation of the Salvation Army however, made it a rather useful case for Stufkens, for as a longtime adherent to social-democratic politics, he was closely involved in the predecessor of the PvdA, the SDAP. Also as editor of the PvdA magazine *Doorbraak* (Breakthrough), he is regarded as one of the inspirations of the postwar movement within the PvdA that aimed for a convergence of the pillarized political structure, the so-called breakthrough movement. In this light, the resolution with which Stufkens insisted on guaranteeing the

diversity of the council by pressing for the inclusion of non-pillarized organizations like the Salvation Army, confirms the idea that the Salvation Army was at least not seen as part of the established religious currents.⁴² Because of this separate position from the pillars, the Salvation Army seemed to have been regarded more as a faith-based movement than a church. A perception that made the Army a sympathetic and politically ‘harmless’ charity.

2.2. The Army as a test case for the government

During the 1950s and 1960s, welfare development saw a boost and civil society organizations were accordingly increasingly supported by government finances. With regard to the Salvation Army, the legal scope of terms like ‘ecclesiastical’ and ‘foundation’ seemed to become more and more confusing, and within the discourse that explored the boundaries of the existing law, the Salvation Army was produced as a test case more than once. In its increasing cooperation with civil society during the first decades of the twentieth century, the Dutch government referred to the legal form of foundation in order to “set up social-economic activities outside the administrative hierarchy”.⁴³ This form however also facilitated churches to create foundations in order to receive government money. The subsequent increase in foundations sparked the demand for a more suitable legal framework for incorporation – a process that would take until the 1950s to bear result. In anticipation of the renewal of the Dutch *Burgerlijk Wetboek* (Civil Code, see also paragraph 3.1.), the *Wet op stichtingen* was introduced in 1954 and passed on May 3, 1956 as the Foundations Act.⁴⁴

This codification of the foundation might also have redefined the status of the ‘ecclesiastical foundation’, as some had hoped for in the parliament, but in fact, by excluding this particular type of legal entity together with the ‘governmental foundation’ from the Bill, the issue was avoided altogether. In the Foundations Act, explicit exceptions were made for churches as well as “their autonomous parts” (i.e. ecclesiastical foundations), because as it was argued that they found their legal basis in the 1853 Law on Churches. The explanatory memorandum on the Foundation Act confirmed this viewpoint:

“The [ecclesiastical] foundation will have to aim at an activity or promotion of interests, which has to be regarded as the inherent aim or inherent task of a church. Furthermore, the foundation will have to be incorporated or accepted as such, by that particular body of the church that is entitled to do so, in such a way that its administration pertains to canon law or that incumbents have authority over the foundation.”⁴⁵

⁴² This point was made by Ringelberg 2005:139-159

⁴³ “op sociaal-economisch gebied activiteiten op te zetten, buiten de overheidshierarchie” Quoted in: Dijk en Van der Ploeg 2007:10

⁴⁴ *Wet op stichtingen* (1956). Dijk en Van der Ploeg 2007:11

⁴⁵ “De [kerkelijke] stichting zal ten doel moeten hebben een werkzaamheid of een behartiging van belangen, welke tot het eigen doel of de eigen taak van een kerk moeten worden gerekend. Voorts zal de

This phrasing however, did not make clear what the difference was between an ecclesiastical foundation and other “autonomous parts” of a church. Additionally, the Act did not demarcate the exact distinction between a religious and secular foundation. The explanatory memorandum did however provide for guidelines, because the activities of the ecclesiastical foundation had to be an inherent part of the mission of the churches and had to be established or adopted by a church because an ecclesiastical foundation was not able to exist in its own right. Therefore, in this way the Foundations Act also determined that the ecclesiastical foundation pertained to private – i.c. canon - law. It can be assumed that to a certain extent this codification increased the appeal of this particular form of legal incorporation for organizations that were religious and performed governmentally supported social services.

The indistinctness between the several forms also raised some questions in parliament. In 1955, during the debate prior to putting the Foundation Bill to a vote, MP Ten Hagen (PvdA) asked the Minister of Justice, Donker (PvdA, 1952-1956), whether this phrasing would lead to regard the *Katholieke Radio Omroep* (Catholic Radio Company) or the *Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam* (VU University Amsterdam) as ecclesiastical foundations because foundations were formed within ideological segments of the Dutch society, respectively the Catholic and Protestant.⁴⁶ Without waiting for an answer however, Ten Hagen continued by stating that in his opinion this certainly ought not be the case, because the activities of these foundations (i.e. public broadcasting and academic research and education) were not “inherent” to the missions of their churches. So in order to help the minister to accentuate the contrasts between the two legal forms, Ten Hagen juxtaposed the term “inherent” with the word “exclusively” by suggesting to “exclude all types of activities and goals that are also deployed by non-churches”.⁴⁷ In support of his argument, Ten Hagen also referred to the Salvation Army as follows: “(...) all the social work by, e.g. ‘The Salvation Army’, also a registered church, could be regarded as a part of its mission.”⁴⁸ Ten Hagen thus, explicitly referred to the ambiguous identity of the Salvation Army and he acknowledged for the record, that the Salvation Army was actually a church, even though that status was disputable because of its emphasis on social activities. For that matter, the Salvation Army was used as a case to show that the two legal forms were still not sufficiently developed in this Bill, for it left indistinctness between both legal forms that would, in Ten Hagen’s opinion,

stichting door het daartoe bevoegde kerkelijk orgaan als rechtspersoon moeten zijn ingesteld of aanvaard in die zin, dat op de bestuursvoering kerkelijke reglementen van toepassing zijn of dat kerkelijke ambtsdragers bevoegdheden ten aanzien van de stichting uitoefenen." *Wet op stichtingen* MvT, punt 20. Quoted in: Roeleveld 1958: paragraph 6.

⁴⁶ *Handelingen II* 1955/56, 8:2094

⁴⁷ “alle werkzaamheden en doelstellingen worden uitgesloten welke ook door niet-kerkgenootschappen plegen te worden verricht of nagestreefd” *Handelingen II* 1955/56, 8:2094

⁴⁸ “(...) al het maatschappelijk werk zou bv. “Het Leger des Heils”, ook ingeschreven als kerkgenootschap, tot zijn doelstelling kunnen achten” *Handelingen II* 1955/56, 8:2094

lead to inequality of justice. The secular foundation would suffer from legal restrictions while the ecclesiastical foundation, which could be established by religious organizations like the Salvation Army, would have a free hand. Ten Hagen seemed to have had a point in his effort to clarify the boundaries of the legal concept of ecclesiastical foundation, for the Foundation Bill stated that the exact demarcation of the concept would be left to the judiciary. Ten Hagen however regarded the legislator as being remiss in its duties, for “the judge has to be able to know what the legislator has envisioned”.⁴⁹ At least the Salvation Army was for the first time acknowledged as a church by the parliament and thus in the political realm, but still it was very closely associated with its social activities.

The idea of transferring the power to the judiciary to assess whether or not an organization was actually an ecclesiastical foundation, sparked another debate during the 1960s. Central to this debate was the question: who actually decided on what defined a church? This question was closely related to the balance between the church and the state, as MP Diepenhorst (ARP) concluded in his contribution to the debate on whether or not to subsidize churches with public money in order to restore their buildings. Diepenhorst concluded that the Dutch government was, to say the least, confused about the status of certain ideological organizations:

“It is the plain and simple truth that we, from the perspective of the state, are at a loss when it comes to the Salvation Army and, on a whole different level, Jehovah Witnesses and Mormons.”⁵⁰

Are they churches? And if so, according to who?, Diepenhorst questioned. Was it the state that had to decide whether an organization is Christian enough to be accepted as a church? Even though it was attempted earlier, according to Diepenhorst, these questions remained without a satisfying answer.⁵¹ He sharply commented that it was this kind of “ignorance” that caused the state “to accept everything as a church that presents itself like a church”. He further criticized the attitude of the state, because in his opinion the state possessed enough common sense to ascertain whether it was dealing with a spiritual organization that “valued spiritual revelation”, or that it was a secular organization that “was

⁴⁹ “de rechter moet duidelijk kunnen weten, wat de wetgever heeft bedoeld” *Handelingen II 1955/56*, 8:2094

⁵⁰ “Het is de eenvoudige waarheid, dat wij met het Leger des Heils, dat wij – in een geheel ander vlak – met Jehovahgetuigen en dat wij met Mormonen vanuit de staat niet zoveel raad weten.” *Handelingen I 1962/63*, 7:3026

⁵¹ In order to codify the difference between a church and an association the ‘State committee on Churches’ (Commissie-Anema) put the Bill on Churches to the vote in 1922. Even though the Bill was rejected, the practice of the Dutch state by means of the Ministry of Justice, was that churches were regarded as autonomous legal bodies and that associations would be acknowledged as such only after Royal approval of their statutes. See: Commissie-Anema 1922.

dressed in a religious, legal form”.⁵² Nevertheless, the assessment of whether or not an organization was a church, was put in the hands of the judiciary, even though it lacked governmental guidelines to do so properly.⁵³

This attitude of the Dutch government to avoid any ruling on whether or not an organization was a church, was based on the idea that church matters were not to be infringed upon by the state. This however, did not mean that the Dutch government did not have a clue about what organizations were to be regarded as being a church, as the registration system of the Ministry of Justice showed. In fact, it was actually this list that formed the basis of other classifications, as the example of the *Wet Premie Kerkgebouwen* (Act on Church Building Premium) shows. During a debate in the Second Chamber, a list of all churches that received grants based on the Act on Church Building Premium during the period 1946-1968 was presented. Because this classification was based on the registration with the Ministry of Justice, the appearance of the Salvation Army on this list was not a surprise.⁵⁴ That however, did not alter the fact that this list, and the governmental attitude towards this issue, was based on the philosophy that Van der Ploeg phrased as: “they who dare to be a church, are a church.”⁵⁵ However, in other debates, this axiom did not seem to apply. In terms of subsidizing “bricks and plumbing”, the government was not very scrupulous, but subsidizing churches was a completely different matter.

2.3. The chameleonic Salvation Army

During the late 1960s, the *Staatscommissie voor de Zaken van de Erediensten* (State Committee on Worship Affairs), also called Committee-Van Walsum, after its chairman, attempted to modernize the financial relationship between the church and the state – a relationship with a longstanding history.⁵⁶ This financial relationship between the church and state resulted from the end of the Reformation. Even though the French Revolution eventually led to introduction of the separation of the church and state in the Batavian Republic and to additional efforts to eradicate any financial relationship between the two, the intended division has never been absolute in the Netherlands. However, the status of the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* (NHK, Dutch Reformed church) was reduced. It was no longer the national state-church, and additionally, the government now deemed all existing denominations as equal. A status that was officially ratified in 1805 by King Louis Napoléon Bonaparte (Article 4: “no dominant church”).⁵⁷

⁵² “die men in een godsdienstige, juridische vorm heeft gekleed” *Handelingen I* 1962/63, 7:3026

⁵³ *Handelingen I* 1962/63, 7:3026

⁵⁴ *Handelingen II* 1967/68, 870

⁵⁵ Van der Ploeg 2010:29

⁵⁶ “De Staatscommissie voor de Zaken van de Erediensten”. Because of the death of (second) chairman prof. mr. F. de Vries, on October 30, 1958 the Mayor of Rotterdam mr. G. E. van Walsum, was appointed as successor and third chairman. The committee would take over 20 years (!) to conduct its research and produce its report.

⁵⁷ Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:6

This equalization of churches worked in two ways: the Dutch state would confiscate the religious properties of all churches (not profane property like church buildings, parsonages and presbyteries), and in return it would start or increase its support to these churches. This support included payment of salaries, pensions, scholarships, child support and additional supplements to shortages of income.

Even though over time this arrangement underwent change and mitigation, the habit of state support to the NHK was legally codified and would remain intact until its intended revision during the 1960s. According to the Committee - Van Walsum, these financial support measures were not to be equated with the governmental subsidies that were being allocated since World War II. These primary payments were mere compensation payments to the NHK "because the value of the religious properties, that had come into the possession of the government during the Republic, would have been more than sufficient to compensate for what at that time was paid out to the local pastors."⁵⁸

Article 194 of the 1815 Dutch Constitution explicitly allowed for government support of churches because of the precarious economic and political times. In the Constitution of 1848, this Article was rewritten into Article 185 in which the Dutch state guaranteed all denominations "equal protection" and the continuation of financial support.⁵⁹ However, it would take until the upheaval of World War II, for the need for reassessment of this arrangement to rise. Already on December 2, 1946, the Minister of Finances, Liefstinck (PvdA, 1945-1952), installed the *Staatscommissie voor de Zaken van de Erediensten* (State Committee on Worship Affairs). Its assignment was to scrutinize the financial relations between the church and state because, according to the minister, the Dutch society as well as the churches themselves had changed very much during the last 125 years: "There is an ongoing struggle between the dynamical organization of the various denominations and the static stipulations that regulate the financial relationship between Church and State."⁶⁰ The current support to Dutch denominations amounted to about fl.4,000,000 of which fl.2,217,500 was paid to several Protestant denominations and fl.1,175,500 to the Roman-Catholic denomination.⁶¹

⁵⁸ "(...) omdat de waarde van de geestelijke goederen, die onder de Republiek in het bezit van de overheid waren gekomen, meer dan toereikend zou zijn geweest om uit de opbrengst van die kapitalen te bekostigen wat destijds aan de plaatselijke predikanten werd uitgekeerd." Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:5

⁵⁹ "Artikel 185. De traktementen, pensioenen en andere inkomsten, van welke aard ook, thans door de onderscheidene godsdienstige gezindheden of derzelve leraars genoten wordende, blijven aan dezelfde gezindheden verzekerd. Aan de leraars, welke tot nog toe uit 's Lands kas geen, of een niet toereikend traktement genieten, kan een traktement toegelegd, of het bestaande vermeerderd worden." Dutch Constitution 1948

⁶⁰ "Er is dan ook een voortdurende strijd tussen de dynamische organisatie der verschillende kerkgenootschappen en de statische bepalingen, die de financiële verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat regelen." Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:12

⁶¹ Amongst the Protestant denominations were the NHK (fl.1.253.900,-), the Evangelisch Lutherse Kerk (Evangelical-Lutheran, fl. 43.370,-), the Remonstrantse Broederschap (Remonstrant Brotherhood, fl. 21.500,-) and more. Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:5

The attitude of the minister in this matter seemed to be very open-minded because the assignment was set up rather capaciously in order to give the committee all the room it needed. It had the explicit freedom to come up with suggestions for either “tightening or total severance of the financial bonds that bind the Church and State together.”⁶² It would however, take more than 20 years for the committee to come to a conclusion. In February 1967, the Chairperson of the Committee-Van Walsum, s’Jacob, reported to the minister and its main conclusion was that article 185 had to be repealed. Instead, all churches had to be treated equally by means of an equal annual grant. This also implied that the committee had formed an opinion on the definition of church. The committee argued that by allocating subsidies to social welfare matters, the government had extrapolated its care from the material to non-material well-being of the Dutch people in terms of support to science, education, and arts. These particular areas might not always be relevant to all people, but nevertheless, the government deemed them worthy of public support. Then why not financially support churches? According to the committee, “spiritual life is not to be placed in an exceptional position with regard to public provisions. (...) It is as little to be denied that this is of great value to large parts of society as that it strengthens its vigor.”⁶³ This view also implied that in order to be called a church, a religious organization had to be of a larger public value.

The parliamentary debate on the report of the Committee-Van Walsum came to an end in 1970 with the rejection of the proposed measures by the Dutch government, for it concluded that the only acceptable solution was paying a fixed amount of “redemption money” that replaced the “monthly allowances” for churches and incumbents.⁶⁴ At the same time however, the findings of the Committee-Van Walsum had given rise to another debate. First, the committee explicitly denied to have the authority to decide whether or not an organization was to be called a church, and the committee explicitly put this responsibility in the hands of the ministers of Finances and Justice. Also, the committee stated that it lacked the right resources in order to make such an assessment. Neither the national census of 1960 in which church-membership was polled, nor the list of churches that was kept by the Ministry of Justice would be decisive in this matter. According to the committee: “(...) the single fact that one calls itself a church, cannot be decisive for eligibility for a grant.”⁶⁵ Therefore, the committee had to come up with an acceptable solution. Because the 1960 national census

⁶² “van nauwere aanhaling tot algehele losmaking van de financiële banden, die Kerk en Staat verbinden.” Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:13

⁶³ “Het godsdienstige leven mag ten aanzien van overheidsvoorzieningen niet in een uitzonderingspositie komen (...) Niet te ontkennen is, dat dit voor brede lagen van de bevolking van grote waarde is en evenmin, dat het de volkskracht ten goede komt.” Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:21

⁶⁴ *Wet van 7 december 1983 tot beëindiging van de financiële verhouding tussen Staat en Kerk* at:

http://www.st-ab.nl/wetten/0433_Wet_beeindiging_financiële_verhouding_tussen_Staat_en_Kerk.htm

⁶⁵ “(...) het enkele feit dat men zich kerk noemt, niet beslissend kan zijn om voor een uitkering in aanmerking te komen.” Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:23

did give insight into the volumes of Dutch denominations by means of membership numbers, without further elucidation, the committee decided that a church with 10,000 members or more would be eligible for financial support.⁶⁶

This definition however raised new problems, for there were some organizations that did not fit this solution. The Salvation Army, the *Nederlandse Protestanten Bond* (Dutch Protestants League) and the *Jehova's Getuigen* (Watchtower Society) appeared to have more than 10,000 members, but, as the committee stated, these organizations “are not commonly regarded as churches”.⁶⁷ This remark showed that the Committee-Van Walsum, consisting of representatives of the main denominations and members of the Ministry of Finances and the academic realm, did not attach much value to the default standard of churches by means of registration with the Ministry of Justice, and thus actually did take a clear position on the matter of what was a church.

This position might actually have endangered the unique legal status of the Salvation Army as a church-foundation. Had the secular robe that the Army cloaked itself in worked a bit too well? The Army's emphasis on being a foundation rather than a church might have downplayed the religious part of the Salvation Army's identity to such an extent that it was hardly recognized outside the Army ranks. Did the Salvation Army have to take action in order to re-emphasize the duality of its identity, now that it was explicitly mentioned in the report as *not* being a church? Even though the Army was provoked to nail its colors to the mast, it did not so much as blink, and gave no official reaction. A silence that however, was not appreciated by everyone.

The report of the Committee-Van Walsum seemed to invoke the idea that churches might become state-subsidized institutions. So, in a reaction MP Scholten (CHU) exclaimed that the Salvation Army was an organization that “clearly did not want to be a church in our society”, probably because it did not seem to want to apply for these government payments to churches.⁶⁸ Two years later, the implicit definition of ‘church’ given by the committee based on number of members was openly defied in the Second Chamber. MP Jongeling (GPV) stated that historically, being a church had never been decided on by membership numbers and then again, even though organizations like the Salvation Army did actually meet this requirement, they still were not regarded as a church in practice.⁶⁹

This issue was also elaborated on by the liberals, and it was especially this liberal contribution that brought a new perspective to the debate. MP Geurtsen (VVD) expressed that it was incomprehensible that a distinction was made between these organizations based, in his opinion, on much less important criteria like size of membership rather than social relevance. As an example to this

⁶⁶ Idem.

⁶⁷ “(...) het Leger des Heils, de Nederlandse Protestanten Bond en de Jehova's Getuigen, die echter naar de gangbare opvatting niet als kerkgenootschap worden beschouwd.” Commissie-Van Walsum 1967:24

⁶⁸ “(...) die duidelijk in onze samenleving geen kerk wil zijn” *Handelingen II* 1968/69, 45:2239

⁶⁹ “(...) schertskerk als ‘The Universal Life Church’” *Handelingen II* 1970/71, 47:2519

statement, he also mentioned the Salvation Army and the Dutch Protestants League, that were not regarded as churches and therefore were not able to receive benefits as churches could.⁷⁰ According to Geurtsen, this was especially undesirable because of the fact that “(...) the accomplished work by these groups is surely not of less importance than those groups that actually are allowed to call themselves a ‘church’.”⁷¹ With this remark, Geurtsen emphasized that social relevance was not actually reflected by membership numbers, but much more by the perception of its actions by the Dutch public. Therefore, for the first time, the coherence between the religious and social missions of the Army seemed to have been acknowledged and valued openly in the Dutch parliament. In March 1971, this new angle on the social relevance of the Salvation Army was discussed further, but now within the senate. In the debate on social relevance, a distinction was made between spiritual relevance, like pastoral care, and social relevance as expressed by social work activities. With reference to this dualist approach, Senator Beerekamp (CHU) criticized the Committee-Van Walsum for its denial of the Salvation Army being a church. Beerekamp expressed to be well aware of the ambiguous identity that resulted in the chameleonic appearance of the Salvation Army:

“Anyone who knows something about the Salvation Army can in fact understand that this Christian grouping is not only interested in *de cura animarum*, but that the social work ensues from this so logically and it is such an impressive part of the work of the Salvation Army that such a division is simply unthinkable.”⁷²

In this statement, Beerekamp not only underlined the importance of both missions, but he also acknowledged them to be very much interconnected, for the social services of the Salvation Army would be lifeless without its religious drive. Therefore, once again the Salvation Army was put forward to exemplify a political idea where social relevance was the criterion in order to decide whether or not an organization was a church. The membership numbers could arguably be seen as much less relevant than the actual social impact of an organization like the Salvation Army. Now, in line with this reasoning, the Salvation Army could actually be very well regarded as a church.

⁷⁰ “ (...) godsdienstige verbanden als Leger des Heils en de Nederlandse Protestanden Bond, die niet als kerk worden aangemerkt en daarom geen uitkering als kerk zouden kunnen ontvangen.” *Handelingen II* 1970/71, 47:2524

⁷¹ “ (...) Het door deze verbanden verrichte werk is zeker niet minder belangrijk dan dat van die verbanden, die zich wel ‘kerk’ mogen noemen.” *Handelingen II* 1970/71, 47

⁷² “Iemand die iets van het Leger des Heils afweet, kan toch wel begrijpen dat het voor deze christelijke groepering helemaal niet alleen om de cura animarum gaat, maar dat het maatschappelijk werk daaruit zo logisch voortvloeit en dat het zo’n geweldig stuk werk van het Leger des Heils is, dat die scheiding eenvoudigegeweg ondenkbaar is.” *Handelingen I* 1970/71, 27:839

From the above can be concluded that the Salvation Army has clearly served as an example of rhetorics in the discourse on the legal definition of 'church'. Apparently, it was hard to pinpoint what the Salvation Army actually was, and to a certain extent that might have been the result of the secular robe that the Army dressed itself in. If that actually has been the case, the attitude of the Dutch government might well have amplified this image, because it is quite conceivable that it was much more convenient for the government to regard the Salvation Army as a foundation than as a church. For as a foundation, the Army could be supported as a social service provider, but if the Salvation Army would only be a church, this position would become a lot more complicated. As for the Army itself, it remained aloof from these political discussions.

The discussion on the matter of the financial relationship between the Dutch state and churches also continued until December 7, 1983 when the *Wet van 7 december 1983 tot beëindiging van de financiële verhouding tussen Staat en Kerk* (Act of December 7, 1983 for ending the financial relationship between State and Church) was adopted. The government refused to adopt the suggestions made by the Committee-Van Walsum with regard to the membership numbers, and with this conclusion, the Salvation Army also disappeared from the political discourse as a rhetorical example. That however, did not mean that the Army itself was finished with the matter, because the recognition as a foundation in the political realm secured its position as a social service provider, but it almost denied its existence as a church. In addition, it was exactly this religious aspect that formed the core of the Army's identity around which the secular robe was wrapped, as will become visible when this part of the Army's identity process is examined moving on from the above parliamentary discourse.

3. The Army's process of legal identity (1958 - 1976)

Next to how the Army's legal position provided for a secular robe and a chameleonic appearance, also internally the Army's process of defining of its legal identity continued after World War II. Since its confirmation as a church-foundation in 1948, the legal status of the Salvation Army had not been discussed internally for more than a decade. In 1958 however, General Kitching (1954-1963) drew the attention of the Commander of the Dutch territory, Åhlberg (1957-1960), to the legal status of the Dutch Salvation Army. The International Headquarters of the Salvation Army had started a worldwide survey of the legal positions of all territories in order to secure a legal separation between the territories and the General in London. The aim was to ensure that the General was no longer to administer possessions of the organization worldwide because, as the Dutch case had painfully shown, this could provide for difficult local situations.⁷³ In order to understand the ambiguous legal position of the Dutch

⁷³ *Decision for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:45

Salvation Army, the IHQ asked for copies of the 1946 *Deed of Rights - re-establishment*. Additionally, the International Secretary Duggins suggested to Åhlberg to make sure that the organization was at least legally incorporated. He refrained nevertheless, from making any suggestions with regard to the choice of legal form.⁷⁴ Åhlberg was not allowed much time to take action on this subject however, because in 1959 he was replaced by Commander Palstra (1959-1966).

Based on the 1946 statutes, Palstra was convinced that the Salvation Army held two corporate identities: church and foundation. In a letter to his Italian colleague Evans, Palstra explained the legal status of the Dutch Salvation Army as follows:

- “1. The Salvation Army is established in The Netherlands as a foundation and on the merits of its statutes, recognized as a charitable organization. As such, it enjoys the rights and benefits emanating from the Poor Law, Children Protection Act, Reclamation Acts, Death rates Act, etc. etc.
2. Since December 4, 1948 The Salvation Army in The Netherlands is also recognized as a church and as such, entered in the list of churches known to the Department of Justice under number 65.”⁷⁵

The tone of this quote suggests that Palstra regarded the two parts as being in perfect balance. The matter of legal incorporation seemed to be no issue at all and no attention was given to the subject at that time.

Six years later, however, in February 1965, the issue surfaced again and now it was Palstra that called upon the IHQ. In contrast with the previous time, Palstra now expressed a tremendous sense of urgency by presenting it as a matter of the highest importance. The issue that he referred to was not so much the matter of being a church or a foundation, but it was the same issue that was addressed by General Kitching: According to the law, the material part of the Dutch Salvation Army was still owned by the IHQ. Palstra underlined that this issue of dependency was “highly dangerous” from a political point of view, and “inacceptable” by the Dutch government as well as the Dutch people.⁷⁶ The immediate reason for his haste remains unclear, but now a very different problem seemed to form the impetus for Palstra’s action:

“(…) I think I ought to say that I would be very much afraid of the consequences if either the government or the press and the public in general were to become conscious of the fact that all Salvation Army property is British owned. As far as the government is concerned, I am, of course, thinking of the huge financial contributions made and subsidies given by the government

⁷⁴ Letter from Under Secretary L. Kntuzen (IHQ) to Commissioner Åhlberg (SA), December 19, 1958. (UA 1182, nr. 172)

⁷⁵ Letter from Chief Secretary Palstra (SA) to P.A. Evans, April 2, 1959. (UA 1182, nr. 172)

⁷⁶ Letter from Territorial Commander Palstra (SA) to International Secretary Aage Rønager (IHQ), Februari 17, 1965. (UA 1182, nr. 172)

with respect to new building schemes as well as to rebuilding and renovation of existing Salvation Army buildings. And with regard to the general public, I am sure that knowledge of the actual legal position of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands would have a devastating effect on their generosity in giving financial support to the work of the Salvation Army.”⁷⁷

Therefore, even though in 1959 the ‘British’ problem of dependency was not shared very much by the Dutch territory, this letter shows that by 1965 it had actually developed into a shared problem. The dependency on the IHQ was a historically formed safeguard against alienation of national territories from their alma mater, and thus was meant to conserve a worldwide shared identity. But now it had turned into a problem. A problem that, according to Palstra, worked in three directions because the Dutch Salvation Army had been cornered between the IHQ, the Dutch government and the Dutch public.

As a valued actor in the social policy system the Army’s dependency on governmental support had developed throughout the twentieth century. But now that by 1963, the Dutch state had become its main financial provider, a positive public image was essential to the Army. As has become clear during parliamentary debates, this image could very well influence political debates. But also the financial support of the Dutch public was of utmost importance to the Army, for by means of this flow of money the existence of the Army’s corps was guaranteed. These corps were not state-subsidized, but were entirely dependent on public donations and earnings made through the thrift stores and other recycling activities. Palstra’s fear of defacement of the Army’s public image was not without reason, because it would have direct consequences on the generosity of the Dutch public and thus on the corps. Therefore he expressed his concerns on how the lucrative relationship with the Dutch government as well as the Dutch public would be affected when this financial relationship with the UK would become public. In his view, it was unthinkable that both the government and the Dutch people would find out that the Army was in fact an English-owned organization and that the bulk of financial support was actually donated to a foreign organization. Combined with the fact that the Army had become a valued partner in the social policy system, this international connection once again seemed to turn against it.

Another issue that confronted the Army with its unclear legal status was that the Army command regarded the Army primarily as a church, a church that offered various social services. With respect to government subsidies however, the Army’s legal advisors had tried to cut the Gordian knot of the Army’s legal identity by affirming that even though the Army regarded itself as a church, it had *presented* itself as an ‘ecclesiastical foundation’ and thus was eligible for subsidies. The fact of the matter is that the Salvation Army was both a church (Ministry of Justice, 1941) and a foundation (statutes, 1946). Nevertheless, the

⁷⁷ Idem.

Army additionally chose to represent itself officially as an ecclesiastical foundation. The available sources do not reveal the reasoning on which this was based, but the only manner in which this claim on being an ecclesiastical foundation could be substantiated, had to be based on the fact that the Dutch branch of the Salvation Army was a legal part of the British Salvation Army, which actually was acknowledged to be a church. Only as an extension of this British legal body, could the Dutch Army be an ecclesiastical foundation, but in no available sources was this argument openly made. In the statutes of 1946, the Army stated that it was a foundation that also claimed to be a church, but because according to Dutch law, an ecclesiastical foundation could only exist as *a part of* a church, the claim that the Army was an ecclesiastical foundation might have been contestable. Nevertheless, during the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the Dutch Army considered itself to be an ecclesiastical foundation.⁷⁸ This legal position did not mean however that the Army's connection with London was not up for evaluation in the 1970s again, because subsidization became a very important reason for the Salvation Army to recalibrate its legal position:

“Various government bodies grant subsidies to certain branches of social and youth work for which very often a condition is that the subsidized institution has the foundation or association form.”⁷⁹

Directly after his appointment in 1974 as Territorial Commander, Verwaal (1974-1978 and 1980-1982) tried to come to grips with the issue by assigning the Army's legal advisor Houthoff to draft new statutes in order to establish a separate foundation for the Army's properties. While this revision was to take place however, the statutes also had to be brought up to date in a linguistic sense. In addition, Verwaal took the matter one step further and also established a committee to recalibrate the Army's mission, as this mission would form the base for the new statutes. In this committee, the Commander included the two legally schooled staff members from the probation department: Hartjes and Fijn.⁸⁰ Interesting fact is that both men were not Salvation Army officers, as the other members of the committee (Ligtelijn and Nijman) actually were. The advice of the committee was to use the probation department mission statement as a mould to rephrase the general Salvation Army mission. This was phrased as follows:

⁷⁸ Even though the Army was not ben very active in presenting itself as an ecclesiastical foundation, it did considered itself as such. This is confirmed by the fact that the Army did not consider the 1956 Law on foundations to be of any consequence for itself, because the Army was not a secular but ecclesiastical foundation. The Army's reasoning was formed by the argument that before 1956, the word 'foundation' was not regulated and so the Army felt free to interpret its own legal position as an ecclesiastical foundation. See: *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands*, 1989:45-46.

⁷⁹ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands*, 1989:46

⁸⁰ Ringelberg 2010:74-76

“To propagate the gospel of Jesus Christ in the broadest sense to all people and especially to those who are usually not confronted with it, and, based upon this gospel, to relieve their social needs and necessities as much as possible”⁸¹

Even though the propagation of the gospel was mentioned first and thus seemed to be the primary goal, the Army’s social activities were no longer regarded as auxiliary to this religious mission. In this new phrasing, the social objective was not just merely a means to win souls, but it seems to have become an objective on its own. The phrasing was adopted by the Army’s command, and was broadly applied throughout the Salvation Army and its different departments. Rather soon after his appointment, Verwaal had established his first crown jewel: a new definition of the Army’s mission. Soon, however, the matter of the legal incorporation of the Army would surface again, as in 1967 the Second Book of the Dutch Civil Code was adopted.

3.1. Civil Code, Book 2: 1976

The Dutch Civil Code was created in 1838 and just before World War II, its centennial was celebrated. Soon after the liberation, however, the Dutch government ordered a re-codification due to the growing disparity between the code and the changes in society that had occurred over more than a century. A new civil code had to incorporate the 110 years of law development that had taken place in the meantime. In 1949, E.M. Meijers from Leiden University was commissioned to modernize the civil code and he presented the drafts of the first four books just before he died in 1954. Successors Drion, Eggens, De Jong and De Grooth continued his work and finished the assignment in 1992.

The revision of the second book was adopted in 1976 and brought an end to the discussion of the legal status of the (ecclesiastical) foundation. A clear distinction was made between ‘association’ and ‘church’ on the one side, and ‘foundation’ on the other. In Article 2 of Book 2, it was confirmed that a church was indeed a legal body by itself. Nevertheless, defining the term ‘church’ was once again avoided, for, echoing the arguments used in the parliamentary discussions, the state did not deem itself qualified to give an interpretation of how a church was to be defined and organized. Therefore, further interpretation of what set a church apart from a foundation was still in the hands of the judiciary.⁸² With the introduction of Book 2 however, another more relevant subject to the Salvation Army was actually decided on. By positioning the church and the foundation quite opposite to one another in a legal sense, the gray area that

⁸¹ “Het uitdragen van het evangelie van Jezus Christus in de ruimste zin van het woord aan alle mensen en in het bijzonder aan hen die gewoonlijk daarmee niet in aanraking komen en hen zoveel mogelijk helpen voorzien, op basis van dit evangelie, in hun maatschappelijke en sociale noden en behoeften”. Ringelberg 2010:76

⁸² Santing-Wubs 2002

until then had offered space for the ecclesiastical foundation had disappeared, and the legal status of ecclesiastical foundation was abolished. An faith-based organization, like a church, could still start foundations, but these were from then on considered separate and above all secular organizations on their own. That meant that a church could no longer *also* be a foundation and vice versa, even if they shared the same goals. Dijk and Van der Ploeg rephrased the definition of a church accordingly:

“An organization that aims at common religious experience is a church according to art. 2:2 BW, when it acts accordingly in the public sphere and is not incorporated as an association or a foundation.”⁸³

After 1976, in order to become a church an organization had to meet two conditions: it had to have the right legal form (no foundation), and it had to present itself as a church. These new rules of incorporation forced organizations that were considered to be ecclesiastical foundations to choose a new legal form. This push for clarity from the side of the government on the issue of incorporation would also have its consequences on the legal position of the Salvation Army, for its preferred chameleonic appearance of a religious organization in a secular robe would no longer be tenable in a legal sense. The new civil code presented the Army with the question of how to do justice to its valued double mission in this new legal constellation, and confronted the Army with a radical choice. A choice that would soon prove to be a troublesome dilemma.

⁸³ “Een op gemeenschappelijke religieuze beleving gerichte organisatie is een kerkgenootschap in de zin van art. 2:2 BW wanneer zij naar buiten als zodanig optreedt en niet de vorm heeft van een vereniging of stichting.” Dijk en Van der Ploeg 2007:25

CHAPTER 5. PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE SALVATION ARMY

Various historical images exist of the early beginnings of the professionalization of social work in the Netherlands. With regard to occupational groups, it can be argued that professionalization had already started during the seventeenth century with the system of guilds. This formation of occupational groups had modernized during the second half of the nineteenth century, when teachers, medical doctors and public notaries organized themselves into groups based on profession. Also, from the micro-perspective of the workers, the urge for professionalization was already detectable in the Netherlands before 1900, as in 1899 the first educational institute for (women) social workers worldwide (!) opened its doors in Amsterdam: *Opleidingsinrichting voor Socialen Arbeid* (Training institute for social work). This school provided for the education of volunteer workers in order to equip them for the increasingly complex social work they wanted to provide.¹ This school was however not the first attempt to equip certain occupational groups to provide for better services and care. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, for example, nursing had become a profession on its own by means of schooling and in 1878, the first diplomas on nursing were awarded.²

1. Professionalization boosted

The first impetus for professionalization was felt in the work field itself, but with regard to the possibilities for schooling and certification of workers for community work, it is observed that such professionalization was still in its infancy during the 1960s.³ Nevertheless, during the first decades of the twentieth century, professionalization received a major boost. The combination of industrial development and a persistent belief in progress resulted in new activities that developed outside the framework and finances of the 1912 Poor Law. Between 1875 and 1931, seventeen new forms of social work came into being, amongst which were child welfare, after-school child care; shelters for homeless; treatment of drug addicts and recreation work.⁴ By then, a larger group of people, beyond just the poor, could benefit from a certain degree of support. The diversity of social work activities stemmed from a dichotomy that also was perceptible in other European countries: social work and social pedagogy. In this dichotomy, social work refers to activities that aim to (temporarily) support individuals and groups who need social assistance. Social pedagogy on the other

¹ Van der Linde 2007:172

² Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:111

³ Peper 1972:149

⁴ Van der Valk 1986:112; Van der Linde 2007:174-175

hand, is aimed at the support of the educational power of communities and informal networks such as families and youth groups. This resulted in an interest in care for youth and children, and also in more community centers and the support of volunteer work.⁵

The Dutch government also increasingly started to gain interest in this development. As was described in Part I on a local level, municipalities regarded this development as a chance to increase their support to the public, and arrangements were made to subsidize civil society organizations to provide for social services.⁶ On a national level, the government started to determine attainment levels for educational programs in order to assure a basic level of skills and knowledge within an occupational group. When a program met these requirements, its diploma was officially endorsed by the state, as was the case with the nursing program in 1921.⁷

Even though the process of professionalization had started long before 1900, during the 1950s it experienced a boost. The social disruption that resulted from the war instigated an intensification of social care during the postwar decades, especially with regard to family care and youth care.⁸ Many areas of the social work field would start up their own training programs and schools, as the alumni of the School for Social Work in Amsterdam were not always prepared for these new areas of work. In the area of the community center work, a growing discontentment with the quality of alumni even incited the umbrella organizations to found their own educational programs.⁹ During the 1960s however, the Schools for Social Work started their own curricula for cultural work and tried again to catch up with the work field organizations.¹⁰

In addition to the increase in numbers of professionals, the developing welfare state arrangements had also created a new brand of professionals: a stratum of professional experts and administrators that, according to some, had become increasingly dependent on the expansion of the welfare state system itself and its myriad of provisions. This so-called ‘transformation of the middle class’ was the result of the ascension of a group of experts that was able to position itself aside from the more traditional middle class by its specialist knowledge in combination with its relative proximity to the state. A proximity that in fact would mean: dependency. In many ways, this professional was confined to boundaries set by the state and was urged to make use of provisions offered by the state. In return for this loss of independence, these professionals would gain in terms of social mobility.¹¹ This group of bureaucratic professionals would even prove to be able to impose a “professional regime” on the citizens, as they became an active

⁵ Van Ewijk 2010:62-68

⁶ Van der Valk 1986:113

⁷ Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:112

⁸ Van der Valk 1986:113

⁹ Nijenhuis 1987:171

¹⁰ Idem:228

¹¹ De Swaan 1996:238 etc.

element in the creation and subsequent control of welfare arrangements.¹² Additionally, as experts, these professionals started to define beforehand, the needs and interests of the clients and organized the service accordingly. Therefore, according to De Swaan, through these state-dependent professionals the state itself initiated and implemented organized social services that often reached into the private sphere of the individual client.¹³

The urge to professionalize did not only seem to come from the Dutch government and the professionals themselves, it was also shared by the civil society organization. The example of the creation of training programs for community center work does not stand alone. Also in case of nursing and maternity care, the *Wit-Gele Kruis* (see Chapter 1.3) started its own educational programs and initiated the additional unification of the many other courses and programs that were offered in the Netherlands in this work field.¹⁴ The recognition of the importance of professional education was clear.

Next to pragmatic considerations like the staffing of the organization, other motives contributed to this need for professionalization. For one, professionalization offered the possibility for emancipation and social mobility to young women. During the 1950s, the echelon of professionals was actively strengthened by the influx of Catholic girls.¹⁵ Another motive to professionalize was that it opened the way for the work field to be acknowledged as a profession.¹⁶ Many of these activities had originated from charity and were still associated with that past, which had by then become somewhat uncomfortable. Especially because this association no longer did justice to the financial structure of the work, nor to its level of quality or its moral implications.¹⁷ Therefore, professionalization seemed to provide for a solution to certain problems that the work field dealt with. On another level, however, professionalization seemed to create new problems by itself.

2. Professionalization debated

The complexity of the social policy system and Dutch society as a whole had contributed to the need for more professionals. Nevertheless, during the 1970s the presence of the professional within the social policy system became the subject of intense critique. In 1969, sociologist Milikowski published a popularized version of his dissertation *Lof der onaangepastheid* (Tribute to non-conformity).¹⁸ In this book, he criticized the morally normative character of the Dutch social care system. As an exponent of the 1960s, Milikowski regarded

¹² Idem:233

¹³ Idem:241

¹⁴ Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:118

¹⁵ Idem:120

¹⁶ Idem:116, compare with Van der Linde 2007:228

¹⁷ Nijenhuis 1987:86-87

¹⁸ Milikowski 1969

non-conformity as a prerequisite for social emancipation and, ultimately, self-sufficiency, but the normative superiority of the professional over the clients seemed to produce the opposite effect.¹⁹ This criticism on the role of the professional was underlined with the publication of *Nieuwe vrijgestelden. De opkomst van het spijkerpakkenproletariaat* (The newly dispensed. The rise of the ‘denim suit proletariat’) in 1977. In this work, sociologist Vuijsje questioned the discretionary powers that professionals possessed. What exactly were these professionals doing in their work and to what extent did the professional have a free rein?, were questions that Vuijsje addressed.²⁰

During the 1970s and 1980s, professional care was being increasingly criticized as patronizing and unwanted interference, and the call to maintain professional distance from one’s clients became louder. This approach was quite the opposite to what had been the prevailing standard since the introduction of the social casework method (see paragraph 4.2 of this Chapter). In addition, Van Doorn and Schuyt contributed to this criticism in their elaboration on the perceived problems that the modern welfare state was confronted with. According to them, professionalism had driven up the costs of the welfare system substantially, for professionals always demanded further development of their specialization and area of work. Therefore, by claiming this professional space the professional put his own interest above the common interest, and this would lead to an increasing distance from the clients that he worked for, and additionally increase managerial uncontrollability from the side of the government.²¹ What was even more menacing according to Van Doorn and Schuyt however, was that these professionals seemed to make the clients dependent on their specialized services. They detected a growing interference in the personal life of individuals, which was visible in the increasing supply of services like infant care and kindergartens, elderly care, socio-cultural training, community work, and moral instruction like sex education, a development that might make the client accustomed to being provided for by the state.²² Philosopher Hans Achterhuis drove home this argument of the growing dependency of the clients.²³ In his *De Markt van Welzijn en Geluk* (The market of welfare and bliss), Achterhuis argued that viewed from the perspective of the free market, professionalization of the welfare work had generated its own demand.²⁴ The system of supply-orientation by means of the multitude of social services had, according to Achterhuis, led to a preserving tradition that seemed to have one aim: to maintain the level of care as it is. Professionals were serving their own interest and by generating new services, they created a new demand, making people unhappy through welfare work, rather than happy.

¹⁹ Idem:97-113, 203

²⁰ Vuijsje 1977

²¹ Van Doorn en Schuyt 1978:138

²² Idem:32

²³ Achterhuis 1979

²⁴ Idem; compare to De Boer en Duyvendak 2007:178

Next to this perceived growth of dependency on the professional, a second problem that was ascribed to professionalization had to do with was the institutionalization of civil society. Sociologist (and co-author of the *Knelpuntennota* of 1973, see Chapter 2) Peper observed that the combination of a growing financial dependency on the government; the removal of the traditional religious and socio-political barriers (de-pillarization) and the emphasis on professionalization, had undermined the legitimacy of civil society as a whole.²⁵ Its grassroots were relieved of financial obligations towards their organizations because of state support, and the influx of professionally (in contrast with ideologically) motivated employees had disconnected these organizations from the people they aimed to represent.²⁶ At an organizational level, Peper argued, professionalization had resulted in “an erosion of one’s own initiative and material responsibility”.²⁷ This erosion had become quite visible in the tensions that had risen between the professionalized work force and their volunteer management.²⁸ With their increasing skills and knowledge because of their professionalization, the workers started to become more and more independent from their management in determining the goals and direction of the work, and at the same time, non-professionalized managers were increasingly unable to control the quality or the direction of the work of the professionals. A position that, according to Peper, deprived them of the last bit of legitimacy that they held in that time of anti-authoritarianism.²⁹

A third problem that was perceived to be connected to the professionalization process had to do with voluntarism. Traditionally, charity and other forms of social services had been drawing from a seemingly inexhaustible source of voluntarism provided for by family, friends and communities. Voluntarism had been an important element in the development of societies and had been valued as such in both the academic and political realm. Even Beveridge, who had elaborated on the possibility of a state-supported system of social welfare, clearly envisioned the concept of the welfare society consisting of smaller groups of – ‘Friendly Societies’ – that helped the people to maintain awareness of one’s responsibilities towards oneself and others.³⁰ This sense of responsibility would prevent the individual to just appeal to the state for help, and would instead would encourage citizens to care for each other. T.H. Marshall however argued, in 1949, that Beveridge’s vista might be utopian and instead Marshall envisioned a “mutual aid society run by the state”. A type of welfare society in which individual responsibility, and as its result also voluntarism, might evolve

²⁵ An interesting detail is that Van Doorn was Peper’s supervising professor.

²⁶ Peper 1972:314-316

²⁷ Idem:26

²⁸ Eventhough at that time most managers were unpaid volunteers, some social work organizations were actually able to pay their managers. For example the managers of the community center organization *Ons Huis* were salaried staff. See Nijenhuis 1987:84

²⁹ Peper 1972:315-316; Van Doorn en Schuyt 1978:31-32

³⁰ Beveridge 1942

in a different direction than Beveridge imagined, because the growing dominance of the state would function as a determinant of this relationship.³¹

In addition, the Dutch government chose a side in the debate on the effects of professionalization. In 1980, the Ministry of CRM openly acknowledged that the position and relevance of the volunteer in society had been neglected in the advancement of the welfare system. The ministry concluded that due to a variety of causes, the number of volunteers was dropping and the influence of volunteers on public management declined.³² The main causes observed for this drop in voluntarism were: the increase in other leisure activities that competed with the available time that would be taken up by volunteer work; the lessening of the bonds with religious institutions; growth of collective welfare arrangements that diminished the stimulus to engage socially; and the increase in professionalism that encouraged tutelage and dependency of the client. A reevaluation of the volunteer seemed pivotal – an observation made by the government that was particularly awkward at a time that was generally regarded as the completion of the welfare state system, as Adriaansens and Zijdeveld concluded.³³ From this perspective, the ongoing emphasis on professionalization had created a tension between the professional and the volunteer. On the other hand, not everybody was positive about this reevaluation of the volunteer that the ministry proposed. Labor unions especially, thought of this strategy as a government scheme to increase the influx of volunteers to the labor market as a cheap alternative to expensive professionals.³⁴ Additionally, the image of voluntarism was not very positive. Over time, it was associated with amateurism and incompetence, especially when it came to the managers that were increasingly outwitted by their professionalized staff.³⁵ Therefore, professionalization of certain social services was quite welcome in order to gain recognition of the profession.³⁶ This invokes the question of how professionalization affected the Salvation Army, and to what extent the Army suffered from these perceived negative effects of professionalization. In order to understand this to its full extent, we will first have to gain some insight on how the Salvation Army was organized.

³¹ Quoted in: Adriaansens en Zijdeveld 1981:52

³² From available data it can now be concluded that the numbers of volunteers had not dropped at all in 1980. Between 1975 and 1980 the percentage of people that did volunteer work had actually even increased. The number of hours that they spent per week had actually dropped. See: Dekker 2002:32

³³ Adriaansens en Zijdeveld 1981:55

³⁴ Idem:56

³⁵ Idem:59; Nijenhuis 1987:86-87

³⁶ Wijnen-Sponselee 1997:116

3. Salvation Army: vocational voluntarism (1887-1945)

3.1. The officer: personification of the Salvation Army's identity

In the organizational structure of the Dutch Salvation Army, the axiom 'distinct but inseparable' was clearly recognizable during most of the twentieth century, and especially since World War II. When looking down the Army's organizational chart, the social and religious work were embedded in its structure and statutes and the Army's double mission was firmly tied together by the management constellation. And when looking upward, the two missions were clearly distinct, as, for example, the social and religious activities had their own separate financial flows. The linking pin between the spiritual and social work of the Salvation Army was formed by the officer. Serving as the personification of the Army's double mission made the officer a key element of the Army's identity. In order to illustrate the position of the officer, the Salvation Army itself tends to draw the analogy with the Catholic Church. The position of the General resembles that of the Pope; the position of the Territorial Commander can be compared to that of an archbishop; the officers are the priests of the Salvation Army and the soldiers can be equated with committed and active church members or parishioners.

The central place of the officer was also stressed by General Booth in his expectations towards the compliance of the officer. Booth compared the role of the officer to that of a soldier-volunteer of an army prepared for battle:

“For Discipline I can answer. The Salvation Army, largely recruited from among the poorest of the poor, is often reproached by its enemies because of the severity of its rule. It is the only religious body founded in our time that is based upon the principle of voluntary subjection to an absolute authority. No one is bound to remain in the Army a day longer than he pleases. While he remains there he is bound by the conditions of the Service. The first condition of that Service is implicit, unquestioning obedience. The Salvationist is taught to obey as is the soldier on the field of battle.”³⁷

Just a few years after its start in the Netherlands, the Salvation Army claimed to already have 110 officers. In 1939, the number had risen to 743 active officers (78 retired) and approximately 12,200 soldiers.³⁸ These officers had, like priests, committed themselves to the Salvation Army for life, by contract, and were mainly active within the corps. By doing so, the officers avowed the Army's articles of faith, and just as within the Catholic Church, the Army command could assign tasks to officers at will:

³⁷ Booth 1890:266

³⁸ Spaan 1947:17

“These officers are in the field, constantly exposed to privation and ill-treatment of all kinds. A telegram from me will send any of them to the uttermost parts of the earth, will transfer them from the slums of London to San Francisco, or dispatch them to assist in opening missions in Holland, Zululand, Sweden, or South America.”³⁹

This resulted in an organizational culture of complete devotion and flexibility on the part of the soldiers and officers. And of course, to an increasing extent, skill, because an officer could be assigned to be a corps leader (including conducting the Sunday services and other religious tasks) or a probation worker, or even both, and such a transfer of tasks could occur haphazardly. As a *cadet*, as an officer-trainee was called, one had to also waive his rights to any wages – excluding the possibility of becoming a salaried employee. Voluntarism was the only way these devotees could become successful officers, and voluntarism that was based on an individual and very personal conviction that one was called to do this work:

“No good salary will keep him at work when his heart is not present anyway. (...) Vocation and profession have to remain apart.”⁴⁰

This ‘vocational voluntarism’ was highly valued by the Army and was regarded to be the main motivation for the Army’s officer. Salary was not at all to be the main incentive for the Army’s recruits, for that was regarded to be merely material and basically unsatisfying. The spiritual incentive on the other hand, was regarded as eternally rewarding – an idea that was not unwelcome regarding the circumstances that officers sometimes had to endure. The livelihood of the officers was maintained by the Salvation Army for only a part, by providing for housing and heating and a very basic income. So, in order to develop their corps activities officers had to generate additional income. The Army also stated some restrictions on private matters. Even though the Army did not apply the vow of chastity, an officer was only allowed to wed another Salvation Army officer, and not even a soldier nor someone from outside the Salvation Army. Therefore, the Salvation Army’s officer, as a dedicated vocational volunteer, was often active in both the religious as well as the social work activities of the organization and thus was the very personification of the two missions that the Army held so dear.

3.2. Preparing for the (spiritual) battle

The fact that the Army valued voluntarism so highly however, did not mean that the organization did not expect its recruits to develop a certain level of

³⁹ Booth 1890:267

⁴⁰ “Géén goed salaries houdt hem in het werk waar zijn hart toch niet is (...) Roeping en beroep moeten gescheiden blijven.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1912/13:115-116.

knowledge and skills that were deemed necessary for their work. From its early beginnings, the Salvation Army aimed to train its officers, for already in 1892 it had two functioning training schools for officers in Amsterdam: one for female officers that was located at Prins Hendrikkade 131 and a training school for male officers at Parklaan 4.⁴¹ The curriculum included studying the Salvation Army doctrines, singing, prayer, bookkeeping, reading, arithmetic, education theory, and of course “methods to save souls” and to recruit new soldiers.⁴² In the afternoons the newly acquired knowledge could be brought into practice when the cadets went out in groups of two and tried to sell the *Strijdkreet* to the willing passersby or in the local café’s, and undoubtedly try to strike up a conversation on matters of the soul. This meant that the training of the officers also had to be seen in the light of saving souls:

“Our goal is to save souls, - so we have to raise soul-winners. Everything has to work together to achieve this aim. With the training of Officers, we aim only at this target: saving of souls. Everything in the Cadet’s life will serve this purpose: all the lessons, the prayer, the singing, the work, all are focused on that (...).”⁴³

For the part of social work however, structural and professional training was not provided for by the Army at first.⁴⁴ As stated before, most of the necessary skills and knowledge were acquired on the job, but nonetheless the Army was clear on the fact that their officers needed “a certain amount of spiritual education under able supervisors” before they were sent out to “spread the gospel of salvation”, and this training would already take four to six months.⁴⁵

However, times were changing rapidly and the altering scope and complexity of social problems also seemed to demand more and more attention. As a result, in 1913 the Army concluded that the training programs had to be modernized. Due to “increasing demands that are made on the Officer it has proven to be necessary to attend more care to his education”, and in order to school its officers the Army opened a training school in 1917 on the Overtoom in Amsterdam.⁴⁶ In 1933, this training school moved to a new building in Amstelveen, and was now renamed the William Booth *Kweekschool* (training school). By then, it provided a 10 month training curriculum. The growing interest in professionalization in the Netherlands coincided with the development of the manifold social

⁴¹ *De Wijde Wereld*, September 15, 1895:277 (UA 1128 nr. 1)

⁴² *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1889/90:11; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1891/92:16-19

⁴³ “Ons doel is zielen te redden, - wij moeten dus zielenwinnaars kweken. Alles moet samenwerken om dit doel te bereiken. Met de opleiding der Officieren beogen wij dus alleen dit doel: redding van zielen. Daaraan wordt in het leven van de Kadet alles dienstbaar gemaakt: al de lessen, het bidden, het zingen, het werk, het is alles daarop ingericht (...).” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1891/92:16-18

⁴⁴ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1891/92:16

⁴⁵ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1891/92:16

⁴⁶ “Bij de toenemende eischen die aan den Officier gesteld worden is het noodig gebleken steeds meerde-re zorg aan zijn opleiding te wijden.” *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1912/13:1128-129

work activities. One of the first activities to be professionalized was probation work, and because the Salvation Army was traditionally a valued participant in this work field, it had to adopt to this development in one way or another.

4. Professionalization of the probation work field (1887-1980)

4.1. Initial professionalization (1910-1945)

As has been addressed before, during the decades before World War II, the probation work field in the Netherlands was increasingly supported financially by the government. In 1913, the Ministry of Justice started to finance the first Salvation Army probation officer, and at the end of the 1930s, the Army seemed to have been quite comfortable with this arrangement, for by then there were eight probation officers at work in the Army ranks, all receiving their salaries from the Ministry of Justice.⁴⁷ This governmental grant system had an enormous influence on the probation work field. It facilitated the increase in probation organizations that adhered to their ideological pillars during the antebellum, and thus the government indirectly strengthened the pillarized society. With the financial crisis of the 1920s and 1930s however, this ideological division proved to be rather expensive and not very efficient, as was observed by the *Genootschap*. As a consequence, the *Genootschap* actually even called out for government regulation of the work field during the 1930s.⁴⁸ This call for government influence was not much appreciated by the confessional probation organizations like the Catholic RKSv and Protestant PCRv who were mainly concerned about the strengthening of their ideological grassroots, but the Ministry of Justice reacted promptly. It appointed five ‘external’ government officials on a departmental level that had to supervise the probation officers in the field, thereby forming a temporary administrative layer between the government and these private probation organizations. In the case of the Salvation Army, the state-salaried officers had to report to the Ministry of Justice and at the same time coordinate the work of hundreds of Salvation Army soldier-volunteers who were doing most of the probation legwork. This legwork, called “correspondence”, consisted primarily of visiting the prisoners and their families in order to prepare them for their return into society.⁴⁹

By 1920 however, it became clear that a demarcation dispute had developed between these two echelons of officials, because in the daily practice both these types of officials were increasingly doing the same work – both were providing “information” and aftercare. When, because of the rising amount of work, in 1921 the Ministry of Justice (by the person of former Salvation Army officer

⁴⁷ Maris 1991:35

⁴⁸ Heinrich 1995:150-151

⁴⁹ The technical term that was used for this work by the Ministry of Justice was ‘patronage’, but the Salvation Army preferred the term ‘correspondence’. Compare Heinrich 1995 to Maris 1991:36

Veenstra) expressed its intention to appoint more government supervisors, the private organizations protested and in return opted for more staff within their own ranks. After being requested repeatedly, the ministry gave in and in 1925, it broadened the range of tasks for the private probation organizations with the underlying justification that the prime responsibility for probation work had to be in the hands of these organizations. In return, they had to demonstrate that they were capable; professionalization thus, seemed to be inevitable.⁵⁰

With the increase in workload during the first decades of the twentieth century and the pressure to meet these rising expectations of agovernment that provided subsidies, the need for organizational development grew, and the Salvation Army in its turn also set out to professionalize its workers. This form of professionalization however, had to transcend the traditional emphasis on preparation for a spiritual battle, for now the Army officer had to also explicitly demonstrate his or her capability as a social worker. Therefore, in order to create a professional identity for its workers the Salvation Army probation department issued an internal magazine called *Onze Kracht* (Our Strength). In this magazine probation workers discussed topics and issues that they encountered in their work and read about the experiences of other workers and thus *Onze Kracht* served as a platform of professional knowledge sharing and forming of ideas. Another such platform was the annual study conferences organized by the Army's probation department. During these conferences, probation workers were able to discuss recent developments that they encountered in the work field. By doing so, a culture of debate and knowledge sharing started to grow within the probation department, and additionally, these activities strengthened awareness of unity amongst the Army's probation workers, an awareness that would develop into an organizational culture that distinguished this department from the other Salvation Army social work departments in the near future.⁵¹

4.2. Postwar professionalization (1945-1970)

After World War II, the Dutch government showed a growing interest in the development of many different social services, as described in Chapter 2. The rise in demand of probation activities spurred the government to also increase its financial support to this line of work. The growing complexity of the probation work created the need for better-qualified personnel, a need that was shared by both the government as well as the probation organizations. So, in order to ensure a certain standard of quality, a combined effort was made to professionalize the branch by education of the professionals and 'scientification' of the probation work itself. In its wake, the need for efficiency and controllability grew.

Directly after the war, a first attempt to enhance the quality of the work was reflected in the *Reclasseringsregeling* of 1947. In this Order, it was specified that all changes in state-salaried personnel had to be approved of by the Ministry

⁵⁰ Heinrich 1995:137-139

⁵¹ Maris 1991:35, 39,47

of Justice. This meant that the ministry would scrutinize recruits on their abilities and qualifications. In return, their salaries would be subsidized by 90%. This directive made the employment of untrained workers highly unattractive for probation organizations.⁵² During the same period, the improvement of probation work was reflected in the announcement of a new methodology for social work: 'social casework'. Social worker Marie Kamphuis introduced this originally American approach to social work in the Netherlands in 1950.⁵³ Social casework explicitly valued the relationship between the client and its helper. The professional and the client were regarded as fundamentally equal and from that idea, the professional had to stand beside the client instead of above him. The idea behind social casework was that only on the basis of this form of confidence and informality, would the offered assistance be effective.⁵⁴ Additionally, the idea of 'good or bad behavior' changed into 'conformist or non-conformist behavior', and thus stressed that it was not just that external factors contributed to an individual's problems, but also the fact that they themselves were responsible for these problems.⁵⁵ So, social casework combined existing methods into a more comprehensive approach that would become leading in the social work field and also this personal approach, combined with taking responsibility for one's own life, corresponded well with the view of the Salvation Army on probation work. This proximity to the client would, of course, also provide for a good possibility to exercise the Army's core idea of probation work: spiritual 'rescue work'.⁵⁶

This widely accepted concept of social casework incited a spur in education in the welfare work field. In order to quickly build this new spirit in new trainees of probation work, a crash course was created by the national bureau of the probation organizations. This course was soon adopted by the social schools and was called the "urgency-program", a name signifying the sudden need for new and qualified workers. In 1964, the Ministry of Justice made the training program compulsory for probation workers and thus publicly acknowledged probation work as a part of the broad array of professional social services.⁵⁷ The growing complexity of the problems that prisoners showed called for specialized helpers. During the 1950s, the probation organizations called on the ministry to provide for means to hire psychologists and sociologists, and from 1958 onwards, the ministry actually started to subsidize the hiring of such experts. Of the 16 probation bureaus that the Salvation Army had by 1961, 13 were facilitated with their own psychiatrists.⁵⁸

⁵² Heinrich 1995:164

⁵³ Kamphuis 1950

⁵⁴ Maris 1991:70-71

⁵⁵ Kamphuis 1950:15

⁵⁶ Maris 1991:69

⁵⁷ Idem:63

⁵⁸ Idem:82

The boost in professionalization also became visible on an organizational level. The various governmental flows of subsidies, the growth of the different social work activities and the growing pressure on the organization itself to control all these developments, incited the Salvation Army to reorganize its social work activities. In 1963, it parted with the old tripartite structure of ‘Social work for women and children’, ‘Social work for men’ and its so-called ‘Charity work’, and reorganized into separate sectors: probation, child care, nursing, hotels, elderly care and homeless care.⁵⁹ Apparently, the professional idea of furthering the organizational efficiency also started to permeate the Salvation Army.⁶⁰ By 1970, the contours of a semi-professionalized probation department had become visible, and additionally, the department grew extensively. In 1967 it worked with an annual budget of fl.1,582,244 and in 1971, its budget had increased to fl.3,197,964.⁶¹ This growth was also detectable on the level of its workers, for the increase in workload and the lack of qualified personnel meant that many new employees were actually not yet qualified. Many of them were put into the urgency program directly *after* their employment. The manager of the Army’s probation department, Hartjes (1963-1973) candidly emphasized to the Ministry of Justice the great pressure that the organization was under: “Of six persons that were employed in 1969, one held the degree of the Social School.”⁶² On the other hand, the trend seemed promising. In 1964, only 17% of the probation officers were certified and in 1970, the number had risen to 50%.⁶³ This trend however, would create another problem for the Salvation Army, for in the additional letter to the 1970 subsidy-proposal, Hartjes argued that the rise in the budget proposition of the 1970s was partly caused by the former allocation of subsidies by the ministry, and with the influx of new staff the pressure on the available facilities was growing. Therefore, a proposed increase in subsidies from the side of the Army was to expand these facilities.⁶⁴ The initial supply of subsidy seemed to have created its own demand for new, additional subsidies, and Hartjes boldly pointed out to the ministry how the Army was put in this position of being forced to ask for more funding by the ministry itself.

⁵⁹ Idem:65-66

⁶⁰ Idem:86

⁶¹ Budget orders for 1970 from the Ministry of Justice (NA 2.09.103. nr. 62-67)

⁶² “Van de zes personen die in 1969 werden aangesteld, was er één in het bezit van het diploma der Sociale Academie.” Letter from the Probation Department of the Salvation Army to the Ministry of Justice, Februari 10, 1970. (NA 2.09.103. nr. 62-67)

⁶³ Idem.

⁶⁴ Letter from the Probation Department of the Salvation Army to the Ministry of Justice, Februari 4, 1969. (NA 2.09.103. nr. 62-67)

5. Effects of professionalization on the Army's identity

5.1. Professional depillarization

An important consequence of this need for professionalized personnel was that the Salvation Army's probation department was soon in short supply of qualified workers from its own rank and file, its 'own people'. The demand for professionalization by education had resulted in an unforeseen development. Former policy adviser of the Army's probation department, Maris recalls that many officers that had followed higher education were "a loss to the Army":

"Even though they came from a family of officers, they distanced themselves from it. (...) They could absolutely not relate with the Army any longer. The officers in particular – they hurried out. And they especially disappeared completely outside the organization. Thus the organization became more secularized."⁶⁵

This lack of 'own' personnel meant that if it wanted to maintain the level of service that it had been providing so far, the Army had to open its doors to people outside its own ranks. This was not something entirely new, for the Salvation Army probation department always did have non-Army volunteers within their brigades, but a shortage of troops on such a scale was actually quite new. Therefore, during the 1950s both on the level of management, as well as in the work force, this serious deficit called for drastic measures. On the managerial level, for the first time a somewhat controversial appointment was made when Hartjes became manager of the Salvation Army's probation department. Hartjes was the first manager within the Salvation Army that was not an officer. Even though he was a dedicated Salvation Army soldier, the fact that he had not completed the regular Salvation Army training and thus was not an Army officer, was quite a novelty. The fact of the matter was that the Ministry of Justice exerted increasing pressure to appoint a professional that was schooled in matters of the law, and so, to the ministry, Hartjes, being an academically schooled lawyer, qualified for this role just fine.⁶⁶

Also on the level of workforce, the Salvation Army liberalized its hiring policy. Already at the beginning of the 1950s the Army decided to:

⁶⁵ "(...) Ook al kwamen ze uit een officieren familie, ze distantieerden zich ervan. (...) Die konden zich daar absoluut niet meer in vinden. Vooral als ze officier waren – weg waren ze. En met name verdwenen ze helemaal buiten de organisatie. Daarmee werd de organisatie wereldgelijkvormiger." Interview with Maris, September 2, 2011.

⁶⁶ Maris 1991:64-65

“(...) broaden the recruitment of probation workers to all those that stand to the same attention of beliefs, irrespective of which (Protestant-) Christian denomination one is a member of.”⁶⁷

Even though the professionalization process had put the Army in the position of having to somewhat water down the wine, it clung to its philosophy of a two-fold mission by strongly emphasizing that “professionalism without personal inspiration” was not at all acceptable for the Army.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, this liberalization of the Army’s hiring policy would have its effects. For one, it would start up a process that was greatly feared by the Salvation Army’s management, for it touched directly upon the Army’s identity. A process that the historian of probation work, Heinrich called “professional depillarization”.⁶⁹ Heinrich described that people that already worked as probation officers would become trained professionals and new recruits would only be hired when they were qualified. In the process of schooling, these students would become acquainted with values other than the ideology of religious charity that formed the traditional base of social work. Values like professional distance from the clients, a discerning attitude towards new developments within the profession and a critical attitude towards the organization became inherent to this new professionalism. The personnel that finished such training programs might still possess an ideological drive that inspired them to do their work, but they were also increasingly professionally motivated. It was not unthinkable that in this process, they might lose their regard for the ideological identity of the organization that they worked for. According to Heinrich this was actually the case in the probation work field, which consequently led to the eroding of the ideological pillars.

Even though all key positions within the Salvation Army were to be occupied by internally trained and totally committed officers, within the Army too, this professional depillarization became tentative in the slow but unavoidable influx of qualified and certified personnel from ‘outside’. Although these recruits were carefully scrutinized for their religious beliefs, and were thus practicing Christians, they were still at some distance from the organization and its ideology.

5.2. An exodus of the volunteers

Professional depillarization also became visible on another level. A level that was not discussed by Heinrich: the volunteers. Until the late 1950s, the two main probation tasks were divided between the professional probation officers who provided information to the judiciary before trial, and the volunteers who

⁶⁷ “Het Leger besluit de werving van reclasseringspersoneel te verruimen tot allen die in eenzelfde geloofshouding staan, ongeacht tot welke (protestants-)christelijke richting men ook behoort.” Maris 1991:71

⁶⁸ Idem:72

⁶⁹ Heinrich 1995:195

offered aftercare to the convicted or released prisoner. The new professionals however, started to arrogate more and more of the probation work. In the name of quality enhancement, the professionals strove for the concentration of both the aftercare and information tasks in their own hands. The volunteer had always been the core upon which the probation work had relied since its start, but since World War II further education of these workers seemed imminent and in order to improve the quality of the probation services, the government also started to subsidize the education of the volunteers. Those volunteers who were not interested, were increasingly be replaced by qualified staff. In 1954, the ratio between the professionals and volunteers was 1:54, but already ten years later, this had shrunk to 1:14.⁷⁰

That this change in personnel was unexpected, can be concluded from the fact that it called for protest within the other confessional probation organizations PCRV and KRV. Like the Army, they also seemed to sharply feel the lack of suitable volunteers in their workforce, for they also acknowledged the volunteer to be ideologically driven to do his work, thus personifying the organization's ideological values. Subsequently, with the replacement of these people with well-educated, and thus maybe more professionally driven workers, the organizations' ideological identities seemed to be at stake.⁷¹ With regard to the Army, the large part of the probation workers were volunteers, and it was especially these volunteers that had been able to build up effective relationships with the clients. So, with the concentration of information and aftercare tasks in the hands of the professionals and the growing knowledge gap between the well-trained professionals and the untrained volunteers, the trend of avoiding the use of a volunteers became visible. The result was that the probation brigades within the corps ran down.⁷² The probation brigades, that stemmed from a different era and hampered the professionals, seemed to have become dead weight to the corps. This process culminated in 1972 when the approximately 500 volunteers of the Army were invited to attend the annual probation congress in one of the large market halls of the Amsterdam RAI, and after being heartily thanked for their valued services by Commander Pindred (1971-1974), they were dismissed. Arend Maris recalls:

“They were cast off. They gathered in the RAI – there were a few hundred – and: ‘It has been enough, thank you very much for all you have done!’ Nevertheless, the undertone was clear: the professionals had seized power. And, indeed, they had become redundant. And that is painful. The arrogance of the professional: ‘Listen, we can do it ourselves and don’t need those fossils anymore.’ Terrible!”⁷³

⁷⁰ Idem:176

⁷¹ Idem:195

⁷² Maris 1990:91-92, 101-102

⁷³ “Die werden afgedankt. In de RAI kwamen ze allemaal bij elkaar – het waren er een paar honderd – en: ‘Het is mooi geweest, hartstikke bedankt voor wat jullie allemaal gedaan hebben!’ Maar de ondertoon

Within Army ranks, this choice is presently regarded as a black page in the Salvation Army history, and not in the least because of the personal grief this inflicted on all those devoted workers. But also because this choice would enlarge the already widening distance between the probation department and the rest of the Salvation Army's organization.⁷⁴ In addition, in combination with the embracement of the social casework methodology, it would also prove to bring the Salvation Army probation department in an even more difficult position.

5.3. Social casework: "a Trojan horse"

The Salvation Army had always been open to new methods that could further its mission, and the social casework method seemed to offer a perfect match because the idea of proximity to the client that the Salvation Army envisioned now seemed to be legitimized. However, as Maris concluded, it soon proved to be "a Trojan horse".⁷⁵ At first glance, social casework offered the perfect possibility to provide for pastoral care. Therefore, it was greeted as an ally to the Army's evangelization work, or as Salomon declared on this matter: "Science will help us to analyze the client and dismantle him, and through the Gospel we will rebuild him."⁷⁶ Soon however, it became clear that it was nothing more than a mere "secular variety of pastoral care" and it would, according to some, even elbow out the spiritual work, for with the increasing professionalization it became clear that social (probation) work had its own mission and this was not religious influencing:

"Conversion cannot and may not be the primary goal, nor the concealed goal of the aid offered by social workers."⁷⁷

It almost even became a taboo amongst probation workers to speak of religious matters. This process was encouraged by the process of professionalization which created an influx of new professionals who had little connection with the Salvation Army's organization or its philosophy. Combined with the exodus of the volunteer, the ideological core of the Army's probation department was severely weakened. In that sense, the embracing of social casework and its unforeseen consequences renewed the friction between the Army's spiritual and social mission.

kwam duidelijk over: de professionals hadden de macht gegrepen. En inderdaad, ze waren overbodig geworden. En dat is pijnlijk. De arrogantie van de professional: 'Jongens, we kunnen het zelf wel en hebben die oude zakken niet meer nodig'. Vreselijk." Interview with Maris, September 2, 2011

⁷⁴ Maris 1991:102

⁷⁵ Idem:61

⁷⁶ "De wetenschap helpt ons de client te analyseren en af te breken en met het evangelie bouwen we hem weer op." Quoted in: Maris 1990:23

⁷⁷ "Bekering kan en mag noch het primaire noch het verborgen doel zijn van de hulpverlening door maatschappelijk werkers." Maris 1991:103

5.4. Waves of merger

At the end of the 1960s, another force also started to threaten the Army's probation work. A combination of rising wages and costs and the expansion of the probation work field led to excessive expenditures and incited the Ministry of Justice to make cutbacks. It was to be expected that the probation field too would have to contribute its mite, and especially because of the steadily growing workload, scaling-up and increased cooperation seemed imminent. In close consultation with the Minister of Justice, the probation organizations decided that maintaining the present level of efficiency and quality could only be guaranteed when joint action was taken, and during a gathering in 1968 possible scenarios of cooperation were explored, like the forming of a federation, merging organizations, working together in coalitions or participating in projects. The work field was divided on the issue. The PCRV was hesitant because of its ideological stance. The *Genootschap* and the KRV however, thought quite the opposite. They were no longer convinced of the private character of the probation work, because its core seemed to have been reduced to nothing more than carrying out the law and, consequently, government policy. The KRV was even willing to abandon its Catholic identity in the process of a merger in order to further efficiency.⁷⁸

The Salvation Army was quite explicit in not wanting to cooperate more than a mere coalition, because it regarded its probation work to be very much interconnected with the other social services that it provided. A merger or other intensive forms of cooperation were not an option to the Army:

“The Foundation The Salvation Army, of which the probation department is a part, is not restricted to just probation work with regard to its activities. The entire work includes much and much more.”⁷⁹

In addition, the personnel of the Salvation Army's probation department did not appreciate a merger: 92.2% were opposed to the idea.⁸⁰ Next to these reasons of the organizational kind, ideological reasons also played a part, for the Army was convinced that its added value lay in the fact that it was an organization with an explicitly faith-based identity and a merger was unthinkable without the loss of this identity.⁸¹ With the *Genootschap* and the KRV striving after a thorough collaboration however, and even pressing for a merger within the probation field, the PCRV and the Salvation Army now openly turned against them and in turn agreed on a certain degree of cooperation between themselves, “with

⁷⁸ Heinrich 1995:203-205

⁷⁹ “Immers, de Stichting Het Leger des Heils, waarvan de afdeling Reclassering een onderdeel is, is wat zijn arbeidsterrein betreft niet beperkt tot de reclasseringsarbeid. Het totale werk omvat veel en veel meer.” Maris 1991:91

⁸⁰ Idem:91

⁸¹ Idem:102

preservation of one's own goals".⁸² In 1970 however, the PCRV changed its mind and together with other probation organizations it issued a statement that they were willing to cooperate on a close level. The only two Dutch probation organizations that did not take part in this new constellation were the CAD, which concentrated particularly on those prisoners who had a substance abuse problem, and the Salvation Army. In July 1973, this merger resulted in the establishment of the *Stichting Samenwerkende Reclasseringsinstellingen* (SRI, Association of Cooperative Probation Organizations) and three years later, this altered into the *Algemene Reclasseringsvereniging* (ARV, General Probation Society).⁸³

5.5. The relationship with the government as a counterbalance

Many of these external pressures were counterbalanced by the personal bonds that were formed between the Salvation Army and the Dutch government. In 1969, public administration scientist R. Crinice Le Roy stated in his inaugural lecture, that next to the three official branches of government (legislative, judiciary and executive) a fourth branch had developed: the civil servants. This fourth branch, or fourth estate, was also recognizable from an international perspective, but then consisting of pressure groups and the press. In the Netherlands, it was, according to Crinice Le Roy, the large group of civil servants that formed this 'shadow power'.⁸⁴ These civil servants had to interpret and implement the political decisions that were made by the politicians and were to be executed by their employer: the Dutch government. These civil servants were not democratically chosen and also often formed a continuous base under the often-changing echelon of ministers. Thus, for the Salvation Army's probation department, the importance of maintaining good relations with key persons within this fourth branch was obvious. This was abundantly clear by the fact that the Army could very well even discern certain periods within this branch, periods that did not at all cohere with subsequent cabinets but that correlated with the Secretaries-General that were responsible for the policy lines on probation within the Ministry of Justice: the 'Veenstra era' (1912-1939); the 'Tjaden era' (1945-1968) and the 'Goedemans era' (1970-1984).⁸⁵

The Salvation Army was very keen on maintaining their own relations with these key persons. In general, policy discussions between the ministries and the civil society organizations were held on the level of the umbrella organizations, like the *Genootschap*, but because the Salvation Army and the CADs did not merge into the newly formed ARV, they formed a kind of troika that had its own contacts within the Ministry of Justice. Therefore, in disregard of its relatively small size, the Salvation Army's probation department had seized its place at the

⁸² Heinrich 1995:237; Maris 1991:90

⁸³ See also Chapter 3.4

⁸⁴ Crinice Le Roy 1969

⁸⁵ Maris 1990:25

national policy table, which meant in practice that, for instance, Fijn was a regular guest of Goedemans at the ministry. However, the one-on-one deliberations between Goedemans and Fijn were about subsidies and budgets, not about policy. In such a negotiation, Fijn and Goedemans talked for instance about the necessity of qualified personnel.⁸⁶ Usually Fijn made the suggestion of expanding the staff with another very useful worker, and when Goedemans was convinced of the necessity, he would approve and allocate the budget. Especially on the matter of professionalization, this effort to align policy goals between Fijn and Goedemans could result in a lucrative collaboration; For example, for workers who were still studying to attain a qualification, a compensation was bargained such that they had a five-day work week that was fully paid for by the ministry, but of which they were allowed to use two days for study at the social school. In addition, the ministry did have an interest in a well-managed organization, so when asked for the employment of qualified policy advisors by Fijn, Goedemans would usually agree. However, manager of the Army's sector for nursing and elderly homes Jansen, defined this mode of operation as quite the opposite: "It was also the case that when you wanted to hire someone, you had to ask for approval at the level of the individual. That's how far government influence reached."⁸⁷ Even though this mode of operation was also applied by other ministries, the employment of qualified personnel could also be enforced in a different way, as Jansen recalls:

"There has been a time that when, for example, if a nursing home had a certain number of patients, the government stipulated the particular number of nurses and orderlies that it required. Thus the inspection determined, on the basis of the number and sort of patients, which professional groups had to be brought in."⁸⁸

Because of this close scrutiny by the government, the matter of identity became an issue for the Army, for how was it to acquire qualified *and* Army-allied personnel? The Army's probation department reacted by drawing a clear policy line on hiring in which identity became a precondition of appointment: "When spoken of competencies, religious aspects are a part of working for the Salvation Army. Besides owning the diploma of the Social School, you'd have to be a

⁸⁶ Fijn estimated that during the period of his directorate, the Army's probation organization formed about 10% of the total of probation work. The CAD's 20% and the ARV about 70%: Interview with Fijn, Februari 5, 2010.

⁸⁷ "Het was ook zo dat als je iemand aannam, moest je op de persoon toestemming hebben om iemand te kunnen aanstellen. Zo ver ging de invloed vanuit de overheid." Interview with Jansen, August 16, 2010.

⁸⁸ "Er is een tijd geweest dat bijvoorbeeld voor verpleegtehuizen was het dat als je zoveel patiënten had, moesten er zoveel verpleegkundigen zijn en zoveel ziekenverzorgers. Dus de inspectie bepaalde dan aan de hand van het aantal en aard van patiënten welke beroepsgroepen er binnen moesten komen." Interview with Jansen, August 16, 2010

Christian.”⁸⁹ Of interest is the fact that Fijn hardly remembers an occasion on which the ministry withheld its support to a professionalization demand. Any reservation on the availability of government support thus actually came from the Army itself. In the words of Fijn:

“Well, at some point, you yourself also find it enough, I can still remember that. With a staff of seven people: two managers, four executives, and an office manager, we found ourselves to be big enough. (...) You can also sense that this is about the max. We should not push it beyond the limits, that would not earn any applause anyway. A sort of self-restraint.”⁹⁰

Moreover, all new personnel would have to be appointed according to the stipulations of the CAO of their branch. The main stipulation was that they had to be officially qualified and this matter would also be a subject of discussion between Goedemans and Fijn. In fact, that is exactly why it was possible for people like Fijn and his predecessor Hartjes, to be able to hold the management position they were in: non-officer but Army manager. It was the Ministry of Justice that demanded qualified managers on these posts, qualified by education and not by ideology or experience, and within the Army ranks there was apparently no such person available who was also an officer at the same time.⁹¹ These personal bonds however, could not prevent for the Army’s probation department to be confronted with the matter of its identity.

5.6. Identity as a precondition for existence?

Even though the probation work of the Salvation Army succeeded in avoiding being pressured into a new organizational body, this position of exemption evoked a new problem, for as this position was required based on an argument of identity, it would now have to prove its worth. What exactly was the added value of the Army’s probation work as compared to the other probation organizations? What provided for its *raison d’être*? The Salvation Army’s probation department had always held the view that there were two sorts of probation organizations: confessional and general organizations, and in its own opinion, the Army reckoned itself to being part of the latter group, because it wanted to be available for the general public, regardless of which denomination people be-

⁸⁹ “Als we het over competenties hebben, levensbeschouwelijke aspecten horen erbij als je bij het Leger des Heils wilt werken. Naast of je het diploma Sociale Academie had, moest je ook christen zijn.” Interview with Jansen, August 16, 2010

⁹⁰ “Nou, op een gegeven moment vind je het zelf ook wel genoeg, hoor, dat kan ik me nog wel herinneren. Dat wij met een staf van 7 mensen: 2 directieleden, 4 staffunctionarissen en hoofd administratie, vonden we het wel voldoende. (...) Je voelt ook wel aan dat dit is ongeveer het max. We moeten het niet gekker maken, daar krijgen we toch geen handen voor op elkaar. Een soort zelfterughoudendheid.” Interview with Fijn, Februari 5, 2010

⁹¹ Interview K. van Teijlingen, August 18, 2010

longed to.⁹² From the beginning of the 1970s, the Army struggled with the above existential questions – an effort that would from that moment on become a structural debate within the realms of the Salvation Army. This debate and the struggle for existence would however not be led by Hartjes. In September 1973, he was succeeded by his colleague and also lawyer, Fijn. It was Fijn who would be commissioned to shepherd the probation department through the troubled times that loomed up in the horizon. But first, attention had to be given to another quite specific development that resulted from the process of professionalization, and that knocked on the Salvation Army's doors quite suddenly at the beginning of the 1970s: democratic participation.

6. Democratic participation

Based on his analysis of community work, social scientist Van Ewijk argues that democratic participation is the most abstract form of social participation that an individual can strive after.⁹³ Van Ewijk discerns four levels of participation that are loosely based on their degree of formality, four phases that are recognizable in the activation process of an individual. The most informal level that Van Ewijk describes is a personal commitment of individuals in the private sphere. A commitment that becomes visible in e.g. providing for care in informal social networks like family, friends and neighborhood. The second phase of participation is the rather hybrid category of “voluntary work and civil society”. This type suggests a more abstract level of organization, but still exists on an intersection of different private spheres of individuals and groups based on voluntariness. and is thus still quite informal. According to Van Ewijk, a third level of participation becomes visible in the labor market, including its preparatory phase of education. Participation of individuals in the labor system is regarded to be an important activating force for individuals to participate in society in a broader sense. This phase of participation is based on a formal relation with the organization (employer, school) that provide for this opportunity. The fourth level of participation is involvement in the political process or decision-making process. This categorization makes the concept of democratic participation the most abstract formalistic possibility for citizens to participate.⁹⁴

When these phases are used to roughly analyze the development of participation in the Netherlands, it can be argued that the first two phases were predominantly visible before World War II, even though participation in the labor market and political participation also played an important role in the public debate during the first decades of the twentieth century. The emphasis on the latter two, however, became evident after World War II, because the combination of wealth, secularization, depillarization, professionalization and the political

⁹² Maris 1990:142, compare to: Ringelberg 2005:174.

⁹³ Van Ewijk, 2010

⁹⁴ Idem:108-109

awakening of a new and engaged generation called the *baby-boom* generation, kindled a process during the 1950s and 1960s which can be phrased as the ‘emancipation of the citizens’. The idea gained ground that the general public was being spoon-fed by authorities in all spheres of life - whether it be private, work, politics, or arts -, and thus lacked real influence on how to shape these matters that they were involved in to their own will.⁹⁵ During the public debate on how participation related to the Dutch welfare state developments, participation was often associated with the perceived effect of the state intervening in private matters. Even though the coming of age of the welfare state could be regarded as an era in which, for the first time in history, a society had been able to take its fate with regard to welfare into its own hands, an often heard counterargument was that because of the myriad of social arrangements, the individual was perceived to have lost his or her power to really influence their own living circumstances and people had become inactive. Although this counterargument was not substantiated with scientific data, the call for the activation of these groups by taking part in the labor market or being educated, grew louder during the 1970s and 1980s.

A decade ago, however, this call for emancipation of the people had set the path for the so-called participation democracy.⁹⁶ Provos, students, women – all kinds of groups within the Dutch society answered this call and started to claim their right to influence and participation. In the political realm, this process resulted in the establishment of new political parties: *Democraten '66* (Democrats '66, D'66) and *Politieke Partij Radikalen* (Political Party for Radicals, PPR). Additionally, a spirit of renewal was awakened within the political establishment, as the PvdA's internal New Left movement revealed in 1966. This counter-movement aimed to create clarity with regard to the PvdA's ideals after decades of political compromises.⁹⁷ Another argument came from another PvdA thinker, Bram Peper. The coming of age of the welfare state had induced a large amount of government regulation and influence, and according to Peper, the subsequent bureaucratization and institutionalization had widened the gap between the individual and the state and increased a feeling of impotence amongst its citizens. That people had to be ‘activated’ for participation was deemed essential for their well-being.⁹⁸ So, since the 1960s, two perspectives on participation became visible: emancipation and activation.

During the 1960s, the Dutch government increasingly sought for means to support this fourth phase of participation as described by Van Ewijk, i.e. the general public was to be involved with the decision-making process of social policy and also with the determination of relevant policy goals. The people had to be invited to shape their own personal environment and in 1967, public partic-

⁹⁵ Aerts, *et al.* 1999:312; Maris 1991:91

⁹⁶ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:101; Aerts, *et al.* 1999: ch. 9, par.10.

⁹⁷ Aerts, *et al.* 1999:297-306

⁹⁸ Peper 1972:233. Compare with Putnam 2000, and Van Ewijk 2010:94-95

ipation by democratization became an official policy goal.⁹⁹ One of the ways in which this would occur, was to increase employee participation in organizations, for this was a kind of democratic influence on organizational policy that would not only increase the accountability of the managers to the workers, but would also bind the employees to their organization. Of course, in this era of mistrust towards many of the state-initiated activities, this participation model of employee influence induced critique. For instance, social-democrat thinker Paul Kalma regarded this model not so much as a participation model, but much more as a pacification model. According to him, this binding of the employee to the organization was meant to win over the workers by offering them a stake in the power.¹⁰⁰ Regardless of these opponents, however, the new emphasis in government policy on democratization within organizations was patently obvious and as a result, in 1971 the renewed Works Councils Act was adopted by the parliament.

6.1. Works Councils Act

The original Works Councils Act was already established in 1950, though in a rudimentary form. Before World War II, employee participation on the level of the organization had only sporadically been allowed in a few isolated cases, such as, for example, the yeast and alcohol factory Van Marken in Delft and the Stork machine factory in Hengelo. On a collective level however, participation in the Netherlands had made further development. Already in 1927, the *Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst* (CAO, Collective Work Agreement Act) was adopted. After World War II the concept of *bedrijfsraden* (corporate councils), in which both the employee and the employer were represented, came into fashion, and also the idea of collaboration between private organizations (like unions) with public representatives of the government, was also codified in 1950 in the *Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie* (Wbo, Dutch Industrial Organisation Act). Surfing the waves of collectiveness that supported the reconstruction efforts during the postwar decade, employee participation was solidified on a more general level into the *Stichting van de Arbeid* (Foundation of Work) in 1945, a deliberative body of both employers and employees providing the national government with advice. Additionally in 1950, the *Sociaal-Economische Raad* (SER, Social and Economic Council) embodied a first move into the direction of collective consultation on the level of subsequent industrial and business sectors.

In the same year, participation on organizational level was legally guaranteed in the *Wet op Ondernemingsraden* (WOR, Works Councils Act) making works councils obligatory for organizations within the private sector. In fact though, these employees would not have much say in policy matters. The management was in charge and the works council only had non-binding advisory rights. Together with the management, this works council strove after the monistic aim of

⁹⁹ De Haan en Duyvendak 2002:101; Peper 1972:233-234

¹⁰⁰ Kalma 1982:96

the well-being of the organization, as the council was not yet a real exponent of the well-being of the employees.

During the 1960s, the call for participation and democratization also rekindled the discussion on this limited role of the works council. As a result, labor unions like the CNV provided for coaching classes for works council members, and in 1971, the Law on Works Councils was adjusted. Now the rights of the employees became more central to its focus on the establishment of a right to consent to social policy, and the legal position of the council's members was secured. The most important change in the role of the works councils was that they acted on behalf of the employees and consequently the relation between the councils and the organization was able to alter from monistic into a more dualistic relation. This revision also boosted the number of works councils within organizations, even though they were hardly in working order yet.¹⁰¹

6.2. Democratic participation and civil society

That the employee involvement in the decision-making processes within organizations was not always in good working order, was also confirmed by the *Knelpuntennota* of 1974.¹⁰² Especially in the case of civil society organizations, the people that these organizations were to represent, still hardly possessed any influence. An influence that was regarded to be vital, for in order to maintain their social *qui vive*, these organizations were quite dependant on their grassroots. This idea however, was not shared by some of these organizations, where as a result of archaic conceptions of hierarchical management structures, thorough internal democratization was blocked more than once. According to the *Knelpuntennota*, the general perception was that these civil society organizations had become undemocratic and therefore unrepresentative, drifting away from their original grassroots supporters, and in order to make concrete suggestions for improvement of the “democratic, effective and efficient functioning of subsidized institutions”, Minister of CRM, Van Doorn, appointed in July 1974 a committee under the direction of lawyer F.H. van der Burg.

Fields of tension

The findings of this Committee-Van der Burg were presented three years later, in March 1977. First of all, the committee stated that the interesting combination of the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘*doelmatigheid*’ in their assignment, made the possibilities for an overall advice very complex.¹⁰³ The committee tried to

¹⁰¹ Commissie-Van der Burg 1977:81; Kollektieve Nederlandse Ondernemingsraad Associatie: <http://www.knora.nl/>

¹⁰² For a more thorough analysis of the *Knelpuntennota*, see: Chapter 2.1.

¹⁰³ Commissie-Van der Burg 1977:11-34. The use of terms in the report raises a problem of philological nature with regard to the term *doelmatig*. This Dutch term is used as a generic term for both ‘effectivity’ (referring to the *measure* to which a goal is achieved) and ‘efficiency’ (referring to the *manner* in which a goal is achieved). The English language seems to lack a corresponding word. So, at the risk of spoiling

find their position between the two main but very divergent ideas on the relation between these concepts. The first position being the idea that democracy always supported effectivity. This idea seemed to make democratization a goal in its own. The other position was that democratization intrinsically meant inefficiency, because of the measure of deliberation that characterized the concept. The committee stated that examples of these extremes could be found throughout the work field, that consisted of these subsidized organizations. For example, in the area of community work that had been developing since the 1950s, the direct involvement of the clients seemed to secure their influence in shaping the goals and means of the work, but organizations in other areas were functioning rather like regular companies in their provision of services. In those kinds of organizations, democracy might indeed have its negative effects on efficiency, so, as the committee stated:

“The matter of democratization is, in its relation to effectivity and efficiency, different, for example, for a theatre company, than for an institution for the mentally handicapped; different for a housing corporation than for a hospital.”¹⁰⁴

Therefore, in its effort to advise the entire group of subsidized organizations, the committee decided to focus on separate sectors, relevant subjects, available instruments and on the various stakeholders. Stemming from its analysis of the concrete problems with democratization that were present within the organizations, the committee listed the following three fields of tension:

1) The mission statements in the statutes of many of these organizations were broadly formulated and were done so in general terms. Any derived policy line could thus become equally vague, creating tensions between the managers and the professionals on how to phrase and implement these missions.¹⁰⁵

2) Because of their high qualifications, professionals tended to stipulate policy directions and form subsequent activities and they had thus become quite autonomous. Based on their education, these professionals were also inclined to “strongly orientate themselves (...) towards the prevailing standards that apply to their profession”. Since the 1960s, these values were increasingly being perceived as politically colored and openly critical of authority. This development towards autonomy and criticism was combined with a lack of an official description of their formal competences and authority, and the lack of an official platform by means of which these professionals could exert their influence on the organizational processes, thereby increasing this tension. Therefore, from the

any linguistic aesthetic, in order to do justice to the nuance of the term ‘doelmatig’, I do not choose between the terms efficiency or effectivity, but to use both as a pair.

¹⁰⁴ “Het democratiseringsvraagstuk in zijn relatie met de doelmatigheid is bijvoorbeeld anders bij een toneelgezelschap dan bij een zwakzinnigeninrichting, bij een woningcorporatie anders dan bij een ziekenhuis.” Quoted in: Commissie-Van der Burg 1977:29

¹⁰⁵ Idem:38

side of the professional, the acceptance of any supervision by managers became a problem, and from the side of management, this attitude could only be countered by “referral to the subordinate position of the employees.”¹⁰⁶ This often implicit but strongly felt display of power could be interpreted as a demonstration of impotence because, as the committee stated, from this lack of formal description of competences and authority, the coordinating and stimulating efforts of these managers were often interpreted as the mere use of power. Interestingly, the committee also mentioned that part of this tension between the professional and the manager could be pinpointed to the difference in age between the young professionals and the long-term managers. In this light, the call for more influence of this younger generation was perfectly in line with the anti-authoritarian attitude that related to what had been acknowledged as the ‘generation gap’.¹⁰⁷

3) Another group that formed a relevant stakeholder to the committee was that of the clients, and to a growing extent, the relation between the professional and the client seemed to be based on divergent values. The client wanted a personal approach from a committed professional. The professional was of course willing to provide for this, but that might go against the also very much needed methodological approach to the sizeable caseload that he or she had become responsible for. In return, the client was asked to trust the capabilities of these professionals, and when the client did not or could not do so because of the lack of a personal approach, this might be misinterpreted by the professional as obstruction. The problems that resulted from these divergent values had no official organizational structure that could be used as the basis for arriving at a solution, and the clients lacked any formal influence on this process.¹⁰⁸

Basic assumptions and preconditions

In their preparations for advice on these problems, the committee acknowledged to be basically in line with the ideas of sociologist Van Doorn who stated that the interest of the three main stakeholders had to be promoted: the general public, for they were paying for these services; the clients because of their dependency on these organizations; and the employees, because they did the actual work.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, the committee acknowledged that the issue of democratization might also very well have its effect on the identity of the organizations. Already in many subsidy arrangements, a provision was made that the services of the organizations were to be offered to everyone without any distinction between race, religion or social status. On the other hand, the committee agreed that in the Dutch pluralist society these organizations had to be able “to show

¹⁰⁶ “Geschoolde beroepskrachten oriënteren zich vanuit hun opleiding sterk op de normen en waarden die in hun beroep gelden.” And: “(...) verwijzing naar de ondergeschikte positie van het personeel.” Both quoted in: Commissie-Van der Burg 1977:39

¹⁰⁷ Idem:40. Compare to: Righart 1995

¹⁰⁸ Commissie-Van der Burg 1977:40-41

¹⁰⁹ Idem:48

their own special character and that they do not have to become colorless and neutral because of the subsidies.”¹¹⁰ The committee however, also saw that to a growing extent, organizations were populated by people that had become distant to the organizational values, but that did not mean that these people were to be excluded from shaping their organization. When it came to exertion of influence on certain organizational processes like decision-making or policy preparation, no group was allowed to be slighted. There was however, according to the committee, an exceptional position with regard to the hiring policy and the appointment of people for key positions within the organization. The committee regarded this as a prerequisite for an organization to safeguard its own identity and these possibilities were not to be eroded by any measure of democratization. Ultimately, for those organizations for which no satisfactory solution could be found that would do justice to both the requirement of democratization and the preservation of their identity, democratization was of overriding importance, according to the Committee-van der Burg.¹¹¹

A suggested policy line

The committee concluded that in case of democratic participation within subsidized organizations, there were too many variables to create one all-encompassing Act. Therefore, different proposals were made for all relevant sectors. In addition, the possibility to make amendments to already existing legislation was worked out and it was suggested that these proposals could very well be enforced by means of the subsidy arrangements. The main themes in these policy proposals were: distribution of responsibilities and power over management and professionals; broadening of the support of management in the organization; improvement of transparency of different processes for all stakeholders; creation of councils in which all stakeholders (clients, general public, employees) would be able to give relevant input; and the creation of a supervising authority.¹¹²

The committee also reacted on two other related issues. During 1976, the Works Councils Act had been revised once more, and again the dualistic nature of this instrument of participation was strengthened. Now, also a works council was obligatory for every organization that had 100 or more salaried employees. According to the committee, this provided for enough possibilities for workers to participate.¹¹³ Additionally, the matter of legal incorporation was addressed, for a part of the assignment of the Committee-Van der Burg consisted of an assessment of which legal form suited these subsidized organizations best, with regard to the possibilities for democratization. The committee concluded that all suggested proposals suited the legal forms of foundation and association very

¹¹⁰ Idem:78

¹¹¹ Idem:80

¹¹² Idem:148-154

¹¹³ Idem:23

well, so no alterations of Book 2 of the New Civil Code were deemed necessary. Nevertheless, all organizations were obliged to include in their statutes or articles of association, a description of how they organized democratic participation.¹¹⁴

After the presentation of the report of the Committee-Van der Burg, the Dutch government decided on the matter by assigning another committee to draw up a draft Act based on the presented advice.¹¹⁵ The result of this effort was the *Wetsontwerp Democratisch Functioneren van gesubsidieerde Instellingen* (WDFI, Bill on Democratic Functioning of Subsidized Institutions). Initially, the report of the Committee-Van der Burg had escaped from the Army's attention, but with the announcement of its derived WDFI-Bill, the Army command started to show a certain amount of interest. In October 1984 the suggestion was made to organize a study day on the report of the Committee-Van der Burg, but even though this idea was approved of, it did not seem quite as urgent, because it made way for a more short-term matter in February 1985.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, one year later, in February 1986, the Army again put the Bill on its agenda. Now, the decision of the Amsterdam municipality to test its subsidy-policy against the proposed Bill, urged the Army to also take the Bill into consideration.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, because of a cabinet change in 1986, this Bill never made it through the parliament. It took until the mid-90s before two derived Bills were adopted by the Dutch parliament to codify democratic say (*Wet medezeggenschap cliënten zorginstellingen*, 1996) and the right of complaint (*Wet klachtrecht cliënten zorgsector*, 1995). With regard to Van Ewijk's phrasing of the public participation process, during the 1970s the fourth phase of participation had presented itself to the full. This phase however, would cause a lot of tension for civil society organizations with a strong sense of identity, like the Salvation Army.

7. "Water and fire": Salvation Army and democratic participation

Democratic participation had always been at odds with the management culture of the hierarchically organized Salvation Army. Nevertheless, the autocratic constellation of a one-headed leadership did not remain undisputed within Army ranks as already during the 1920s, this matter of democratic influence stirred up quite some trouble. Gustaaf Maste, the first manager (1906-1921) of the Salvation Army's social work activities for men, had more than once suggested to the

¹¹⁴ Idem:155,162

¹¹⁵ Stuurgroep Democratisch en Doelmatig Functioneren van gesubsidieerde instellingen, also called the "Interdepartementale Stuurgroep Dijk", or DDF

¹¹⁶ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) October 1984:7; *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) December 1984:3; *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) February 1985:3

¹¹⁷ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) June 1986:3

Army command that leading officers of the social work department should have at least some say in whether or not to start up new social aid activities and also in the hiring policy of this social work department. In support of his plea, Maste stated that he had positive experiences with democratic participation, especially because within some of the probation brigades this was already a common practice. The Army's probation department was once even described as "a democratic flower in an autocratic garden".¹¹⁸ The Army command however, would not hear of this request for democratization. Not even when Maste threatened to resign and to start his own Salvation Army organization. And indeed, due to a combination with other unrewarding experiences that he endured with the Army's command in the Netherlands and the IHQ, Maste decided in 1921 to secede and actually start a new organization: the Dutch Salvation Army.¹¹⁹ So, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Salvation Army was not quite ready for large-scale democratization.

7.1. A monastery and its brewery

The call for democratic participation during the 1970s would cause internal commotion again. The Salvation Army had always been averse to any external influence and also the works councils were perceived as such an external influence, for even though they were manned by own employees, it was rather unthinkable for the Army command to give up control over its own organization, to whatever be the extent.¹²⁰ Chief-secretary Schurink characterized the possibility of works councils within the Salvation Army organizational structure as incompatible as "water and fire".¹²¹ Schurink and the Salvation Army's public relations officer Jan Filius recapitulated the internal difficulties with democratic participation: "In real terms, the works council cannot surpass chit-chat on coffee and tea. That will get you nowhere."¹²² The employee representatives were regarded to be ill-informed on policy issues, which made them ill-qualified as interlocutors in the opinion of the Army command. On the other hand, this alleged deficiency could however also be very much to the Army's advantage, as

¹¹⁸ "Een democratisch bloempje in een autocratisch hof." This quote is from probation worker Peeterman as he had stated in an article in *Het Utrechts Nieuwsblad*, September 8, 1921. Quoted in: Ringelberg 2005:176

¹¹⁹ Maste's organization was actually called 'Nederlandsch Leger des Heils' and the soldiers wore an almost identical uniform. The only differences were the hat was red instead of blue, and the letter H was stitched to the collars instead of the S that the regular Salvationist wore. This similarity to The Salvation Army of the Netherlands was, of course, annoyingly obvious and often confusing. The Dutch Salvation Army actually still exists, but is quite small in numbers and organization. See also footnote 1 of Chapter 1.

¹²⁰ Interview with Fijn, Februari 5, 2010

¹²¹ Harm en Polman 1982:4-59, 31

¹²² "In de praktijk kan de OR dus niet verder komen dan gebabbel over koffie en thee. Daar koop je niets voor" Harm en Polman 1982:4-59, 34

the authors concluded: “But *more* than chit-chat on coffee and tea however was hardly the intention.”¹²³

It was not only the supposed lack of knowledge of the workers that bothered the spokespersons. It was a much more fundamental matter, a matter of identity. The Works Councils Act required that the council consisted of employees. But within the staffing structure of the Salvation Army, those that were considered the bearers of the Salvation Army identity, the officers, were not employed by contract and thus not regarded as regular employees. They also did not participate in collective labor agreements (CAOs), nor were they entitled to government retirement pay, as for example many of the probation workers were. Because of this position, officers basically lacked the influence that external employees actually did possess by law. The problem was chalked out strikingly by Filius:

“It is like a monastery that has its own brewery and the workers of this brewery want to take part in deciding on the education of the priests at the seminary. They surely are no adequate discussion partners.”¹²⁴

These examples of rhetoric show that the Army was more than reluctant to provide for the opportunity for works councils. Viewed from the perspective of identity however, this attitude actually was quite understandable, for their fear of external influence on the internal identity did not seem to be without cause. The process of professionalization had actually changed the Army’s work force within the social work sectors. By 1980, the Salvation Army had 317 officers, of which most were part of the corps work or retired. About 70 officers were working in the government sponsored social work sectors and usually held managerial functions. These 70 officers had to cooperate with about 1200 employees.¹²⁵ With the officer being the personification of the organization’s character, this part of the Army’s identity had been watered down to a ratio of 1:17, and thus it was not very off the mark to assume that the acceptance of democratic influence of these new professionals, who were not raised in the Army tradition, might lead to a quite different view on various subjects that touched directly on the Army’s identity. More concretely, when the works councils would receive the power to (dis)approve of the organizational budget and of proposed policy lines, the Army command would have no control over the Army’s identity, for he who controls the flow of funds, controls a large part of an organization’s identity, especially when this social work organization also was a church.¹²⁶ In the worst

¹²³ “Maar méér dan babbelen over koffie en thee is ook weer niet de bedoeling.” Harm en Polman 1982:4-59, 34

¹²⁴ “(...) het is alsof je een klooster hebt waar een bierbrouwerij bij hoort en het personeel van die brouwerij wil meepraten over de opleiding van de priesters op het seminarie. Dat zijn toch geen adequate gesprekspartners.” Harm en Polman 1982:4-59, 34

¹²⁵ Idem:4-59, 34

¹²⁶ Interview with K. van Teijlingen, August 18, 2010

case, these new non-Army professionals might even start to interfere with religious principles that the Army held!¹²⁷

At some occasions, this fear was actually confirmed. When during a game show on the Dutch national television one of the contestants stated that he worked for the Salvation Army probation unit, the quizmaster assumed that this meant that the contestant also believed in God. The man however answered: “No, I don’t believe in anything.”¹²⁸ This was frowned upon by the whole Salvation Army leadership, but also within the probation department this was experienced as rather startling. The probation department had by then, already created a system of scrutiny on whether or not an applicant adhered to religion and the mission of the Army. If he did not, he would not be hired. This incident opened a discussion on creating a hiring policy that was in line with the subsidy stipulations on the one hand, but that also would do justice to the Army’s identity on the other. So, to what extent was the Army able to influence this relationship?

7.2. The Army’s effort to obstruct democratic influence

Quite in line with these developments of the Army’s hiring policy, the Army leadership tried to do everything within its power to prevent democratic participation. So it was clear that the Salvation Army leadership did not want works councils, and additionally, based on its legal position as a church, the Army command was under the impression that it was not obliged to have works councils at all. In the years following the 1971 adjustment of the Works Councils Act, the Salvation Army leadership aimed for release from the obligation to install works councils by following the strategy of attaining formal dispensation from the Dutch government. A strategy that was quite successful because the government soon approved. This obstruction of the external demand for participation however, soon faced the democratic powers that were alive in the probation department. As stated above, the Salvation Army probation department had had some experience with democratic expression within its organization by means of the influence of workers in its brigades. In 1970, it went a step further and the department willfully decided to formalize this democratic participation in a workers committee and a committee of advice.¹²⁹ The workers committee formed a deliberative body for representatives of the probation workers and a delegation of this committee conferred with their employer in the committee of advice. Even though the workers did not have very much influence, they had achieved an acting role in the consultative structure.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ A rationale that was alive within Army ranks, according to Jansen (interview with Jansen, August 16, 2010)

¹²⁸ “Nee, ik geloof in niets!” Interview with Fijn, Februari 5, 2010

¹²⁹ Maris 1990:24

¹³⁰ Interview with Fijn, Februari 5, 2010

Soon they also proved to be ready for battle – internally. For when the workers committee got wind of the dispensation to install works councils, it protested heavily. First this protest was contained within the committee of advice, but when this proved to be fruitlessly, the workers commission, supported by the workers union CNV, turned directly to the Ministry of Social Affairs. They informed the minister about the fact that the Salvation Army actually employed many salaried workers and thus had to be regarded as a regular labor organization, meaning that the Army had to comply with the Works Councils Act. The workers committee pleaded for discontinuance of the Army's exemption. The argumentation was favorably received and the minister acted accordingly, but now the Army's leadership was unpleasantly surprised and lodged various appeals on this suspension of the dispensation, though without lasting effect. On May 26, 1978 the judicial department of the *Raad van State* (Council of State) ruled that because the Salvation Army had more than 100 employees it was a labor organization and consequently had to comply with Works Councils Act and allow works councils to be formed.¹³¹ Remarkably, the Raad was not at all sensitive for the Army's argument that it was a church. The legal form of the organization apparently did not apply when the organization was also an employer. In the end, the initial fears of the Army command had become reality: the door was officially left open for what they experienced as a direct external influence on the Army's identity, and what is more, this episode had also brought something else to the light; a budding internal struggle between the Army's command and the probation department had come into view.

7.3. Alienation of the probation department

The tension between the Army and its probation department rooted from the prewar era. The probation work was the first type of social work that had entered into a structural relationship with the Dutch government by submission to the *Reclasseringsregeling* in return for financial support. Even though it was not prohibited, this relationship was looked at by the Army command with Argus' eyes, as the cooperation with other probation organizations and the Ministry of Justice would soon become very close. The second oddity in relation to the probation department was the commencing democratization within the department, a point that Maste tried to bring to the attention of the Army commands too, but without much success. Therefore, by the beginning of World War II, the probation department had already displayed a hint of its non-conformist nature towards the Army's command.

Directly after World War II, the matter of professionalization revived this tension. In 1950, the probation work was still embedded in the local corps and the national headquarters, but during the following decades, the department underwent a process of detachment. Until the end of the decade, the central bu-

¹³¹ Raad van State - Afdeling Rechtspraak (ARRvS), 26 mei 1978, A.B. 1978, 430 (F.H.v.d.B.)

reau of the probation work was situated in the same building as the Dutch Salvation Army's Head Quarters in Amsterdam. In 1960 however, it moved out and in 1963, an even more radical change was made: the probation work formed its own department and was no longer a part of the social work department.¹³² Whether or not this internal branching off was a requirement from the Ministry of Justice is hard to retrieve from the available sources on this matter, but the fact that against all odds a non-officer lawyer like Hartjes became the manager of this new department can actually be related to the government demands for professionalization. However, at the same time that this organizational dissociation took place, the Commander Palstra showed the firm intention of not allowing the mutual bonds to loosen. He actually installed an internal advisory board, the Council on Probation Affairs, consisting of the high-ranking staff of the Salvation Army including the manager of the probation department. This council would however be dissolved in 1970 when another deliberative organ was created, the *Coördinatieraad Bestuurders* (Coordinating Council of Managers).

In addition, the probation work force was subject to thorough professionalization, as we have seen above. The government overtly demanded further professionalization, and by incorporating these requirements in the subsidy arrangements that the Army's probation department had grown dependent on, the measure of government interference with the probation work must have been quite unbearable for the Army's command. The way that the Ministry of Justice seemed to decide who to hire and who not, speaks volumes, and moreover, many of the probation employees were very much alike salaried public servants - a position that they were actually quite proud of - and not so much vocational volunteers.¹³³ Even though that should not make any difference in a legal sense, this element seemed to have especially made a huge contribution to the conceptualization of mutual images between the probation workers, other Salvation Army people and the corps.¹³⁴ In general, according to former key persons, the probation department was regarded as the odd one out by both the Army leadership and the corps.¹³⁵ The image of the department was that it consisted of state hired workers, who were highly educated and often adhered to values like democratic influence and anti-authoritarianism.

7.4. Cracks in the indivisible coin?

Viewed from the perspective of the corps, this image was quite understandable. The emphasis on quality had provoked a process of professionalization, decentralization and reorganization of social work. The Salvation Army leadership however, had actively prevented the corps from being a part of this process.

¹³² Maris 1991:61-65

¹³³ Because the Salvation Army is a private and not a public organization, the probation employees were *de facto* not public servants.

¹³⁴ Interview with Ringelberg, December 11, 2009

¹³⁵ This image rises up from all the interviews that I have conducted with Fijn, K. van Teijlingen, Jansen, and Maris.

Except for improving the training of the officers, the corps were kept aloof from every form of externally motivated professionalization, for this would automatically mean government influence.¹³⁶ In the case of the corps, this was unacceptable to the Army command. Additionally, before the probation workers were state-salaried, they were embedded in the corps and so they might very well have been a speaking example of how social and religious work could be successfully unified. Therefore, with the probation department becoming independent from the corps, this symbiotic unity began to show some cracks, further inciting the fear of loss of identity. The exodus of the volunteers in 1974 enhanced this fear, because now also the vocational volunteer was put aside, and with it, the connection with the corps. Therefore, when viewed from the perspective of the corps, the probation department seemed to have steered away from the Army's core and had contributed to the watering down of the Army's identity.

Also, in the eyes of the Army command, the probation department could very well be regarded as a troublemaker. For one, the probation department had positioned itself as a structural partner to the Ministry of Justice with a consequence of having become (mutually) dependent. Even when the pressure from the government for merger during the 1970s had made it vividly clear that this position was quite a threat to its autonomy, the probation department chose to stay close to the ministry. The legitimization for this strategy was in line with the anti-authoritarian spirit of the 1960s: instead of being on the leash of the government, it now wanted to act as "a counterforce" and "humanize" the "indifferent and cold" probation system.¹³⁷ This attitude of social action and reformation that the probation department revealed during the 1970s echoed a distant memory of what the Salvation Army stood for in the era of the nineteenth century East-London: a shield for the weak and poor, guarding them against the miseries that were inflicted on them by the many problems of industrialization and by a neglecting government but according to Fijn, during the twentieth century the Army had gained too much to lose, and had become reluctant to overtly pressure the government, as the probation department seemed to want to do now.¹³⁸ This renewed call for social action seemed to separate their paths.

The matter of work field positioning was another issue that confronted the Army command with the exceptionality of the probation department. Being part of a confined judicial system with its own directives and rules, and having employees that were paid based on the CAO-stipulations including pension plans, made the probation department look like a mere administrative organ of the Dutch government. Some even began to ask how much a part of the 'Salvation Army' the probation department actually was and whether it should still be in-

¹³⁶ Interview with Ringelberg, December 11, 2009

¹³⁷ Maris 1991:95

¹³⁸ According to Fijn, social action was a main characteristic of the early Salvation Army (interview with Fijn, Februari 5, 2010)

corporated in the Army structure.¹³⁹ It was increasingly regarded as a separate organization, an island, within an organization.¹⁴⁰ In addition, the struggle for democratic participation during the 1970s did confirm the controversial position that the probation department was in. Fijn characterized the way the Army command frowned upon him as the manager of the probation department as follows:

“You are those troublemaking people who want to hand the Salvation Army over to the power of the employees!”¹⁴¹

At the brink of his departure as manager of the probation department in 1973, Hartjes acknowledged that the gap between the autonomous and heterogenic probation department and the rest of the Salvation Army had become quite significant. The dual loyalty of the department towards the probation work field and the Salvation Army, combined with a growing influx of external professionals seemed to have caused the mutual bonds to loosen.¹⁴² The above-sketched causes of this development would most probably not alter in the near future. So the task that Hartjes' successor, Fijn, was confronted with seemed quite impossible. With a futuristic view, however, the probation department sought for possibilities to strengthen its bonds with its mother-organization without severing the bonds with the work field, including the ministry. In the visionary policy proposal called *Forensia 2000*, a research group within the Army's probation department saw good opportunities to improve the relationship between the probation work and the Salvation Army by creating a coherent overall policy for all social services that the Army provided. However, this was still a suggestion that was made way too early.¹⁴³ Over all, the probation department seemed to be ahead in time compared with the rest of the Salvation Army for about 30 years. The fear of the Army command had to a certain extent come true: the main-spring of the probation department was altered from being ideological towards that of professionalization.¹⁴⁴ It would actually take until the mid-1980s for the two organizational entities to find each other once again, as we shall see in the next chapter.

¹³⁹ Interview with Jansen, August 16, 2010

¹⁴⁰ Interview with K. van Teijlingen, August 18, 2010

¹⁴¹ “Jullie zijn die lastige mensen die het Leger des Heils willen uitleveren aan de macht van de werknemers!” Interview with Fijn, Februari 5, 2010

¹⁴² Maris 1991:102-104

¹⁴³ This train of thought on creating overall social service policy would however be recognized in the 1990, during the restructuring and the forming of an overall foundation for all social services, including the probation work.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Maris, September 2, 2011

CHAPTER 6. REORGANIZATION OF IDENTITY (1980-1990)

1. Interdependency v. identity

The developments with regard to the Salvation Army that are described in the preceding chapters flow together during the 1980s. In the decades before the 1980s, the matters of (inter)dependency, the Army's legal identity and its modernization process largely influenced its relationship with the government, and at the same time, increasingly seemed to shape the Army's process of identity. During the 1980s, these three processes would put the Salvation Army before fundamental dilemmas that forced it to make difficult choices with regard to its identity. Also, the Salvation Army had encountered the new currents of economization and neo-liberalization. In fact, its financial report of 1986 made up the balance.¹ With its centennial coming up in 1987, the Army took the opportunity to call attention to its basic principles and how they translated into the daily work and had served to form its history as a faith-based social service provider.² That this account needed more than just financial figures had become obvious:

“Our targets are not primarily of an economic nature, like companies. The measure to which we accomplish our goals of social care and evangelization is not deducible from an annual financial report. For that purpose an activity report is more suitable.”³

This however did not mean that the Salvation Army would not provide for clear information on the financial status of its social and health care activities and the organization itself. In 1986, the Army had 1800 active workers, of which 1500 were external employees and 300 were officers. This workforce was flanked by 8500 vocational volunteer (soldiers and adherents) who staffed the 92 corps nationwide.⁴ The annual costs of the social services had amounted to fl.76,854,000, and the report stated with a certain amount of pride that, “The costs of the social services and health care activities are almost entirely subsi-

¹ Because the government had not yet stipulated the exact form and contents of financial reporting by non-profit organizations, in 1988 the Army issued a two-fold report on its progression during the year of 1986.

² *Met hart en hand. Beeldverslag en financieel overzicht, 1986; Van zeep, soep en redding tot evangelisch geïnspireerd maatschappelijk werk. Het Leger des Heils in Nederland, 1988.* Supplement to the annual financial report of 1986. (UA 1182, nr. 8)

³ “Onze doelstellingen zijn immers niet op de eerste plaats van economische aard zoals bij ondernemingen. De mate waarin wij onze doelstellingen van hulpverlening en evangelisatie realiseren is niet af te lezen uit een financieel jaarverslag. Daartoe is een activiteitenverslag beter geschikt.” Accompanying letter by Commander J. Schurink to the *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils 1986*, December 1978.

⁴ *Van zeep, soep en redding tot evangelisch geïnspireerd maatschappelijk werk*:33-34

dized by the state.”⁵ The Army had become quite comfortable with its position as a partner in the social policy system, but for how long?

1.1. Interdependency: pointing out the problems

As described in Chapter 3, the Army had developed an interesting strategy of anticipatory action towards its subsidizers. At the same time, the Army had grown accustomed to a certain amount of government support and this habituation resulted in a somewhat calculating approach to the possibility of new funding. During the 1980s, this approach seemed to have developed into a subtle but quite full-fledged strategy: innovation. A strategy that also fitted very well with the Army’s position as an ‘advanced guard’. The Army was well known for its ability to spot newly developed social problems because it was present at all levels of society, and especially with, in the words of the Army, those who have no helper. Whenever the Army detected a new social problem, its first step was to start up a social service that addressed this problem because there was a clear need for it. The initial costs of these activities were paid for by the Army itself, through fundraising efforts or by the corps. But when these activities proved to meet a structural demand, the costs would become more pressing on the limited Army budget. In such a case, the need for such services would be presented to the relevant ministry in order to support the argument that a more structural financial support was needed than what the Army could supply. This strategy of anticipatory action made it possible for the Army to be innovative by developing different social services, and when a social service seemed successful, the Army was very well able to tap new sources of subsidies.⁶ As an example, in 1986 the Army had opened a new home for various groups (homeless, unwed mothers, etc.) in the rural province of Drenthe because the area lacked such an accommodation. The high occupancy rates underlined its local relevance and the only downside of this project was that because the Ministry of WVC “has [had] not yet made financial support available”, it had to be financed by the Army itself.⁷ However, the addition of ‘not yet’ in this statement, reveals that the Army anticipated the ministry to change its mind at some point.

On another level, the Salvation Army had clearly learned from its experience with the Dutch government. Some of the Army’s activities were intentionally kept aloof from governmental support. The alcohol detox-center *De Wending* in Apeldoorn was such a project. Everybody was welcome at *De Wending* to kick their alcohol addiction, regardless of their religious background, and the project was financed solely out of the Army’s own resources, though motivated by a clear goal:

⁵ *Met hart en hand*:31; “De kosten van het welzijnwerk en de gezondheidszorg worden bijna geheel door de staat gesubsidieerd.” *Van zeep, soep en redding tot evangelisch geïnspireerd maatschappelijk werk*:37

⁶ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), January 1988

⁷ *Met hart en hand*:6

“The project (...) is purposely kept aloof from subsidies in order to safeguard freedom of action. ‘De Wending’ wants to preserve a Christian character and considers the way towards God a way out for the alcoholic. A way out that is otherwise only indicated, but is by no means obligatory.”⁸

This case shows that the Army was very well aware of what the effect of being a valued partner in the social policy system could mean. The suggestion that some types of work had to be protected against the possible erosion of intrinsic values implied that the Salvation Army knew very well what it was up against when it dealt with the government.

The government on the other hand, also knew what it was dealing with, as the Salvation Army’s nationwide availability and service history had made it a valued partner. This was once again confirmed when during the harsh winter of 1986, the Amsterdam municipality allocated a large extra subsidy to the local Goodwill Center in order to ensure the provision of night shelters and food. The council had no choice other than to allocate the money to the Army for: “The Salvation Army was the only organization that had the apparatus (for dealing with this problem) at its disposal.”⁹ Nevertheless, the financial situation of the 1980s forced the Dutch government to make drastic cutbacks, also with regard to the Salvation Army. Not only did the government-oriented probation department have to downsize, but also other parts of the Army’s social services suffered financial hardship.¹⁰ The Amsterdam elderly home *De Goodwillburgh* started to show a lack of occupancy and its residents were less able to pay for the services.¹¹ The Army’s community work also experienced rough times. Because of the ongoing cutbacks, its financial base had become weak and the number of employees had decreased. Additionally, even though most of the Army’s youth centers seemed to be able to keep their heads above water, for Ons Honk in Utrecht things took a turn for the worse, as will be elaborated further in paragraph 1.3. And as a worrying confirmation of the difficulty of the times, the Army’s corps reported a growing number of homeless people to which they made a bed and a bath available.¹² So, especially in terms of its innovative reflex to social evils, the Army was a welcome partner to the government. On the other hand, the Army was not spared when cutbacks and reorganizations were deemed necessary, and once again, it was painfully confronted with its dependency on government resources. With regard to decentralization, the difficulty of this position also became tentative on a local level.

⁸ “Het project wordt geheel uit eigen middelen van het Leger des Heils gefinancierd en is doelbewust buiten de subsidies gehouden om vrijheid van handelen te waarborgen. ‘De Wending’ wil namelijk een christelijk karakter handhaven en beschouwt de weg tot God als een uitweg voor de alcoholverslaafde. Een uitweg die overigens slechts aangeduid wordt en zeker geen verplichte route is.” *Met hart en hand:6*

⁹ “(...) omdat het LdH de enige organisatie was die het apparaat al had.” *Met hart en hand:9*

¹⁰ *Idem:11*

¹¹ *Idem:10*

¹² *Idem:15-16*

1.2. Identity: the Amsterdam omen

Amsterdam became the first so-called covenant city that shaped its social policy to suit its decentralization efforts.¹³ The underlying idea of the Amsterdam view on decentralization was that the social welfare services had to be organized in regions. This meant that a social service organization was allocated a certain part of the Amsterdam region to which it was to offer (and had to restrict) its services. This policy would become effective starting 1985 and the municipality of Amsterdam had already started to take relevant measures during the preparatory years.

Identity as a problem

In line with these preparations, in April 1984 the Salvation Army Goodwill Center in Amsterdam was confronted with having to reorganize its homecare activities in Amsterdam.¹⁴ From its start, the Army's Goodwill Center had resided in a specific area in Amsterdam: the prostitution zone in the inner city. Over time, however, it had developed into a sizeable social work organization that provided for shelters for the homeless, women and elderly on a very local level. Additionally, it also provided for social work and homecare services throughout Amsterdam. In 1982, the Goodwill Center employed 130 professionals.¹⁵ Because of the new policy responsibility and the necessity to make financial cutbacks - both a result of decentralization - the Amsterdam municipality had taken up the plan to restructure the available homecare services from a city-wide service into different "uniform care districts". This meant that each social service provider would become responsible for one particular district alone.¹⁶ At first glance, this arrangement might seem to have offered security to the Army's Goodwill Center because the actual size of the homecare work of the Army in Amsterdam was relatively small. It provided for just 111,000 hours of care out of a total of 4.5 million hours (= 2,5%) that the Army served within the Amsterdam area.¹⁷ The assessment of this situation, done by the manager of the Homecare and Goodwill Department, Wim van der Harst, was that probably "the inclination will exist to allocate its hours to another larger organization" and the Army would have to leave the field.¹⁸ The same development was expected in the area of homeless care and this posed a major problem for the Army, because the total amount of subsidy for homeless care in Amsterdam amounted to about fl.7,500,000 annually.¹⁹ Additionally, the idea that the Army would have to

¹³ The term 'covenant city' is described in Chapter 2.4.3.

¹⁴ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) April 1984:3

¹⁵ Harm en Polman 1982:39

¹⁶ *Besluit nr. 634 "Aangaan subsidierelatie met de Amsterdamse instellingen voor gezinsverzorging."* Gemeentebld Amsterdam, April 8, 1986

¹⁷ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984

¹⁸ "De neiging zal bestaan haar uren onder te brengen bij een grotere instelling." *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984:6

¹⁹ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984

retrench and confine its services to a certain geographical area, was incompatible with the Army's ambition to reach as many people as possible.

This was not the end of it however. During 1984, it had become clear that the Amsterdam municipality also wanted to make sure that the organizations that opted to participate as social service providers in the local area, would need to meet the subsidy requirements. In the case of the Salvation Army, this matter was taken very seriously as the municipality announced a debate in the city council on the participation of the Army as a religious organization in the field of social work. Central to the debate was the issue of the Army's legal position, because as a church the Salvation Army would not be eligible for subsidies. Therefore, the Amsterdam municipality asked the Army to submit its statutes. When this matter reached the Army command, Van der Harst emphasized that: "For the financing of the social work, the legal form must be made clear soon."²⁰ This was not the only issue at hand however, for the Amsterdam municipality also wanted to check "whether or not these organizations acted against the regulations that the Amsterdam municipality agreed on, e.g. regarding the issues of democratization and gay-emancipation".²¹

Now, together with the problems of decentralization and the Army's legal status, these matters of internal democratization and ethical views completed the areas of tension that the Army had to take into account, while operating in Amsterdam. One of the central issues that was influenced by these different tension fields was that of the Army's legal identity, as became clear when three questions presented themselves to the Army: What *are* we? What do we *want* to be? And what *can* we be? Questions that formed the base for elaborate discussions in the Salvation Army *Coördinatieraad*. This coordinating council consisted of the executive managers of the various social services of the Army in combination with the Army's financial council (i.c. TC, CS and FS). This meant that by means of the coordinating council, all information lines from the various departments converged into one deliberative body. This structure facilitated a somewhat reflective debate on possible national Army approaches on different policy subjects and it first and foremost aimed to advise the TC on its policy decisions.²² While discussing the Amsterdam developments in the coordinating council, Van der Harst expressed his worries as follows:

²⁰ "voor de financiering van het algemeen maatschappelijk werk moet de rechtsvorm op korte termijn duidelijk zijn." *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1984:3

²¹ "(...) of deze instellingen in strijd handelen met de speciale door de gemeente Amsterdam aangenomen regelingen, bijv. over democratisering en homo-emancipatie." *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984

²² *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1985; *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), September 1984

“At this moment the old Salvation Army statutes of 1946 still apply, of which it is established that, if only on the matter of democratization, they do not meet the requirements of the city council (...).”²³

In reply, Territorial Commander Cox (1982-1986) suggested sending a letter to the relevant departments of the municipality in which a change of the Salvation Army’s legal form would be announced. According to Cox, this had to be accompanied by a phrase stating that:

“(...) we are working on it, but that the Salvation Army will not be able to have entirely adjusted its legal form to the subsidy policy of the Amsterdam municipality by January 1, 1985.”²⁴

This token of the willingness to be very flexible in order to retain subsidies, was presumably meant to buy the Army some time. Van der Harst however, was not reassured, for the municipality could suspend the subsidies pending this matter and that would have great financial consequences for the Army’s departments. Following up on the same debate, the Assistant-Chief Secretary, Ligtelijn wondered if a transitional period was possible, because, as he argued, when the national government had previously granted subsidies on the basis of a certain legal form, would municipalities be authorized to change that on such a short notice? ²⁵ Van der Harst in his turn, responded that he shared this opinion, except for the fact that it could be established that the current subsidy denominator had *also* not covered the old legal form, suggesting that the national government had been rather careless in this matter. However, in order to assess the situation better, he proposed to have the Amsterdam subsidy requirements checked by legal experts.

Commander Cox continued on his proposal to send a letter to the municipality and suggested including this question in the letter and thus be transparent in communication, but now the Manager of the Recycling Department Van Teijlingen and the Manager of the Probation Department Fijn, opposed this idea. It was “not correct” to suggest the idea of suspension to the Amsterdam municipality as Van Teijlingen put it, for one should let sleeping dogs lie. Then Fijn proposed to “informally probe a legal friend” on the issue.²⁶ The Commander however concluded the debate with the remark that:

²³ “Op dit moment gelden nog de oude L.d.H.statuten van 1946, waarvan geconstateerd werd dat zij alleen al op het punt van de democratisering niet voldoen aan de voorwaarden van de gemeente (...).” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984:2

²⁴ “(...) we hiermee bezig zijn , maar dat per 1 januari 1985 het L.d.H. nog niet zo ver kan zijn dat haar rechtsvorm geheel is aangepast aan het subsidiebeleid van de gemeente Amsterdam.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984:2

²⁵ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984:2

²⁶ *Idem*. Actually during the next meeting of the Coördinatieraad, Fijn reported that his ‘legal friend’ had confirmed that the Army was not to fear anything. In such a case, transitional arrangements could be

“(...) we have to put our cards on the table for the works councils as well as the municipality of Amsterdam, and explicate the actual situation in such terms that they will accept our argumentation.”²⁷

The complexity of the effects of decentralization on the Salvation Army was clear. As an actor in the social policy system, the Army was forced to deal with the new local policy regulations. In the Amsterdam case, these regulations seemed to pose a threat to the Army because they touched directly on the Army's identity. Anticipating things to come, the Army itself already concluded that it did not meet the local standards that were to be met in order to continue its existence in Amsterdam. Local standards that seemed to differ greatly from the previous national requirements, since before the decentralization movement these issues had never stirred any trouble. Was the Amsterdam government more demanding than the national one?

Identity as a solution

The reaction of Commander Cox on the issue was quite meaningful. He decided that the Army had to be transparent towards the local government as well as to the works councils, which he apparently perceived as an external force. This approach expressed a great belief in the character of the Salvation Army as the municipality was to be persuaded by nothing more than an adequate explanation of the actual situation, supported with the right arguments, arguments that referred to the Army's mode of operation that in its turn stemmed from its identity. So, even though the Army's identity was under fire from these external developments, it was this very same identity that Cox suggested should be brought into position to counter these external influences.

A month earlier, during the meeting of the coordinating council in May 1984, Van der Harst had already made a plea for a profiling strategy.²⁸ By doing so, he portrayed the same line of thought as the Commander, and even more explicitly so. In the case of general social work activities that the Amsterdam Salvation Army Goodwill Center provided for, the claim for an exceptional position to proposed policy rules by the Amsterdam municipality had proven to be a successful strategy. In this particular case, the strategy consisted of stressing both the Army's unique “identity”, and its service to certain “specific target groups”.²⁹ However, in the case of the Salvation Army's homecare services, the argument of target groups would not apply, as Van der Harst reasoned, for these

applied for the period of 1 to 3 years. And also the fact that organizations have functioned well under the old regime, could not be waved aside and ignored; *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), December 1984:1

²⁷ “(...) wij open spel moeten spelen naar zowel de O.R.-en als de gemeente Amsterdam, en hun de feitelijke situatie in dusdanige bewoordingen moeten uitzetten dat zij onze redenering accepteren.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984:3

²⁸ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), May 1984:5

²⁹ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), October 1984:2

services were available for anyone in need of them. If an alternative argument could not be found soon, the result would be having to give up the autonomous Salvation Army homecare service. So, as an effort to increase the Army's opportunities, Van der Harst announced that the Amsterdam homecare services would join forces with the Jewish Social Work, which also found itself cornered. The crux of their common strategy would be that both would place 'identity' at the center of their argument towards the municipality. Van der Harst concluded his plea with a call for support among the members of the coordinating council for "the battle that he was about to wage" with the Amsterdam municipality.³⁰

During the same period, the Army's regular social work had succeeded in obtaining financial support to facilitate and maintain its accessibility. Being a corps on its own, the Amsterdam Goodwill Center was able to deploy Salvationists and volunteers around the clock and because of this, the Army was regarded to be the best-equipped organization for night duty in Amsterdam. Based on that assessment, the municipality had offered to subsidize 2.4 FTE's until 1990.³¹ In the process of the application for the preservation of the homecare service, the argument of being able to provide for a 24/7 homecare service was swiftly added.³² Additionally, both the arguments of identity and around the clock availability were used in deliberating with personal contacts from the local administration like Amsterdam alderman Jonker.³³ And with success, for already in April 1986 the Amsterdam city council reached an agreement that seemed workable for all parties involved:

"The Salvation Army draws attention to the special character of its social services, which are mainly focused on the more complex cases, and to the deployment of volunteers from within its own organization, through which the Salvation Army is able to offer care in situations in which the regular social services are in remiss."³⁴

Based on their argumentation of being unique, both the Jewish Social Work and the Salvation Army retained their municipal functions in Amsterdam. There was however a catch, because the Amsterdam municipality still wanted to test the statutes of these organizations against the local subsidy arrangement called *Algemene Subsidieverordening Amsterdam* (General Subsidy Arrangement Amsterdam). Furthermore, the municipality stated that it "reserved the right to de-

³⁰ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984:6

³¹ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), August 1985

³² *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1985:3

³³ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1986

³⁴ "Het Leger des Heils wijst op het bijzondere karakter van het hulpverleningsaanbod, dat vooral is gericht op zwaardere hulpverleningsgevallen en op de inschakeling van vrijwilligers vanuit de eigen organisatie, waardoor het Leger des Heils in staat is hulp te bieden in situaties waarin het normale hulpverleningsaanbod tekort schiet." Besluit nr. 634 "Aangaan subsidierelatie met de Amsterdamse instellingen voor gezinsverzorging." *Gemeentebld Amsterdam* April 8, 1986

mand for changes of the statutes when deemed necessary.”³⁵ This meant that the Amsterdam municipality could actually demand of the Salvation Army to live up to its word and adjust its statutes – an offer that was primarily made to satisfy the Amsterdam council. And indeed, the municipality took up on its statement, as in December 1986 the council demanded to be granted inspection of the Army’s statutes in order to assess whether or not the Army could remain eligible for subsidy.³⁶ This announcement had confirmed the idea that the local administrators had a different approach than the policymakers on a national level. An idea that might have incited Manager of the Homeless Care, Egberts, to announce: “(...) it will not be only the case as it is in Amsterdam that subsidies are channeled through the city, the same will apply to more large cities.”³⁷ Egberts was right and the Amsterdam example could very well be regarded as an omen, as the consequences of decentralization could provide for the same kind of trouble for the Army in the other covenant cities. Would the strategy of identity also prove to be enough to counter these perils in other cases? Was the strategy of identity enough to persuade local governments to continue to hire the Salvation Army in order to fulfill their local social policy goals?

1.3. Identity: the Utrecht case

During the same period, the municipality of one of the other covenant cities, Utrecht, had already decreased the amount of subsidy to the Army’s youth homes to such a measure that one of its homes, “Ons Honk”, was on the verge of being closed. The expected date of closure was June 1, 1985.³⁸ The Army however, would not let this pass without any opposition and in order to fight this decision, a legal procedure was started. By doing so, the Army displayed an attitude that seemed to have caught the Utrecht municipality by surprise: “The Utrecht city council appears to be shocked by the fact that the Army is going to court.”³⁹

Whether or not it was a direct result of this approach, the Utrecht municipality backed down and offered the Army to help find alternative housing for its youth home. Nonetheless, the three youth homes in the province of Utrecht were to merge into two houses, and both in the Utrecht municipality as well as in the province, the Army’s youth activities were under great pressure because of cut-backs.⁴⁰ On the other hand, in the Utrecht town of Driebergen, the youth work

³⁵ Besluit nr. 634 “Aangaan subsidierelatie met de Amsterdamse instellingen voor gezinsverzorging.” *Gemeentebld Amsterdam* April 8, 1986

³⁶ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), December 1986:4

³⁷ “(...) dat het niet alleen in Amsterdam zo zal zijn dat subsidies over de gemeenten gaan lopen, hetzelfde geldt voor meer grote steden.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), December 1984:1

³⁸ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), January 1985:3

³⁹ “De gemeente Utrecht blijkt nu toch wel geschrokken te zijn van het feit dat het Leger gaat procederen.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), January 1985:3

⁴⁰ “Uit subsidie-technisch oogpunt zal gesproken worden over de Utrechtse Jeugdhuisen Leger des Heils (UJL).” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1985:4

division that provided for non-residential care actually grew, and this appeared to also be the case in Voorburg and Veendam.⁴¹ This incongruent development within this work field suggests that the government showed a growing preference for non-residential work above residential work, maybe because it was cheaper.

Identity as a problem

One month later, the general tone of the worries about the Army's youth work within the coordinating council had changed for the worse:

“The Salvation Army does not meet all the government requirements including those regarding democratization. That has its consequences for the continuation of and the amount of subsidy for this work. They want to know the vision of the SA on this work. The people involved in this work are waiting anxiously, which has to be brought to an end with clarity.”⁴²

Like in Amsterdam, this desired clarity had to come from the statutes. According to the Utrecht municipality, the statutes of the Salvation Army contained references to religious ideology and the municipality wanted to speak about that with the Army. Referring to the possibility of a national trend, the manager of the Army's Youth Work, Kruisinga stressed the importance of this development for the Army by suggesting that the Army was to prepare this meeting by fully considering how this view reflected on the totality of the Army's social-cultural work and how the Army wanted to incorporate the government requirements on democratization in this work.⁴³ This exercise was necessary, according to Kruisinga, because it would be useful to all departments in deciding on how to cope with their local governments:

“A debate with municipalities on their proposition that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’ can only be held when the Salvation Army has a clear view on its social-cultural work. Then the Salvation Army can show the councils what it has to offer. It may turn out that the vision has to be readjusted. That does not automatically have to lead to the termination of the work. Of course, there are basic principles, but the Army should not be immediately afraid (...).”⁴⁴

⁴¹ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1985:5

⁴² “Het Leger des Heils voldoet niet aan alle eisen van de overheid o.a. m.b.t. de democratisering. Dat heeft consequenties voor de voortzetting en de mate van subsidie voor dit werk. Men wil de visie van het LdH op dit werk weten. De mensen die bij dit werk betrokken zijn leven nu in een spanning, waaraan middels duidelijkheid een einde moet komen.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1985

⁴³ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), May 1985:3

⁴⁴ “Een discussie met de gemeentes over hun stelling dat wie betaalt ook bepaalt kan pas plaatsvinden nadat die LdH visie op het sociaal cultureel werk duidelijk is. Het LdH kan dan de gemeentes duidelijk maken wat het te bieden heeft. Het kan blijken dat bijstelling van visie noodzakelijk is. Dat behoeft niet

As the Army was still awaiting the outcome of the legal procedure that it had started against the Utrecht council, with the beginning of 1986 the situation of the youth work in other parts of the Netherlands presented a mixed development. In Haarlem and Zierikzee the financial pressures seemed to lead to a difficult situation for the Army's local youth work.⁴⁵ On the other hand, in Veendam and Driebergen new youth facilities opened their doors in February.⁴⁶ Yet, irrespective of the pending legal procedure, the Utrecht municipality went ahead with cutbacks and as a result, the Army staff had to be discharged, making the Utrecht case a striking example of this ambivalent but worrying development.

In March 1986 the pressure on the Army was amplified by the announcement that the Amsterdam municipality was about to adjust its subsidy requirements to the outcome of the report of the Committee-Van der Burg.⁴⁷ As stated above, the Army thought of itself as not being able to sufficiently meet the government requirements on democratization, so it was not a real surprise to the coordinating council when during the same month, the Utrecht municipality had once again announced that the subsidy for the Army's youth home in Utrecht would be terminated. The reason behind it however, was actually quite surprising to the Army, because now it was not so much the inadequate facilitation of democratization, but the Army's faith-based identity that seemed to cause the trouble:

“(...) we cannot escape the impression that because of our religious view the municipality of Utrecht ceases to support our work. They prefer neutral institutions.”⁴⁸

This observation was of enough importance to return to the agenda of the coordinating council and indeed, after having consulted with the province in April, Jan Nieuwland reported to the coordinating council that there was no escape:

“The municipality of Utrecht is (...) very definite with regard to its point of view. The Provincial Executive states: the municipality is autonomous. We cannot prove it, but ideology will play a part, also with regard to decentralization. One does not have any possibility of appeal and there will be great insecurity. We lack proper on-site lobby contacts. The standards that the Salvation Army has laid down, play a great part and are very often an obstacle.”⁴⁹

zonder meer te leiden tot beeïndiging van het werk. Uiteraard zijn er basisprincipes, maar het Leger moet niet meteen bang zijn (...).” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), May 1985:3-4

⁴⁵ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), January 1986:4; *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), February 1986:4

⁴⁶ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), February 1986:4

⁴⁷ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1986, see also Chapter 5.6.2

⁴⁸ “We kunnen niet aan de indruk ontkomen dat vanwege onze levensbeschouwelijke visie de gemeente Utrecht wil stoppen met de ondersteuning van ons werk. Men wil liever neutrale instellingen.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1986:5

⁴⁹ “De gemeenteraad in Utrecht is zeer beslist in haar standpunt. Gedeputeerde Staten zegt: de gemeente is autonoom. “We kunnen het niet hard maken maar levensbeschouwing zal doorwerken ook in het verband

Following his analysis, Nieuwland raised the question of how to deal with this situation in which the Army was not just profiled as a faith-based organization, but where the local administration was also inclined to stop the collaboration because of this profile. How to change the minds of these administrators? Or was the Army maybe no longer the obvious organization to provide such services in Utrecht. Should the Army quit its local activities in Utrecht? These were questions that Nieuwland asked in the coordinating council. Nevertheless, surrender was unthinkable, as the overall conclusion of the ensuing debate in the coordinating council reveals:

“We’ll have to defend our position aggressively, support the normative content of our work with actual facts. Deliver good quality and be attentive to new developments.”⁵⁰

Identity as a solution

This position of being driven into a corner by the local government, made the Army realize very well that it had to work actively on its image. The above statement shows that the Army was quite aware that its social services did contain a ‘normative content’, and as this content formed the base of the Army’s relationships with (any) government, the Army had to prove its added value to the Utrecht council. The suggestion was made that this was to be done by demonstration of the quality of the Army’s work: ‘actual facts’ would have to support the effectivity of the Army’s normative approach. This solution however, raised a new problem, for how was the Army to communicate these facts to the people that decided on the allocation of funds? Earlier, the coordinating council had concluded that they suffered from a lack of local contacts that were able to lobby for the Army. So, in addition to a change in tactics towards local governments, the Army decided to arrange for local contacts that could actually convey the Salvation Army image of effectivity and commitment to the local administrators. Also, it was decided that the role of the Internal Committee for Press and Publicity (also referred to as ‘Politics and Publicity’) was to be scaled-up. This committee had already existed for some time, but apparently without a structural role in trying to convey the unique character of the Salvation Army’s work to local administrators. Now the Army started a lobby that targeted exactly these public officials.

Since the matter of faith-based identity had raised some questions, the unique character of the Army’s approach to social work served as ammunition. On re-

met de decentralisatie. Je hebt geen beroepsmogelijkheden meer en er komt grote onzekerheid. Ter plaatse missen wij de nodige contacten om te lobbyen. De normen die het Leger des Heils aanlegt spelen een grote rol en zijn heel dikwijls een struikelblok.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1986:3

⁵⁰ “We moeten agressief onze standpunten gaan verdedigen, onze normatieve inhoud van ons werk ondersteunen met actuele feiten. Goede kwaliteit leveren en alert zijn op nieuwe ontwikkelingen” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1986:3

quest of the committee for press and publicity, the coordinating council decided to start with publishing an article in the designated magazine for local administrators *De Nederlandse Gemeenten* (Dutch Municipalities). This article was meant to elaborate: “(...) on the Salvation Army, namely its goals, its core and criteria of its care program in order to try to eliminate misunderstandings.”⁵¹ In order to write this article, a well-known Christian journalist, Sipke van der Land, was approached.⁵² In addition to this article, another, more thorough approach was chosen. The coordinating council decided to send every member of a city council in the Netherlands a personalized letter. In this letter the Army aimed to point out its unique character and presumably hoped to emphasize that the government had nothing to fear from it in terms of identity. Especially the covenant cities were targeted, for:

“In Amsterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht and Rotterdam the welfare subsidies are allocated by the city councils. In doing so, the city council has its freedom to prioritize with regard to the apportionment of funds from the subsidy pot. Political influencing of these councils can be a means to not be slighted in the subsidy distribution.”⁵³

As a third action, the coordinating council decided that, after the upcoming local elections, meetings would be held with the new political parties on the councils of these cities to accentuate “the aim, core and help-criteria” of the Army’s social work. Also, in order to streamline the representation of the various interests that the diverse social programs of the Army had on this local level, the Commander decided to appoint one Salvation Army representative for every covenant city. He or she would then keep in touch with relevant local administrators.⁵⁴ Added to this lobbying on a local level, the members of the Army coordinating council would also try to influence the national key administrators.

Following the Amsterdam omen and the Utrecht case, the religious fundament of the Army’s social work became the talking point. However, the reaction that the Army had on this matter was quite strategic and maybe even quite unexpected. The Army did not try to mitigate its perceived identity, but it actually chose to cultivate and deploy it, thus revealing quite a sense of self-consciousness and political assertiveness. The developments on the matter of youth work and community centers however, seemed to take another turn for the

⁵¹ (...) over het Leger des Heils, n.l. over de doelstelling, het wezen en de criteria voor hulpverlening teneinde misvattingen daaromtrent proberen uit de weg te ruimen.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1986:2

⁵² *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1986:3

⁵³ “In Amsterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht en Rotterdam worden de subsidies voor het welzijnswerk toebedeeld door de gemeentebesturen van deze steden. Hierbij hebben de gemeentebesturen de vrijheid om prioriteiten te stellen ten aanzien van het toebeden aan het particulier initiatief van gelden uit de subsidiepot. Politieke beïnvloeding van deze besturen kan een middel zijn om in de subsidieverdeling niet achtergesteld te worden.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1986:4

⁵⁴ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1986

worse during the second half of the 1980s. The introduction of a budgetary system for youth work in 1987 altered the manner in which subsidies would be allocated, and combined with the cutbacks, this led to a significant reduction in subsidies for youth work from fl.760,000 in 1986 to fl.645,000 in 1987 and with a further prospect of reducing to fl.515,000 in 1988.⁵⁵ Additionally, the Utrecht municipality substantiated its claim that it would enforce the outcome of the Van der Burg-report, and now it issued stipulations on the matter of democratic participation within the Salvation Army. This combination of measures confirmed within Army ranks the idea that "Utrecht wanted to get rid of the Army".⁵⁶ The coordinating council kept receiving signals that this would actually be the case, and that the Army's youth work would be closed down in Utrecht.⁵⁷ But for the time being, through a different flow of subsidy (of a far smaller amount than before) than the regular program, it would be possible to continue their work in another location.⁵⁸

1.4. Harmonization and decentralization

In line with the national trend to harmonize social policy and its civil society organizations, the Salvation Army youth work also experienced increasing pressure to combine forces with other organizations. The idea was, like in Amsterdam, to decentralize youth work activities into separate districts in which all types of youth services would be available, and if necessary, these would be offered by different organizations.⁵⁹ This plan however, would infringe on the Army's idea of providing for coherent services on a national level and urged the Army to think about preserving its identity.⁶⁰ At the end of 1988, the *Rapport harmonisatie van standaarden in de residentiële jeugdzorg* (Report on harmonization of standards in residential youth care) was issued, in order to accompany the proposed policy implementations. For the Salvation Army this new direction seemed to be disastrous, as the accompanying cutbacks of 2 million euro's would mean, for the Army, a large reduction of its staff and management.⁶¹

In the covenant city Den Haag, a thorough reorganization of social work was also announced to achieve further harmonization of the work field. The plan was to unite all active social service organizations in a municipal umbrella organization with the legal form of a foundation. This would mean that the Army's relatively young Goodwill Center in Den Haag would have to merge into this new foundation and its employees would have to take up office with this new organization. Thereupon, these workers would be sent on secondment to their original

⁵⁵ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), August 1986; *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1986

⁵⁶ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1986:3

⁵⁷ *Idem*; see also *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1987

⁵⁸ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1986

⁵⁹ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1988

⁶⁰ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), March 1988

⁶¹ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), December 1988

organizations, which in this case was the Salvation Army.⁶² That this would mean a fundamental intrusion on the Army's identity was confirmed by the Manager of the Goodwill Center Den Haag, Holland, who stated that he would do "everything in order to be able to continue to work the same way."⁶³ In fact, Holland started a lobby with local political parties and even in the parliament.

In the field of homeless care as well, the policy of harmonization resulted in reorganization. In October 1987, the Army's coordinating council learned that the national foundation for homeless care would lose its subsidy. This would open the possibility to reorganize on a local level, as was the case in Den Haag. The result would be that each covenant city would have its own service-bureau in which all parties would be united. If the Army did not want to participate in such a cluster, it would have to form a cluster of its own in order to maintain its right of existence. After having discussed the issue, the coordinating council however, agreed on not forming a cluster of its own for the time being, because the Army lacked the necessary volume. Even though the alternatives were not yet clear to the Army, in 1988 the finances of the umbrella for homeless care were actually be stopped and this was experienced as a great loss of the possibility of representation of civil society organizations at the national level.⁶⁴ These developments on the front of decentralization and harmonization, let the Army feel the burden of being dependent on government finances, and the threat of losing parts of its social work activities was imminent. The Army however, did not concede, for its reflex was to come into action in order to win the battle, and for this purpose it deployed two important approaches.

2. Recalibration of the Army's identity

2.1. First efforts of recalibration

The first approach of the Army was to convince the local and national decision makers of the quality of its work by showing its plumage by starting a lobby on its identity. This approach however, suggested that the Army actually did have a clear idea of its identity, for otherwise it was hard for these tactics to be convincing. This assumption however, might not be correct as the call for clarity on the subject of how the Salvation Army viewed its faith-based character in regard to its social services was increasingly heard, both inside and outside Army ranks. As shown above, local governments, more than once, asked questions on this subject and subsequently Army officials wanted to know what to communicate in such a case. As a result, the matter of religious identity was placed higher and higher on the Army's agenda during the 1980s. For instance, the discussion on the matter of religious identity seeped through to the practical level of the work

⁶² *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), September 1986

⁶³ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1986

⁶⁴ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), July 1988

field, confronting the Army with the difficulties of the operational interpretation of its vision. On February 13, 1987, the Manager of the Homeless Department, Egberts pointed the attention of Chief Secretary Krommenhoek to an internal dispute on rephrasing a clause on the living regulations in the care homes. Until then the regulations mentioned the following stance on the subject of ‘spiritual care’:

“Spiritual care: this is based on putting into practice the Christian faith in the broadest sense of the word. The preaching of which shall take place, among other ways, during the home meetings on Sunday morning, where every resident is welcome.”⁶⁵

A member of the staff of the department for homeless care, Zürhaar, had suggested changing this text into what was regarded to be a more professional and up-to-date phrasing:

“Spiritual care: Christian therapeutic approach whereby it is attempted to meaningfully anticipate the spiritual needs c.q. signals of the residents. This being an aspect of the wholesome human being. On Sunday morning there will be a short time of reflection for all residents. This is in relation to the aforementioned.”⁶⁶

Because of the subtle but more compelling ring to it that the new phrasing seemed to bear, the other staff members did not comply with Zürhaar’s proposal, for the Army did not compel its residents to any form of religious activity. Nevertheless, both parties insisted on bringing this matter before the Army command, and thus hoped to gain clarity on ‘what is wise’ in this matter. Krommenhoek informed Egberts that the issue would be discussed in the coordinating council, but Egberts protested heavily to this procedure:

“I object to this. I have, in consultation with the managers, put this matter before you as Army command. When this would be discussed in the *coördinatieraad*, people that do not belong to the Salvation Army will help decide on matters, at least those who are not Soldiers.”⁶⁷

⁶⁵ “Deze is gebaseerd op het beoefenen van de christelijke godsdienst in de ruimste zin van het woord. De verkondiging hiervan vindt o.a. plaats in de huissamenkomst op zondagmorgen, waar iedere bewoner welkom is.” Letter from J.J. Egberts to L.E. Krommenhoek, Februari 13, 1987 (UA 1182, nr. 80)

⁶⁶ “Christelijk therapeutische benadering waarbij getracht wordt zinvol in te spelen op de geestelijke behoeften c.q. signalen van de bewoners. Dit als aspect van de totale mens. Op zondagmorgen is er een korte bezinningstijd voor alle bewoners. Dit in het kader van het eerdergenoemde.” Letter from J.J. Egberts to L.E. Krommenhoek, Februari 13, 1987

⁶⁷ “Ik maak daar bezwaar tegen. Deze zaak heb ik, in overleg met de directeuren, aan u voorgelegd als Legerleiding. Indien dit in de Coördinatieraad aan de orde zou komen, besluiten mensen mee die niet in het Leger des Heils behoren, althans geen heilssoldaat zijn.” Letter from J.J. Egberts to L.E. Krommenhoek, Februari 18, 1987 (UA 1182, nr. 80)

With this reaction, a second problem was revealed with regard to the Army's identity, because next to the question of what this identity was all about, now the question emerged that: who would decided this? Army people or outside professionals? A week later, the matter seemed to have come to an end when Krommenhoek, after having consulted with Commander Schurink, informed Egberts:

“You are right that the *coördinatieraad* of management cannot and will not decide on such matters, but this matter does require a certain form of coordination for it plays a part, one way or another, in all sectors. That is why it is decided to discuss this matter in the *coördinatieraad*. In my opinion you do not have to worry about this procedure.”⁶⁸

Thus Egberts was only partly accommodated. And maybe he was right to worry, for in April 1987 the coordinating council gave him a “proposal for alterations”:

“This [spiritual care] is based on putting into practice the Christian faith in the broadest sense of the word. The implementation takes place within the pastoral care under which fall the home gatherings, etcetera.”⁶⁹

Even if Egberts had his way in terms of a lighter, less compelling phrasing of the care home regulations clause, he was confirmed in his fear that the coordinating council incidentally decided on matters that did not belong to its capacity, and that these decisions were made with the help of what was perceived as non-Army people. However, according to the coordinating council itself, the issue of the Army's faith-based identity was to remain a subject of discussion, for: “The Christian basis can form a ground for provoking termination of subsidies.”⁷⁰

2.2. Scrutinizing the Army's faith-based identity

The decision of the Army command to approach the matter of identity in a comprehensive manner, became visible during the second half of the 1980s when the Army deployed a second approach on convincing the government of its added value. As mentioned in Chapter 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 was the Army used to prepare its

⁶⁸ “U heeft gelijk dat in de Coördinatieraad bestuurders geen besluiten over dergelijke zaken kunnen of moeten worden genomen, maar het is wel zo dat deze aangelegenheid een bepaalde coördinatie vraagt, daar deze zaak in alle sectoren op de één of andere wijze speelt. Daarom is besloten om in de Coördinatieraad over deze zaak van gedachten te wisselen. Ik stel mij voor dat u over deze procedure geen zorgen heeft.” Letter from L.E. Krommenhoek to J.J. Egberts, Februari 26, 1987 (UA 1182, nr. 80)

⁶⁹ “Deze [geestelijk verzorging] is gebaseerd op het beoefenen van de christelijke godsdienst in de ruimste zin van het woord. De uitwerking vindt plaats binnen de pastorale zorg waaronder de huissamenkomst e.d. valt.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1987:4

⁷⁰ “De levensbeschouwelijke basis kan aanleiding zijn tot het niet in aanmerking komen van (sic) subsidies.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), April 1987:1

soldiers and especially its officers for the Spiritual battle. An additional means to this end was the 'social congress'. By means of regular gatherings the Army Aimed to develop and strengthen a common view on matters of identity amongst its members. Also in 1987, a national social congress was planned, but because of the economic hardship of these times, the estimated costs of more than fl.300,000 proved to be rather an obstacle. After a short debate however, the coordinating council unanimously decided that the congress had to take place, for a social congress had to be seen as a form of employee education:

“We profess to be more than just an organization that offers social services. The color that has to be in our work, that is what such a social congress is about.”⁷¹

So, even though it would cost a fortune, the congress was on, and not in the least because in that particular year, it would be combined with the centennial anniversary of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands. However, it was not time yet for any festivities, for in February 1987, once again attention was called to the tendency of local governments to question the Army's stance on religious matters:

“ (...) this question is not only asked in Rotterdam, various other municipalities present questions on religious identity. The political choice is often for a neutral organization (...). The trend is obvious.”⁷²

In a reply to this observation, Assistant-Chief-Secretary, Ligtelijn, announced that during the centennial a symposium would be held on the subject of 'Christian identity and social service'. Ligtelijn sketched out the plan: first the attending major political parties would describe their points of view on the matter of identity. And then:

“Based on these statements, we can determine our strategy. What is quite clear and necessary however, is that we will have to outline a strategy in the future.”⁷³

⁷¹ “Wij pretenderen meer te zijn dan alleen maar een organisatie, waar maatschappelijk werk wordt bedreven. De kleur die in ons werk moet zitten, daarvoor is zo'n maatschappelijk congres.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1986:5

⁷² “(...) niet alleen in Rotterdam [wordt] deze vraag gesteld (...), diverse andere Gemeenten komen ook met vragen omtrent levensbeschouwing. De politieke keuze is zeer dikwijls een neutrale instelling (...). De tendens is duidelijk.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), February 1987:2

⁷³ “Naar de uitspraken, daar gedaan, kunnen wij onze strategie bepalen. Wat wel duidelijk en noodzakelijk is, is dat wij in de toekomst een strategie moeten uitstippelen.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), Februari 1987:3

After the centennial celebrations and its symposium, further deliberation on this subject was planned, but in order to create a proper strategy, Ligtelijn also concluded that the Army had to be better prepared than it was currently: “It is established that we are too unschooled in a political sense to be attentive to such matters.”⁷⁴

The Army’s view on its identity

On the morning of Saturday, May 23, 1987, almost 500 people flocked together in the vast conference hall of the Jaarbeurs in Utrecht to participate in the Salvation Army’s centennial symposium: “Christian identity and social services. Social policy once more confronted with a choice”. Next to many interested Salvationists, a multitude of delegates from other organizations were also present, including people from elderly homes, care centers, hospitals, Catholic diaconal organizations, probation organizations, broadcasting companies, the government, and other faith-based and secular social service providers.⁷⁵ Territorial Commander Schurink opened the symposium. Even though his speech was not preserved, it can be assumed to be in correspondence with the preface to the symposium booklet, which was handed out to the attendants as they entered. In this preface, Schurink defined the issue that induced the Salvation Army to organize the event:

“We can establish that professionalization of the services, which includes health care, social work, family care, youth work, probation and elderly care, has been increased. During this symposium we want to dwell together upon the question of what a Christian character means in these mentioned areas of interest. To put it briefly, we want to focus on asking each other the question of whether or not the Salvation Army still has a right of existence in these times of social needs and unprecedented wealth.”⁷⁶

Schurink explicitly related the tendency of the local governments to ask the Army to give account of its identity in relation to their subsidy arrangements to the ongoing process of professionalization, as a result of which social service providers like the Salvation Army seemed to have to repress the Christian element of their identity. Additionally, after presenting this urgent matter to his

⁷⁴ “Wel wordt geconstateerd dat wij te weinig politiek geschoold zijn om op deze zaken alert te zijn. Over genoemd onderwerp zal lektuur verzameld moeten worden.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), Februari 1987:3

⁷⁵ *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening. Samenlevingsbeleid opnieuw voor de keuze*. Symposium booklet of the Leger des Heils symposium, May 23, 1987 (UA 1182, nr. 400)

⁷⁶ “Wij mogen constateren, dat de professionalisering van de dienstverlening, waaronder de gezondheidszorg, het maatschappelijk werk, de gezinsverzorging, de jeugdhulpverlening, de reclassering en de bejaardenzorg steeds meer is toegenomen. Op dit symposium willen wij met u allen stilstaan bij de vraag wat een christelijke signatuur betekent voor de genoemde aandachtsgebieden. Kortom, wij willen elkaar bepalen bij de vraag of het Leger des Heils nog (steeds) bestaansrecht heeft in deze tijd van maatschappelijke noden en ongekende welvaart.” *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987: preface.

audience, Schurink emphasized the coherence between the Army's social and religious objectives by quoting former General Couatts:

“These [the Army's twofold mission of evangelization and social work] are just two activities of one and the same salvation that aims for total redemption of the human being. Both are inspired by the same motive. Both aim for the same target. And where the Gospel has united them, we do not intend to separate them.”⁷⁷

Thus, the Army's point of departure regarding the theme of this symposium was clearly framed, for however the debate would evolve during the day, the Army was determined to conserve the coherence between the two parts of its mission, thus confirming the fact that this coherence formed the mainstay of the Army's identity.

Alternated with musical intermezzos and slide shows of the Army's social activities, four speakers were invited to shed light on the theme and the existential question that Schurink introduced. In the first contribution, the manager of the Army's youth department and the department of elderly care and nursing, Noorlander, elaborated on Schurink's train of thought while trying to answer the question: what inspires the Salvation Army to provide for social services?⁷⁸ According to Noorlander, the cause of this question lay in the dominant character of the Dutch welfare state, for this dominance often resulted in a loss of specific character of faith-based social service providers.⁷⁹ That the Salvation Army had to position itself towards this problem was clear, and Noorlander made a plea to firmly hold on to its faith-based identity in the process, for it was exactly this identity that provided for the inspiration for the Army's social services:

“Without the capital ‘C’ the Salvation Army would lose its right of existence; its founding principle. It is also the source of inspiration for social service and the point of departure that gives content to the performed labor. (...) This is how a theology of social service came into being within the Salvation Army.”⁸⁰

⁷⁷ “Zij [evangelisatiewerk en maatschappelijk werk] zijn slechts twee activiteiten van één en hetzelfde heil dat de totale verlossing van de mens beoogt. Beide worden geïnspireerd door hetzelfde motief. Beide hebben hetzelfde doel voor ogen. En waar het evangelie hen heeft samengebracht, zij wij niet van plan hen te scheiden.” *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987: preface.

⁷⁸ Noorlander was manager of the Youth Work department and also of the Nursing and Care department.

⁷⁹ *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:5

⁸⁰ “Het Leger des Heils zou zonder de ‘C’ met een hoofdletter zijn bestaansrecht verliezen; het is zijn grondbeginsel en zijn fundament. Dat is ook de bron van inspiratie tot maatschappelijke dienstverlening en het uitgangspunt dat inhoud geeft aan zijn uitvoerende arbeid. (...) Zo ontstond er een theologie binnen het Leger des Heils van maatschappelijke dienstverlening” *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:6

Indeed, the Dutch government showed an increasing tendency for change, instigated by a policy that, according to Noorlander, left less and less room for a faith-based character and pressured the Army to show more and more flexibility on the matter of its identity, especially with regard to harmonization and mergers.⁸¹ In response to this development, however, Noorlander stated that the reduction of the Army to a mere social service organization was out of the question. In reference to social scientist Thoenes' observation that the main weakness of the Dutch welfare state was that "it lacked a great and inspiring ideal", Noorlander stated that it was exactly this Christian identity that formed the base for the added value of the Army's social services. This was an important argument for the creation of a level playing field by distributing financial means on an equal basis:

"On the market of welfare, that offers no intrinsic security, safety, justice and social security, the Salvation Army wants, together with other Christian institutions, to keep providing for the added value of Christian identity and so improve the happiness of people."⁸²

So in her reaction to the Commanders' quest for legitimization of the Salvation Army's existence as a religious social service provider, Noorlander emphasized that this Christian character of the Army could be regarded as indispensable as a counterweight to the neutralizing efforts of an encroaching government.

Other views on the Army's faith-based identity

This emphasis on the Army's identity as an added value, was however criticized by the second speaker, expert on criminal law and state law, Diepenhorst.⁸³ Diepenhorst focused on the question of: how to display this Christian character in the services? He started off by summarizing the idea that some understand faith-based social services to openly differ from non-faith-based services, an idea that Diepenhorst disregarded by calling it "primitive self-exaltation" because of a lack of scientific evidence that supported this idea. Elaborating on this point of view, he continued that based on common sense and "public spirit", all people have, or at least should have, a certain urge to help each other.⁸⁴ In such situations mutual respect excluded condescension, sense of responsibility was strengthened, and character was valued. Even though Diepenhorst remained silent on the specific situation of the Salvation Army and the legitimization of its

⁸¹ *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:7

⁸² "Het Leger des Heils wil op de welzijnsmarkt, die uit zichzelf geen geborgenheid, geen veiligheid, geen rechtvaardigheid en bestaanszekerheid schept, met andere christelijke instellingen de meerwaarde van het christelijk goed blijven aanbieden en zo geluk van mensen bevorderen." *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:9

⁸³ Diepenhorst (Rector of the Free University Amsterdam (1972-1976) and Minister of OCW (1965-1967))

⁸⁴ *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:16-18

existence, and even confessed to his own Christian roots during the second half of his contribution, he was quite critical of the idea that faith-based organizations possessed a certain glorified uniqueness – it was enough for these organizations to present their Christian ideology through action. This was a message that might very well have disturbed quite a part of the audience.

The third speaker, however, seemed to be more supportive to the idea of the Salvation Army's unique right of existence. In his speech on the possibilities and boundaries of modern social services, expert in *andragologie* (adult education theory), Van Beugen, came to the same conclusion as Schurink, that far-reaching professionalization had changed the identity of these social services from being value-based towards value-free, or 'neutral'. Van Beugen however, also observed that this development was being averted by the growing criticism on the professional, during the 1980s. "Does this maybe mean a recurrence from 'professionalism' to personal motivation, even maybe to a Christian inspired motivation?", Van Beugen wondered.⁸⁵ In his answer, Van Beugen started out by stating that even though criticism on professionalization was quite helpful, there were also two "extremely valuable products" of professionalization: the individual approach of the 'personal-service' ideology, and the expertise that is needed to counter the growing complexity of the social problems of the clients. According to Van Beugen, the combination of these two aspects implicated that personal motivation alone would never be enough to become an effective professional. On the other hand, the importance of the personal approach implied that the professional would have to be facilitated by, for example, the government. Additionally, the professional would have to show a non-expansionist, supplementary character towards volunteer aid, for professionals had also to contribute to the revitalization of solidarity and to, what had been called, the 'caring society'.⁸⁶ So, how did a Christian ideology relate to this interpretation of professionalism? According to Van Beugen, this was not at all a problem. The professional profile of the social worker acknowledged the importance of personal values, and even though services were not a means for evangelization, Van Beugen recognized the convictions of a Christian worker as a "working style". The primary task of a professional, be it a Christian or otherwise, was to provide for expert help, but this help could only be effective when offered by a 'real' person, which involved his values. Additionally, in support of his plea for granting a certain measure of Christian values in social work, Van Beugen spent a few words on the difference between hiring a Christian professional and working with a professional faith-based organization: a Christian professional could also very well be employed by a 'general' organization, for it was not that these organizations were value-free, or neutral, but the designation 'general' only

⁸⁵ "Betekent dat misschien een terugkeer van 'deskundigheid' naar persoonlijke motivatie, wellicht dus ook naar een christelijk geïnspireerde motivatie?" *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:9

⁸⁶ Idem:11-12

implied that professionals in such an organization did not all adhere to the same convictions.⁸⁷ Christian organizations however, were valuable in facilitating and supporting professionals to do their work from a strong personal conviction. So, summarizing the words of Van Beugen, one could conclude that in his view a social worker is inherently ‘value charged’ and can act accordingly, be it within certain boundaries.

From the perspective of the Army command, the fourth speaker, Director-General of the Ministry of WVC, Gijsbers might have been regarded as the most significant.⁸⁸ As a government representative and a vital contact for the Salvation Army in terms of welfare subsidies, Gijsbers’ view on how the Army was to legitimize itself was important. As Ligtelijn had stated in preparation of this symposium: the Army would mould its position partly in reaction to political points of view.⁸⁹ Citing former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pronk, Gijsbers introduced his argument by stating that the “government should always work at the Salvation Army becoming redundant”, meaning that political solutions had to be found for the needs that the Army addressed.⁹⁰ By this statement, Gijsbers pointed out that the Salvation Army functioned as a mirror, or even a conscience to the Dutch government. And according to Gijsbers it was especially the Army’s ideology, its combativeness and decisiveness, which had made the Army recognizable within Dutch society. Addressing the matter of separation of church and state, Gijsbers argued that the Dutch state did not favor one ideology over another, but aimed to give room to all different forms of expression. This resulted in a type of government that did not actively support different social groupings to pursue their religious goals, but, according to Gijsbers, it also did not hamper it. Did this mean that a subsidized organization would still be able to propagate its own convictions?⁹¹ Gijsbers stated that this was very well possible. All actions of an organization could be in line with its specific philosophy of life, as long as they were also in line with Dutch law, and especially criminal law. When the criminal law prohibited certain actions, subsidies could be revoked. “So, what about an issue like equal rights?” Gijsbers asked rhetorically, for in Amsterdam the Salvation Army was threatened with revoking the permit to collect money publicly because of its conviction that homosexuality was incompatible with Army views. Gijsbers replied:

“I can hardly imagine that the subsidies for the huge amount of work that the Salvation Army does, (...) often in places where no one has access to or is

⁸⁷ Idem:13

⁸⁸ Gijsbers, (Director-general Welzijn, Ministerie WVC; Chairman General Diaconal Council of the Dutch Reformed Church)

⁸⁹ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) February 1987:3

⁹⁰ “(...) dat [door de overheid, SB] eigenlijk altijd gewerkt zou moeten worden aan de overbodigheid van het Leger des Heils” *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:22

⁹¹ Idem:22-23

prepared to go to, that the subsidy for this work must be revoked based on the opinion of the Army on homosexuality.”⁹²

This remark was actually quite on the borderline, for it could very well be interpreted as a display of government endowed meritocracy. After all, it implied that the Army did not have to conform to all the demands that the government made, because of its good work. Gijsbers, however, continued that exactly because of this fact that there was no religious pressure or coercion in the case of the Salvation Army at all, and that it did not try to hide its identity, the Army provided for both social services and spiritual propagation, and was quite effective in both. According to Gijsbers, the Army did not apply “evangelical blackmail” by asking a needy person: do you believe? But by providing care to such a person without any pressure to convert, the Salvation Army proved to be a mature social work organization, and one that also brought the gospel overtly.⁹³

Continuing on the matter of separation of church and state, Gijsbers also addressed the question: How can a church be subsidized? He firmly stated that Dutch law, including the Constitution, did not at all prohibit the state to subsidize religious communities, but that it was actually quite careful with it. With regard to the Salvation Army however, the state did not seem that reserved at all, and Gijsbers explained: “With the Salvation Army, the propagation of faith and services are impossible to separate. Not even administratively.”⁹⁴ So, if the government wanted to deploy an organization like the Salvation Army, according to Gijsbers:

“It would be a tragic mistake if we would put subsidies up for discussion because of this, or when we would plead for or even force a separation between social services and propagation. The Army would not be the Salvation Army anymore.”⁹⁵

So, as final speaker, and displaying the government’s perspective, Gijsbers had openly acknowledged the Army’s added value to the government, a value that was primarily based on the Army’s double mission. It might be the case however, that being invited as a VIP-speaker to the Army’s congress, Gijsbers paid mere lip service to the Army’s principles. Nevertheless, as an active member of

⁹² “Toch kan ik mij nauwelijks voorstellen dat de subsidie voor het vele werk dat het Leger des Heils verricht en dat (...) dikwijls verricht wordt daar waar niemand toegang heeft of bereid is heen te gaan, dat de subsidie voor dit werk moet worden ingetrokken op grond van de opvatting over homofilie van het Leger.” *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:24

⁹³ Idem:25

⁹⁴ “Bij het Leger zijn verbreiding van geloof en dienstverlening niet te scheiden. Ook administratief niet.” *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:25

⁹⁵ “Het zou een tragische vergissing zijn als we daarom subsidie discutabel stellen of als we daarom een scheiding tussen maatschappelijke dienstverlening en evangelisatie zouden willen bepleiten, laat staan forceren. Dan zou het Leger, het Leger des Heils niet meer zijn.” *Christelijke indentiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:25-26

the Reformed church, Gijsberts might very well have given his personal professional view on the matter, and if this was the case, a more telling declaration of support from the side of the government seemed impossible. The Salvation Army was not only labeled as indispensable to the government as a mirror on social developments, but it was indispensable exactly because of its dual mission, instead of despite of it. This message must have strengthened Schurink and the other members of the coordinating council in their efforts to formulate a fitting answer to the trend of accountability on a local level.

Concluding observations by Schurink

In a subsequent panel discussion, the matter of the Army's Christian identity in relation with the professionalized social services, and a few other related issues, were addressed and this concluded the afternoon session of the symposium.⁹⁶ The question that Schurink posed at the start of the gathering seemed to have been answered, as Schurink's closing statements reflected:

“The place of religion in our society has changed considerably. While 50 years ago nobody could imagine charity without Christian inspiration, nowadays Christian inspiration is for a large part replaced by other methods that have resulted in a great generalization of the services. Even though quality and expertise are certainly recognized as preconditions, the Salvation Army adheres to the point of view that in these services, the Christian aspect is invaluable, also in these times. Hence our package of services also aims to include this deeper dimension, that has to become visible in, amongst others, the contact with those who need help in certain situations of their lives. (...) With this we are very well aware of the fact that in (professional) services quality deserves attention primarily, at all times. We believe that the Christian aspect of our philosophy also gives an impetus to that.”⁹⁷

⁹⁶ This panel consisted of Army representatives, politicians, scientists, representatives from government and the work field: De Pree (MP, PvdA); Van Meteren (Provinciale Staten Noord-Holland, VVD); Van Leeuwen (Wethouder - Alderwoman, Zoetermeer, CDA); chairman Jansen (Manager a.i. Salvation Army Nursing and Care); Luchtmeyer (Manager Health Insurance Fund Rotterdam); Noorlander (Manager Salvation Army Youth Department and Manager a.i. Nursing and Care); Van Beugen (Catholic University of Nijmegen); Gijsbers (Director-general Welzijn, Ministry of WVC)

⁹⁷ “De plaats van de godsdienst in onze samenleving is aanzienlijk veranderd. Was het 50 jaar geleden voor niemand denkbaar zich naastenliefde en charitas voor te stellen zonder christelijke inspiratie, tegenwoordig is voor een groot deel de christelijke inspiratie vervangen door andere benaderingswijzen die tot een sterke veralgemenisering van de dienstverlening hebben geleid. Hoewel kwaliteit en deskundigheid zeker als voorwaarden erkend worden, blijft het Leger des Heils de mening toegedaan dat in de dienstverlening het christelijke aspect ook in deze tijd van onschatbare waarde is. Vandaar dat er in ons hulpverleningsaanbod naar wordt gestreefd ook die diepere dimensie aanwezig te laten zijn, wat o.a. moet worden gezien in de omgang met hen die in bepaalde situaties van hun leven hulp nodig hebben. (...) Hierbij zijn we ons terdege bewust dat in de (professionele) dienstverlening de kwaliteit te allen tijde primair aandacht verdient. Wij vinden dat vanuit onze filosofie het christelijk aspect daar mede een aanzet toe geeft.” *Christelijke identiteit en maatschappelijke dienstverlening*, 1987:3

In this statement Schurink implied that he felt supported by the contributions of Van Beugen and Gijsbers that it was especially the Christian aspect of the Army that gave a positive impetus to the quality of its work. And especially in the light of the public debate on the welfare state during the 1980s, the Army seemed to be of at least certain value to the government. This image was confirmed by the Dutch press as reporter Gérard van Tillo observed in his account of the Salvation Army centennial symposium, that:

“The Salvation Army has a future to the extent that the welfare state fails. Never before has an organization caught the wind in its sails because of that.”⁹⁸

On the other hand, the Army was still confronted with a development on the local level that seemed to indicate that municipalities were aiming to get rid of it. Such contradictory signals also became visible on other levels during the 1980s.

2.3. Contradictory signals

The era of economization and cutbacks during the 1980s gave municipalities the opportunity to leave their mark on local social policy. Even though this had its consequences for social service organizations like the Salvation Army, the total costs of the Salvation Army's social services did not decrease, but even remained practically the same during this decade. In 1980 these costs were fl.79,665,907 and in 1989 they amounted to fl.79,614,329.⁹⁹ At the same time, the total net worth of the Salvation Army's organization rose during these years from fl.172,647,167 in 1980 to a spectacular fl.279,410,553,- in 1989. One of the main contributing factors was the increase in fixed capital such as the acquisition of new property and the increasing value of possessions (fl.107,416,841 in 1980 and fl.137,652,098 in 1989). Another contribution came from the rising value of investments. The Salvation Army had developed an early habit of investing a part of its surplus in stocks and bonds. The range of investment varied from the Dutch Railroad Company (NS), the Dutch State, Royal Dutch Airline (KLM), to various social funds and banks.¹⁰⁰ These investments now paid off, for while in 1980 the total amount of investments was a mere fl.27,106,547, by 1989 it had quadrupled to a whopping fl.100,264,478.¹⁰¹

The perceived aim of municipalities to get rid of the Army was contrasted by the fact that, at odds with the general tendency of cutbacks, new support was

⁹⁸ “Het leger des Heils heeft toekomst naar mate de verzorgingsstaat verstek laat gaan. Nooit heeft een organisatie daarom zó de wind in de zeilen gehad.” Van Tillo 1987:333

⁹⁹ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1980:16; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1989:8

¹⁰⁰ These are random examples of investments. Source: *Territoriale Financiële Raad* (TFR, Territorial Financial Council) minutes: February 2, 1957; May 14, 1957; June 2, 1958; December 2, 1958; September 8, 1959; June 6, 1961 (UA 1182, nr 14)

¹⁰¹ *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1980; *Jaarstaat Leger des Heils* 1989

allocated to the Army on a local level more than once. In February 1985, the town of Goes in the province of Zeeland allowed the Salvation Army to open a building to facilitate recycling activities, and in Driebergen, Voorburg and Veendam too, new homes were opened or planned to be opened.¹⁰² In May 1985, the Amsterdam Goodwill Center reported that the municipality seemed to be prepared to make new subsidies available to finance the 24/7 opening of the center for homecare.¹⁰³ Even though the residential home of the Army's youth care was under pressure in Utrecht, against the odds, the municipality did actually agree to financially support a cheaper alternative: a bus that functioned as "a mobile living room".¹⁰⁴ In August 1986 the Army's field department reported the opening of several new buildings by the corps of Alphen a/d Rijn, Delft and Beverwijk. Also the Care and Nursing Department announced the construction of a new building in Almere for the elderly. At the same time, in Dordrecht the municipality was considering subsidizing the renovation of an elderly home. Their reason to do so was actually "the Christian character of the home". This led the responsible officer to state that the same argument could be applied in order to persuade the municipality of Baarn to do the same. In Rijswijk also, new construction plans seemed to be received positively.¹⁰⁵ Another example of newly subsidized Army activities during this decade was found in Groningen. For even though in November 1986 the coordinating council observed that the youth department had to make drastic cutbacks for 1987 because the Ministry of WVC was about to change the system of budget subsidies, the members themselves were astonished with the fact that the Groningen municipality allocated a subsidy of fl.100,000 to a new family shelter project of the Army.¹⁰⁶ Similarly amazing was the fact that, even though the residential youth work suffered financial hardship and workers were let go, as seen in the Utrecht case, the non-residential youth work continuously grew and people were actually hired.¹⁰⁷ To add to these observations, in March 1987 the Army swiftly bought a new building because the Rotterdam Goodwill activities had grown to such an extent that certain "accommodation problems" had risen.¹⁰⁸

The national and local trend during this period was financial economization, and in case of specific areas of the work field, this was translated into concrete cutbacks. Additionally, some municipalities questioned the practical implications of the Army's Christian identity with the threat of revoking their subsidies. Nevertheless, the above examples show that even though these measures led to a lot of financial pressure on the Army, it did not automatically mean that these local governments wanted "to get rid of the Army", as the Army presumed.

¹⁰² *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) February 1985:4-5

¹⁰³ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) May 1985:3

¹⁰⁴ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) April 1986

¹⁰⁵ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) August 1986:3-5

¹⁰⁶ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) November 1986:4

¹⁰⁷ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) December 1986:1

¹⁰⁸ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) March 1987:6

Even during the times of financial hardship that the 1980s characterized, the government seemed to value the Salvation Army as a partner in the social policy system. There was however, still some unfinished business for the Salvation Army to deal with, because, as the Army's modernization process reveals, it was still struggling with its legal and moral identity.

3. Democratization coming to a head

3.1. COR: a field of tension

After the ruling of the judicial department of the *Raad van State* in May 1978 on the matter of whether or not to allow works councils to be formed within the ranks of the Salvation Army, the Army was compelled to install works councils in its various departments.¹⁰⁹ A few years later these councils were represented in a central works council (COR) – the main organ of democratic participation with which the Army command was to deal. The report of the Committee-Van der Burg had described three fields of tension that had to be addressed by new legal adjustments: 1) the statutes of these subsidized organizations, 2) the perceived gap between the professionals and their managers in these organizations, and 3) the perceived gap between the professionals and their clients. At the same time, the committee concluded that further democratization could very well affect the organizational identity, for it allowed all workers to have certain influence on the organizational policy, irrespective of their measure of commitment or other characteristics.¹¹⁰ This sudden vulnerability seemed to have invoked a thorough adjustment of hiring policies of institutions, as the example of the Salvation Army shows. The Army made the adherence to its Christian identity a precondition of appointment.

That the Army command had learned from its experiences with the unsuccessful attempt to delay the establishment of works councils, became clear in May 1984. In preparation of the Bill on democratization, the government seemed to aim for the enhancement of the democratization possibilities for another group of stakeholders – clients – by mandatory installment of client councils for all subsidized social service providers. The coordinating council acknowledged that this also was awaiting the Army, and Fijn and Van Teijlingen stated that it was better not to wait for things to happen, but to anticipate this development policy-wise:

“That way the Salvation Army can control the matter better. Even though it is still a proposal Bill, Fijn and Van Teijlingen insisted getting into the matter, even before the law is adopted, and through an amendment, to possibly

¹⁰⁹ See: chapter 5.7.2

¹¹⁰ Commissie-Van der Burg 1977

attempt to take off the sharp edges. The Salvation Army, possibly, by experimenting within its sectors, can come up with a better model that is tested in daily practice.”¹¹¹

Commander Cox seemed to be in two minds. On the one hand he acknowledged the possibility that this new democratic arrangement for clients could conflict with Army ‘rules’:

“Of course it cannot be the case that the Salvation Army people have no say over anything in their own care homes, but there are also positive sides to it. We have to face both.”¹¹²

So, on the other hand, the Army’s reflex to counter anything that might infringe on its autonomy was restrained by the acknowledgement of possible upsides to what had previously been regarded as merely negative. Even though the possible downside of this client council plan was clear to the Army, a vanguard strategy of early influencing was adopted.

Also on another level, the Army’s command showed flexibility. During a discussion on how to involve the COR in the appointment process of a new staff manager, two management models were discussed that could be applied in this context. The first was the consultative model that meant that the COR was to be involved in the process from the first moment on. The second model was the *diktat* model and implied that the TC appointed a new staff manager and subsequently informed the COR. Even though, when viewed from the outside, the second model might have suited the Army’s organizational culture quite well, the coordinating council decided that the consultative model was to be preferred, alas without retraceable argumentation.¹¹³ So, by September 1984, the Army command and the coordinating council showed that it took a far more flexible position towards the matter of democratization than before. This however, did not mean that the search for how to shape the relationship between the Army command and its works councils had come to an end, because still, almost 5 years after their installation, the coordinating council spent a whole study day on how this relationship could be formed.¹¹⁴ This was not without reason, for the COR did actually show active involvement in Army policy. For example, the COR stated that it clearly favored the idea of a selection committee above a one-

¹¹¹ “Dan kan het Leger des Heils de zaak ook beter in de hand houden. Het gaat nog om een wetsvoorstel, maar toch dringen dhr. v. Teijlingen als dhr. Fijn aan om nú, voordat de wet wordt aangenomen op deze materie in te gaan, en eventueel via een amendement proberen de scherpste kantjes eraf te krijgen. Mogelijk zou het LdH door experimenteren binnen haar sectoren, met een beter en aan de praktijk getoetst model kunnen komen.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) May 1984:6

¹¹² “Het zal uiteraard niet zo mogen zijn dat LdH mensen in hun eigen tehuizen niets meer over iets te zeggen hebben, maar er zitten ook positieve kanten aan, en we moeten beide onder ogen zien.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) May 1984:6

¹¹³ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) September 1984:2

¹¹⁴ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) November 1984:3

headed approval of applications. In this case, the COR pressured for a system of approval in which at least more than one person would be responsible for the appointment of new applicants.¹¹⁵

Also with regard to the matter of volunteers, the COR forced the coordinating council to be clear on its standpoint as it reacted on this issue because the Army was in the habit of sometimes deploying retired officers or other volunteers for positions that might also be filled by professionals – a form of enrollment of volunteers that, according to the COR, might endanger regular employment. This observation led to a discussion during the coordinating council meeting of April 1985. The governmental trend of economization had resulted in redundancies, but when the financial means to hire a professional were reduced by the government, was it alright to re-appoint such an individual as a volunteer? Or, in a broader sense, was it alright to appoint a volunteer instead of a professional?¹¹⁶ According to the entire coordinating council, when viewed from the perspective of employment this was not alright, but in addition, Van Teijlingen suggested that the dividing line between the tasks of the professional and the volunteer had changed over time. Forced by the government cutbacks, the range of duties of the professional had clearly been reduced.

“Because of this, you are forced to determine again and again what job belongs to the volunteer and what has to be done by the paid staff.”¹¹⁷

The fact that the COR started to ask certain questions on the issue of volunteers, did spark a sense of urgency within the coordinating council on this subject. Also on other subjects the COR was able to assert its influence, as the discussion on the restructuring of the organization will show.

3.2. Probation Department: identity and proxy

Next to democratization, another result of the professionalization process played out its course. The Army was growingly confronted with the ongoing governmental pressure on the probation organizations to unite. The axiom of a free market and less public expenditure resulted in a growing demand for efficiency of social services, in combination with financial cutbacks. For the probation sector, this proved to be a difficult task because of the hardening climate of crime as crime rates increased and organized crime flourished. Unemployment, poverty, drug abuse, and ethnical problems grew, and the increasing sense of social insecurity led to a call for more severe punishment. As crime and probation became important issues on the Dutch political agenda during the 1980s, the

¹¹⁵ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) December 1984:4

¹¹⁶ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) April 1985

¹¹⁷ “Hierdoor wordt je steeds gedwongen opnieuw uit te maken wat nu werk is voor een vrijwilliger en wat door een betaalde kracht moet worden gedaan.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes) April 1985

probation organizations in general, held the point of view that their purpose was to function as a loyal but critical partner of the Ministry of Justice.¹¹⁸

Diverging courses

In 1982, the probation department of the Salvation Army presented its national policy plan called *Van organisatie naar beweging* ("From organization towards movement"). Its core idea was that the probation department had to go back to its roots and become a broader movement than being just a partner of the government. The plan stated that the reinforcement of criminal law revealed that the society did not know how to deal with inter-human conflicts; conflicts that were the product of power differences between social groups, in combination with an increase in poverty. On the other hand, the Salvation Army probation department was caught between two evils. Being part of the social policy system, it was also part of the criminal law system. This latter system was however, exactly the very system that the Army wanted to confront on this matter of power differences. In his presentation of the plans of the probation department, manager Fijn made a plea to work towards "extra-judicial conflict resolution" (an approach that can be compared to the current methods of mediation). In order to facilitate this innovative method, the Salvation Army had to be a refuge, a neutral ground. This idea stirred up quite some debate within the Army's probation department.¹¹⁹

The Dutch government also seemed to aim for quite a different policy line than the one Fijn had presented. After the previous unsuccessful attempts of the probation umbrella organization ARV, to reorganize the probation work field, now the Ministry of Justice itself took the lead. In May 1982, it presented a reorganization proposal called *Taak en Structuur van de Reclassering in Nederland* (Task and structure of probation work in the Netherlands). In this proposal, certain models of reorganization of the work field were presented, additional to the proposal to shift policy responsibility and control of the deployment of means from the probation organizations to the government.¹²⁰ This policy intention suggested that with this increase in government responsibility over probation matters, the actual probation organizations would be reduced to mere administrative organs that had only to choose whether or not to agree with their government-initiated assignments. Heinrich appropriately concludes that with the acceptance of this proposal the probation organizations would give up their independence and even their cherished private character.¹²¹

At first, the probation organizations showed some opposition to this proposal, especially because the main rationale behind these plans was formed by motives of economization and efficiency and not the quality of work. It was

¹¹⁸ Maris 1991:115-116

¹¹⁹ Idem:116-117

¹²⁰ Idem:118

¹²¹ Heinrich 1995:283

estimated that already in 1982 the probation work field would receive fl.8,000,000 less in subsidies. The Salvation Army, in addition, reacted against the diminishing plurality of organizations. According to the Army, the faith-based element could not be missed from the work field and therefore it kept with its position that it did not want to merge into any other organization whatsoever. The Army however, had to do something in order to counter the government proposal, and in December 1982, together with the ARV, the Salvation Army announced that it would increase their cooperation in a federate structure. The idea encountered forceful resistance within the Salvation Army, especially from the works council of the probation department. It was assessed that the plans offered too little guarantee against the threat of loss of identity, and the plan was canceled.¹²²

Heading for a conflict

Almost a year after disclosing its policy intentions with regard to harmonization, in March 1983 the Ministry of Justice presented its concept of the *Reclasseringsregeling* for 1986. This plan included many of the ideas that were presented in *Taak en Structuur*. The probation work field would have to restructure into 19 autonomous districts and these districts would be unified in a national federation that decided on policy lines for all districts. In their turn, the districts were allowed to interpret these policy lines on their own account.¹²³ For the Salvation Army probation department, this proposed constellation was unacceptable. The Army traditionally operated on a nationwide level, and confinement to a certain district directly opposed the Army's ambition to reach as many people as possible. The second problem was that in these plans the district's management would become responsible for the Army's probation work and its workers. In fact, these new plans endangered the continuance of the Salvation Army's probation department. In a written reaction to the *Reclasseringsregeling* proposal, the Army emphasized that it was much more than just a probation organization. It was an internationally known and well-respected community of faith, as well as a social service provider. The organization involved thousands of people and, as the Army argued, to demand for such an organization to give up its autonomy and identity in order to reorganize and economize, would be unrealistic.¹²⁴

This reaction incited a series of deliberations between the Army and the Ministry of Justice, and also the ARV and other probation organizations pulled up a chair in the discussion. Soon however, it became clear that the Army remained the only obstructionist. The other parties accepted the idea of working in districts, and now the former ally of the Army, the CADs, which like the Army fulfilled a national service as well, also complied and accepted a status as a contract partner of the government, as was suggested in the *Reclasseringsregeling*

¹²² Idem:281-287

¹²³ Maris 1991:120; Heinrich 1995:292

¹²⁴ Maris 1991:120

proposal. The Army however, continued to decline such a status, for this would still mean a significant reduction in autonomy as Army probation teams would, as sub-contractors, work under the responsibility of the district management.¹²⁵ So, with no alternatives left but to give up a part of its organization and identity, the Army engaged in battle.

The first move on the battle scene was made by Commander Cox. In December 1983 he wrote a letter to the Second Chamber arguing that the Army was being deprived of its managerial responsibilities towards its probation work, reducing the Army's organization to merely providing for spiritual counsel to the workers. Furthermore, the Army's General also engaged in the battle and he also wrote to the Dutch parliament. In his turn, he underlined the threat of the Army's probation work in the Netherlands being cut loose from the international organization – a development that in his opinion defied all historical foundations. Next to this high-profile attack on the proposed plans, a more intermediate level opposition was also raised by the Army's management. The management of the probation department tried to win political parties within the Second Chamber for their cause, by contacting possible supporters like Evenhuis-van Essen (CDA), Trippels (VVD) and Leerling (RPF).¹²⁶

These specific opening salvos were followed by a more widespread attack: now the Army mobilized the public opinion. It sent pamphlets to various organizations and institutions in the Netherlands, and on the first day of the budget debate in the Second Chamber (January 31st, 1984), the Army organized what has become known within Army ranks as the "March at the *Binnenhof*".¹²⁷ On this day the Army's brass band, accompanied by Salvationists and other adherents, marched through the inner city of Den Haag and ended their procession at the central square of the Binnenhof. Accompanied by an overt display of flags and the shining brass of their instruments and omnipresent uniform buttons, the Army's command presented a petition signed by thousands of adherents, to the chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee of Justice.

Whether or not as a result of the Army's offensive, during the debate in the Second Chamber, a CDA-VVD resolution was adopted that incited the parties to return to the negotiating table. The manager of the probation department, Fijn again engaged in close consultation with the State Secretary of Justice, Korte-Van Hemel, in order to construct a policy framework for their cooperation.¹²⁸ The result of this new round of negotiations was a statement of principles, that affirmed that after the reorganization, as put forth in the *Reclasseringsregeling* proposal, the Salvation Army was to contribute to the districts, be it in a valuable manner and under its own responsibility. This last part was especially of great importance to the Army. On the other hand, the direction of the probation

¹²⁵ Heinrich 1995:294

¹²⁶ Maris 1991:121-122

¹²⁷ "Binnenhof" being the building in which Dutch Parliament resides.

¹²⁸ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), October 1984; *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1984; *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), January 1985

work would change focus from a national level to the districts. A level that in its turn was subject to government directions. So, in the end, the Army complied with a painful compromise. It was allowed to maintain its own probation work and workers, but it had to give up its individual national policy.¹²⁹

Aftermath: the Army's probation department as a government proxy

It is hard to assess the effects of the Army's efforts to influence the decision-making process in the Second Chamber. One of the Army's probation professionals who had been closely involved in the creation of the probation policy during that period, Maris, stated that the Army was able to appeal to an enormous amount of goodwill amongst the Dutch people: "We actually lacked valid reasons to stay apart, but we have just always been a good organization." And, especially after the sensational march at the Binnenhof, the debate stopped. According to Maris this was because the politicians must have thought: "Well, that's the Army, we cannot get around it."¹³⁰ Fijn remembered this moment as an important contribution to the internal search for how to operationalize the Salvation Army's unique identity. He remembered this march as a demonstration of "the unique evangelical element" that the Army possessed.¹³¹

The Army's probation department had been confronted with a predicament over which choices would lead to a certain measure of surrender of its identity. The options were: merger into another organization; discontinuance of the work, or become a contract-partner and hope to preserve some of its own identity. The choice the Army made ensured that the probation work was able to continue. This new position of a contract partner seemed to have reduced the probation department to a mere instrument in the hands of the Ministry of Justice. On an internal level, however, this struggle for perseverance of the probation work for the Army led to positive results. Throughout the Salvation Army, and in fact on all levels, the Army had shown that it valued its probation work very much. Even though the probation department had been perceived as the odd one out, it proved to form an essential part of the Salvation Army's identity. In this sense, for many Salvationists, the march at the Binnenhof was the symbol of unity and fraternization of the Army's ranks – a symbol that to a certain extent evokes the biblical image of the prodigal son.

The new proxy-position that the probation department found itself in, was to be operationalized swiftly into a workable policy for the Army's probation department. Presumably with his back against the wall, the department's manager Fijn accepted the policy of district concentration as opposed to the policy line that had formerly been chosen in the case of the Amsterdam Goodwill Center. Fijn argued that after much internal debate, this policy line was chosen because it was the best of the three options that were left to the Salvation Army. From

¹²⁹ Maris 1991:122-123

¹³⁰ Interview with Maris, September 2, 2011

¹³¹ Maris 1990:27

now on, the Salvation Army was responsible for those discharged prisoners that would voluntarily choose for the Army:

“Viewed from the perspective of the individual character of the Salvation Army – an institution with a general (i.e. available for everybody) package of services that are motivated and designed from a strong inner conviction about life – it would be more or less ideal, when a ‘choice by the probationer’ could function as such.”¹³²

In daily practice however, this did not work as well as was presumed. In many court districts the choice by the probationer appeared to have been hindered by other probation organizations, and in those court districts where it did seem to be possible to choose, 60% to 90% of the probationers did not make a choice at all – they did not seem to care. So, in order to preserve its market share, the Salvation Army concluded that it had to create clear and simple criteria in order to stop its dependency on these more accidental and varying factors. There were three options available. The first option was the division of probation tasks between all parties involved, but with the battle for preservation still in mind, this option was basically unacceptable for the Army. Coherence between all parts of its social services had proven to be an intrinsic part of the Army’s identity. The second option was a segmentation of the different target groups, but even though it fitted the philosophy of the Army to serve the weakest of society, this option had shown not to be the most effective. As Fijn added, this “could not be asked from our workers with regard to a reasonable workload and job satisfaction”.¹³³ So, this left open the last option: division into coherent districts in which all different tasks and target groups could be serviced. This would only be acceptable when the right of the probationer to choose for an organization was guaranteed. It also implied that a discharged prisoner was allowed to seek for care across the district borders when he desired. This last option was the only way for the Army to “remain available to everyone as usual”, as Fijn stated.¹³⁴ And the Army decided accordingly.

¹³² “Gezien vanuit de bijzondere eigenheid van het Leger des Heils – een instelling met een algemeen, d.w.z. op iedereen gericht hulpaanbod, dat gemotiveerd en vormgegeven wordt vanuit een sterke innerlijke levensovertuiging – zou het min of meer ideaal zijn, wanneer “keuze door de justitiabele” als zodanig kon functioneren.” *Beleidsvisie 1987-1990, Leger des Heils Reclassering*, Supplement to the *Coördinatie*raad (minutes), October 1987

¹³³ “(...) vanuit oogpunt van een redelijke werkbelasting en arbeidsvreugde, niet van onze werker gevraagd kan worden.” *Beleidsvisie 1987-1990*.

¹³⁴ *Beleidsvisie 1987-1990*.

4. Legal incorporation

4.1. Two lines of reasoning

As described in Chapter 4, the initial motivation to change the Army's statutes came from the internal need to address the matter of possession of real estate in the Dutch territory, first from the side of the London headquarters, and later from the Dutch Army command itself. This need rekindled the debate on the legal form of the Dutch Salvation Army - a debate that ran parallel to another problem: how to frame the Army's twin mission in a contemporary and comprehensive mission statement? The fact that the problems of legal and organizational structure and the Army's mission were addressed simultaneously, is no coincidence. Both were essential to the Army's identity as the process of redefining this identity reached its peak during the 1980s.

With the abolishment of the legal form of ecclesiastical foundation in 1976, the Army's legal status came under fire once again and, as Ringelberg describes vividly, the connected issues of the Army's mission and its legal identity were extensively debated within the Army ranks. On April 19, 1977, the Territorial Financial Council (TFR) of the Salvation Army gathered to discuss the draft of the statutes written by the Army's legal advisor Houthoff.¹³⁵ This draft was already based on the newly adopted version of the Army's mission, and Commander Verwaal had invited Houthoff himself, as well as Hartjes and Fijn to this meeting. Soon it became clear that Hartjes disagreed with Houthoff's premise that the Army was basically a church, as he had stated in the first article of his new statutes. In return, Houthoff argued that the Army had been using the term foundation in the sense of an ecclesiastical foundation. Hartjes however, argued for his part that the Salvation Army was a foundation and secular, in terms of the law, with religious activities that were developed under the name of a church for "practical reasons". He continued with stating that in the future the Salvation Army could not be primarily a church with derived ecclesiastical foundations, because according to the author of the Civil Code, Meijers, any subdivision of a church had to be of a religious character. That was hardly the case, as Hartjes put it, with the Army's recycling work or its low budget hotels, and Houthoff's viewpoint led to the conclusion that certain parts of the Army's activities had to be separated from its core into foundations. In Hartjes' view, this would lead to the splitting of the indivisible coin of its identity. In order to preserve the internal organizational unity, Hartjes argued that it was best that the Army preserved the legal status quo of the statutes of 1946 – of the Army as a foundation.¹³⁶ This implied however, that in order to remain eligible for government support, the Army had to present itself more distinctly as a foundation than as a church.

¹³⁵ The TFR consisted of the Territorial Commander, the Chief Secretary, the Assistant Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Field Secretary.

¹³⁶ Ringelberg 2010:77

During this debate two lines of thought became discernible. Both parties meant well for the Army and both parties were searching for the optimal balance between preservation of the Army's identity (translated as internal coherence) and the external political context that the Army had to deal with. There were however, distinct differences between the two lines of thought on what this identity actually encompassed and how this was to be organized in the best possible way, and both parties based their argument on the statutes of 1946. Analysis of the 'Houthoff-argument' shows that it represented the idea that the Salvation Army was at its core a Christian community, a church. Everything else was subsidiary to this core. This idea was strongly supported by the Army's leadership. The 'Hartjes-argument' on the other hand, did not exactly contradict Houthoff's reasoning, but it expressed a more equal position for both the religious and the social mission, arguing that both were equally important, as William Booth had described in 1890. According to Ringelberg, this view found more supporters in the Army's rank and file of officers and employees.¹³⁷ Verwaal nevertheless, chose for the 'Houthoff-argument'. Even though his underlying motives are no longer retraceable, the Army position towards government interference makes it plausible to assume that this choice was based on the idea that the legal form of a church would give more freedom of organization than a foundation. Also, the consequent accommodation of many of its subsidized social services in a separate foundation was not perceived by Verwaal as a problematic split in the Army's identity.

4.2. Mission statement altered again

With the rise of the debate on the Army's legal position, the rather newly phrased mission statement of the Army was also brought up for discussion. When in 1977 the chief editor of the *Strijdkreet*, Filius questioned the balance between the religious and social mission, he stated that the social work activities were "mere auxiliary forces" in the Army's effort for spiritual conversion.¹³⁸ As this argument was rather in line with the Houthoff argument, it is of no surprise that Verwaal was sensitive to this view. He was even prepared to review the new mission again, and in November 1977 he established a committee to carry out this task. Again this committee was staffed by Ligtelijn, Nijman and Fijn, just as its predecessor, but now Hartjes was replaced by Filius.¹³⁹ That the almost unaltered staff on this committee raised no objections to a rather new orientation became patently clear, for the new wording of the mission had become:

¹³⁷ Idem:80

¹³⁸ Idem:78

¹³⁹ Even though a motivation for this change is not available, this alteration may have found its source in the fact that Hartjes had been on formal leave since September 1973. But if that would be the only reason, Hartjes would not have participated in the first committee (1974) neither. This observation suggests that with the replacement of Hartjes with Filius, Verwaal openly favored the Houthoff line, instead of the point of view of Hartjes.

“The Salvation Army is a community of people who know that their sins are forgiven and who are bound together by the love for God and fellow men, with the shared goal to bring others to Christ.”¹⁴⁰

This version of the Army’s mission not only made explicit that evangelization was the most important goal of the Army, but it also totally replaced any reference to the Army’s social objective. Fijn, who had contributed to the new phrasing of the mission, was displeased with this result, for the quest for freedom from government influence that the Army command had pursued seemed to have made social work quite auxiliary to spiritual work in terms of organizational structure.¹⁴¹

The result of the renewed debate on the Army’s mission and the abrogation of the ‘ecclesiastical foundation’ incited Houthoff to rewrite his proposal for the new statutes. Now that the hybrid form of ecclesiastical foundation was no longer valid, in a theoretical sense, the intended legal detachment from the International Headquarters meant that the Dutch Army had to choose between becoming a church or a foundation. This meant that the choice between freedom from government influence and the preservation of organizational unity now proved to be a new dilemma. A matter that was mirrored at the grassroots level, for any decision Verwaal made between the ‘Houthoff-argument’ or the ‘Hartjes-argument’ might automatically mobilize a countermovement from supporters of the other line of thought. Nevertheless, a choice had to be made. When Verwaal decided to follow the Houthoff-line of thought, a widespread commotion was detectable throughout the Army ranks that prevented the debate from stopping.¹⁴²

In 1980, legal advisor Dijk stated, in line with Houthoff, that based on the statutes of 1946 the Army was actually a church, and if the Army wanted to be a foundation, it had to adapt its organization to the Civil Code. Dijk advised, conclusively, to preserve the status of the Army as a religious denomination.¹⁴³ As a result, Verwaal’s interim successor Commander Nelting (1978-1980) ordered avoiding the use of the term foundation in official documents like employment contracts, but once again the Army command found the Central Works Council in its path. Led by Nieuwland the COR protested against this decision. They were further supported by Fijn who warned that when the Salvation Army would present itself as a church it would create a new legal problem, because in retroactive effect, it would have received much of its subsidies till date, illegally. And, he added in line with Hartjes, in 1946 the Army had not dissolved its status

¹⁴⁰ “Het Leger des Heils is een gemeenschap van personen die weten dat hun zonden zijn vergeven en die saamverbonden zijn uit liefde tot God en de medemens voor het gemeenschappelijk doel anderen tot Christus te brengen.” Quoted in: Ringelberg 2010:78

¹⁴¹ Idem:79

¹⁴² Idem:80

¹⁴³ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands*, 1989:46; Ringelberg 2010:80-81

of a foundation and thus the establishment of a new foundation was superfluous. A mere presentation of the Army as a foundation seemed to solve the problem, but even though the ‘Hartjes-argument’ seemed to have gained some ground, once again the two factions found themselves opposed to one another.

In order to come to a definite solution, in October 1980 Commander Nelting gathered all parties, including the representatives of two workers unions and the Ministry of Justice. During this meeting Goedemans, Director of the Probation Section of the Ministry of Justice, made very clear that a church was not eligible for subsidies, but in addition, he granted the Army command a year to solve this legal problem.¹⁴⁴ This remark presumably strengthened the fear that Fijn had expressed earlier: the Army should not become solely a church, nor split up the organization. On the other hand, it also confirmed the ‘Houthoff-argument’ in that a separate foundation was needed in order to secure further subsidies and to guarantee the corps their freedom. Additionally, the pressure to decide on how to reorganize in a structural and durable manner had increased even more, and this time under an external influence.

Another externally initiated pressure began to accumulate as the call for implementation of democratic participation of employees and clients grew louder and louder. In May 1978 the Army was decreed to install works councils, but the implementation process proved to take some time and in addition, as described above, now client’s councils were to be installed as well. As difficult as these developments with regard to its social work departments were for the Army command to accept, in the case of the Army’s fieldwork department (corps) the idea of democratic participation was unthinkable and as long as the Salvation Army remained one legal entity, the influences of democratic participation would also touch upon this part of the Army’s work. When viewed in this light, some sort of isolation of this organizational branch seemed a rather sound idea, and strengthened by the confronting meeting with Goedemans, Commander Nelting asked Dijk to draft statutes for separate foundations for the probation work and the youth homes department, which were to be swiftly sent to London for approval. Before the General had answered, however, the works council of the probation department claimed its right to give its opinion on the drafts.¹⁴⁵ Even though the search for coherence between an acceptable legal identity and a compatible mission had become a complex effort because of the various internal groups and individuals that influenced the process, it was actually an external influence that would soon prove to be of overriding importance.

4.3. The Gordian knot (1983)

This Gordian knot was finally cut in 1983. In December 1982, the Dutch weekly *Vrij Nederland* issued a Christmas special on the Salvation Army and how it managed its flow of funds. This critical article sparked the suspicion of the insti-

¹⁴⁴ Ringelberg 2010:82

¹⁴⁵ Idem:83

tution that granted permits of public collections in the Netherlands: Central Archives for the Collection system (CAC). Until this publication the CAC had not been aware of the fact that the Salvation Army was a church, and a church was not allowed to make public collections.¹⁴⁶ Soon the CAC announced that the Salvation Army would only be allowed to continue to collect public money when it adapted the legal form of foundation or association.¹⁴⁷ In combination with the remarks of Goedemans and the growing pressure for democratic participation, this notification seemed to have tipped the scale in favor of Houthoff's argument.

The Army had to react with adequate measures, because the monetary flow for both the social and the spiritual mission was now in danger, and in both cases the solution seemed to be clear-cut: real estate and other property matters would have to be accommodated in one or more separate foundations. So, in order to survive financially, the Salvation Army had to become a foundation or association.

5. Solving the 'chronic problem': reorganization of identity

Just before Verwaal's second term as Army's Territorial Commander was terminated, he established a committee that was to come up with a first draft of how the new organizational structure could be shaped, taking into account all the issues and arguments previously discussed. This so-called "committee on the legal form" consisted of Ligtelijn (Assistant-Chief-Secretary); Van Nee (Army's secretary for Legal Matters); Van Boven (financial secretary of the Army); Ter Haar (successor of Dijk as external legal adviser of the Army); Jansen (Manager of the department of Care and Nursing); and Telling (external accountant).¹⁴⁸ The committee worked with a lot of drive and already in the very same year, gave their recommendations. These recommendations followed the arguments of Houthoff suggesting the establishment of a new so-called "mother-foundation" that included three sub-organizations: the religious denomination based on the existing legal form; a new foundation called "services" that would be responsible for all coordinating and other general functions; and a new foundation called "welfare and health care" in which all social work sectors would be combined. The proposal was cheerfully welcomed and in due time also approved by the General in London.

¹⁴⁶ *Aantekeningen [Houthoff] voor de discussie op 8 maart 1983 inzake de rechtsvorm van het Leger des Heils*. March 7, 1983 (UA 1182, nr. 172)

¹⁴⁷ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:46

¹⁴⁸ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:46. The proposals of this committee would form the basis of what would prove to be an all-encompassing restructuring of the Dutch Salvation Army. By urging to accept the fact that the Army was a foundation, Hartjes tried to emphasize the preservation of organizational unity. Because if it wanted to be a church, organizational separation was imminent, thus affecting the Army's core identity. This event triggered a debate between Houthoff and Hartjes, who battled as outright opponents, and the arguments they raised continued for about a decade, amidst great tension and at times even negativity.

Even though the matter now seemed to be settled, this was not by far the end of it. For now that a transparent proposal had been presented, the Army's grassroots came to action and already in March 1983, the sectoral works councils fiercely opposed these plans. Six out of nine councils reacted unfavorably and they collectively appealed to the *Ondernemingskamer* (Central Chamber of Business). The President of the Chamber however, decided that both parties had to continue their deliberations until they had worked out a solution, and subsequently both parties agreed on calling for expert help. This aid was offered by the lawyer Van Schilfgaarde who, like Dijk, assessed in August 1984 that the Salvation Army was a church by law, and that if it would change into a secular foundation it would lose its denominational status.¹⁴⁹

Even though this was not the first time that the conclusion was drawn that the Army was a church, the political and legal context in which this took place now, had changed considerably from earlier. The new Civil Code and the demands from the Ministry of Justice and the CAC all pointed in the direction that in order for the Army to be able to maintain its subsidy-relations, it would have to incorporate into a foundation or association.¹⁵⁰ Another consequence of this assessment of Schilfgaarde was that the 'Salvation Army church' could never be included in a mother-foundation, as was proposed by the committee. In the view of the Salvation Army, a foundation was too vulnerable to external regulation as the Army command argued:

“(...) The work of the corps should explicitly be placed in a church in order to guarantee that in the spiritual work the freedom is preserved to take points of view so as to pursue policy from our respective biblical view without being impeded by, for instance, restrictions which the legislator might put in book II of the Civil Code.”¹⁵¹

Combined with the additional demand of the CAC that the Army would adopt such a legal specification that fitted “with the demands made by law at which a public raising of funds is not permitted for denominations”, the additional consequence was that the social work was to “be placed in a foundation or association on the basis of subsidy schemes.” This suggestion seemed to head for a growing disconnection of the spiritual and social branches of the Salvation Army in an organizational sense, a detachment to the extent that “no employees should be working in the denomination Salvation Army”, for all salaried social activities were to be centralized in a separate organizational entity. So it was now clear that the matter “has (had) been decided on once and for all” and that another thorough re-adjustment of plans was necessary. That this intention headed for a rearrangement of the balance between the social and spiritual parts

¹⁴⁹ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:47; Ringelberg 2010:84

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Schurink, April 28, 2010

¹⁵¹ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:37

of the Army's identity was clearly felt, as revealed by the debate in the Army's coordinating council on how this new organizational structure would have to be shaped.

5.1. Fundamental debate

After the sectoral works councils agreed on continuing with the organization plans, a study group of 5 sub-committees, under the guidance of Ligtelijn (chairman) and Jansen (secretary), set out to work on subjects like 'welfare and healthcare'; 'denomination'; 'personnel'; 'services' and 'finance'.¹⁵² The starting points of this study group were formed by 1) the statement of Schilfgaarde that the Army was a church; 2) preservation of the identity and unity of the Salvation Army; 3) preservation of the legal position of members of the labor organization; and 4) preservation of the positions of the officers and Salvationists. These preconditions had to comply with other limiting conditions that were stipulated by the International Headquarters, which consisted of 1) preservation of the Army's principles; 2) preservation of the position of the General as worldwide leader of the Salvation Army; and 3) application of internationally valid rules like guaranteeing of the position of the Territorial Commander, the Chief-Secretary and the Financial Council, and some additional directives of which the most important was the safeguarding of the denomination of any external influences like works councils.¹⁵³ In November 1985 a first draft of their report was discussed in the coordinating council. The first issue on the agenda was the quality of management:

“The organization the Salvation Army is part of society. Influences from that society also find their way into the organization. More managerial power and adequate management is clearly necessary. (...) The social developments have to be monitored closely and answered adequately. The board and management of the organization have to engage themselves with the broader policy lines more than they have been doing up to now. At the moment it is the case that there is too much distraction because of matters of detail. (...) High quality standards are set for management. Pay attention to this especially in a.o. training policy and hiring policy.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Idem:39

¹⁵³ Idem:39-42 Interesting is that in November 18, 1982, in the committee the issue was discussed of how to confine the COR's influence to the social work activities and exclude any influence from the church: *Samenvatting bespreking over de bevoegdheden van de (centrale) ondernemingsraad*, November 18, 1982 (UA 1182, nr. 172)

¹⁵⁴ “De organisatie het LdH is deel van de samenleving. Invloeden vanuit die samenleving vinden ook hun weg naar de organisatie toe. Duidelijk is dat er grotere bestuurskracht en adequaat management noodzakelijk is. (...) De ontwikkelingen in de samenleving dienen goed gevolgd en adequaat beantwoord te worden. Het bestuur en management van de organisatie moet meer dan tot nog toe zich met de grote lijnen van het beleid bezig houden. Nu is er nog sprake van teveel afleidingen door detailkwesties. (...) Er worden hoge eisen aan de kwaliteit van het management gesteld. O.a. in trainings- en benoemingenbeleid hieraan nadrukkelijk aandacht geven.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:1

It was agreed upon that the new management had to be of a different caliber than it had ever been before. This subject was followed by another quite fundamental matter: decentralization of government policy. Nieuwland (a namesake of the chair of the COR) wondered about the extent to which the structure proposed by the study group was flexible enough to anticipate diverging local situations: "Every place seems to have its own set of desires and demands".¹⁵⁵ Ligtelijn replied that decentralization had been considered to the extent where it was possible to establish separate foundations on a local level when needed. But, as he hurried to add, the Salvation Army did not favor this option at all. Jansen came to the aid by rephrasing this issue by saying that the Army had to be able to "respond flexibly to demands of local communities." . And Van Boven added, that after deliberation with the relevant ministries, there was no objection towards the proposed legal form, nor was this to be expected on a local level.¹⁵⁶ But in order to put things into perspective, Jansen stated pragmatically that "when subsidizers pose their own demands, we will have to meet them."¹⁵⁷

This positioning towards an unpredictable but unavoidable government that influenced the Salvation Army was further discussed with regard to the case of the Reformed church in Rotterdam. There, the Reformed church had been able to successfully claim its "own space" in order to guarantee its right of existence. Again Jansen dismissed the suggestion that this might also be of interest to the Salvation Army by stating that he held the view that "when an organization provides a product of good quality, local communities will probably go along with the wishes of such an organization." Nieuwland, for his part, objected that it were not the local municipal officials but the local politicians that worried him. So once again it was emphasized by the council that in order to counter that possible obstacle, contacts with these local council members had to be maintained by competent Army people.¹⁵⁸

This part of the discussion on the external pressures on the Army's identity was brought to a close via another subject: would the new foundations follow the recent agreement between the unions and the employer's federations on how to board of subsidized organizations was to be formed? Now the idea was that at least a one-third of the board was to be filled by employees, and maybe in the future even a part was to be filled by external members. This raised the question of adherence to the Army's mission. When Bakker, manager of Groot Batelaar, asked whether or not the new board members would have to support the Army's mission statement, Jansen replied that they would indeed have to positively comply with the Army's mission.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:2

¹⁵⁶ *Idem*:2-3

¹⁵⁷ "Als (...) subsidiegevers eigen eisen stellen, zal daar op ingespeeld moeten worden." *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:3

¹⁵⁸ "(...) als de kwalitatief goed product geleverd wordt, de gemeente wel mee wil gaan in de wensen van een instelling." *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:4

¹⁵⁹ *Idem*:4-5

The above considerations were to a certain extent connected to the Army's identity, but the next item on the coordinating council's agenda proved to touch upon its core. Chair of the Sub-committee on Personnel, Fijn, had written a memorandum in which he expressed his doubts on the proposed restructuring: "The Salvation Army is in crisis," Fijn argued, referring to "a crisis of "software" - of ideas." In Fijn's view, the struggle for the legal form had cost the Army much of its energy while the Assistant Chief Secretary had stated that "whether we are employees or officers, together we fight for one cause."¹⁶⁰ According to Fijn, this implied that "Salvationists are jointly responsible for the areas of well-being and healthcare, but also that employees are co-responsible for the Salvation Army as a whole."¹⁶¹ Even though the unity of the Army was beyond dispute and had to be preserved, according to Fijn, the new plans seemed to head for splitting up the organization, while in his opinion, coherency and unity were more important aims than "security and controllability". So, the crisis of software (ideas) was being addressed by changing the hardware (the organization), just like, as Fijn added subtly, the Ministry of Justice has done with the probation work field.¹⁶²

Commander Cox replied by stating that he did not share Fijn's point of view because he was of the opinion that the reorganization actually accentuated the wish for organizational unity. According to Cox the Army lacked a sense of unity at the moment, but that had more to do with the "thinking of the people" than with the organizational form: "The legal form does not alter the thinking of the people." To illustrate this, Cox drew a parallel with the case of an officer who is transferred from one department of the Salvation Army to another: "This person will not think that he is appointed to another Salvation Army." With regard to Fijn's remarks on the underlying motivation of the reorganization, Cox additionally argued that the core motive was not "safeguarding, control and continuation", but that this legal form had been chosen "in order to bridge the gap that existed between the organization and the external demands".¹⁶³ When the Commander continued to stress that the unity within the Army would be strengthened by the reorganization by means of the increase of responsibilities on a local level, Fijn replied that the current proposal in fact, excluded the church from the foundation. The Commander stated that this was done because the external demands that were put on the foundation would be of great influence on the church, and he continued that this form had also been applied in other territories without alienating the church from the rest of the organiza-

¹⁶⁰ "(...) of wij nu employees of officier zijn, tezamen strijden wij voor een zaak." *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:6

¹⁶¹ "(...) heilssoldaten medeverantwoordelijk zijn op het gebied van welzijn- en gezondheidszorg, maar dat ook employees medeverantwoordelijk zijn voor het gehele LdH." *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:6

¹⁶² *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:7

¹⁶³ "(...) om de overbrugging van de kloof die bestaat tussen de organisatie en de eisen van buitenaf." *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:7

tion.¹⁶⁴ Fijn however continued by citing his experience as manager of the probation department where he had observed a great lack of unity within the Army, and thus these reorganization plans would be “a psychological confirmation of what many already feel”. Because he regarded this division as unnecessary, Fijn would continue to resist it. In fact, he was of the opinion that these new plans would even “betray the heritage of William Booth”.¹⁶⁵

5.2. Tension between employee and officer

What response this ultimate remark had brought about in the coordinating council was not recorded in the minutes of the meeting, but the fundamental debate between Fijn and Cox seemed to have loosened up more tongues within the council. Now more members showed their reservations towards the plans. For example, Van der Harst stated that he preferred one, undivided organization because that formed the main guarantee for preservation of the Army’s identity. Even though he expressed his trust in the legal experts that had studied this issue, Van der Harst was still of the opinion that this proposed structure “bears the life-size possibility that the Army will grow further apart - a process that had in fact already begun.”¹⁶⁶

Egberts too, expressed his concerns. To begin with, he confirmed that the question of whether or not the new legal structure would endanger the Army’s unity, was very much alive within his department of the homeless care as well. Additionally, together with Nieuwland he also addressed a new matter: the position of the officer in this new structure. The already strained relationship between the officer and the employee seemed to be worsened by this new proposal. Now officers already seemed to feel “neglected as opposed to employees, because of which employees were blamed for having more rights.”¹⁶⁷ Commander Cox replied that it was not so much the legal form that determined the position of the officers, but the fact that the Army worked with employees. This has caused the Works Councils Act to apply to the Salvation Army. And, as Cox added:

“Because of these works councils, the employees have an apparatus through which participation and advice is arranged. The officers lack such an apparatus.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985

¹⁶⁵ “(...) een psychologische bevestiging van wat velen al aanvoelen”, *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:8

¹⁶⁶ “(...) levensgroot de mogelijkheid in zich dat het Leger verder uit elkaar zal groeien (in feite is dat process al ingezet)” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:8

¹⁶⁷ “(...) achtergesteld te zijn bij employees, waardoor het employees kwalijk wordt genomen dat zij meer rechten hebben.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:9

¹⁶⁸ “De employees hebben door die OR een apparaat, waardoor inspraak en advies geregeld is. De officieren hebben een dergelijk apparaat niet.” *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:9

So, because of the fact that the officers were not employed, they lacked a legally recognized right to democratic participation like the non-Army employees. At that time the Army had 9 sectoral councils for every type of social work, and a Central Works Council (COR) had only recently been established, in which all 9 sectoral councils were represented. Even though the question of how this structure was to be continued in the new organizational form was regarded to be the subject of further study, it was clear that the works councils had advisory and approval rights with regard to the restructuring proposal. In order to smoothen the path towards this much-needed approval, certain details of this plan were discussed in advance with the council, like for example, the internal flow of funds and how this was subdivided between the separate organizational entities.¹⁶⁹ Commander Cox however, emphasized that he had no problems whatsoever with the existence of works councils (OR): “The responsibility of a Christian organization and employer has to also be fulfilled well with regard to the OR.”¹⁷⁰ When however, Cox suggested pragmatically that the other ranks of the Salvation Army (officers and soldiers) be informed only after the OR had given its reaction on the reorganization plans that they had already received, the sensitivity of the tense relationship between the officers and the employees revealed itself once more. For the reaction of the coordinating council was that it might be better if this was done in an earlier stage, or “otherwise a number of officers will again have to learn from the employees which plans are made.”¹⁷¹

5.3. Birth pangs of a new organization

After further fine-tuning the reorganization proposal, on August 16, 1988 the COR received a voluminous document from Commander Schurink on the intended decisions regarding the restructuring of the Salvation Army. This document reflected the latest state of affairs on this matter as it included all adjustments made on the basis of earlier remarks, discussions and COR advice. It was also made up to date with possible new demands from the subsidizers, and the COR was asked to give its formal advice on it before December 1.¹⁷² Exactly one day before this deadline, the COR sent its reply. It started off with a short description the frame of reference it used in order to “test the restructuring plans”. The first starting-point was democratization. In accordance with the demands made by several subsidizers, the COR also emphasized the fact that:

¹⁶⁹ *Coördinatieraad* (minutes), November 1985:1

¹⁷⁰ “(...) de taak van christelijke organisatie en werkgever moet ook t.o.v.de OR goed vervuld worden.
Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1985:9

¹⁷¹ “(...) nu zullen anders een aantal officieren weer van employees moeten horen welke plannen er zijn.”
Coördinatieraad (minutes), November 1985:9

¹⁷² Letter from Commander R.J. Schurink to the members of the Central Works Council, August 16, 1988, quoted in: *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:5-6

“(...) all parties directly and indirectly involved in the institution will also be able to influence the policy, to be determined and to be executed by the board of the institution.”¹⁷³

The second point was closely related to the first: participation. The COR explicitly stated that its mission was to facilitate the organization to function well in its social and economic aims (and not religious aims!). This was “not exclusively a matter of management, but also a task of the employees and therefore the works councils.” The COR stressed that in order to fulfill this task, it must operate in a dual tension field of consulting with management, and representing the employees and protecting their interests. The third starting-point of the COR’s advice was that income by subsidy and other means was to be secured and as a result, any flow of money (external and internal) had to be “recorded in a clear way.”¹⁷⁴ As a fourth point, the legal position of the employees had to be guaranteed, including “a good social policy.”¹⁷⁵ The last point was formed by the issue of *doelmatigheid*, for a focus on efficiency had to reduce overhead costs.¹⁷⁶ After having conferred with the sectoral works councils, an external consultancy agency, and labor unions CFD and AbvaKabo, the COR concluded that the testing of the plans revealed three main “pressure points”:

- 1) Not all foundations which employ employees have a joint management.
- 2) There is no Central Works Council, which handles the affairs of all employees.
- 3) The planning of two (labor) foundations results in a loss of suitability and an increase in costs.¹⁷⁷

In addition, there were quite a few matters that the COR wanted to see changed. As a 10-page long list of Army-concessions and new COR-suggestions shows, the COR had devoted itself to increasing the possibilities of employee participation, decreasing organizational costs, enhancing the democratic character of the management and boards of the foundations, and strengthening its own position within the new organizational structure and its influence on the Army’s identity by means of asserting its right of approval of changes in statutes.¹⁷⁸ Already on several occasions, the COR had been asked for advice on earlier versions of the plans, and in general terms the COR seemed to be pleased with the results of the

¹⁷³ Letter from Jan C. Nieuwland (chairman of the COR) and Ruud Tinga (secretary of the COR) to Commander R.J. Schurink, November 29, 1988, quoted in: *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:18

¹⁷⁴ *Idem.*

¹⁷⁵ Letter from Jan C. Nieuwland (chairman of the COR) and Ruud Tinga (secretary of the COR) to Commander R.J. Schurink, November 29, 1988, quoted in: *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:19

¹⁷⁶ *Idem.*

¹⁷⁷ *Idem.*

¹⁷⁸ *Idem.*:19-29

long and intensive process of negotiation between the COR and the Army's management. However, after the Army's denial of the COR's suggestion in February 1988 to establish a separate foundation to manage labor issues, the COR expressed its hope for other concessions from the part of the command. In his turn, Commander Schurink expressed the importance he attached to a swift and successful restructuring process, because the very next day already he had formulated his reply to the COR's advice. After thanking the COR for its constructive attitude throughout the whole preparatory process, and a long reprisal of the concessions to and new demands of the COR, the Commander concluded that he was aware that not all of the COR's wishes had been granted. Nevertheless he expressed to be:

“ (...) of the opinion that a well-balanced decision has been taken with which a solid basis has been laid for a new legal framework of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands. (...) I express my faith that the new boards, works councils and all officers, employees and volunteers will cooperate in good harmony to realize the plan.”¹⁷⁹

With the approval of the reorganization intentions by the COR, the way was paved for the actual realization of the seven-year-long effort to modernize the Salvation Army and on January 1, 1990, the new organizational structure came into effect.

6. The new Salvation Army (1990)

From 1990 onwards, the Salvation Army consisted of five legal entities: a denomination and four foundations. Each entity was endowed with its own assignment and each was responsible for a part of the many services, tasks and activities that the Salvation Army had developed over time in The Netherlands. The overall structure complied with internal aims like cost-efficiency, work expansion and safeguarding of the church against external influences, and because this structure was created in close consultation with the Ministries of Justice and WVC and with the CAC, it also complied with external demands on matters of legal form and democratization. Or, as the Army itself stated in a list of underlying motives for this reorganization:

- “1. To enlarge the flexibility to anticipate the social developments.
2. To improve/enlarge the controlability (*sic*) and efficiency of the organization.
3. To increase the total result of the aid.

¹⁷⁹ Letter from Commander R.J. Schurink to the Central Works Council, November 30, 1988, quoted in: *Decisions for legal restructuring of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:17

4. Space for the denomination to come to the determination of a point of view etc. without immediate consequences for the work within the other legal bodies.
5. The certainty for the financing of the subsidized social work.
6. To maintain, if possible enlarge, and secure the income flows.
7. To improve the controlability (*sic*) of costs.
8. To create more clarity regarding the legal frames of the Salvation Army towards third parties.¹⁸⁰

Even though the creation of five separate entities suggested a thorough fragmentation of the Salvation Army, the intention was to make as many connections between these entities as possible (See Appendix C, figure 1). These connections comprised the flow of funds, staffing and shared principles.

6.1. Flow of funds

The Foundation Salvation Army was to function as an umbrella-organization for all entities, interconnecting the three other foundations and the denomination by means of its central banking function.¹⁸¹ It was responsible for redistributing all income that was generated through “contributions from private individuals and organizations, bequests and legacies, and allocated government subsidies.”¹⁸² A part of this income was generated by the Foundation Salvation Army Fundraising. It was assigned to “actively raise funds on a central level for the financing of the social and humanitarian activities of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands”.¹⁸³ This focus on the funding of the Army’s social activities by this foundation was dictated by the demands of the Central Archives, for in order to continue its annual public “National Collection”, the Salvation Army had to be a foundation.¹⁸⁴ This however, meant that the Foundation Salvation Army would focus more on the financial support of the Army’s religious activities as they were organized in the denomination Salvation Army. Both foundations were to make their generated funds available to the other two foundations, especially money that was earmarked for a designated activity or aimed to be spent on that particular goal. The other flow of funds -undesignated money - however, was divided amongst the denomination, the social work and other parts of the Salvation Army, and in order to make this work, a distributive code was created. Initially, this code was enforced during 1984 by the ORs, but subsequently, it had become a regular method. The distributive code was guarded carefully against certain possible misinterpretations, and only with the consent of the board of the Foundation Salvation Army (i.c. Territorial Commander) and the Territorial

¹⁸⁰ Idem:36

¹⁸¹ Idem:1, 49

¹⁸² *Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils* 1989:13 (UA 1182, nr. 171)

¹⁸³ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:1, 67

¹⁸⁴ *Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils* 1989:25

Financial Council, and after consultation with the boards of all the other entities and both Central Works Councils, could it be altered.¹⁸⁵

In addition to these two entities, the Foundation Salvation Army Services was to render administrative and executive services on a contract basis to the other entities, including the denomination.¹⁸⁶ Next to the income that these services generated, the foundation could profit from contributions made by private individuals and organizations, bequests, and legacies, on the condition that these were especially allocated to this foundation.¹⁸⁷ The core of the Salvation Army's social work was embodied in the Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care. This entity was assigned to prepare and execute policy and to organize separate working-units in order to carry out its "institutionalized social work".¹⁸⁸ Headed by a board and supported by a national bureau, these working-units were probation; social-psychological care (a.o. Groot Batelaar); youth welfare (both residential and non-residential); care and nursing; homeless care; goodwill centers; sociocultural work & life education (also for the Army employees and members).¹⁸⁹ Finally, yet importantly, as mentioned above, the denomination Salvation Army would remain an entity on its own, based on its legal status of 1946 as a church.

6.2. Staffing

Now that the separation of the social work activities and the religious core of the Salvation Army had been legally confirmed and given shape in a new organizational form, it was even more essential to the Army to secure its identity. With regard to this matter, the staffing of the organization was of great importance, for the Salvation Army had always held the view that the core of its identity was formed by its staff, and especially by its vocational volunteers – officers. Therefore, in order to maintain the connection between the two parts of the Army's mission, an overlapping of the management was to be realized throughout the several entities (See Appendix C, figure 2).

The interconnection between the various entities was ensured by the presence of the Territorial Commander, who had a place on the boards of all entities, including the denomination. The General, as head of the international Salvation Army, secured his influence (and with it the Army's international identity) on the Dutch branch by the provision that the Dutch Territory was under a one-headed command. For practical reasons however, the General delegated much of his power to the Territorial Commander, as had been done traditionally.¹⁹⁰ The above figure also shows that the Army paid special attention to the interconnection between the religious community, the Army's main income generator, and

¹⁸⁵ Idem:27

¹⁸⁶ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:2, 77

¹⁸⁷ *Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils* 1989:20

¹⁸⁸ *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:2

¹⁸⁹ Idem:105

¹⁹⁰ *Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils* 1989:6

the Army's social activities. In all three boards, the Commander was assisted by the Chief-Secretary. On explicit demand by the Central Archives, the board of the Foundation Fundraising was complemented with five external members that were able "to mirror the plurality of Dutch society".¹⁹¹ One of these members was to be appointed on the recommendation of the Central Works Council of the Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care, and a second member was to be appointed on behalf of the works council of the Foundation Salvation Army Services. Additionally, it was established that the CAC had to approve of the board. The board of the Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care itself was also complemented with four external members, and thus complied with the demands on democratization and representation.¹⁹² The external board member of the Foundation Salvation Army Services was to be appointed by the Employee's council of the foundation itself.¹⁹³ With regard to the legal position of the Army's personnel and the participation of staff members, it was clear that all officers would legally stay attached to the denomination and that all employees would be attached to the labor-organization (i.c. Foundation Salvation Army Services and Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care). This was done for reasons of external influence:

"The denomination Salvation Army will have absolutely no employees within the meaning of the law so that it actually is not required to comply with the demands of the Law Works Council."¹⁹⁴

Nevertheless, the exchange of staff was not ruled out:

"Although officers know themselves called for work (*sic*) in the entire Salvation Army, they come (*sic*) in the organizational sense and, for legal reasons, under the denomination Salvation Army. As the occasion arises, they will (must/can) be appointed in the foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care or in the foundation Salvation Army Services. It may also happen that employees are placed in relation to a certain piece of work in the denomination Salvation Army, although this denomination does not have any employers in the legal sense."¹⁹⁵

Because both financial foundations (Foundation Salvation Army and the Foundation Salvation Army Fundraising) had no employees, a works council was not required for these entities. However, the foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care was actually required to establish such councils, which it did for its main working-units. The smallest units could combine their forces in a

¹⁹¹ Idem:26

¹⁹² *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:1-2

¹⁹³ Idem:79

¹⁹⁴ Idem118

¹⁹⁵ Idem:116

joined works council and all these councils would send representatives to the Central Works Council of the foundation.¹⁹⁶

6.3. Shared principles

Next to the flow of funds and the matter of staffing, the third way in which the Army tried to realize a durable connection between the separate entities was by emphasizing their shared principles. On December 27, 1988 the statutes of all four of the Salvation Army foundations became effective. The legal basis of the denomination Salvation Army would continue to be formed by the statutes of 1946 with the following mission statement:

“The object of the Salvation Army is: to exercise the Christian Religion in the broadest sense and, especially to advance and enjoy of the religious fraternity, to preach to and provide for the blessings of the Gospel to those who usually are not under the influence of religious teaching, or live in great poverty because of vice or misfortune. Therefore the Salvation Army includes those departments, corps, groups, brigades and bonds whose labor is primarily of spiritual character as well as those departments, institutes, institutions and homes whose endeavors on moral, social and material matters are above all aimed at the spiritual and eternal well-being of all people.”¹⁹⁷

In light of the fundamental legal and organizational detachment that the Army went through, this statement seems quite odd, because now the other entities had their own legal identity, therefore, hardly any legal consequences could be attached to this article. It is thus plausible to assume that this Article now served to remind the other entities that however divided the organization might seem, all parts were still unified in its religious core: the Salvation Army church, at least in a spiritual sense. Analogous to the statutes of 1896, again in the Article following this one, the means to this end were described, and amongst these were the social work activities that the Army offered.¹⁹⁸ This fundamental classification was also recognizable in the new statutes of the other entities. In case of the Foundation Salvation Army, it was translated into a subsidiary mission as phrased in Article 3.2:

¹⁹⁶ Idem:118

¹⁹⁷ “Het Leger des Heils heeft ten doel: het beoefenen van den Christelijken Godsdienst in den ruimste zin en, in het bijzonder, het bevorderen en doen genieten van godsdienstig broederlijk verkeer, ‘t brengen onder de prediking en de zegeningen des Evangelies van zoodanige personen als gewoonlijk niet onder den invloed van godsdienstige leering zijn, dan wel door ondeugd of ongeluk in groote armoede verkeer. Het Leger des Heils omvat daarom zoowel die afdelingen, korpsen, groepen, brigades en bonden, wier arbeid in de allereerste plaats van geestelijken aard is, als die afdelingen, instellingen, inrichtingen en tehuizen, wier werkzaamheid op zedelijk, maatschappelijk en materieel gebied toch bovenal het geestelijk en eeuwig welzijn van alle menschen beoogt.” *Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils* 1989:5

¹⁹⁸ Idem:5-6

“The Foundation will promote the method of the Salvation Army to propagate the gospel – especially the call for conversion contained therein – in speech and action at and in any appropriate place, time and manner and in being together with our fellow-men, also to give attention to their social troubles and needs and try to provide for them, whether with the help of its own organization or through others, assuming that to be truly human in accordance with God’s purpose and to truly be a community in accordance with God’s purpose requires the turning and obedience to Jesus Christ of all.”¹⁹⁹

In addition to this statement of servitude to the ‘Salvation Army’, the religious identity of this particular foundation was confirmed in Article 4 and in the quotation of the religious principles and doctrines that were drawn up at its very beginning in the UK. The same was done for the other three foundations. After the (now!) explicit confirmation that the Salvation Army in the Netherlands formed a part of the religious organization ‘The Salvation Army’ in Great Britain, the same doctrines were cited in the statutes of this foundation.²⁰⁰ However, in the statutes of the Foundation Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care, its non-material and material services were overtly placed in the context of the religious objective of the Salvation Army:

“The object of the Foundation is to actively carry out the objects and method as described in the Statutes of the Salvation Army (...)”²⁰¹

And following the description of whom this Foundation directed its efforts towards, the actual “objects and method” were described, a description that almost entirely corresponded with Article 3.2 of the Foundation Salvation Army. The above shows that with this new structure, the Salvation Army had institutionalized an organizational and legal separation of the indivisible coin. The social objective was firmly positioned as subsidiary to the religious aim. Propagation, in word and in action, was the Army’s main goal, for in its view the social services that it also rendered were not of any lasting effect. The core business of the Salvation Army since its beginning, and still on January 1, 1990, had been: “the turning and obedience to Jesus Christ of all”.

¹⁹⁹ Idem:11. Translation from: *Decisions for legal restructuring of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands* 1989:49-50

²⁰⁰ *Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils* 1989:17-18

²⁰¹ “De Stichting stelt zich ten doel daadwerkelijk uitdrukking te geven aan de doelstelling en werkwijze zoals omschreven in de statuten van het Leger des Heils (...)” *Akten van oprichting en statuten - Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils* 1989:31

PART III

A DYNAMIC COURTSHIP

CHAPTER 7. DYNAMICS OF IDENTITY

The above depiction of how the Army's identity process was influenced by being part of the social policy system, was derived from the main research question: What dynamics are perceptible in the relation between the state and the Salvation Army in the Netherlands with regard to social policy between 1890 and 1990, and how did this influence the Salvation Army's process of identity? The depiction of the history of the Salvation Army in Parts I and II of this study, leads to some conclusive observations. First, I will evaluate the developments concerning the social policy system and what these meant for faith-based civil society and its central feature: identity. Subsequently, I will make a recapitulating evaluation of how the Salvation Army's identity process unfolded within this social policy system. These assessments will lead to conclusive observations with regard to the central research question.

1. The social policy system and identity

The development of the social policy system revealed certain underlying values of quality, participation and manageability, values that endured throughout the twentieth century, be it with different accents over time. During the prewar era, the approach of the (merely local) government to social problems was to incidentally support goals of a concrete character of care. This support would however only occur when these problems had developed to such an extent that civil society organizations were not able to battle them, as was the case with, for example, tuberculosis and infant mortality. Additionally, local governments were sometimes willing to support social work, but only on the request of the organization that was to implement the care, and also only on the basis of supplementation from other parties, like the organizations who were to pay most of the costs themselves. Soon after 1900, a change started to become visible. The government showed a growing urge to actively ask the help of civil society organizations, as the Probation Code of 1910 shows. From then on, both civil society and the government increasingly sought each other's assistance on various issues. This growing mutual interest was however, curbed by sentiments of anti-statism and the fear of loss of autonomy by civil society.

During the decades between 1910 and 1945, the government became increasingly aware of its policy power, as in addition to these financial arrangements, certain extra demands were stipulated. These demands aimed for professionalization by means of hiring skilled labor, and accountability by the opening of the books. This early emphasis on professionalization was to improve the quality of the services and the organizations that delivered them, but at the same time, it was becoming quite clear that the government had to deal with a large variety of organizations that were active on different levels in many different fields of social work. Every segment of Dutch society was trying to create a self-maintaining group of organizations within their pillar – an effort that contributed to a fragmentation of the work field. This situation was not only difficult to

work with for the government, but was also very expensive, so with the intention of harmonizing this field, the government encouraged the involved organizations to unite themselves based on their shared identity, under umbrella organizations. The results of these policy aims of professionalization and harmonization during the prewar era were clear. The availability of money to social service organizations instigated a growth in the number of organizations, but the funding appeared to be of a more structural nature than was envisioned. This increasingly structural cooperation between the government and civil society service providers gave birth to the social policy system.

After World War II, the spirit of reconstruction and renewal strengthened the alignment of goals between the government and civil society. The financial certainty for social welfare organizations increased, together with the rise in national prosperity, and on a policy level, the government aimed at securing their social policy efforts by establishing a Ministry of Social Work. The governmental aim for the creation of a system of social welfare arrangements, which had to provide for a basic level of quality of life for all, increased the social policy costs, as well as the ongoing expansion of the work field. As a counter effort, the number of these organizations had to be restrained and harmonization efforts continued. Based on a strong notion of identity that still formed the main organizing principle of the pillarized civil society, this emphasis on manageability was inspired by its potential to activate individuals into joint action. Also, because identity was appreciated for its binding capacity, civil society organizations were regarded to be the main mobilizing force. These organizations thus became valued partners in the social policy system and the government increasingly supported them financially.

The involvement of the public with the construction of social policy proved to be very important to the government. Because civil society organizations were regarded to be the representatives of their public grassroots, these organizations were invited by the government to be involved with the actual formulation of social policy. In close deliberation, they worked for the creation of a sense of 'shared responsibility' through community organization and social planning, because this shared responsibility was to enhance social activation and participation. Additional policy lines aimed for public participation in another way: social activation was also to be incited by the stimulation of volunteer work.

Together with this new structural emphasis on the value of participation, and at the same time improvement in the quality of the social services and their effectivity, a debate started on the decentralization of national policy to those administrative government levels that had more knowledge and understanding of how to put policy into action with effect: namely, the province and local communities. This meant that some of the policy power would be redistributed towards the local level, and subsequently civil society had to recalibrate its position in this force field.

All these policy endeavors started to show some initial effects. As was the case in the prewar era, the availability of finances incited the creation of new

organizations that were active in all different parts of the social work fields, but still within their pillars. Another effect was that the government itself lost its reserve to deploy the policy instrument of subsidies – the positive effects were clearly visible to the government, but this structural and abundant availability of funding also generated a side effect that would have its repercussions: it created a subsidy demand of its own. Many civil society organizations started to become accustomed to this infinite source of finances.

In 1963, the ABW epitomized the development of social care changing from an incidental favor into a structural right. During this era of emancipation of the individual, the furthering of individual development and autonomy was a central theme. However, in disregard of this evolution of individuality, emancipation and secularization, during most of the 1960s the social policy concepts of professionalization, participation and harmonization, continued to dominate the political agenda. Professionalization still aimed to increase the accountability of organizations by demanding streamlined administrative processes and employee education, and thus aimed for the enhancement of quality. On the matter of participation, shared responsibility was developed further by means of supplementary financing and the creation of a common view on social policy between civil society and the government, next to decentralization of policy responsibilities. On the other hand, harmonization of the work field was aimed at by the government for the purpose of increasing the manageability.

By 1970 however, some changes became visible. On the matter of quality, the goals of the government and civil society still seemed to be quite in line, for professionalization and quality were increasingly standardized. This issue of quality however seemed to have become of such importance to the government that it let go of the prerequisite of supplementary funding, and thus abandoned the goal of shared (financial) responsibility. On the matter of participation, the cooperative concept of social planning had turned into a more activist concept of ‘social reform’ and aimed directly at what was regarded the morally empty concept of consumer society. This implied a shift in the attitude of civil society towards the government. Their mutual alignment showed some degree of deviation. This became clearer when during the 1970s - as a result of the emancipatory vigor of the 1960s - participation was increasingly translated into democratization and representation. Self-activation also became a central objective of the social policy, and public participation was to be further strengthened by the already often-discussed decentralization of policy and close consultation with civil society as representatives of their members. They were still regarded as being ideologically driven and thus of added value to the government because of their representative functions, but on the matter of manageability, a development opposite to decentralization was clearly visible, for in order to improve harmonization, the use of the term ‘merger’ became an often heard expression, thus stressing the wish for further centralization, and no longer restricted to just within the already crumbling organizational pillars. Civil society had been uniting within these pillars for half a century already, so this new emphasis on further unification breached the boundaries of these pillars and seemed to force civil

society into often-unwanted new structures of collaboration. Once again then it became clear that it was still the government that held the better part of the balance of power.

The *Knelpuntennota* of 1974 took stock of the government's policy efforts on harmonization, quality and participation, and the results were tough on civil society as well as on the government itself. The report classified civil society as a functionally pillarized substitute for the crumbling fundamentals of the ideological pillars. The process of functional pillarization was however, incited by the government itself, for it actively supported many new efforts to provide for services in every pillar. The report also pinpointed other bottlenecks that hindered an effective functioning of the civil society social service providers: waning public legitimization of welfare, increasing individualization and secularization, a call for democratic influence, and marginalization of volunteers by professionals. All this was alleged to have turned civil society organizations into introspective, self-referential organizations and had created a chaotic range of services that made the quality of these services uncontrollable. Professionalization had reduced the importance of the volunteer, a development that also influenced the representation function of the issue of identity, a function that had already been under pressure by the emphasis on the scaling-up of organizations into umbrellas. Because of all this, civil society seemed to have lost its added value. Its assets of representation and identity had been lost, and now that the government had obtained primacy in the field of social care, it was only a matter of time before it intervened, and even though both actors still aimed for cooperation on social relief, the function that civil society held for government was changing. Many policy efforts would be continued however, including the decentralization of social policy to local administrative levels; civil society would continue to be restructured and harmonized. Civil society was also to continue on the road to participation in terms of democratization and *doelmatigheid*), and possibilities for further democratic influence on civil society organizations would be studied.

Now the situation of civil society itself had changed. The matter of decentralization however, seemed to weaken the position of civil society organizations in the social policy system, and as the *Knelpuntennota* had made abundantly clear, civil society organizations had lost their added value as representatives of their grassroots on the matter of identity. This formed a clear threat to the existence of civil society in the form of organizations, and so, in order to regain its position in the social policy system, civil society organizations had to give up their political position as intermediaries between the government and their grassroots - and had to reinvent themselves. In order to help with this process, the government suggested an alternative that was in line with its goals: now that civil society organizations were no longer (political) representatives, they could function very well as supportive structures to further individual activation of what was left of their grassroots. In this way the policy goals of participation and personal responsibility were combined, and civil society continued to remain relevant in the social policy system. On the matter of quality, the improvement of services by means of professionalization was continued, but now it was also

supplemented by a strong reevaluation of the volunteer, for even though civil society organizations no longer incited the motivation that identity might call up, the volunteer's internal motivation was still based on this identity, and the importance of this source of intrinsic commitment was still recognized by the government. So now, instead of the civil society organizations, the individual citizens were regarded as representatives of their individual identity. The importance of the volunteer was stressed by the fact that in 1977 the 'rehabilitation of the volunteer' was seen as essential for the quality of social services.

During the 1980s, these developments continued to form the base of the social policy system. To develop human potential, policy goals like decentralization, democratization and volunteer commitment were emphasized. However, the new idea was that this was not to be facilitated by the central state, but on a local level, and also not by civil society organizations as intermediary political institutions, but only as supportive structures to the individual development of their autonomous members. In this concept, volunteer work had to be revalued as a means of participation, as well as a possible effective way for cost reduction – principles that were recognizable in the term 'responsible society'. In the second half of the 1980s this idea was further elaborated as individual activation and self-responsibility by means of self-help and volunteer work, which became central elements in the social policy. In order to implement these elements effectively, the government aimed to stimulate more than to regulate, and it strove after becoming conditional and supportive instead of directive. The idea was that the government had to retrench and keep its distance from the welfare 'playing field'. Society itself would have to regain its responsibility for its social problems, and this effort had to be supported more by the market than the state. This view also meant that civil society umbrellas had lost their function, and with the retrenchment of the state and the lack of added value of these organizations, individuals and society themselves had become responsible.

2. The Salvation Army's process of identity

Since the Salvation Army had been active in the Netherlands as a faith-based social service provider, it had experienced the above-described developments with regard to the social policy system up close. The description of the Army's identity process in Part II provides for a diverse view on how the Army tried to shape its identity, an effort that can be retraced on three levels: the Army as a part of the social policy system, the Army's legal identity, and the Army's modernization efforts with regard to professionalization and democratization. In the struggle to shape its identity, the Army always referred to its twin mission, as was outlined by its founding father William Booth; providing for material and spiritual relief by means of the word and the deed formed the maxim of the Salvation Army throughout the twentieth century. So, at least to a certain extent, all of the Army's efforts with regard to its identity related to this double mission, and thus were part of the contest between these two parts. Another struggle that the Army was confronted with, was the increasing interdependence between

itself and the government in the social policy system. Both these issues formed the basis for the relationship that the Army had with the government, thus defining the dynamics of their relationship, and also contributing greatly to the Army's identity process.

During the decades preceding World War II, the balance between the two parts of the Army's mission experienced a drastic change. Until 1910, the balance between the social and religious mission remained in balance as the Army grew swiftly, both in numbers of corps as well as in social activities. With the *Reclasseringsregeling* of 1910, a structural change was announced. In its ongoing effort to try to align its goals with those of the government, and at the same time maintain its position as an autonomous organization, the Salvation Army accepted the financial support offered by the government and became increasingly dependent on these funds. However, when the first financial cutbacks were announced, this position of dependency became rather burdensome. In its reaction, the Army revealed its strategy on how to position itself towards the government by stressing that by doing its work properly the Army saved the Dutch state thousands of guilders. By doing so, the Army hinted at the fact that even though the balance of power was in favor of the government, the relationship that the government had with the Army was based on a certain amount of reciprocity in which the Army was of added value to the state in economic terms. But there was more to it, for the Army additionally presented itself to be an instrument in the toolbox of government in its fight against social problems, and thus stressed that the goals of both actors still corresponded with each other and that the Army wanted to be supplement the government in their mutual struggle to fight social problems. So already before World War II, the Army had become an actor in the social policy system by revealing a strategy of its own. This position however, had by then put the Army's identity out of balance by inflating the social mission and neglecting the religious mission in itself. This process would continue throughout the twentieth century as the Army's social mission continued to grow and develop.

The tension between the two parts of the Army mission also was aggravated by the ongoing discussion on the Army's legal position. Central to this part of the Army's process of identity were the questions: What are we? and What can we be?, which demanded much of the Army's attention. But the most interesting matter in this process was the question: What do we want to be? For the debate on this matter revealed that there existed two lines of thought within the Army ranks on this issue, lines of thought that were also very much related to the two parts of the Army's mission. Ideally, the Army wanted to be both a church and a foundation, for that position would do the most justice to the Army's double mission. In fact, for a large part of the twentieth century, the Army had been able to maneuver itself in such legal positions that it actually was able to be both; it could present itself, without much trouble, as both a church and a foundation, in various situations. During the 1970s however, the Army was forced to make an actual choice on which part of its double mission would legally prevail. Then again, an actual choice on this matter was only taken about fifteen

years later, when the fundamental reorganization was decided on. Then still, the Army maintained its double identity as it established separate foundations from its church.

With regard to its modernization process, the Army also experienced certain developments that influenced its identity and incited debate. Professionalization as well as democratization were strongly spurred by outside influences, but they left their marks on the Army as an organization. Already before World War II, the government aimed to improve the quality of social services through professionalization of the labor force and the organizations themselves. Also on the level of accountability, organizations were spurred to work on a more professional basis, because the government wanted to assure that the money it granted to these social work organizations was indeed allocated to the goals that it was aiming for. For the Salvation Army, this beginning process of professionalization became noticeable in the developing probation work. From 1950 however, professionalization would experience a boost when the increase in social work and its growing differentiation and specialization resulted in various trainings that created professional experts. The introduction of the social casework methodology offered the Army a legitimization for doing its work in its own preferred way: on an individual level, in close proximity to the client. On the other hand, this social casework method also required the professional to dispose of any hidden agendas, like possible proselytizing. Moreover, it became a sort of taboo to speak of any religious subject, especially during the 1980s. On another level, professionalization brought about a change in personnel. The number of well-trained officers reduced as compared to the new employee recruits, and on a managerial level as well, professionals were hired, as illustrated by the example of Hartjes and Fijn. On all levels, it looked like the ideological motivation of the Army people was slowly but surely replaced by professionally motivated personnel. In order to counteract this development, the Army tried to occupy all other key positions with its own people, except for in the probation department, but during the 1970s, it had to nevertheless part with its former core: the volunteers.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the probation work field and the Salvation Army probation department diverged increasingly in course. Because of the emphasis on harmonization, the probation work field started to merge into larger, general organizations, but the Salvation Army remained autonomous. This position however, urged the Army to show its added value and justify its right of existence. Could the Army rely on the traditional argument that it used with regard to being supplementary to the government and therefore of economic value? Now, however, it was not only that the Army's finances were at stake, but this time the Army's existence was also tied to its identity, because when municipalities increasingly signaled that they wanted to scrutinize the Army's statutes, the Army regarded this as a threat to maintaining its identity and autonomy. On the other hand, the national government had revealed that it valued identity as an activating force. But with the balance of power leaning towards the local government, the existence of the Salvation Army was endangered.

During the 1980s, the Army's identity process gained momentum. The cut-backs in subsidies threatened to result in the closure of certain Army activities, especially since it appeared to be combined with a growing sense that local governments were only willing to do business with neutral organizations, and that they wanted to get rid of the faith-based Salvation Army. On the other hand, the Army had increasingly argued that it still had added value, based on its identity, as was confirmed by the march at the Binnenhof. This strategy however, also raised the question of what exactly this identity was, and during the 1980s the Army increasingly sought to find an answer that was both satisfying to its members, as well as to the various levels of Dutch government. And at the end of the decade, the Army came up with a solution that was of startling simplicity as well as daring. The Army attempted to turn the pressure on its identity, into an advantage by presenting its identity as an actual weapon in the struggle for its existence. It was exactly this identity that had formed the foundation of the Army's work and its continuous quality, and therefore it was exactly its identity that had to be assessed for its added value.

With regard to the Army's twin mission, it can thus be stated that early in the twentieth century, the government began to regard the Salvation Army as a valued partner in their cooperative effort to battle social injustice. In its drive to support (faith-based) civil society organizations like the Salvation Army, the government contributed strongly towards the Army's social mission through financial support. Even though in a general sense the government regarded the Army's religious mission with certain respect, and even acknowledged its added value until the mid-1970s, it was the Army's social mission that corresponded most with government policy goals. This resulted in a one-sided emphasis from the government on the Army's social mission to expand the development of the Army's social activities, over its religious activities as an effect. The Army itself did not have many inhibitions regarding this form of government support. It did show a certain hesitation though, when it was invited to take part in government-initiated and subsidized programs, as the example of the probation department in 1910 showed. But it is also clear that the Army was soon accustomed to its new position in the social policy system, and with much success, for it became a valued partner for the government. On another level, it became clear that the Army did not even mind the overemphasis on its social mission, even though it regarded itself as a religious organization. From the process of legal incorporation, it can be deduced that even though the Army valued both its missions very much, on a fundamental level it regarded its social mission as instrumental to its religious mission. When this is related to the Army's conceding attitude towards the overemphasis on its social mission by the government, it follows that whether or not this was a deliberate move on the part of the government, the Army considered this overemphasis rather an opportunity than a threat, for developing their social mission would also take their religious mission further. So even though the government emphasis was concentrated on the Army's social mission, but at the same time, the legal narrative of the Salvation Army shows that

it considered its religious mission as the final goal, these two directions were not at all at odds with each other.

3. Concluding remarks

At the close of this research, a few concluding remarks are called for. With regard to the social policy system, it is, first of all, interesting to notice that the various policy lines are of a rather continuous character instead of variable. Even though within different periods, different accents are perceptible, and over time, the policy concepts were interpreted in different manners, in general, it can be stated that the three main policy concepts of quality, manageability and participation have formed the base for the Dutch social policy system. Another conclusion is that this perceived continuity can be very well ascribed to the systemic approach of looking at the relationship between the Salvation Army and the government as taking part in the context of what I have called the social policy system. This approach helps to reveal coherent patterns between the two actors, like for example that both the government and the Salvation Army operated in certain fields of tension that characterized their relationship: attraction and repulsion, alignment and variation of goals; the measure of (inter)dependency, the balance of political power; tension fields that bear certain resemblance to that of a courtship.

A third concluding observation is that even though the balance of power between the two actors lay very much in favor of the government, the Salvation Army had actually been able to make some use of its space to maneuver. Habituation to subsidy arrangements and playing by the rules of the social policy system, were at times replaced by Army initiatives to influence its position towards the government. These initiatives often also indicated a great perseverance in guarding the Army's autonomy. In fact, the Army developed a particular response to encroaching developments by proving its added value towards the government. At first the Army presented itself as being supplementary to government policy, and even willing to function as a government tool. Additionally, the Army argued that its work was of actual economic importance, and thus tried to convince the government of the reciprocal character of their relationship. During the 1980s however, the Army complemented these arguments of supplementarism and reciprocity with a third argument: the Army's faith-based identity as a precondition of the quality of its work. This leads to the conclusion that the Army was not only a part of the social policy system, but it also actively contributed to the development of this system. Also, in disregard of its dominant position, the government was not the only initiator in this system, but shaped the system together with civil society and the Salvation Army.

However, the government did show a rather ambivalent attitude toward the matter of identity in the social welfare system. For one, a growing emphasis on ideological generalization of traditionally faith-based social services became detectable after the 1960s. The sympathy that the parliament expressed with the clearly religious Salvation Army however, seemed to contradict this trend. In

parliament, the general opinion of the Army varied from being a sympathetic faith community to being an important partner in social services. The Army was almost always regarded with much respect and affinity, and it was clearly a valued part of civil society and partner of the government. It remains unclear however, as to how this discrepancy with the idea of a neutral government developed during the twentieth century. Further empirical study on this subject is thus welcome.

The metaphor of a courtship however, provides for (a limited but) expressive interpretative means, because in this light, the overtly sympathetic attitude of the government towards the overtly Christian Salvation Army might even be characterized as amorous. The government seems to have had a weakness with regard to the Salvation Army, as its steady show of appreciation of the Army indicates. The Army seemed to have been a trustworthy partner with regard to delivering qualitative social services, but it might also have been the Army's explicitly value-based character that attracted the assumably 'neutral' government. By emphasizing the supplementary and reciprocal character of their relationship at first, and at a later stage its own identity, the Army showed its plumage, and as a result it seemed to have struck a note with the government. On the other hand, it might even have been the government itself that incited the Army to come forward and engage in this courtship, for its continuous emphasis on the Army's positive image and even sometimes its faith-based identity, might also be interpreted as an opening move of the courtship. An invitation that the Salvation Army was at first reluctant to accept, but to which it soon surrendered.

With regard to the Army's hard work to keep the right balance between the two parts of its double mission, it is at this point hard to assess whether or not the Army had made the right choice in the form of its 1990 reorganization. For this, we will have to look at the period following this decisive moment – an effort that will be tentatively undertaken in the closing chapter of this study. For now, it suffices to conclude that the Salvation Army's choice to play an active part in the social policy system had actually changed the Army's financial situation. This changing financial position had far-reaching consequences for the Army's legal position as well as its work force and administrative structure. Another important, but less explicit consequence of the Army's nestling in the social policy system was that it seemed to have influenced a fundamental Army characteristic: the spreading of the gospel. Even though William Booth had put the religious and social parts of the Army's mission at the same level of importance, it was hardly thinkable for a social professional during the 1980s to make any verbal reference to the gospel whatsoever to the client. Any proselytizing in a professional context was regarded as highly inexpedient, so the only way to the Army professionals to refer to the gospel was by 'doing good deeds'. However, because many of these good deeds were now paid for by the Dutch government, it can be argued that these also might have lost much of their religious connotations. So, to what extent was an Army professional able to spread the gospel, now that the Army's active contributions to the social policy system

seemed to have reduced the interpretation of Booth's vision of bringing the good news by word and deed, to bringing the gospel by means of a deed only?

In this sense, Kettle's implicit suggestion that the proximity of a faith-based civil society to the (neutral) government will influence the identity of the former, is confirmed, for at least a part. In case of the Salvation Army, the dominant power in the social policy system was the government, and it was most of the time the Salvation Army that had to make policy compromises. On the other hand, it was also the Army itself that agreed on doing so, so in that sense the Army chose to take such a risk. However, it had not lost its faith-based identity, as many of the other social service providers had. In that sense the Salvation Army seems to form an exception to Kettle's theory, for by 1990 it was still a much valued social service provider, and a recognizable faith-based organization. There was an imminent problem, however. The ongoing secularization had started to hollow out many religious communities and churches in the Netherlands, and this menace was also threatening the Salvation Army. So, even though it surpasses the scope of this research, this observation calls for another evaluation. Did the reorganization of 1990 prove to be the panacea for this trend? Was the Army able to prevent the cherished two-sided coin of its identity from being split after all? These matters will be addressed in the closing part of this study.

IN RETROSPECT: BEYOND THE REORGANIZATION

In 2012, the Salvation Army celebrated its 125th anniversary in the Netherlands with various festive activities. Not many faith-based social service providers had survived the ideological erosion of the social work field that had characterized the last decades of the twentieth century. Therefore this landmark event in the Army's history suggests that the Army's new organizational structure of 1990 had been a success. Was this, however, the same with regard to the Army's preferred balance of its two-fold mission? Did the Army also succeed in maintaining its identity based on its double mission? Or had the Army's fear of the splitting of its two-dimensional identity become a reality? In order to assess the possible outcome of the Army's reorganization, we will have to turn our attention to the decades that followed the reorganization. However, because this chapter functions as a retrospective, this effort will not consist of a thorough empirical study, but will be of a more discursive character in which reflections of the Salvation Army itself will also have a place.

When we assess the development of the two Army missions during this period, it can be observed that the Salvation Army's position in the social policy system continued to consolidate. Compared to the period before the reorganization, by 2010 the operating result of the Salvation Army's Welfare and Health Foundation (W&G) had multiplied eight times from fl.76,854,000 to €288,400,000.¹ At the same time, the number of employees within W&G increased from 1500 in 1988 to 5377 in 2010, operating about 244 working units nationwide.² The Army's faith community however, did endure harder times. Army soldiers had been reduced to half their number from 8500 in 1988 to 4618 in 2008.³ The same was true with regard to the Army's officers: in 1988, there were about 300 officers active, but in 2010, this had been diminished to a mere 140.⁴ In addition, the number of corps also showed an inversely proportional development to the Army's social services, for the 92 corps (1988) had been reduced in 2010 to 59.⁵ So, what had happened here?

1. Professionalization of the Army as social service provider

The Salvation Army experienced three phases of organizational development during the post-reorganization period of 1990-2010. Interesting however, is that

¹ *Met hart en hand. Beeldverslag en financieel overzicht 1986*, 1988:31 (UA 1182, nr. 8); *Jaarverslag 2010*:135. It is important to notice that in 2002 the Dutch guilder was replaced by the Euro with an exchange rate of 2.20371. This means that the amount of €288,400,000 would have approximately equalled fl.635,550,000 (without taking into account inflation or any economical fluctuations).

² *Van soep, zeep en redding tot evangelisch geïnspireerd maatschappelijk werk 1988*:34; *Jaarverslag 2010*:134

³ *Van soep, zeep en redding 1988*:34; *Jaarverslag 2008*:12

⁴ *Jaarverslag 2008*:134

⁵ *Jaarverslag 2008*:33; *Jaarverslag 2010*:134

this organizational professionalization only took place within W&G, leaving the Army's faith community to itself. The first phase (1990-1995) of this organizational development was that of the construction and fine-tuning of the new organizational model by means of centralization; the second phase (1995-2005) was the return to a more decentralized model. The third phase (2005-2010) was characterized by the external pressure on the Army to once again prove its added value with regard to its identity.

1.1. Centralization and de-compartmentalization (1990-1995)

The first years following the reorganization were decisive for building a solid base for the Salvation Army. The creation of W&G did not only provide for an organizational structure that facilitated cooperation between the different areas of social work, but it also continued to support the much valued professional quality of the Army's work. Before 1990, the separate social work departments of the Army had created a managerial monster, that slowly but surely revealed a particular downside to the philosophy of a one-headed management: the bureaucracy had risen to the highest levels, as all policy authorizations had to come from the apex of the organization.⁶ This resulted in a management situation that, in the opinion of many involved, had paralyzed the organization's striking power and had brought the Salvation Army to a situation of immobility that would have been experienced as a disaster by any standing army. Additionally, this bureaucracy was stimulated by a culture of organizational fragmentation because every department had created its own culture, administration, financial flows and contacts.⁷ This meant that the central Army command was less in control of the organization than was implied by its external univocal representations, like the uniforms and rhetoric. With the creation of W&G, many of these situations were to change.

The first assignment for the management of the new organization was to break through the old habits and patterns, and to create a new organization with a corresponding organizational culture. The new operational manager of W&G, Jansen (1990-2000) understood this task very well and started by collecting all policy records, documents and files and gathering them at the new Central Bureau.⁸ Everything that had to do with any sort of social services was centralized in W&G, and from 1992 onwards especially, Jansen and his team (amongst which was vice-CEO Voorham) started to restructure all policies on finances, personnel and social work. Slowly, but surely, the contours of a rather homogeneous organization became visible during the first half of the 1990s. This process of unification was supported by memoranda that described the framework in which the various social service units were to operate. Jansen envisioned that all

⁶ This opinion is shared by all of the people that have been interviewed for this study.

⁷ Interview with H. van Teijlingen, September 5, 2012

⁸ Idem.

32 units should work with, what he called, “relative autonomy”.⁹ This meant that within the outer limits of organizational freedom in policymaking as stipulated by these memoranda the units were free to act on what they thought was best. Additionally, the work units started to implement specific annual budgets and planning and control cycles – a structure that also gave them relative autonomy.

This approach of relative autonomy can also be interpreted as a continued legitimization of the 32 separate departments, but the difference with the period before 1990 was that now these departments were bound together by a coordinating policy. A situation that was rather new to the Army, for now a process of de-compartmentalization was setting in, and on a central level, control was being regained. This was needed very much, because the Army’s social work departments had not only developed into separate organizational units that were only compelled to cooperate by means of the monthly gatherings in the Coordinating council, but they were also hardly used to working together. In Jansen’s view of W&G however, close collaboration was a central policy goal. This goal was not only based on managerial motivations, but it was also closely related to the Army’s philosophy that it wanted to ‘help those who had no helpers’. The problems of this target group were often of a complex nature, because when for example, somebody had become addicted to drugs, he would most probably also have problems with work, income, housing, and probably even social skills. According to the Army, only a comprehensive approach would therefore be effective. Even though the Salvation Army as a whole was providing for many of the social services that were needed in such multi-problem cases, the organizational culture of fragmentation often stood in the way for such an all-encompassing approach.

Combined with a certain measure of centralization, this de-compartmentalization of social services was to form an organizational context for what the Army called the “Army method”.¹⁰ This method was based on principles like: everybody is valuable; everybody always deserves a second chance; and everybody can always contribute something¹¹, all principles which, according to Voorham, can be retraced to the Methodist roots of the Salvation Army. These principles were molded into the Army method in combination with notions like “justice”, “solidarity” and “charity”, all concepts that focused the attention of the Army on those who had no possibilities of their own to look after themselves.¹² This Army method also included rhetorical one-liners that were

⁹ *Verkenningen over samenwerken en samen-gaan* 1995:4; *Notitie Effecten Decentralisatie* 1998:1

¹⁰ *Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg. Basisdocument Ondernemingsplanning* 1992:5

¹¹ Interview with Voorham, September 3, 2012; Ringelberg 2005:56-58

¹² *Door Christus aangeraakt, om mensen bewogen. Nota Identiteit Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg* 2006:11; *Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg. Basisdocument Ondernemingsplanning*, 1992:2-5

generally attributed to William Booth: “go and do something” and “an empty stomach doesn’t have ears”.

The combination of the organizational decentralization, de-compartmentalization, and the Army method appears to have been rather successful. In an informative account of the first ten years of W&G, Voorham listed several new social services that the Army had developed in those years: hospices for terminal care; day training centers for short-term prisoners; projects for combined care, nursing and treatment of physically and mentally ill homeless people; social pensions for (temporary) homeless people; medical day care centers; a project for homeless children; holiday camps for the socially troubled; playgroups and possibilities for daytime occupation.¹³ Even though the need for these services seemed to be large enough to take specific actions, all these activities were rare or even nonexistent in the Netherlands at that time. From these innovative actions it becomes clear that during the first years after its reorganization, the Army’s vision to put individual material and non-material needs central to its services, combined with a comprehensive approach towards social services, had resulted in new social services.

1.2. Decentralization and scaling-up (1995-2005)

While Jansen and his management team were fully dedicated to their centralization effort, the next phase of professionalization presented itself. The decentralization process that the government had initiated during the 1970s was still very much ongoing during the 1990s. In an internal memorandum on the developing social trends, the Army concluded in 1995 that the increased governmental efforts to decentralize its national social policy was accompanied by a tendency to combine coherent areas of social services on a local level. This however, created a local counterforce to the national decentralization effort, making it a difficult process to follow.¹⁴ Jansen argued that this development provided for certain possibilities for the Army, because it could probably combine these external tendencies towards harmonization, cooperation and decentralization very well with its internal policy to combine work units and to offer a comprehensive approach. Within the changing context of health care and welfare that was increasingly oriented towards free market principles, these developments could very well be matched when the Army itself would decentralize further. According to Jansen, the Army would be very well able to find its own position in this changing market, as it was used to doing so for a long time.¹⁵ This meant that, after a period of organization building through centralization, the time had come to loosen the internal reins. In order to maintain its relevance as a strong actor on a local and regional level, the Army started to strengthen the position of its work

¹³ Voorham 1999

¹⁴ *Verkenningen over samenwerken en samen-gaan*, 1995

¹⁵ Idem:3,5

units by once more decentralizing the recently centralized financial administration. In addition, the units would also become responsible for their own staff and in order to take over these new tasks, a new administrative layer was organized within every work unit. Also, in line with the external developments, the local work units combined their forces, because by scaling-up on this level the Army's position in the local market would be strengthened. This combined effort of decentralization and scaling-up was formalized into policy and had to be completed in 2001.¹⁶ Interestingly, during this second phase an important feature of the Army surfaced once again: it showed great willingness to be flexible towards its external environment – a flexibility that would be tested even further a few years later, because soon the Army encountered another interfering development to which it had to react.

1.3. Competing in a free market: identity (2005-2012)

Already by the end of the 1980s, the discourse of the free market had become perceptible within debates on welfare and healthcare reform, mostly as a result of the recommendations of Committee-Dekker (1987) on how to revise the Dutch healthcare system.¹⁷ From that time on, free market principles had started to become a subject of debate, but it would take until the first years of the twenty-first century, for those principles to become more visible in the social sector. For example, in 2005, the new *Wet op de Jeugdzorg* (WJZ, Youth Care Act) put the needs of the clients at the center of its approach, instead of the former supply-oriented focus.¹⁸ This fundamental shift from supply-orientation towards demand-orientation, also became visible on the matter of health care, as in 2006 Minister of VWS, Hoogervorst (VVD, 2003-2007) introduced a fundamental reform to the Dutch system of health insurances. From then on, individual citizens were able to choose their preferred health insurance company and degree of insurance. This development also brought about a rather new approach for social service providers, as in many sectors they had to compete for the possibility to offer their services with other providers by submitting tenders, especially concerning those services that were financed through AWBZ funds. This meant that organizations that were traditionally providing for these services were no longer automatically a preferred partner for the government.

This new *modus operandi* forced providers like the Salvation Army to rethink their position in the market. They had to make very clear to possible customer organizations like insurance companies and also to the government, what their distinguishing characteristics were. Once again, the Army was forced to scrutinize its core values, for how else could the Army maintain its visibility in this force field of the free market while proving its added value. To consider this

¹⁶ *Notitie Effecten Decentralisatie* 1998:1-9

¹⁷ Duyvendak en Otto 2007:154

¹⁸ Pommer, Van Kempen en Sadiraj 2011:14-15

issue, the Army returned to both its historical roots and its grassroots. Over a series of sessions, Army employees were asked what they thought characterized the Army best, and in spite of the huge imbalance between the number of Salvationists and its external employees, a clearly shared image became visible: it was the basic Methodist principles of the Army method that seemed to form the core of the Army's personnel work ethics. Another action the Army took was the creation of what was called a "heritage movement". Internationally, many Army branches already had a heritage department that was commissioned to keep alive the memories of the organization's identity. Until then, the Dutch Salvation Army lacked such a department. So a historical canon of the Army's history in the Netherlands was composed and in 2006, a Memorandum on Identity was introduced. This memorandum brought about a return to the Army's roots through renewed emphasis on the combination of the Army method, with other basic principles that William Booth had stipulated: providing for concrete, effective and often long-term activities for those who really needed help and actually wanted to be helped, but had no helper in sight.¹⁹

This renewed focus on identity also brought about the incorporation of religion as an explicit part of the Army method. As we have seen, during the 1980s the Army used its identity as an argument for quality in its communications with the government and other financiers. However, the way in which the Army made use of its identity was rather reserved. According to Voorham, this modest attitude was at that time the result of the perceived incompatibility of professionalism and religion, even to the extent of mutual exclusion. However, this reserved attitude of the Army with regard to its identity had changed by 2006 because, in the opinion of Voorham, during the last two decades the Salvation Army had experienced a transformation from: "Oops, we are a Christian organization, to: "Yes! We are a Christian organization".²⁰ During this period, the Army came to realize that next to the provision of social services, its faith-based identity was the most important asset it had. This awareness gave birth to a renewed view on identity and once again in 2006, the Army sought a way to deploy its faith-based identity as an argument of quality, as it adopted the combination of Christian faith and professionalism in its personnel policy:

"Therefore W&G regards the personal Christian belief as a competency of her staff. This competency is of equal weight as other competencies, like professional skill and suitability, that are relevant for the hiring policy."²¹

¹⁹ *Door Christus aangeraakt, om mensen bewogen. Nota Identiteit Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg* 2006:9

²⁰ Interview with Voorham, September 3, 2012

²¹ "Daarom rekent het (*sic*) W&G de persoonlijke christelijke geloofsovertuiging tot een van de competenties van haar medewerkers. Deze competentie is gelijk in gewicht als andere competenties zoals vakbekwaamheid en geschiktheid die meewegen bij het aannamebeleid." *Door Christus aangeraakt, om mensen bewogen. Nota Identiteit Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg* 2006:21

Until this new personnel policy, the Army had relied on its vocational volunteers, but since the number of vocational volunteers had dropped, the Army decided to take a more structural approach to the conservation of its identity through its personnel. The consequence of this new approach was that all employees were to officially express their respect for the Army's dual mission, as well as to comply with bringing this mission into practice in their contact with clients and colleagues as 'ambassadors' of the Salvation Army *and* the Christian faith. This did not mean however, that the Army's view was restricted to only one particular religious doctrine. The Army made explicit that it valued all Christian varieties, as long as they respected the Army's broad-ranging mission: "The diversity of Christians means an enrichment of the organization."²² By 2006, the Salvation Army method had become an official policy line and it had been developed into a clear and historically based definition of the Army's target group; a mission-driven staff and a strong focus on the client as 'a whole being'. So, just as during the 1980's once again the Army had put forward its identity in order to position itself in the force field of the free market, but now this notion of identity was combined with the Army's professionalism.

Additionally, the Army confirmed its supplementary position towards the government, as the Army's added value of reciprocity no longer referred only to the savings in expenditures, in combination with a trusted provision of services, but the Army was also very useful to the government in another manner. The Salvation Army's focus on 'those who have no helper' made the Army the organization par excellence to point out to the government what the most acute social problems were. Also, by starting up first-response activities itself, the Army was also able to create initial policy proposals on such matters. First, the Army would fund these innovative projects itself, and when such a project had proven to be successful, it would ask the government for structural funding, a strategy that proved to be successful for both actors. That the Army had indeed succeeded to once again prove its added value to the government was illustrated in a rhetorical manner by Prime-Minister Rutte (VVD, 2010- currently) in his appraisal of the Army. In the foreword of the 2012 jubilee issue of the *Strijdkreet*, Rutte argued that it was exactly "the combination between a practical approach and a deep religious conviction" that led to "a unique and exceedingly effective method" and that made the Salvation Army "an attractive and reliable partner".²³ This token of appreciation by Rutte has to be put in perspective however, for eventhough he expressed gratitude for the Army's work, and

²² "De verscheidenheid aan christenen is een verrijking binnen de organisatie." *Door Christus aangeraakt, om mensen bewegen. Nota Identiteit Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg* 2006:22

²³ "(...) de combinatie tussen een praktische aanpak en een diepe religieuze overtuiging"; "dat maakt de aanpak van het Leger uniek en uitermate effectief"; "een aantrekkelijke en betrouwbare samenwerkingspartner". Quoted in: '*Strijdkreet*' *Magazine van het Leger des Heils*, Jubileumspecial, Jaargang 125, Nr. 5:3

he even acknowledged that much of the effectiveness of this work was related to the Army's faith-based identity, this appraisal must be seen more as a personal message to the Army's workers than as official government policy with regard to faith-based organizations. Identity still proved to be a matter of prudence. Nevertheless, the Army would continue with its strategy to emphasize its faith-based identity as an inherent part of its work in order to position itself as a social service provider. However, since the Salvation Army also consisted of a faith community, it is necessary to assess how the reorganization of 1990 worked out for this other essential part of the Dutch Salvation Army.

2. The Salvation Army's faith community

As the figures at the beginning of this chapter show, the Army's faith community experienced an alarming decline in numbers between 1990 and 2010. Both the numbers of adherents and corps had nearly been halved. This raises the question of the extent to which this development can be related to the reorganization of 1990. Did the restructuring sharpen the distinction between the social and religious activities in such a way that the faith community suffered from it?

The first consequence of the restructuring seems to be that the bundling of all professionalized social activities into W&G resulted in a thorough undermining of the financial basis of the faith community.²⁴ Since the reorganization, the faith community seemed to have failed to gain by the positive public image of the Salvation Army and its financial consequences, because most of the donations by the public were made to the Army's social work. The Army church could not dispose of this money. It did however, also receive donations that were explicitly labeled for the church. These funds were supplemented by unlabeled income through the Foundation Salvation Army and Foundation Fundraising. This was done by means of a distributive formula between the different Army foundations and the church, nevertheless it proved to be hardly enough for the church to keep afloat as the bulk of the income went to W&G. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, an unfortunate investment strategy in stocks led to a loss in monetary reserves, and together with the decline in visitor numbers and a subsequent decrease of collections, the financial situation of the Army's faith community became deplorable. In 2009, it was observed that no more than seventy months were left before the Army's faith community would have to start to sell its properties...²⁵

A second effect of the reorganization that had fundamental consequences for the Army's church was the new organizational structure itself. The creation of separate entities did not only guard the Army's religious community from gov-

²⁴ Interview with Fijn, June 24, 2011

²⁵ *Strategieherziening Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils. Beleidsdocument. Uitgegeven door het Beleids-overleg Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils (BOK)*, November 2009:15

ernmental interference, but it also seemed to have prevented the faith community from experiencing the same organizational professionalization as W&G had.²⁶ In the opinion of some former and present Salvation Army managers, the result was that the faith community had not been able to profit from the innovative drive and the subsequent expansion of W&G. This can partly be ascribed to the choices that were made during the reorganization process, for already then it was decided to concentrate much of the Army's organizing power within W&G. For example, because of their abundant professional experience outside the Army, managers like Jansen and Van Teijlingen were regarded to be able to shape and manage a sizeable organization like W&G. Additionally, these 'organizational professionals' were supported by an executive board which was also constituted by experienced people. The Salvation Army church on the other hand, was run by the Territorial Commander, the Chief-Secretary and the Field Secretary, and without any structural support of other organizational professionals. Even though this leadership of the church was in full control of the religious part of the Salvation Army since 1990, W&G seemed to have outweighed the denomination on a managerial level as well as on the level of finances. Seen from this light, the new structure of the Salvation Army certainly contributed to the reduction of Army's religious community.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the concentration of social services within W&G did not affect the corps much, because already long before the reorganization, all subsidized social services had been organized within the several departments. Also the social activities that were exploited by the corps were of a voluntary and unsubsidized character and of a much different scope. Additionally, not many corps were socially active on a significant scale. That had to do with the size of a corps, and the focus of its presiding officer (did he or she feel comfortable with community activities?). Also, the possible lack of continuity in leadership contributed to the modest scale of the corps' social activities, for it was often the case that a certain corps-officer started a soup kitchen or another local social activity, but with the replacement of this individual two years later, the activity also often halted.²⁷ The differences between the social activities of the church and W&G were too big to be a real threat to the church, for it were not those small-scale voluntary activities that were centralized in W&G. Also, within the corps the sentiment with regard to the reorganization seemed to have been rather abiding and indifferent, or maybe even intentionally unresponsive, because people would continue to gather on Sundays whether W&G existed or not.

The general opinion however, was that the corps were in trouble. When, during the mid-2000s, Van der Harst came into command of the Salvation Army, he made a thorough attempt to rekindle the social potential of the Army's corps.

²⁶ Interview with Ringelberg, December 11, 2009

²⁷ Interview with Voorham, September 3, 2012

According to Voorham, Van der Harst was inspired by his work experience in the Amsterdam Goodwill Center and aimed to counterbalance the centralization of social services in W&G with the creation of a line of primary care activities by the corps. The high standard of professionalization of W&G's services had also made them, to a certain extent, less accessible as a potential client had to comply with an increasing number of preconditions. The corps on the other hand, were able to provide for an easily accessible form of social assistance in their local environment and therefore, Van der Harst sought for the enhancement of these local corps services. These efforts however, were only partly successful. They sparked a certain competition between the corps and W&G, and also, as Ringelberg reflects, a lack of revenues from these activities and limited Army funds to support them resulted in a lack of fundament to professionalize into structural services. The approach of Van der Harst did however, inspire some larger corps, like Amsterdam, Almere and Utrecht to invest more in their social activities – others seemed to have lacked the capacity to make it work.

The efforts and vision of Van der Harst also show that the Salvation Army has not been negligent with regard to the problems with its church. More than once, the Army attempted to revitalize the faith community, but only with little success. In November 2009, the most recent effort was launched. Confronted with a steady decline in membership and with the bottom of the treasury in sight, the Army was forced to resort to what it called “radical measures”:

- 1) In order to regain financial health the number of corps had to be reduced from 70 to 50 by 2012.
- 2) An accentuation of the vision of the faith community reveals that the Salvation Army attempted to widen its scope with regard to its target group, because in addition to those that had no helper, another explicit target group was now non-churchgoing and secular people.
- 3) As a result of regarding the Christian identity a competency, the officers who decided to dedicate themselves to the Army and its mission were to be professionalized.
- 4) The corps were to create social and religious activities that were in keeping with the needs of their vicinity, for example social and legal advice, catering and clothing shops.²⁸

These measures formed a strategy that aimed to strengthen the position of the faith community and that was called the “One Army concept”. The Army was well aware of the fact that Dutch society had different images of the Army, and with its One Army concept, it aimed to increase a balanced public image of the Army in which both its social services and its church were regarded as closely

²⁸ *Strategieherziening Kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils 2009:5-7*

interconnected.²⁹ Next to the positive appeal of this effort, this new emphasis on internal and external cohesion of the Army's identity explicitly acknowledged the gap between the faith community and the service community.

Nevertheless, when making up the balance of the reorganization of 1990 with regard to the Army's faith community and social services, it becomes clear that the new organizational structure had an ambivalent result. With regard to W&G a new vigor was visible and a drive to prove its added value by means of innovation and supplementarity. Additionally, the Army had found a way to combine its social work with its faith-based identity by presenting its identity as a competence and a quality. In this way the Army tried to resonate with the discourses on social policy and while at the same time it hoped to find a structural foundation for its core values. For the Army's community of faith however, the reorganization did produce both direct and indirect consequences of an undeniably negative character. So, with regard to the balance between the two parts of the Army's mission, it can be stated that even though the inseparable coin of the Army's twofold mission was still intact in 2010, in daily practice the inspiring and productive field of tension between the social and spiritual part of the Army's twofold mission seemed to have been neutralized by a paralyzing dividing line. Instead for the faith community to have become an inspiring source for the professional service community social, and vice versa, the organizational structure seemed to have failed to contribute to such synergy.

3. The government: lessons learned?

During the best part of the twentieth century, the Dutch government appreciated many of the traditional elements that characterized faith-based civil society: grassroots organizations that represented various groups in society and were organized based on different religious and political worldviews. During much of this period, identity was an important organizing principle for the social work field and thus the government had put much confidence in civil society for shaping and defining the character of the social welfare work. This changed however. Civil society lost its added value because of its alleged disfunction in combination with an altering society and subsequently, the government increasingly tried to tighten its grip by defining the social problems and regulating which organization or group was eligible to provide what type of care. At the same time, during this era of the 'end of ideologies' and decreasing interest in organized religion, the government gradually presented itself as less ideologically motivated and of a more neutral 'no-nonsense' character. This changed the balance of power between the civil society and government and additionally exerted much pressure on the identity of many faith-based social service providers, as

²⁹ Idem:4, 8

we have seen in the case of the Salvation Army. At the end of the 1980s civil society was domesticated and sidelined by the state, and the binding element of identity had been disqualified. The government had lost much of its appreciation for identity, but at the same time the government seemed to have thrown out the baby with the bathwater. The alternative to this variety of small faith-based care providers were large general and impersonal social service corporations. Maybe these were better to manage as proxy organizations, and maybe even these were able to provide for services in a cheaper way, but were these organizations also capable of being as sensitive to the social problems as many of their predecessors had been? And could they react to these problems with the same amount of responsiveness and flexibility? And with the same *doelmatigheid* as the former grassroots organizations had been able to?

It seems that the government also had asked itself these questions, for at the start of the twenty-first century once again a shift in the attitude of the government towards civil society was detectable. The revision process of the Dutch welfare state, which had started in the 1980s, had reached a phase of reevaluation of civil society. Civil society was once again invited by the government to re-think its relevance and position towards social issues and at the same time, the debate on the role of religion in the public domain revived. New, often individual forms of spirituality, combined with the emergence of Islam and other religions in the Netherlands, demanded the attention of Dutch social policymakers and again some initial acknowledgement became detectable from the side of government with regard to faith-based civil society organizations that had access to the poor side of society.³⁰ So, was there actually a broadening of the mindset of the government towards the role of identity in the public domain going on? Had the government learned a lesson? This question seemed to be answered positively by the introduction of the *Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning* (Wmo, Social Support Act) in 2007.

The Wmo aimed at activation of individual citizens by appealing to one's capacities instead of trying to find external compensation for one's limitations. In the explanatory memorandum comments on the first article of the Wmo, it was clearly indicated that the government had come to the conclusion that the intended social coherency and quality of life were to be strengthened, first and foremost, bottom-up. It was all about the "bringing into action of one's immediate surroundings like family, neighbors, local volunteers or church volunteers, or for example the sports club."³¹ The Wmo aimed to incite people to make use of their own individual possibilities and social connections before asking government for support. Interestingly, at the same time it opened doors for less professional organizations like religious communities to recreate their social relevance

³⁰ Dekker 2011:104

³¹ "Ook, en veelal in eerste instantie, gaat het om de inzet van de naaste omgeving, zoals familie, burens, vrijwilligers in de buurt of in kerkelijke verbanden of bijvoorbeeld de sportvereniging." *Kamerstukken II* 2004/05, 30 131 (MvT)

because now faith-based organizations and churches were invited to cooperate with government in shaping social support policy.³²

This modest but detectable revitalization of the role of identity in the public (welfare) domain however, did not prove to be an instant success. Public servants and policymakers had to get reacquainted with working with religious organizations. Possible private motives like proselytization might have induced much of the hesitance from the side of government, but that did not stop the government from looking for possible ways to increase cooperation with faith-based organizations. In doing so, the government hardly openly referred to their religious identity, but revealed a rather pragmatic attitude by showing mere interest in cooperation on certain policy goals like the reduction of social exclusion of certain groups and the pointing out of new social problems. Goals that the government knew very well that it could not reach by itself. In this cooperation, faith-based organizations were, once again appreciated for their intermediate functions between the government and these groups, and of course, for their high level of volunteer (and thus cheap) involvement.³³ The way in which the Wmo treated religious communities as equal with family and sports clubs, reveals that it was not so much the identity of these religious groups that had the interest of government, but much more their potential to mobilize their grassroots in order to fulfill their civic duty in terms of volunteer work and to generate social cohesion. Civil society organizations seemed instrumental once again to certain policy goals that were set by the government. And identity only seemed to play a minor part in this view. Nevertheless, two years after the introduction of the Wmo, the *Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten* (VNG, Association of Dutch Municipalities) published a guideline for public servants, policymakers and faith-based organizations on how to establish durable relations between the government and faith-based organizations without breaking the principle of separation of church and state. According to the authors, this was necessary because “religion is a fact of society that government cannot ignore.”³⁴

Another effort to redefine their relationship took place in mid-2011, when the Dutch Cabinet and the philanthropic sector entered a covenant in order to make a combined effort to achieve their shared public goals. In this covenant, churches were represented by their umbrella organization *Interkerkelijk Contact in Overheidszaken* (CIO, Interchurch Contact in Government Affairs in The Netherlands) of which the Salvation Army was an active member. Within the framework of this covenant, the government aimed to help professionalize the sector and to start collective social initiatives in order to create a ‘good society’. In this collective manner, all parties worked towards an exchange of information and knowledge, the balancing of policy and spending, the creation of innovative

³² Kennedy 2011:69,95

³³ Noordegraaf 2012:109-115

³⁴ “Religie is een maatschappelijk feit waar de overheid niet omheen kan.” VNG 2009:4

ways of financing social initiatives, enhancement of the infrastructure and transparency of the philanthropic sector and the strengthening of public trust.³⁵ So, at least to a certain extent, there was interest in cooperation between government and faith-based civil society, be it that the manner in which to shape this cooperation, was still rather undefined. Both government and faith-based civil society were actively exploring the possibilities for a new *modus operandi* to combine their efforts.

This reservation however, was the same for faith-based organizations and churches themselves, as they also needed some time to become conversant to the new possibilities that the Wmo offered to regain social relevance. Being accustomed to the fact that the primary responsibility of poor relief and many other forms of care had been in the hands of the welfare state, faith-based organizations and churches had to reassess their own diaconate or social charity function. The Wmo incited faith-based organizations and churches to actually rethink their public relevance and with the creation of local platforms of cooperation, these organizations were, to a certain extent, able to represent themselves in formal policy circuits. It also encouraged interdenominational cooperation. On a more internal level, the Wmo has induced a contemplative process on how to be a church with social relevance and this in its turn has resulted in cooperative projects and the reinforcement of networks. Also, churches had become more visible in society, as is exemplified by the increasing number of church-activities that were subsidized by the government.³⁶

This budding reevaluation of identity in the public domain also reflected on the role of the social professional, a subject of debate since the 1970s. During recent years, the axiom of professionalization had lost some of its edge because of new arguments that pointed in the direction of de-professionalization of the welfare work. The high standard of professionalization of social service providers seemed to have created an echelon of distant and unreachable professionals, which had an inhibiting effect on some of those who actually needed that help. This growing awareness gave birth to the idea that the capacities of individuals had to be emphasized rather than their deficiencies, and to make the citizen himself an accessible “social professional”.³⁷ This *burgerkracht* (civil force) also translated to the high level of volunteer activity in Dutch society. In 2008, the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* (CBS, Central Statistical Bureau) concluded that almost half of the Dutch citizens were active as volunteers, which made voluntarism an important part of the public debate on social responsibility and de-professionalization.³⁸ This voluntarism within Dutch society was particularly relevant to the idea of participation and activation of the individual that was

³⁵ *Ruimte voor geven. Convenant tussen het kabinet en de sector filantropie*, ‘tekenversie’ 2011:4

³⁶ Vreugdenhil 2012:234; Noordegraaf 2012:124-126

³⁷ Van der Lans 2010:123-129; De Boer en Van der Lans 2011; Wilken en Dankers 2012:28-31

³⁸ Herten 2008

incorporated in the Wmo.³⁹ The role of identity, now framed as *zingeving* ('giving meaning') had already been a part of the debate on the professional since the recent turn of the century when a new emphasis on ethics in social work triggered an academic debate on the "normative professional". In the Netherlands this debate was inspired by the University of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht but this interest in the role of identity and even religion in social welfare professionalism had continued to grow worldwide, and a renewed interest in the role of religion in social work was also detectable during the first decade of the twenty-first century in the international social work field.⁴⁰ In April 2011, the Netherlands center for social development, MOVISIE, even started a research platform on the issue of *zingeving* as an important part of social work counseling methods.⁴¹

This combination of an emerging interest in cooperation between government, faith-based civil society, and churches; voluntarism; de-professionalization and even religious professionalism seems to create a challenging environment for civil society and the government to recalibrate their current and future dynamical relationship. Part of this future however, is also the current financial malaise within the Eurozone. Many of the European economies are suffering hardship, and the sovereign debt crisis has not only destabilized many an economy but also hampered the European internal cooperation. The direct result of these European developments is that the current Dutch government (liberal-social) is focusing on huge cutbacks. For many Dutch citizens these cutbacks imply a declining public purchasing power, and a possible increase in non-payable debts. So, how can the Salvation Army, as a part of the Dutch faith-based civil society, proceed with its calibration effort in this unpredictable and challenging environment? Especially when one takes into account the dependent position that the Army has with regard to government? Is the Salvation Army up to the new challenges that it is confronted with during current times? Does the Army have a future in the Netherlands?

4. A world to win, or to lose?

When making up the balance, the decline of the Army's faith community cannot be ignored. Or even worse, it can be argued that because the government had become such an important part of the Salvation Army's frame of reference, the attitude of 'neutralization' of the government has also induced a certain degree of secularization within the Salvation Army as the doors were set widely ajar for non-Army professionals. The Army was forced to do so, because of its depend-

³⁹ Dekker 2002; De Vries 2012

⁴⁰ Van Ewijk 2010:67-68

⁴¹ http://www.movisie.nl/134500/def/home/maatschappelijke_zorg/zingeving_in_de_hulpverlening/ Also: Akkermans en Van Leeuwen-den Dekker 2010; Van 't Hof en Teppema 2011

ency on government support. This external influence on what the Army itself regarded to be a core element of its identity seems to have been accepted by the Army ‘collateral damage’ in exchange for the possibility to maintain its position in the social policy system. But why did the Army allow for this to happen? Why did the Army allow for the social activities to grow to such an extent that it was no longer able to pay for them by itself, and had to accept external funding accompanied by much governmental influence? Why did the Army not dispose of its professionalized social welfare activities to the partner that was already paying for it by means of subsidies and expenses: the government? That way it could very well have guarded itself from any outside influence. And in addition to this matter of identity, was not the Army, by accepting government funding, *de facto* denying the voluntary character and religious drive of its charitable work and thus allowing for the altruistic meaning of these ‘good deeds’ to be reduced to a merely salaried profession? Has the Salvation Army sold its birth-right for a bowl of lentil soup by becoming a paid charity? Or was this financial support to be interpreted as being an initial recognition of charitable faith communities that offered their services to governments and citizens?

According to Voorham, faith-based Christian charity is not attached to money, for it is the intention and the consequential deed that matters.⁴² The intention with which one wants to help others is regarded within Army ranks to be of overriding importance for the choices one makes. The Salvation Army regards itself as an organization that places itself between the state and those who are regarded as being socially excluded. As an intermediary, the Army holds out its hand for those that may have a legal right to obtain care but are not able to reach it on their own account. According to Voorham, this means that the Salvation Army will make use of all means possible in its effort to help these people: Christian compassion, professional knowledge and skills, devotion and commitment, ‘others’ who can do something that is outside the scope of the Army, and last but certainly not least, governmental welfare provisions and other public and private financial support. This last mentioned resource has proven to be quite well accessible, for the Salvation Army in its turn, has also proven to be an acceptable professional partner for the Dutch government. Not many social service providers focus their activities and services on what the Army describes as ‘those 5 to 10 percent that live on the fringes of society’. This means that in the view of the Army itself, being almost fully financed by the government combines very well with its pragmatic approach to help the poor and socially excluded. In that sense, the Army very suitably adapted its strategy to the sign of the times.

This also explains why the Army had no urge to submit its market share, and retrench and fall back to its own finances and community of faith. According to the current CEO of W&G Vader, renouncement of government funding would

⁴² Interview with Voorham, September 3, 2012

mean the discontinuance of much of the Army's social services. This would result in marginalization of the Salvation Army within Dutch society, a position that would be hard to swallow for the Army, because then it would have to surrender its dearly won political and social relevance. The most profound consequence, according to Vader, would be that the Salvation Army had to leave many of the socially excluded out in the cold.⁴³ So, also from this point of view, the acceptance of governmental finances seems rather well-founded in its religious identity as it invokes the motto "the end justifies the means".

This motto fits well with any army, but what about the underlying intention of evangelization? Is it not the Army's goal to save souls? For was it not Booth who declared that real change in people's lives would only be possible when they would be spiritually converted? According to current vice-CEO of W&G and son of K. van Teijlingen, H. van Teijlingen, spiritual conversion lies not within the power of men, and even more, any form of conditional sale by the Army is absolutely out of the question.⁴⁴ The Army is dedicated to propagating the gospel by means of acts of charity – good deeds – and not to actively convert people by words. In the *Nota Identiteit* of 2006, it is made explicit that the core of the Army's social philosophy is based on Biblical principles.⁴⁵

^[34] Then the King will say to those on his right, 'Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world. ^[35] For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, ^[36] I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me.'^[37] "Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink?' ^[38] When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? ^[39] When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?' ^[40] "The King will reply, 'Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.'

^[37] Jesus replied: 'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.'^[38] This is the first and greatest commandment. ^[39] And the second is like it: 'Love your neighbor as yourself.'"⁴⁶

⁴³ Interview with Vader, August 31, 2012

⁴⁴ Interview with H. van Teijlingen, September 5, 2012

⁴⁵ *Door Christus aangeraakt, om mensen bewogen. Nota Identiteit Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg* 2006:11. Many of the persons interviewed referred to this scriptural passage as having a leading influence on the Army's approach to social activities.

⁴⁶ Matthew 25: 34-40 and Matthew 22: 37-39, New International Version (NIV)

Based on these scriptural passages, the Army takes the view that ‘acts speak louder than words’, irrespective of these acts were being paid for, and that through the acts of Salvationists the message of the gospel may be communicated even clearer than through their words. By making this view also central to its policy strategy, the Army avoids being accused of proselytizing in combination with providing for social services, but at the same time it is able to emphasize its image as a religiously motivated social service provider with some specific distinguishing features: committed, trustworthy and reliable. In the effort to maintain its position towards the government, the Army has positioned itself by means of emphasizing reciprocity, supplementarity, and by arguing that its services are of good quality, a quality that most recently has been ascribed to the combination of highly-professional care and identity as part of that professionalism. This line of argumentation would have been rather circumspect during the 1980s and 1990s, but in current times, this approach might actually prove to be of value. This brings us to the last question of this book – a question that is, from a historian’s point of view, as tempting as it is perfidious: what about the future of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands?

With regard to above described developments, there seems to be a world to win for the Salvation Army in the Netherlands, and the Army has interesting features that, when mobilized successfully, can prove to be of much value. But to what extent will the Army be able to do so? One possibility to make this effort successful for the Army is to combine its highly professionalized but possibly inhibiting social services, with its voluntary, but very accessible local church activities. Then, the two pillars of its dual mission will not only be held together, but will continue to create a synergetic innovative and vital force. Such an approach might even prove to be a constructive route towards the revitalization of the Army’s faith community. The sentiments between the faith community and W&G however, give reason to believe that this will need more attention than has actually been allowed for a long time since the reorganization of 1990. Whereas the social services of W&G can be assessed as being rather over-professionalized, and the faith community seems to have become despondent, a duty presents itself to the Army leadership: to ensure a close cooperation between the Army’s faith community and the professionals of W&G, and interestingly enough, the Army does not have to search far to find a vivid example of how this can be realized. Van Teijlingen recounts:

“From the growing number of visitors, our Army corps in Almere concluded that solitude amongst elderly had increased, for every year more elderly stopped by for a chat and a cup of coffee. Traditionally the corps had provided for elderly services through their *Bejaardenbond* (Senior Society), but even though W&G had also started a similar project *Grijs Genoegen* (Grey Delight) that aimed to breach the social isolation of the elderly on a national level, the Almere corps had initiated local activities on its own to invite the elderly: gymnastics, playing shuffleboard, et cetera. From the conversations

that occurred during those activities, it became clear that there was a more structural need for day care for the elderly, and the *Huiskamer project* (Living Room project) was started. At the same time, in 2008, W&G also opened its first community center called *Buurtsteunpunt "Bij Bosshardt"* (Neighborhood center "With Bosshardt"). This center was named after the famous Army Major Bosshardt, and it was open to anyone that wanted to come for a chat and a cup of coffee.

In Almere, the limited opening hours of the *Huiskamer* were extended and at the end of the day, a bowl of soup was served. This attracted a new group of people – other than the elderly – with their own stories and problems, and soon one of these new problems proved to be the issue of financial debt reduction. Because a growing number of visitors seemed to have been confronted with high debts and low incomes, the Almere corps started to provide for meals at low prices. With this new service, however, the corps also needed new kitchen equipment, which was partly provided for by another local foundation that wanted to pitch in. Also, local supermarkets started to offer their surplus supplies, which resulted in the distribution of food parcels for the deprived.

All these activities were organized according to immediate needs and with the strong dedication of committed individuals. The corps in Almere has been totally dependent on volunteer commitment, but only 15% to 20% of its 120 volunteers are Salvationists. There are many more 'outside' volunteers. For example, when the corps continued to develop activities and increased in social relevance, the Almere municipality asked the corps to help people with their reintegration process into a regular work situation, and since then it functions as a certified trainee post. However, as these trainees require professional tutoring, this part of the work is provided for by W&G staff, and not the corps volunteers. W&G is also indirectly involved in the activities of the corps as W&G staff has a place in the steering committee that supervises the palette of corps activities. Also on other matters, the corps knows how to find W&G and vice versa. When, for example, the corps encounters an acute problem like home eviction, it contacts the W&G project called "*Perspectief*" in order to secure a shelter for the people in question. Sometimes the corps also receives the request from the W&G to take over supervision over a certain individual."⁴⁷

This insight on a tentative cooperation between an enterprising corps like Almere and W&G shows that sometimes both parts of the same organization develop similar activities without making use of the other's expertise and resources on the matter. It also shows that, even if it happens prudently, any synergy between parts of the Army's organization might lead to an advantage for

⁴⁷ Interview with K. van Teijlingen, August 18, 2010

both parties when developed consciously. Because when, for example, a corps, as a voluntary organization, is overloaded with work it can ask W&G to step in and take over certain activities. In its turn, W&G can make good use of the knowledge that a corps has developed with regard to the creation of accessible local social services, and with it increase the range and impact of its presence in society. It is interesting that this ‘Almere type’ of interconnectedness between different social and religious parts of the Army has always formed the basis for the Army’s goodwill centers. As a matter of fact, Major Bosshardt had always regarded this combination of social and religious aims essential to the effectiveness of the Army’s work: “The secret of ‘her’ Goodwill-center and its vigor was that she combined two things: social work (subsidized) and an Army corps.”⁴⁸ But to what extent is this scenario possible at the current juncture the Army finds itself in?

Throughout its history, the innovative capacity of the Salvation Army has provided for creative and relevant solutions to rather new and acute social problems. Whenever the Dutch welfare state seemed to fail a particular group within society, the Army has shown the potential to fill in that particular gap. Accordingly, also the current financial crisis may therefore provide new chances for the Army to prove its social relevance. This does however, mean that the Army has to be able to seize the opportunity and in order to be able to do so, the Army has to have an organizational structure at its disposal that facilitates this innovative potential, and also abundant personal drive as is provided for by e.g. vocational voluntarism. The problem is however, that especially these two features are under rather great pressure, as we have seen above.

First of all: will the current organizational structure prove to be sufficiently supportive for such a process of joining forces between the two parts of the Army’s mission, especially with regard to the ongoing secularization within the Salvation Army? What if this results in a further decrease in numbers of corps? For, the chances are that in the ultimate case, the Army’s mission will be reduced to its social objective only. And would in that case the Army as we know it still exist? Both Vader and Voorham are of the opinion that when viewed from this perspective, the Army corps are just an organizational form.⁴⁹ This idea correlates with how social scientist Sengers views the concept of *caritas*. In his opinion, *caritas* stands for both belief and deed, and not so much the organization that provides for it.⁵⁰ According to Voorham, the core of the Salvationist motivation is not so much formalized in an organizational structure, but it is existent in the spirit of its people. This idea equals the analysis behind the classification that management consultant Peter Drucker put on the Salvation Army in the U.S. According to Drucker the Army is “the most effective organization

⁴⁸ “Het geheim van ‘haar’ Goodwill-centrum en de bloei ervan was dat ze twee dingen combineerde: maatschappelijk werk (met subsidie) en een legerkorps.” Harm en Polman 1982:39

⁴⁹ Interview with Voorham, September 3, 2012; Interview with Vader, August 31, 2012

⁵⁰ Sengers 2012

in the U.S.” because the Army offers non-material goals for people who therefore are willing to ‘go an extra mile’ and therefore embody the values that the brand Salvation Army stands for.⁵¹ When this line of thought is continued, according to Voorham, in the ultimate case, the Army’s faith-based fundament could very well continue to form the base of its social services as long as the Salvation Army has a spiritual breeding ground (for example the texts of its founding father William Booth). In that case it is not the number of Salvationists that form the key to the Army’s success, but it is “Salvationism” that forms the secret of the Army’s social relevance.

This line of reasoning however, denies the implications of an organizational structure on its identity. Organizational structures tend to form a force by their own and become more dominant than that people sometimes like. On the other hand, with regard to the spiritual breeding ground, organizational structure might just prove to be an element of success. For even Salvationism has to be nurtured and fed, and without the support of an effective organizational structure, Salvationism might wither irrespective of any number of Salvationists. The Army has chosen to make its identity into an important distinguishing feature and this strategy might prove to be of great interest in the Army’s struggle to curb the ongoing internal secularization. Additionally, the diminishing membership numbers has put the Army’s existential question of identity on the forefront, in a rather pressing manner. This need for internal deliberations however, brings with it the risk that the Army will become too introverted and thus also the organizational structure has to provide for mechanisms that check such a reflex.

One of the unique selling points of the Army that might help to prevent running dry from its grassroots is to activate external volunteers. Even though the Army had made some unfortunate choices on the subject in the past, it has proven to be able to commit hundreds of volunteers. This mobilizing potential makes the Army attractive to the Dutch government and society as a whole, especially with regard to the Wmo. On the other hand, will this influx of external people not encroach on the Army’s precious identity? Most obvious is that the Army will try to recruit its volunteers amongst kindred spirits and even also other religious communities. Is this the case? Does the Army actively try to entice members of other churches and religious communities to make use of the Army’s organizational structure (W&G or corps work) and become active within one of the various social activities that the Army provides for? Or has the Army to intensify its effort in this area? The current strategy of the Army is focused on creating a sense of shared responsibility between the Army and the Dutch society in a more general sense. With the slogan: ‘Together we’re one’, the Army not only emphasizes the internal coherence between the various parts of the organization, but also the Army wants to make an inviting statement to anyone and any organization in society that is willing to contribute time, money or other means

⁵¹ Watson and Brown 2001

in order work towards a good society.⁵² In this manner, the Army actually seems to have widened its scope even more, in order to create a critical mass on a voluntary basis that can contribute to the Army's twofold mission. But will that be enough?

Even though the Salvation Army seems to have a world to win in the Netherlands, the way to do so depends very much on how the Army will continue to balance its two-sided mission, as it has done throughout its very existence in Dutch society. The Army proves to have a selling point that has become more and more unique over time: its faith-based identity. At the same time, it is exactly this faith-based identity that confronts the Army with problems on a regular basis. So, will the Army continue to be able to raise it high enough so that it can give light to everyone in the house? Or will the Army feel forced to put its lamp under the bowl and keep its faith-based identity hidden – a private force that silently fuels the Army's work? When done carefully, the Army might well continue on the road of propagating its identity as part of its professionalism, for at least within some parts of the Dutch government a budding interest value-driven social work seems to be present. Sometimes even the government seems not only to have lost some of its embarrassment with religious organizations, but it has started to show an active interest in a renewed cooperation. This might not only give the Army a chance for further stabilization of its position in the social policy system as an important co-actor to the government, but it also leaves the door ajar for the Army to do so, based on its religious identity. Thus the Army's two-fold mission might be rebalanced again, and this time in favor of its religious mission. On the other hand there are many developments that pose a threat to the Army's faith-based identity as a social service provider, and much of the Army's continuation depends on how the people who are responsible for managing this sympathetic icon of the Dutch (urban) scene: are they able to maintain such an organizational structure that the cherished Salvationism has a chance for survival? For as a member of the Dutch society I hope that during the Christmases of many years to come, when I will myself probably still hurry through the crowded corridors of the Utrecht Station shopping mall, it will be possible for me to catch another glimpse of this uniformed individual, next to the Army's iconic red kettle.

⁵² Interview with Vader, August 31, 2012

Appendix A – List of legislation with regard to the Dutch welfare state

This list is based on four important functions of the welfare state: care, community, education and social security.

1803	Lager Onderwijswet
1854	Armenwet
1857	Onderwijswet
1863	Wet op het Middelbaar Onderwijs
1865	Wet op de Uitoefening van de Geneeskunst
1874	Kinderwet
1875	Wet op het Lager Onderwijs
1876	Wet op het Hoger Onderwijs
1889	Arbeidswet
1895	Veiligheidswet
1900	Leerplichtwet
1901	Ongevallenwet
	Woningwet
	Kinderwetten
1902	Beroepswet
1912	Armenwet
1913	Radenwet
	Ziektewet
	Invaliditeits- en Ouderdomswet
1914	Noodregeling-Treub
1915	Oorlogszeeongevallenwet
1916	Werkloosheidsbesluit
1919	Ouderdomswet
	Gezondheidswet
	Invaliditeitswet
	Zeeongevallenwet
	Werkloosheidsverzekeringsnoodwet
1920	Wet op de Rijksverzekeringsbank
1921	Ongevallenwet
	Nijverheidsonderwijswet
1922	Land- en Tuinbouwongevallenwet
1925	Arbeidsgeschillenwet
1927	Wet op de CAO vorming
1929	Ziektewet
1932	Bedrijfsradenwet
	Steunregeling Werklozen
1933	Organisatiewet Sociale Verzekering
1934	Woningwet
1935	Werkloosheidssubsidiewet

- 1937 Wet op het verbindend en onverbindend verklaren van CAO's
- 1939 Kinderbijslagwet voor Loontrekkenden
- 1941 Ziekenfondsbesluit
- 1947 Noodwet Ouderdomsvoorziening
Woonruimtetwet
- 1948 Kinderbijslagwet voor rentetrekkeners
- 1949 Werkloosheidswet
- 1950 Wet op de Ondernemingsraden
Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie
- 1951 Noodwet Kinderbijslag Kleine Zelfstandigen
- 1952 Organisatiewet Sociale Verzekering
- 1955 Beroepswet
- 1956 Wet op de Sociale Verzekeringsbank en de Raden van Arbeid
Gezondheidswet
Algemene Ouderdomswet
- 1959 Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet
- 1962 Interimwet Invaliditeitsrentetrekkeners
Algemene Kinderbijslagwet
- 1963 Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening
Kinderbijslagwet voor kleine zelfstandigen
Algemene Bijstandswet
Wet op het voortgezet onderwijs
- 1964 Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening
- 1965 Ziekenfondswet
Tijdelijke rijksgroepsregeling mindervaliden
- 1966 Ziektewet
- 1967 Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering
Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten
- 1971 Wet Voorzieningen Gezondheidszorg
- 1974 Kaderwet Specifiek Welzijn
- 1976 Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet
- 1980 Algemene Kinderbijslagwet
- 1982 Ziektewet
- 1985 Wet op het Basisonderwijs
- 1987 Welzijnswet
- 1992 Besluit Beheer Sociale Huursector
- 1993 Wet op de Basisvorming
Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg
- 1994 Welzijnswet
- 1996 Algemene nabestaandenwet
Wet Educatie en Beroepsonderwijs
- 1997 Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten
- 2003 Wet werk en bijstand
- 2007 Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning

Appendix B – List of Territorial Commanders of the Salvation Arm in the Netherlands

1887-1888	J.K. Tyler
1888-1889	H.C. Hodder
1889-1891	G.P. French
1891-1896	W.E. Oliphant
1896-1902	A.S. Clibborn
1902-1907	<i>Various</i>
1907-1915	W. Ridsdel
1915-1920	<i>Various</i>
1920-1928	W.H. Howard
1928-1939	B. Vlas
1939-1940	A.J. Benwell
1940-1941	B. Vlas
1939-1946	Liquidation. <i>Various</i>
1945-1945	B. Vlas
1945-1950	C.H. Durman
1950-1956	E. Thykjaer
1956-1960	R. Åhlberg
1960-1966	W.F. Palstra
1966-1971	K. Westergaard
1971-1974	L.P. Pindred
1974-1978	C.A. Verwaal
1978-1980	G.L. Nelting
1980-1982	C.A. Verwaal
1982-1986	R.A. Cox
1986-1992	R.J. Schurink
1992-2000	J. van Boven
2000-2002	T.R. Gulliksen
2002-2007	W. van der Harst
2007-2010	R.A. Frans
2010-	J.C.Y. van Vliet

Appendix C – Salvation Army’s organizational charts since 1990




Figure 1: Function Diagram Salvation Army in the Netherlands, 1989 (source: *Decisions for legal restructure of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands 1989:74*)




Figure 2: Function Diagram Salvation Army in the Netherlands, 1989. Including staffing (source: *Decisions for legal restructuring of the Salvation Army in The Netherlands 1989*)

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Summary in English

The Salvation Army is a recognizable icon of social care all over the world. In the Netherlands the Army is well known for its charitable activities like giving shelter to the homeless and providing for other primary help like clothing, food or just a friendly face. Interwoven with this image is its faith-based character, for in its public display, the Army explicitly emphasizes that the Christian faith is what drives the Salvationist. In fact, in the Netherlands the Salvation Army is an acknowledged church.

This image of the Army as a faith-based charity is far from complete though, because the Salvation Army is also a sizable professional social service provider. The Army offers, on a daily basis, programs for the elderly, children, women, the homeless and young mothers; as well as day care programs, addiction programs, services to the armed forces, prisoners, youngsters, the unemployed, those in debts, the hungry and even programs to students. Apart from this, the Salvation Army provides for many other medical and health services, emergency disaster response, and educational programs. As a faith-based organization, the Salvation Army is embedded in the Dutch society as well as in the realms of social and medical care.

Throughout Dutch history, these social activities were traditionally provided for by church groups and other, often faith-based, organizations. However, after the era of secularization and political neutralization that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century, there are not many faith-based social service providers left in the Netherlands. The fact that the Salvation Army forms an exception to this development makes it an interesting organization for further analysis. Especially considered that 90% of the costs that the Army incurs on these social services are paid for by public money in the form of subsidies, grants, government contracts, contributions from collective health insurances and other social welfare legislation.

The Salvation Army does not operate in a political or social as it had to relate to the Dutch national government. Also, from the moment it opened its doors in Amsterdam in 1887, it had to participate in a field of social care that was already occupied by a myriad of smaller and larger organizations. Therefore the Army was always part of the Dutch civil society. Since the last decades of the nineteenth century, the national government began to show an increasing interest in alleviating social problems by means of social welfare legislation. This however, meant that the roles of both the government and civil society would be altered. With the increase in social legislation between 1890 and 1945, the prime responsibility for these issues slowly started to shift from the shoulders of civil society to the national and local governments. This process gained momentum after World War II when the contours of what would be called the 'welfare state' became visible, both internationally as well as in the Netherlands. Next to the Ministry of Social Affairs (1933), the Ministry of Social Work was established in 1952, and a safety net of social (welfare) legislation was laid out during these decades. The introduction of the Social Support Act in 1965 created in-

come security for everyone in the Netherlands. This closing move by the Dutch welfare state however, also implied that civil society had lost its traditional prerogative of being ultimately responsible for poor relief, a position that is still a fact in present times.

This shift in the balance between the government and civil society with regard to the responsibility for social care shows that the Dutch state and civil society maintained a relationship in their mutual effort to battle social wrongs; a battle in which both actors were dependent on each other. While the government lacked the power to actually intervene in people's private situations, civil society made use of governmental (financial and legislative) support in its effort to do precisely that. And so this relationship was based on a shared goal. On the other hand, as this study shows, both actors also demonstrated reluctance in this cooperation. Even though they were bound together by mutual dependency, this relation seems to have been interspersed with an alternating pattern of attraction and repulsion in which both actors had their own, variable, preconditions. To a certain extent this pattern bears a resemblance to that of a courtship dance - a relationship in which attraction and repulsion alternate within the social framework of interdependence. This metaphor also applies to the Salvation Army which has been more than just a witness to these developments. Being part of civil society, the Army has also actively taken part in the social policy system process as an actor. Therefore, studying this relationship sheds new light on how this system impacted the Dutch faith-based civil society with the Salvation Army operating on its frontline.

The central research questions in this study are as follows: What are the perceptible dynamics in the relation between the state and the Salvation Army in the Netherlands with regard to social policy between 1890 and 1990? What do these dynamics reveal about the developing Dutch welfare state and faith-based civil society and how did they affect the identity of the Salvation Army itself? These main questions are further subdivided into more empirical research questions with regard to the relationship between the government and the Army: What were the policy goals and underlying principles of the government and of the Salvation Army? And how did these goals function in the cooperation, dependency and distribution of power between both actors? Moreover, how did this cooperation influence the Salvation Army's identity? This last question leads to more issues connected to the Salvation Army, of which the following are addressed: How was the Salvation Army able to maintain its faith-based identity within the force field of the changing governmental attitude towards such faith-based civil society organizations? What were the main issues in relation to the state that pressured the Salvation Army, and by what means did the Salvation Army attempt to control these external influences and to maintain its autonomy and identity?

These questions are addressed in this study by means of historical research. Primary and secondary sources are studied and interpreted in a historical-hermeneutical manner. In order to learn more about the Salvation Army, its archives in the Netherlands are analyzed and supplemented by interviews with

key-persons from the Army. The historical description of the Dutch welfare policy is largely based on parliamentary records and further supplemented with secondary literature. The most significant concepts that are studied, like the welfare state, civil society, organizational identity, and the idea of the relationship between the government and the Salvation Army as a part of civil society, are framed in an international discursive academic context.

Part I: The social policy system in the Netherlands

In Part I the development is analyzed of what is framed as the 'social policy system'. This system is based on a structural relationship between the government as the main policy provider, and civil society and the Dutch citizens as main policy implementers and clients. In a combined effort to tackle social problems, these actors have created a system in which public and private funds are structurally reallocated to social policy aims; aims that alter over time, according to social and political developments. The time span of this part of the study (1854-1990) is chosen because of the underlying theme of this narrative: the responsibility for care and the effects this has on the position of civil society in relation to the government.

Around 1900 the (merely local) governmental approach to social problems was mainly to support goals on concrete social issues, and only step into the picture when these had developed into situations beyond the scope of civil society organizations, as was the case with tuberculosis and infant mortality for example. This support was hardly structural, was offered on request of the organization that was to carry out the implementation and was based on supplementarism, for the organizations themselves had to pay for most of the costs incurred.

Soon after 1900 however, a change started to take shape. Both civil society and the national government increasingly sought the assistance of each other on various social issues. However, opposition to state control and the fear of losing autonomy from the side of civil society curbed the further structuralizing of this budding cooperation. Nevertheless, during the period 1910-1945 the contours of certain policy goals became visible. The quality of the social care was to be increased by professionalization of the organizations involved: skilled labor and accountability. Also, the intensifying process of pillarization had increased the number of care organizations and problems of manageability grew. So, with the intention of 'harmonizing' this fragmented and extensive group of organizations, the government encouraged them to unite into an umbrella organization, corresponding with their ideological pillars. With World War II approaching, two important social policy themes had become visible: quality and manageability. Additionally, the availability of governmental funding to social service organizations not only instigated a growth in the number of organizations, but more than once, the funding appeared to be of a more structural nature than was envisioned. This enhanced the structural character of the cooperation between the government and civil society. The 'social policy system' was born.

The post-war spirit of 'reconstruction and renewal' strengthened the co-alignment of the government and civil society, resulting in the establishment of

the Ministry of Social Work in 1952. Also, between 1945 and 1965 important Dutch welfare legislation was adopted and implemented, and the Dutch welfare state was coming of age. The social policy theme of manageability, interpreted as harmonization and efficiency, was now legitimized by acknowledgment of the value of identity. This became clear in the government's effort to involve the public with the construction of social policy by inviting its organizational representatives – civil society – at the policy table. Because of their identity, civil society organizations were regarded to be the pre-eminent structures to mobilize their grassroots and made them valued partner to the government in the social policy system. During the empowering 1960s however, the governmental view on identity as an organizing principle started to change. With the crumbling of the ideological pillars, new ideologically 'neutral' organizations were created, in which the smaller former faith-based civil society organizations started to combine their forces. With this development a third important policy theme rose to the surface: social activation and participation. The development of the welfare state was accompanied by a growing emphasis of the government on participation and during the 1960s promotion of volunteer work became one of the policy lines that were adopted. Also the administrative approach of decentralization aimed at the increase of both participation and manageability and would remain a recurring theme throughout the twentieth century. National policy was to be decentralized to those governmental administrative levels (municipality, province) that were regarded to have more knowledge and understanding of the groups that were the subject of these policies. This development also meant that some of the power that the government possessed would be redistributed to the local level and civil society would have to recalibrate its position in this force field accordingly.

With regard to the policy theme of quality, the emphasis on professionalization of both personnel and the administration of the civil society organizations continued throughout these post-war decades. But as a result of the emancipatory vigor of the 1960s, the themes of professionalization and participation were also translated by a new theme: democratization and representation.

In 1974, *Knelpuntennota* (Bottleneck report) took stock of the government's policy efforts on harmonization, quality and participation and the results were tough on civil society as well as on the government. In short, civil society was alleged to have turned into introspective organizations. Professionalization had reduced the importance of the volunteer, the role of identity had diminished and with it the representational function of civil society suffered much pressure. It seemed to have lost its added value and now its place in the social policy system was debatable. The characteristics of representation and identity that had earlier set civil society apart had now devaluated, and with the responsibility for social help in the hands of the government, it was only a matter of time before the government would intervene.

The *Knelpuntennota* had for the first time made explicit what was already widely felt: civil society had lost its added value of being a representative on the matter of identity. This observation formed a clear threat to its existence and so

civil society organizations had to reinvent themselves, for which, interestingly, civil society received help from the government. In response to the situation sketched by the *Knelpuntennota* the government continued its decentralization effort in order to improve participation on the local level. Civil society itself would have to be restructured, but in order to do achieve success on this front the organizations themselves would have to be involved in the process. Civil society also was to continue on the road to harmonization and participation in terms of democratization and effectiveness, and possibilities for further democratic influence in civil society organizations would be studied. However, now that civil society organizations were no longer regarded as organizational exponents of their grassroots, they could function very well as support structures to further individual activation of what was left of their grassroots. This was combined with a reevaluation of the volunteer from the side of the government. Even though the civil society organizations were no longer valued as identity organizations, the volunteer's internal motivation was still based on this identity and this source of intrinsic commitment was still considered important by the government. In place of civil society organizations, individual citizens were now regarded as representatives of their individual identity. These organizations however, could be able to maintain their place in the social policy system by facilitating this 'rehabilitation of the volunteer' which was deemed by the government as essential for the quality of social services.

This development continued into the 1980s when policy goals like decentralization, democratization and volunteer commitment were emphasized to develop human potential. New however, was the idea that this was not to be facilitated by the central state, but on a local level. And not by civil society organizations as intermediary political institutions, but only as support structures for the individual development of their autonomous members. Volunteer work had now to be revalued for it was both a means of participation as well as a possible way for effective cost reduction. This new policy framework was phrased as 'the responsible society' by Minister of CRM, Brinkman (CDA): individual activation and self-responsibility by means of *mantelzorg* (taking care of one's fellow), self-help, and volunteer work, became central elements in the welfare policy of these years. In order to implement these policies effectively, society itself would have to regain its responsibility for social problems, and this effort had to be supported more by the market than by the state. So the government had to keep its distance from the playing field. With the announcement of the retrenchment of the state and the lack of added value of these civil society organizations, individuals and society had regained their responsibility. Further financing of the umbrellas was now needless and many ceased to exist.

By 1990, the welfare policy system had seen different phases of development: commencement, coming of age, flowering, hampering, adjustment and fine-tuning. And now it seemed to enter a new phase of change. Interesting however is that even though change seemed to have been the main force that shaped the structure and form of policy, three values were visible throughout this process: quality, manageability and participation. These values formed the

base for welfare policy concepts that differed over time in dominance as well as with regard to their actual interpretations: professionalization, harmonization, shared responsibility, democratization, decentralization, volunteer work and activation. A central theme in the development of these policy concepts was the role of civil society as co-actors in the system. As long as 'identity' provided for an organizational principle, the government seemed to value civil society as a partner. But when this added value became less clear, civil society had to recalibrate its position in the welfare policy system, and even though the government provided for a possible new role, many faith-based civil society organizations united into large 'neutral' service providers, while others ceased to exist. What about the Salvation Army then? How did the Army position itself within this welfare policy system and how did it cope with the different force fields that were integrated into this system?

Part II: The Salvation Army identity process

In Part II, the development of the Salvation Army as an actor in this social policy field is described, starting with the Army's establishment in the Netherlands in 1887 and continuing on till the Army's most recent fundamental reorganization in 1990. During this period, three narrative lines are followed: how the Salvation Army became a part of the social policy system and how this influenced the Army's identity; the consequences of this process on a legal level; and its consequences on the level of professionalization. These three developments converged during the 1980s, and provided for important and rather pressing reasons for the Army to consider a fundamental restructuring of its organization, which eventually took place in 1990. The Salvation Army's identity was shaped along three developments: its position in the social policy system, its legal identity and its professionalization.

The Salvation Army as part of the welfare policy system

Although the English parent organization The Salvation Army started out as a religious community, founder William Booth decided in 1890 that the Army had to be more than a church. It could no longer close its eyes to the poignant social misery existent in the industrialized England of the late nineteenth-century. With the publication of *In Darkest England and The Way Out*, Booth introduced an additional goal to the preaching of the gospel: provision of social care where and when possible. Since then, the identity of the Army was based on a double mission: religious salvation and social care. This double mission set the path for the young division of the Army in the Netherlands (1887) to cooperate with the Dutch government. Therefore, over the period between 1887 and the end of World War II, the government and the Army increasingly realized that, to a large extent, they pursued similar goals, focusing on combating social problems. Soon after the introduction of the social mission in 1890 the Army in the Netherlands grew in size from 37 corps in 1890 to 48 in 1892. The Army's social work also increased and in 1908, the Army spent an equal amount of money on its religious mission as it did on its social work.

The initial cooperation of the Army with the government became visible through its rehabilitation work. Although, since the early years of the twentieth century, the government made grants available for this work on an occasional basis, the Probation Order of 1910 made way for a structural government support funding. Because of its decades-long experience with this form of care, the Army was also asked to participate in this arrangement, indicating that the government recognized that both actors pursued similar goals. Nevertheless, the Army showed some hesitation, because the acceptance of this invitation would bring other cherished values of the Army under pressure: autonomy and independence. The Army took plenty of time before it decided to finally enter into such cooperation, the decision being necessitated by the threat to the very livelihood of the organization - an argument also used by other rehabilitation organizations. During the economic crisis of the 1930s, it became obvious that the probation department of the Army had become quite dependent on these funds. However, instead of withdrawing, the Army decided to strengthen its own position. The Army had to be spared, it argued, because the work that it did saved the government thousands of guilders. And with this argument, the Army claimed that although the balance of power had changed in favor of the government, the relationship between the two actors was based on a certain degree of reciprocity. This argument of economic reciprocity legitimized the Army's position - a strategy that fitted well in the time of economic downturn. But because the Army realized that its dependence on the government was greater than the other way round, it hastened to add that it was only a tool in the toolbox of the government, thereby presenting itself as being merely instrumental. These arguments of economic reciprocity and instrumental supplementation remained important features of the relationship of the Army with the government.

After World War II the Army continued to expand as both its social activities and church grew, and its operating result doubled (as did the private donations). This was partly because the government increased its subsidy supply. But another important factor was that the Army itself was getting accustomed to its place within the social policy system, and also managed to locate new subsidy sources. Additionally, the Army reorganized parts of the organization based on the subsidy flows, which was a clear sign of the readiness of the Army to be flexible in order to ensure its own existence. At times however, the relationship between the government and the Army became tensed, but the relationship with the Army proved to be too valuable for the government municipality to risk, emphasizing the interdependence of both actors.

Between 1910 and 1980, the Army's strategy of economic reciprocity and supplementation, legitimized the position of the Army in the social policy system, and the social mission of the Army became an important pillar of the organization and its identity. But during the 1970s and especially the 1980s, this legitimization as well as the convergence of objectives between the two actors, came under pressure as the harmonization efforts of the government were hardly felt, especially within the rehabilitation department of the Salvation Army. The government aimed for harmonization of the work field and for the Army, merger

meant having to let go of its own rehabilitation work and disappearing into a larger and ‘neutral’ organization. This would prove to not be an option to the Salvation Army which strove for the preservation of its right of existence and autonomy. Thus this interdependency with the government had resulted in the development of the Army’s social services to such an extent that within the social policy system it pressured the other side of the Army’s coin: its identity. Once again the question presented itself: how to maintain its identity and at the same time show as much flexibility as possible in order to secure its income?

The legal identity of the Salvation Army

During most of its existence in the Netherlands, the Salvation Army has tried to give shape to its legal identity, especially with regard to its changing political and social context. This legal identity was mirrored on three levels: the Articles of Association; the phrasing of the Army’s mission statement therein; and the subsequent form of legal incorporation that the Army chose. The Army’s legal identity was closely related to its identity in a larger sense, as the underlying questions of this narrative show: What are we? What can we be? And what do we want to be? And to a certain extent, these questions in turn also relate to the balance of power between the government and the Salvation Army.

Before World War II the Salvation Army seemed to have maneuvered itself into an unclear legal position. With its Articles of Association of 1896 and 1931 it was incorporated as a foundation. But the Army was at times convinced that it was actually an “ecclesiastical foundation” – a legal form for foundations that were part of a denomination or a church. The international relation with its alma mater in the United Kingdom however, invoked another ambiguous image, for even though in fact the Dutch Salvation Army was British property, it clearly presented itself to be quite Dutch. Until World War II, the Army seemed to feel comfortable with this self-selected identity. But during the war, this changed with the liquidation of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands by the German oppressors, for the Articles of Association of 1931 clearly indicated that the Army was an English organization. In order to counterbalance this show of force from the oppressors, and to continue its activities, the Army re-established itself in 1941, but now as a church, and with a separate foundation for its remaining social activities. This flexibility in order to ensure its existence would have far-reaching consequences, as became clear when in 1945, once again by means of external intervention, the liquidation was annulled and the Army’s past legal form of foundation was restored based on the 1931 Articles. But by then the Army’s rank and file had learned to appreciate being a church to such an extent that it wanted to remain a church. Additionally, being a church could also shield the Salvation Army against possible new unwanted government interference. So next to its internal drive, the Army also wanted to remain a church in order to improve its position relative to the government on the power balance. On the other hand, the Army did not want to give up the legal form of the foundation, for this provided for a better legal framework for its financial relations with the government. And, quite in line with its pre-war preference for ambiguity, the

Army chose both: based on the Articles of 1931 the Army was a foundation and based on its annulled recognition as a church (1941), it presented itself as a church. This new hybrid legal form was recorded in the new statutes of 1946, and with (hesitant) recognition by the Department of Justice in 1948, the Salvation Army was from then on actually a church-foundation. An identity that was partly formed under the strong influence of governments, but which was also self-willed by the Army, for it perfectly fit the Army's attitude of flexibility of being both a church and a social work organization, and also provided for an organizational framework that ensured financial certainty.

The Army had succeeded in dressing its religious core (church) in a secular robe (foundation) and creating a chameleonic identity that proved to serve its purpose well in the public sphere. How this secular robe worked in practice became clear in the parliamentary debates during the post-war decades. Often the Army became an example of either a religious organization with a significant supply of social services, or a regular social service provider with a religious identity. And it was even a test case during the debate on how to define a church. The Salvation Army was used as an example to explore the boundaries of possible legislation in this debate. But even when in parliament, the Salvation Army proved to be intangible. It seems to have been quite convenient to regard the Army mainly as a social service provider, for it was regarded as a valued partner in the social work area. So, the government intention of being flexible towards civil society, and in this case the Salvation Army, became quite visible in this instance. The co-alignment of goals might have induced certain goodwill with regard to the Army's ambiguous identity.

Next to this external debate on the Army's legal identity, within Army ranks as well, there began a debate on what the Army was, during the first half of the 1960s when Dutch Commander Palstra signaled that something had to change. Because the Dutch public and government finding out that they were actually supporting an English organization would probably have quite negative consequences on the finances. This indicated that the Army was searching to enhance the certainty of its existence, be it in a legal or financial form. However, it still took until the mid-1970s for the debate to actually heat up. In 1974 Commander Verwaal decided that the Army had to establish a separate foundation for some of its social activities (e.g. probation), presumably because of the subsidy stipulations that these parts had to deal with. Additionally Verwaal commissioned a group to rewrite the mission statement of the Army to establish a better balance between its social and religious missions. So, because of external pressure the Army once again showed rather large internal flexibility. This would however, result in a prolonged and sometimes heated internal debate in which two lines of argumentation revealed themselves. This was also incited by the introduction of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code in 1976 as it knocked away the legal pillar which till now had supported the Army's ambiguous identity. The legal form of ecclesiastical foundation (as the Army had till now presented itself) was no longer valid and the Army was now confronted with a choice between becoming either a church or a foundation. This new legislation also revealed the weaker

position of the Army in this power balance where it actually had little influence and therefore proved to be rather vulnerable with regard to its identity.

Professionalization of the Salvation Army

The modernization of the Salvation Army is closely related to the process of professionalization. Already long before World War II, professionalization was visible within the social work field itself, as educational institutes were already established since the end of the nineteenth century, aiming to provide for better quality social aid to the workers. For the Salvation Army the beginning of this process of professionalization became noticeable in the developing probation work. The rise in demand for probation work brought the government and the Army more on one line and the government spurred organizations like the Army to take on more work by offering growing financial support. Moreover, the increasing complexity of social problems, which was also felt in the probation work field, emphasized the need for professionalization. This created a culture of knowledge-sharing and debate within the Army's probation organization, next to a qualitative improvement of its probation workers. With regard to accountability, the Salvation Army was already publishing its annual financial accounts before 1900, including a separate balance sheet for its social work activities.

From 1950 onwards however, the process of professionalization experienced a new development. The increase in social work activities and its growing differentiation and specialization resulted in various training programs that created professional experts. This development was not only supported by the government, but civil society organizations themselves also sustained the process as both actors wanted to improve the quality of the provided services. Moreover, these organizations often strove for governmental acknowledgment of their profession, thus also creating possibilities for structural finances.

With regard to the Army's rehabilitation department, the Probation Code of 1947 stipulated that all personnel had to be approved by the Ministry of Justice. On another level, the introduction of the social casework method offered the Army a legitimization for its method of work based on an individual level with close proximity to the client. This social casework method however, also required the professional to dispose of any hidden agendas like proselytizing. Even more, speaking of any religious subject became a sort of taboo. In its wake however, the popularity of social casework brought about a new emphasis on schooling and in 1964 the Ministry of Justice indicated education as being a compulsory prerequisite to the employment of probation officials. Just a year ago, the Army's probation department had reorganized into separate organizational units and had therefore loosened its organizational ties with the corps. Was a breach in the two-sided coin of the Army's identity starting to become visible?

Another effect of professionalization on the Army was that its work force changed. The amount of well-trained officers diminished compared to the new employee-recruits. On a managerial level as well, professionals were hired, and

in the case of the Army's rehabilitation department this was also done by the stipulation of the Ministry of Justice. So, on many levels the Army thought that its ideological core was slowly but surely being watered down by professionally-motivated personnel. In order to counteract this development, the Army tried to occupy all other key positions with its own people, except for in the probation department. In 1972 however, the probation department finally parted with its traditional core by dismissing its many volunteers.

During the 1960s and 1970s the probation work field and the Salvation Army probation department diverged increasingly in course. Because of the emphasis on harmonization, the probation work field started to merge into larger, general organizations (SRI in 1973, AVR in 1976) but the Salvation Army remained a faith-based probation organization on its own. The opposition towards governmental actions to merge smaller organizations into a larger umbrella organization went so far that it urged the Army to show its added value. On what basis could it claim retaining its right of existence? The Army's answer was its unique identity. But then again the Army was confronted with the question: what did this identity consist of? On the other hand, the government had displayed that it valued 'identity' as a source of activating power. Nevertheless, by 1980, the divergence of goals between the government and the Salvation Army started to raise tensions that directly confronted the Army with the matter of identity. And this matter would have to be addressed sooner rather than later, for with the balance of power leaning towards the government, the Salvation Army was quite endangered in its existence.

During the 1970s and 1980s the role of the professional was thoroughly debated in the Netherlands. The increase in numbers of professionals was regarded to have created a separate group of workers within former volunteer organizations. This brought about two problems: for one, these professionals had seized some of the organizations' powers at the cost of non-professionalized management, and on the other hand, the availability of professional help seemed to have created a demand of its own. Professionals were suspected of making clients dependent on their services, stripping them of their own initiative and sense of responsibility. And in its wake, these professionals were blamed for sidelining the volunteers that had traditionally formed the core of the organizational identity, as had happened within the Salvation Army probation department. Within the original constellation of the Salvation Army, it was the officer that personified the Army's double mission. As what this study calls a 'vocational volunteer', the officer often worked both in the social work field and in the Army's corps. In order to improve this work on both types of activities, internal schooling was provided for that prepared the officer 'to win souls'.

On another level, professionalization developed into a call for democratic participation within civil society organizations. The public had to regain influence over their lives, and one of the forms in which this took place was to gain influence in the organizations they worked in or that worked for them. This resulted in a thoroughly revised Works Councils Act in 1971. In 1977 the committee-Van der Burg tried to support the effect of this Act by suggesting that the

position of all stakeholders in these organizations, general public; employees; and clients, had to be strengthened. In the case of the Salvation Army, democratic participation was regarded to be quite at odds with its hierarchical management structure. Especially with regard to the declining number of (internal) officers in relation to the growing number of (external) employees. The possibility of democratic participation would imply the growth of external influence within the organization, and especially in the case of the church, this was unacceptable to the Army command. Even though democratic participation was already common practice to a certain extent within the probation department, the Army command contested the installment of works councils throughout the entire organization. It was convinced that the law did not apply to the Salvation Army since it was officially a church. However, the Dutch Council of State decided that the Works Councils Act did actually apply to the Army for it had more than 100 employees. Thus in this context, the fact that the Army was also a church was disregarded, and the Army was considered first and foremost a social work organization.

Reorganization of identity

During the 1980s the developments that are described above came together. The decentralization movement caused the Salvation Army to an increasing extent to do business at the local level. The Army itself however, found that municipalities were not always convinced of this cooperation, especially when the economic downturn left its mark on the public finances. In the Utrecht case, the proposed cutbacks threatened a number of Army activities with closure. In addition, the Army itself concluded that the Utrecht municipality preferred doing business with general organizations instead of with the obvious Christian Salvation Army. Even though this turned out not to be true, the tone was set: the identity of the Army was now openly problematic. In Amsterdam as well the identity of the Army was debated: To what extent were non-Christian clients or even homosexuals welcome in the Army? And should the government even be subsidizing a Christian social service? The Amsterdam municipality wanted to check the Army's statutes in order to answer these questions, but according to the Army, these statutes were not sufficiently up-to-date. Another problem that Amsterdam confronted the Army with was its reorganization of the home care system. The city-wide approach would be constrained to separation into particular districts. For the Army this meant that it would lose much of its city-wide home care and thus the Army decided to appeal against it. The main argument that the Army used was that because of its 'identity' it was able to appeal to a particular audience. Additionally, due to its large proportion of volunteers, the Army would be able to provide for 24-hour accessibility. So now the Army tried to turn its problematic identity to its advantage, and with success because the Amsterdam municipality agreed with this position.

These arguments of autonomy and identity were also used in the Army's efforts to rescue its rehabilitation work that was threatened by the waves of merger during the 1970s. In the early 1980s, however, this seemed to have been in vain

as the Army was facing an increasingly compelling government approach. In 1984 a large-scale lobby was organized by the Salvation Army. The General (U.K.) wrote letters to the Dutch parliament and the Army explained its precarious situation to many Dutch (health)care organizations by sending them leaflets. On January 31, 1984 the Salvation Army rallied at the *Binnenhof* in The Hague. Among much display of flags, brass instruments and shiny buttons on uniforms, the Commander offered a petition to the Parliamentary Committee on Justice. This 'March at the *Binnenhof*' showed that the Army had remained committed to its rehabilitation organization, thus expressing its internal unity. However, it would not be much later that the Army faced decisions regarding the rehabilitation work, whereby the options were either to merge into a large, general organization; or cease to exist; or become a contractual partner of the government in the hope that the Army's identity might be preserved. The Army chose the latter option, as this was the most likely way to continue its rehabilitation work while hoping to maintain its own identity. It did however change the status of the department into a proxy organization of the Dutch government.

This hardly meant that the debate on the Army's identity was over. Quite the contrary, for during the 1980s the question of what exactly this identity contained became increasingly urgent. To find a contemporary answer, the Army Leadership decided to use the Army's centenary in 1987 by organizing a symposium where representatives of the Army, along with people from various fields in which the Army was active (politicians, policymakers and academics) could reflect on the question together: to what extent does a Christian organization like the Salvation Army have a right to exist and how can identity affect such a faith-based social service provider? This formula proved successful. Though there were also critical comments on the combination of social work and religion, the overall conclusion of the day was that precisely because of its own identity, the Salvation Army was a relevant actor in the field of social work. It was even stated that this identity increased the motivation of the employees to an extent that many other organizations were left to envy.

Nevertheless, this was not the end of it, for the Gordian knot of the Army's identity had still to be cut in a legal sense. The main question here, since the new Dutch Civil Code had knocked away the legal pillar supporting the Army's ambiguous identity, was: what legal form did the most justice to the modern Salvation Army? The Army was forced to make a choice between becoming a church or a foundation. The two trains of thought within the Army ranks on this problem were based on the same legal documents. The Salvation Army's legal advisor Houthoff and his adherents (amongst which were many of the Army executives) were of the opinion that the Salvation Army was legally a church and in order to protect this church from government influences, but at the same time remain eligible for government financing, the Army had to establish separate foundations for its social activities. The church would in this case remain a church. The other line of thought, represented by managers of the probation department of the Army: Hartjes and later also Fijn, stated that the Army was a foundation and that it had to legally alter nothing in order to maintain its posi-

tion. It had never actually been an ecclesiastical foundation, but ‘just’ a foundation. Both the Army’s legal entities (church, 1948; foundation, 1949) were already incorporated, but the Army had to present itself in the future more as a secular foundation instead of a religious foundation. In this way there was no legal alteration necessary, an alteration that would, in the opinion of Hartjes and Fijn, lead to a ‘splitting of the coin’ that William Booth had forged together in 1890.

When the Army command decided to go with the Houthoff argument: that the Army was and would remain a church, it led to enormous financial consequences, for the government was not allowed to subsidize a church as was confirmed in 1980 by the Ministry of Justice. This vulnerable position was once again emphasized three years later when the Central Archives for the Collection system (CAC) stated the same with regard to public collections. So, even though the Salvation Army actually wanted to be a church donning a secular robe – a position that was opposed internally – external demands brought about a different decision. In 1990 the Salvation Army had reorganized itself into five separate but connected legal entities: four foundations with their own corporate identity, and a church, based on the Articles of 1946.

Part III: A dynamic courtship

In this concluding section, the perspectives of the government and of the Salvation Army are brought together to analyze the main question of this study about the dynamic relationship between these two actors. In order to make a valuable assessment however, it is necessary to include the aftermath of the Army’s reorganization, and therefore a chapter is added at the end that takes into account the developments of the governmental welfare policy as well as the Army’s identity process during the post-reorganization period of 1990-2010.

The relationship between the Salvation Army and the Dutch government within the social policy system has yielded a dynamic that can be characterized as a system in which reciprocity and mutual dependence play important roles. To determine who has what influence, both internally and externally, the balance of power between the two actors is crucial. This balance of power is partly connected to the values that formed the base of the social policy during much of the twentieth century: quality, participation and manageability. The degree to which the actors were attracted to each other, was in part determined by the extent to which their goals co-aligned. Another element was the measure in which both actors were able to entice the other to demonstrate adequate flexibility, while their own position remained secure as far as possible. Additionally, the dynamic that has been analyzed in this study was not only at work between the Army and the government, but also within the Salvation Army itself.

The Army was focused on securing its right to exist as a faith-based social service provider, and to do so it constructed its identity on its dual mission, while it formed its organization according to the requirements of the time. During this process the Army used a number of arguments of which economic reciprocity and supplementation were a part. With regard to its legal identity, the Army was

much more ambivalent. Its idea of donning a secular robe over its religious core offered much flexibility in the legal field while simultaneously supporting the view that the Army had on its identity. With regard to the theme of professionalization, the Army reacted quite fiercely. From the beginning the Army worked to develop the professional skills of its staff and its administrative processes, but at the same time it could not avoid the increase in external professionals in the organization. Any initial resistance within the Army towards professionalization increased when democratization seemed to put the core of the Army's identity at stake and now, the Army defended its identity, just as it did during the period in which the probation work of the Army was threatened with annexation.

The two decades following the Army's reorganization in 1990 showed that these external and internal developments had not ended. The free market system that was actively supported by the government during the 1990s and 2000s forced the Army to distinguish itself even more. Once again a (now)tested Army-argumentation was brought into position: its identity. In 2005 the Christian identity was even defined by the Army as an important competence through which the quality of the Army's staff was guaranteed. The Dutch government also seemed to loosen up a bit with regard to faith-based civil society. The Social Support Act (WMO, 2007) made an explicit appeal to the entire Dutch civil society, including churches and religious organization, to contribute to the social cohesion between the citizens and to stimulate individual participation. Yet, the instrumental nature of this appeal seemed to ignore all nuances that were related to civil society, for in the Explanatory Memorandum churches were placed at par with sport-clubs.

The Army continued to develop briskly during this decade. At least the Army's social services did, because the church proved to have a much harder time. Revenues declined, as did the number of members. And after several attempts to revive the Army church, in 2009 a thorough revision of the Army's strategy for the church was set in motion. The number of corps had to be reduced significantly, and they had to also create more relevance to their immediate environment. However, the implication that these corps could call in the support of the Army's Foundation of Welfare and Healthcare was not made very concrete. In some places though, collaboration between the local corps and the Foundation was actually established and seemed to bear fruit for both entities. But, as some within the Army ranks wonder: is the organizational structure actually that important to keep the driving force of its members alive - Salvationism? Isn't the actual deed more important to express the spiritual message? Nevertheless, the organization, and the way the two missions are interwoven in its structure and people, will continue to play a major role in the near future. Though the breeding ground of Salvationism will have to be cultivated and nurtured. So, does the current organizational structure and culture provide for sufficient space, protection, heat and light? Answering this question is far beyond the skills of a historian.

Een dynamische balts

Het Leger des Heils en de verzorgingsstaat in Nederland (1887-1990)

Het Leger des Heils is een mondiaal en vooral ook sympathiek toonbeeld van maatschappelijke hulpverlening. Ook in Nederland staat het Leger bekend om zijn charitatieve hulpverlening zoals het bieden van onderdak aan daklozen en het verzorgen van kleding, voedsel, alles gepaard gaand met een vriendelijk gezicht. Een onlosmakelijk onderdeel van dit imago is het religieuze karakter van het Leger des Heils, want in zijn publieke uitingen benadrukt het Leger vaak expliciet dat het geloof de drijvende kracht is van de *Salvationist*. Toch is dit beeld van het Leger als een christelijke liefdadigheidsorganisatie verre van compleet. Het is ook een omvangrijke professionele maatschappelijke hulpverlener. Zo biedt het Leger professionele diensten aan op het gebied van ouderenzorg, zorg voor kinderen, vrouwen, daklozen en jonge moeders. Daarnaast heeft het diverse programma's op het gebied van dagopvang, verslavingsproblematiek, het militaire apparaat, rampenbestrijding, vermiste personen, gevangenen, werklozen, schuldenproblematiek, studenten, en ook op het medische gebied heeft het Leger een professioneel aanbod. Dit betekent dat het Leger des Heils een onderdeel is van zowel de Nederlandse samenleving, alsook van de sociale en medische zorgsectoren.

Daarnaast is het Leger des Heils ook een officieel kerkgenootschap met ongeveer vijftig lokale afdelingen – korpsen – die op zondag samenkomsten voor geïnteresseerden en leden verzorgen, en daarnaast vaak kleinschalige, laagdrempelige sociale activiteiten aanbieden. Hiermee past het Leger des Heils in een traditie van kerkelijke groeperingen en andere ideologische en religieuze organisaties die zorg dragen voor sociale activiteiten die gevolgen van armoede, gebrekkige educatie, ziekte en inkomensderving tegengaan: het particulier initiatief, maatschappelijk middenveld, of met een meer contemporaine term *civil society* genoemd. Deze dubbele focus van sociaal en geestelijk werk heeft de basis gevormd van de identiteit van het Leger des Heils want, zoals blijkt uit deze studie, heeft het Leger zich, door zijn bestaan heen, zoveel mogelijk gepresenteerd als een organisatie met een tweevoudige missie: 'woord en daad'. Een missie die het Leger zelf graag aanduidt met de metafoor van een munt met twee zijden, die onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden zijn.

Na een proces van secularisatie en politieke neutralisatie (een combinatie die ook wel bekend staat als verstatelijking), dat vooral plaatsvond gedurende de laatste decennia van de twintigste eeuw, zijn er niet veel levensbeschouwelijke maatschappelijke dienstverleners overgebleven in Nederland. Het feit dat het Leger des Heils hier een uitzondering op vormt, roept een aantal vragen op. Zeker ook gezien het feit dat ruim 90% van de exploitatiekosten die het Leger maakt om deze diensten te kunnen aanbieden, wordt betaald uit publieke gelden

als subsidies, overheidscontracten, bijdragen vanuit collectieve zorgverzekeringen en andere sociale regelingen en wetgeving.

Dit maakt meteen ook duidelijk dat het Leger de Heils niet opereert in een politiek of sociaal vacuüm, want vanaf het moment dat het Leger zijn deuren opende in Nederland (1887) betrad het een werkveld van sociale zorg, dat al bediend werd door vele kleine en grotere organisaties. Hierdoor maakte het Leger al vanaf zijn begin onderdeel uit van de Nederlandse *civil society*. Tegelijkertijd moest het Leger zich verhouden tot de Nederlandse overheid, omdat deze sinds de laatste decennia van de negentiende eeuw in toenemende mate interesse toonde voor het verlichten van sociale nood door middel van wetgeving. Dit maakte echter wel dat de verhouding tussen de overheid en de Nederlandse *civil society* veranderde, want met de toenemende sociale wetgeving tussen 1890 en 1945 verschoof ook de primaire verantwoordelijkheid voor deze problematiek van *civil society* richting de overheid. Dit proces won aan snelheid na de Tweede Wereldoorlog wanneer op internationaal vlak, en ook in Nederland, de contouren zichtbaar werden van wat de verzorgingsstaat genoemd zou gaan worden.

In Nederland ontstond een zogenaamd vangnet van sociale wetgeving, mede dankzij het in 1952 opgerichte ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk. Het symbolisch sluitstuk van de Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat De inwerkingtreding van de Algemene Bijstandswet in 1963 wordt gezien als een symbolisch sluitstuk van de Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat, omdat elke Nederlandse burger vanaf toen was verzekerd van een bestaansminimum. Sociale hulp was veranderd van een gunst in een recht. Dit hield echter ook in dat de *civil society* nu definitief zijn eindverantwoordelijkheid voor (materiële) sociale zorg - en zeker voor armenzorg - was kwijtgeraakt aan de overheid, waarmee de balans tussen de overheid en de *civil society* met betrekking tot het primaat voor de zorg aanzienlijk veranderde.

Deze verandering onderstreepte daarnaast ook dat beide actoren in ieder geval het bestrijden van maatschappelijke problematiek als gemeenschappelijk doel hadden, en dat ze elkaar daarvoor tot op zekere hoogte nodig hadden. Het ontbrak de overheid immers aan uitvoeringscapaciteit om haar sociaal beleid om te zetten in daadwerkelijke acties en de *civil society* maakte rijkelijk gebruik van de geboden overheidssteun (financieel en juridisch) om deze daadkracht werkelijk te leveren. Aan de andere kant, en zoals blijkt uit deze studie, lieten beide actoren met regelmaat enige terughoudendheid zien met betrekking tot deze samenwerking. Hoewel ze van elkaar afhankelijk waren in de strijd tegen maatschappelijke problematiek, leek de relatie tussen beiden gekenmerkt te worden door een afwisselend patroon van aantrekking en afstoting, waarbij beide actoren hun eigen, eveneens veranderlijke belangen voorop stelden. Dit proces van aantrekken en afwijzen lijkt tot op zekere hoogte op dat van een bals: vanuit wederzijdse aantrekkingskracht maken twee actoren elkaar het hof, waarbij aantrekking en afwijzing elkaar afwisselen.

Deze metafoer van de bals is ook van toepassing op het Leger des Heils. Het Leger was namelijk niet alleen een getuige van de bovengeschetste ontwikkelin-

gen, maar het Leger heeft als onderdeel van de Nederlandse *civil society* zelf actief deelgenomen in, en vormgegeven aan, wat in deze studie het ‘sociaal beleidssysteem’ genoemd wordt. Daarmee dient zich nog een reden aan om het Leger des Heils als onderwerp van studie te maken. Zeker ook doordat hierdoor een nieuw licht kan schijnen op hoe de veranderingen in de Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat van invloed waren op de levensbeschouwelijke *civil society*.

Centrale onderzoeksvragen

De vragen die centraal staan in deze studie zijn dan ook: welke dynamiek is zichtbaar in de relatie tussen de overheid en het Leger des Heils in Nederland met betrekking tot het sociaal beleid tussen 1890 en 1990? In hoeverre beïnvloedde deze dynamiek de identiteit van het Leger des Heils? En wat zegt dit over de veranderende verzorgingsstaat en de rol daarin van de levensbeschouwelijke *civil society*? Deze veelomvattende vraag wordt in deze studie beantwoord aan de hand van een aantal, meer empirische deelvragen: wat waren de beleidsdoelen en hun achterliggende uitgangspunten van de overheid met betrekking tot sociale vraagstukken? Hoe ontwikkelde de machtsbalans en de mate van afhankelijkheid tussen beide actoren zich binnen deze relatie? Met betrekking tot het Leger des Heils leidt dit tot de volgende vragen: wat waren de doelen en uitgangspunten van werk van het Leger des Heils in Nederland? Hoe gaf het Leger vorm aan zijn christelijke identiteit in het krachtenveld van veranderlijke houding van de Nederlandse overheidsvisie met betrekking tot de identiteit van *civil society* organisaties? Wat waren de belangrijkste elementen hierin die de identiteit van het Leger des Heils mogelijk onder druk zetten? En welke mechanismen werden binnen het Leger zichtbaar, om om te gaan met deze externe (en interne) processen en invloeden, zodat de autonomie en identiteit bewaard bleven?

Methoden, concepten en structuur

Deze vragen worden beantwoord door middel van de historisch-hermeneutische onderzoeksmethode, waarbij zowel primaire als secundaire bronnen worden bestudeerd en met elkaar in verband worden gebracht. Het resultaat hiervan is een samenhangende interpretatie van de dynamische relatie tussen beide actoren en wat dat voor het Leger des Heils betekend heeft. Het narratief over het Leger des Heils wordt gevormd door middel van bestaande beschrijvingen van (delen) van de geschiedenis van het Leger, het archief van het Leger in Nederland en interviews met sleutelpersonen uit de beleids- en managementgeledingen van het Leger. De grote lijnen van de beschrijving van het Nederlandse sociaal beleid zijn gebaseerd op secundaire literatuur terwijl de reconstructie van de beleidsdoelen van de overheid en hun onderliggende waarden, hoofdzakelijk voortkomt uit een grondige analyse van uiteenlopende parlementaire stukken.

In deze studie wordt gerefereerd aan een aantal concepten die belangrijk zijn voor het komen tot een goed begrip van de dynamische relatie tussen het Leger des Heils en de Nederlandse overheid. In de eerste plaats wordt uitvoerig aandacht besteed aan de (internationale) ontwikkeling van wat we nu de verzorgingsstaat noemen. Daarna gebeurt hetzelfde voor het concept *civil society*. Met

betrekking tot de dynamiek in de relatie tussen de overheid en het Leger des Heils wordt in deze studie speciale aandacht besteed aan de theorie 'government by proxy' van de Amerikaanse organisatiewetenschapper Donald Kettl. Kettl beargumenteert dat een overheid een voorkeur ontwikkelt voor samenwerking met bepaalde betrouwbare partners in de verwezenlijking van overheidsbeleid. Deze 'standaard partners' worden aangeduid met de term *proxy-organizations*. Een *proxy* kan zich verheugen op een voorkeursbehandeling wanneer het aankomt op het door de overheid toekennen van subsidies, belastingvoordelen, opdrachten en leningen, die gericht zijn op bepaalde beleidsdoelen. Zo is in de Verenigde Staten de Salvation Army een *proxy* van de nationale en ook bepaalde regionale overheden op het gebied van maatschappelijke hulpverlening. Met betrekking tot de dynamiek tussen de overheid en *proxy* organisaties stelt Kettl dat deze relatie wordt gekenmerkt door de mate van convergentie van doelen van de twee actoren. Een proces dat vaak een spanningsveld oplevert, want in dit spanningsveld vormt de behoefte aan zekerheid voor zichzelf en flexibiliteit van de ander een bron voor mogelijke conflicten tussen beide actoren. Ondanks dit spanningsveld blijkt het gedeelde belang voor beide actoren meestal voldoende aanwezig om te blijven zoeken naar samenwerking, zoals in het geval van de Nederlandse overheid en het Leger des Heils die beiden het doel hadden maatschappelijke problematiek te verminderen. Aan de andere kant echter kan een actor ook private doelen hebben die tegelijkertijd worden nagestreefd, zoals in het geval van het Leger bijvoorbeeld het verspreiden van het evangelie. Ook dit kan spanningen opleveren. Daarnaast heeft in deze relatie volgens Kettl ook de machtsbalans tussen beide actoren ook een grote invloed op het karakter ervan, en omdat deze balans nogal eens doorslaat richting de opdrachtgever – i.c. de overheid – kan deze machtsbalans van invloed zijn op de autonomie en daarmee ook de identiteit van de *proxy*. Hoewel Kettl niet specifiek onderzoek heeft gedaan naar levensbeschouwelijke organisaties noch naar hoe dit spanningsveld nu precies doorwerkt op de identiteit van organisaties, kan zijn zienswijze van dienst zijn bij het bestuderen van zowel de dynamiek van deze relatie. Ook biedt het inzicht in hoe deze bepalend kan zijn voor de dynamiek die zich binnen een *proxy*-organisatie als het Leger des Heils afspeelde met betrekking tot zijn eigen identiteit. Op een meer algemeen niveau is het hierdoor mogelijk om meer inzicht te krijgen in het proces van verstatelijking van de Nederlandse *civil society*. Een proces dat het Leger des Heils met succes lijkt te hebben doorstaan.

In Deel I van deze studie ligt de focus vooral op het overheidsperspectief en wordt een beschrijving gegeven van het sociaal beleid-systeem gedurende de periode 1900-1990. Dit systeem is gebaseerd op een structurele relatie tussen de overheid als voornaamste beleidsproducent, de *civil society* als medebeleidsproducent, opdrachtnemer en uitvoerder, en de Nederlandse bevolking als financiers en afnemers. Om maatschappelijke problematiek gezamenlijk aan te kunnen pakken wordt door deze actoren structureel publiek geld verzameld en verdeeld over bepaalde maatschappelijke beleidsdoelen. Deze doelen zijn gebaseerd op onderliggende waarden en beiden zijn onderhevig aan verandering door

de tijd heen, al naar gelang sociale, economische, demografische, culturele en politieke ontwikkelingen. In dit eerste deel worden deze veranderingen beschreven en wordt weergegeven hoe dit de relatie met de *civil society* mede vormgaf. In Deel II wordt vervolgens ingegaan op hoe het Leger des Heils zich ontwikkelde als een actor in dit sociaal beleid-systeem en hoe dit van invloed was op de interne dynamiek betreffende de identiteit van het Leger. In deze geschiedenis, die de periode vanaf start van het Leger des Heils in Nederland in 1887, tot en met de fundamentele reorganisatie in 1990 bestrijkt, staan drie verhaallijnen centraal waardoor zichtbaar wordt hoe het Leger zijn identiteit heeft getracht vorm te geven. De eerste lijn beschrijft de ontwikkeling van de positie van het Leger ten opzichte van de overheid – twee actoren die binnen het sociaal beleid-systeem wederzijds afhankelijk van elkaar zijn. De tweede lijn betreft het vormgeven van de juridische identiteit. De weergave hiervan laat zien hoe het Leger worstelde met het vormgeven van de dubbele doelstelling van religieus en maatschappelijk werk, die essentieel blijkt te zijn voor de identiteit van de organisatie. De derde narratieve lijn laat zien welke gevolgen de positie van het Leger binnen het sociaal beleid-systeem had met betrekking tot de professionalisering van de organisatie. Deze drie ontwikkelingen vloeiden samen gedurende de jaren 80 van de twintigste eeuw, waardoor het Leger besloot om een fundamentele reorganisatie door te voeren in 1990.

Deel I: het sociaal beleid-systeem in Nederland

Gedurende het grootste gedeelte van de negentiende eeuw heeft de Nederlandse centrale overheid zich passief opgesteld met betrekking tot maatschappelijke vraagstukken. Problematiek rondom armoede, werkloosheid, ziekte en educatie was de verantwoordelijkheid van het particulier initiatief – een verzameling van groepen en organisaties in de samenleving die in de meeste gevallen werkten vanuit een ideologische of religieuze motivatie – en de lokale overheden. Met de totstandkoming van de Grondwet in 1848 en de Armenwet van 1854 legde de Nederlandse overheid echter een eerste interesse aan de dag met betrekking tot deze problematiek. De onderliggende gedachte van deze houding was die van de subsidiariteit: alleen wanneer alle andere opties faalden, zou een beroep op de overheid gedaan kunnen worden, zoals rond 1900 wel gebeurde in geval van bestrijding van hardnekkige ziekten als tuberculose en kindersterfte. Ook lokale overheden lieten deze lijn zien, waardoor overheidssteun van het particulier initiatief niet alleen sporadisch voorkwam, maar ook op incidentele basis en minimaal qua bedragen. Rond 1900 kwam hier mondjesmaat verandering in door nieuwe sociale wetgeving die een groeiende overheidsinteresse in sociaal vraagstukken liet zien.

Duidelijk werd dat daarbij ook de interesse voor een meer structurele samenwerking met de *civil society* toenam, zoals de Reclasseringsregeling van 1910 liet zien. Met deze regeling werden reclasseringsorganisaties gestimuleerd gestructureerd te werken aan de doelen die de overheid stelde op dit terrein. Toch was dit soort overheidssteun nog steeds van aanvullende aard op de financiën van de organisaties zelf, en zorgden ook de angst voor het inperken van de

autonomie en de dreiging van overheidsinvloed in de 'eigen sfeer' voor sterke terughoudendheid aan de kant van de *civil society*. De samenwerking tussen beide actoren op het gebied van reclassering was rond 1910 dus nog steeds incidenteel en minimaal, net als op andere gebieden van het sociaal werk.

Toch veranderde dit aanzienlijk in de decennia voorafgaande aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog. De overheid liet door de groei aan financiële voorzieningen en wetgeving duidelijk zien dat ze zich in toenemende mate bewust werd van haar beleidsvoerend vermogen en in deze aanzet tot sociaal beleid werden de contouren zichtbaar van de belangrijkste beleidsdoelen: professionalisering en harmonisatie. Professionalisering werd vertaald in termen van het inhuren van geschoolde arbeid en het afleggen van administratieve verantwoording, beide gebaseerd op de onderliggende waarde van 'kwaliteit'. Zowel het werk als de organisaties moesten op een hoger plan gebracht worden.

In dezelfde periode was duidelijk dat de overheid te maken had met een grote variëteit aan organisaties die op verschillende niveaus in verschillende werkvelden actief waren, met als resultaat een sterk versnipperd werkveld. Deze situatie was niet allen moeilijk beheersbaar, maar ook duur omdat om mogelijk ongelijke behandeling van de verschillende ideologische zuilen te voorkomen, elke zuil in gelijke mate financieel gesteund diende te worden. Omdat de gedeelde ideologische grondslag werkte als een verenigende kracht binnen de zuilen, moedigde de overheid de organisaties aan zich alsnog te verenigen binnen de eigen zuil, om zo de beheersbaarheid van het werkveld te vergroten. Deze nadruk op harmonisatie diende dus voornamelijk om de beheersbaarheid en daarmee de doelmatigheid te vergroten. Een onvoorzien neveneffect van deze de beschikbaarheid van overheidssteun was echter dat deze ook de groei in aantal en omvang van organisaties aanwakkerde. Daarnaast veranderde het karakter de financiële steun langzamerhand van incidenteel in structureel, wat de samenwerking tussen de overheid en de *civil society* ook een meer structureel karakter gaf en waarmee het sociaal beleid-systeem was geboren.

Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog zorgde de tijdgeest van 'herstel en vernieuwing' voor een verdere overeenstemming van de sociaal-beleidsdoelen van de overheid en de *civil society*. Voor deze laatste nam de financiële zekerheid toe, samen met een stijgende nationale welvaart en op het gebied van beleid probeerde de nationale overheid haar beleidsinspanning te ondersteunen door de oprichting van het ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk in 1952. Ondanks pogingen deze te doorbreken zette de verzuiling door en de *civil society* maakte daar een stevig onderdeel van uit. Ook de sociale wetgeving breidde zich verder uit met als gevolg dat ook de kosten van het sociaal beleid-systeem toenamen. Om de uitdijing van het werkveld enigszins in banen te leiden, bleef harmonisatie dus een belangrijk beleidsdoel. Het vergroten van de beheersbaarheid van deze organisaties werd, net als voor de oorlog, gelegitimeerd doordat deze werd vormgegeven op basis van identiteit, en wel levensbeschouwing. Een begrip dat vooral van samenbindende aard was en vanuit die implicatie de achterban zou kunnen aanzetten tot maatschappelijk activering. *Civil society* organisaties konden dan, als hun vertegenwoordigers, deze achterban gericht mobiliseren en juist

vanwege deze toegevoegde waarde werden deze organisaties als waardevolle partners gezien binnen het sociaal beleid-systeem, waardoor ook de financiële steun vanuit de overheid groeide. Beheersbaarheid, geïnterpreteerd als harmonisatie en doelmatigheid, was nu gelegitimeerd door de wederzijdse erkenning van de toegevoegde waarde van identiteit en versterkte het samenvloeien van beleidsdoelen.

Voor de overheid was de inbreng van het publiek in het creëren van sociaal beleid, belangrijk. Vandaar dat de *civil society* hier door de overheid bij werd betrokken. In nauwe samenwerking werkten ze aan het idee van gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid door middel van maatschappelijk opbouwwerk en sociale planning, want volgens de overheid was het juist dit idee van gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid dat mensen zou prikkelen om actief deel te nemen aan de maatschappij. Ook het stimuleren van de vrijwillige inzet vanuit de achterban moest dit doel van participatie ondersteunen. Doordat de *civil society* als vertegenwoordigers van een achterban in beide processen een belangrijke spilfunctie had, leek de *civil society* terrein te winnen op de machtsbalans. Toch zou dit tegen blijken te vallen. Samen met deze nieuwe structurele nadruk op de waarde van participatie in combinatie met verbetering van de kwaliteit van de diensten en de verhoging van de doelmatigheid, werd de aanzet zichtbaar van een decentralisatie van nationaal beleid naar die bestuurlijke lagen die veel meer voeling hadden met hoe een dergelijk beleid effectief vorm te geven: de provincie en de gemeente. Het afstaan van een deel van de beleidsmacht door de landelijke overheid aan het lokale niveau impliceerde echter dat ook de *civil society* zich moest heroriënteren op zijn positie in dit krachtenveld. Gedurende de jaren vijftig en zestig werden de eerste resultaten van deze beleidslijnen zichtbaar. Net als voor de oorlog groeide het aantal organisaties dat gebruik maakte van overheidssteun en daarbij vormde identiteit nog steeds een belangrijk organiserend principe binnen de *civil society*. Ook werd duidelijk dat de overheid nauwelijks enige terughoudendheid toonde met betrekking tot de inzet van het subsidie instrument. Het stimulerend effect ervan was zichtbaar, maar dit structurele en ruime aanbod, genereerde ook als bijkomend effect een nieuwe vraag naar subsidie: veel van de organisaties die gebruik maakten van deze kennelijk onuitputtelijke bron, raakten er immers snel aan gewend.

Gedurende de jaren zestig vormden emancipatie van het individu, persoonlijke ontwikkeling en autonomie centrale maatschappelijke thema's, maar ondanks deze revolutie van het individualisme, emancipatie en secularisatie, domineerden de beleidsthema's professionalisering, participatie en harmonisatie de politieke agenda van de *civil society*. Ook in deze periode bestond het beleidsdoel professionalisering uit twee delen: het vergroten van de mogelijkheden van organisatie om zich te verantwoorden door middel van het stroomlijnen van de administratieve processen. Ook scholing, certificering en deskundigheidsbevordering van de medewerkers kwam steeds meer centraal te staan, beide steeds met het oog op kwaliteitsverbetering. Met betrekking tot participatie werd gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid als beleidsconcept gehanteerd, door deze te koppelen aan aanvullende financiering van organisaties en het creëren van een ge-

meenschappelijke visie op sociaal beleid, naast verdere decentralisatie van beleidsverantwoordelijkheden. Aan de andere kant werd ingezet op harmonisatie van het werkveld om zo de beheersbaarheid ervan voor de overheid te vergroten.

Rond 1970 echter, werd een aantal veranderingen zichtbaar. Met betrekking tot de kwaliteit leken de beleidsdoelen van de overheid en de *civil society* redelijk met elkaar overeen te komen, want professionalisering en bedrijfsvoering waren in grote mate gestandaardiseerd. Tegelijkertijd echter, had de overheid de voorwaarde van aanvullendheid van de financiering zo goed als laten varen, waarmee het doel van gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid minder belangrijk leek te zijn geworden. Met betrekking tot participatie was het coöperatieve idee van sociale planning veranderd in een wat meer activistisch idee van sociale actie, welke direct was gericht tegen wat werd beschouwd als het moreel inhoudsloze idee van de consumptiemaatschappij. Deze veranderende houding naar de overheid van delen van de Nederlandse *civil society* duidde op toenemende divergentie van de doelen van beide actoren.

Dit werd nog duidelijker gedurende de jaren zeventig wanneer – als gevolg van de emancipatoire krachten van het voorgaand decennium – participatie in toenemende mate werd geïnterpreteerd als democratisering en politieke invloed, terwijl ook noties als zelf-activering centrale doelen werden van sociaal beleid. Publieke participatie zou door middel van verdere beleidsdecentralisatie moeten worden versterkt, maar dan wel in overleg met de *civil society* als vertegenwoordigers van hun achterban. Deze representatieve functie van de *civil society* was nog steeds interessant voor de overheid, mede omdat deze nog steeds gebaseerd was op de legitimerende kracht van ‘identiteit’. Maar op het gebied van de beheersbaarheid werd een aan de decentralisatie tegengestelde ontwikkeling zichtbaar: de term ‘fusie’ werd steeds vaker gebruikt, waarmee de wens voor verdere centralisatie van het werkveld zichtbaar werd, zij het dat de zuilen hiervoor niet langer de aangewezen bindende structuur vormden. De nadruk om nu ‘zuil-overstijgend’ samen te gaan werken dreef de *civil society* in een nieuwe richting.

Tegelijkertijd werd duidelijk, dat het nog steeds de overheid was die het overwicht bezat op de machtsbalans. Dit werd bevestigd in 1974, toen de zogenaamde Knelpuntennota het licht zag. In dit rapport werd de maat genomen van de overheidsinspanningen op de beleidsgebieden van het welzijnswerk. De uitkomsten kwamen hard aan, zowel voor de overheid als voor de *civil society*. Het rapport beschreef de *civil society* als een instituut dat in plaats van ideologische verzuild, nu functioneel verzuild was doordat de overheid erop stuurde dat binnen de zuilen alle diensten aanwezig zouden zijn. Daarnaast stelde het rapport vast welke knelpunten er waren die de doelmatigheid van maatschappelijke dienstverlening tegenwerkten: afnemende publieke steun voor het welzijnsbegrip, toenemende individualisering en secularisering, een toenemende roep om democratische invloed en de marginalisering van de vrijwilliger door de groeiende groep professionals. De conclusie was dat volgens het rapport de *civil society* teveel naar binnen gericht was. Daarom, en ook omdat de rol van identiteit in het huidige tijdsgewricht gedevalueerd was, kon de *civil society* de representa-

tieve functie van de achterban niet langer waarmaken. Met dit alles leek de *civil society* zijn toegevoegde waarde te hebben verloren.

Na het verschijnen van de Knelpuntennota continueerde de overheid in eerste instantie haar beleid. Lokale betrokkenheid en participatie moesten verder worden versterkt en met betrekking tot de *civil society* zou de ingeslagen weg richting harmonisatie en participatie moeten blijven vervolgd, waarbij democratisering en doelmatigheid meer centraal zouden komen te staan. Maar voor de *civil society* betekende de decentralisatie een verdere verzwakking van de positie in het sociaal beleidssysteem. Ook de Knelpuntennota verzwakte deze positie, omdat het voor het eerst zichtbaar gemaakt had, wat al breed werd gedacht: de *civil society* had de toegevoegde waarde van representativiteit en identiteit verloren. Die vaststelling vormde een regelrechte bedreiging voor het voortbestaan van veel van de oorspronkelijk levensbeschouwelijke particuliere organisaties, tenzij deze opnieuw hun maatschappelijke relevantie wisten aan te tonen.

Opvallend genoeg was het de overheid die de *civil society* hier enigszins te hulp schoot. In lijn met de beleidsdoelen suggereerde Minister Van Doorn van CRM dat nu de *civil society* organisaties weliswaar niet meer als representatief voor hun achterban werden gezien, ze allicht nog een rol zouden kunnen vervullen als een ondersteunende structuur bij het activeren van wat er nog van de achterban over was om sociaal actief te worden. Op deze wijze werden de beleidsdoelen van participatie en persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid gecombineerd en zou de *civil society* een relevante actor in het sociaal beleidssysteem kunnen blijven. Wat dat precies inhield voor deze organisaties werd niet duidelijk, maar wel werd een oplossingsrichting voorgesteld: voor wat betreft de onderliggende waarde van kwaliteit, zouden de diensten verbeterd kunnen worden door continue professionalisering, maar nu geflankeerd door een herwaardering van de vrijwilliger. Ook dat zou kunnen bijdragen aan participatie, omdat de intrinsieke motivatie van vrijwilligers om hun betrokkenheid in daden om te zetten niet was verminderd. En met deze suggestie was de vrijwilliger opnieuw belangrijk geworden in de overheidspogingen om de kwaliteit van de sector te verbeteren.

Gedurende de jaren tachtig bleven decentralisatie, democratisering en vrijwilligersinzet centrale beleidsdoelen om participatie, kwaliteit en beheersbaarheid na te streven. Nieuw was echter dat het zwaartepunt nu niet bij de centrale overheid lag, maar veel meer op het lokale niveau. Ook waren de *civil society* organisaties bezig enigszins te veranderen van alleen intermediaire instituties, naar meer ondersteunende structuren van individuele leden van hun achterban. Vrijwilligerswerk werd belangrijk voor zowel de bevordering van participatie alsook voor kostenreductie – een beleidsdoel dat steeds belangrijker werd in de jaren zeventig en tachtig. Deze nieuwe combinatie van beleidslijnen werd door CRM-minister Brinkman bestempeld met de term ‘zorgzame samenleving’ waarbij individuele activering, mantelzorg, zelfhulp en vrijwilligerswerk centrale elementen in het sociaal beleid waren. Om deze beleidslijn effectief te kunnen implementeren, zou de overheidsrol verkleind moeten worden en moest de deur naar marktwerking tussen vraag en aanbod worden opengezet. In combinatie met het afnemende draagvlak van de *civil society* zouden individuele burgers en

de maatschappij veel meer zelf de verantwoordelijkheid voor eigen en ander-mans welzijn zelfstandig op zich kunnen en moeten nemen. Dat dit concreet ook betekende dat de overheidsfinanciering van de *civil society* koepelorganisaties zou ophouden, werd ook snel duidelijk.

Rond 1990 had het sociaal beleidssysteem verschillende fases doorlopen: be-gin, opgroeien, bloei en bijstelling. Opvallend in deze ontwikkeling is dat on-danks dat verandering de grote kracht lijkt te zijn geweest in de vorming van het sociaal beleid-systeem, er drie vrij continue beleidswaarden centraal hebben gestaan gedurende de gehele twintigste eeuw: kwaliteit, beheersbaarheid en participatie. Deze waarden hebben de basis gevormd voor verschillende beleids-concepten die gedurende die periode zowel in dominantie als inhoudelijk, ver-anderlijk bleken: professionalisering, harmonisatie, gedeelde verantwoordelijk-heid, democratisering, decentralisatie, vrijwilligheid en activering. Het grootste gedeelte van de twintigste eeuw zijn deze beleidsdoelen en -waarden gevormd in samenspraak met de Nederlandse *civil society* als co-actoren in het sociaal be-leidssysteem. Lange tijd heeft de overheid de *civil society* gewaardeerd vanwege identiteit als een organiserend principe, maar toen deze toegevoegde waarde minder aanwezig leek te zijn, moest de *civil society* zich heroriënteren op zijn positie in het systeem. Hoewel de overheid nog een alternatieve rol suggereerde, zijn veel levensbeschouwelijke organisaties uiteindelijk opgegaan in nieuwe ‘neutrale’ maatschappelijke dienstverleners, terwijl andere ophielden te bestaan. Dit roept de vraag op: hoe zit het dan met het Leger des Heils? Hoe ging het Leger om met de verschillende krachtenvelden die deel uitmaakten van het soci-aal beleidssysteem?

Deel II: Het identiteitsproces van het Leger des Heils

Leger des Heils als deel van het sociaal beleid-systeem

Hoewel de Engelse moederorganisatie The Salvation Army begon als een reli-gieuze gemeenschap, besloot de oprichter William Booth in 1890 dat het Leger meer moest zijn dan een kerk. Het kon niet langer de ogen sluiten voor de socia-le ellende die in het geïndustrialiseerde Engeland van het eind van de negentien-de eeuw schrijnend zichtbaar was. Met de publicatie van zijn *In Darkest Eng-land and The Way Out* (1890) introduceerde Booth een tweede doelstelling voor het Leger naast de prediking van het evangelie: maatschappelijke hulpverlening bieden waar mogelijk. Sindsdien wordt de identiteit van het Leger gevormd door een dubbele missie: geestelijke en maatschappelijke hulpverlening. Voor het nog jonge Leger in Nederland werd hiermee de deur opengezet voor samenwerking met de Nederlandse overheid. Toch zou het nog een aantal decennia duren voor-dat hiervan de contouren zichtbaar werden. Zo kan de periode tussen 1887 en het eind van de Tweede Wereldoorlog worden gekenmerkt als een periode waar-in de overheid en het Leger in toenemende mate beseften dat ze voor een groot deel gelijke doelen nastreefden, die zich richtten op het bestrijden van sociale problematiek.

Al snel na de introductie van de sociale missie in 1890 groeide het Leger in omvang van 37 korpsen in 1890 tot 48 in 1892, en ook het sociaal werk zelf nam toe: in 1908 werd door het Leger evenveel geld besteed aan de religieuze missie als aan het maatschappelijke werk. De ontwikkeling van de samenwerking met de overheid werd in eerste instantie goed zichtbaar via het reclasseringswerk van het Leger. Hoewel sinds de eerste jaren van de twintigste eeuw incidenteel overheidsgeld vrij werd gemaakt voor dit werk, maakte de Reclasseringsregeling van 1910 een structurele financiering vanuit de overheid mogelijk. Vanwege de jarenlange ervaring die het Leger met deze vorm van hulpverlening had, werd ook aan het Leger gevraagd hieraan deel te nemen, waarmee de overheid erkende dat zij en het Leger gelijke doelen nastreefden op dit gebied. Toch werd aan de kant van het Leger snel enige aarzeling gevoeld, omdat duidelijk was dat wanneer het zou ingaan op deze uitnodiging, een ander belang in de verdrinking zou kunnen komen: autonomie, beleidsvrijheid en onafhankelijkheid. Het Leger nam dan ook ruim de tijd voordat het besloot in te gaan op deze vorm van samenwerking. Aannemelijk is dat gebrek aan geld, hierbij van doorslaggevend belang zou zijn geweest. De bestaanszekerheid van de organisatie was dus een belangrijk argument voor een structurele samenwerking met de overheid – een argumentatie die ook bij andere reclasseringsinstellingen werd gezien.

Al in 1915 zou deze samenwerkingsrelatie met de overheid ervoor zorgen dat de overheidsgelden de andere inkomsten van het Leger overstegen. Dit was op zich geen probleem, maar toen de overheidssteun stagneerde als gevolg van de economische crisis van de jaren dertig, werd pijnlijk duidelijk dat de reclasseringsafdeling van het Leger toch redelijk afhankelijk was geworden van deze geldstroom. Maar in plaats van zich terug te trekken, besloot het Leger de eigen positie te versterken. Het Leger moest worden ontzien, want het werk dat het deed, bespaarde de overheid duizenden guldens, zo was de redenering. Daarmee gaf het Leger aan dat hoewel de machtsbalans in het voordeel van de overheid uitviel, de relatie tussen beide actoren was gebaseerd op een zeker mate van wederkerigheid. Door middel van deze argumentatie van economische wederkerigheid probeerde het Leger zijn positie te legitimeren – een strategie die goed paste in de tijd van economische malaise.

Maar omdat het Leger blijkbaar ook goed beseftte dat zijn afhankelijkheid van de overheid groter was dan *vice versa*, haastte het zich om aan de argumentatie toe te voegen dat het Leger slechts een gereedschap in de kist van de overheid was, om de sociale problematiek aan te pakken. Hiermee onderschreef het Leger dat beide actoren dezelfde doelen nastreefden, maar ook dat het Leger daarbij instrumenteel was voor de overheid. Deze argumentatie van ‘vervollediging’ zou een belangrijk middel blijven in de relatie van het Leger met de overheid. Het directe resultaat van deze strategie leek te zijn dat het Leger zijn reclasseringswerk verder kon blijven uitbreiden, net als andere werkzaamheden op het gebied van maatschappelijke hulpverlening, en vanaf die tijd groeiden de activiteiten die betrekking hebben op de sociale missie dan ook veel sneller dan de meer religieuze activiteiten van het Leger.

In de periode na de Tweede Wereldoorlog zou deze trend doorzetten en tien jaar na de oorlog was het exploitatieresultaat van het Leger verdubbeld, net als de particuliere giften. Deze groei was echter eerder te danken aan inkomsten door investeringen en onroerend goed dan aan overheidssubsidies op sociaal werk. Behalve bij de reclassering, want daar nam deze subsidiëring met grote sprongen toe. Toch zou ook op andere maatschappelijke diensten in toenemende mate overheidsfinanciering volgen. Dit kwam deels doordat de overheid deze in toenemende mate ter beschikking stelde, maar een andere factor van belang was dat het Leger zelf steeds meer gewend raakte aan zijn plek binnen het sociaal beleid-systeem. Het Leger wist in toenemende mate zelfstandig nieuwe subsidiebronnen aan te boren. Daarnaast hervormde het Leger delen van de organisatie al naar gelang de loop van subsidiestromen, hetgeen een duidelijk teken was van de bereidheid van het Leger om zich flexibel op te stellen om zo de eigen bestaanszekerheid te waarborgen. Dat de overheid de samenwerking met het Leger op prijs stelde, was al voor de oorlog duidelijk. Maar ook in deze naoorlogse tijd ging het Leger voor de overheid niet alleen een betrouwbare *proxy* vormen, maar leek het Leger ook een bruikbaar alternatief te zijn voor het verzuilde maatschappelijk werkveld.

Toch was de relatie tussen de overheid en het Leger niet vrij van spanningen. Zo wilde de gemeente Utrecht in 1959 dat het Leger de boekhouding aanpaste aan de maatstaven van de gemeente. Vanwege de interne organisatorische versnippering gaf het Leger daar echter niet snel gehoor aan, maar toen de gemeente de druk expliciet opvoerde, en het Leger nog steeds niet volgde omdat het nog meer tijd nodig had, zou de gemeente zich uiteindelijk toch minder hard opstellen dan het suggereerde: de voorggehouden sancties bleven uit. Blijkbaar was de relatie met het Leger te waardevol voor de overheid om op het spel te zetten en daarmee werd ook de wederzijdse afhankelijkheid van beide actoren benadrukt.

In het algemeen kan over de periode tussen 1910 en 1970 gezegd worden dat de houding van Leger richting de overheid zijn vruchten afwierp. Economische wederkerigheid, aangevuld met het argument van vervollediging legitimeerde de positie van het Leger in het sociaal beleid-systeem en deed de sociale missie van het Leger uitgroeien tot een belangrijk fundament van de organisatie en zijn identiteit. Gedurende de jaren zeventig en vooral ook tachtig zou deze legitimering echter onder druk komen te staan, net als de gelijkgerichtheid van doelen tussen de twee actoren. De harmonisatiedruk vanuit de overheid werd ook weer voor het eerst echt gevoeld binnen het reclasseringswerk van het Leger des Heils omdat al gedurende de jaren zeventig voortdurend werd aangestuurd op eenwording en schaalvergroting binnen deze branche. Voor het Leger was het laten opgaan van het eigen reclasseringswerk in een groter en neutraal verband echter geen optie, zoals zou blijken tijdens de jaren tachtig.

De juridische identiteit van het Leger des Heils

De vraag naar de identiteit van het Leger des Heils werd ook op een andere manier aan de orde gesteld, want gedurende een groot deel van zijn bestaan heeft het Leger nagedacht over hoe de eigen identiteit het best kon worden vormgege-

ven op het juridische vlak. Deze juridische identiteit kwam tot uitdrukking in drie elementen: de statuten van het Leger, de beschrijving van de missie daarin, en de rechtspersoon die het Leger koos: kerk of stichting. De onderliggende vragen die de discussie binnen het Leger hierover bepaalden, waren: wat zijn we *de facto*? Wat kunnen we zijn? Wat willen we zijn?

Voorafgaande aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog was de juridische positie van het Leger nogal onduidelijk. Door middel van de statuten van 1896 en 1931 was het Leger een stichting, maar vanwege de nauwe verwantschap met het Engelse The Salvation Army – dat feitelijk een kerk was – werd de juridische status van het Leger in praktijk ook wel gelijkgesteld met wat een ‘kerkelijke stichting’ werd genoemd. Deze rechtspersoon was typisch Nederlands en voorbehouden aan stichtingen die vanuit kerken werden gesticht.

De historische band met Engeland zorgde op andere momenten ook voor het idee dat het Leger des Heils in Nederland feitelijk een buitenlandse organisatie was, terwijl het Leger zelf zich in toenemende mate als geheel Nederlands presenteerde. Tot aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog slaagde het Leger er goed in deze zelfgekozen autonome identiteit vorm te geven, maar omdat de statuten stelden dat het Leger een Engelse organisatie was, werd het in 1941 alsnog door de Duitse bezetters verboden. Dat betekende echter niet dat het Leger zich gewonnen gaf en in hetzelfde jaar registreerde het Leger zich als geloofsgemeenschap bij het Ministerie van Justitie. Het maatschappelijk werk werd voor een deel ondergebracht in een nieuwe stichting.

Na afloop van de oorlog echter, werd de liquidatie van het Leger ongeldig verklaard door de Nederlandse overheid en werden de statuten van 1931 weer van kracht. Toch was het Leger gesteld geraakt op het idee dat ze ook een kerk waren, en niet in de laatste plaats omdat deze vorm meer zekerheid gaf tegen ongewenste overheidsbemoeienis dan een stichting. Daarnaast bood de rechtspersoon stichting de mogelijkheid om overheidssubsidie te ontvangen, wat die vorm erg relevant maakte voor het maatschappelijk werk van het Leger. Het Leger koos dan ook voor beide vormen tegelijkertijd: gebaseerd op de statuten van 1931 was het een stichting terwijl tegelijkertijd de erkenning als geloofsgemeenschap van 1941 overeind bleef. Sterker nog, vanaf dat moment zou het Leger zich voornamelijk presenteren als kerk.

Om deze hybride rechtsvorm van een juridisch fundament te voorzien formuleerde het Leger in 1946 nieuwe statuten, welke in 1948 ook werden geaccepteerd door het Ministerie van Justitie, waardoor het Leger des Heils in Nederland in feite een nieuwe rechtspersoon had ontwikkeld: stichting-kerk. Deze hybride rechtspersoon deed recht aan hoe het Leger de eigen tweevoudige missie interpreteerde: het was een kerk (vanuit de geestelijke doelstelling) die zich juridisch had vormgegeven als stichting (vanuit de sociale doelstelling). In feite was het Leger nu dus een kerk die bedekt was met een seculiere mantel.

Hoe het kameleontische karakter van deze hybride identiteit in de praktijk werkte, werd duidelijk gedurende de vele Kamerdebatten waarin het Leger des Heils ter sprake kwam. Daarin werd het Leger vaak getypeerd als zowel een religieuze organisatie met een aanzienlijk aanbod aan maatschappelijke hulpver-

lening. Maar met regelmaat gebeurde dat ook andersom: het Leger was een maatschappelijke dienstverlener met een religieuze identiteit. In sommige gevallen werd het Leger zelfs een *testcase* van de definitie van wat een kerk is. De hybride identiteit van het Leger werd daarmee voor het parlement onderdeel van het aftasten van de rijwijdte van bepaalde wetgeving. Deze ongrijpbaarheid van de Leger identiteit kwam de overheid dus ook wel goed uit, want met enige regelmaat was het juist gunstig om het Leger niet zozeer als kerk, maar als een maatschappelijke dienstverlener te beschouwen, omdat het een gewaardeerde partner in het sociaal beleidssysteem was. Ondanks dat daarmee geen recht werd gedaan aan hoe het Leger zelf dacht over de eigen identiteit. Of juist wel, want het wilde immers ook beide zijn, en zolang de seculiere mantel van de stichting mogelijke overheidsbemoeienis met de religieuze kern wist af te wenden was het goed. Op deze wijze bekrachtigde de overheid ook expliciet de overeenkomst in doelen tussen de overheid en het Leger, en werd ook de flexibiliteit van de kant van de overheid duidelijk zichtbaar.

Ook binnen het Leger des Heils duurde het debat over de juridische identiteit voort. De eerste aanzet kwam daarvoor vanuit het internationale hoofdkwartier in Londen. In 1958 kwam het verzoek de banden met Engeland te onderzoeken, om de situatie die zich in de oorlog voordeed, in de toekomst te voorkomen. In eerst instantie was het Leger des Heils in Nederland niet erg geïnteresseerd in deze exercitie, maar zeven jaar later zou de Nederlandse commandant Palstra alsnog sterk voorstander blijken te zijn van het doorknippen van de internationale juridische banden. De urgentie kwam voort uit de angst dat wanneer de Nederlandse bevolking en de overheid te weten zouden komen dat het Leger inderdaad zo een sterke verwantschap met de Engelse moederorganisatie had, de inkomsten weleens sterk terug zouden kunnen lopen. Toch zou tot de jaren zeventig duren voordat er serieus werd nagedacht over een mogelijk andere rechtspersoon. In 1974 besloot commandant Verwaal dat het maatschappelijk werk ondergebracht zou moeten worden in een of meerdere aparte stichtingen, conform de subsidie-eisen voor dat werk. Tevens zou de doelstelling van de organisatie moeten worden herschreven, waardoor een beter balans tussen de sociale en de religieuze doelstelling werd aangebracht. Dus ook nu weer werd duidelijk dat door mogelijke externe problemen, het Leger intern, een grote mate van flexibiliteit vertoonde zolang het voortbestaan van de identiteit en de organisatie maar gegarandeerd bleef.

In 1976 echter werd een belangrijke pilaar onder de hybride identiteit van het Leger des Heils weggeslagen: deel 2 van het Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek werd geïntroduceerd. Hiermee werd de kerkelijke stichting afgeschaft, en dat terwijl het Leger zich graag als zodanig presenteerde. Opnieuw werd het Leger dus geconfronteerd met de eigen hybride identiteit, maar nu in de zin dat er moest worden gekozen tussen de stichtingsvorm of doorgaan als een kerk. Met deze nieuwe wetgeving werd ook nog eens extra duidelijk hoe kwetsbaar het Leger was op de machtsbalans met de overheid. De identiteit moest dus beter beschermd worden. In de discussie die hierop volgde binnen het Leger, werden aan het eind van de jaren zeventig twee stromingen zichtbaar, die beide een andere,

niet geheel tegengestelde interpretatie gaven van de statuten van 1946. De juridisch adviseur van het Leger, mr. Houthoff, was van mening dat het Leger vooral als een kerk moest worden gezien. Als men de overheidsinvloed buiten de deur wilde houden, maar tegelijkertijd in aanmerking wilde blijven komen voor overheidssubsidies, moest de maatschappelijke hulpverlening dus in een aparte juridische entiteit worden ondergebracht. Een andere redenering kwam van twee juristen, die, na elkaar, ook de directie vormden van de reclasseringsafdeling van het Leger: mr. Hartjes en mr. Fijn. Zij waren van mening dat de statuten van 1946 stelden dat het Leger al een stichting was, waardoor er geen aanpassing nodig was. Het bijkomend voordeel was in dit geval dat de eenheid tussen de religieuze doelstelling en de sociale doelstelling in één organisatievorm behouden bleef. Want deze broze eenheid zou naar hun mening veel meer onder druk komen te staan bij het oprichten van nieuwe rechtspersonen. Het Leger was volgens Hartjes en Fijn officieel geen kerkelijke stichting, want The Salvation Army was geen Nederlandse kerk. Dus ook met de introductie van Deel 2, BW was er geen probleem. Alleen zou het Leger zich in de toekomst wel meer als een seculiere stichting moeten presenteren dan een kerkelijke, zoals het voorheen gedaan had. Het debat draaide nu, zoals eerder aangegeven dus niet alleen om de correcte juridische vorm, maar de onderliggende vraag: wat willen we zijn? Een vraag die gedurende de jaren tachtig pas beantwoord zou gaan worden.

Professionalisering van het Leger des Heils

Het derde thema in de ontwikkeling van de identiteit van het Leger des Heils is professionalisering. Net als vele andere ontwikkelingen, werd de behoefte om te professionaliseren voor het eerst gevoeld binnen de reclasseringsafdeling van het Leger. Al voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog zette de Nederlandse overheid in op de professionalisering van organisaties en het sociaal werk. En naarmate de maatschappelijke hulpverlening zich ontwikkelde, nam ook binnen deze organisaties de behoefte aan scholing toe. Opleidingsinstituten werden opgericht en ook door middel van regelgeving op het gebied van bedrijfsvoering werd professionalisering gestimuleerd. De overheid wilde op deze manier zeker zijn van dat de toegekende subsidies ook hun doel zouden bereiken door efficiency en kwaliteit van werken. Voor de reclasseringsafdeling van het Leger des Heils betekende de groeiende vraag ook een groter aanbod van subsidies van de kant van de overheid. Daarnaast zorgde de toenemende complexiteit van sociale problematiek ook voor een versterking van de vraag naar verdere professionalisering. Binnen het Leger ontstond daardoor naast een kwalitatieve verbetering van de medewerkers zelf door scholingseisen, een cultuur van kennisdeling en vooral ook debat.

Vanaf 1950 zorgde de groei van het sociaal werk en de toenemende differentiatie en specialisatie daarbinnen, ervoor dat de professionalisering een stimulans onderging. Verschillende opleidingen leidden professionals op, die vaak ook op beleidsniveau hun stempel begonnen te drukken. Deze ontwikkeling werd zowel door de overheid als de organisaties zelf gestimuleerd. Beide actoren wilden de

kwaliteit van de geleverde diensten verbeteren, en maatschappelijke hulpverleningsorganisaties streefden naar erkenning van het eigen vakgebied om zo ook weer structurele financiering beschikbaar te krijgen. Voor het leger des Heils betekende deze professionalisering dat binnen de reclassering vanaf 1947 al het gesubsidieerde personeel voortaan door het Ministerie van Justitie moest worden goedgekeurd.

Ook de introductie van het *social casework* gaf het Leger een middel in handen om hun voorkeursmethode in het sociaal werk te legitimeren: op individueel niveau, met grote betrokkenheid op de cliënt. De gelijkwaardigheid tussen cliënt en hulpverlener die deze nieuwe methodiek verkondigde, vroeg echter ook van de professional om zich te ontdoen van mogelijke verborgen agenda's, zoals bijvoorbeeld evangelisatie. Sterker nog, langzamerhand werd elk religieus onderwerp verbannen naar de sfeer van het taboe. Een ander belangrijk gevolg van dit *social casework* was dat er nog meer nadruk kwam op scholing, en in 1964 zou dit dan ook een subsidie-eis voor reclasseringsorganisaties worden. Opvallend was dat een jaar eerder binnen het Leger des Heils al een reorganisatie van maatschappelijk werk-activiteiten had plaatsgevonden, waardoor elke (gesubsidieerde) activiteit zijn eigen departement kreeg en waardoor het werk meer los kwam te staan van de korpsen waarbinnen dat tot dan toe ondergebracht was. Begonnen hier haarscheurtjes zichtbaar te worden in de tweezijdige munt van de dubbele doelstelling van het Leger?

Naast de verbetering van de kwaliteit van het werk was een ander belangrijk effect van professionalisering voor het Leger dat het personeelsbestand begon te veranderen. Het aantal intern opgeleide officieren nam af, ten opzichte van het aantal externe professionals, die dus nieuw binnengehaald werden. Binnen het reclassering departement werden ook op het managementniveau professionals, i.c. juristen, aangenomen. Dit werd gedaan op uitdrukkelijk verzoek van het ministerie van Justitie. En met deze nieuwe lichte professionals zou, op veel niveaus binnen de reclassering van het Leger, de ideologische motivatie langzamerhand onder druk komen te staan door een meer professionele motivatie, die deze externen vaak met zich meebrachten. Om deze trend te keren probeerde het Leger alle sleutelposities te bezetten met 'eigen mensen', wat dus wel lastig werd voor het reclasseringwerk.

Deze kwestie van professionalisering zorgde er gedurende de jaren zestig en zeventig voor dat het reclassering departement van het Leger steeds meer een eigen koers zou gaan varen ten opzichte van de rest van de organisatie. Daar kwam bij dat binnen het werkveld van de reclassering een sterke beweging op gang gekomen was om alle landelijk opererende reclasseringsorganisaties te laten fuseren in een grote, algemene organisatie. Dat gebeurde ook in 1973 (SRI, later ARV). Het Leger des Heils echter bood sterke weerstand tegen deze trend, en weigerde deel te nemen aan deze vorm van schaalvergroting. Dit riep echter wel de fundamentele vraag op: op basis waarvan legitimeerde het Leger het bestaansrecht van een eigenstandige reclasseringsorganisatie? Welke meerwaarde leverde zo een organisatie? Als vanuit een reflex beantwoordde het Leger deze vragen meestal met: de eigen identiteit. Maar wat betekende dat? Waar

bestond deze uit? En waarom was deze zo veel waard dat het voortbestaan een eigenstandige reclasseringsorganisatie gerechtvaardigd was? Het zou tot in de jaren tachtig duren voordat het Leger hier een antwoord op gevonden had.

Gedurende de jaren zeventig en tachtig werd deze rol van de professional onderwerp van maatschappelijk debat. De toenemende aantallen professionals leken een eigen groep te vormen die binnen de organisatie vaak redelijk wat macht naar zich toe wist te trekken ten koste van het vaak nog niet geprofessionaliseerde management en de vrijwilligers, die voorheen vaak de kern van het personeelsbestand vormden. De maatschappelijke discussie over de rol van de professional binnen het welzijnswerk barstte volledig los tegen 1980. In dit debat werd gesteld dat de beschikbaarheid van professionals ook een eigen vraag leek te hebben gecreëerd. En hadden professionals hun cliënten afhankelijk gemaakt van hun diensten waardoor de cliënten hun gevoel voor zelfredzaamheid en verantwoordelijkheid waren kwijtgeraakt? Naast deze beschuldiging aan het adres van de professional werd deze ook beticht van het verdringen van de vrijwilligers binnen organisaties. En het waren vaak juist deze vrijwilligers die de kernwaarden van de organisatie vertegenwoordigden en daarmee de identiteit.

In geval van het Leger des Heils was dit ook terug te zien, en wel in de functie van de officier. De officier is te vergelijken met een priester in de katholieke kerk: de functie is een roeping, en niet zozeer een beroep. Als 'geroepen vrijwilliger' was de officier de personificatie van de dubbele missie van het Leger, omdat deze vaak actief was in zowel het sociaal werk alsook als korpsleiding of in een andere geestelijke functie. Om officier te worden verzorgde het Leger dan ook een complete interne opleiding aan de kweekschool, met als uiteindelijk doel: evangelisatie door woord en daad. Het aantal professionals binnen het Leger des Heils echter nam zo snel toe, dat deze vorm van identiteit stevig onder druk kwam te staan. Zo was in 1954 de ratio tussen professional en officier nog 1:54, terwijl deze tien jaar later was geslonken tot 1:14.

Op een ander niveau zorgde de ontwikkelingen met betrekking tot professionalisering voor een toenemende roep om inspraak binnen *civil society* organisaties. De burgers moesten betere mogelijkheden krijgen om invloed te winnen op hun eigen bestaan en een vorm daarvan was het uitoefenen van inspraak in die organisaties die hen vertegenwoordigden. Het resultaat van deze beweging was de Wet op Ondernemingsraden uit 1971. In 1977 bevestigde de commissie-Van der Burg het belang van deze wet door te stellen dat de positie van de belanghebbenden in deze organisaties moest worden versterkt: de burgers, de werknemers en de cliënten.

Deze democratiseringsbeweging ging echter lijnrecht in tegen de hiërarchische organisatiestructuur van het Leger des Heils. Sommige bestuurders zagen democratische inspraak zelfs als onverenigbaar met de aard van het Leger omdat dit ongewenste externe invloed op de organisatie-identiteit zou geven: je laat een medewerker van een kloosterbrouwerij toch ook geen invloed uitoefenen op de opleiding van de priester? Gerelateerd aan groeiende populatie aan externe pro-

professionals was dit inderdaad geen irreële zorg en deze externe invloed op het Leger was onacceptabel voor de Legerleiding.

Toch was democratische inspraak al jarenlang gemeengoed binnen de reclasering van het Leger. En daar werd met argusogen naar gekeken. En niet zonder reden, want toen de medewerkersraad van de reclasering lucht kreeg van de tegenwerking die de Legerleiding bood aan de installatie van ondernemingsraden binnen het Leger, bond het de (juridische) strijd aan. De Legerleiding echter, was in de veronderstelling dat voor het Leger als kerkgenootschap geen wettelijke plicht tot inspraak bestond. Toch besloot in 1978 de Raad van State anders, want ondanks dat het Leger ook een kerk was, was het ook een arbeidsorganisatie waarin meer dan 100 mensen werkzaam waren, waardoor een ondernemingsraad verplicht was. Daarmee werd nog eens bevestigd dat het Leger niet alleen zowel een kerkgenootschap alsook een maatschappelijke dienstverlener was, maar dat ook de externe invloed op het Leger er niet minder op werd.

Dit betekent dat tegen 1980 de ontwikkelingen op het gebied van professionalisering voor het Leger niet alleen resulteerde in een bloeiende maatschappelijke hulpverleningsorganisatie, maar tegelijkertijd heeft het de vraag naar de identiteit van het Leger stevig op de kaart gezet. De reclasering van het Leger was een organisatie binnen de organisatie geworden; vrijwilligers werden aan de kant gezet; officieren moesten geschoold worden of verdwenen geheel uit het voor het Leger zo kenmerkende reclaseringswerk. En de strijd om de schaalvergroting binnen de sector was nog niet beslecht, zoals gedurende de jaren tachtig duidelijk zou worden.

Reorganisatie van identiteit (1980-1990)

Gedurende de jaren tachtig kwamen de verschillende hierboven beschreven ontwikkelingen bij elkaar. De decentralisatiebeweging zorgde ervoor dat het Leger des Heils steeds meer op lokaal niveau zaken moest doen met verschillende gemeenten. Het Leger zelf constateerde echter dat gemeenten niet altijd overtuigd waren van deze samenwerking, zeker niet wanneer de economische achteruitgang zijn sporen achterliet op de overheidsfinanciën. In Utrecht bijvoorbeeld bedreigden voorgenomen bezuinigingen een aantal activiteiten van het Leger met sluiting. Daarnaast werd binnen het Leger geconcludeerd dat de gemeente Utrecht überhaupt liever zaken deed met algemene organisaties dan het duidelijk christelijke Leger des Heils. De Legerleiding had zelfs het vermoeden dat Utrecht van het Leger af wilde. Uiteindelijk bleek dat mee te vallen, maar de toon was gezet: de identiteit van het Leger was nu openlijk geproblematiseerd. Ook in Amsterdam werd in deze eerste jaren van de jaren tachtig kritische vragen gesteld met betrekking tot de christelijke identiteit van het Leger des Heils. In hoeverre waren bijvoorbeeld niet-christelijk cliënten of zelfs homoseksuelen welkom bij het Leger? En kon de overheid überhaupt wel een christelijke dienstverlener subsidiëren? Om die vragen goed te kunnen beantwoorden moest het Leger meer duidelijkheid verschaffen over de identiteit en daartoe de statuten aanleveren. Deze statuten echter waren nog niet voldoende up-to-date, waardoor binnen het Leger de spanning rees over een mogelijke afwijzing door de

Gemeente. Tegelijkertijd was Amsterdam bezig met het reorganiseren van de thuiszorg in uniforme zorgregio's. Omdat hierdoor het stedelijke werk van het Leger des Heils zou worden ingeperkt tot werken in een bepaald district, en dan ook nog onder een coördinerende organisatie, besloot het Leger hiertegen bezwaar aan te tekenen. De gebruikte argumentatie was dat het Leger vanwege de 'eigen identiteit' in staat was een bijzondere doelgroep aan te spreken en daarnaast door beroep te kunnen doen op een groot aandeel vrijwilligers, 24-uurs bereikbaarheid kon bieden. Het Leger probeerde nu dus de geproblematiseerde eigen identiteit om te keren in hun voordeel, want in eigen ogen had de identiteit juist meerwaarde. En met succes, want de Gemeente Amsterdam ging akkoord met deze geclaimde uitzonderingspositie.

Dit argument van eigenheid en identiteit werd ook gebruikt in de pogingen van het Leger des Heils om de fusiegolven af te slaan, die sinds het midden van de jaren zeventig op het reclasseringswerk afkwamen. Begin jaren tachtig echter leek dit alsnog tevergeefs te zijn en werd het Leger door de overheid geconfronteerd met een steeds dwingender overheidsaanpak. In 1984 leidde dit tot een grootschalig protest van het Leger des Heils. Na brieven van de Generaal aan het Nederlandse parlement en het rondsturen van vlugschriften aan Nederlandse zorgorganisaties kwam op 31 januari 1984 het Leger samen op het Binnenhof in Den Haag.

Onder veel vlagvertoon, schallend koper en met glimmende knopen aan de uniformen, bood de Commandant een petitie aan, aan de Kamercommissie van Justitie. Deze 'Mars op het Binnenhof' leverde de toezegging op dat het Leger zou blijven bestaan als reclasseringsorganisatie, maar veelmeer nog was dit gezamenlijke vertoon een uiting van de interne eenheid het Leger, dat met betrekking tot het eigenzinnige reclasseringswerk steeds meer onder druk was komen te staan. Toch zou niet veel later het Leger voor een keuze gesteld worden met betrekking tot het reclasseringswerk, waarbij in alle opties enige mate van identiteit zou moeten worden prijsgegeven: opgaan in een grote, algemene organisatie; ophouden te bestaan of een contractpartner van de overheid worden in de hoop zowel het werk, als de identiteit te kunnen behouden, maar wel door gebonden te zijn aan contract-specifieke regelingen en eisen. Het Leger koos voor deze laatste optie, omdat het hiermee de meeste kans had op continuering van het reclasseringswerk, met behoud van de eigen identiteit. Wel veranderde hiermee de status van het departement tot een *proxy*-organisatie van de overheid.

De identiteit van het Leger werd gedurende de jaren tachtig dus steeds meer een onderwerp van debat. Daarmee werd de vraag wat die identiteit dan precies was, steeds dringender. Om hier een contemporain antwoord op te vinden, besloot de Legerleiding het honderdjarig jubileum in 1987 aan te grijpen door een symposium te organiseren waar vertegenwoordigers van het Leger, samen met mensen uit de diverse werkvelden waarin het Leger actief was, en ook politici, beleidsmakers en academici, zich gezamenlijk zouden buigen over de vraag: in hoeverre heeft een christelijke organisatie als het Leger des Heils nog bestaansrecht als maatschappelijke dienstverlener en welke rol kan de identiteit daarin spelen? Deze formule bleek succesvol want, hoewel er wel degelijk kritische

kanttekeningen werden geplaatst bij de combinatie van sociaal werk en religie, was de teneur van de dag dat er zeker relevantie was voor het Leger, en wel juist *vanwege* de eigen identiteit – deze zorgde immers voor een drijfveer van de medewerkers waar menig organisatie jaloers op zou zijn.

Toch was hiermee niet de kous af, want ook op het juridische vlak moest de gordiaanse knoop van de identiteit nog worden doorgesneden: welke juridische vorm deed het meeste recht aan het moderne Leger des Heils? De vraag: wat willen we zijn, werd in twee discursieve lijnen bediscussieerd: de lijn Houthoff en de lijn Hartjes. Uiteindelijk zou de Legerleiding haar voorkeur uitspreken voor een van de twee lijnen waarlangs de vraag wat we willen zijn, werd bediscussieerd. Men koos voor de lijn Houthoff, waarmee werd aangegeven dat het Leger in eerste plaats een kerkgenootschap was. Dit werd gedaan omdat zo de mogelijke externe invloed op de religieuze identiteit zo klein mogelijk gehouden zou worden.

Dit betekende echter wel dat de subsidiëring van het sociaal werk in gevaar zou kunnen komen, wat ook bleek uit het standpunt van het Ministerie van Justitie: als het Leger des Heils geen stichting was maar alleen een kerk, zou het geen overheidsgeld meer kunnen ontvangen. En ook het Centraal Archief voor het Inzamelingswezen, de toezichthouder op publieke collectes, deelde deze mening. Dus, hoewel het Leger idealiter een kerk in een seculiere mantel zou willen zijn, werd als gevolg van deze externe ontwikkelingen anders besloten: het zou zich moeten onderverdelen in minstens één aparte stichting en een kerk. De voorbereidingen voor de reorganisatie werden in gang gezet en het zou tot 1990 duren voordat het nieuwe Leger des Heils de deuren zou openen. Het kerkgenootschap was apart gezet van vier stichtingen waarvan de Stichting Leger des Heils Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg (W&G) alle professionele maatschappelijke hulpverlening in zich herbergde. De andere stichtingen waren nodig om de geldstromen en onderlinge dienstverlening te regelen. Ook de eenheid tussen de geloofsgemeenschap en dienstensector moest worden bewaakt. Deze eenheid zou ook worden benadrukt in de statuten van alle entiteiten, waarin duidelijk werd vermeld dat het Leger des Heils een samenhangende organisatie is, gestoeld op dezelfde christelijke leerstellingen en principes. Deze nieuwe structuur zou moeten voorkomen dat de kerk teveel aan externe invloeden bloot zou staan, terwijl het maatschappelijke werk voldoende voeling zou kunnen houden met de geestelijke kant van het Leger. De Legerleiding was ervan overtuigd dat de tweezijdige munt op deze wijze behouden zou kunnen blijven.

Een dynamische balts

De relatie tussen het Leger des Heils en de overheid zoals is vormgegeven binnen het sociaal beleidssysteem, heeft een dynamiek opgeleverd die als volgt te kenmerken valt: het is een systeem waarin wederkerigheid en wederzijdse afhankelijkheid een belangrijke rol spelen. Om te bepalen wie welke invloed heeft, zowel intern als extern, is de plaats op de machtsbalans tussen de twee actoren van cruciaal belang. Deze machtsbalans hangt deels samen met de onderliggende beleidswaarden als kwaliteit, betrokkenheid en beheersbaarheid,

die, ondanks dat er verschillende beleidsconcepten zijn uitgewerkt en ingezet, continu aanwezig zijn geweest gedurende de twintigste eeuw. De mate waarin de actoren tot elkaar aangetrokken werden of juist niet, werd voor een deel bepaald door de mate waarin de eigen doelen met elkaar overeenstemden en hoe beide actoren in staat waren elkaar te verleiden om daarin flexibiliteit te tonen, terwijl de eigen zekerheid zoveel mogelijk behouden bleef. Dat betekent dat de dynamiek die in deze studie zichtbaar wordt, niet alleen tussen de actoren, maar zeker ook binnenin de actoren aanwezig was.

De beschreven ontwikkelingen binnen en rondom het Leger des Heils waren vooral gericht op het zekerstellen van het bestaansrecht als maatschappelijke dienstverlener, het construeren en behouden van de eigen identiteit door recht te doen aan de dubbele missie, en tegelijkertijd het vormen van de organisatie naar de eisen van de tijd, waarbij gebruik gemaakt werd van de mogelijkheden die de overheid hiervoor bood. Het Leger verliet zich in deze exercitie op een aantal argumentaties, dat in meer of mindere mate succesvol gebleken zijn. Richting de overheid was dat vooral een argumentatie van economische wederkerigheid en vervollediging: de samenwerking met het Leger leverde de overheid dus iets op. Op juridisch gebied was het Leger minder concreet. De hybride vorm van de seculiere mantel rondom de religieuze kern, bood op juridisch vlak veel meer speelruimte terwijl daarmee tegelijkertijd recht werd gedaan aan hoe het Leger zijn eigen missie beschouwde. Met betrekking tot het thema van de professionalisering, reageerde het Leger misschien wel het meest fel. Vanaf het begin werkte het Leger mee aan de ontwikkeling van de competenties van het personeel en de administratieve processen van de organisatie en tegelijkertijd kon het niet heen om een toename van externe professionals binnen de organisatie. De weerstand binnen het Leger ten opzichte van professionalisering kwam pas goed op stoom toen democratisering een rol ging spelen. Dat werd vervolgens zoveel mogelijk bestreden, want zodra de kern van de Leger identiteit in het geding leek te komen, kwam het Leger in actie en ging indien nodig over tot de aanval. Een reflex die ook zichtbaar werd tijdens de periode waarin het reclasseringswerk van het Leger dreigde te worden geannexeerd.

De twee decennia die volgden op deze reorganisatie lieten zien dat deze externe en interne ontwikkelingen nog lang niet aan hun eind waren. De marktwerking die gedurende de jaren negentig en zeker in de jaren tweeduizend in de zorg haar intrede deed, dwong het Leger zich nog meer te profileren. En ook hier lijkt een bekende Legerargumentatie in stelling te zijn gebracht: net als in de jaren tachtig koos het Leger ervoor om de identiteit als troef op te voeren, en in 2005 werd besloten dat de christelijke identiteit zelfs een professionele competentie was, die de kwaliteit van de betreffende medewerker waarborgde. Tegelijkertijd werd ook duidelijk dat de overheid identiteit ook in zekere mate interessant vond. Met de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning (Wmo, 2007) werd een beroep werd gedaan op de gehele Nederlandse *civil society*, inclusief kerken en religieuze organisatie, om een bijdrage te leveren aan de sociale cohesie tussen en individuele participatie van de burgers. Toch leek het instrumentele karakter met betrekking tot de *civil society* van deze overheidswens voorbij te gaan

aan alle nuance daarbinnen, want in de Memorie van Toelichting werden kerken direct op een lijn gesteld met voetbalclubs. De overheid liet daarmee wel een beperkte visie op de activerende kracht van religie zien.

Het Leger echter bleef zich stevig doorontwikkelen. Tenminste, het sociaal werk, want het kerkelijke deel had het steeds moeilijker. De inkomsten liepen terug, net als de ledenaantallen, en na een aantal pogingen om het kerkgenootschap Leger des Heils nieuw leven in te blazen, is vanaf 2009 een stevige strategieherziening voor de kerk van kracht. Het aantal korpsen moest aanzienlijk worden teruggebracht, en ook moesten de korpsen meer relevantie voor de eigen directe omgeving weten te creëren. Dat daarbij de steun van de Legerstichting Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg kon worden ingeroepen, werd niet heel concreet gemaakt. Wel kwam op sommige plaatsen een samenwerking tussen het lokale korps en W&G tot stand, waardoor het bestaansrecht van het korps wat meer verzekerd leek. Maar, zoals sommigen binnen het Leger zich ook wel afvragen, is er echt wel een organisatie als het Leger des Heils nodig om de drijvende kracht van de leden – het ‘Salvationisme’ – levend te houden? Het gaat toch immers om de daden, waardoor de geestelijke boodschap wordt verwoord? Toch zal de organisatie, en de manier waarop de twee missies daarbinnen zijn verankerd, een grote rol blijven spelen. Om met een metafoor te eindigen: deze voedingsbodem van het Salvationisme zal moeten worden bewerkt, gecultiveerd en gevoed. Biedt de huidige organisatiestructuur en cultuur hiervoor voldoende ruimte, bescherming, warmte en licht? Het beantwoorden van deze vraag valt ver buiten de competenties van een historicus – laat de toekomst het uitwijzen.

Curriculum Vitae

Stijn Bollinger (1968) was born and raised in Rijswijk, near the Dutch city of Den Haag. His adolescence was characterized by an alternation of study, music and life. In 2003 he obtained his MA degree in History, with American Studies as specialization, at the Utrecht University. In his thesis '*God Bless America!*' *De civil religion van Jerry Falwell en de Moral Majority* he showed a clear interest in studying the role of religion in the public domain and in 2004, it was awarded the Theodore Roosevelt American History Award. The following years Stijn displayed various professional interests like for the academic institute of a Dutch political party, quality management at the University of Applied Sciences Utrecht (HU), and especially as lecturer in research at the HU. It was the combined ambition of the HU and Stijn, that enabled him to once again apply his investigative qualities to the subject of religion in the public domain – the fruit of which, you are reading now. Stijn is married and has two beautiful daughters.

