Keeping trouble at a safe distance

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Unravelling the significance of 'the fear of crime'

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'An individual may be troubled by the problem of crime, but not be in the least afraid of being personally victimised'

Frank F. Fürstenberg
(1971:603)

Acknowledgements

It took a while to figure out what really makes me tick. When I attended university the equation really hit me: it is social research. But a problem arose here. I have a fascination for those macro-societal-concepts everybody tells you *not* to study, as they are too big and vague... Luckily my supervisor prof.dr. Hans Boutellier (VU University Amsterdam) hasn't discouraged me in my research ambitions. Thank you, Hans, for always being interested, urging me to keep an oversight and believing in my plans. A big thank you goes out to my co-supervisor dr. Stijn Verhagen (HU University of Applied Sciences Utrecht) as well. Thanks for your trust and solid feedback, which really sharpened my thinking and writing. You both had a crucial influence on this journey.

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During this project I had many special encounters with respondents who were willing to share some quite private thoughts and feelings with me. Thank you for being so open! Special thanks to the survey respondent who had me in hysterics with his "leaf blower" answer in response to my open survey question on previous victimisation. I have formulated multiple hypotheses explaining the exact nature of that criminal event, each more dramatic than the one before, but I'm still curious to find out what really happened…

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1.   Doubting public fears

Do we really live in an age of fear? The world is continuously changing at a fast pace. Numerous sources of unrest reach us from across the globe on a more than daily basis. It may even be that we are witnessing an acceleration of international and societal change. But does this all make Western citizens more *fearful* than before?

Some often-cited macro analyses frankly state that this is the case. A quick look at current events might easily verify this conclusion. But is it a realistic perspective? While journalist are keen to report on fear events, politicians are tripping over each other in their enthusiasm to lead the way in fighting back against a multitude of public 'fears', since the public appears to be collectively suffering from chronic anxiety.

Does the public really fear what it claims to fear, what the media tells it to fear, and what politicians and many institutions reassuringly claim to be fighting back against?

To be more precise: do individual citizens really *fear* global warming, flooding, epidemics, radiation, traffic accidents, refugees, economic decay, a breakdown of international stability or crime? Maybe we all just talk and think too superficially about these troublesome problems. And the same might be true also of associated public sentiments. This may well distort our understanding of these highly important problems. Because there is another side to modern Western life to emphasise as well: Western citizens are more affluent, happier, healthier and older than ever before. It is not all doom and gloom. So, let us shift some paradigms to bring more rationality to our heated, yet superficial debates.

We will zoom in on a persistent public fear in this thesis: 'the fear of crime'. It is "upon everybody's tongue" nowadays (Farrall & Gadd 2004:1). The concept is widely accepted as social problem across the globe (Gray, Jackson & Farrall 2008, Garland 2001) as it is held to impinge '(…) upon the well-being of a large proportion of the population' (Farralll et al. 1997:658). And so, politicians stress the importance of fighting back against this "public fear of criminal victimisation" through a get-tough-on-crime discourse. Many practitioners, too, are searching for ways to combat it (Spithoven 2014). But do we actually have a *valid* picture of a genuine 'social problem of striking dimensions' (Ditton et al. 1999:83)?

Critical voices say we don't. 'The fear of crime' - as we generally know it - is seen by them as '(…) a product of the way it has been researched rather than the way it is' (Farrall et al. 1997:658). Critical empirical insights give a whole other view on the nature of 'the fear of crime', making it '(…) a relative infrequent experience when research focuses on a more experientially based conception of fear' (Gray, Jackson & Farrall 2008:378). And, '(a)s such, the fear of crime would not appear to be a major societal concern, nor a major source of public anxiety '(Farrall & Gadd

2004:22). Ultimately, '(i)t seems that levels of fear of crime (…) have been hugely overestimated' (Ditton et al. 1999:676).

The research tradition's overreliance on the much criticised 'standard items' and survey design (Hale 1996:84, Farrall & Gadd 2004:5) led to the situation that - now forty-five years after the research began - still 'surprisingly little can be said conclusively about the fear of crime' (Ditton & Farrall 2000:xxi). On the other hand, though, the concept '(…) is not a stable entity that enlightened researchers will someday know "the truth" of' (Lee & Farrall 2009:211). Because the '(…) fear of crime can be experienced very differently in terms of individual relevance, explanation and consequences' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:64).

1.1 The focus of this research

The aim of this research is to contribute to a growing body of knowledge - from particularly the last fifteen years - which treats 'the fear of crime' as '(…) a complex allocation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments on the personal as well as the societal level' (Pleysier 2010:43). Several studies taking such a multi-dimensional approach have singled out the complexity of the interwoven nature of the sub-concepts of the fear of crime (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Girling et al. 2000, Jefferson & Hollway 2000, Taylor et al. 1996).

One specific observation in the results from these *multi-dimensional* research studies catches the eye: citizens generally perceive a growing threat of crime to their society, but consistently perceive a low risk of themselves falling victim of crime (Van der Wurff & Stringer 1989, Brantingham et al. 1986, Hindelang et al. 1978, Van den Herrewegen 2011:52, Elffers & De Jong 2004:46, Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, de Graaf & Boutellier 2012). Could it be that 'societal concern about crime has been transmuted into a personal problem of individual vulnerability' (Ditton & Farrall 2000:xvi)? Citizens seem to experience crime primarily as '(…) a general, abstract category (…) social problem' instead of a '(…) a more specific threat, differentiated and potentially tangible in the everyday' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:22-23). But this is not indisputably clear at this point, nor do we have a view on the underlying dynamics.

Current insights into 'the fear of crime' do not provide suitable answers, although the tradition certainly made progress with a theoretical and empirical approach to the fear of crime as an externalisation of a *broader kind of contemporary insecurity*. But clearly, 'more theoretical work needs to be done so that cross-level interactions (…) can be better explained and interpreted' (Wilcox-Roundtree & Land 1996:176, also see Pleysier & Cops 2016:17, Farrall et al. 1997:674, Hale 1996:84, Jackson & Gouseti 2014:9).

In order to achieve such insights, Tulloch (2000) stressed the importance of research incorporating how individuals actually *experience* constructs in relation to their personal definitions and social identities. Because an individual's '(…) multiple

identities can be a source of richness, or a source of conflict, or both' (Massey 1994:153 as quoted by Sparks, Girling & Loader 2001:888). Inter-relations between an individual's multiple social identities may well explain logically incompatible cognitions (Brewer & Gardner 1996 and Turner et al. 1987, 1994), such as the simultaneous cognition of a growing threat of crime to one's society and a low risk of criminal victimisation in respect of oneself. Clearly, 'people respond very differently to events and issues in which they are personally implicated as distinct from those of which they are more abstractly aware' (Sparks, Girling & Loader 2001:891).

By taking a *social psychological approach* (see Farrall et al. 2000, Jackson 2008), we will search for suitable explanations for this confusing observation in the fear of crime research tradition. As expounded by Pleysier and Cops (2016), the aim of this research is 'to integrate social psychological concepts related to the individual's identity and evaluation of his position in an increasingly complex society, to enhance our understanding of the fear of crime concept' (Pleysier & Cops 2016:3).

1.2 Research objective, questions & design

The research objective of this research is to find out at what level of *psychological distance* citizens most significantly experience the fear of crime and - especially - how this multi-dimensional concept is shaped at different layers of psychological reference. To realise this objective, we will critically analyse the current body of knowledge related to fear of crime and supplement it with a robust theoretical expansion, as well as a differentiated qualitative and quantitative empirical contribution. The concept of 'the fear of crime' demands an integrated research approach (Lee & Farrall 2009:212-213, also see Pleysier 2010:151, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:46, Hale 1996:132).

The main research question of this research is:

At what level of psychological distance do citizens primarily experience 'the fear of crime' and how do they construct it?

In the first instance, what is needed to answer this research question '(…) is a strategy which begins by unpacking the concept of fear of crime' (Hale 1996:132). Because the concept '(…) is, by nature, indeterminate' (Lee & Farrall 2009:211), we will start with an exploration of the concept's *history* to find out how it was initially understood, since the history of a highly complex concept can tell us much about its *inherent meaning* (Collier et al. 2006, also see Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:2). The sub-question to this stage of the research is:

1. *When and how did the fear of crime become a social problem and what was the concept's initial meaning?*

In order to answer this guiding question to our historical overture on 'the fear of crime', we employed the method of historical discourse analysis. In this way we empirically supplemented the work of several authors on the history of the concept (Lee 1999, 2001, 2007, Loo 2009, Loo & Grimes 2004, Jackson 2004a & Vanderveen 2006, 2011) to capture a sense of the concept's initial meaning.

After this historical analysis, we undertook a review of the current literature to find out what is known about 'the fear of crime' at present. This body of knowledge of theoretical and empirical insights soon revealed a disappointing status, as results are too scattered to speak of a firm knowledge basis (Hale 1996, Ditton & Farrall 2000). After this review of the existing literature, three theoretical complementary explorations were made: (I) an expansion of the theoretical framework related to 'societal fear of crime', which is in need of more structure and supplementation; (II) an exploration of psychological and social psychological dynamics underlying risk perceptions; and (III) an attempt to reach renewed conceptual clarity on 'the fear of crime', based on the former theoretical insights.

After reviewing and expanding on the literature, we took on a qualitative focus, in which our central research question was:

2. *What explanations do citizens themselves give for 'the fear of crime' and how do they explain their 'personal' and 'general fear of crime'?*

Because much is still unknown about the nature of 'the fear of crime' (Hale 1996) - and to access unconscious dynamics underlying the concept (Hollway & Jefferson 1997, 2000) - we started with a free associative question: 'Do you ever feel unsafe?' to see where respondents headed in their associations. After that, respondents were asked to sort a set of photographs related to fear of crime, according to their point of view. After laying this subjective foundation, respondents were asked semi-structured questions, which were rooted in the theoretical framework. Together with this theoretical framework, the results of this *mixed-method qualitative approach* led to the formulation of hypotheses to be tested in the quantitative stage of our empirical research.

In this quantitative stage, citizens from three very different Dutch municipalities were asked to complete a survey, designed to test our hypotheses and ultimately answer the quantitative research question:

3. *What are the relative roles of 'personal' and 'general fear of crime' in the generic explanation of 'the fear of crime' and what are the explanatory elements for these sub-concepts?*

Taken together, the answers to these three research questions will deepen our knowledge of the nature of 'the fear of crime' in general, by enhancing our understanding of influences, reciprocal dynamics and the significance of the concept at multiple levels of psychological reference.

1.3 The relevance of this study

1.3.1 Scientific relevance
The disappointing status of the scientific body of knowledge on 'the fear of crime' is already incontestably clear at this point in time. We will join a critical 'revival' of the research tradition, which does justice to the complexity of the concept in both its theoretical and methodological approach (Cops 2012:5, Jackson 2005:311, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:44). Our contribution will focus on the interwoven nature of sub-concepts related to the fear of crime, aiming to better explain and interpret 'cross-level interactions' in particular because, in general, 'we lack data on the psychological significance of the fear of crime' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:7) and so 'more work needs to be done (…) to examine its variety, its effects, its causes, and its nature' (ibid:81).

1.3.2 Societal relevance
'The fear of crime' has a central position in most Western governmental policies nowadays (Lee 2007). It is a critical argument in the approval of potentially freedom-limiting measures (Simon 2007). Despite all good intentions, how can this be if the public's 'fear of crime' is still primarily a 'black box' (Hale 1996)? A more precise understanding of the nature of 'the fear of crime' could potentially lead to a more suitable and contemporary democratic political use of the concept.

1.3.3 Practical relevance
Both local and national governments appear highly motivated to deal with 'the fear of crime' (Spithoven 2014). But since it is difficult to combat, most governments get stuck in rhetoric (Grabosky 1995, Markowitz et al. 2001). Scientific evaluations of interventions still show little to no effect on levels of 'the fear of crime' (Hale 1996, Spithoven 2014). And so, '(…) continued clarification of the concepts is essential. This will enable more realistic appraisals of strategies to combat fear to be taken' (Hale 1996:132).

1.4 What to expect in the following chapters?
In the second chapter we will explore the history of the fear of crime, with an empirical focus on the history of the concept in the Netherlands. The goal is to get a sense of the initial meaning of this highly ambiguous concept, before we explore what is known about it today.

Subsequently, we will review the literature in chapter three. The results from previous empirical and theoretical work on 'the fear of crime' will be analysed at the level of the individual, the neighbourhood and broader society. In chapter four, these insights will be supplemented with three complementary theoretical explorations.

In chapter five, our focus will be on the research objective as well as on the foundation of the research questions. We then provide an overview of the operationalisation of our central elements of 'the fear of crime' - rooted in the

previous theoretical framework - in order to reach a *valid* conceptualisation of 'the fear of crime'. Last but not least is a reflection on the research design.

In the subsequent chapters – chapters six and seven – the focus will be, respectively, on our qualitative and quantitative research results. The qualitative results conclude with the formulation of hypotheses, which were tested in the quantitative stage of the project.

In the eighth and final chapter we will draw together our newly gained insights into 'the fear of crime' by answering our research questions. We will discuss what these answers mean in terms of our knowledge about 'the fear of crime', and set out options for future research and practical implications.

It turned out that most citizens primarily fear crime *at a safe distance*, even though some of them perceived a highly significant risk *outside their own front doors*. We will explore the whys and hows of this observation in the course of this book.

2. An historical overture on public crime fears

The fear of crime is clearly a prominent social problem in most Western countries across the globe today. But *when* and *how* did the fear of crime become a 'social problem'? It turns out that the history of the fear of crime is actually not very clear. Most authors assume that the concept arose from public opinion in some way, at some point in history. This view is called the 'democracy at work' thesis (Vanderveen 2006:207). Others, such as Lee (2007), argue that the concept was ultimately created by politicians. But - given the complexity of agenda-setting in representative democracies - could either of these explanations be accurate?

Since the history of a concept can tell us much about the concept's inherent meaning (Collier et al. 2006, also see Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:2), in this chapter we will attempt to gain insight into the history of the fear of crime in the Netherlands. In the process, we will complement the work of Lee (1999, 2001, 2007), Loo (2009) and Loo and Grimes (2004) on the American history, Lee (2007) and Jackson (2004b) on the British history, and Vanderveen (2006, 2011) also on the Dutch history of the concept. The leading question for this chapter is:

> *When and how did the fear of crime became a social problem and what was the concept's initial meaning?*

We will first discuss the concept's American and British histories, to place the Dutch history of the fear of crime within its international context.

2.1 American & British histories of 'the fear of crime'
The concept of the fear of crime seems to be completely absent from the social sciences, governmental archives and records of popular media until the mid-1960s, which is when usage of the concept 'exploded' in the USA (Lee 2007:7). By that time, statistics provided by the American Bureau of Justice Statistics provided the first glimpse of a broad, emotional response to crime among citizens, in pilot studies that led to annual National Crime Surveys (Lee 2001:53, Ditton & Farrall 2000:xv). But where did research into this phenomenon stem from?

2.1.1 Crime-fearing Americans during the sixties?
The most frequently encountered explanation for this "discovery" is that 'the law and order issue' arose among the public in the face of turbulent changes in American society (Loo 2009:12). But Loo (2009) and Loo and Grimes (2004) showed that the American public was actually more concerned about the Vietnam war, civil rights, integration and racial discrimination than they were about crime. So, the explanation in terms of prevailing concerns about crime in the late 1960s seems to lack empirical evidence (see Loo 2009, Loo & Grimes 2004).

Loo and Grimes (2004) conclude that there is more reason to believe that the 1960s political commotion about crime was entirely based on a *false impression* of great public concern about crime. This false impression '(…) can be attributed to the collective efforts of conservative officials, mass media, pollsters and

conservative intellectuals (…)' (Loo & Grimes 2004:62). These actors could easily profit from the already ongoing press coverage of rapidly rising crime rates in America. And the fear of crime was even supposed to be used by politicians to mask public fears about racial integration in America (Bourke 2003, based on Ohlin 1971, Fürstenberg 1971, Merry 1981, Smith 1986 and Hall et al. 1978). So, the idea that the discovery of the fear of crime was not an accident at all imposes itself swiftly. This is where Lee's extensive work (1999, 2001, 2007) comes into the narrative.

2.1.2 Fear of crime as a political invention
Lee's conclusion - stated briefly - is that the fear of crime did not spontaneously start to bother the American public. At the heart of the fear of crime, newly available crime statistics were given political momentum in 1964 by Barry Goldwater, the republican presidential candidate of that time. With newly available national crime statistics, Goldwater framed crime as the 'growing menace' to the 'personal safety' of US citizens (Lee 2007).

To add a note to Lee's work, it is actually not very surprising that a *republican candidate* for the presidential elections of 1964 focused on crime as a threat to personal safety. The billboard pictured below (fig. 1) was part of a local republican campaign in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as early as 1949.

Fig. 1 - Republican campaign billboard with slogan "Make Our Homes and Streets Safe!" possibly on Morgan Street, Hill District, October 1949, by Charles "Teenie" Harris
© Carnegie Museum of Art, Pittsburgh.

At that time the Republican candidate for the United States Senate - James Henderson Duff - won easily, being the 'most popular republican in Pennsylvania' (Klein & Hoogenboom 1980:476). It is quite likely that the Republican party took the Pennsylvania strategy to a national level fifteen years later, with Goldwater's focus on crime strengthened by newly available crime statistics.

Despite the Republican's efforts they lost the presidential elections of November 1964 to the Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson. During his 'State of the Union Address' of 4 January 1965, Johnson stated that '(e)very citizen has the right to feel secure in his home and on the streets of his community' (Lee 2007:62). By now the public's *assumed* feelings of unsafety formed part of the Democrat president's policy ambitions, even though his Republican rival had initiated the theme.

President Johnson formed The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which was in favour of utilising new methods to collect crime statistics and conduct victim surveys. The findings of these surveys and polls dramatically changed the political discourse on crime, as witnessed by Johnson when referring to the first results in March 1966: '(f)ear can turn us into a nation of captives imprisoned nightly behind chained doors, double locks, barred windows. Fear can make us afraid to walk the streets by night or public parks by day. These are costs a truly free society cannot tolerate' (as quoted by Lee 2007:68).

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice warned that a ´(t)houghtless, emotional or self-serving discussion of crime, especially by those who have the public's attention and can influence the public's thinking, is an immense disservice' (ibid:69). But the fear of crime was already out of the Commission's hands. Only a month after the release of the Commission's report, President Johnson stated: 'America cannot tolerate enduringly this climate of fear. Our streets, our parks, our businesses and our homes ought to and must be made safe' (ibid:72), implying that they were not. Johnson's republican successor, Richard Nixon, continued this presidential war against crime.

All this political attention to crime and the fear of crime resulted in 'The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act' of 1968. The bizarre history of this legislation is documented by Harris (1969), who labelled the act as 'a piece of demagoguery devised out of malevolence and enacted in hysteria' (ibid:14). Its content comes down to the American police being given more freedom in their practice, affecting civilians' original freedoms and rights.

2.1.3 British history of the fear of crime
By May of 1970 the fear of crime became politicised in Britain by the British Conservative Party – fully based on American findings as a matter of fact - as they stated they would strive for '(a) better tomorrow with a greater freedom: freedom to earn and to save, freedom from government interference, freedom of choice, freedom from fear of crime and violence' (Lee 2007:84, also see Jackson 2004a). But the British political debates of the eighties, too, were believed by some to mask

anxiety about 'black youths' and 'inner city degeneration' among the public (Bourke 2003:127).

It would take until 1977 for Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher to stress a 'get tough attitude' on crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:30-31). In that same year, the fear of crime was empirically investigated for the first time in London by Sparks, Genn & Dodd (1977). They asked four questions related to the fear of crime, but they were not sure what they were actually measuring: '(t)o be frank, the question about concern was included because other researchers have also asked it (…)' (Sparks, Genn & Dodd 1977 as quoted by Lee 2007:88). By 1984, the fear of crime had become the primary focus of the British Victim Survey (Lee 2007:84-92).

2.1.4 There is more to the rise of "social problems"
These explored histories of the fear of crime resonate significantly with Simon's more recent plea for *governing through crime* (2007), according to which governments try to retain *indirect* influence on many aspects of society, by simultaneously stimulating public fear and addressing the problem of crime with their policies. But this *by itself* is a rather negative standpoint. We need to add more theoretical insights about the rise of social problems in general, in order to get a more balanced understanding of the rising fear of crime.

Loo (2009) and Loo and Grimes (2004) used the *moral panics* paradigm to uncover the foundations of the fear of crime in the USA. Moral panics are not easy to pin down as they differ in form, size, intensity, duration and their effects on societies. And the problems they refer to can be serious, trivial or imaginary (Garland 2008:13). Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) identified five key factors to define a moral panic:

> (I) First, there must be a form of concern or anxiety about a threat. (II) Second, the source of the threat must be identified. (III) Furthermore, the social reaction to the threat and its sources must be unanimously negative; and (IV) the threat must be exaggerated. And last but not least, (V) the moral consternation and its reflection in the media's reporting must be temporary.

Garland (2008:10-11) added two elements to this list:

> (VI) The moral question 'Why is this matter unacceptable?' must be answered before we can call a social movement a moral panic. And, (VII) a moral panic usually reflects a network of disturbing matters, rather than a single immediate problem.

The body of knowledge about moral panics essentially comes down to three theories that explain the emergence of moral panics: the interest group explanation, the elite-engineered explanation and the grassroots explanation. In order to understand these theories, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) used the analogy of a pyramid. At the top are the few power elites. In the middle of the

pyramid are the interest groups, leaving the grassroots at the bottom. The three *complementary* theories depart from other levels of this pyramid:

I.   The *elite-engineered explanation* states that moral panics are created by the power elites as interventions to divert attention from or get to grips with underlying, more serious problems. So, 'moral panics are political phenomena and are generated, whether 'deliberately and consciously' or not, through political and juridical activity' (Hunt 1997:635).

II.   The *interest group explanation* can be summarised as extensive media coverage, igniting a latent moral agitation among interest groups. According to this theory, the moral agitation about the direction of social change is not new, but suddenly appears in the limelight of the mass media (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 2009:52, Cohen 1972, Hunt 1997:631).

III. The *grassroots explanation* states that 'politicians and the media cannot fabricate concern where none existed initially' (Hunt 1997:636). This explanation focuses on pre-existing attitudes among citizens as pillars of an enhancement made by politicians and the mass media.

According to its founding father Cohen (2002), however, the moral panics tradition has some important conceptual problems and limitations. Garland (2008:21-25) has compiled a set of six specific, connected problems with this claim, based upon critique of the tradition:

> Firstly, (I) the assumption that any societal reaction is disproportionate demands an empirical argument about the real magnitude of a problem. (II) Most of the time this only refers to the researcher's own conception of how things are. (III) What the analyst considers a social over-reaction might be seen as a wholly appropriate reaction from another point of view. And (IV) most researchers overlook the influence of history, since a social reaction to phenomena is most accurately recognised as an allocation of responses to similar cases. Furthermore, (V) when studying a moral panic, one has to be sensitive to the social psychological consensual processes that take place in society. The sixth (VI) and final element that Garland considered is the ethics of the attribution of the label 'moral panic' to a social reaction.

Overall, Garland suggests that moral panic analysis implies a contemptuous critique and aggressive tendency that can be seriously incompatible with the academic fundamentals of objective research, and can overlook the symbolic meaning of social reactions. This critique brings us to the frequently cited arena model of Hilgartner and Bosk (1988). They advocated the rise of social problems within a context of public discourse as being 'projections of collective sentiments' (ibid:53), because social problems are 'embedded within a complex institutionalised system of problem formulation and dissemination' (ibid:55).

Hilgartner & Bosk's arena model comprises many institutions that all present "social problems" to the public. Within those *arenas,* the actors with the most communicative initiative and creativity, the best rhetorical and dramatic abilities, and in closest co-operation with other actors and journalists will achieve the greatest media coverage and thereby gain better access to the public (Sheaffer 2001:718). All actors are held to discuss, select, define, frame, package and dramatize "social problems" in line with their own interests. But it is also possible that a "social problem" will be presented in a similar way in different arenas, simply because actors know that certain problems "work" to get a broader message out.

This "consensus" will amplify public recognition of the "social problem" and will surely catch the public's attention. This last notion interfaces with the concept of *discursive space* '(…) in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach common judgment' (Hauser 2009:86). This is when actors repeat or apply the claims of others in order to get the attention and support of the public (Stallings 1990:91-92). Actors do not reflect their own intentions single-mindedly; they can learn from and support each other (Haggerty 2009). This is how a public can be convinced about a "social problem" which did not even exist before.

2.1.5 Sub-conclusion for the American and British histories
From the point of view of the moral panics paradigm, political acts in the USA and the UK attract particular attention in terms of the history of the fear of crime in those countries. But we must not forget that moral panics float on a 'loose set of causal conditions that are associated with the phenomenon' (Garland 2008:14). The rise of the concept as a "social problem" was not solely based on political action; this action was only made possible by the emergence of three preconditions: (I) the public already being concerned about (a) related issue(s); (II) momentum being given to the topic of crime as a result of newly available crime statistics; and (III) politicians knowing that the topic of crime "works" to cover up more ambiguous public concerns.

As Lee concludes, historically, the rise of the fear of crime is a product of 'a number of discursive realignments, technical shifts, historical accidents and governmental imperatives' (Lee 2001:ix). So, the history of the concept simply reveals a balanced combination of coincidence and conscious political acts, which led to *discursive space* opening up about the "social problem" of crime and its related public sentiments.

2.2 Historical research question, expectations & method
Given what we now know about the historical development of the fear of crime in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the rise of social problems in general, the research question for the rest of this chapter is: *When and how did the fear of crime become a social problem in the Netherlands and what was the concept's initial meaning?.*

Vanderveen (2006, 2011) has already touched on the Dutch history of the fear of crime by exploring details of the first Dutch research reports on the fear of crime (Fiselier 1978, Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976). Farrall, Jackson and Gray (2009:253, based on Burney 2005) stated that the fear of crime in the Netherlands really gained momentum through the politics of Pim Fortuyn. But much of the public and political background - and thus the inherent meaning of the concept in its early days - is still unclear.

2.2.1 Expectations

The previously mentioned American and British histories of the fear of crime and theories about the rise of social problems provide us with some important expectations to add detail to Vanderveen's findings (2006, 2011):

I.   *Politicians* have played an important role in setting the agenda for the fear of crime in the Netherlands;
II.   (Scientific) *research* must have measured a magnitude of fear of crime prior to or as a result of the political attention;
III. The *public* must have broadly experienced a sentiment akin to fear of crime or was already convinced that a related social problem existed;
IV.   Politicians must have gained *media attention* to reach the public with their message.

But the central expectation is that different actors have influenced each other, making the fear of crime a successful "social problem" since, clearly: '(…) it has become a reference to a set of social problems and accompanying solutions' (Vanderveen 2006:206).

2.2.2 Method

To put these expectations to the test, we employed the method of *historical discourse analysis* (following Godfrey 2012 and Blommaert & Verfaille 2010). Discourse analysis is a method designed to analyse how complex phenomena are *constructed* (Koemans 2011). Although frequently applied, it is not a well-defined method (Blommaert & Verfaille 2010, Koemans 2011). The key element is the understanding that a problem can be viewed from different angles, leading to different constructions and narrations of the problem.

In essence, the method focuses on distinguishing *linguistic processes* in order to define how people construct their view of reality. It is through these linguistic processes that people express how they categorise and represent phenomena (Blommaert & Verfaille 2010). But their *words* need to be understood in a social, cultural and historical context (ibid, Godfrey 2012).

Godfrey states that most historical research focusing on crime relates to social changes '(…) that challenged social commentators, politicians and policymakers to find solutions' (Godfrey 2012:160). Their ideas about solutions implicitly carry the respondents' problem constructions. According to Godfrey (2012:161-164), these

ideas and constructions can be historically accessed through analysis of (I) historical documents; (II) autobiographies; or (III) historical interviews.

The aim is to search for historical texts and to interview key actors in the Dutch history of the fear of crime, to analyse when and how the fear of crime was constructed as a 'social problem' in the Netherlands. We will use the method of *historical discourse analysis* to analyse how actors representing four perspectives constructed the "social problem" of the fear of crime:

I.   The *'political perspective'* can be analysed through the availability of verbatim minutes from the Dutch parliament, called 'Dutch parliamentary transactions'. Memoires and (auto)biographies of Dutch politicians can also offer insight into how politicians reflected on certain events in their careers (Egerton 1992:293).

II. A similar outcome can be achieved in respect of the *'academic perspective'*, since Fiselier and Van Dijk – two pioneers in the study of fear of crime in the Netherlands –were willing to be interviewed.

III. We can also acquire insight into the role of the *'media perspective'*, since the articles of Dutch national newspapers are accessible in different archives dating back to the 1950s.

IV. Analysis of the *'public perspective'* is more difficult, because we can only rely on past surveys related to the fear of crime. Nonetheless, reports by both Fiselier (1978) and the WODC (Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976) provide good quantitative insight into public opinion as expressed in 1973 and 1975, respectively.

According to Godfrey (2012), it is best to adopt social-scientific techniques in the analysis of historical texts. All historical texts and interview transcripts were therefore carefully coded (following Saldaña 2012) in Atlas.Ti, to find out how the fear of crime was perceived, constructed and narrated from these four perspectives. The aim was to identify patterns and categorise a portion of text or transcript (Saldaña 2012). The dynamics within and between these four perspectives can thereby be discovered.

2.3 The rise of 'the fear of crime' in the Netherlands
Our analysis of four historical perspectives on the fear of crime in the Netherlands aims to reconstruct the moment and conditions under which the fear of crime gained momentum as a Dutch social problem and - ultimately – reveal the initial meaning of the concept.

2.3.1 The political perspective
The Dutch political perspective on these topics was analysed by studying the Dutch parliamentary transactions from the period of 1950-1951 to 1980-1981. The following terms and their synonyms were set as search topics: crime ('criminaliteit'); violence ('geweld'); unsafety ('onveiligheid'); unrest ('onrust'); feelings of unsafety ('onveiligheids-gevoelens'). It quickly became apparent that the

political debates related to the fear of crime were linked to the topic of civil disobedience ('burgerlijke ongehoorzaamheid'), which then also became a search topic.

In the event, all relevant hits were restricted to the period of 1970 to 1981. The development of political attention to crime and the fear of crime between 1970 and 1980 is shown below (fig. 2). As the table illustrates, the Dutch political debate related to the fear of crime clearly gained its momentum in 1973.

Fig. 2 – Development of the Dutch political debate related to
the fear of crime between 1970-1980.

In total, the six search topics led to 216 relevant claims[1] in 42 debates of the Dutch Parliament between 1970 and 1980. No relevant claims were present before 1970. All relevant passages of these 42 debates were coded[2] for comparative analysis in Atlas.Ti.

Quantitative analysis of the political perspective
Let us look at the actual composition of the 42 debates and the relative contributions of political parties to them (tab. 1). Debates related to the fear of crime were mainly influenced by right-wing, conservative political parties[3]: they contributed 131 claims across 63% of the debates. The contribution by parties in the left-wing, progressive camp[4] was less than half of that made by their political counterparts: 54 claims across 24% of the debates.

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[1] A political party that made the same claim multiple times in the same debate was listed only once. Furthermore, search topics had to be in the same context as another search topic and ultimately had to be related to 'crime' to be relevant. For instance, debates solely about 'civil disobedience, ' or 'insecurity' due to high-speed traffic were excluded from analysis.

[2] Ideally, all articles would have been coded *independently* and the 'inter- coder-reliability-coefficient' computed (Saldaña 2012:27, also see Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002). Unfortunately this was not possible in the time span of this project, so the next best option was chosen: My research assistant read through all coded articles and checked them with the codebook.

[3] KVP, SGP, DS'70, CDA, ARP, CHU & BP.

[4] PvdA, D'66, PPR & PSP.

	Left prog.	Left cons.	Right prog.	Right cons.	TOTAL
Crime	10	2	4	24	**19% (40)**
Rising **crime**	11	3	2	23	**18% (39)**
Violence	4	1	-	10	**7% (15)**
Rising **violence**	2	-	-	8	**5% (10)**
Fear of crime	11	-	4	13	**13% (28)**
Rising **fear of crime**	4	-	-	6	**5% (10)**
Unrest about crime	3	-	2	9	**6% (14)**
Rising **unrest about crime**	-	-	-	2	**1% (2)**
Public unsafety	1	-	1	12	**6% (14)**
Rising **public unsafety**	3	2	1	9	**7% (15)**
Civil disobedience	5	3	4	15	**13% (27)**
TOTAL	**24% (54)**	**5% (11)**	**8% (18)**	**63% (131)**	**214**

Tab. 1 – Substantive content of 42 debates related to fear of crime 1970-1980.

The political perspective on the fear of crime had an increasing focus on 'crime' as its backbone and this became connected to 'violence' and 'civil disobedience'. More importantly, politicians *supposed* public sentiments of 'public unsafety' and 'unrest about crime' during these debates. The left-wing conservative parties[5] as well as the right-wing progressive party (VVD) found themselves in agreement with the right-wing conservative claim of 'rising fear of crime' due to 'risen crime' and 'violence' as a result of 'civil disobedience'.

Now that we have a quantitative oversight of the nature of the political debate, we will take a qualitative view to see how the fear of crime was constructed and narrated by Dutch politicians.

Qualitative analysis of the political perspective
It was DS'70[6] frontman Dr. Willem Drees Jr[7] who managed successfully to address the topic of 'rising crime' and 'public unsafety' in the Dutch parliament. On October 11th, 1973 he said[8]: 'The Queen's speech[9] talks about rising feelings of unrest and threat. And indeed, especially in the bigger cities this feeling of unsafety is rising, but the Queen's speech remains silent on this topic. What is the government going

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[5]   GVP, CPN & RKPN.
[6]   DS'70 was a centre-right, social-democratic party that was formed as a split from the PvdA due to concerns primarily about the latter party's economic and foreign politics.
[7]   Drees Jr was Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment and before then a high-level public official in the Ministry of Economic Affairs. His father was Prime Minister of the Netherlands between 1948 and 1958.
[8]   Dutch Parliamentary Transactions 1973/1974, 4:95. This and all other translations of excerpts from the Dutch Parliamentary Transactions are mine.
[9]   Every September the monarch of the Netherlands gives a speech, on behalf of the government, to outline its intended policy for the next year.

to do about these feelings of unsafety?'. Neither the government nor the parliament was given opportunity to react to Drees Jr's speech, since debating on this topic was postponed until October 31st 1973, when the parliament and government would discuss the ministry of justice's budgets.

This is when Drees Jr repeated his claim[10]: 'The Prime Minister even acknowledges rising public unsafety! But his budgets for prevention and the police force are very miserable.' Commotion immediately arose in the parliament. Joop Wolff of the Dutch Communist Party (CPN), tried to close the door on Drees' fear of crime rhetoric[11]: 'Heavy artillery about rising crime and unsafety of our citizens came before this discussion. We are not very impressed by this. (…) The new crime rates are seriously concerning, which every crime rate is, but we give a strong warning against manipulating these rates. This happens. Barry Goldwater did this in America. Nixon was good at it in his better days, and the guys around here know how to do this too. They throw all the numbers in a heap and call for more displays of power, on the basis that the safety of our citizens is not properly guaranteed.'

American influence
This was no idle rumour about the American influence on Drees Jr's politics, voiced by Joop Wolf. Drees Jr lived in the United States of America from November 1947 to April 1950, while working for the International Monetary Fund (Drees 2000:93-106), and he had a strong interest in American politics (ibid:220 & 258-259). Looking back on DS-'70's politics, Drees Jr stated that: '(W)e needed to transmit our ideas to society to gain electoral profit. To do this, we used psychological elements to perpetuate our vision among the Dutch public' (Drees 1991:84-85). And in this manner: '(s)ometimes, popular misconceptions were embraced, where others might not have been able to expose our actions' (Drees 2000:205-206, my translation). Although Joop Wolff did expose his American-inspired actions, Drees Jr's way of pursuing politics had an impact on the entire Dutch political perspective: other parties needed to keep up with his – *American-inspired* - crime and unsafety rhetoric.

The undercurrent of 'civil disobedience'
As briefly explored before, there was a broader social undercurrent of 'civil disobedience' in the fear of crime debates. As with the rest of Western societies, several occupations, strikes, hijacks, riots and protests by civilians irrevocably showed that citizens, students and workers were insisting on a *revision of power relations* in Dutch society, using various forms of disruption. They embarked on numerous violent confrontations with the authorities during this period, and this led to serious unrest in the Dutch parliament (Spierenburg 2013:14-30 & Kennedy 2007b:146-179).

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[10] Dutch Parliamentary Transactions 1973/1974, 6:194.
[11] Dutch Parliamentary Transactions 1973/1974, 17:698-700.

Intense, lengthy debates on how to regain social order in Dutch society followed. Soon, right-wing conservative members of the Dutch parliament (KVP and SGP) stated that '(…) given the deliberations on the phenomenon of *civil disobedience*, considering that an increase of this phenomenon will do damage to our constitutional state, and will threaten the *public's feelings of security and safety (…)*', they were asking the government to regain its hold on the public and maintain public order[12]. Ultimately, the topics of 'civil disobedience', 'rising crime' and 'public unsafety', as well as 'fear of crime', became *politically entwined* in the Netherlands between 1973 and 1976.

Fear of crime in Dutch election programs
Prior to the debates between 1973 and 1976, 'fear of crime' and 'crime' were absent from Dutch election programs[13]. But by the time of the elections to the Dutch parliament of May 27th 1977, 'crime' and 'fear of crime' occupied a prominent position on the Dutch political agenda. It was mentioned from the progressive left to the conservative right (D'66 1977, CDA 1977, RKPN 1977, VVD 1977, DS'70 1977, SGP 1977). Drees Jr really set a political snowball in motion. But what did the Dutch public think about crime at the time it was becoming such a prominent "social problem" on the political agenda?

2.3.2 The public perspective
Survey research carried out by Fiselier (1978) and the Dutch Research and Documentation Centre (Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976) offers a rather good reflection of Dutch public opinion related to crime in, respectively, 1973 and 1975. We know from the previous section on the political perspective that this was exactly the time when the fear of crime graduated to being a "social problem" in Dutch politics.

Fiselier concluded for his 1973 sample that the *actual* fear of crime was strongest among a small group of young women (Fiselier 1978:139). Feelings of unrest about crime were relatively more widespread, but did not have a serious impact on citizens' lives (ibid:141-148). The Dutch Research and Documentation Centre (Cozijn & van Dijk 1976) came to a similar conclusion for their 1975 sample. A relatively small number – 16 percent of respondents – considered crime to be the most important social problem. So, both reports suggest that the Dutch public was not as engaged with the "social problem" of crime as politicians were at that time. But what motivated the interest in researching fear of crime in the Netherlands? Was it perhaps politically initiated?

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[12]   Dutch Parliamentary Transactions 1973-1974 – 12:926, my translation and emphasis.
[13]   Searching the political programs of all political parties in the archive of the Documentation Centre of Dutch Political Parties at the University of Groningen for: 'safety' (veiligheid),'crime' (criminaliteit), 'unrest' (onrust) and 'feeling'(gevoel).
      http://dnpp.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/root/programmas/Verkiezingsprogramma/.

2.3.3 The academic perspective

Dutch pioneers in the academic research of the fear of crime, Professor Jan Fiselier[14] and Professor Jan van Dijk[15] were interviewed to explore their memories of the Dutch history of the fear of crime. Fiselier stated that political influence had never been exerted on his research. His main influences were the previously mentioned American and British victim surveys: '*The Americans were the first to conduct such large-scale victim surveys. At a NATO conference about victimisation of crime, I met Miss Hazal Genn, who was working with Sparks at that time on a British victim survey.*' Genn explained how the British intended to perform their survey, inspired and helped in practical ways by the American researchers. And so Fiselier ordered copies of several American research reports to figure out how the Americans had performed their surveys. He was especially inspired by the work of Frank Fürstenberg (1971).

Van Dijk was not involved in the design of the Dutch Research and Documentation Centre survey. He only wrote the survey report soon after joining the Dutch Research and Documentation Centre, which had been tasked by a steering committee to conduct research into the public's concern about crime. This committee had been formed by the Minister of Justice of that time. *'So it is possible that the choice of the research's theme was politically influenced.'* According to van Dijk, there was a strong American influence on the actual survey items: '*This research was possible because the Dutch Research and Documentation Centre hired somebody from the opinion polling industry - from Nipo, a subsidiary of the American Gallup company. This Nipo employee must have proposed the question about the relative importance of crime compared to other social problems. That question brings us back to the influence of old Mr Gallup. The fear of crime must have entered the Netherlands through the polling industry too.*'

Both Fiselier and van Dijk remember that their research reports attracted a great deal of media attention. As Van Dijk recalls: *'It reached all the newspapers, including some editorials.'* So the media was clearly paying attention to research results related to fear of crime, but was that also the case for fear of crime politics? And how did the media reflect on these research results and political debates?

2.3.4 The media perspective

The archives of three Dutch university libraries were searched for newspaper articles related to the fear of crime, using the above political, public and academic perspectives as our guidelines. With the timespan of a week before to a week after the dates of the debates and publications, this search produced 36 relevant articles in eight newspapers[16]. All 36 articles were carefully coded in Atlas.Ti to gain a

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[14]   The interview with Prof.dr. J.P.S Fiselier was held on the July 3rd, 2012 in Nijmegen.

[15]   The interview with Prof.dr.mr. J.J.M. van Dijk was held on the April 11th, 2012 in Amsterdam.

[16]   Algemeen Dagblad (AD), Nederlands Dagblad (ND), Parool, Reformatorisch Dagblad (RD), Trouw, Volkskrant (VK), Telegraaf and Waarheid.

comparative view of their content[17]. We will discuss media attention to the relevant political debates first.

The media perspective on fear of crime politics
Dutch newspapers were quite polarised in their reflections on the political debates related to the fear of crime (tab. 2).Some newspapers primarily gave voice to politicians from the right wing of the Dutch parliament (Trouw, Volkskrant & Telegraaf) and law and order arguments (Telegraaf), while other newspapers primarily mentioned politicians from the left wing of parliament (Algemeen Dagblad & Nederlands Dagblad) and *anti* law and order arguments (Nederland Dagblad, Parool, Volkskrant & Waarheid). All newspapers paid attention to the fierce debates that took place. But the fear of crime and unrest about crime were not often mentioned in the articles. The focus of the newspapers was on the relative positions of right-wing and left-wing politicians on the general topic of crime.

	AD	ND	Parool	RD	Trouw	VK	Telegraaf	Waarheid	TOTAL
Anti law and order arguments	4	14	12	15	9	15	4	7	**23% (80)**
Law and order arguments	4	8	5	11	10	6	14	3	**18% (61)**
Left-wing politicians	9	17	11	13	8	7	6	1	**21% (72)**
Right-wing politicians	6	8	11	15	12	13	8	2	**22% (75)**
Fierce debating	1	2	5	1	4	2	4	1	**6% (20)**
Motion	2	2	3	1	2	4	2	1	**5% (17)**
Fear of crime	-	1	1	2	5	3	1	-	**4% (13)**
Unrest about crime	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	**1% (3)**
TOTAL	**8% (26)**	**15% (52)**	**14% (48)**	**17% (58)**	**15% (50)**	**15% (50)**	**12% (42)**	**4% (15)**	**341**

Tab. 2 - Composition of the media perspective on fear of crime politics.

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[17] Using a total of 206 codes with a mean of 19 codes per article. Ideally, all articles would have been coded *independently* and the 'inter- coder-reliability-coefficient' computed (Saldaña 2012:27, also see Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002). Unfortunately this was not possible in the time span of this project, so the next best option was chosen: My research assistant read through all coded articles and checked them with the codebook.

The media perspective on fear of crime research[18]
The Dutch Research and Documentation Centre research reports (Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976) and Fiselier's PhD thesis (Fiselier 1978) attracted significant attention in the national press. Let us examine how the newspapers described the research findings (tab. 3).

As table 3 demonstrates, most newspapers paid similar amounts of attention to the research findings, except for De Telegraaf and De Waarheid. De Telegraaf only paid attention to Fiselier's report and De Waarheid did not report on the findings at all. All newspapers that reflected on the research findings primarily focused on 'crime facts' in their articles: the focus was really on knowledge about criminal victimisation. The articles paid only little attention to the nuances reported by the researchers that 'fear of crime has little to do with actual crime', 'unrest about crime is a relatively small problem' and that 'feelings of unrest about crime have little impact'. So the journalists who wrote the articles on the research findings apparently chose to present the juicy elements to their public, rather than the more nuanced stories.

	AD	ND	Parool	RD	Trouw	VK	Telegraaf	Waarheid	TOTAL
Crime fact	34	34	40	36	49	29	13	-	**59%(235)**
Unrest about crime	8	16	3	24	14	6	4	-	**19% (75)**
Fear of crime	8	9	4	10	4	7	9	-	**13% (51)**
Unrest about crime only has little impact	2	3	2	3	2	1	-	-	**3% (13)**
Public insecurity	-	1	4	1	3	2	-	-	**3% (11)**
Fear of crime has little to do with actual crime	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	-	**2% (9)**
Influence of mass media on fear of crime	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	**1% (6)**
TOTAL	**13% (54)**	**16% (65)**	**14% (56)**	**19% (76)**	**18% (74)**	**12% (48)**	**7% (27)**	-	**400**

Tab 3. – Composition of the media perspective on fear of crime research.

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[18]   Parool 1976, Volkskrant 1976, Algemeen Dagblad 1976, Nederlands Dagblad 1976, Reformatorisch Dagblad 1976, Trouw 1976, Trouw 1978, Reformatorisch Dagblad 1978, Nederlands Dagblad 1978, Parool 1978, Volkskrant 1978, Telegraaf 1978 & Algemeen Dagblad 1978.

2.4 Conclusion on the history of 'the fear of crime'

Let us answer the research question of this chapter: *When and how did the fear of crime become a social problem and what was the concept's initial meaning?*

It appears that the fear of crime did not spontaneously translate from a public concern into a political issue. It was more the other way around, in that the fear of crime gained momentum as a social problem in the United States of America due to discursive space for crime opening up and the public's *pre-supposed* fear of crime based on newly available crime statistics. The concept's British history is quite similar and was heavily influenced by American research and politics.

The Dutch history of the fear of crime was also similar, except that it was influenced in multiple ways by earlier Anglo-Saxon research and politics. Most impactful was political attention to the concept, which really took off on October 11th 1973 with the words of DS-'70 frontman, Dr. Willem Drees Jr. From that time on, the conservative right wing of Dutch parliament would continue to stress this issue. In political debate, the issue of crime became linked with the societal instability of that time, which was clearly due to the phenomenon of 'civil disobedience'. By May 1977, the entire Dutch political spectrum was 'concerned' about the problems of 'crime' and 'fear of crime' itself. Dutch politicians were clearly convinced that this "social problem" needed to be combatted.

But the Dutch public was actually not that concerned about crime, because it had little impact on their lives. The Dutch were merely concerned about crime *in general* (Fiselier 1978). And only a relatively small number - sixteen percent of Dutch citizens - identified crime as the most important social problem (Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976). Dutch academic research into the fear of crime, carried out by Fiselier, gained its inspiration from earlier American and simultaneous British research. The Dutch Research and Documentation Centre research was politically initiated and implemented American fear of crime items directly into its survey. Newspapers were primarily focused on how left-wing and right-wing politicians clashed on the topic of crime and law and order, as well as on some juicy research findings. Few of the nuances of this complex concept actually found their way to the public through newspaper articles.

Seen from a *moral panics* perspective, the topic of 'crime' clearly was a matter of mutual interest to Dutch politicians - from both the left and right wings of parliament - and all newspapers. But again, we must not forget that moral panics float on a '(…) loose set of causal conditions that are associated with the phenomenon (…)', such as '(…) threats to existing hierarchies; status competition; the impact of social change upon established ways of life and the breakdown of previously existing structures of control (…)' (Garland 2008:14). And precisely this was true of Dutch society of that time, struggling with clear demonstrations of 'civil disobedience' (Spierenburg 2013:14-30 & Kennedy 2007b:146-179)

Overall, this indicates that the rise of the fear of crime in the Netherlands stemmed in large part from the *discursive space* (Hauser 2009) too. This discursive space about crime and the fear of crime - floating on the social instability of that time - opened up in September 1973 and grew quickly . Now, almost forty-five years later, the fear of crime is still an important "social problem". What we now know about the initial meaning of the Dutch fear of crime is that it was *not* a straightforward translation of public worries about the chance of falling victim of crime. It was initially a highly politically influenced concept, which proved successful in making free-floating worries about social instability tangible for political discussion.

But does this mean that addressing contemporary fear of crime only touches upon abstract societal sentiments? This is unlikely to be solely the case. A multi-dimensional position needs to be taken in order to understand the *highly versatile* nature of the fear of crime. This will be the focus of the next two chapters.

3. What we know about 'the fear of crime'

As is true of many other concepts, it is quite difficult to state *exactly* what the fear of crime is (Fürstenberg 1971, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987, Hale 1996, Girling et al. 2000, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Pleysier 2010). In essence, the concept '(…) is not a stable entity that enlightened researchers will someday know "the truth" of (Lee & Farrall 2009:211)'; it '(…) is, by nature, indeterminate' (ibid). But it is surely possible to explore the variety, effects and causes of the fear of crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:80). After all, the social sciences are well known for the complexity of the concepts they study (Collier et al. 2006:211).

This chapter aims to bring together what is already known about the fear of crime from the theory and from empirical research. We can build on a solid foundation of excellent literature reviews carried out previously (Hale 1996, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Pleysier 2010, Doran & Burgess 2012). Insights from earlier works will be complemented with more recent findings and supplementary theories in order to develop a theoretical and empirical contribution to our knowledge of this *challenging concept*.

The fear of crime has been researched through a sequence of aggregation levels, namely the individual, the neighbourhood and broader society (Hale 1996). We will explore findings from this gradually expanded approach to the research in the same order. Significantly less attention has been given to the study of *situational events* related to fear of crime (Farrall et al. 1997) and *adjusted behaviour* in response to the fear of crime (Doran & Burgess 2012). However, since these aspects proved crucial to our understanding of the nature of the fear of crime, they will be discussed in this chapter as well.

3.1 Personal fear of crime

This section explores theories and empirical research results related to the fear of crime at the *individual level*. This classic orientation focuses primarily on correlations between demographic characteristics and the fear of crime. Insights are complemented with a psychological approach that aims to determine how an individual's psychological traits influence their fear of crime.

Several theories have been formulated to explain the correlation between fear of crime and demographic characteristics. The first concept that surfaces in explanations is vulnerability.

3.1.1 Vulnerability

Research into the fear of crime identified 'women, the elderly and the poor' as more fearful of crime, due to their heightened sense of vulnerability (Hale 1996:95, Killias 1990). The concept of 'vulnerability' is supposed '(…) to emphasise the feelings of susceptibility and openness to attack that influence the process by which definitions of criminal danger are constructed and regarded as salient bases

for action' (Sacco & Glackman 1987:99). The concept is '(...) particularly helpful in explaining seemingly disproportionate fear levels' (Killias & Clerici 2000:437).

Many authors followed up on Killias' (1990) notion of *interacting aspects of vulnerability,* assessing, for instance, 'exposure to risk', 'seriousness of consequences' and 'loss of control' (Hale 1996:96; Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:85-86). Based on the work of Killias (1990), Jackson (2009) defined vulnerability more precisely as 'the feeling that one and one's social group are especially likely to be targeted by criminals; the feeling that crime would have especially serious consequences; and the feeling of little control over the event' (Jackson 2009:367). As such, the 'multi-dimensional' (Jackson 2009:367, Sacco & Glackman 1987:109) concept of vulnerability can be broken down into several sub-dimensions: (I) physical; (II) psychological; (III) social; (IV) ecological; (IV) socio-economic; and (V) minority vulnerability. We will discuss these dimensions now.

(I) *Physical vulnerability* is about an individual's general assessment of their ability to cope with a physical attack (Killias & Clerici 2000). Physical vulnerability includes assessments of one's '(...) health, body size, self-defense capabilities and disabilities' (Doran & Burgess 2012:30). It also involves assessment of the duration of effects and the seriousness of physical injury (Killias 1990). A perception that one cannot defend oneself can, for instance, stem from a perception that individuals '(...) cannot run fast or lack the physical powers to ward off attackers' (Hale 1996:95, also see Stiles, Halim & Kaplan 2003).

(II) *Psychological vulnerability* relates to an integration of one's perceived self-efficacy with an assessment of the chances of victimisation and the consequences of crime (Jackson 2009): 'When individuals judge the impact of crime to be especially high, and when individuals feel that they have especially low levels of control over its incidence, then levels of worry will tend to be relatively high' (Jackson 2011:513). This is because '(...) a lower level of perceived likelihood is needed to stimulate worry about crime' (ibid).

(III) *Ecological vulnerability* combines a heightened sense of physical vulnerability for women, due to biological differences in overall strength, and heightened social vulnerability as a product of the more sensitive socialisation of women (Pleysier 2010:106, Hale 1996:95, Tulloch & Jennett 2001). More specifically, women are held to perceive more serious effects of crime due to a 'shadow of sexual assault' (Warr 1985, Jackson 2009, 2011, Ferraro 1996). They expect many offences to be contemporaneous with sexual assault (Ferraro 1995). The rationality of this specific sexual 'stranger danger' has been largely disputed (see Pleysier 2010:113). Hirtenlehner and Farrall (2014) found that this thesis has to be corrected for both a fear of non-sexual physical assault and perceptually contemporaneous offences more generally.

(IV) *Socio-economic vulnerability* is based on the theory that the experience of vulnerability is linked to the relative social position of individuals (Ferraro 1995,

LaGrange et al. 1992, Van der Wurff 1992, Stiles, Halim & Kaplan 2003, Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010). One explanation is that people from lower social classes feel more vulnerable to the risk of victimisation because they have less recourse to ways of preventing crime (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006). Research undertaken by Will and McGrath (1995) confirmed this thesis and adds to the explanation a relatively low level of confidence in the government, among what they call 'the underclass'. Doran and Burgess (2012) add further a lowered 'capacity to cope with the consequences of victimisation' (Doran & Burgess 2012:30) among the poor. In sum, the sense of vulnerability among the poor is merely a result of poverty leading to a general sense of vulnerability (Larsson 2009).

(V) The final type of vulnerability is *minority vulnerability,* identified primarily among ethnic minorities: '(t)hreats of racist inspired victimisation and lack of confidence in the police and others in positions of authority will do nothing to alleviate the sense of vulnerability of non-whites' (Hale 1996:103). But similar feelings of vulnerability are hypothesised among religious minorities and minorities on the grounds of sexual orientation (Van den Herrewegen 2011:44). Similarly to socio-economic vulnerability, minority vulnerability is held to be a general sense of powerlessness and negative future perspectives (Covington & Taylor 1991).

In the fear of crime research tradition, 'the most persistent findings are that women and older persons are highly afraid of crime' (LaGrange & Ferraro 1989:697). But this could well be due to an over-simplistic operationalisation of the concept of vulnerability (Jackson 2009:382), which in itself is probably caused by little theoretical progress having been made in respect of the concept of vulnerability (Jackson 2009:265). As a result, empirical assessments of the concept of vulnerability tend to treat social sub-groups as homogeneous, which they are probably not, given individual diversity (Cops 2012:95, Pain 1995:594). We will now turn to theories about how 'gender', 'age', 'socio-economic factors' and also 'direct and indirect victimisation' influence the fear of crime, to explore the theoretical and empirical nuances of these factors' influence.

3.1.2 Gender
Despite variance on all other demographic indicators, women are consistently found to be more fearful of crime than men. Gender is therefore generally seen as '(…) the best predictor of fear of crime' (Hale 1996:96). Women of all ages express the highest levels of fear of crime, although young men are generally most likely to fall victim of crime. Several theories have been formulated in order to explain this gendered observation (Hale 1996:97-98):

1. Women report less victimisation than they are disproportional victims of sexual assault and violence;
2. Women's fear of crime is actually a fear of sexual threat;

3. Due to more careful lifestyles and routine activities women are less exposed and thus less used to crime risks;
4. Women are more often confronted with threats that are sub-legal, such as being stared at, followed and shouted at.

A more critical examination of the gendered phenomenon by Sutton and Farrall (2005) proposes another explanation, in that much of the gender effect turned out to be explained by socially desirable answering by *males*. With the control variables of a lie-scale, men showed a 'macho concealment of fear' (Sutton & Farrall 2005:221). The reason being that 'men, by virtue of being male do not experience fear' (Walklate 1994:7): men's crime fears '(…) are suppressed by the perception that it is not socially acceptable to express one's fears' (Sutton & Farrall 2005:222). In sum, it is quite likely that men macho-tricked researchers into the gender paradox, for the sake of a positive self-presentation.

3.1.3 Age
According to Hale, the general consensus among fear of crime researchers is that 'as people grow older they become more fearful' (Hale 1996:100). But we have to take seriously Pleysier's (2010:109) warning that these age-effect observations are *not* based on any longitudinal survey study. So, the empirical studies highlight *existing* differences among age groups, instead of actually observing *change* due to age, undermining the reliability of the claim that age affects the fear of crime.

Four basic explanations were formed for the observation that the elderly fear crime more than other age groups (Fattah & Sacco 1989, Hale 1996:101-102):

1. The fear among the elderly is actually dependent of the local environmental condition, since only the elderly in high risk areas experience more fear than other age groups;
2. The lifestyles and routine activities of the elderly mean that they are less exposed to risk, which to a great extent explains their lower victimisation rates;
3. Lower levels of victimisation among the elderly might well be the result of their heightened fear of crime and avoidance behaviour;
4. If crime-specific items were to be used, the elderly would no longer appear to fear crime substantially more than the general public.

Like Ferraro (1995), Tulloch (2000) found that the elderly 'do not see their personal levels of risk as high' (Tulloch 2000:466). The age effect related to the fear of crime seems to come down to a heightened sensitivity of the elderly to crime in *general* and them being more conscious (also see Warr 1984, Greve 1998). The elderly's lower participation in public life must not be seen as a result of their fear of crime, but merely as 'symptomatic of an age-related change in lifestyle' (Greve 1998:293). The elderly actually tend to perceive younger individuals as being in more danger, due to their more active lifestyles and related routine activities (Tulloch 2000).

The relationship between age and fear of crime is not as straightforward as it appears in many studies (Ditton & Farrall 2000). The use of standard items, such as 'How safe do you feel, or would you feel, being out alone in your neighbourhood at night?', would automatically lead to apparently more fearful responses from the elderly, simply because they are less likely to be out alone in the streets at night (LaGrange & Ferraro 1989:715). In sum, the age effect is highly sensitive to the operationalisation of both the fear of crime and age. More complex research strategies reduce or even eliminate the effect (Warr 1984, Chadee & Ditton 2003, Greve 1998, Pain 1995). In addition, recent studies by Cops (2012) and Pain (2003) indicate the young to be an undeservedly overlooked group in fear of crime research.

3.1.4 Socio-economic factors
Mainly on the basis of American empirical work, we know that fear of crime correlates with a low 'socio-economic position'. To be more precise, fear of crime correlates with 'race, income and education' (Hale 1996:103). A fairly straightforward explanation for this observation can be offered, because (I) people in lower socio-economic groups tend to live in areas where crime is highly prevalent, making their heightened fear actually very rational; (II) they lack the financial resources to protect themselves against crime (Hale 1996); and (III) most do not have a well-functioning social network, due to disrupted social organisation (Hale 1996, Sun et al. 2004, Doran & Burgesss 2012:34). All aspects lead to a general 'sense of lack of control' (Hale 1996:103). In conclusion, the fear of crime among people living in poverty '(…) should not be seen in isolation of other insecurities such as job loss, debts and mortgage repossession which may be connected to local, national and international processes' (Pantazis 2000:414).

3.1.5 Direct victimisation
'The victimisation hypothesis posits a positive relationship between direct experience of victimisation and fear of crime' (Doran & Burgess 2012:26). This is one of the oldest hypotheses in the fear of crime tradition. But soon after research started, a paradox emerged: 'more people worry about crime than are likely to fall victim and the wrong people seem to be worrying' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:83, also see Pleysier 2010). The influence of direct (or personal) victimisation on the fear of crime is still not clear (Hale 1996:104-105), as only a few researchers attempted to study this relationship (Pleysier 2010, Hale 1996). Whether actual victimisation has occurred or not, lived-through events of *situational* fear of crime are logically of influence to respondents' answers to questions about their *anticipated* risks of falling victim of crime (Gabriel & Greve 2003:603).

Agnew (1985) proposed that neutralisation techniques shape how the impact of events of criminal victimisation are experienced. These techniques include (I) denial of physical or psychological injury from the event; (II) denial of the possibility of repeated victimisation, due to the belief that one has control over the risk of crime as a result of the newly gained crime information; (III) acceptance of one's own share in the blame for the event; (IV) the belief that the offenders will be punished

sometime, somehow; and (V) appeals to higher motives to rationalise the event of victimisation to oneself. The neutralising influence of these techniques is dependent on 'the nature of the victimisation, the characteristics of the individual, the degree of social support and the community climate' (Hale 1996:105). But clearly, victims of crime do not automatically become more fearful of crime.

The general challenge in assessing the relationship between victimisation and fear of crime is that only a relatively small proportion of any population will actually be victims of crime (Box et al. 1987). Another problem is that '(g)enerally, the more conventionally serious an incident is, the less frequently it occurs' (Skogan 1987:139). Additionally, most victim surveys only ask about events of victimisation that took place a year before the survey or up to three years beforehand, while the effects of more serious incidents might well have a longer-term impact (Fattah 1993:58, Pleysier 2010:132). For these reasons, it is very difficult to assess the influence of the seriousness of victimisation. Another problem is that legal definitions of crime exclude very unpleasant events that could potentially have a strong impact on the subject of the event (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:85).

A much-needed (Fattah 1993, Ditton et al. 2003) longitudinal study – to actually measure the influence of time – carried out by Russo & Roccato (2005) verified the clear principle that the more recently one has fallen victim of crime, the more fear of crime is experienced. The impact of an event of victimisation is also dependent on the relationship in which it occurred as well as many other elements that relate to the offender, the victim and the context in a broad meaning (Pleysier 2010:129). A recent study by Jackson and Gouseti (2015) into the impact of stranger violence on fear of violent crime showed multiple potentially moderating and mediating effects of victimisation. Direct and indirect victims of violent crime tend to be more *risk sensitive* than non-victims (also see Mesch 2000), as they are more cognisant of the consequences of violent crime victimisation than non-victims.

To conclude, there are no clear-cut results to explain the relationship between victimisation and the fear of crime (Hale 1996:104). As an early study by Garofalo maintained: '(...) the fear of crime is not a simple reflection of the risk or experience of being victimised' (Garofalo 1979:98, also see Van der Wurff & Stringer 1989, Fattah 1993, Ditton & Farrall 2000).

3.1.6 Indirect victimisation
The indirect victimisation thesis is based on the idea that fear of crime is rooted in what people hear about criminal activity '(…) either from conversations with others or from the mass media' (Bennett 1990:14), because 'people can experience victimisation vicariously and may experience the same emotions that result from a direct victimisation when they hear of others' crime encounters' (Doran & Burgess 2012:27). Hearing a crime story theoretically activates our imagination, putting ourselves in the described situation and shining a new light on one's former assessments of personal vulnerability and the risk of crime (Hale 1996:105).

Indirect victimisation might well be the most important source of crime knowledge among the public, as '(m)ost individuals know much more of victimisation through their friends, relatives, and network' (Mesch 2000:49, also see Hale 1996:105-108, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:86) The more recent the crime event, the more impact it has on the people who hear about it (Russo & Roccato 2005). And interpersonal discussions of risks primarily contribute to a more negative risk perception at the level of society (Coleman 1993:623). Skogan therefore stressed that interpersonal channels of crime information 'may inflate, deflate, or garble the picture' (Skogan 1986:211). Warr (1980) observed that the public overestimates the occurrence of the least frequent crimes and underestimates the most frequent crimes. Geographical studies have even observed that local fear of crime primarily rested on a neighbourhood's reputation, as a consequence of interpersonal communication (Doran & Burgess 2012:29).

In sum, still little is empirically known about the indirect victimisation thesis, because results are mixed (Hale 1996:105). But a methodological explanation for this can also be offered, insofar as most victim surveys have a rather limited way of operationalising indirect victimisation, which stops at the boundaries of the household (Fattah 1993:53, Pleysier 2010:131). In fact, research has demonstrated that, besides the victimisation of significant others, the victimisation of strangers with whom we socially or geographically identify is also an important source of indirect victimisation (Pleysier 2010:131, Van den Herrewegen 2011:35, Vanderveen 1999).

3.1.7 Media impact
Media are generally held to remind us collectively of the 'dangerous' world we live in (Svendsen 2008:12). This collective, dynamic and aggressive strategy is held to be the result of a more demanding public, the commercialisation of media and technological possibilities (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010:16). Clearly, media 'have a prominent role in popular accounts of fear of crime' (Hale 1996:109). But the way the media actually *affect* the fear of crime requires more nuanced attention, because associated explanations are complex (Hale 1996:104).

The linear influence of media messages on the public's fear of crime is channelled, according to the cultivation theory posited by Gerbner and Gross (1976). Gerbner and Gross state that our worldviews and perceptions align more with issues as reflected by the media, the more we are exposed to them. His theory has been extensively criticised, especially for its assumption of the public's passivity and the universal effects of cultivation. Oftentimes media messages have only a temporary impact and are only "absorbed" in part, since daily life distracts attention from them (Banks 2005).

The public is simplistically held to consist of a number of interpretative audiences, in which individuals share similar experiences and worries, leading to identical interpretations of media messages through similar patterns of media consumption (Chadee & Chadee 2016). In short, the cultivation theory was found incapable of

reflecting the complexity of 'many contributing factors, including social, personality, and cultural' (Chadee & Chadee 2016:60) factors that interact with media in order to cultivate. If media have any cultivation effect on the fear of crime, it is considered most likely that this is a *general* fear of crime rather than a personal one (Hale 1996). According to Mutz (1992), Coleman (1993) and Park, Scherer & Glynn (2001), mass media messages particularly influence perceptions at the level of the bigger society. In Mutz' vision: 'mass media are an obstacle to the politicisation of personal experiences because they provide a steady flow of information that establishes a social world beyond one's personal experiences and interpersonal contacts' (Mutz 1992:504).

Clearly, '(m)edia crime reports dramatise, sentionalise, and report only the most serious crime (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:88) as they have to 'capture existing public concerns and frames of reference' (ibid:91). But media do not just cover any crime: '(t)he age, race, class, and gender of those reported on, especially in criminal victimisation, are determining factors for newsworthiness (Chadee & Chadee 2016:63-64). This, together with randomness and sensationalistic elements (Heath, Patel & Mulla 2016) lead to an over-representation of violent and sexual crimes in the mass media (Chadee & Chadee 2016). So, '(…) the same factors that make crimes more likely to be covered by the media are the same factors that make them more frightening to the reader if they occur locally' (Heath, Patel & Mulla 2016:93).

Local crime news is known to instigate more fear of crime than general crime news (Heath 1984). Especially the consumption of local newspapers leads to an increased fear of crime (Hanslmaier 2013). But when a media message is perceived as reporting on crime at a distance, a reassuring function actually emerges: *feeling safe by comparison* (Liska & Baccalini 1990, Heath 1984, Heath, Patel & Mulla 2016). It turns out that reports on crime in other cities generally make people feel safer in their own environments. But this is only the case when the stimuli in the report bear no resemblance to the reality experienced by the recipient of the story (Hale 1996). So, in general, 'we appear to watch crime drama for the reassurance it provides in order to alleviate, not exacerbate, our fears' (Hale 1996:112).

Nowadays, social media make it possible to customise one's media consumption 'to receive only the news on the exact topics and exact location and in the exact manner' (Heath, Patel & Mulla 2016:82) that is preferred. One is also more likely to find like-minded people through the internet, and interpersonally filter out disturbing news (Heath, Patel & Mulla 2016).

When it comes to assessing media influence on the fear of crime, the bottom line is that too much remains unclear to be really conclusive (Chadee & Chadee 2016, Ditton et al. 2003, Hale 1996). The media clearly supply the public with crime information they cannot retrieve from other sources (Chadee & Chadee 2016:58), but this does not imply that crime messages have a direct influence on the public's fear of crime. Results from most studies are too 'blurred and inconsistent' (Pleysier

& Cops 2016:18, Chadee & Chadee 2016, Hale 1996) to indicate a direct relationship. But still, most research does suggest this linear effect (Chadee & Chadee 2016, Chadee & Ditton 2005, Ditton et al. 2003). Clearly, an integrated vision is required to understand the influence of media messages on contemporary fear of crime (Ditton et al. 2003, Chadee & Ditton 2005): 'The more serious media attention is given to the crime the greater the amplification. The audience's risk sensitivity will determine the extent of the risk amplification ripple. Ambiguity, amplification, or attenuation effects from the initial media information and moderated by risk sensitivity would influence the degree of media dependency and protective motivation' (Chadee & Chadee 2016:72).

This integrated approach is necessary, especially because the media landscape is a rapidly changing one (Heath, Patel & Mulla 2016:94).

3.1.8 Summative theoretical model of personal level explanations
We will now calibrate theoretical insights into the fear of crime at the *individual level*. This was done with a summative theoretical model (fig. 3), which features below. As can be seen, the fear of crime at the level of the individual results from many explanatory elements. The classical demographic explanations of *gender, age and socio-economic position* are starting points. These factors are held to permeate assessments of *vulnerability* in particular, rather than to have a direct effect.

Both *direct* and *indirect victimisation* are held to influence the fear of crime. Direct victimisation impact is expected to be reduced through *neutralisation techniques*. In the end, the fear of crime is held to cause *adjusted behaviour,* in the form of avoidance behaviour and preventive measures.

Fig. 3 – Summative theoretical model of personal fear of crime.

3.2 Situational fear of crime

As explored in the previous section, most research tends to focus on fear of crime as a fairly steady personal trait. But there is much to say for the conceptualisation of the fear of crime as a 'momentary affective state that varies within a person according to the situation at hand' (Gabriel & Greve 2003:601). Much of the fear of crime would be 'a transitory state that will generally pass quickly' (Gabriel & Greve 2003:601, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157, Pleysier 2010:175-179) instead of

a steady trait. And 'to leave aside these issues is seriously to damage our understanding of the fear of crime' (Farrall et al. 1997:661).

Gabriel and Greve's (2003) conceptual distinction between fear of crime as a *state* and as a *disposition* is a good theoretical start to explore 'situational fear of crime'. It is clearly 'a dynamic process that has a beginning and an end, and that lasts for a specific length of time' (ibid:602), leading to an 'action tendency': a motive to expose avoidance behaviour or self-protection to limit the outcomes of the event (Gabriel & Greve 2003).

Situational fear of crime is thus 'a time and space specific response to external stimuli (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157, Pleysier 2010:175-179), leading to '(…) a sense of immediate threat to one's security (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:18&245) and discharging into feelings of alertness, threat or fear (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42). Such situational fear of crime events do influence our more general and steady dispositions in relation to our personal risk of crime. Events of situational fear of crime are therefore logically *in the back of the minds* of respondents answering questions on their anticipated crime risks (Gabriel & Greve 2003:603). Newly acquired crime knowledge, following an event of situational fear of crime, might also lead to new or more adapted behaviour (Agnew 1985).

But what causes situational fear of crime? The occurrence is dependent on 'the individual's affective-cognitive state before exposure to the [crime] cue' (Gabriel & Greve 2003:605), one's general level of dispositional fear, coping abilities, perceptions of self-efficacy, physical health and social support (Greve 1998). So the previously explored characteristics of 'vulnerability' and 'risk sensitivity' are also foundations for situational fear of crime. The trait of 'risk sensitivity' is of strong influence here (Gabriel & Greve 2003, Pleysier 2010, Van der Wurff 1992). Van der Wurff adds the element of 'vulnerability', stating that, in an event of situational fear of crime, individuals engage psychologically in an assessment of their vulnerability and control in light of an imagined confrontation with a 'dangerous other', who may or may not actually be present (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

Interpersonal and media exchanges of crime information together shape the 'mental maps' that individuals have of risky places and situations, as 'gossip and folk tales are an important way of transmitting knowledge of avoidance and coping strategies' (Hale 1996:108). This knowledge resonates in new, aberrant or unique situations. As such, mental maps are not bound to geographical locations: they merely are fear-management strategies that people exchange (Pleysier 2010, Sparks 1992, Lupton 1999), mostly coming down to the communication of 'crime knowledge' about unsafe places and times (Liskia, Sanchirico & Reed 1988, Fürstenberg 1972, Greenberg 1986) and more detailed communication of 'fear cues', 'fear triggers' and 'fear spots' (Pleysier 2010, Warr 1987, Van der Wurff 1990, Bannister 1993).

These mental maps have a crucial function in situational fear of crime because they provide the information that individuals can scan for in their immediate

surroundings. An explanation for this "scanning behaviour" is found in evolutionary psychology and socio-biology in that 'humans seek out stimuli in their environment that might be a threat to themselves or those who are in their gene pool' (Chadee & Chadee 2016:62). Most individuals are only slightly aware of this scanning in unfamiliar environments but everybody is held to scan their immediate surroundings constantly, albeit unconsciously. The experience of environmental discontinuities or sudden, unexpected changes will make an individual's scanning cross the threshold of consciousness (Pleysier 2010, Hale 1996). People who get into this watchful mood additionally start to scan the environment for potential *ways to escape* and *'lurk lines'* where potential perpetrators might be hiding (Pleysier 2010, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009).

People basically scan their environment for stimuli in the environment that reveal or symbolise a heightened risk of falling victim of crime (Gabriel & Greve 2003). The most obvious cue is being confronted with criminal behaviour in one's immediate surroundings, which automatically heightens one's personal fear of falling victim of crime (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010, Wilcox-Roundtree & Land 1996, Skogan & Maxfield 1981). But many forms of crime actually go unnoticed by the public, while other 'cues' are symbolic for the threat of crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Innes 2004). Perceived incivilities signal a potential risk of victimisation in an environment, in the same way as crime does (Ferraro 1995:15).

Incivilities can be categorised as social or physical incivilities (LaGrange et al. 1992, Hale 1996). Farrall, Jackson & Gray (2009:91-92) list the following *social incivilities* found in earlier research: disorderly or disreputable behaviour, the presence of empty or abandoned streets, the number of people present in the area and noise pollution. They also list the following *physical incivilities*: poor lighting, graffiti, litter, vandalism, dog dirt, hiding places for criminals, a poor state of buildings and areas adjoining vacant areas such as car parks, parks or factories. Individuals can, however, become accustomed to physical and social incivilities, lowering the impact of these crime cues (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:84, Innes & Jones 2006, Hale 1996).

The characteristics of the built environment are held to have a general influence on the situational fear of crime as well. To prevent potential victimisation, people automatically enter a watchful state of mind when unable to scan the environment sufficiently due to a limitation of sight (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006, Warr 1990, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009). This limitation can be the result of darkness, poor lighting or the layout of public spaces. Urban settings in particular seem to be perceived as unsafe after dark, due to a sense of anonymity that is highlighted by dilapidated buildings, the position of vegetation, large abandoned areas and empty streets (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Van der Wurff & Stringer 1988, Lewis & Maxfield 1980).

In a related theory of *'defensible space',* the physical conditions of an environment are seen as a general manifestation of the social fabric of the community living in

that environment. People are held to fear crime less in a well-kept environment since this reveals a strong social tissue that acts as a buffer against crime and fear of crime: it demonstrates that inhabitants are capable of defending themselves due to common goals and shared responsibility for the safety and maintenance of the environment (Newman & Frank 1982).

When people are confronted with crime events or other situations that they perceive could lead to victimisation, they will turn to coping strategies. Situational coping strategies are active deeds (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010) as displays of an action tendency (Gabriel & Greve 2003), which tend to appear in the form of physical reactions (Cramer 2006:3), to '(…) intentionally engage in activity that will address the problem (…)' in the form of '(…) conscious, purposeful attempts to reduce anxiety with the intent of managing or solving a problem situation' (Cramer 2006:8).

Three general coping strategies exist: (I) 'judgmental coping' involves an adaptation of values and objectives in order to change one's thinking during a stressful situation; (II) 'issue-aimed coping' involves active deeds to ease or control a stressful situation; and (III) 'emotion-aimed coping' involves regulating one's emotions during a stressful situation. Individuals show a general preference for one of these strategies (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010). Whether or not an individual will turn to 'issue-aimed coping' is also dependent on one's sense of *self-efficacy*: '(…) belief in their capabilities to mobilise the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to exercise control over given situations' (Ozer & Bandura 1990:472, as quoted by Yuan et al. 2015:2). Self-efficacy is ultimately a perception of what people 'believe they can do under certain circumstances' (Maddux & Gosselin 2012:199-200). This self-efficacy is closely linked to one's perceived vulnerability: the more one believes oneself capable of exerting control over a given situation, the more issue-aimed coping will be displayed during situational fear of crime events.

The summative model below (fig. 4) collates the theoretical explanations for situational fear of crime explored in this section. Just as in the summative model of individual-level explanations, events of *direct* and *indirect victimisation feature in figure 4 too*. But specifically for the situational fear of crime, these are expected to stimulate individuals to develop *mental maps* of unsafe locations and situations. This knowledge enables individuals to conduct unconscious *environmental scanning.*

Clearly, situational fear of crime events lead to an *action tendency,* which is held to be influenced by both one's *coping preferences* and one's sense of *self-efficacy* as these result in temporary, situational coping. Afterwards, situational fear of crime events may lead to structural, *adjusted behaviour* in the form of avoidance behaviour and preventive measures to prevent recurrence.

Fig 4. – Summative theoretical model of situational fear of crime.

3.3 Neighbourhood fear of crime

Despite the multitude of explanations discussed in the previous sections, a great deal of variation in the fear of crime remained unexplained. As a result, academics started to theorise and research the fear of crime beyond individual psychological characteristics (Hale 1996:119), in a context of *neighbourhoods* (Cops 2012:101, Hale 1996:119). The concept of 'neighbourhood' is itself difficult to define as a geographical area and it is very subjective in meaning (Pleysier 2010, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987, Kaal, Vanderveen & McConnell 2006). As a *place*, however, a neighbourhood 'is a fundamental category in the formation of self-identity' as 'it acts as a physical context for everyday life, a material situation, but it is also imaginary and subjective (…), emotionalised space or space with feeling' (Banks 2005:172). The local community therefore 'is extremely important and should not be ignored in attempting to understand the dimension of this fear' (O'Mahony & Quinn 1999:246).

3.3.1 Urbanism

The fear of crime appears to be concentrated in inner-city neighbourhoods (Hale 1996:113, O'Mahony & Quinn 1999:245). The most frequently offered explanation for the urban fear of crime seems quite rational: there is more crime in cities and so, urban citizens run a *greater risk* of criminal victimisation (Hale 1996). But a broader view needs to be taken, because the '(…) fear of crime may be conceptualised as an expression of the sense of powerlessness and uncertainty that accompanies much of urban life' (Smith 1989:198 as quoted by Hale 1996:117).

Smith (1987) stressed that urban fear of crime might well have 'displaced anxieties' at its roots: a '(…) dissatisfaction with urban life which includes deterioration of community life, poor services, and social isolation' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:94). Some authors (e.g. Garofalo & Laub 1978, Girling et al. 2000, Jackson 2004a, 2009, Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013) go a step further, stating that the context of the neighbourhood functions as a prism that converts more abstract anxieties and sentiments into fear of crime.

Urban contexts also have direct influences on the fear of crime, though. (Hale 1996:113). Citizens of cities experience more isolation and loneliness due to the weakening of social ties as a result of population density and social heterogeneity. Urban communities have rather unclear community boundaries, which generally make it difficult to know who are neighbours and who are not (Hale 1996:118). In this way, urban citizens tend to be perfect strangers to one another, leading to a heightened social uncertainty (Hale 1996): individuals find themselves surrounded by 'unknown, reluctant and uninterested people' (Van der Wurff 1990:84). Urban communities have higher proportions of single-parent families, which are held to be less effective in the supervision and guardianship of children, as well as of the community in general (Hale 1996, Doran & Burgess 2012). Overall, the density and configuration of the urban population seem to disorganise local communities.

3.3.2 Social disorganisation
Although Shaw and McKay (1942) originally developed the theory of social disorganisation to explain neighbourhood crime, the theory also helps to explain the fear of crime in neighbourhoods (Doran & Burgess 2012:33). '(S)ocial disorganisation refers to the inability of a community structure to realise the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls' (Sampson & Groves 1989:776 as quoted by Hale 1996:117). The theory focuses on communities with 'common or dominant values and social norms' (Doran & Burgess 2012:34), leading to *informal social control*: the ability of a local community to 'regulate its members according to desired principles – to realise collective, as opposed to forced goals (…)' on the basis of 'mutual trust and solidarity among neighbours' (Sampson et al. 1997:918-919). Public housing seems to prevent this social integration, because 'unlike most other neighbourhoods, public housing residents are not there by choice' and may not be striving to socially integrate at all (DeLone 2008:117).

According to Lewis and Salem (1986), neighbourhoods vary in respect of their level of *political power*. Neighbourhoods that lack political power are less successful in addressing local problems with the authorities. And so, local problems are left to fester. This is connected to what Taylor et al. (1986) called *lack of resources* in a more general sense: 'a judgement that the government and the social structure will not be able to provide the collective good of safety' (Hale 1996:118).

The fear of crime is particularly rooted within 'neighbourhoods characterised by social impoverishment and dilapidated infrastructure' (Ferguson & Mindel

2007:325, also see Crawford 2006), caused by disinvestment, demolition and reconstruction, demagoguery and deindustrialisation (Skogan 1986). Additionally, many urban communities in decline experience the *migration* of families who, given the financial opportunity, move away from the community (Hale 1996, also see Elffers & De Jong 2004).

Warr (1990) and Wilox-Roundtree & Land (1996) discovered that the more individuals feel they "fit in with the neighbourhood", the more they will perceive it as being a safe neighbourhood. So, a neighbourhood's *racial and ethnic heterogeneity* is held to challenge the neighbourhood's ability to reach consensus and thus it indirectly feeds social disorganisation (Hale 1996). So, underlying the fear of crime in a neighbourhood might well be local 'concerns about race and a fear of racial change' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:102, also see Skogan 1986).

But the idea that the cultural - and especially racial - composition of a neighbourhood explains the fear of crime there is criticised for being too shallow, since this connection needs to incorporate mediating variables that provide actual explanations (Hale 1996, Doran & Burgess 2012). Research by Chiricos, Hogan and Gertz (1997) showed primarily that 'the perception that one is the racial minority in one's neighbourhood elevates fear among whites but not among blacks' (Chiricos, Hogan & Gertz 1997:107, also see Elffers & De Jong 2004). As such, the fear of crime seems to thrive in neighbourhoods where residents perceive themselves proximate to others with differing racial, ethnical and cultural backgrounds (Doran & Burgess 2012). The crucial issue within ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhoods is a lack of understanding of each other's different behaviour, leading to mistrust and the mutual perception of being 'dangerous others' (Doran & Burgess 2012:35).

A neighbourhood's social integration can be threatened by both *rapid growth* and *change* of the local community (Hale 1996, O'Mahony & Quinn 1999). Empirical assessments of the effects of rapid community growth by Crank, Giacomazzi and Heck (2003) confirmed this influence. In essence, a rapid turnover in the community composition can undermine social connections between neighbours (Doran & Burgess 2012, Elffers & De Jong 2004), 'limiting their ability to agree on common sets of values or to solve commonly experienced problems' (Bursik 1988, as quoted by Doran & Burgess 2012:33). The experienced decline in social relations prevents neighbours who stayed behind organising themselves against the anti-social behaviour of groups of new immigrants coming into their neighbourhood. Older residents, especially, become 'hesitant to reprimand youths participating in deviant activities' (Doran & Burgess 2012:33, also see Taylor and Covington 1993) as they tend to withdraw from public interventions on behalf of the community, since this "community" is no longer perceived to exist (Sampson 1991:45). This led Skogan (1986) to articulate a more nuanced interpretation of ethnic group conflicts in neighbourhoods as being merely "intergenerational conflicts", because newcomers are usually relatively young and behave differently to the older residents who stayed behind (Skogan 1986).

3.3.3 Social integration, collective efficacy & social capital

An individual's *social integration* in their local context theoretically provides citizens with a sense of social support and 'living in a cohesive and supportive community' (Hale 1996:113, Ferguson & Mindel 2007). Social integration is mainly held to function as a buffer against a perceived lack of safety, even in the most crowded neighbourhoods of a city (Hale 1996). In fact, however, research has actually observed a reversed relationship: 'The more integrated the neighbourhood, the more cautious are residents' activities' (Wilcox-Roundtree & Land 1996:174, also see Elffers & De Jong 2004, Sacco 1993).

Covington and Taylor (1991) explained this observation in terms of one's social integration partly determining the amount of information one receives about crime. Sparks, Girling and Loader (2001) more specifically add engagement in 'crime talk' due to social integration, bringing a wide variety of first-hand and second-hand crime stories to the doorstep, urging caution and a need to prevent victimisation. People's social relations thus function as a multiplier to crime knowledge, especially in tight social networks (Doran & Burgess 2012:29) and are even able to develop 'reputations and place-myths' (Sparks, Girling & Loader 2001:888, also see Perkins & Taylor 1996, Banks 2005).

Gibson et al. (2002) take a positive position: 'It is likely that social integration is only the starting point for the formulation of positive perceptions of one's neighbourhood environment' (Gibson et al. 2002:539). According to them, *social integration* is present 'when citizens know their neighbours, talk to their neighbours regularly, and feel that their neighbourhood is a "real home"' (Gibson et al. 2002:539). More crucial is a perception of *collective efficacy* – the perception of 'shared expectations and mutual civic engagement by community members in local social control, with an emphasis on residents' joint capacity to act together to generate solutions to local problems' (Ferguson & Mindel 2007:327, also see Sampson et al. 1997:918). The origins of collective efficacy remain largely unclear (Gibson et al. 2002), although some consensus emerged in respect of the role of social capital.

'Social capital' (Gibson et al. 2002, Ferguson & Mindel 2007, Crawford 2006) '(…) consists of a set of components found in social associations and interactions among people that, when activated, empower individuals and facilitate cooperation toward a mutual benefit' (Ferguson & Mindel 2007:323). This concept integrates the positive features of trust, shared values and reciprocity between social networks, institutions and a community (Ferguson & Mindel 2007). According to Crawford we have to be 'sensitive to the context specificity of social capital and its multi-dimensional sources' (Crawford 2006:962). With reference to Lin (2001) and Granovetter (1973), Crawford stresses the importance of the *instrumental role* of weak social ties, which serve the same goal of achieving social control, but are not based on shared values. These weak ties are 'are often the most useful form of social organisation for getting things done' (Crawford 2006:963) in an urban community.

To conclude, regarding the relationship between social integration and fear of crime: '(…) high levels of community efficacy, social cohesion, and a tight social structure (with low levels of anonymity and distrust) might inhibit fear of crime' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:93, Jackson 2004a). But the empirical results are still very inconsistent (Gibson et al. 2002:538).

3.3.4 The experience of incivilities in the neighbourhood

A heightened fear of crime in inner cities might also be the result of more frequent confrontations with *social and physical incivilities* (Lewis & Maxfield 1980:187, Hinkle & Weisburd 2008). But the theory is quite clear, as the 'feeling that one is surrounded by symbolic or actual threats, feeling that the immediate neighbourhood is in decline and the community deteriorating, may produce not only generalised anxiety but a specific fear of crime' (Hale 1996:115). Observing crime and incivilities in an environment gives a strong signal that the local community appears 'to be suffering from deteriorating standards of behaviour, diminishing power of informal social control, increasing diversification of norms and values, and decreasing levels of trust, reciprocity and respect' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:90, also see Jackson 2008, Austin, Furr & Spine 2002). Ultimately, though, empirical results related to the relationship between the fear of crime and disorder are largely mixed (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009).

3.3.5 The physical environment as a social heuristic

As discussed in section 3.2, the built environment is frequently theorised to act 'as a heuristic device, providing cues about likely levels of neighbourhood crime' (Wilcox, Quisenberry & Jones 2003:322). For many practitioners, this theory of 'defensible space' gave rise to a strategy of 'fear reduction by modifying certain aspects of the built environment' in neighbourhoods (Grabosky 1995:5, Henig & Maxfield 1978, Pain et al. 2006, Wilcox, Quisenberry & Jones 2003, Schweitzer, Kim & Mackin 1999:70). But the outcomes from this strategy are mixed and limitation of the fear of crime cannot be guaranteed (Atkins, Husain & Storey 1991, Hale 1996, Pleysier 2010, Ditton & Farrall 2000).

Fear-reduction strategies developed on the basis of this paradigm are often dismissed in critical reviews as 'one-sided architectural determinism' (Pleysier 2010, Taylor et al. 1984), because the associated 'technical fixes' do not affect the social problems that underlie the fear of crime (Pain et al. 2006, Wilcox, Quisenberg & Jones 2003). Such interventions require, as a minimum, a complementary social strategy (Hale 1996; Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010, Taylor 2002) that is sensitive to the local situation and history (Hale 1996, Pain 2000, also see Hardyns 2012).

3.3.6 Summative model for neighbourhood fear of crime

Figure 5 on the next page summarises explanations for the fear of crime at the level of the neighbourhood. Fear of crime at neighbourhood level is partly explained by *displaced anxieties* – abstract sentiments caused by broader *social changes*. At neighbourhood level, individuals can also perceive *environmental cues,* as explored

in the section on situational fear of crime. To a great extent, though, fear of crime at neighbourhood level is explained by the social consequences of *urbanisation*, which directly influences not only the fear of crime but also a *lack of social capital*, which in turn leads to a *lack of collective efficacy* and *social disorganisation.* The latter is held to result in *neighbourhood problems* including crime, which feeds the fear of crime within the neighbourhood and extends the presence of *formal social control* there.

Fig. 5 - Summative model of neighbourhood fear of crime.

3.4 Societal fear of crime

Previous sections touched on ways in which more abstract, societal anxieties are held to influence the local community of the neighbourhood (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013:5). In fact, the personal evaluation of neighbourhood conditions is actually psychologically embedded in a broader context of society (Cops 2012:106, also see Jackson 2004a and Dowds & Ahrendt 1995). Since the start of research into the fear of crime, it has been accepted that this broader society forms an important background to people's fear of crime (Fürstenberg 1971).

3.4.1 Societal change as a background to the fear of crime
Fear of crime is theorised to be influenced by several social changes. The first change connected to the fear of crime is *individualisation*. As relations between individuals have changed fundamentally, so has the relationship of an individual with society as a whole, due to the growth of individual autonomy in relation to collectives (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006:40). Other changes that are held to influence the fear of crime are *internationalisation, economic backlash and political pessimism*. Due to internationalisation boundaries, distances and time differences

have lost much of the meaning they previously held to society. Internationalisation also led to the establishment of non-Western immigration and the rise of the European Union. For sections of the public, these changes lead to uncertainty and a feeling of threat (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010). The status of a society's economy can also influence the fear of crime, since the economy is held to have an influence on the public's perception of many social matters (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010, also see Van den Herrewegen 2011:42). The same appears true of the political climate in a society (Van Nooije & Wittebrood 2010).

3.4.2 Broader influences of societal fear of crime?

The influence of broader society on the fear of crime has not received much research attention. A few critical pioneers have emphasised the need for such a broad, social-psychological perspective (Fürstenberg 1971, Garofalo & Laub 1978 and Smith 1986). When Ditton and Farrall edited a cutting-edge collection of articles on the fear of crime in 2000, they repeated Hale's (1996) earlier assertion that this part of the explanation of the fear of crime is in strong need of empirical attention (Ditton & Farrall 2000), because '(…) researchers have largely ignored social psychological and psychological factors that may be important in explaining the fear of crime' (Farrall et al. 2000:400).

After 2000, critical research into the fear of crime changed its orientation, which led to what some call a "revival" of the research tradition (Cops 2012:5, Jackson 2005:311, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:44). The scope now does more justice to the multi-dimensional nature and versatility of the concept (Cops 2012:5, Jackson 2005:311, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:44). Besides being a clear paradigm shift, this new path in the research tradition was also enabled by the incremental evolution of methodological possibilities (Pleysier 2010:145). Many interesting insights arose from this perspective, excavating the deeper societal dynamics of the fear of crime. We will now explore these insights in brief.

> Through their qualitative research, Hollway and Jefferson found that people translate ambiguous sources of contemporary insecurity by making use of the 'crime discourse'. This is a satisfying discourse for expressing more widely generated anxieties as it makes risks 'knowable, decisional and controllable' (Hollway & Jefferson 1997:265).

> Additionally, Jackson (2004a) was able to distinguish 'experienced fear of crime' from 'expressed fear of crime' in another qualitative study. 'Experienced fear of crime' is about 'everyday worries about personal risk (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:120)', whereas 'expressed fear of crime' is a set of general opinions and attitudes that people bring forth when they discuss feelings about crime, which are primarily rooted in broader social changes and the cultural meaning of crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157). By applying a structural equation model to earlier quantitative data, Farrall, Jackson and Gray discovered that expressive fear of crime is indeed merely a discursive attitude that articulates one's '(…) wider concerns about the state of society today' (ibid:232). This type

of fear of crime is influenced by long-term socio-cultural change, economic change and also an increased focus on crime in politics, policy and research.

Pleysier (2010) posited that both the perception of neighbourhood problems and anomie, as a reflection of a broader ontological insecurity, have a prominent influence on people's personal fear of crime (Pleysier 2010:288). Even when taking a more specific and contextualised operational definition of the fear of crime, 'anomie' – as a function of an ambiguous and vague feeling of insecurity – remained a prominent explanation for the fear of crime (Pleysier 2010:291-292). And Cops (2012) confirmed this to be the case for young people as well.

Hummelsheim et al. (2011) found an association between welfare state regimes and public insecurities about crime, through a large survey sample collected in 23 European countries. Welfare state regimes seemed to provide the public with a *buffer* against social and economic fears and insecurities. And so, '(t)he more public insecurities are neutralised by welfare security arrangements the less social anxieties may be channelled into crime' (Hummelsheim et al. 2011:337).

Taking a social-constructionist, qualitative approach, Van den Herrewegen worked out how people construct, justify and manage their fear of crime in interaction with their environment (Van den Herrewegen 2011:261). Besides personal and environmental aspects, people also refer to social and cultural changes when recounting their fear of crime (Van den Herrewegen 2011:58).

Earlier research of my own (Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, De Graaf & Boutellier 2012) highlighted that people maintain a definite psychological distance from crime, since they associate the problem of crime particularly with the level of society. Even when respondents experienced more crime and social incivilities in their own neighbourhood, they did not involve themselves. Instead, they attributed these problems to the larger society (also see Van Noije 2010).

Based on an earlier quantitative study by Hirthenlehner (2008), Hirtenlehner and Farrall (2013) assumed that fundamental societal changes of recent decades had led to '(…) a general feeling of unease, in which various risks and insecurities lose their uniqueness and blend into a generalised threat' (Hirtenlehner 2008:133). Fear of crime is one part of this broader amalgam of unease (Hirtenlehner 2008:133, also see Garfalo & Laub 1978, Girling et al. 2000, Hollway & Jefferson 1997, 2000, Jackson 2004a, Taylor et al. 1996). This form of fear of crime actually stands on its own as a type of *generalised insecurity*, rather than it feeding into people's local community concerns (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013).

So, there are clear signs that an undercurrent of discomfort about a range of social and cultural conditions has found its way into the crime discourse. It may be that the fear of crime is characterised more by a general sense of discomfort and

dissatisfaction about the state of larger society than previously believed (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:239, Hale 1996:132, Mosconi & Padovan 2004:137-138 and Pleysier 2010:162). Through the classical fear of crime research orientation, perhaps 'societal concern about crime has been transmuted into a personal problem of individual vulnerability' (Ditton & Farrall 2000:xvi). But empirical studies into this aspect of the fear of crime are still rare (Pleysier & Cops 2016).

3.5 Adjusted behaviour

The previously explored concepts of (anticipated) 'personal fear of crime', 'situational fear of crime' and 'neighbourhood fear of crime' are all hypothesised to discharge into *adjusted behaviour* (Bandura 1977), as '(p)eople who are afraid of being criminally victimised change their habits' (Hale 1996:82, also see Fattah 1993, Yuan, Dong & Melde 2015). Research has made clear that not only those individuals who are strongly fearful adjust their behaviour (Liskia, Sanchirico & Reed 1988, San-Juan et al. 2012). But what behaviour do people change and why? We will look more closely at this aspect, to find out.

Behavioural adjustment to prevent criminal victimisation is defined as 'an action or set of actions for which the presence of crime risks is believed to be a relevant consideration' (DuBow et al. 1979:30). This behaviour is varied and ranges from 'trivial and nearly universal behaviours (…) to more socially consequential actions' (Yuan et al. 2015:11). The most serious consequence would be 'physical withdrawal from community life' (Skogan 1986:215), which is in fact the most prominent argument stressing the problematic nature of the fear of crime. It is the "stereotypical response to crime" (Greenberg 1986:235).

The change of habits as a response to fear of crime can be theoretically broken down into different dimensions (Fürstenberg 1972, Greenberg 1986): (I) *behavioural avoidance tactics* and (II) *preventive measures* (Vanderveen 2006:158-159, San-Juan et al. 2012:656, Wilcox-Roundtree & Land 1996:147, Gabriel & Greve 2003:602).

Behavioural '(…) avoidance tactics (…) are primarily taken to decrease one's exposure by trying to avoid situations that are related to a highly perceived risk of criminal behaviour' (Vanderveen 2006:158, Fürstenberg 1972, Greenberg 1986). Ferraro (1995) argued that much of this avoidance behaviour was the result of indirect victimisation, while others (Wilcox-Roundtree & Land 1996) relate it to earlier events of direct victimisation (also see Bandura 1977). Manifestations of restricted social behaviour in order to prevent criminal victimisation are quite diverse, ranging from staying at home as a protection against crime to constraining behaviour to 'safe places at safe times' (Liskia, Sanchirico & Reed 1988:828, Fürstenberg 1972, Greenberg 1986). But avoiding "dangerous places" could also lead into 'a downwards spiral in which fear causes people to constrain their behaviour and this behavioural response in turn heightens their fear' (Hale 1996:82-83).

Besides changing behaviour, people may also take *preventive measures* '(…) to protect oneself and thus to lessen the seriousness of victimisation' (Vanderveen 2006:159, also see Greenberg 1986). According to Greenberg these measures are ultimately '(s)trategies that increase the sense of control [which] are likely to reduce fear' (1986:237). People 'purchase various devices, such as guns, extra locks, outside lighting, watch dogs, anti-burglary equipment and insurance, as well as learning self-defense, to protect themselves and their homes from crime' (Liskia, Sanchirico & Reed 1988:828).

In conclusion, insights exist into the whats and whys of the behavioural aspects of fear of crime. But these results mainly emphasise a need for more research (Liskia, Sanchirico & Reed 1988, Hale 1996, San-Juan et al. 2012, Doran & Burgess 2012:44). More importantly, however, Jackson and Gray (2010) stressed that too much attention is given to the fear of crime as an *exclusively negative social problem*: 'For too long, fear of crime research has ignored the 'everyday consumer' who engages in precautionary behaviours, who buys security items, who successfully manages their own sense of risk and their own emotional responses to risk' (Jackson & Gray 2010:16). They claim that the fear of crime in the daily lives of people can as well be a 'functional worry that motivates vigilance and routine precaution' (Jackson & Gray 2010:1, also see Fattah 1993, Hale 1996, Warr 2000 and Ditton & Innes 2005). These constructive actions will not always reduce one's actual chances of victimisation, but they do function as an important *cognitive buffer against crime fears* (Jackson & Gray 2010).

3.6 Making up a balance
This section draws together the body of scientific knowledge, now forty-five years since the first scientific publication on this subject matter appeared (Fürstenberg 1971). It turns out that *still little is actually known about the fear of crime* (Hale 1996, Ditton & Farrall 2000). This is partly due to the concept's internal complexity, but it is also the result of a highly problematic research tradition. We will search for the most fundamental lacunae in order to proceed into complementary theoretical avenues.

3.6.1 A disappointing state of affairs
The fear of crime has been researched at three levels of aggregation: the individual, the neighbourhood and broader society. Most fear of crime research roughly assessed which characteristics of the population correlated with the fear of crime. Many results are limited to the observation that 'age', 'gender' and 'socio-economic positions' are highly influential on the level of fear of crime. An attempt at actual theorisation led to the concept of 'vulnerability', but this gained little research attention. Even less attention was given to the psychological dynamics that logically underlie the fear of crime.

'Neighbourhood fear of crime' was shown to be a function of many elements, but the social disorganisation of urban communities was particularly influential. Less is known about 'societal fear of crime' since only a few societal changes has been

considered as a backdrop to the fear of crime. In the past fifteen years, a new research orientation has shed a different light on the fear of crime though a broader conceptual and methodological approach. A great deal more energy needs to be devoted to this promising line of research, since it might change our fundamental understanding of 'the fear of crime' in general. But overall, scientists have not yet succeeded in realising an accumulated body of knowledge on the etiology of 'the fear of crime'.

3.6.2 A problematic research tradition
'Overall, reading the literature on fear of crime produces a sense that the field is trapped within an overly restrictive methodological and theoretical framework' (Hale 1996:132). The lack of scientific knowledge on the fear of crime may therefore 'in part be an artefact of the way that certain survey questions are routinely asked' (Ditton et al., 1999:84), since the tradition's critical analyses continued to be couched in "dead words" (Jackson 2004b:54, Pleysier 2010:77). Researchers aimed 'to find the level of the fear of crime, how it was distributed among the national domestic population, and to explain the relationships between the threat from crime and its associated fear' (Ewald 2000:169 as quoted by Cops 2012:94) in order for studies to be sufficiently relevant for funding eligibility (Ditton & Farrall 2000, Cops 2012).

Farrall and Gadd (2004:5) referred to the work of the authors 'Bernard, 1992; Bowling, 1993; Fattah, 1993; Schneider, 1981; Skogan, 1981; Farrall et al., 1997 and Zauberman, 1985' as important commentators on the *validity* of most fear of crime research. 'Taken together, these criticisms suggest that crime surveys ignore the meaning of events for respondents; turn 'processes' into 'events'; neglect that the fear of crime can be a multi-faceted phenomenon; poorly conceptualise the fear of crime; ignore important contextual problems (such as time and space); greatly influence the reported incidence of the fear of crime and rely too heavily on respondents recall' (Farrall et al. 1997:662).

The primary focus of these criticisms is on the so-called 'standard items' related to the fear of crime, such as 'How safe would you feel being out alone in your neighbourhood after dark?'. Farrall et al. (1997) stated that most fear of crime research studies use standard items and thus lead to a 'decontextualised snapshot' (Farrall et al. 1997:660). They stressed further: 'a simplistic, numerical answer to a closed question cannot hope to represent the breadth of experience and feelings about crime experienced by most people' (ibid:661). The standard items are criticised more specifically for: (I) starting with a leading word of 'how'; (II) not explicitly referring to crime; (III) referring to an ambiguous geographical area; (IV) asking for largely hypothetical behaviour; (V) mixing up emotional and cognitive elements; (VI) mixing different social identities of an individual and (VII) not referring to a specific period of time (Farrall & Gadd 2004, also see Hale 1996:86-87). So, '(h)ow likely is it that we will be able to come up with conclusive answers to the variety of questions that are central to the issues of fear of crime if we continue

to use the same research strategies and techniques that have, up till now, yielded less than satisfactory results?' (Fattah 1993:61).

In addition to providing critique of the standard items, authors have pointed out an over-reliance on the survey method: 'there is a need to widen the methodological approaches to the study of fear of crime by (…) incorporating more qualitative work. This would allow a richer operationalisation of fear of crime to develop (…)'. And '(g)ood social investigation benefits from methodological triangulation: different research approaches have different strengths which are complementary' (Hale 1996:92, also see Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:47). A complex and nuanced approach (Cops 2012:5) should be applied because '(…) the object of study itself is multi-dimensional, subjective and experiential' (Lee & Farrall 2009:212-213, also see Pleysier 2010:151, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:46). Clearly, for appropriate measurement, the fear of crime demands '(…) a broad range of techniques that healthily complement, contrast and challenge one another' (Jackson 2004b:57).

Policy-makers, however, promoted the reproduction of fear of crime items used previously (Ditton & Farrall 2000, Cops 2012:75), which is quite understandable given their governmental interest in the assessment of "trends". But these items were held to be fatal to the validity of the research from the early days of the tradition (Pleysier 2010:75-96, Vanderveen 2006:312-313, Jackson 2002:241, Lee 2001:26-33 & Hale 1996:84-94). As a result, most fear of crime authors '(…) do not specify what they want to measure (…)' (Van der Wurff 1992:27).The research tradition has a very strong methodological limitation on the exclusive use of surveys (Pleysier 2010, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Hale 1996). This *superficial* research approach unquestionably reinforced the perception of fear of crime as a 'black or even empty box' (Van den Herrewegen 2011:61). And as a result, '(i)t seems that levels of fear of crime (…) have been hugely overestimated' (Ditton et al. 1999:676).

As Ditton and Farrall concluded in 2000, after nearly thirty years of fear of crime research, still 'surprisingly little can be said conclusively about the fear of crime' (Ditton & Farrall 2000:xxi). 'The fear of crime has been primarily measured, instead of theorised or debated' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:46), which has significantly hampered the cumulative development of knowledge (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:277). Scientists instead had 'rude debates about the rationality of public opinion' (Jackson 2004a:962). Sadly, much academic energy was lost to this debate that missed the actual core of the concept (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:18, Pleysier 2011:36).

3.7 Towards a scientific contribution
Fear of crime has been researched at three levels of aggregation: the individual, the neighbourhood and broader society. Clearly more investigation needs to be carried out to understand the foundations of 'societal fear of crime', since this sub-concept only recently started to receive serious research attention (Cops 2012:5, Jackson

2005:311, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:44) despite Fürstenberg's early findings (1971).

More sophisticated research approaches have demonstrated that citizens perceive a growing threat of crime to society or to their local community, but paradoxically perceive a low risk of themselves falling victim of crime (Van der Wurff & Stringer 1989, Brantingham et al. 1986, Hindelang et al. 1978, Van den Herrewegen 2011:52, Elffers & De Jong 2004:46, Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, de Graaf & Boutellier 2012). This replicated observation raises an important question about the fundamental nature of the fear of crime, because the fear of crime is generally understood as a problem at the *individual level* (Hale 1996, Ditton & Farrall 2000). The question remains: at which level of psychological reference is fear of crime primarily rooted? And more importantly: when it comes to fear of crime, what are the dynamics within and between these different levels of psychological reference of the self, the neighbourhood and society?

Several studies have singled out the complex, interwoven nature of the sub-concepts of fear of crime (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013, Farrall et al. 2009, Girling et al. 2000, Hollway & Jefferson 2000, Taylor et al. 1986). But 'more theoretical work needs to be done so that cross-level interactions (…) can be better explained and interpreted (Wilcox-Roundtree & Land 1996:176, also see Pleysier & Cops 2016:17, Farrall et al. 1997:674, Hale 1996:84, Jackson & Gouseti 2014:9). Current fear of crime theories and research findings explored in previous sections do not provide suitable answers to these fundamental questions. We will therefore extend our theoretical insights in working towards an empirical contribution.

4. Necessary theoretical extensions

In this chapter we will focus in turn on three prominent theoretical gaps: (I) the theoretical explanation of 'societal fear of crime', which is in need of structure and supplementation; (II) psychological and social psychological dynamics underlying risk perceptions; and (III) conceptual clarity on 'the fear of crime'.

4.1 A structured & broader view on societal fear of crime

We will firstly expand our theoretical explanation of the fear of crime as an *externalisation of a broader kind of contemporary insecurity* (Hale 1996:120, Elchardus, De Groof & Smits 2003:13-17, Pleysier 2011:28, Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013, Girling, Loader, & Sparks 2000, Hollway & Jefferson 1997, 2000, Jackson 2004a, 2006, 2009b, Taylor & Jamieson 1998, Walklate & Mythen 2008).

4.1.1 The cultural impact of social change

In only a few decades, Western societies have undergone fundamental social, economic, political, cultural and ecological changes. We will explore these developments in brief, to give an impression of the *fundamental change* that Western societies have experienced in a short window of time.

> First of all, the world became *globalised* (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006), which led to changes in economic organisation (Johnston 2001:964), the rise of the European Union and international business (Schnabel 2000). Globalisation also led to an increase in *ethnic or racial heterogeneity* in societies due to *migration*. (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Van Marle 2010). In addition, technological progress and globalisation led to a strong increase of *mobility* within many aspects of life, including spatial, economic and social mobility (Van Marle 2010:57). Western societies saw an unprecedented growth of *societal affluence* (Johnston 2001, Beker 2003, Van den Brink 2007). And this societal wealth is held to have led to mass consumption (Johnston 2001), a focus on non-existential matters (Beker 2003) and higher standards within many aspects of life (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Offer 2006, Van den Brink 2007), including politics, marriage, employment, education and morality (Van den Brink 2007:223). Meanwhile *life expectations*, *educational levels* and the *emancipation* of women and minorities rose strongly too (Van den Brink 2007, Van Marle & Maruna 2010).

> These rather positive social changes also have a downside. Individuals have experienced a sense of alienation due to the processes of individualisation and *secularisation* (Schnabel 2000, Van den Brink 2007), which in turn has led to an erosion of *traditional structures* (Boutellier 1993). As a combined result of these changes, individuals can no longer fall back on a firm set of norms, values and certainties (Van Marle 2010). This sense of *moral diversity* (Eckersley 2000) is translated into a sense of societal disintegration, which undermines individuals' sense of security (Pleysier 2010, Van den Brink 2007) and general trust (Furedi 1998).

Against this backdrop, the *mass media* became highly influential on public opinion (Van Marle & Maruna 2010, Svendsen 2008, Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010, Beunders 2006, Elchardus 2004). With advances in information technology, everyone can nowadays be connected to anybody on the other side of the planet in real time, leading to a fast and wide reach of social media (Schnabel 2000, Van den Brink 2007, Chadee & Chadee 2016).

Together these changes have a strong societal and individual impact, because '(…) sudden, comprehensive, fundamental and unexpected (…)' (Sztopmka 2000a:283) changes within societal structures and functions can lead to cultural disorganisation and disorientation in the form of *cultural trauma*. Cultural trauma can escalate into a *traumatic mood.* Should such a mood arise, it will usually echo in the public memory for an entire generation. Recurring cycles of societal change can sustain cultural trauma as constant fundamental change disturbs the consolidation of 'basic values, central beliefs and common norms' (Sztompka 2000b:453, also see Van den Brink 2007:126).

Besides this collective impact of societal change, there is an individual downside to cultural trauma as well. After all, culture 'transmits tools, standard operating procedures, unstated assumptions, categorisations, definitions, norms, and values to others' (Triandis & Trafimow 2003:368). Recurring fundamental social change has made Western cultures too vague to provide a basis for identity or to cultivate social cohesion (Sztompka 1997:8-12, also see Beker 2003), leaving individuals with a disrupted sense of community. So, together, societal changes have contributed to a less coherent, more insecure and fluid society (Bauman 2006, Boutellier 2005) in which culture and institutions can no longer protect us from feeling unsafe (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:12, Hajer & Schwartz 1997:9, Beck 1992:11-12).

Not every individual experiences this in a similar way, however. An individual's *personal sensitivity* to contemporary conditions is grounded in their sentiments of authoritarianism, attitudes towards law and order, attitudes towards social change in the community, and attitudes towards social change among young people (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:225), as well as their attitudes in relation to '(…) cohesion and order, local identity and change, and justice and morality (…) (Jackson 2004a:951)'. So, it is conceivable that the previously explored trait of risk sensitivity discharges itself into more negative perceptions at the societal level of reference as well.

4.1.2 Personal discomfort and societal discontent
Our individual lives have also changed significantly. Living in contemporary society demands a flexible lifestyle that enables people to adapt continuously to ever-changing conditions. Contemporary daily life is surprisingly complex (Van Marle 2010, Kennedy 2007a, Van den Brink 2007, Trommsdorff 1994, Kinet 2011). In sum, modern life implies '(…) qualities, attitudes, values, habits and dispositions' (Inkeles 1976:321 as quoted by Sztompka 1993:77-78), for which not everybody feels equipped (Cops 2012:273, Verhaeghe 2011:87-94). According to Giddens (1990)

there are four typical ways of coping with the demands of contemporary daily life: (I) pragmatic acceptance; (II) sustained optimism; (III) cynical pessimism; and (IV) radical contestation (also see Sztompka 2000b). But despite these ways of dealing with the complexity of daily life, individuals are left with quite a bit of *residual discomfort*.

People experience *personal discomfort* because they feel they live a *detached* life as a result of the erosion of traditional societal structures. With the loss of these structures, individuals also lost *traditional securities and mutual expectations* that gave direction to social interactions of daily life. This led to greater *insecurity about interpersonal contact* on a daily basis (Cops 2012). Individuals can no longer derive *economic and political future perspectives* from social structures and socio-political blocks (Deklerck 2006:22, also see Hollway & Jefferson 1997), leaving them with *unclear* (Deklerck 2006:22) *and pessimistic future perspectives* (Fattah & Sacco 1989:223, Van den Herrewegen 2011:58, Hale 1996:120). This is problematic for two reasons: (I) societal pessimism about the future is held to negate people's sense of having meaningful roles and responsibilities in relation to governments and other institutions (Eckersley 2000); and (II) the experience of an uncertain future leads to feelings of anxiety on a daily basis (Bauman 2002:60). This fragility of contemporary individual life is so broadly shared, however, that we are usually unaware of it (Young 2007:3, 35, Geldof 2001:18-19).

The loss of social integration at societal level is closely related to the concept of *ontological insecurity,* the latter being an erosion of '(…) the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action' (Giddens 1990:92). Due to this 'disembedding of social systems' (Garland 2001:155), people's self-identities became less clearly defined as their 'protective cocoon of relational ties' (Giddens 1990) has vanished to a great extent. People display quite inflexible reactions to this ontological insecurity, emphasising the unchanging core of the self by highlighting essential values, which they also associate with other individuals of their group, and strongly denigrating others who lack these virtues (Van Marle 2010:84, also see Van den Brink 2007:37-52). In this way social disintegration becomes a vicious circle.

Besides 'personal discomfort', people also experience *'societal discontent'*. When asked, individuals express a significant number of *anxieties and concerns* that are 'embedded in how people make sense of social bonds, normative standards and inter-group relations (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:210).' There is widely held perception of a *decline in moral values* (Van den Brink 2007:231-236, also see Boutellier 2011)*.* Moral values are crucial to daily life, because they '(…) provide the foundations and frameworks of social systems and functions. They determine how we get along together and manage our affairs; they define our relationships and shape our identities, beliefs and goals' (Eckersley 2000:14). The decay of moral cohesion makes us less able to define 'we', turning us into isolated individuals who are very precautious and frightened of 'strangers' (Sztompka 1998:46-50). We

seem to have lost solid moral bounds (ibid:55), which makes '(…) the order of things feel vague, shapeless, diffuse and un-pinpointable' (Bauman 2002:51). As a result of this perceived decline in 'moral density' (Merton 1982, Sztompka 2002b, Boutellier 2011), people experience a '*disrupted sense of community'* at the level of wider society (Pleysier 2010:X). As mutual strangers, we perceive each other as unpredictable, rude and untrustworthy – people from whom we have to keep our distance (Albers & Teller 2006:85-120, Van den Herrewegen 2011:58, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:243). But this is not the only societal worry.

The broader amalgam of contemporary discontent about the state of society can be described as '(…) feeling bad in one's own society and the state of affairs within that society' (Elchardus 2008:12). Individuals share a common feeling that the key issues of the day are too large-scale and abstract for them (Dekker et al. 2013:66-69, De Kesel 2011b:212-213). Essentially, societal dissatisfaction is a complex constellation, a sequence of alienation due to a loss of belief in progress, acceleration stress and information overload, as well as a loss of singularity due to globalisation. These layers of alienation lead to societal dissatisfaction, with severe consequences on the collective level (De Cauter 2011:18).

Societal discontent is historically ubiquitous (Beker 2003, De Kesel 2011a:40) and its existence has been fairly stable over the years, something that can be explained by the concept's flexibility (Dekker et al. 2013). It is a reaction to the spirit of the time (De Cauter 2011:15, Van der Bles, Postmes & Meijer 2015). Clearly societal discontent functions as a discourse, used by the public to express a wide variety of sources of social frustration (RMO 2013:9-15 &47-52), including crime.

4.1.3 Coping problems and projection
The fore-mentioned sources of contemporary personal discomfort and societal discontent are difficult to cope with, due to their *ambiguity.* But people basically need cognitive closure to uncertainty (Carvalho & Lewis 2003:807). When individuals fail to get a real grip on the sources of their discomfort, they are drawn to discourses that make unidentified and unknown anxieties knowable and nameable (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:261, also see Jackson & Gouseti 2014, Elchardus 2008, Hollway & Jefferson 1997, 2000).

People use a fairly common discourse when explaining their fear of crime. This discourse generally consists of arguments about 'the worsening nature of the crime problem' and 'declining standards of behaviour' and is of a rather nostalgic nature (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:33). Crime functions as a 'condensation symbol', making tangible those mutations in social and moral order that would otherwise have remained difficult for individuals to grasp (Loader, Girling & Sparks 2000:66, Farrall et al. 2009:12, Cops 2012:32). So ultimately, crime discourse provides a way for people to express concerns about '(p)rofound social, economic, and political changes' (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013:6, also see Hirtenlehner 2008, Hollway & Jefferson 1997).

Unsurprisingly, 'crime' and 'insecurity' happen to be keywords in the discourses of societal discontent (Dekker et al. 2013:103-124). Fear of crime does indeed function as '(…) an unconscious displacement of other fears which are more intractable (…)' (Hollway & Jefferson 1997:263, also see Farral, Jackson & Gray 2009:4, Pleysier 2010:161-162, Bannister 1993:72). Ultimately, the projection of abstract anxieties onto the crime problem adds '(…) up to the belief in one's capacity to control the external world (…) (Hollway & Jefferson 1997:263) and that the government and other institutions are responsible for combatting the problem of crime (Vanderveen 2006, Furedi 1998).

Fertile - cultural and social psychological – ground exists for the projection of diffuse anxieties and insecurities onto the crime problem. Crime turns out to have an intuitive moral meaning in our morally pluralistic society (Boutellier 1993:215, Chadee & Chadee 2016:62). People show a strong and unambiguous aversion to crime and other kinds of anti-social behaviour (Spithoven 2012 & Spithoven, De Graaf & Boutellier 2012). This can be interpreted as a societal rejection of crime (Van der Wurff 1992) and rough behaviour, which threaten solidarity in our society (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010, Koemans 2011, Van Marle 2010, Ericson 2007:20). Results from modern social psychology research concur with this vision (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg 2003:418). Contemporary 'punitiveness' puts considerable pressure on politicians and policy-makers. As a result, governments and politicians want to disseminate the message that they are 'in control' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:15-16, also see Spithoven, de Graaf & Boutellier 2012). The downside is that this changed policy rationale potentially lowers public tolerance of many forms of ambiguous behaviour (Ericson 2007, Koemans 2011).

In sum, Western cultures have developed a general preoccupation with negative messages, which makes individuals more alert to crime threats in their environments and easily turns ambiguous events into a perception of threat (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:114). This cultural attention is in turn reinforced by political and media attention to crime with a focus on risk control (Ericson 2007, Beunders 2006, Svendsen 2008). Eventually, all of this leads to a strongly emotional and unequivocal rejection of crime, which is highly symbolic in nature due to its projective function for more ambiguous anxieties and sentiments (Boutellier 1993:11-32, Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, De Graaf & Boutellier 2012, Van der Wurff 1992).

4.1.4 Summative model of societal fear of crime
An overview of influences on the fear of crime at societal level is available on the next page (fig. 6). Rapid, fundamental and recurring societal change in Western societies has led to an increase in cultural trauma, which causes every individual to experience some degree of personal discomfort and societal discontent. Since the sources of discomfort cannot be dealt with directly, individuals turn to a crime discourse that makes the discomfort tangible. Contemporary cultural, political and media attention to crime further strengthens this social psychological charge in

relation to the crime problem. In this way, societal fear of crime is an expression of a mixture of abstract sources of contemporary societal unease.

So, the fear of crime has to be seen in a 'broader environmental and social picture' (Pleysier 2010:102, Ditton & Farrall 2000, Jackson 2004b, 2005a), since the way that people experience the broader social world around them seems to have a profound influence on their experience of - and answers to questions about - the fear of crime (Jackson 2004a:947, 963, Pleysier 2010:151-152).

Fig. 6 - Recapitulative model of societal fear of crime.

4.2 Psychological dynamics underlying risk perceptions

More sophisticated research approaches observe that citizens perceive crime to be a growing threat in the context of society, while believing there is only a very limited chance that they themselves will fall victim of crime. It turns out that this effect is not unique to the problem of crime. Since Weinstein revealed this phenomenon in 1980, the same effect was found in 'over a thousand studies and for a diverse array of undesirable events, including diseases, natural disasters, and a host of other events ranging from unwanted pregnancies and home radon contamination to the end of romantic relationships' (Shepperd et al. 2015:232). The phenomenon effectively amounts to a strict denial of personal risk (Fromm 2005): a vast majority of people - within different countries and at different points in time – indicate they are 'happy, satisfied with their lives and optimistic about their futures' (Eckersley 2000:5) while being very pessimistic about the state of affairs within 'the entire society, population or nation' (ibid). But how can this be?

4.2.1 Individual psychological factors: sensitivity to risk

Up to this point we have explored demographic elements that were found or hypothesised to influence - or at least to correlate with - the fear of crime. But

there may well be a false bottom to these observations and theories, because 'using general socio-demographic predictors to account for fear of crime masks potentially significant individual psychological factors, which should be considered' (Doran & Burgess 2012:30, also see Farrall et al. 2000). So, we must incorporate individual psychological dynamics into our understanding of the fear of crime. An explanation is found in the umbrella concept of 'risk sensitivity', which fundamentally means that '(h)igh risk will only produce high levels of fear if sensitivity is high (…)' (Hale 1996:108).

Warr's initial theory of sensitivity to risk
In an exploratory analysis of fear of rape among urban women, Warr (1985) found that '(…) the major determinant of sensitivity to risk for any offence is the perceived seriousness of that offence' (Warr 1985:244). In a later article (1987), he theorised further on this observation: '(s)ensitivity to risk refers to the relation between fear of a particular offence (…) and the perceived risk of that offence' (Warr 1987:30, also see Jackson 2011:515). Warr observed such linear relationships for a multitude of specific offences (Warr 1984). But some other *perceptually contemporaneous offences* '(…) may be feared only (or largely) because they are associated with other, more serious offences' (Warr 1985:245).

In his theoretical underpinning to these observations, Warr focused on three psychological parameters that determine an individual's sensitivity to risk: (I) a threshold of fear, (II) a slope of fear and (III) the maximum fear that an offence can produce. The *threshold* 'indicates the minimum level of perceived seriousness of risk necessary to produce fear'. It is the point at which fear is triggered. The *slope of fear* 'is the rate at which fear inceases with perceived risk'. And the *maximum fear an offence can produce* is a function of the threshold and slope of fear and 'indicates the full degree of fear that any particular offence is capable of producing' (Warr 1987:30).

In sum, Warr concluded that for 'people who judge crime to be especially serious, a lower level of perceived likelihood was needed to stimulate a given level of personal fear' (Jackson 2011:531). He suggested the concept of risk sensitivity to be crucial in explaining different levels of fear of crime between socio-demographic groups.

Jackson's extension of risk sensitivity
Warr's theory of 'risk sensitivity' did not receive much follow-up attention until the recent work of Jackson (2011, 2013, 2015). Jackson extended Warr's theoretical model with '(…) dual interaction effects in which perceived control and perceived consequence each alter the observed relationship between perceived likelihood and worry about crime' (Jackson 2011:518). His empirical findings verified his position: 'The greater the perceived consequence and the lower the perceived control, the stronger the observed association between perceived likelihood and worry about crime. People worried even when they viewed victimisation to be

relatively unlikely, so long as they saw the personal impact of the event to be high and/or their personal control to be low' (ibid:531).

In a later study, the psychological concept of 'aversion to uncertainty' turned out to influence the respondent's probability judgments. Individuals with a high score on need for cognitive closure expected more serious consequences from crime. This led Jackson to the conclusion that '(r)isk sensitivity may thus be not only about representations of the outcome of a given personal threat, but also about the individual differences in need for order, certainty, predictability, and decisiveness that shape affective response to risk' (ibid:236). Risk sensitivity clearly has broader psychological roots.

Risk sensitivity as a psychological trait
We will now explore 'risk sensitivity' as a general psychological trait as it was studied in the tradition of 'risk perception research'. Risk sensitivity is held to be a reasonably stable characteristic of sensitivity to threats and risks (Wildavsky & Dake 1990:167, also see Sjöberg 2000). The difference with the former conceptualisations of risk sensitivity is that both Warr and Jackson focus on *crime-specific* sensitivity, where the risk perception tradition is orientated to an individual's *general* trait of risk sensitivity.

As a general trait, the concept comprises several elements covered in previous fear of crime theory and research: (I) dispositional fear; (II) specific crime fears; (III) one's level of tolerance; (IV) need for closure; (V) authoritarian sentiments; (VI) societal conservatism; and (VII) passivism. We will explore these related concepts in brief.

> *I. Dispositional fear*
> Dispositional fear is described by Gabriel and Greve as a stable individual trait '(…) characterised by experiencing more situations as being relevant to fear, being more likely to experience fear in a given situation, and possibly experiencing fear more intensely' (Gabriel & Greve 2003:601). This dispositional fear is held to be influenced by one's socialisation, as well as events of direct and indirect victimisation (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:64-66, Gabriel & Greve 2003:603).

> *II. Specific crime fears*
> Individuals can also have a specific fear of a specific risk (Sjöberg 2000). In this way, individuals can have 'an anxiety about being a victim of a specific crime' (Lupton & Tulloch 1999:516, Lai, Zhao & Longmire 2012:14, Warr & Stafford 1983). Research into these specific crime fears is very limited (Lai, Zhao & Longmire 2012). We know that young women show a specific fear of rape (Warr 1985), but this was found to be actually a fear of non-sexual physical assault and perceptually contemporaneous offences in general (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2014). So, we must be wary of taking specific crime fears at face value, although they do play an important symbolic and consolidation role in respect of fear of

crime at the level of 'lay knowledge and sense making' (Lupton & Tulloch 1999:520).

III. Level of tolerance
According to Ferraro and LaGrange (1987) one's level of tolerance is a reflection of one's moral values. Level of tolerance is known to reflect worries about social change (Girling et al. 2000), signals of a weak social order (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Sampson & Raudenbush 2004) and social efficacy (Jackson 2004a), as well as it being related to one's general capacity to relativise (Van den Herrewegen 2011:270).

IV. Need for closure
The 'need for cognitive closure' (Jackson 2015) has a fairly strong influence on the way that individuals perceive the world around them, providing also a filter for knowledge about crime: 'People with a high need for cognitive closure have a preference for predictability, an aversion to uncertainty, and an inclination for order and structure in an uncertain world' (Jackson 2015:223). Kruglanski and Webster (1996) defined the concept as: '(…) a desire for definite knowledge on some issue and the eschewal of confusion and ambiguity (…) need for closure is presumed to exert its effects via two general tendencies: the urgency tendency, reflecting the inclination to attain closure as quickly as possible, and the permanence tendency, reflecting the tendency to maintain it for as long as possible' (Kruglanski & Webster 1996:278 as quoted by Jackson 2015:226).

V. Authoritarian sentiments
Jackson (2004a) found a connection between individuals' level of tolerance and authoritarian sentiments: authoritarian sentiments are expressed by individuals through arguments related to law and order (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:114), concerning ''anti-welfarism', punitiveness, and social conformity' (ibid:103, also see Markowitz et al. 2001, Dowds & Ahrendt 1995).

VI. Sentiments of societal conservatism
Fear of crime is also connected to the concept of societal conservatism: the perception that the world has changed and is still changing in an unwelcome direction (Pleysier 2010:158). Societal conservatism is rooted in negative thoughts about the speed and profundity of social change (Sztompka 1993:xvi, Hale 1996:120). Most of the time individuals feel that they 'are powerless to intervene' (Smith 1987: 128, also see Elchardus et al. 2003) in these societal matters personally, and so '(…) rapidly changing structures of work, technology and communications seem to take their toll on human beings in the form of nostalgia' (Walklate 2002:301).

VII. Passivism
Societal conservatism can also escalate into a state of societal passivism (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:33) – an urgent need to consolidate the current state

of society (Sztompka 2000a:275), due to a sense that decisions might be regretted later on (Pleysier 2010:160-161).

Due to their close theoretical linkages, these seven psychological sub-concepts are seen as indicators of the general concept of 'risk sensitivity'. Besides these "fear-stimulating concepts", we also see an important downplaying of cognitions related to personal threat, in the form of risk denial.

4.2.2 Risk denial

Some individuals appear fundamentally unable to accept their own vulnerability. Fromm (2005) offers two ways of explaining this: (I) defensive denial 'safeguarding one's self-esteem' (Fromm 2005:13, also see Perloff 1999, Sherman & Cohen 2006); and (II) cognitive biases 'used by individuals to oversimplify complex judgment tasks' (Fromm 2005:13, also see Shepperd et al. 2015).

> The first category of *defensive denial* has not received much empirical support (Fromm 2005). We will look at related psychological defense mechanisms in more detail later in this section, because the lack of empirical support for their role in risk denial may well be due to risk perception researchers' methodological overreliance on surveys: psychological defense mechanisms are very difficult to measure using survey items (Cramer 2006, Valliant 1992, Bond 1992).

> The second category led to the discovery of several *cognitive heuristic biases* underlying risk denial, which include 'egocentrism' and 'downward comparison' (Fromm 2005:13). People who compare themselves with negative stereotypes, have extreme ideas of how much personal control they have over risks they face in daily life, and also 'tend to be overconfident with respect to the accuracy of the predictions they make' (Fromm 2005:18, also see Shepperd et al. 2015, Sherman & Cohen 2006). Two more related explanations were provided: daily confrontations with risks make them cognitively less prone to risk denial (Fromm 2005). And 'people may feel that their risk is low because they take precautions' (Shepperd et al. 2015:235).

In sum, there seems to be a self-excluding reaction to the potentially negative features of contemporary life. Humans seem to be equipped with a built-in defense mechanism that protects them against perceptions of personal threats and discontinuities. We automatically believe that they will not do us damage; 'others' will be harmed, not ourselves (Eckersley 2000). But how does this function? To find suitable answers requires a brief exploration of what is known about the function and dynamics of 'the self'.

4.2.3 The flexible self

'The self' is simply what comes to our consciousness when we think about ourselves (Oyserman 2003). This mental representation is embedded in broader historical and cultural contexts and it functions as a repository of autobiographical memories, as an organiser of experience and as an emotional buffer and

motivational resource (Oyserman 2003). The most common explanation of 'the self' makes a fundamental distinction between 'the private self' and 'the collective self' (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto 1991, Simon 1996, Turner et al. 1994, Brewer & Gardner 1996, Oyserman 2003, Sedikides & Gaertner 2001). Trafimow, Triandis & Goto (1991) explain that '(t)he private self includes cognitions that involve traits, states or behaviours (e.g., "I am honest"), while the collective self consists of cognitions about group membership (e.g., "I am a son", this concerns membership in the family)' (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto 1991:649). This collective self is essentially '(…) based on impersonal bonds to others derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification with a group' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2). These sub-concepts of 'the self' enable individuals to make unconscious but strict cognitive differences between themselves as individuals, themselves as part of groups and 'others' (Park, Scherer & Glynn 2001:289, Paul, Salwen & Dupagne 2000, Cooper, Kelly & Weaver 2003:265 & 268).

The private self has self-interest as its basic motivation, while collective welfare is the basic motivation of the collective self (Brewer & Gardner 1996:84). So each type of self-cognition simply leads to other perceptions (Simon 1996). But in essence, '(t)hese concepts of the self are 'equally valid and authentic expressions of the psychological process of self' (Turner et al. 1994:454).

The development of more individualistic cultures in the West may have led into individuals to 'retrieve more private-self cognitions' (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto 1991:650), as 'they belong simultaneously to an increasing number of different, often mutually independent, but sometimes also conflicting social groups' (Simon 1996:325, also see Hogg & Williams 2000). Nowadays 'the collective self gains flexibility, but also loses stability and thus provides more room for the evolution of the individual self' (Simon 1996:334). But still, individuals have a 'fundamental "need to belong" as an innate feature of human nature' (Brewer & Gardner 1996:83, also see Hogg 2001, Hogg & Williams 2000).

People bolster their self-image when this is challenged, because the basic principle of any self-concept is '(…) feeling good about oneself, evaluating oneself positively, feeling that one is a person of worth (…)' (Oyserman 2003:503). As a result, individuals are strongly motivated to maintain a positive self-image or enhance their self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner 1986). The classic understanding of "bolstering" self-image is that individuals need a stable entity (Oyserman 2003, Tice & Baumeister 2001) and thus the unconscious blanks out cognitions that are undesirable to our self-image (Perloff 1999). The aim is to prevent a state of *cognitive dissonance* (Cooper, Kelly & Weaver 2003). As a result, individuals tend to have an exaggeratedly positive self-image, because they filter out negative information associated with the self-image and tend to consolidate the positive residue (Dunning 2003). Individuals strive to achieve such *cognitive closure* as quickly as possible and desire to maintain it for as long as possible (Cooper, Kelly & Weaver 2003).

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More recently, however, social psychology has found that this process of self-cognition is not as rigid as previously thought. According to Swann & Buhrmester (2012:420), it is not that individuals essentially strive for coherence; rather they strive for *self-enhancement* and they have multiple sources to realise this: *multiple* private and collective self-cognitions, which are all part of a more general self-concept (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto 1991). '(S)elf-categorisation varies with the social context' and is 'inherently variable, fluid and context-dependent' (Turner et al. 1994:454) instead of 'fixed, absolute properties of the perceiver' (ibid:456, Simon 1996, Hogg 2001, Deaux & Perkins 2001). These 'shifts between various forms of self-representation flow[ed] easily and without any notable disjuncture' (Deaux & Perkins 2001:311), with the result that individuals remained unaware of the process.

When an aspect of the self is challenged (or threatened) – whether the private or collective self - people will simply maintain their self-integrity 'through the affirmation of alternative sources of self-identity' (Sherman & Cohen 2006:73), by means of 'uncertainty reduction' in order to retain 'self-esteem' (Hogg & Williams 2000). The individual self turns out to have a greater impact on an individual's overall self-definition than the collective self, as was observed by Gaertner, Sedikides and Graetz: 'Following the threat to the individual self, participants demonstrated an increased preference for self-definitions in terms of the collective self (…). Analogous shifts in self-definitional preference were not observed following a threat to the collective self' (Gaertner, Sedikides & Graetz 1999:16). And apparently, '(t)he need to belong (…) is powerfully adaptive' (Tice & Baumeister 2001:72). In later work, Sedikides and colleagues labelled this phenomenon "identity shift" (Sedikides & Gaertner 2001:14) and "the *substitution principle"* (Sedikides 2012)*.* Psychological identities are often used to buffer one another in order to lessen anxiety and stress (Sedikides 2012:335). This is highly likely to be occurring below the surface during attempts to measure respondents' levels and characteristics of fear of crime. Most probably these cognitive identity shifts are further strengthened by the psychological defense mechanisms mentioned previously.

4.2.4 The influence of psychological defense mechanisms
Similarly to 'the substitution principle' and 'risk denial', the function of psychological defense mechanisms is to 'protect the individual from painful emotions, ideas, and drives' (Valliant 1992:3, also see Cramer 2006:viii). A few authors have hypothesised on how defense mechanisms influence the fear of crime (Ruiter, Abraham & Kok 2001, Coston & Finkenauer 2004), but no actual empirical testing of this relationship is to be found. Hollway and Jefferson (1997, 2000) found empirical signs of a general defensiveness, but did not focus on underlying specific defense mechanisms. We will explore this challenging concept through the lens of work carried out by defenses experts, Phebe Cramer and George E. Valliant.

Although the concept of defense mechanisms is quite old – first mentioned by Sigmund Freud - it is still a subject of strong research interest, especially in the field

of *psychiatry* (e.g., see Bond & Perry 2004, Rice & Hoffman 2014). Psychological defense mechanisms are 'mental maneuvers in which we all engage to maintain our psychological equilibrium and protect our self-esteem' (Cramer 2006:4). They especially 'protect the integration of the self' into cognitions 'that harm the self and the sense of self-esteem' (Cramer 2006:7).

Specific types of defense mechanisms have been theorised and researched. Some lists are longer than others (e.g., see Valliant 1992:237-252), but fundamentally the following types can be distinguished: (I) denial; (II) projection; (III) displacement; (IV) suppression; and (V) rationalisation. We will explore the respective definitions to gain an oversight of the rich palette of cognitive manoeuvres that protect our self-image and self-esteem:

I. *Denial* is '(t)he failure to see, recognise, or understand the existence or the meaning of an internal or external stimulus, so as to avoid the anxiety that would occur if the stimulus were recognised' (Cramer 2006:23).
II. *Projection* is '(a)ttributing one's own unacceptable thoughts, feelings, or intentions to others, so as to avoid the anxiety associated with harboring them'(Cramer 2006:23).
III. *Displacement* is '(a) mechanism in which the person generalises or redirects a feeling about an object or a response to another object' to feel 'less endangered' (Valliant 1992:237).
IV. *Suppression* is '(a) mechanism in which the person intentionally avoids thinking about disturbing problems, desires, feelings or experiences' (Valliant 1992:238)
V. *Rationalising* is '(a) mechanism in which the person devises reassuring explanations' (Vailliant 1992:238).

Despite their theoretical clarity, defense mechanisms are difficult to demonstrate empirically (Valliant 1992:4, Bond 1992:128). In the words of Cramer: 'Defenses are effective because we are unaware of their functioning, and this absence of awareness creates a dilemma. How are we to study an important aspect of our inner life that colours our perception of reality and affects our adaption but functions at a level that precludes our awareness?' (Cramer 2006:5).

There is consensus that defenses can be accessed through *narrative analysis* (Bond 1992:129, Cramer 2006:vii, Valliant 1992) in which they 'often appear odd or irrational to observers' as 'they repress, deny, and distort internal and external reality' (Valliant 1992:45). The tricky part is that 'defenses are extremely short-lived, evanescent phenomena that rarely occur in isolation' (Valliant 1992:50). But one has to be alert '(t)o sense a disjunction, disruption, or nonsequitur in the flow of discourse – something that hovers on the edge of illogicality or disbelief'. In the end '(i)t is the listener who must evaluate the nature of the statement and the intent of the speaker – that is, the context in which the remark occurs – in order to determine the presence of a defense mechanism' (Cramer 2006:13).

We have so far explored *basic principles of our self-image* that explain how an individual's unconscious keeps one feeling 'safe' and 'in control' 'through comfortable, well-rehearsed generalisations' (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:33). As a result, people seem to leave societal problems, should they take place, at the level of abstraction (Coleman 1993:623-624): they are and will remain 'societal problems' (Mutz 1992, Coleman 1993). In other words, individuals are motivated to keep as much *psychological distance* between the self and negative stimuli (Svendsen 2008:74, 75&79).

4.2.5 Psychological distance
The concept of psychological distance has proved to have a strong influence on people's cognitions, emotions and motivations (Williams, Stein & Galguea 2014). Gouseti and Jackson (2016) recently applied the theoretical concept of 'psychological distance' to the fear of crime, providing an explanation as to how people generally experience crime 'as occurring far from one's here and now, to different people than one's own self, and as highly improbable to occur' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:25). The construal level theory of psychological distance (see Bar-Anan, Liberman & Trope 2006, Bonner & Newell 2008, Rim, Uleman & Trope 2009, Trope & Liberman 2010, Eyal & Liberman 2012) provides a further explanation for the 'risk denial' that individuals display in their fear of crime. We will explore this concept in more depth before concluding this theoretical exploration of (social) psychological dynamics underlying risk perceptions.

Psychological distance '(…) refers to the perception of when an event occurs, where it occurs, to whom it occurs, and whether it occurs' (Trope & Liberman 2010:442). The focus is on the following dimensions of psychological distance: 'time, space, social distance and hypotheticality' (Rim, Uleman & Trope 2009:1089). In this way, psychological distance is connected to construal level theory, which 'specifies four dimensions of psychological distance: (a) spatial—how distal in space is the target from the perceiver; (b) temporal—how much time (past or future) separates the perceiver's present time and the target event; (c) social—how distinct is the social target from the perceiver's self (e.g., self vs. others, friend vs. stranger); and (d) hypotheticality—how likely is the target event to happen, or how close it is to reality, as construed by the perceiver' (Bar-Anan, Liberman & Trope 2006:609). These four dimensions underlie a shared concept of psychological distance (Ibid:619) that essentially leads to *concrete or abstract* mental representations (Williams, Stein & Galguera 2014).

The self in the 'here and now' functions as the zero-point position of psychological distance (Gousetti & Jackson 2016, Trope & Liberman 2010, Bar-Anan, Liberman & Trope 2006). The construal level of a thought dictates its concreteness: 'Near events are represented at lower level construal, defined as concrete, specific and detailed. Distant events are represented at a higher level, which are more abstract, decontextualised and general' (Bonner & Newell 2008:411).

A greater perceived distance to the self in *time, space, social distance and hypotheticality* explains why individuals are also 'capable of experiencing and expressing reactions to events that are not present in their immediate context' (Gousetti & Jackson 2016:22). These abstract mental representations at greater psychological distance 'tend to be simpler, less ambiguous, more coherent, more schematic, and more prototypical than concrete representations' (Trope & Liberman 2010:441). This explains why at high levels of abstraction, the threat of crime is naturally connected with other social problems (Gouseti & Jackson 2016) and more prominently subjected to abstract concepts such as values and moral principles (Eyal & Liberman 2012).

As Gouseti and Jackson (2016) pointed out, crime can be experienced as both a *near* and *distant* problem. A 'near' perception of the problem of crime makes it '(…) a more specific threat, differentiated and potentially tangible in the everyday', while a 'distant' perception of the problem of crime represents it '(…) as a general, abstract category (…) social problem' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:22-23). A *low-level construal* of the threat of crime will result in a perception of high probability that the private self will fall victim of crime, since the threat of crime is perceived as 'real', 'close' in both time and space, and also 'relevant to the self'. A *high-level construal* of the threat of crime will result in a perception of very low probability that the *private self* will fall victim of crime, since now the threat of crime is perceived as 'hypothetical', 'distant' in both time and space, and 'relevant to different people' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:34).

Psychological distance is also connected to affect intensity, but not much research has been devoted to this relationship so far (Wlliams, Stein & Galguera 2014). The theory is that 'psychological distance decreases the intensity of affect that is experienced' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:23), since 'the more concrete the information is, the easier it is to imagine and associate with affect' (Bonner & Newell 2008:412). The psychological distance construal accordingly reduces affective intensity, whereas psychological closeness enhances affective intensity. Psychological distance thus reduces the threat of a negative threatening stimulus (Williams, Stein & Galguera 2014:1125). In the words of Ben-Ze've: 'Closeness – as "being near in time, space, effect, or degree" - is a crucial element in determining emotional relevance. Greater closeness typically implies greater significance and greater emotional intensity' (Ben-Ze've 2000:132).

As previously discussed in relation to the 'substitution principle' or 'identity shift', it is possible for individuals to *make shifts in their thinking* between crime as a distant risk and as a nearby risk: 'In a construal level theory approach to fear of crime, these cognitive mechanisms are one's psychological distance/proximity to crime and their abstract/concrete crime construals' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:32).

4.2.6 Summative model
Figure 7 summarises our exploration of the psychological and social-psychological literature, which provides a basis for the observation that citizens perceive a

growing threat of crime to society or their local community, but simultaneously perceive a low risk of themselves falling victim of crime (Van der Wurff & Stringer 1989, Brantingham et al. 1986, Hindelang et al. 1978, Van den Herrewegen 2011:52, Elffers & De Jong 2004:46, Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, de Graaf & Boutellier 2012).

The literature shows that a negative stimulus implicitly threatens an individual's self-identity and induces a state of cognitive dissonance that is extremely uncomfortable. This is where an individual makes a clear distinction between threats to one's (I) individual self-identity and (II) collective self-identity. A threat to one's collective self-identity will lead to a low level of emotional intensity due to high-level construal thoughts at a comfortable psychological distance. Threats to one's individual self-identity will lead to a high level of emotional intensity due to low-level construal thoughts. To prevent this negative emotional state, psychological defense mechanisms are activated, which motivates an identity shift to collective self-identity at a psychological distance that brings cognitive closure.

Fig. 7 – Summative model of the psychological dynamics underlying risk perceptions.

This process is highly likely to be active below the surface while respondents are being asked to make judgements about the threat of crime at various levels of psychological reference. A psychologically nearby perception of the threat of crime is too much of a threat to one's self-identity, so individuals undergo an 'identity shift' to a collective identity and assign most psychological significance to the threat of crime at the collective level. Meanwhile they claim to be 'in control' of themselves. We will integrate these findings into a renewed conceptualisation of the fear of crime, given that the theoretical extensions described above shine a fundamentally different light on the nature of the fear of crime.

4.3 Renewed conceptual clarity
The previous section's extensive exploration of the fear of crime urges us to treat the concept as a complex allocation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments at a personal as well as societal level (Pleysier 2010:43, also see Jackson 2006 and De Groof 2006).

4.3.1 DuBow et al.'s classification
The classification of the fear of crime by DuBow et al. (1979:2, also see Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72) is a good starting point for detailed consideration of the concept. Figure 8 below summarises their categorisations.

	Type of perception		
	Cognitive		Affective
Level of reference	*Judgments*	*Values*	*Emotions*
General	A. Risk to others; crime or safety assessments; rates of victimization.	B. Concern about crime to others	C. Fear for others' victimization
Personal	D. Personal risk; safety of self	E. Concern about crime to self; personal intolerance	F. Fear for self victimization

Fig. 8 – Combination of the classification of crime perceptions by
DuBow et al. (1979:2) and Ferraro & LaGrange (1987:72).

According to Ferraro and LaGrange, '(t)he major benefit of this taxonomy is that it differentiates judgments from values from emotions at both the individual and community levels' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71). In this way, the taxonomy implicitly treats the fear of crime as an *attitude*.

An attitude is a reflection of a psychological tendency, expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour' (Eagly & Chaiken 1993:1). Attitudes represent 'preferences, sentiments and values' (Cooper, Kelly & Weaver 2003:259) and reveal both cognitive and emotional evaluations (Eagly & Chaiken 1993:3-5), based on sentiments and values (Cooper, Kelly & Weaver 2003:259). The most-often quoted definition of the fear of crime, that of Ferraro (1995), aligns with aspects of the 'attitude' concept. According to Ferraro, fear of crime is 'an emotional response of dread or anxiety to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime' (Ferraro 1995:4, also see Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72).

Looking at the actual categories, on the vertical scale both DuBow et al. (1979) and Ferraro and LaGrange (1987) follow Fürstenberg (1971 & 1972) in distinguishing between the *social issue* of crime *in general* and crime as a *personal risk* (DuBow et al. 1979:2). This is also what Jackson (2004a) referred to as *experienced* versus *expressed* fear of crime.

On the horizontal scale, we find a reflection of the cognitive-affective dichotomy. Ferraro and LaGrange state that '(…) the cognitive end of the continuum includes judgments of risk and safety, while the affective end of the continuum includes fear reactions' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71). However, as has been pointed out by Gabriel and Greve, there is a logical connection between the cognitive and affective sides of perception: 'Being afraid implies that the situation at hand is perceived as dangerous, regardless of how vague this perception may be. It is logically impossible to be afraid but not to judge the situation as threatening' (Gabriel & Greve 2003:602).

4.3.2 Adjustments to DuBow et al.'s classification

Although inter-linked in the way they are experienced by individuals, one can distinguish analytically between judgments, values and emotions. 'Judgments' refer to '(…) people's assessments of crime rates and the probability of victimisation' (DuBow et al. 1979:3). 'Values' refer to the public's opinions about the political priority associated with a range of social issues (ibid:2) or '(….) the seriousness of the crime problem (…)' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71). And 'emotions' refer to the entwined '(…) emotional reaction to a perceived situation (…)' and the emotional reaction to a '(…) perception of "facts" or "reality"' (ibid:4).

Rather than consider affective elements of the fear of crime as true emotions, it is more logical to believe that affective aspects - such as fear - are *expressed* by respondents in order to emphasise their attitudes about judgments and values related to the fear of crime (Dekker et al. 2013:127-149). After all, we are dealing with *anticipated* fear of crime (Sacco 2005, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981, Van der Wurff 1992). It follows that the fear of crime identified by survey research at the personal level of reference is, instead, a reflection of fear as an instrument for interpreting our world and events within it (Svendsen 2008:46-47). These 'emotions' are merely 'everyday worries about personal risk' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:120) rather than derivatives of '(…) a sense of immediate threat to one's security—or to the security of things one holds dear' (ibid:18&245). Most fear of crime research is simply not measuring *situational* fear of crime.

Let's be very clear: there are events in which one experiences actual fear due to 'a sense of immediate threat' (ibid:18&245) because of 'crime or symbols that a person associates with crime' (Ferraro 1995:4). But it is illogical to assume that fear of crime interviews or surveys will actually measure such experiences - not unless we explicitly aim to measure this type of fear of crime. Even if ethical concerns were left out of consideration, this would involve the design of sophisticated methods to measure *unintended fear* by monitoring 'rapid heartbeat', 'increased respiration' as well as 'risen blood pressure' (Dalgeish 2004:585), as a result of 'stress hormone release' (Hildebrandt 2009:1). We cannot get insight into this type of fear of crime by simply asking respondents to check some boxes and answer survey questions on the fear of crime in general.

The fact that the detailed nature of our episodic memory generally expires within two weeks (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:64-66, Dalgeish 2004:584) makes it even more unlikely that this situational fear of crime is measured in survey research. According to affective neuroscientists, we are simply no longer able to measure *situational fear of crime* accurately once two weeks have passed since the fear event. It would be quite illogical to assume that respondent populations could have sufficient samples of people (Box et al. 1987, Skogan 1987) who had experienced a sense of immediate threat due to crime or crime signals in the two weeks prior to filling in a survey.

It follows from this that the personal-level fear of crime measured in fear of crime research is merely an *attitude* based on 'everyday worries about personal risk' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:120), instead of a time and place-specific response to external stimuli in daily life. We are essentially measuring a response to stimuli that make a respondent *anticipate* the risk of crime.

But people do not restrict their perceptions of 'crime' to legal boundaries when they explain their level of fear of crime. They rather treat crime as a problem that is connected to a network of social problems (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:5, Taylor & Jamieson 1998, Girling et al. 2000). After all, in respect of the fear of crime, the concept of 'crime' functions as a sponge: '(…) absorbing all sorts of anxieties about related issues of deteriorating moral fabric, from family to community to society (…)' and so it refers to '(…) a range of complex and subtle lay understandings of the social world-broader social values and attitudes about the nature and make-up of society and community' (Jackson 2006:261, also see Pleysier & Cops 2016).

Now having greater knowledge of the psychological depth of the concept, we can proceed towards an extended conceptualisation of the fear of crime. Following in the tracks of DuBow et al. in 1979, whose '(…) analytical distinctions have been formulated inductively from existing survey data' (DuBow et al. 1979:2), I have attempted to supplement their classification on the basis of the theoretical and empirical insights discussed above. An extended classification of the fear of crime *as a multi-layered set of attitudes* is added on the next page (fig. 9).

4.3.3 Renewed conceptualisation
The renewed conceptualisation of 'the fear of crime' in figure 9 (on the next page) is a supplementation to the work of DuBow et al. (1979). The personal level of reference is divided into 'situational' and 'personal fear of crime', and the general level of reference is divided into 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime'. The theoretically corresponding levels of psychological distance and emotional intensity are also added, to give a well-defined conceptual overview.

Sub-concept	Level of psychological reference		Cognitive				Affective		Type of perception
					Assessments	Values		Emotions	
									high ← Emotional intensity low
Situational fear of crime	Personal, specific situation	The private self		A.	Situational risk of personal victimisation	B.	Concern about imminent crime threat to the self	C.	Emotions about imminent crime threat to the self
Personal fear of crime	Personal, anticipated			D.	Anticipated risk of personal victimisation	E.	Concern about anticipated personal crime risk	F.	Emotions about anticipated personal risk
Neighbour-hood fear of crime	General, as part of neighbour-hood	The collective self		G.	General risk of crime in the neighbourhood	H.	General concern about crime risk in the neighbourhood	I.	Emotions about crime risk in the neighbourhood
Societal fear of crime	General, as part of society			J.	General risk of crime in society	K.	General concern about crime in society	L.	Emotions about crime in society
General fear of crime			near **Psychological distance → distant**						

Fig. 9 – Fear of crime as a multi-layered set of attitudes.

The horizontal layers

The distinction between cognitive and affective types of perception, as made by DuBow et al. (1979) and Ferraro and LaGrange (1987), has been validated in many empirical studies (Ferraro 1995, Ferraro and LaGrange 1987, LaGrange et al. 1992, Wilcox-Rountree 1998, Wilcox-Rountree and Land 1996a, Wyant 2008) and is therefore maintained on the horizontal layer. Also maintained is the value category of perception, since this category has also been validated (Farrall & Ditton 1999). So, on the horizontal scale a conceptual difference is made between (I) – cognitive perception as 'thinking or being aware of crime'; (II) affective perception as 'fearing, being afraid, or feeling anxious about crime'; and (III) – value perception as 'feeling anger, outrage or annoyance about crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58).

On the cognitive side of the classification, the column labelled 'judgments' by DuBow et al. (1979) and Ferraro and LaGrange (1987) is now labelled 'assessments', on the basis that this side of the fear of crime does not only cover 'the perception of the probability of being victimised' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71); it also covers estimations of the consequences of victimisation (Warr & Elison 2000, Lupton & Tulloch 2002, Lupton 2000, Spithoven, De Graaf & Boutellier 2012) and estimations of the magnitude of the crime problem (Vanderveen 2006:48).

A similar adjustment is made on the affective side of the classification: the narrow label of 'fear of victimisation' is replaced by the broader label of 'emotions about crime'. The reasoning for this is that, in daily life, people's responses to crime and related problems actually reflect a complex palette of highly correlated emotions (Ben-Ze'ev (2000:4, Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, also see Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards 1993:740-741). This complexity of emotions has been largely neglected in criminology (Van Marle 2010:41, De Haan & Loader 2002). What has previously been treated as 'fear' of 'crime' is merely a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:61-66).

The vertical layers

Compared to the classifications by DuBow et al. (1979) and Ferraro and LaGrange (1987), the renewed conceptualisation has additional layers on the vertical scale. The starting point for the vertical layers was the difference between 'the private self' and 'the collective self' as *psychological levels of reference*. A further distinction was made for both the personal and general levels of reference, to incorporate notions of self. 'Personal fear of crime' is supplemented with '*situational* fear of crime', which considers perceptions of the personal self *in a specific situation*, while 'personal fear of crime' is held to be about an *anticipated* perception.

'General fear of crime' is then split into '*neighbourhood* fear of crime' and '*societal* fear of crime' – two collective terms that the research tradition has studied as a context for the fear of crime.

On the cognitive side, the concept of 'psychological distance' has been added, with two levels functioning as extremes: (I) *near* – referring to the private self in a specific situation, since the 'here and now' is the zero point of psychological distance (Gousetti & Jackson 2016, Trope & Liberman 2010, Bar-Anan, Liberman & Trope 2006); and (II) *distant* – referring to the collective self at the level of society. Psychological distance'(…) refers to the perception of when an event occurs, where it occurs, to whom it occurs, and whether it occurs' (Trope & Liberman 2010:442). The focus is on the following dimensions of psychological distance: 'time, space, social distance and hypotheticality' (Rim, Uleman & Trope 2009:1089). 'Near events are represented at lower level construal, defined as concrete, specific and detailed. Distant events are represented at a higher level, which are more abstract, decontextualised and general' (Bonner & Newell 2008:411). As Gouseti and Jackson (2016) point out, crime can be experienced both *near* (or proximate) and *distant* (or far). A 'distant' perception of crime represents it '(…) as a general, abstract category (…) social problem', while a 'near' perception of crime makes it '(…) a more specific threat, differentiated and potentially tangible in the everyday' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:22-23).

On the affective side, the concept of 'emotional intensity' has been added. 'Emotional intensity' mirrors the levels of 'psychological distance' because 'psychological distance decreases the intensity of affect that is experienced' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:23). Emotional intensity is about the relative magnitude and duration of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4). *High* emotional intensity is an individual's '(…) momentary magnitude (peak intensity) and long temporal structure (mainly, duration) (…)' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:117) experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena. *Low* emotional intensity, on the other hand, is more a vague and chronic mood (Pleysier 2010): a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4), 'having no clear borderlines between them', which seem to '(…) lack a particular object (…) directed at the world at large (…), in search of an object' (Ben Ze'ev 2000:86-87).

This renewed conceptualisation of the fear of crime, rooted in the previously explored theories and empirical observations, will be the starting point for a detailed operationalisation of 'the fear of crime' and its sub-concepts. Before turning to this in the next chapter, we will discuss the research goal of the remainder of this research.

4.4 Towards a research objective
This research is heavily inspired by the 'revival' of the research tradition from the year 2000 (Cops 2012:5, Jackson 2005:311, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:44). Our goal is to do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon and treat 'the fear of crime' as an umbrella concept, harboring many different sub-concepts, which embraces the multi-dimensional and versatility of the concept (Cops 2012:5). After

all, the '(…) fear of crime can be experienced very differently in terms of individual relevance, explanation and consequences' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:64).

Clearly, '(…) more work is needed to capture the complexity and multi-dimensionality of this important social and political phenomenon' (Jackson & Gouseti 2014 :9). The focus will therefore be on the interwoven nature of fear of crime's sub-concepts (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013, Farrall et al. 2009, Girling et al. 2000, Jefferson & Hollway 2000, Taylor et al. 1996), since more work is needed to explain and interpret 'cross-level interactions' (Wilcox-Roundtree & Land 1996:176, also see Coleman 1993:625).

Just as Pleysier and Cops set out to do, (2016) the aim is 'to integrate social psychological concepts related to the individual's identity and evaluation of his position in an increasingly complex society, to enhance our understanding of the fear of crime concept' (Pleysier & Cops 2016:3). We are convinced that 'the study of the fear of crime could benefit from incorporating a dynamic perspective' (Pleysier & Cops 2016:17), setting out to 'explicitly acknowledge the different aspects of the concept of fear of crime and, as a result, the variety of operationalisations and the diversity in determinants of fear of crime' (ibid:18). Social psychologists Brewer and Gardner (1996) and Turner et al. (1987, 1994) theorised that inter-relationships between various sources of the self (e.g., the private and collective selves) may even include logically incompatible cognitions, as has been replicated many times for the fear of crime.

We will explore the dynamics between and below the fear of crime's sub-concepts at different layers of psychological reference. In this way we will search for empirical answers to the question why citizens simultaneously perceive a growing threat of crime to society or their local community yet a low risk that they themselves will fall victim of crime (Van der Wurff & Stringer 1989, Brantingham et al. 1986, Hindelang et al. 1978, Van den Herrewegen 2011:52, Elffers & De Jong 2004:46, Spithoven 2010, 2011, Spithoven, de Graaf & Boutellier 2012).

The next chapter outlines our research questions and provides a detailed operationalisation of the central concepts, before describing the research design, which will contain '(…) a broad range of techniques that healthily complement, contrast and challenge one another' (Jackson 2004b:57).

5. Sharpening our view

This chapter outlines the crucial step from theory to empirical observations. The point of departure is the formulation of a research objective, a central research question and sub-questions. These questions define the sub-concepts of the fear of crime, which are our specific interest and which were translated into theoretical indicators. The goal of this process was to reach *conceptual order,* before conceiving ways to measure 'the fear of crime'.

After the concept of 'the fear of crime' had been brought to measureable proportions, the focus moved to the research design. The qualitative and quantitative design subsequently developed was tailor-made to fit the research objective and answer the central research question of this research. Because '(…) the object of study itself is multi-dimensional, subjective and experiential, research into fear of crime needs to reflect the amorphous nature of the concept and not be tied to a set of methodologies or reduced solely to a stock range of survey questions' (Lee & Farrall 2009:212-213, also see Pleysier 2010:151, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:46).

5.1 Research objective & research questions
The objective of this research is to find out at what level of psychological distance citizens most significantly experience the fear of crime and how this multi-dimensional concept is shaped at different layers of psychological reference. The aim is to empirically disentangle sub-concepts of the 'fear of crime', paying special attention to the relative explanatory roles and influences of 'personal fear of crime' and 'general fear of crime'.

The main research question related to this objective is:

> *At what level of psychological distance do citizens primarily experience 'the fear of crime' and how do they construct it?*

This central research question was split into three sub-questions. The first sub-question was answered in the second chapter of this book:

1. When and how did the fear of crime become a social and what was the concept's initial meaning?

Fear of crime gained momentum as a social problem in the Netherlands in October 1973, but this was certainly not a direct translation of public worries about the likelihood of falling victim of crime. The public was merely concerned about the issue of crime in general. The topic of crime became politically connected to the societal instability of that time. So - in short - the fear of crime was initially a highly politically influenced concept, successful in making free-floating public worries about social instability tangible for political discussion in the Netherlands.

The question is whether or not this is still the case for *contemporary* fear of crime among the Dutch. We need to calibrate further the psychological significance of the fear of crime's sub-concepts, as well as their underlying dynamics, before we can answer this fundamental question about the nature of the concept. For this reason, a qualitative view was adopted. The leading question within the qualitative empirical stage was:

2. What explanations do citizens give for 'the fear of crime' and how do they explain their 'personal' and 'general fear of crime'?

Findings from this qualitative exploration led to the formulation of hypotheses, which were tested in the subsequent quantitative stage of the research. The question within this stage was:

3. What are the relative roles of 'personal' and 'general fear of crime' in the generic explanation of 'the fear of crime' and what are the explanatory elements for these sub-concepts?

This final sub-question could be answered through descriptive and explanatory statistical analysis. Once the answer to the final sub-question was known, the main research question could be answered through a combination of the answers to each sub-question in the final chapter of this book.

Before explaining methodological decisions, we will first conceptualise 'the fear of crime'. Operational definitions were applied to all relevant sub-concepts, including 'personal fear of crime' and 'general fear of crime', since these take a central position in the research.

5.2 Towards operationalisation

According to Babbie (1998:120), conceptualisation '(…) is the process through which we specify what we will mean when we use specific terms'. The goal of the process of conceptualisation is to come to an *operational definition* of concepts (Babbie 1998:102-124). Concepts consist of sub-concepts and these comprise specific aspects or facets of the concept called indicators (Babbie 1998:102-124). Highly abstract concepts must be measured with multiple indicators, because they cannot be measured directly (Waege 2001).

As is true of most concepts, fear of crime is not observable by nature, but must be translated into observable entities (De Vaus 2001:24). Abstract concepts have to be divided into sub-concepts (Waege 2001:105), ultimately leading to '(…) the specification of (…) indicators of what we have in mind, indicating the presence or absence of the concept we are studying' (Babbie 1998:120). But when a concept contains several sub-dimensions, '(…) we have to take care that several indicators are provided for each sub-dimension' (Waege 2001:143).

5.2.1 Definitions

Conceptualisation starts with a definition. De Vaus (2001:24) suggests three steps to reach a suitable definition for a concept: (I) search for explicit and implicit definitions in various sources; (II) choose one of them or devise a more suitable one yourself; and (III) name the dimensions of the construct. These steps align with Vanderveen's specific steps to develop a valid conceptualisation of the fear of crime (2006:317-319).

Our search for definitions led only to implicit definitions of 'the fear of crime', prescribed by the standard items used to measure the concept. Some explicit definitions were discovered. However, as explored in the previous chapter, none of them seemed to capture the depth of the concept and its sub-concepts. This led to the decision firstly to name the dimensions of the construct and then to apply elements of earlier definitions in a *complementary fashion*.

The first step in the process of conceptualisation, then, was to divide the main concept into *sub-dimensions* (De Vaus 2001:24, my emphasis). The goal of this process was to create 'conceptual order' – to generate definitions that would direct the precise measurement of the concept (Babbie 1998:102-124). According to the theoretical model outlined in the previous chapters, fear of crime is first divided into three sub-concepts: (I) situational fear of crime; (II) personal fear of crime; and (III) general fear of crime. General fear of crime is then split into: (IV) neighbourhood fear of crime; and (V) societal fear of crime; thereby making a total of five sub-concepts of the umbrella concept for this study. We will now outline the definitions of these sub-concepts.

(I) *Situational fear of crime* is defined as:

'A time and space-specific response to external stimuli (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157; Pleysier 2010:175-179) of crime, crime signals or crime symbols (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72) leading to '(…) a sense of immediate threat to one's security (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:18&245), which discharges into feelings of alertness, threat or fear (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42), as one identifies the private self (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) as the potential victim of a - whether or not actually present - 'dangerous other', based on an assessment of vulnerability and a perceived lack of control (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

(II) *Personal fear of crime* is defined as:

Frequent thoughts, behaviours and feelings (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245) surrounding the anticipated (Van der Wurff 1992, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981) risk of crime to the private self (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1), due to a complex accumulation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments at the personal and collective levels (Pleysier 2010:43, Jackson 2006 & De Groof 2006), related to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72).

(III) And *general fear of crime* is defined as:

A general set of thoughts, behaviours and feelings that people bring forth when they discuss crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157), due to a complex accumulation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments at the societal and local community levels (Pleysier 2010:43, Jackson 2006; De Groof 2006 and Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013) from their collective selves (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2), related to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, also see Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72).

'General fear of crime' is treated as a compilation of two sub-concepts:

(IV) *Neighbourhood fear of crime*:
 A set of general thoughts, behaviours and feelings that people bring forth when they discuss crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157) in their neighbourhood, due to a complex accumulation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments at the local community level (Pleysier 2010:43, Jackson 2006; De Groof 2006 and Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013) from their collective selves (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2) as part of what they perceive to be their neighbourhood (Kaal, Vanderveen & McConnell 2006), related to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, also see Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72).

(V) … and *societal fear of crime*:
 A set of general thoughts, behaviours and feelings that people bring forth when they discuss crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157) in their society, due to a complex accumulation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments at the societal level (Pleysier 2010:43, Jackson 2006; De Groof 2006 and Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013) from their collective selves as part of their national society (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2), related to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, also see Ferraro &LaGrange 1987:72).

Taken together, the generic concept of *'the fear of crime'* is defined as:
 A complex accumulation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments at personal and collective levels (Pleysier 2010:43, Jackson 2006 and De Groof 2006), related to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72).

5.2.2 The validity of operational definitions
The concept of validity is crucial to this process of operationalisation. But the concept of *validity* is itself quite ambiguous (ibid:274). It is defined as '(…) the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration' (Babbie 1998:133). According to both Babbie (1998:133-143) and De Vaus (2001:29-30), validity in the process of conceptualisation can be achieved in three complementary ways: by paying attention to *criteria* validity, *content* validity and *construct* validity.

Criteria validity is the extent to which a measurement is proportional to a well-established measurement of the concept in question (De Vaus 2001:29). The well-established measurement therefore sets the external criterion against which the new measurement is assessed (Babbie 1998:133). No well-established measurements of the fear of crime exist, however, since the validity of the single standard items that tend to be applied has been too heavily challenged (Vanderveen 2006:60-68 & Farrall et al. 1997:659). These items will be added to our measurements, but only for the sake of comparability (Waege 2001:151).

Content validity '(…) refers to the extent to which a measure covers the range of meanings included in the concept' (Babbie 1998:134). But since social science is largely undecided on the meaning of many of its concepts, it is rather difficult to develop an instrument with an agreed validity (De Vaus 2001:30). For the central concepts of 'personal' and 'general fear of crime', we will adopt the important conceptual work by Fürstenberg (1971); Ferraro and LaGrange

(1987); Farrall and Ditton (1999); Gabriel and Greve (2003) and Jackson (2004a), as discussed above.

Construct validity '(…) relies on seeing how well the results we obtain fit with theoretical expectations' (De Vaus 2001:30). But theoretical formulations are often too unspecific to rely on (Waege 2001:154). So this type of validity is merely '(…) based on the logical relationships among variables' (Babbie 1998:134). Our conceptualisation of the fear of crime will therefore contain many elements from the above theoretical framework, grouped into sub-concepts and groups of explanatory concepts. The conceptual framework – previously discussed in section 4.3.3 (see fig. 9 in the previous chapter) – gives an overview of hypothesised theoretical relations among indicators of the sub-concepts.

In the absence of suitable options to reach *criteria* validity, all indicators of the fear of crime's sub-concepts are assured to have a theoretical origin, to guarantee both *content* and *construct* validity.

5.2.3 Operational definitions

The first step towards achieving conceptual clarity on the central concept of the fear of crime was discussed in the previous chapter (see section 4.3.3, fig. 9). At the heart of the conceptualisation of the fear of crime are attitudinal aspects (Eagly & Chaiken 1993; Cooper, Kelly & Weaver 2003), ranging from cognitive 'assessments', through 'concerns' to affective 'emotions'. Cognitive assessments can be described in brief as 'thinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58). Value-driven concerns relate to '(…) a concern one has about crime' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71). But the affective side of emotions is more complex.

Emotions are multi-dimensional events of affective phenomena that are highly correlated (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, Gabriel & Greve 2003). As Ben-Ze'ev (2000:4) puts it: 'An emotional term usually refers to a highly complex and interactive cluster of emotions rather than to a single and isolated entity'. Besides 'fear', the concept of 'the fear of crime' is theoretically and empirically linked to the experience of a multitude of negative affective labels: *Alienation* (Cops 2012), *powerlessness* (Cops 2012; Eve & Brown Eve 1984), *rage* (Van der Wurff 1992, Gray et al. 2008, Cops 2012, Van den Herrewegen 2011), *shame* (Van der Wurff 1992, Gray et al. 2008, Cops 2012, Pleysier 2010), *grief* (Van der Wurff 1992, Gray et al. 2008, Cops 2012), *unease* (Van der Wurff 1992, Gray et al. 2008, Cops 2012), *frustration* (Cops 2012, Van den Herrewegen 2011), *vulnerability* (Cops 2012), *worry* (Pleysier 2010, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009), *irritation* (Ditton et al. 1999; Pleysier 2010; Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009) and *anger* (Ditton et al. 1999; Pleysier 2010; Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009).

So, when we go on to discuss the affective element of a sub-concept of the fear of crime, we might explore isolated affective *accents* or *tendencies*, while knowing that these affective phenomena are actually connected in an 'interactive cluster of emotions' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4).

When we add these insights to the sub-dimensions of fear of crime explored and defined earlier, a multi-layered conceptualisation of the fear of crime comes into view. This conceptualisation is outlined in the previous chapter (fig. 9, see section 4.3.3). Before presenting operational definitions for aspects of the fear of crime's sub-concepts (A-L below), we will provide operational definitions for the additional theoretical elements of the concepts, since these are crucial to the main research question and thus our conceptualisation of the fear of crime. Here, then, are definitions for: (I) level of *psychological reference*, (II) level of *psychological distance* and (III) level of *emotional intensity.*

(I) Level of *psychological reference*:

…is about a theoretical distinction between 'the private self' and 'the collective self' (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto 1991, Simon 1996, Turner et al. 1994, Brewer & Gardner 1996, Oyserman 2003, Sedikides & Gaertner 2001). In which '(t)he private self includes cognitions that involve traits, states or behaviours (e.g., "I am honest"), while the collective self consists of cognitions about group membership (e.g., "I am a son", this concerns membership in the family)' (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto 1991:649).

The private self is the experiential home base of a person (Sedikes & Gaertner 2001) and '(…) contains those aspects of the self-concept that differentiate the person from other persons as a unique constellation of traits and characteristics that distinguishes the individual within his or her social context' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1). This person-based identity psychologically '(…) differentiates self from all others' (Hogg 2001:137).

The collective self '(…) contains those aspects of the self-concept that differentiate in-group members from members of relevant out-groups' and '(…) is based on impersonal bonds to others derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification with a group' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2). This collective identity psychologically '(…) differentiates "us" from "them"'(Hogg 2001:137).

(II) *Psychological distance*:

'(…) refers to the perception of *when* an event occurs, *where* it occurs, to *whom* it occurs, and *whether* it occurs' (Trope & Liberman 2010:442). The focus is on the following dimensions of psychological distance: 'time, space, social distance and hypotheticality' (Rim, Uleman & Trope 2009:1089). '*Near* events are represented at lower level construal, defined as concrete, specific and detailed. *Distant* events are represented at a higher level, which are more abstract, decontextualised and general' (Bonner & Newell 2008:411). As Gouseti and Jackson (2016) point out, crime can be experienced both near (or proximate) and distant (or far). A *'distant'* perception of crime represents it '(…) as a general, abstract category (…) social problem', while a *'near'* perception of crime makes it '(…) a more specific threat, differentiated and potentially tangible in the everyday' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:22-23).

(III) *Emotional intensity* is defined as:

The relative magnitude and duration of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4). *High emotional intensity* is a '(…) momentary magnitude (*peak intensity*) and long temporal structure (mainly, *duration*) (…)' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:117) experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena by a person. *Low emotional intensity* is more a vague and chronic mood (Pleysier 2010): a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4) 'having no clear borderlines between them', which seems to '(…) lack a particular object (…) directed at the world at large (…), in search of an object' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:86-87).

And here are operational definitions, indicated A-L, for aspects of the fear of crime's sub-concepts (see fig. 9 in section 4.3.3 of the previous chapter).

Situational fear of crime

A. Situational risk of personal victimisation (assessments)
'A time and space-specific response to external stimuli (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157; Pleysier 2010175-179) of crime, crime signals or crime symbols (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72) from which one identifies the private self (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) as the acute potential victim of a - whether or not actually present - 'dangerous other', based on an assessment of vulnerability and a perceived lack of control (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

B. Concern about imminent crime threat to self (values)
'A time and space-specific response to external stimuli (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157; Pleysier 2010:175-179) of crime, crime signals or crime symbols (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72) leading 'to concern about crime' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71) in the form of '(…) a sense of immediate threat to one's security (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:18&245).

C. Emotions about imminent crime threat to the self (emotions)
'A time and space-specific response to external stimuli (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157; Pleysier 2010175-179) in the form of the experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:1999, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4) due to crime, crime signals or crime symbols (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), with a tendency of *acute fear* (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42): '(…) a response to existential threats (…)' that leads into a strong '(…) aversion of a certain situation (…)' and a strong hope '(…) that the undesired event will not materialise' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:479). This acute fear '(…) is typically brief, has a high peak of intensity, is provoked by tangible stimuli or situations and is easy to detect' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:479)

Personal fear of crime

D. Anticipated risk of personal victimisation (assessments)
'(T)hinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), with 'the private self' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) in mind as the potential victim of a - whether or not specific - 'dangerous other' (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

E. Concern about the anticipated personal crime risk (values)
'Concern about crime' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71) due to 'thinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), with 'the private self' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) in mind as the potential victim of a - whether or not specific - 'dangerous other' (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

F. Emotions about the anticipated personal crime risk (emotions)
The experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:1999, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4), due to 'thinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), with 'the private self' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) in mind as the potential victim of a - whether or not specific - 'dangerous other' (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42), with a tendency of *anger*: '(…) hostility toward someone' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:83) - whether or not specific (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42) - due to the perception that the anticipated – whether or not specific - offence against the personal self is '(…) intentional, malicious and unjustified' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:221).

Neighbourhood fear of crime

G. General risk of crime in the neighbourhood (assessments)
'(T)hinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to a group of people - which one has '(…) impersonal bonds with, from common identification (…)' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2), due to '(…) proximity in current position (…)' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:341) of what one perceives to be one's neighbourhood (Kaal, Vanderveen & McConnell 2006) – in mind as the potential victim(s) of a - whether or not specific - 'dangerous other' (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

H. General concern about crime in the neighbourhood (values)
'Concern about crime' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71) due to 'thinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to a group of people - which one has '(…) impersonal bonds with, from common identification (…)' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2), due to '(…) proximity in current position (…)' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:341) of what one perceives to be one's neighbourhood (Kaal, Vanderveen & McConnell 2006) – in mind as the potential victim(s) of a - whether or not specific - 'dangerous other' (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

I. Emotions about crime in the neighbourhood (emotions)
The experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:1999, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4), due to 'thinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to a group of people - which one has '(…) impersonal bonds with, from common identification (…)' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2), due to '(…) proximity in current position (…)' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:341) of what one perceives to be one's neighbourhood (Kaal, Vanderveen & McConnell 2006) – in mind as the potential victim(s) of a - whether or not specific - 'dangerous other' (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42), with a tendency of *disgust*: '(…) a strong sense of aversion to something perceived as capable of (…) violating the boundaries of self' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:387). This object of disgust is held to be 'harmful to our well-being' (ibid:388), '(…) because it (…) may inflict personal harm upon us' (ibid:389).

Societal fear of crime

J. General risk of crime in society (assessments)
'(T)hinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to other members of society – being '(…) strangers about whom we hardly know anything (…) (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:341) but we have '(…) impersonal bonds to (…) derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2) due to a shared nationality or geographical location.

K. General concern about crime in society (values)
'Concern about crime' (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71) due to 'thinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to other members of society – being '(…) strangers about whom we hardly know anything (…) (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:341) but we have '(…) impersonal bonds to (…) derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2) due to a shared nationality or geographical location.

L. Emotions about crime in society (emotions)
The experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:1999, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze'ev 2000:4), due to 'thinking or being aware of crime' (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to other members of society – being '(…) strangers about whom we hardly know anything (…) (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:341) but we have '(…) impersonal bonds to (…) derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification' (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2) due to a shared nationality or geographical location, with a tendency of *pity*: a '(…) sympathetic sorrow for someone's substantial misfortune (…)' (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:327), due to '(…) the belief that the object does not deserve such substantial misfortune (…)' (ibid:329), while we '(…) perceive ourselves as being unable (…)' (ibid:328) to solve the basic problem, as it is beyond '(…) our control of the eliciting event or to the control of others' (ibid: 344).

5.2.4 Conceptual framework

Several theoretical concepts discussed in the previous theoretical chapter are logically of influence (Waege 2001:88) to our four explored sub-concepts of the fear of crime. We will provide indicators of these concepts, also with operational definitions, following the structure of the *conceptual framework* on the next page (fig. 10). Given the problematic nature of the research tradition (see section 3.6.2), causal assumptions are omitted.

Fig. 10 – Conceptual framework for 'the fear of crime'.

Risk sensitivity

Risk sensitivity is a reasonably stable characteristic of sensitivity to threats and risks (Wildavsky & Dake 1990:167): '(…) some persons are very upset and worried about virtually all hazards, whereas others are quite indifferent and tranquil' (Sjöberg 2000:8). This characteristic acts as a filter for an individual's general '(…) knowledge construction, information judgement and processing' (Jackson 2015:222).

1. Fear threshold

A relatively low 'minimum level of perceived risk necessary to produce fear' (Warr 1987:30).

2. Perceived likelihood

'(T)he feeling that one and one's social group are especially likely to be targeted by criminals' (Jackson 2009:367).

3. Perceived consequences

A lowered 'capacity to cope with the consequences of victimisation' (Doran & Burgess 2012:30) resulting in a judgment of a high impact of criminal victimisation (Jackson 2009).

4. Perceived control

An individual's perception to have 'especially low levels of control' over the incidence of crime (Jackson 2011:513), due to one's general, personal assessment of one's capacity to win (or at least not lose) a confrontation with a - whether or not specific - member of a comparison group' (Van der Wurff 1992:40).

5. Contemporaneous offences

A high estimation of the likelihood of falling victim of an offence, as a result of this offence being associated with other offences that one perceives one is likely to fall victim of (Warr 1985:245).

6. Dispositional fear

A natural tendency to respond generally more fearfully to situations than others do (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006; Gabriel & Greve 2003; Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010).

7. Specific crime fear

A distorted perception of crime risks, due to an over-sensitiveness to crime (Sjöberg 2000).

8. Level of tolerance

The extent to which one tolerates crime and anti-social behaviour (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009).

9. Authoritarianism

Sentiments of authoritarianism accentuate '(…) a desire to reestablish rules and behaviour that underpin social organisation, and censure those who violate the rules (…)' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:117).

10. Conservatism

A need to consolidate the current state of society (Sztompka 2000:275), because of the perception that the world has changed and is still changing in an unwelcome direction (Pleysier 2010:158), and due to negative thoughts about the speed and profundity of social change (Sztompka 1993:xvi, Hale 1996:120).

11. Passivism

The sense that decisions might be regretted later on (Pleysier 2010:160-161), based on a general nostalgic appreciation of the past (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:33).

12. Need for closure

'(A) desire for definite knowledge on some issue and the eschewal of confusion and ambiguity (…) need for closure is presumed to exert its effects via two general tendencies: the urgency tendency, reflecting the inclination to attain closure as quickly as possible, and the permanence tendency, reflecting the tendency to maintain it for as long as possible' (Kruglanski & Webster 1996:278, as quoted by Jackson 2015).

Sense of vulnerability

Vulnerability is an individual's sense of exposure to risk, the expectance of serious consequences, a loss of control over a situation or an inadequate ability to manage the direct and indirect consequences of a threatening situation (Killias 1990:98, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:87, Cops 2012:94, Pleysier 2010:106).

1. Physical vulnerability
The extent to which people estimate their own capability to physically defend themselves in threatening situations (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006).

2. Psychological vulnerability
The extent to which people estimate their own capability to psychologically defend themselves in threatening situations (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006).

3. Ecological vulnerability
A complex mixture of a heightened physical vulnerability due to biological differences in overall strength and a heightened social vulnerability as a product of the more sensitive socialisation process of women (Pleysier 2010: 106).

4. Socio-economic vulnerability
A sense of vulnerability due to having fewer resources to prevent crime than people from higher economical classes (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006, Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010).

5. Minority vulnerability
A general sense of powerlessness and negative future perspectives (Covington & Taylor 1991) among racial minorities, religious minorities and minorities on the grounds of sexual orientation (Van den Herrewegen 2011:44).

General attention to crime

General attention to crime is a societal source for a discourse that people turn to when they discuss issues related to crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009). It feeds the discourse on crime with arguments about 'the worsening nature of the crime problem' (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:33), strongly relating to anti-social behaviour: 'behaviour or uses that are outside the normative values of the majority' (Millie 2011:1).

1. Cultural attention
A general preoccupation with negative messages, which makes individuals more alert to crime threats in their environments and turns ambiguous events into a perception of threat (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:114).

2. Political attention
A political attention to crime and anti-social behaviour with a focus on risk control (Ericson 2007).

3. Media attention
Media attention to crime and anti-social behaviour, which is influenced by political attention to crime and provides the public with information about the magnitude and prevalence of crime (Beunders 2008:40), reminding them also about the continuous threat of crime (Svendsen 2008:12).

4. Crime aversion
Strong emotional reactions to crime, such as 'anger, indignation, and a passionate desire for vengeance' (Van Marle 2010:42, also see Ericson 2007:20), due to an unequivocal rejection of crime (Boutellier 1993:11-32, Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, De Graaf & Boutellier 2012, Van der Wurff 1992) and of other types of rough behaviour that threaten societal solidarity (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010).

Coping strategies

Coping strategies are active deeds (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010), mostly appearing in the form of physical reactions (Cramer 2006:3), to '(…) intentionally engage in activity that will address the problem (…)' in the form of '(…) conscious, purposeful attempts to reduce anxiety with the intent of managing or solving a problem situation' (Cramer 2006:8), leading to change in reality (ibid:20).

1. Avoidance behaviour

Behavioural '(…) avoidance tactics (…) primarily taken to decrease one's exposure by trying to avoid situations that are related to a highly perceived risk of criminal behaviour' (Vanderveen 2006:158).

2. Preventive measures

Measures taken '(…) to protect oneself and thus to lessen the seriousness of victimisation' (ibid:159).

Defense mechanisms

Defense mechanisms are a collection of cognitive operations '(…) that occur at an unconscious level, the function of which is to modify the conscious experience of thought or affect' (Cramer 2006:9). These are '(…) mental maneuvers in which we all engage to maintain our psychological equilibrium and protect our self-esteem' (Ibid:4), but ultimately do not change reality (ibid:20). So, more specifically, their function is to '(…) protect the individual from painful emotions, ideas and drives' (Valliant 1992:3). Defenses ultimately enable the individual to avoid the experience of negative affective states, such as '(…) pain, anxiety and displeasure' (ibid:22). Although these manoeuvres are unconscious, they are reflected in narrative material, in which researchers can track 'disjunction, disruption, or nonsequitur in the flow of discourse – something that hovers on the edge of illogicality or disbelief' (Cramer 2006:13) and these events can be coded (ibid:14).

1. Denial

'(T)he failure to see, recognise, or understand the existence of the meaning of an internal or external stimulus, so as to avoid the anxiety that would occur if the stimulus were recognised' (Cramer 2006:23).

2. Projection

'(A)ttributing one's own unacceptable thoughts, feelings, or intentions to others, so as to avoid the anxiety associated with harboring them' (Cramer 2006:23).

3. Displacement

'(A) mechanism in which the person generalises or redirects a feeling about an object or a response to another object' to feel 'less endangered' (Valliant 1992:237).

4. Suppressing

'(A) mechanism in which the person intentionally avoids thinking about disturbing problems, desires, feelings or experiences' (Valliant 1992:238).

5. Rationalising

'(A) mechanism in which the person devises reassuring explanations' (Valliant 1992:238).

Environmental orientation

People have a general focus on characteristics of environments because 'delinquency tends to occur in characteristic types of area' (Shaw & McKay 1929 as cited by Van den Herrewegen 2011:51). 'Every citizen has a mental topography of the relative safety and danger of various locations (…) which he develops through his own experience, information from friends and relatives, and his response to visual characteristics of the buildings and their layouts' (Merry 1981:413, as quoted by Wilcox-Roundtree et al. 2003:325). This is a constant, mostly unconscious awareness, which leads individuals to constantly scan their environment for 'fear cues', 'fear triggers', 'fear spots' and possible escape routes. It is a watchful modus, ultimately to prevent potential victimisation (Pleysier 2010).

1. Mental maps
Interpersonally and media-exchanged networks of characteristic elements of situations or locations that people are motivated to avoid, due to the perceived high risk of falling victim of crime themselves, and information about how to manage these situations (Hale 1996, Pleysier 2010). The function of these mental maps is to '(…) both represent and avoid (…)' these situations (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:108).

2. Social incivilities
Based on the separation of social and physical incivilities posited by LaGrange et al. (1992), Farrall, Jackson & Gray (2009:91-92) list the following social crime cues: disorderly or disreputable behaviour, the presence of empty or abandoned streets, the number of people present in the area, the perception of the people in the area and noise pollution. These social cues act as a signal for 'the community to be suffering from deteriorating standards of behaviour, diminishing power of informal social control, increasing diversification of norms and values, and decreasing levels of trust, reciprocity and respect' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:90 based on Jackson 2008) and thus a heightened risk of criminal behaviour.

3. Physical incivilities
Based on the separation of social and physical incivilities posited by LaGrange et al. (1992), Farrall, Jackson & Gray (2009:91-92) list the following physical crime cues found in earlier research: poor lighting, graffiti, litter, vandalism, dog dirt, hiding places for criminals, a dilapidated state of buildings and areas adjoining vacant areas such as car parks, parks or factories. These physical cues act as a signal for 'the community to be suffering from deteriorating standards of behaviour, diminishing power of informal social control, increasing diversification of norms and values, and decreasing levels of trust, reciprocity and respect (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009: 90 based on Jackson 2008) and thus a heightened risk of criminal behaviour.

4. Limitation of sight
The inability to see other individuals who may be present (Pleysier 2010:152), due to limited sight as the result of darkness, poor lighting, overgrown landscaping or the layout of the public space (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009; Henig & Maxfield 1978; Grabosky 1995; Pain et al. 2006).

5. Lurk lines
Places where potential perpetrators might be hiding (Pleysier 2010, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009).

6. Escape ways
Potential ways to escape a threat (Pleysier 2010, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009).

7. State of environment
Treating the physical condition of an environment as an expression of the common goals and shared responsibility of the people living there (Pleysier 2010).

8. Sense of anonymity
A sense of anonymity in urban settings, which is highlighted by dilapidated buildings, the position of vegetation, large abandoned areas and abandoned streets (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009, Van der Wurff & Stringer 1988, Lewis & Maxfield 1980).

9. Dangerous other(s)
An assessment of one's vulnerability and of control in the light of an imagined confrontation with a - whether or not actually present - 'dangerous other' (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42) whom one mistrusts (Doran & Burgess 2012:35).

10. Situational coping
Situational coping strategies are active deeds (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010) as expressions of an action tendency (Gabriel & Greve 2003), mostly appearing in the form of physical reactions (Cramer 2006:3), to '(…) intentionally engage in activity that will address the problem (…)' in the form of '(…) conscious, purposeful attempts to reduce anxiety with the intent of managing or solving a problem situation' (Cramer 2006:8). They feature in the form of: (I) 'judgmental coping' - which involves the adaptation of

values and objectives in order to change one's thinking during a stressful situation; (II) 'issue-aimed coping' – which involves active deeds to ease or control a stressful situation; and (III) 'emotion-aimed coping' - which is used to regulate one's emotions during a stressful situation. Individuals show a general preference for one of these strategies (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010). Whether or not an individual will turn to 'issue-aimed coping' is also dependent on one's self-efficacy: '(…) beliefs in their capabilities to mobilise the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to exercise control over given situations' (Ozer & Bandura 1990:472, as quoted by Yuan et al. 2015:2).

Personal awareness
The extent to which an individual perceives one's private self to be exposed to crime risks, due to information about the personal, geographically or psychological closeness of the crime risk, based on previous events of personal victimisation or stories of others' victimisation (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010).

1. Direct victimisation
Reflections of emotions and cognitions of situational characteristics (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:64-66), based on previous events of personal victimisation.

2. Exposure
The extent to which an individual is exposed to crime risks, due to lifestyle and routine activities (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010) '(…) that firstly place individuals in close physical proximity to motivated offenders; secondly, frequently place individuals in risky of deviant situations that expose them to crime; expose individuals as attractive targets to offenders and lack capable guardianship to deter the offenders' (Vanderveen 2006:157-158).

3. Indirect victimisation
What people hear about criminal activity '(…) either from conversations with others or from the mass media' (Bennett 1990:14), as 'people can experience victimisation vicariously' (Doran & Burgess 2012:27).

4. Identification
The extent to which the recipient of a crime story emotionally identifies themself with an identified or identifiable victim and a recognisable context (Pleysier 2010).

5. Closeness
The psychological closeness of crime to the recipient's identification with crime victims of a crime story (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010) because they are '(…) socially and spatially proximate individuals' (Sparks 1992:129 as quoted by Pleysier 2010:124) or due to similarity in background (Ben-Ze'ev 2000:341), geographical similarity (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010, Hale 1996) or a recognisable context (Pleysier 2010).

6. Personal victimisation stories
Hearing about crime events from friends, neighbours or relatives. These stories activate the imagination and lead one to reassess one's own closeness to the risk of crime in the light of the new crime story, due to strong identification with the crime victim (Hale 1996).

7. Local crime gossip
Hearing about crime events in the local community from acquaintances, family, neighbours or friends, which leads to strong identification with the victim, due to the psychological closeness of the situation and the victim(s), as well as the one who tells the story. This provides the public with information about local dangerous locations and sources of danger in their own nearby environment (Hale 1996).

8. Local media reports
Getting to know about crime events in the local community through local newspapers, websites, radio and television broadcasts. This also provides the public with information about local dangerous locations and sources of danger in their own nearby environment (Hale 1996).

9. Mass media reports
Hearing about events of crime in society through newspapers, websites, radio and television broadcasts. These reports are often experienced as captivating, because they are closely aligned with people's lives to enable strong identification (Hale 1996, Svendsen 2008:55).

Neighbourhood influences
Assessments of local social conditions that are held to be related to the fear of crime include: '(…) the perception of disorder and incivility, to concerns about the social and moral cohesion of the community, to worries about community fragmentation, to doubts on the capacity of the community to act collaboratively, and to a sceptical assessment of the cultural stability of the neighbourhood in terms of fundamental value priorities (…)' (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013:4). In this way, the local community plays a 'mediating role' (Hirthenlehner & Farrall 2013:4) between the self and society.

1. Urbanisation
An urban setting's increased population density and heterogeneity lead to a rather low quality of social bonds. This effect is strengthened by social diversity in urban settings, which leads to more interpersonal uncertainty. Urban social life is impersonal and anonymous because it is connected to superficial, temporary and fragmentary contacts between people, based on conventions of apathy and indifference (Pleysier 2010).

2. Social composition
The level of ethnical and socio-economical homogeneity of a local community (Hale 1996:117).

3. Lack of social capital
Relatively weak '(…) social associations and interactions among people' (Ferguson & Mindel 2007:323), which result in a lowered level of mutual trust and a lack of shared values (Ferguson & Mindel 2007).

4. Lack of collective efficacy
A relatively low perception of 'shared expectations and mutual civic engagement by community members in local social control, with an emphasis on residents' joint capacity to act together to generate solutions to local problems' (Ferguson & Mindel 2007:327).

5. Social disorganisation
Relative 'instability of a community structure to realise the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls' (Sampson & Groves 1989:776 as quoted by Hale 1996:117), which incorporates a lack of social capital and a lack of collective efficacy.

6. Neighbourhood problems
The 'feeling that one is surrounded by symbolic or actual threats, feeling that the immediate neighbourhood is in decline and the community deteriorating' (Hale 1996:115).

Societal influences
Connected sentiments of '(…) feeling bad in one's society and the state of affairs within that society' (Elchardus 2008:12, 14 as quoted by Dekker et al. 2013:66). These anxieties and concerns are especially 'embedded in how people make sense of social bonds, normative standards and inter-group relations' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:210).

1. Social change
The individual perception of discontinuity in a society, due to a subjective interpretative process (Cops 2012:107).

2. Cultural trauma
Cultural disorganisation and disorientation due to '(…) sudden, comprehensive, fundamental and unexpected change (…)' (Sztopmka 2000a:283), which disturbs the consolidation of 'basic values, central beliefs and common norms' (Sztompka 2000b:453, also see Van den Brink 2007:126).

3. Personal discomfort
A sense of discomfort due to the fact that individuals have a sense of living a detached life as a result of the erosion of traditional societal structures. With the loss of these structures, individuals also lost traditional securities and mutual expectations that gave direction to the social interactions of daily life. This led to greater insecurity about interpersonal contact on a daily basis (Cops 2012).

4. Societal detachedness
The absence of a feeling of belonging together or unity, despite similarities (Marques et al. 2003:402), as a result of the erosion of traditional societal structures due to social change (Pleysier 2010:158).

5. Societal discontent
A collective global-level evaluation of the state (and future) of society (Van der Bles, Postmes & Meijer 2015:1) in the form of dissatisfaction about the state of society (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:239, Hale 1996:132), as a consequence of alienation due to a loss of belief in progress, acceleration stress, information overload, and also a loss of singularity due to globalisation (De Cauter 2011:18)

6. Disrupted sense of community
A sense of societal alienation due to the processes of individualisation and secularisation (Schnabel 2000, Van den Brink 2007). As a combined result of these changes, individuals can no longer to fall back on a firm set of norms, values and certainties (Van Marle 2010). This sense of societal disintegration undermines one's general sense of security (Pleysier 2010, Van den Brink 2007) as well as one's general trust (Furedi 1998).

7. Symbolic crime concern
Concern about crime is symbolic of concerns about: disorder, social cohesion, trust and social consensus (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:198-202). Crime therefore functions as a 'condensation symbol' (Loader, Girling & Sparks 2000:66, Farrall et al. 2009:12) that offers a way for people to express concerns about '(p)rofound social, economic, and political changes' (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013), ethnic configuration (Chiricos, McEntire &Gertz 2001, Also see Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010), and broader quality of life concerns (Pleysier 2010:153, based on Jackson 2004b, Hollway & Jefferson 1997, Taylor & Jamieson 1998, Tudor 2003 and Vanderveen 2006).

With the main concept of 'the fear of crime' now divided into sub-concepts and clusters of explanatory elements, which are operationalised through the provision of theoretical indicators, a sufficient level of *conceptual order* has been reached to make further decisions about the research design.

5.3 Research design
Many fear of crime researchers take respondents out of their daily contexts by asking them vague questions (Pleysier 2010), such as: *How safe would you feel being out alone after dark?*. Critiques of the fear of crime research tradition state that such single items ultimately '(...) ignore the meaning of events for respondents (...)' (Farrall et al. 1997:662), because they implicitly assume that '(...) the fear of crime is a single entity that can be accessed through one, hypothetical, closed question' (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:24, also see Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:5).

But the complexity of the concept requires '(...) a broad range of techniques that healthily complement, contrast and challenge one another' (Jackson 2004b:57). Qualitative and quantitative approaches are used in complementary ways (Barbour 2008:12) in the empirical part of this book. In addition, *different techniques* are employed within both the qualitative and quantitative empirical stages, with a view to acquiring a more valid understanding of the multi-dimensional and versatile

nature of 'the fear of crime' (Cops 2012:5, Lee & Farrall 2009:212-213, Pleysier 2010:151, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:46).

5.3.1 Qualitative design
The qualitative approach that many have called for (Vanderveen 2006, Pleysier 2010, Ditton & Farrall 2000, Hale 1996) will form the foundation of the empirical part of this book. The qualitative research question is: *What explanations do citizens give for 'the fear of crime' themselves and how do they explain their 'personal' and 'general fear of crime'?* Because qualitative research gives us insight into '(…) how people understand concepts (…)', the goal is to '(…) allow respondents to identify those issues which are salient for them and to explain how these impact on their daily lives (…)' (Barbour 2008:12).

Free-associative foundation
In light of the fact that '(…) less is known about the variety in the nature, meaning, relevance and experience of 'fear of crime' in people's personal lives (…)' (Vanderveen 2006:7), this gap in knowledge was taken as the primary step of our qualitative approach. At the beginning of the interview, respondents were able to select themes and topics, order their stories and articulate them through the application of *free-associative interviewing.* This technique is described by Hollway and Jefferson (1997, 2000) and its aim is to understand '(…) people's experiences through their own meaning-frame' (2000:155).

This stage relies heavily on respondents' *narratives*, which are '(…) dictated by unconscious rather than conscious logic' (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:153). The importance of these "pathways of associations" demands that the interviewer remains as unobtrusive as possible. The instructions for this technique are quite strict, requiring the interviewer to '(…) use open questions, elicit stories, avoid 'why' questions and follow respondents' ordering and phrasing' (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:53), in order for the respondent to '(…) reveal significant personal meanings' (ibid). This technique also requires the interviewer to avoid paying attention to '(…) inconsistencies, contradictions, changes of tone and other textual interruptions' (ibid:58) *during the interview,* since such interpretative acts by the researcher can strongly obtrude into respondents' narratives. And so, the 'interpretative work comes later, is separate from the participant and has a different audience' (ibid:77).

This technique does, however, have a strong disadvantage in relation to our qualitative goal, insofar as it is very difficult to bring free-associative narratives back to interpretable proportions, even when fragments of the narratives are coded and clustered (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:5).

Important adjustments to Hollway and Jefferson's description of the technique were therefore made to suit our research objective of finding 'mechanisms in the data' (Barbour 2008:12). The free-associative interview component was limited in time to a maximum of fifteen minutes and other, complementary interviewing techniques were used as well.

Q-sorting of photographs
After the free-associative section of the interview, respondents were asked to sort a set of photographs according to their personal point of view. We know from various disciplines that well-selected photographs can be very useful: to focus thoughts and feelings about routine activities of daily life, and to make abstract aspects of social life suitable for conversations (Sztompka 2008:32, Barbalet 2004:257, also see Vanderveen 2008, Henkel 2012, Clark-Ibáñez 2004, Banks 2001).

Researchers can keep '(...) a close eye on the perceptions of informants' (Pahl 2006:99) by showing them carefully selected photographs and listening to respondents' reactions. This technique is called *photo elicitation* (Vanderveen 2008, Harper 2002). People incorporate personal feelings and memories in their reaction to a photograph stimulus (Harper 2002), as well as connections with their society, culture and history (Clark-Ibáñez 2004, Banks 2001). Photo elicitation can therefore be seen as a *projective technique*, one of a set of techniques that '(...) provide verbal or visual stimuli which (...) encourage respondents to reveal their unconscious feeling and attitudes without being aware that they are doing so' (Will, Eadie & MacAskill 1996:38).

The process of photo elicitation involves asking the respondent to react to a photograph by saying the first thing that comes to mind when seeing it (Will, Eadie & MacAskill 1996). People "read" photographs by considering their content as well as their context. And so, when they express their interpretations of a photograph, they are articulating their construction of its meaning, as well as their construction of the meaning of the social context that led to the intention to take the picture (Banks 2001). Due to this personal interpretation, photographs are multi-interpretable, multi-vocal or *polysemic* (Vanderveen 2008, Harper 2002, Clark-Ibáñez 2004, Banks 2001), because, '(t)he properties of the images and the interpretation of readers are not fixed' (Banks 2001:11). And so, there are no absolute rights and wrongs in the interpretation of photographs (Rose 2001).

A good photograph can also make it easier and more comfortable for respondents to talk about sensitive topics, because people like to talk about pictures in general (Vanderveen 2008, Clark-Ibáñez 2004). A disadvantage of using photographs is that respondents might focus more on a momentary emotional response, rather than elaborating on their perception of the topic in general (Henkel 2012). According to psychoanalysts, visual stimuli can indeed have a strong emotional impact that is very quick and powerful due to the strong influence of the *unconscious* in interpreting visual stimuli (Rose 2001). But this "disadvantage" might actually become a strength when the aim is partly to measure and disentangle 'situational fear of crime' from other sub-concepts, since situational fear of crime is a time and space-specific response to external stimuli (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157; Pleysier 2010:175-179).

Intermezzo 1 - Experience from test interviews using photo elicitation

When test respondents were shown pictures related to the fear of crime and asked 'what does this make you think?', results proved to be disappointing after only five test interviews. All five respondents and I myself felt quite awkward, because the interview was clearly not a psychoanalytical session or anything like that. These five test interviews revealed an enormous variance in associations with five photographs. We needed to find a less isolated and less uncomfortable technique to reap the benefits of photo elicitation.

The problems experienced during the test interviews brought another projective technique to mind, that of *choice ordering*. This specific technique invites respondents to sort photographs from 'most important' to 'least important' and asks them for explanations and illustrations (Will, Eadie & MacAskill 1996). This technique enables the respondent to assign a *relative position* of importance to their associations with photographs, as well as a more *indirect* medium to talk about these associations. It is therefore potentially more comfortable for respondents. The choice ordering of photographs technique is closely related to the so-called 'Q-methodology', but the latter generally involves the sorting of textual statements rather than photographs.

While attending the 29th annual conference of the International Society for the Systematic Scientific Study of Subjectivity (ISSSS) in September 2013, it became clear that Q-methodology can also be applied to sorting photographs instead of statements (see work of Daley 2013 and Kinsey & Zatepilina 2010). This enables an approach that combines both the ability of photo elicitation to stimulate an open discussion about associations with a complex topic, and the ability of Q-methodology to study subjectivity in a more integrative and comfortable way.

The potentially complementary functions of photo elicitation and Q-methodology lie in the connections between their underlying philosophies of *operant subjectivity* and the *polysemic* nature of photographs. The polysemic nature of photographs (Vanderveen 2008, Harper 2002, Clark-Ibáñez 2004, Banks 2001) implies that there are no absolute rights or wrongs in the interpretation of photographs (Rose 2001). And operant subjectivity is rooted in the idea that people assign psychological relevance to elements that they sort, for which there are no external criteria either. So, both techniques essentially rest on '(…) the authority of the subject rather than the researcher (…)' (Harper 2002:15). In a follow-up test interview, we found the combination of photographs and Q to work reasonably well for a structured study of associations elicited by photographs related to 'the fear of crime'.

Intermezzo 2 - Experience from test Q-sorting of photographs

Twelve test respondents were asked to perform a Q-sort of 25 photographs, found though the Google search engine, using a variety of elements from the theoretical framework of this book. Respondents were asked to sort the photographs in a grid, shaped in the form of a quasi-normal distribution, ranging from 'I do not worry about this at all' (-4) to 'I am very worried about this' (+4). The 12 test Q-sorts were analysed using the computer program *PQ- method* (version 2.33). Together with the respondents' comments in the subsequent interviews, these statistics led to the discovery of four factors. The first two factors showed clear indications of *personal* fear of crime, while the last two factors resonated with the sub-concept of *societal fear of crime.*

The approach offered clear benefit in enabling systematic study of the respondents' associations with the photographs. In addition, the photographs actually made aspects of respondents' abstract social life suitable for conversations and clearly focused the accounts of routine activities of daily life (Sztompka 2008:32-35). Test respondents were also quite comfortable talking about sensitive topics in this setting (Vanderveen 2008, Clark-Ibáñez 2004), such as direct victimisation and worries about immigration. In fact, they really enjoyed performing their Q-sorts and could not wait to elaborate upon them (De Graaf & Van Exel 2005).

Q-methodology is rather unknown in the social sciences, so we will briefly expand on its basics now. Interested readers are encouraged to explore the technique in more detail. The most important source on the method is Stephenson (1953), while Brown (1980) is a classic within the social sciences. De Graaf and Van Exel (2005) offer a sound anthology for a first introduction. Watts and Stenner (2012) give an up-to-date and more detailed overview of the method.

Q-methodology is a mixed qualitative-quantitative (Van Exel, De Graaf & Brouwer 2006) method that has a specific benefit: it allows the researcher to explore subjectivity in a systematic way (Brown 1980). Q-method is a '(…) suitable and powerful methodology for exploring and explaining patterns in subjectivities (…)' (De Graaf & Van Exel 2005:17). In Q-studies, respondents are asked to rank and order statements according to their personal preferences or opinions. In this way, respondents *mediate* their subjectivity through their sorting of statements. The driving force behind Q-methodology is the philosophy of *operant subjectivity*: a naturally existent viewpoint on a political or other matter within a particular context (Brown 1980). The founding father of Q-methodology, William Stephenson, was inspired by the work of Skinner to label this type of subjectivity as *operant* because it is '(…) not under the immediate control of an eliciting stimulus' (Brown 1997). The factors that emerge in a Q-study are held to emerge solely due to the respondents' sorting activities. And so, '(a)ny well-structured Q-sample, containing the wide range of existing opinions on the topic, will reveal these perspectives' (De Graaf & Van Exel 2005:3).

Statistically, Q-methodology is based on an inversion of conventional factor analysis because, instead of presenting a small set of stimuli to a large group of people, a small group of people is presented with a large set of stimuli. So, respondents actually organise *themselves* rather than their test items (McKeown & Thomas 1988, Brown 1980): 'If two persons are like-minded on a topic, their Q-sorts will be similar and they will both end up on the same factor. Hence we do not classify them: they classify themselves on their own terms, which emerge as factors' (Brown 1980:208). The individual rankings can be subjected to factor analysis, enabling researchers to estimate the correlation of individual rankings. In this way researchers can analyse correspondence and discrepancy in subjectivity about a given topic (De Graaf & Van Exel 2005). The result of a Q-study is therefore a description of a population of viewpoints, instead of a description of a population of people (De Graaf & Van Exel 2005). And so, '(w)hat proportion of the population belongs on one factor rather than another is a wholly different matter and one about which Q technique as such is not concerned' (Brown 1980:192). The

respondent can mediate their point of view by sorting a set of statements that contains the *extremes* of subjectivity about a given topic. Through Q-sorting, the respondent provides the researcher with a *self-made reflection* of their subjectivity. Q-methodology is essentially about what the respondents *do* with the statements, since they are sorted according to the 'psychological significance' (Brown 1980:198) that respondents attribute to them.

Q-methodology is usually applied in five steps: (I) definition of the concourse; (II) selection of relevant statements; (III) selection of respondents; (IV) ordering of the statements by respondents; and (V) interpretation of results. These steps will now be described in more detail, following the clear instructions of Brown (1980) and McKeown & Thomas (1988).

(I) The first step of a Q-study is defining the concourse. A concourse is a composition of all relevant aspects of the way that people talk about an issue. The raw material that is assembled in the definition of the concourse is a reflection of opinions and arguments that relate to the topic at hand.

(II) The second step is to select relevant statements. A sub-set is extracted from the concourse to construct a representative miniature of the concourse, within the boundaries of its extremes.

(III) Q-studies only need a limited number of respondents. Usually a Q-study contains 40 to 60 respondents, because '(…) all that is required are enough subjects to establish the existence of a factor for purposes of comparing one factor with another' (Brown 1980:192). The selection of respondents is done on the basis of theoretical relevance to assure that as much variety in opinions as possible is reflected.

(IV) After respondents are selected, they are asked to rank order the randomly sorted set of statements in a sorting grid, which typically ranges from "agree the most with" to "agree the least with".

(V) The final step of a Q-study is interpretation of the statistical data in combination with literal explanations given by respondents in respect of their Q-sorts. Analysis begins by calculating the correlation between all Q-sorts. This leads to an overview of consensus and lack of consensus between individual sorts. This correlation matrix is subjected to factor analysis to identify natural groups of correlating statements. This set of factors is then rotated in order to get as much explained variance as possible (varimax rotation) or to test hypotheses (manual rotation). The remaining factors are reflections of *operant* viewpoints related to the topic in question. Before these factors can be interpreted, all individual sorts are analysed on their factor scores in order to find identifying sorts to the factors. Also calculated are the identifying statements for each factor, which are typically combined with the explanations and illustrations given by respondents in the interviews subsequent to their Q-sorts.

In our specific application of Q-methodology, the photographs presented to respondents were selected to reflect the broad span of the theoretical framework outlined of the previous chapter. All of the photographs are featured in appendix one, accompanied by an explicit record of the theoretical indicators of 'the fear of crime' they are held to reflect.

Semi-structured questions
After the free-associative questions and the Q-sorting of photographs related to the fear of crime, the respondents were asked more classical, theory-driven questions. It was essential to allow enough space for the respondents' individual perceptions and stories, so these interview questions were based on a general plan, rather than a set of specific questions in a particular order: the '(q)ualitative interviewing design is flexible, iterative and continuous, rather than prepared in advance and locked in stone' (Rubin & Rubin 1995:43 as quoted by Babbie 1998:290).

Although topics were carefully drafted, based on the theoretical framework, the respondents had to be '(…) free to answer them in their own words rather than required to choose one or another predetermined alternative' (Weiss 1995:12). With the use of open questions, respondents were enabled to pick out the most important issues for themselves, rather than choosing from the researchers' interests (Barbour 2008:17).

The semi-structured section was underpinned with an interview guide (Weiss 1995:48). This guide (featured in appendix II) primarily contained topics of discussion and some pre-formulated questions where topics were sensitive to formulation. But interviewers were free to deviate from the interview guide and follow the respondent's train of thought (Beyens & Tournel 2009:203). The art in this type of interviewing is subtly to direct the flow of the conversation to a new topic at an appropriate moment in the interview, but these 'transitions should be smooth and logical' (Rubin & Rubin 1995:123 as quoted by Babbie 1998:292).

Selection of interview respondents
'(Q)ualitative research does not seek to recruit representative samples, but to encompass diversity (…)' (Barbour 2008:30). A similar selection principle was found appropriate for Q-methodology (Brown 1980). It is the diversity of *what happens in the minds of citizens* when it comes to the fear of crime that needs to be reflected (Weiss 1995). We have to understand the respondents' perspective, with respect to their frames of reference, by listening to '*what* people say about it and *how* they say it' (Beyens & Tournel 2009:196-202, emphasis in original).

This means that the respondents must be willing to let the interviewer enter their world of thoughts (Ibid:212). For fear of crime, this was not seen as a superficial exploration, since the topic is very close to several intimate aspects of individual lives (Pleysier 2010:149, Cops 2012:104, Van der Wurff 1992). A completely random selection of respondents would lead to many rejections. Therefore, informants were recruited in order to ask potential respondents in their networks

whether they would like to participate in the interview (Weiss 1995:20). In this way, potential respondents could be approached with the 'reassuring sponsorship' of the informants (ibid:34). The downside to this selection method - the respondent's awareness that informants knew of their participation - was mitigated by the guarantee of absolute confidentiality of the research data (Beyens & Tournel 2009:212). This guarantee of confidentiality was formalised in an 'informed consent form' (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:83-103).

This selection technique was just the start of the selection process. Students known to the author (N=500+) were also asked to scout for potential respondents, based on a sketch of general characteristics: gender, age, ethnicity and the level of urbanisation of their place of residency. Almost 100 students were willing to help find potential respondents. In order to ensure that the final sample included 'instances displaying significant variation' (Weiss 1995:23), the goal was a total of 30 respondents, equally distributed over the selection categories, so we could be confident that the widest range of perspectives on the fear of crime could surface within our analysis (Barbour 2008).

Gender (I) was logically divided into the categories of 'male' and 'female'. A respondent's age (II) was taken as one's age in years on the date of the interview. Age was then divided into several categories: '18-30 years', '31-45 years', '46-65 years' and '65+ years'. Ethnicity (III) was divided into the categories 'Native Dutch' (both parents born in the Netherlands), 'Western immigrant' (one or both parents born in Europe (excluding Turkey), North America, Oceania, Indonesia or Japan) and 'Non-Western immigrant' (one or both of the parents were born in Africa, Latin America, Asia (excluding Indonesia and Japan), or Turkey), in accordance with the categorisation of the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS 2010a).

The categories for 'degree of urbanisation' (IV) were again derived from the CBS, which has developed an index for the density of addresses in an environment (CBS 2010b). Up to 1000 addresses per km^2 was held to be a 'low urbanised' area, between 1000 and 1500 addresses per km^2 was held to be a 'moderately urbanised' area and more than 1500 addresses per km^2 was held to be a 'strongly urbanised' area.

Analytical strategy: coding
All 30 interviews were recorded from the beginning to the end. The mean length of the interviews was 1 hour 40 minutes; the shortest took 57 minutes and the longest 2 hours 9 minutes. All interviews were transcribed *ad verbatim* to: '(…) use the transcripts as a set of materials to be mined, accepting that a good deal will be dross' (Weiss 1995:55). Together these interview manuscripts add up to 613 pages (A4 format).

The coding process involved five steps (following Saldaña 2012). The first step (I) was the *open coding* of ten interview manuscripts. The second step (II) was to bring these initial open codes back to *univocal codes* for similar elements in the ten interview manuscripts. This led to the initial code book: '(…) a compilation of the

codes, their content description, and a brief data example for reference' (Saldaña 2012:21). The third step (III) was the *coding of the twenty other interviews* on the basis of the initial codebook while also adding new codes for newly found elements. The fourth step (IV) was a *check on uniformity* in the coding of all thirty interviews, with the final version of the code book. The fifth step (V) was a *check for inter-subjectivity*. My research assistant read through all 30 coded interviews and checked them with the final codebook. He checked whether or not he agreed with the chosen codes or had suggestions for the coding[19]. After that, all final codes were carefully linked to the elements of the 30 interview manuscripts in Atlas.Ti.

This process led to a total of 984 unique codes in the final codebook: 334 for the associative section of the interview, 304 for the personal section, 100 for the neighbourhood section and 246 for the societal section. The mean number of codes per manuscript was 201 codes, with a minimum of 123 and a maximum of 309 codes per interview. Together these 984 codes were used 6027 times. My research-assistant agreed with 95.7% of the applied codes. We had a discussion about 81 codes (1.3%), whether or not their usage was accurate. And in respect of 180 codes (3.0%), my assistant suggested an additional code to improve the accuracy of coding.

The backbone of the analysis was to connect co-occurring codes in *networks of codes,* to reflect 'mechanisms in the data' (Barbour 2008:12). These networks gained greater density when more respondents talked about a similar topic in a similar way or when they added more nuances to the topic. The relative densities of these networks of codes brought the large number of codes and quotations back to interpretable proportions. An example of a network of codes is included in the next chapter on the qualitative results.

5.3.2 Quantitative research design
The next research question - *'What are the relative roles of 'personal' and 'general fear of crime' in the generic explanation of 'the fear of crime' and what are the explanatory elements for these sub-concepts?'* – dictates a cross-sectional research design and thus the application of a survey (De Vaus 2001:170).

The research question contains both a descriptive and an explanatory element. For this empirical stage of this project, we were able to cooperate[20] with the local governments of Amsterdam (825.080 citizens; 219 km²; 102533 crimes reported in 2014); Hilversum (87.115 citizens; 46 km²; 5459 crimes reported in 2014) and Zaltbommel (27.420 citizens; 89 km²; 1178 crimes reported in 2014). The aim was

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[19] Ideally, all 30 interviews would have been coded *independently* and the 'inter- coder-reliability-coefficient' computed (Saldaña 2012:27, also see Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002). Unfortunately this was not possible in the time span of this project, so the next best option was chosen.

[20] These local governments were *not* given any influence on the actual items of the survey. In return for their financing of the survey, data entry and the organisation of postal correspondence, they agreed to receive a detailed research report, accompanied with a tailor made policy advice.

to realise a *differentiated* quantitative view on citizens' construction of the fear of crime, as '(…) insufficient attention is given to the replication of models in different settings and populations' (Bollen & Pearl 2013:324, also see Hale 1996:121).

The survey design
Surveys are designed for a sample of respondents to fill in a standardised questionnaire (Babbie 1998:255). These questionnaires are '(…) excellent vehicles for measuring attitudes and orientations in a large population' (ibid:256, also see De Vaus 2001:176). But since the data is collected at one point of time, it measures already existing '(…) *differences* between groups rather than change' (De Vaus 2001:170, emphasis in original). And this leads to '(…) a relatively passive approach to making causal inference' (ibid:172), but '(…) proper analysis that uses statistical controls enables cross-sectional data to provide valuable information about causal processes and for testing causal models' (ibid:176). The crucial point - especially due to the time aspect – is that with cross-sectional data it is actually impossible to prove that differences in *correlated* variables are due to an *actual causal link*, since direction always remains hard to argue (ibid:177-181).

In particular, though, '(…) multivariate analysis can enable powerful and informative explanatory analysis of cross-sectional data' (De Vaus 2001:211) by: (I) removing confounding variables; (II) analysis of a joint effect of multiple explanatory variables; (III) identification of the relative importance of explanatory variables; and (IV) deduction of causal processes from how well models fit in respect of cross-sectional data.

Our operationalisation of the fear of crime – into sub-concepts and categories of explanatory elements with their theoretical indicators – implicitly dictated that we treat the fear of crime as a set of *latent variables* together. This ambiguous label harbours many different implicit and explicit definitions (Bollen 2002). To be more precise then, we hold the fear of crime to be a set of latent variables '(….) hypothesised prior to an examination of the data' (Bollen 2002:615). This is because they reflect '(…) the surplus of meaning that is not directly observable' (Waege 2001:110), but can be indirectly measured by the application of '(…) statistical techniques to extract or allocate common variance of indicators' (ibid:111).

Analytical strategy: structural equation modelling
The analytical strategy of structural equation modelling (SEM) provides a very appropriate set of statistical procedures to answer the explanatory element of our quantitative research question. Structural equation modelling '(p)rovides an integrative function' (Bagozzi & Yi 2012:12) as it '(…) includes several traditional multivariate procedures' to test data on – theoretically expected - structures for '(…) the covariances between the observed variables', as a reflection of '(…) theoretical constructs, which are represented by the latent factors' (Hox & Bechger 1998:354). SEM currently is '(…) the most popular approach to causal analysis in

the social sciences' (Bollen & Pearl 2013:301). And there are good reasons for SEM's contemporary popularity.

The key strength of this analytical strategy is '(…) to produce a meaningful identification of the correlations between factors' (ibid: 358). But '(t)he real strength of SEM is, that we may specify and estimate more complicated path models, with intervening variables between the independent and dependent variables and factors as well' (ibid:359). Additionally, SEM makes it possible to test indirect effects based on mediational hypotheses (Ullman & Bentler 2013:673). Ullman and Bentler (2013) described a general four-stage process of modelling: (I) model specification; (II) model estimation; (III) model evaluation; and (IV) model modification.

(I) In model *specification*, theoretical relations are translated into a set of hypotheses that are to be tested with the model. This is generally done by developing a diagram in which latent variables appear in the form of circles and observed variables in the form of squares. These figures '(…) allow the researcher to diagram the hypothesised set of relationships in the model' (Ullman & Bentler 2013:661). Direct relations are reflected with a line with one arrow, while a line with two arrows reflects co-variation.

(II) For the step of *estimation*, these models are translated into '(…) series of equations or matrices' and through a suitable software package: '(…) parameters for the model are estimated using sample data' (ibid:664), '(…) with the goal of minimising the difference between the observed and estimated population covariance matrices' (ibid:667-668).

In order to assess the significance of each parameter of the model, researchers often examine standardised coefficients in the *evaluation of models* (III), since these neutralise differences in the scales of the used variables. Models are evaluated on the overall fit of the model. A highly significant chi-square leads to rejection of the model in question and initiates the search for a new model. But this raises a problem, because these goodness-of-fit statistics are very sensitive to sample size: 'Thus, with large samples, we will always reject our model even if the model actually describes the data very well' (Hox & Bechger 1998:365).

Besides the result of the chi-square test, often the comparative fit index (CFI) and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) are used in a complementary fashion. 'CFI values greater than .95 are of indicative of well-fitting models' and RMSEA '(v)alues of .06 or less indicate a close- fitting model' while '(v)alues lower than .10 are indicative of poor-fitting models' (Ullman & Bentler 2013:671). But what do these results mean? All goodness-of-fit indices ultimately revolve around the hypothesis 'that the observed covariances among the measured variables arose because of the linkages between variables specified in the model are supported by fit indices' (ibid:672). So, although researchers have developed many other goodness-of-fit indices to SEM (see Gerbing & Anderson 1993), there are no formal guidelines for the acceptability of the goodness-of-fit statistics for structural

equation models besides the chi-square test (Bagozzi & Yi 2012:28; Barrett 2007:818). And in essence '(…) all of them are functions of the chi-square statistics, but some include a second function that penalises complex models' (Hox & Bechger 1998:366).

An additional guideline for model evaluation was found in Hirtenlehner and Farrall's structural equation modelling work focused on fear of crime. These authors accepted models when '(…) the comparative fit index (CFI) exceeds the acceptance threshold of .90. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) remains below the upper limit of .08. The ratio of χ^2 to degrees of freedom is smaller than the critical value of 3 (…)' (Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013:12). This guideline offers a more suitable integrative interpretation of the *highly complex* structural equation models that the theoretical framework leads us to expect, due to (I) the many indicators of 'the fear of crime' and its sub-concepts, as well as (II) their supposed complex relations. Still, though, the simplest model that suited our theories and operationalisation was the preferred one.

The final step of model *modification* (IV) is done either to improve the fit of the model with the data or to test hypotheses. Because of the sensitivity of the chi-square test to the sample size, researchers usually apply two subsequent additional tests: the Lagrange multiplier test (I) which '(…) asks which parameter, if any, should be added to a model' and the Wald test (II), that '(…) asks which, if any, could be deleted (Ullman & Bentler 2013:674). Ultimately, when an acceptable model was found, interpretation could begin.

Limits to causal claims
Caution is required in our interpretation of structural equation models, as it is very tempting to read them as 'causal models'. Given the limitations of the cross-sectional design outlined above, '(…) there is of course nothing in structural equation modelling that magically transforms correlational data into causal conclusions' (Hox & Bechger 1998:368). According to structural equation modelling and causality authorities, Bollen and Pearl (2013:324): '(…) practitioners give insufficient attention to the strong causal assumptions that are part of their models, and even seasoned analysts are often not clear on what those assumptions are'. In short, researchers cannot make causal claims on the basis of structural equation models (Bagozzi & Yi 2012:22), because '(…) we cannot isolate a dependent variable from all influences but a single explanatory variable' (Bollen 1989:45). Furthermore, causality most often involves a far more complex net of influences that are associated to one another (ibid:57). Moreover, how can we distinguish causes from effects in cross-sectional data, given that '(…) the alleged cause must precede the effect, and this is the primary means to ensure that the explanatory variable has causal primacy' (ibid:61).

Additionally, when it comes to *latent variables*, the observation of causalities becomes elusive, because these variables are '(…) abstractions or unobservable and are nonmaterial, though we hope they represent or capture variance observed in

manifest variables' (Bagozzi & Yi 2012:23). So we must treat structural equation models as enabling *hypothetical measurement of causal relations* based on '(…) imperfect reflections of causal relationships' (ibid:23) in the form of functional relationships. These are *explanatory* relationships when 'a study tests a theory and exogenous and endogenous variables are linked significantly according to the theory'. But still, '(w)e must regard all models as *approximations* to reality. The statistical test can only disconfirm models; they can never prove a model or the causal relations within it' (Bollen 1989:79). As Davis (1985:67-68) puts it: '(1) Causal analysis in social research depends on *assumptions* about causal direction; (2) these assumptions depend on *empirical beliefs* about how the world works. No statistical routine can give you the answers'. With this knowledge in mind, the goal was to reach a balanced interpretation of our structural equation models.

The test survey
Between January 27th and February 12th of 2015, 410 respondents from the online citizen panel of the municipality of Amsterdam completed a test survey. The aim of the test survey was to test the *items,* which test respondents were aware of and had agreed to before starting the test survey. The test survey conscientiously followed the operationalisation of 'the fear of crime' as outlined in this chapter, as well as the qualitative results. With a total of 215 items and a mean of 42 minutes for completion, this test survey was obviously too long.

The test respondents had a mean age of 55 years. The sample contained 212 men and 197 women. 3% (n=11) was lower educated, 10% (n=41) moderately and 86% (n=353) was higher educated. Only 9% (n=36) of the respondents indicated to have a preference for the right wing of the political spectrum, the rest (n=374) indicated a preference for the political left wing. Needless to say, these respondents were absolutely *not* representative for the population of the citizens of Amsterdam, but they were extremely helpful in eliminating some of the practical problems associated with measuring 'the fear of crime', which was the goal of this test survey.

The first goal was to find the *essential items* within categories (Waege 2001:150). We therefore analysed which of the items that were used to measure a hypothesised latent construct did actually together form a reliable scale and which did not. This was done through analysis of the relative contribution to the Cronbach's alpha, as well as the performance of factor analysis.

It was also helpful to find out whether or not test respondents actually *understood* the items used (ibid:149). It appeared that many respondents could not understand the distinction made in emotion items between 'personal fear of crime' and 'neighbourhood fear of crime' following our operationalisation, because they experienced too much similarity in this abstract matter. They also indicated difficulties in responding to the semantic differential scales (following Vanderveen 2006) applied to the cognitive items for all sub-concepts of the fear of crime. So, clearly, important adjustments to these items were necessary.

Another aim was to find out how to carry out effective measurement of some complex concepts, in light of the fact that many '(…) theories are not formulated precisely enough to comply with the requirements of construct validity' (Waege 2001:154). The abstract concepts of the sub-concept 'societal fear of crime' and 'psychological defense mechanisms' were particularly difficult to translate into both *understandable* and *valid* items. However, with the help of the test respondents, we were quite convinced we had formulated items of relevance.

Despite the relatively small sample size (n=410), we were also able to test run our analytical strategy of structural equation modelling. This led to some highly *premature* empirical models related to our theoretical hypotheses, but notwithstanding the initial problems of our test items, the results were quite promising.

Sampling strategy
Given the moderate socio-demographic composition of the populations of Zaltbommel and Hilversum, the choice was made to conduct a *random sample selection procedure* (following Billiet 2001) for citizens of 20 years and older of age. But Amsterdam's more complex socio-demographic structure led us to a stratified random sampling strategy (again following Billiet 2001) on age and ethnicity. The results of our sampling strategy can be found in chapter seven, after this chapter's initial focus on the qualitative results.

6. Talking about 'the fear of crime'

This chapter focuses on results related to the qualitative research question: *What explanations do citizens give for their fear of crime?* The goal was to reach a heterogeneous group of respondents through mixed-method-interviews, in order to get a differentiated qualitative view of individual explanations for the fear of crime. This chapter describes similarities and contrasts between the individual stories of respondents. These insights allow the formulation of hypotheses, which were to be tested in the subsequent survey and for which results are featured in the next chapter. So, the qualitative findings of this chapter fully support the formulation of quantitative expectations on the basis of the theoretical framework.

The guiding principle for this chapter will be the division of the fear of crime into sub-concepts, as indicated in the conceptual operationalisation. So, we will gain an overview of the total concept of the fear of crime *through* the qualitative exploration of its sub-concepts of situational, personal and general fear of crime. Before turning to the results, first some background information on the characteristics of our group of respondents, the interview design and our analytical strategy.

6.1 Interview design, respondents & analytical strategy
As described in the previous chapter on the research design, the interviews consisted of three sections: (I) a free associative section; (II) the sorting of a set of photographs based on the respondent's point of view; and (III) semi-structured questions (see the interview guide in appendix II). The free associative section, revolving around the question 'do you ever feel unsafe?', together with the high level of associative freedom associated with the photographs and their sorting enabled respondents to lay a highly subjective foundation before we turned to the theory-driven semi-structured section. The aim hereby was to stay very close to the respondent's personal meaning of 'the fear of crime'.

Between November 2013 and March 2014, a total of 30 respondents agreed to take part in the interview. Before asking people actually to become respondents, we checked for their potential contribution to diversity, based on the characteristics of gender, age, ethnicity and the level of urbanisation of their place of residence. After the interviews, we additionally asked our respondents to categorise themselves according to the characteristics of: (I) their educational level; (II) political orientation; (III) level of income; (IV) media usage; and (V) previous victimisation of crime. This led to a diverse final composition of the group of respondents as figured on the next page (fig. 11).

Fig. 11 – Composition of respondents.

The resulting composition of respondents is quite balanced, except for the characteristics of 'political orientation' and 'educational level'. This misbalance can be explained by the fact that these individual characteristics could only be checked *after* the interview: asking about them in advance of the interview would have both influenced the results and been considered to be rude. For 'educational level', to a great extent, the misbalance can be explained in terms of the general rise in educational level of Dutch society (Van den Brink 2007:212&230) as well as the fact that our informants were highly educated. It turned out to be quite difficult to locate lower-educated respondents, especially in the younger age groups.

In respect of the characteristic of 'previous victimisation of crime', twenty of the 30 respondents indicated they had fallen victim of crime in the past. Fourteen had their bicycle stolen. But victims of more serious crimes were also present: seven respondents had been victims of burglary, two were victims of domestic violence, one female respondent was violated by an unknown man, and three women had been harassed by a small group of drunk men.

Overall, there seems to be sufficient heterogeneity in the composition of this group of respondents to assume that the *most extreme perspectives* on 'the fear of crime' could have been surfaced during the interviews. And a thorough method of analysis was employed to reveal these perspectives.

The backbone of the analysis was to connect co-occurring codes in *networks of codes* to reflect mechanisms or patterns in the data (Barbour 2008). These networks gained more density when more respondents talked about a similar subject in a similar way or when they added more nuances to the subject. The

relative density of these networks brought the large number of codes and quotations back to interpretable proportions. So, the resulting explanations for the respondents' fear of crime took shape from the stories of *multiple* respondents (see section 5.3.1 for details of the qualitative research design).

To give an example of this analytical strategy, an overview of the network 'Mental map – The big city' is added below (fig. 12). This network of codes was made up out of 22 separate codes and formed the densest network in the free associative section of the interview. The featured relations between the codes are reflections of the information given by the respondents.


Fig. 12 – Example of a network of codes, which led to interview result 'Mental map: The big city'.

All findings presented in this chapter resulted from this analytical approach. Subsequent explanations of respondents' fear of crime therefore rest upon careful and inter-subjective excavations of personal clarifications by multiple respondents (see section 5.3.1 for more details on the research design).

6.2 Associative findings

This section explores the associative findings from the interview results, which surfaced through free associative questioning as well as through respondents sorting the photographs. It emerged that the results from the free associative section strongly relate to the sub-concept of 'situational fear of crime', while the factors from the photograph sorts were easy to divide into two factors of 'personal fear of crime' and two other factors of 'societal fear of crime'.

6.2.1 Situational fear of crime as a result of free association

Every interview started with the free associative section. This section had just one central question: *Do you ever feel unsafe?* This unspecific question actually led 28 of the 30 respondents to associate with five distinct *mental maps*: networks of characteristic elements of situations or locations that people were motivated to avoid, due to the perceived high risk of themselves falling victim of crime (Hale

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1996, Pleysier 2010). Five mental maps were extracted from the respondents' free associative stories, but before discussing these mental maps in detail, we will first explore their background and shared characteristics.

The four information sources of mental maps
The mental maps portrayed by respondents share four information sources. The first source is the respondents' *socialisation* (I):

R₁: I used to travel on public transport a lot. So, I was regularly at a train station at night. There were always addicts and people who approached me. As a teenager my parents warned me about these kind of situations. No, I really did not like to be in stations at night-time. |Native Dutch woman, 31-45 years|

Media messages about crime (II) and *crime talk* (III) also provide the respondents with information on specific features of the risk of crime:

R₂₀: We always used to go to Amsterdam by public transport. But we don't do that anymore. I don't feel safe going there at night. I don't want to run into the wrong person and get knocked down or something. I want to avoid that situation. That's not only for Amsterdam, I would not go to Rotterdam or Utrecht either. Not anymore <SILENCE>…

I: What has changed?

R₂₀: Well, look. I read my newspaper, check the news on Teletext, listen to the radio, so I know what's going on. I don't think: "That won't happen to me". *It can happen to me* <EMPHASIS>, so I don't do that anymore. |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

Some respondents' mental maps were also shaped by previous events of *victimisation* (IV), either personal or the victimisation of family or acquaintances:

R₁₇: … I walked in the station at night with my friend and there was a group of guys who had had too much to drink. So we walked away to go and wait at the buses, because more people were there. And they came after us and one of them grabbed my arm and said 'Hey, come back to my place, we'll have some fun'. That was kind of scary, as you have all these stories in the back of your head about what they could do. Luckily another person said that they should leave us alone and they went away. But that's why I don't like to travel by night anymore. |Western immigrant woman 18-30 years|

The shared characteristics of mental maps
All mental maps shared the characteristic of *darkness*:

R₁₆: I think we grew up as kids with the idea that the dark is scary. When it's dark, you go to sleep and that is when evil things and monsters come. I think that affects our idea of darkness <SILENCE>. Well, I might relativise it now, but bad things do happen when it gets dark, because people do it then, because they think they will get away with it. |Non-Western immigrant man, 31-45 years|

Also crucial in the mental maps is the element that the respondents imagine they are *alone* in the described situations:

R₄: When I walk to my car after work, I have to pass by an alley and a block of houses and a flat. And those are the moments I think 'ugh'.

I: What is it you think about, then?

R₄: Well, they could be everywhere. And as a woman you are the weaker sex, right? |Native Dutch woman, 31-45 years|

The implicit or explicit assumption of being alone in a situation strongly connects respondents' mental maps to the estimation of their *vulnerability*. The sense of being physically able to defend oneself came across as a protection against fear of crime, especially for men. When asked, ten men and four women said they thought

they could physically defend themselves if necessary. But despite their sense of being capable of physical defence, eight of these ten men and all four women still had clear ideas about risky situations or locations they would want to avoid, due to the high risk of crime:

R$_2$:   There are dark alleys here in the city where you will get robbed. In some deprived neighbourhoods and the centre of the city. They'll hold you and take your wallet and phone and everything. |Western immigrant man, 46-65 years|

Mental map #1 – The big city
Twenty respondents said that big cities hold many crime risks. These respondents think there is almost an inevitability of falling victim of crime in a big city:

R$_{23}$:   That is a known fact, there is more crime in big cities.
            |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

Eight of these twenty respondents actually live in a big city themselves. Only three of them said they had become accustomed to the continuous threat of crime in their city. Respondents were aware of two major types of crime risks in city life: 'pickpockets and robbery' and 'violence and aggression'.

According to the respondents, the risk of pickpockets and robbery is omni-present in a big city, 24/7. The respondents are alert to this risk, especially when places are crowded with people, during events and markets for instance. The respondents outlined three stereotypes that trigger their alertness to the risk of theft and robbery: addicts, immigrants in general and, especially, immigrants from the Eastern bloc:

I: Do you ever feel unsafe?
R$_{11}$:   Well <SILENCE>… There are some places here in <NAME OF CITY> or <NAME OF OTHER CITY> <SILENCE>… It depends on the kind of people that are around, let's say, that makes me watch their attitudes and how they look. That is what makes me think 'OK, I have to pay attention or I have to be careful now'. |Native Dutch man, 18-30 years|

The second risk of 'violence and aggression' in the big cities is associated with urban nightlife. And here is how respondents understand this risk: because people use too much alcohol and drugs, tensions arise among them, and because bystanders keep their distance, these tensions easily escalate into aggression and violence. The respondents outlined four stereotypes associated with the risk of violence and aggression: young people, groups of people in general, addicts and people who behave anti-socially.

Mental map #2 – Travelling after dark
The second most dense network of codes reflects the central message that when you travel alone after dark, you are always at risk of becoming a victim of crime. Almost every female respondent (15 out of 16) had the idea that it is unsafe to travel alone after dark. Three elderly men - who held themselves to be vulnerable - also articulated this mental map. Two young men between 18 and 30 years old related this mental map too, but both of them were risk sensitive in general.

R24:   I used to travel a lot, even with public transport. I really liked it, it was kind of exiting to travel. But nowadays I really don't like it anymore. I don't go out when it's dark. I'll do that only when it's light.

I: Only when it's light?

R24:   Yes, because when it's light, I see everything. No, I don't travel after dark anymore. Maybe if there was someone with me, because then you see and feel more <SILENCE>… *But not alone* <DETERMINED>. I once stood at a bus station when it was dark and I really thought *'Will that bus finally come now?'* <IMPATIENT>. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

The respondents mainly contemplate the risk of victimisation through aggression and robbery. But some young women also think about the risk of sexual assault. As a result of this mental map, these respondents said they do not travel alone after dark, as a matter of principle:

R4:   … I'm not looking for trouble. If I don't *have* <EMPHASIS> to go out after dark, I won't go. But if I have to go, you have to remember that there are some things that happen after dark <SILENCE>… And that is when I feel my stomach and think: 'Oeh, it's quite dark' <SILENCE>… |Native Dutch woman, 31-45 years|

Respondents said they specifically avoided public transport, big cities and abandoned areas after dark. The stereotypes related to this mental map were addicts, immigrants, groups of people in general and, especially, groups of intoxicated young men. The respondents had no problem travelling after dark when accompanied by a protective person they were familiar with, such as their male partner or a male friend.

Mental map #3 - Wooded areas
Four women and one young man expressed an extension to the mental map 'travelling alone after dark', as they did not feel safe being alone in a wooded area after dark. The young man did not actually avoid wooded areas, but thoughts about a potentially lurking risk did cross his mind from time to time:

R11:   I usually travel by bike alone in this area <respondent lives in the woods>. Even when it's dark. The thought 'what if there is someone hiding in the bushes?' comes up sometimes. It's very abandoned here in the forest. But, I'll go anyway. When does something like that actually happen? Nah, it never happens. I cycle pretty fast, but when I think about this, I'll just cycle a bit faster. |Native Dutch man, 18-30 years|

The four women said that they try to avoid abandoned and wooded areas like parks, forests and even green areas in their own neighbourhood. Women associate a specific fear of sexual assault with this mental map, respondents not liking the fact that they cannot *see* whether someone is hiding in their surroundings. A man could be hiding in the bushes, waiting to attack a female victim:

R1:   I won't go to a wooded area all by myself, no.

I: Not by yourself?

R1:   Well, I experience more fear of violation and I would feel very alone and vulnerable. I think it comes from all the images you get from TV shows like <NAME OF A TRUE CRIME SHOW>. I'm very aware of those images. It is positive on the one side, as you can avoid those situations. But on the other side, they give you a certain feeling of fear <SILENCE>… |Native Dutch woman, 31-45 years|

Mental map #4 – Using ATM machines
Four men and four women - most of them aged 46 and older – were on the alert when using an ATM machine, at night but also during the day-time:

R19:   You hear about a lot of trouble from people who use an ATM machine without thinking. They try to see your Identification Number and also try to get your card and when they have   it, they're gone before you know it. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

As a result, these respondents consciously look to see what kind of people are around and block any sight of their personal identification number. Sometimes they decide not to use the machine, until the suspicious people are no longer around, but they did not specify the people that would trigger their alertness.

Mental map #5 – Home alone after dark
The last mental map was reported by five women. Three of them were older than 65 years, one was between 31 and 45 years old and one between 18 and 30 years old. These women said they felt unsafe when home alone after dark. Without their male partner to protect them, a rather unspecific feeling of vulnerability arises. But they also relate a specific fear of burglary in this mental map. These women said they even take preventive measures when their partners are away at night:

R6:   I have a big, heavy torch and my phone beside my bed when my husband isn't home at night. That makes me feel better. Of course the gate and doors are locked, but if they want to break into our home, they will do it anyway <LAUGHS>.
|Western immigrant woman, 31-45 years|

Conclusion on free associative findings
When respondents freely associated in response to the question 'Do you ever feel unsafe?' they spontaneously started to talk about lived-through events in which they *felt* unsafe or imagined events in which they *would feel* unsafe. These 'mental maps' connect to the sub-concept of *situational fear of crime*. Despite individual nuances, the respondents told five quite similar stories, suggesting a broadly shared 'lay knowledge' about risky situations and locations.

6.2.2 Four patterns of photograph associations
After the free association question, the respondents were asked to sort a set of 23 photographs on the basis of their personal perspectives. During the sorting task, respondents spontaneously started talking about their associations with the photographs. After the sorting task we also asked for clarification on the sorting and this too gave strong insights into respondents' associations with individual photographs as well as an integrative view of their associations with the complete set of photographs.

Q-methodology using visual stimuli
The respondents were asked to sort 23 photographs[21] on the basis of their personal perspectives, using the grid pictured on the next page (fig. 13).

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[21]   Photographs were selected to represent the breadth of the theoretical framework, see Appendix I for details.

| Maak ik mij in het dagelijks leven totaal geen zorgen over (-4)	(-3)	(-2)	(-1)	(0)	(+1)	(+2)	(+3)	Maak ik mij in het dagelijks leven sterke zorgen over (+4)

Fig. 13 – Photo sorting grid used (Q-method).

The grid goes from left '-4 – *I don' t worry about this at all in daily life*' to right '+4 – *I worry about this a lot in daily life*'. In this way, Q-methodology was combined with the research technique of photo elicitation. The photograph sorts of all 30 respondents were analysed for similarity and differences using the PQ-method (version 2.33). Four factors emerged as a result of factor analysis (Extraction: Centroid, Rotation: Varimax) *and* the clarifications the respondents gave for their photograph sorts.

Following the tradition of Q-methodology, these factors are labelled as: 'A - Societal discontent'; 'B - Worry about crime in society'; 'C - Fear of personal victimisation'; and 'D - Alert and in control'. This is where the respondents elaborated on their stories on 'the fear of crime'. Together these factors explain 56 percent of the variation in the 30 photograph sorts. Overview visual impressions of these patterns of subjectivity are reflected on the next page (fig. 14-17), together with the relative position of the most distinctive photographs within each factor and the position of the photograph within the other factors for comparative purposes.

	Factor A	Factor B	Factor C	Factor D
4.	**+4**	-2	-4	+2
18.	**+3**	-4	+1	-3
9.	**+1**	-2	-2	-1
15.	**-4**	-1	-1	-2

Fig. 14 – Factor A - Societal discontent.

	Factor A	Factor B	Factor C	Factor D
20.	0	**+4**	0	0
17.	+2	**+3**	+3	+1
16.	+2	**-3**	0	+1
18.	+3	**-4**	+1	-3

Fig. 15 – Factor B - Worry about societal crime.

	Factor A	Factor B	Factor C	Factor D
13.	+2	+2	**+4**	+3
8.	0	0	**+2**	-1
10.	0	-2	**+1**	-3
4.	-2	+4	**-4**	+2

Fig. 16 – Factor C - Fear of personal victimization.

	Factor A	Factor B	Factor C	Factor D
5.	-1	-2	+2	**+4**
23.	+3	0	+1	**+3**
10.	0	-2	+1	**-3**
18.	-4	+3	+1	**-3**

Fig. 17 - Factor D - Alert and in control.

Factor A: Societal discontent

The respondents in the first factor (fig. 14) expressed a strong societal discontent and actual anger about the contemporary state of Dutch society. Their concerns about crime in society seem to be part of this broader discontent. They worry about the severe types of crime, but care less about smaller crimes.

In their comments on the photographs, they regularly used strong language, such as when commenting on the photograph of the Dutch parliament (#4), for instance:

R10:   Yes, *the parliament, if they would just do what they are supposed to do… otherwise they might as well drop a bomb on it. They promise, yes, but they never keep their promises* <ANGRY>.

I: Is that the reason why you placed the photograph at +4?

R10:   *Yes, they are guilty of a lot of bad things that happen in our society. They say that they listen to the public, but they don't* <ANGRY>. |Native Dutch woman, 18-30 years|

For courts and tribunals, (#18) they say:

R12:   They don't do anything against crime. So, they are of no use. Nothing changes in the situation. When you watch television, you can hear that they can do whatever they want over here and get away with it. *Their punishment is a joke!* <ANGRY>
|Western immigrant man, 31-45 years|

The picture of the flags of the European Union (#9) led them to state:

R13:   I think that we listen to Europe too much. We should think more in our own way, rather than Europe's. |Native Dutch man, 46-65 years|

Factor B: Worry about societal crime

Respondents in factor B (fig. 15) also experience societal discontent, but in a more nuanced way. It is a specific concern about crime in society. They worry about violent crimes, but they also worry about smaller, more frequent crimes in society.

For the picture of the public fight (#20), they say:

R18:   That's a scuffle and I don't like it. Yes, because, well <SILENCE>… I never experienced it for myself but I think it's scary. You see a lot of those things on television. When it's a movie I like it because it is exciting, but when it's real I don't like it at all.
|Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

For the photograph of a man threatening a young women with a knife, (#17) they said:

R3:   Yes, you hear a lot of, ehm <SILENCE>… that more people get murdered on the streets lately and you hear a lot about this on the news <SILENCE>. Yes, sometimes you do think about it then. |Non-Western immigrant man, 18-30 years|

They also worry about car burglary (#12), bicycle theft (#19) and pickpockets (#14), commenting:

R23:   Oh yes, *they just steal everything nowadays* <ANGRY>. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

Factor C: Fear of personal victimisation

Factor C (fig. 16) was almost exclusively produced by women. They expressed specific fears of burglary, cybercrime and violence. These specific and personal crime fears in this factor are quite strong, such as their fear of burglary (#13), for instance:

R17:   There is a lot of burglary. That is why I feel unsafe from time to time <SILENCE>… You can close the curtains and all, but they still break into your home. You don't, well you cannot control these things. |Western immigrant woman, 18-30 years|

When it came to the photograph of two men in a tunnel (#8), these respondents were very clear – they actually *feared* the man wearing a hat:

I: What makes alarm bells go off for you then, when you see that guy?

R17:   Well, it's a man to start with. It is quite normal; look, this man <INDICATES MAN WITH THE BRIEFCASE > doesn't ring alarms bells so bad for me – it's his clothing and a suit like that, makes me think he is more reliable. Of course you don't really know that, but it's my gut feeling. But this man <INDICATES MAN WITH THE HAT>, he seems a very unreliable person to me. And yes, he just stands there like that. It's his posture <SILENCE>… Well, it's a bit hard to explain <SILENCE>… But he also looks quite strong. For sure he is capable of taking hold of me without me being able to defend myself <SILENCE>… And I think that I would be more afraid of young men than older men <SILENCE>… Because you hear more about young men being a threat to women <SILENCE>... |Western immigrant woman, 18-30 years|

These respondents also referred to this fear of physical confrontations with men when they discussed the photograph of a dark, abandoned alley (#10):

R23:   I wouldn't go through it, oh no! No, if I didn't *have* to, I wouldn't go. Bad people go to those kind of areas when they're up to no good. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

Factor D: Alert and in control

Just like the previous factor, this factor (fig. 17) is almost entirely built up by women. They too think about their chances of falling victim of crime themselves, but they expressed no actual *fear* of crime. They stressed the importance of their own responsibility to prevent victimisation. Due to their alertness, they say they experience control over their chances of victimisation.

The respondents in this factor described being very alert in daily life. Like their response to the picture of the warning to be careful when using an ATM machine (#5):

R19:   I always look to see if there is someone else around or not. I just have a casual look around first. If there is no one else, then I'll use it.

I: So you have a proper check before you do?

R19:   Yes, yes. And I also use my keys to tap in my personal identification number. Not my hand. Because they can scan for your body heat when you do it by hand, so I use my keys or another card. Yes, they can see your body heat on the numbers you touched and that's how they know your number. Really, it's true. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

For the picture of the robbery (#23), they said:

R1:   When I go to the city on my bicycle, I'm always aware of where my purse is. Because, imagine that a guy on a moped comes by and just grabs my purse like that. That is what I am aware of. |Native Dutch woman, 31-45 years|

For the picture of the pickpocket (#14), they stated:

R19:   Well, that's just your own stupid fault. You should not wear your wallet like that! |Western immigrant woman, 65+ years|

The respondents in this factor were slightly irritated by the tougher nature of society as represented to them by the picture of the man in the hoodie (#15). But they said they did not actually worry about it, nor did they worry about the justice system (#18).

6.2.3 Sub-conclusion for the associative interview results
At this point, a temporary conclusion can be drawn in respect of the associative section of the interviews. Respondents' answers to the free associative section of the interview showed that almost every respondent spoke in detail about situations or locations that were to be avoided, due to the perceived high risk of criminal victimisation. This quite coherent information was reflected in five *mental maps*: (I) the big city; (II) traveling after dark; (III) wooded areas; (IV) using ATM machines; and (V) home alone after dark. These mental maps give a rich insight into the crucial function of 'crime knowledge' in relation to the sub-concept of situational fear of crime.

The photograph sorting section of the interview showed four factors in the respondents' associations: (I) societal discontent; (II) worry about crime in society; (III) fear of personal victimisation; and (IV) alert and in control. The first two factors resonate with the sub-concept of 'societal fear of crime', since the focus is on crime as a problem in Dutch society. The last two factors, on the other hand, strongly relate to the sub-concept of 'personal fear of crime', since their focus is on the personal likelihood of falling victim of crime.

Together, the associative interview results show that - despite variation in people's associations in response to, firstly, the question 'Do you ever feel unsafe?' and, secondly, photographs broadly related to fear of crime - respondents actually show *tangible similarities in associations* with fear of crime. And these similarities are well interpretable on the basis of theories explored above and operational definitions of situational, personal and societal fear of crime.

6.3 Semi-structured findings
After the free association question and the photograph sorting task, we asked respondents to elaborate in more detail on theoretically relevant aspects of their personal, neighbourhood and societal fear of crime. Semi-structured items guided this section of the interview, but respondents were free to choose their own path of reasoning. Please see appendix II for details on the interview guide used.

6.3.1 Personal fear of crime: a sense of control
The respondents were quite adamant in making clear that they are on their alert when it comes to the risk of themselves being affected by crime in daily life:

I:		Did you ever actually have something stolen from you?
R_1:		No, *but that is because that is something I am very aware of* <DETERMINED>. Let me tell you, I won't go and walk around with my purse and have the zipper open. I always make sure that it is close to my body and that I can see it or otherwise feel it if someone touches it. |Native Dutch woman, 31-45 years|

Mental maps feed avoidance behaviour
Respondents articulated a sense of personal responsibility in preventing themselves becoming a victim of crime. They try to limit opportunity for criminals by adjusting their own behaviour, by taking preventive measures and avoiding places and situations due to the highly perceived risk of criminal victimisation:

R29:   I only experience fear in certain situations *but I know what they are and I just don't let them happen* <EMPHASIS>. Nothing happened to me so far, but I think that is because I keep a lot of problems away from me. |Non-Western immigrant woman, 31-45 years|

So, avoidance behaviour is connected to 'crime knowledge', which is rooted in the respondents' mental maps. Adjusted behaviour appears as a fear suppressor in the respondents' stories:

R20:   I am very aware not to become a victim of crime <SILENCE>… When you pay attention <SILENCE>… When you <SILENCE>… By doing things properly, you can suppress your fear and say that you're not afraid any more that something might happen <SILENCE>…
I: Is it a way to control your fear then?
R20:   Yes, it is. I say the risk is there, so you better do everything to prevent yourself of becoming a victim of crime and thus no longer worry about it. |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

Avoidance behaviour makes most of the respondents experience a sense of personal control over their chances of falling victim of crime:

I: Do you ever worry about your chances of becoming a victim of crime yourself?
R25:   I'm actually not that bothered about crime. I'm just careful that nothing will happen to me. But that's all, if you ask me. |Western immigrant woman, 65+ years|

Actual control?

21 respondents said that if they stopped to think about it, there would always be a certain risk of falling victim of crime, despite their avoidance behaviour:

R26:   Let me put it this way: I hope I won't become a victim of crime, but I don't expect it either. It could happen <SILENCE>… But that's not something I'm going to worry about. |Native Dutch man, 18-30 years|

R16:   Each day, around a thousand in 16 million people become victims of crime. Someday it will happen to you as well. It is always somewhere at the back of my mind. That's what keeps me alert and why I try to avoid situations. But it's not that I am really worried about it. So, do I expect to become a victim of crime? No. But I know that there is a chance I will. |Non-Western immigrant man, 18-30 years|

Eight respondents said that they did not experience *real* control over crime risks:

R10:   Ultimately, you can't really do anything about it. You can be extremely careful, but it happens anyway. |Native Dutch woman, 18-30 years|

Fear?

When we discussed emotions due to the personal chance of victimisation, the respondents primarily told to experience 'anger':

I: Do you ever worry about your chances of becoming a victim of crime?
R8:   No, it just really annoys me. I'm not worried, but I get very angry about it. Not just for myself, but also for other people. It's just not funny anymore. |Native Dutch woman, 46-65 years|

Others experience a sense of 'irritation' instead of anger:

R24:   Well, anger <SILENCE>… That's a big word. The threat of crime limits my freedom in daily life, but anger is too strong to describe what I feel. I think it's a shame and I feel a bit sad about it, but it's not that I'm angry about it. It's a shame, more than something to get really upset about. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

Psychological defense mechanisms

When respondents discussed their own chances of victimisation, they appeared to make subtle discursive realignments to moderate their cognitions to be less

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disturbing. At first, this process was not that obvious, but as more interviews were held, it became clearer that respondents were making similar shifts in their stories.

Once these shifts became more apparent, the theoretical framework of 'psychological defense mechanisms' provided an analytical grid. Three distinctive defense mechanisms were found to play a part in respondents' stories about the fear of crime: (I) displacement; (II) suppressing; and (III) rationalising.

The most frequently expressed defense mechanism to close off negative thoughts and feelings is captured by the phrase '…but things are worse elsewhere'. This mechanism of *displacement (I)* is understood as 'a mechanism in which the person generalises or redirects a feeling about an object or a response to another object' (Valliant 1992:237).

When seven respondents talked about crime-related problems in their neighbourhood, they seemed to moderate their emotions with the thought that their own situation was relatively safe compared to other situations. They spontaneously started to compare the areas they lived in themselves with (more) deprived urban areas, big cities and even other countries. While discussing problems experienced close to home, these respondents started to mention even worse areas elsewhere:

R$_{15}$:   Well, we get some serious hassle from youngsters in our block. But on the other side of the quarter, at the <NAME OF A SUPERMARKET>, it's really rough. Once in a while you see a police helicopter hanging over there. The police immediately show up when something happens there. |Non-Western immigrant man, 46-65 years|

R$_{30}$:   There's trouble all the time on the streets and in the entrance hall of the flat we live in. Luckily not at my door, but it is a bad neighbourhood. And you hear a lot from neighbours about trouble.
I: What kind of trouble then?
R$_{30}$:   All kinds actually <SILENCE>… Stealing, ehm, breaking in through a window and stealing everything. Those kind of things. Many people have told me that my neighbourhood isn't safe. It's because of the boys – they cause trouble, smoke, do drugs, drink alcohol and steal things. But I heard on the news that it's worse in Amsterdam <SILENCE>…
|Non-Western immigrant woman, 31-45 years|

Eight other respondents showed signs of a similar mechanism while discussing the risk of burglary:

R$_{2}$:   Burglary, *yes that's just awful* <ANGRY>. But it's not a real problem over here. You know, in my father in law's neighbourhood, it's terrible over there. All day long it's trouble. They tried to break in next door, at a house where a woman in her eighties lives. That happens a lot. Some parts of this city are just a tragedy. But not in my neighbourhood – we rarely have attempted burglary over here. I read the newspapers and it's all in other neighbourhoods. Not around here; I'm glad I live here. |Western immigrant man, 46-65 years|

Fifteen respondents expressed a similar mechanism when we discussed their own chance of falling victim of crime in general. They almost immediately responded that *other* neighbourhoods and places of residency experienced more crime than their own neighbourhood and town:

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R₉: Well, when I hear about crime, it's mostly about other parts of the country and other neighbourhoods in the city <SILENCE>… But maybe I just don't want to think about it <SILENCE>…

I: Why not?

R₉: <SILENCE>… Just like you don't want to think about your parents dying, or your own death and all, you know? These are not the things that make me happy. I just hope it won't happen to me. |Non-Western immigrant woman, 18-30 years|

Respondents also gave voice to the mechanism of *suppression (II)*. This is understood as 'a mechanism in which the person intentionally avoids thinking about disturbing problems, desires, feelings or experiences' (Valliant 1992:238). The goal of this mechanism - according to the respondents themselves - is to prevent them from worrying. During the free association and the personal section of the semi-structured part of the interview, this mechanism seemed to occur while sixteen respondents talked about memories of personal victimisation, their own chances of becoming the victim of crime and media messages about crime:

R₂₇: Those things happen in life, but these are the things that will drive you crazy if you keep thinking about them. You'll get into a negative spiral. I don't want to go crazy like that, at least not now <LAUGHS>. It might all sound very indifferent, but it's not. It is actually a form of self-defense. A form many people use I guess. |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

At the societal level, five respondents told a similar story:

I: Do you ever think about crime in society?

R₂₄: Well, I try not to <LAUGHS>. But you hear about it anyway. I always try my best to <SILENCE>… Maybe it's not good but <SILENCE>… I try to do the things I like to do and think about nice things and for the rest <WIPES HAND OVER THE TABLE> <SILENCE>...

I: You fend them off?

R₂₄: Yes <SILENCE>…

I: How come?

R₂₄: Because you cannot *do* <EMPHASIS> anything against them <SILENCE>... You have to go on living. Otherwise you'll go crazy. I can't live like that. It's probably not the best thing to do. I hope the government will do something about it, but I try not to think about it. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

The same mechanism appeared when the respondents discussed the impact of media messages about crime on their thoughts in daily life:

I: Do media messages about crime ever make you think about crime as a problem in Dutch society?

R₂₅: *No* <DETERMINED>. It's a waste of energy to think about that. I prefer to think of nice things. I don't want negative thoughts and so I won't think about it when I hear it on the news or something. I'll take note of it and go on as usual. I have enough on my mind already. So no, that keeps the problem at a distance. |Western immigrant woman, 65+ years|

R₂₆: When I read that something really bad has happened, I try not to read it because it will make me feel disgusted. And when I hear that someone got stabbed or that an old woman got beaten up for a few coins, I think 'Oh, how sad <SILENCE>… *Oh, what a nice song* <INNOCENT>' and I continue what I was doing before that thought. I know my own family and myself to be safe and so I keep it at a distance.

I: Why is that?

R₂₆: I don't know really why. I just try not to think of others' misery, I guess. It might not be fair to others, but that's how it works for me <SILENCE>… |Native Dutch man, 18-30 years|

The final defense mechanism that respondents gave voice to is that of *rationalisation (III)*. This mechanism can be understood as "talking away" emotions: 'a mechanism in which the person devises reassuring explanations' (Valliant 1992:238). Twelve respondents seemed to show this mechanism when they spoke about anticipated victimisation and the avoidance behaviour they reported. By rationalising, they seemed to break free from the thoughts and feelings they expressed shortly before:

I: Do you ever feel unsafe?

R_8:   Yes, all day through actually. I'm busy closing doors all day long, because you get a lot of intruders, especially during the summer time. When I go upstairs I think about the garage doors and the door to our veranda. It's really on my mind during the day <SILENCE>... But no, it only lasts for a moment. It's not that I am stressed out or something <SILENCE>... I'm not excessively thinking about it, it's just that I'm very careful. I really don't think about it all day long, actually <LAUGHS>. It's just now that you discuss it, that it all comes so much to mind <LAUGHS>. |Native Dutch woman, 46-65 years|

Four respondents also seemed to rationalise the emotional consequences of previous events of victimisation:

R_{25}:   I don't go straight home when I've taken my money out of the ATM machine. I consciously walk through the shopping centre, and who knows how long I might stay there and how much money I'll spend? They won't know it.

I: Is that due to that violent robbery you just told about?

R_{25}:   Yes, that is what stayed with me. But it's not dramatic, it's actually quite normal. It's not all that dramatic what happened to me <SILENCE>... |Western immigrant woman, 65+ years|

At the personal level, twelve respondents seemed to rationalise their own chances of becoming a victim of crime:

R_{14}:   It is a known fact that robberies take place in the big cities. But I rationalise it. I mean, the chances are extremely low that men will become victims of robbery <SILENCE>... It's the women they're after when it comes to robbery. So, I don't see it as a risk to myself, I rationalise it. You hear the stories, remember them and accept it. But the chance that it will happen to me is negligible. |Non-Western immigrant man, 18-30 years|

I: Do you ever think about your chances of becoming a victim of crime in daily life?

R_{21}:   No, look, you actually have a very small chance with so many million people living in this country. I mean, it's such a large group of people <SILENCE>... No <SILENCE>... I think that my chance is marginal. |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

I: How did you deal with that story of your parents-in-law whose car was broken into?

R_{16}:   <SILENCE>... I think I <SILENCE>... I keep some perspective and relativize a little. I call it down-to-earth, but my wife would call it irresponsible <LAUGHS>. But it's not that it happened to them that I think it will happen to me as well. Yes, they took stuff from my in-laws, but that happens all the time, - it happens, we all know that. I won't change my way of doing thing because of that. |Non-Western immigrant man, 18-30 years|

Twenty respondents also seemed to neutralise the impact of media messages about crime though the defense mechanism of rationalisation:

R_{20}:   If they just wrote that a crime occurred and that it was bad, nobody would read it. People are after the juicy stories. So, they have to give it to them. But you just have to keep thinking while you read those messages, they are not just news stories. It's business. They write what you want to read. It's entertainment, not a neutral source of information about the risks I face in life myself. |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

So, besides avoidance behaviour, respondents also seemed to gain a sense of *distance* from the risk of crime through apparently activating psychological defense mechanisms of displacement, suppressing and rationalising.

6.3.2 Neighbourhood fear of crime: collective efficacy is crucial
When we talked about the neighbourhood, seven respondents said they were very happy in the neighbourhood they live in:

I: How do you feel about your neighbourhood in general?
R_5:   Well, I think it is pleasant to live here <SILENCE>…
I: Can you explain to me why that is the case for you?
R_5:   Hmm… Why? Yes, well strange things never happen around here. And everybody cares for each other. |Native Dutch woman, 46-65 years|

A certain degree of collective efficacy appeared to be connected to their positive evaluation of the neighbourhood. It clearly provided the respondents with a buffer against crime fears, as they know their neighbours were keeping a watchful eye:

R_6:   We have good contacts in our neighbourhood. If something is wrong you can always call somebody for help. I feel the same about the people that live in the houses on the other side of the road. It's a very nice neighbourhood. We have good contact, but we don't see each other very often. It's more that you keep a watchful eye. Imagine that something strange would happen, then I am certain that we will keep each other informed.
|Western immigrant woman, 31-45 years old|

But for 22 respondents this buffer of collective efficacy against fear of crime was not present, as they said only to have superficial contact with others in their neighbourhoods:

R_{13}:   Well people are more on their own nowadays, do their own things and <SILENCE>… The social part, it isn't there anymore. People hardly say 'good morning' or 'good evening' around here and that's about it. |Native Dutch man, 46-65 years|

This lack of local connections appears to be associated with a negative evaluation of the neighbourhood and quite a defensive attitude towards neighbours in general:

I: How do you feel about your neighbourhood in general?
R_{10}:   Ugh, it's horrible <LAUGHS>. No, as long as you keep a bit of distance from all the people and the nuisance they cause, it's actually fine to live around here.
|Native Dutch woman, 18-30 years|

Ten of these 22 respondents said that they would not want more extensive contact either:

R_{12}:   I try to live my own life and try not to bother anyone else and hope that nobody will bother me either. I leave everybody alone and expect the same thing in return. As long as that's the case, it's fine by me. I respect them and they respect me. I live my life and they live theirs.
|Western immigrant man, 31 – 45 years|

Eight of the 22 respondents who said to have only superficial contact with others in their neighbourhoods give another explanation, explaining that they live in anonymous, urban neighbourhoods:

R_{18}:   When I lived in a village, we all talked with each other. But you don't have that around here, we all slide along each other, very anonymously. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

But although most of the respondents do not really know their neighbours, they expressed some sort of basic trust in their neighbours, just from being familiar with their faces:

R₃: I trust the people in my neighbourhood because I see them a lot. I know their faces, so yes, I trust them. I think they will trust me as well. |Non-Western immigrant man, 18-30 years|

6.3.3 Societal fear of crime: crime as a growing social problem

Touching upon the theme of crime in Dutch society changed the atmosphere in almost every interview, as all of a sudden most respondents expressed quite strong emotions:

I: Do you ever think about crime in Dutch society in daily life?
R₁₈: Well, I think that the police should be more on top of it
        <STRIKES HER HANDS>. It's a very soft approach here in Holland *and criminals know it* <DETERMINED>. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

I: Do you ever think about crime in Dutch society in daily life?
R₄: *Yes* <ANGRY>, when I hear about the sentences they get when they've done something, then I think <SWEARS> *what are we doing here in Holland?* <ANGRY>. We don't do enough against it! When someone kills another, they're out in no time! Then I think: What are we doing here? But I guess everybody will tell you they think the same way. I mean, you hear it from almost everybody. |Native Dutch woman, 31-45 years|

The respondents primarily tend to be angry about crime in Dutch society:

R₁₈: It makes me think, *where in God's name will this all end?* <FRUSTRATED>
        |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

But crime in Dutch society does not lead many respondents to actually *fear* crime themselves:

R₂₉: It stops at the point of anger. To fear crime, *I must actually see it for myself* <DETERMINED>. I just think it's dreadful that we have this much crime <SILENCE>…
        |Non-Western immigrant woman, 31-45 years|

The respondents who said they did actually experience 'fear' because of the problem of crime in Dutch society showed a heightened sense of risk sensitivity throughout the rest of the interview:

R₁₉: I'm fearful anyway, even if there was no crime in Holland <LAUGHS> I'm fearful, I'm a real scaredy-cat <LAUGHS>. |Western immigrant woman, 65+ years|

Twelve of the respondents thought crime in Holland to have risen lately. And fourteen of the respondents expected more crime in Dutch society in the near future. Most of them could not exactly pinpoint *why* they expected more crime. But five of them thought the arrival of immigrants to be a reason for the rise in crime they expect to happen:

I: What is your expectation for crime in Dutch society in the future?
R₁₈: <SILENCE>… Ahh, I see where you are going, *you're thinking about the immigrants, right?* <SUGGESTIVE>
I: Ehm, actually no. I'm not going anywhere with this. I'm just interested in your thoughts actually. My thoughts are not that relevant here <SMILES>. But if it's something you think about <SILENCE>…
R₁₈: Well <SILENCE>… Ok then <SIGHS>… *It has something to do with crime* <DETERMINED>. My idea is that all the scum comes to us. All the riff-raff and it's not OK. When you listen to the radio and the telly, you can hear it for yourself <SILENCE>…
I: People coming to the Netherlands to do crime?

R₁₈: Yes! *They should p*** off...* <ANGRY> <SILENCE>... Ehh, we should throw 'em out. How should I say that? Ahh, excuse me <LAUGHS>

I: Well, let's keep it at "something with a P", ok? <LAUGHS>.

R₁₈: <LAUGHS> Yes. Well, I can get really mad about this. It makes me think: *what are we doing? We have to work hard for it, right?* <ANGRY>. Yes, it makes me really mad!
         |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

Almost every respondent indicated the media as their prime source of information about crime in Dutch society. Ten of them stressed their objections to the way that crime messages are utilised by the media:

R₁₆: I have a problem with the media. On the one hand, they let you know many things. On the other hand, they're not a neutral group. Their core business is writing stories and there is a lot of subjectivity to it as well. But is it really that unsafe in Holland? Or do they just filter out those events that help them run their business?
         |Non-Western immigrant man, 18-30 years|

R₂₁: Just open a newspaper and there you have it <SILENCE>... It's there, week after week <SILENCE>... It's more a kind of entertainment, but I don't think crime to be entertaining, it's bad. |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

Fourteen respondents said they felt no sense of any personal influence on the problem of crime at the level of Dutch society:

R₁₄: Ehm <SILENCE>... I have quite some influence on my own life, but these kind of societal problems are out of my hands. I can vote, but I cannot control. I have little to say about these things, but in my own daily life I luckily have quite some influence.
         |Non-Western immigrant man, 18-30 years|

R₂₈: Ok, I vote when there are elections. Everybody votes. But I cannot do anything more than that against crime. What can I do about it then? <LAUGHS>. Politicians have to see what they can do about it, but it's complicated, right? <LAUGHS>
         |Non-Western immigrant woman, 31-45 years|

6.3.4 Discussing crime leads into a discourse of societal discontent

Crime proved itself to be a key word in activating a discourse around a broader societal discontent, for no fewer than 22 respondents:

R₈: It's our own stupid fault. We have permitted way too much. Things got too cozy here in Holland. We all had to be extremely tolerant, turn a blind eye to everything and all. But you wouldn't dare to do it in another country. Something has to change here, yes. We have to be stricter. Just what my father used to say: everybody in Holland could use a proper spanking. Yes. |Native Dutch woman, 46-65 years|

As a societal problem, the respondents mixed crime with many different societal worries. Strong sentiments were expressed frequently in combination with worries about:

- the future of young people in Holland (n=25);
- the arrival of Eastern-European immigrants (n=23);
- the arrival of Non-Western immigrants (n=21);
- loss of morality (n=19);
- the state of the economy (n=16);
- unemployment rates (n=16);
- consequences of the highly individualised society (n=13);
- the hardening nature of society (n=13);
- segregation (n=13);

- political dissatisfaction (n=12);
- the intensification of daily life in Dutch society (n=8).

Most respondents expressed the view that societal problems are beyond the reach of citizens as individuals and even beyond the reach of the government:

R29:   Yes, you hear a lot of people complaining about many things <SILENCE>… But it is not that you can influence it easily, it's not like moving or rebuilding something and it's done. No, it's way more complex <SILENCE>… |Non-Western immigrant woman, 31-45 years|

Almost every respondent looked to politicians to do something about the problem of crime in Dutch society. But this opened up a new area of frustration, with nineteen respondents saying they had no confidence in politicians:

R20:   They only worry about crime when they are in the picture. No, they just look for ways to get their votes. Do I expect a real solution for crime from politicians? *No.* <DETERMINED> |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

R27:   Ahh, they only *talk* <EMPHASIS> about crime, *Oh it's horrible* <CYNICAL>. Politicians who talk that simplistically about crime only have one goal and that is to warm up their seats in the European parliament, because it pays better. *But they do it on the backs of the normal people* <ANGRY>. |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

Eight respondents - and not only elderly respondents - articulated a sentiment of societal conservatism while discussing crime in Dutch society:

R6:   I think that we had a more stable society before. Yes. |Western immigrant woman, 31-45 years|

R11:   Well, communities were just way smaller and people had more like real contact and all. |Native Dutch man, 18-30 years|

R18:   Life was easier you know? You lived at a way slower pace than I see young families living at now. It makes me think: Wow, we really had a different way of living, way more relaxed. |Native Dutch woman, 65+ years|

For five respondents, Dutch society's radical and rapid change had led to a sentiment of alienation:

R20:   You know, if I was younger, I would leave Holland and emigrate. Really. There's too much tolerance and indifference among the Dutch nowadays. I think that there is a large group of people who think the same as I do. There is a lot of discontent in Holland. That's what I easily dare to say. *Yes, it has to get better in general* <DETERMINED>. |Native Dutch man, 65+ years|

6.3.5 Sub-conclusion for the semi-structured interview results

We will now summarise findings from the semi-structured questions concerning 'situational', 'personal', 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime' on the basis of the theory explored and our subsequent operationalisation of the fear of crime. The sub-concept of 'personal fear of crime' appeared to get suppressed by avoidance behaviour, which is strongly guided by the respondents' mental maps explored above. Besides avoidance behaviour, psychological defense mechanisms appeared to provide respondents with a sense of control and distance from the risk of crime.

At the level of the neighbourhood, we see a strong relationship between the fear of crime and collective efficacy, which itself seems to be related to the level of anonymity and individual intentions to invest in local connections. 'Societal fear of crime' appears to be amplified by broader societal discontent and political anger and to be related to sentiments of societal conservatism and alienation.

So, the semi-structured results show that respondents experience a *restrained* personal fear of crime, due to a convergence of avoidance behaviour and psychological defense mechanisms. But the experience of societal fear of crime seems to be *accelerated* by a broader societal discontent and a lack of political trust.

6.4 Qualitative conclusions

Crime proved itself to have a quite complex significance for the respondents. By breaking down the concept of 'the fear of crime' into the sub-concepts of 'situational', 'personal', 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime' – we gained a deeper understanding of the concept, through the individual stories of the thirty respondents.

Besides some clear differences, overall we were able to gain some significant insights into the fear of crime. Even when respondents were given *carte blanche* when developing associations with the question 'Do you ever feel unsafe?', they turned out to share significant knowledge about the risk of crime. This knowledge is rooted in five distinct *mental maps.* The factors that emerged from respondents' associations with photographs clearly resonated with the sub-concept of either 'personal' or 'societal fear of crime'.

The semi-structured results showed that 'personal fear of crime' is quite limited in the experience of the respondents, due to a convergence of avoidance behaviour and psychological defense mechanisms. Both of these lead to a sense of control and less involvement with the risk of crime at the personal level. 'Neighbourhood fear of crime' appeared to be strongly dependent on a more general experience of the neighbourhood. In particular, the degree of collective efficacy experienced seems to be of influence here. The respondents showed most involvement with 'societal fear of crime', as this sub-concept of the fear of crime seems to be amplified by a broader societal discontent and a lack of political trust.

So, respondents' explanations for their fear of crime lead us to suspect the fear of crime to have the most profound meaning at the societal level, instead of being a problem to the private selves of the respondents. The problem of crime seems to be perceived at the *safe distance* of the societal collective. But this distance does not prevent the expression of heartfelt worries.

6.5 Hypotheses for the subsequent survey

The qualitative insights of this chapter led us to the following hypotheses, the empirical tenability of which will be scrutinised in the next chapter for three very different research populations.

H_1	Citizens' personal fear of crime is experienced as relatively less problematic, since general fear of crime is experienced as more problematic.
H_2	Most citizens experience the risk of crime to be controllable at their personal level, but uncontrollable at the societal level.
H_3	The situational fear of falling victim of crime is, to citizens, a psychologically different concept from 'personal fear of crime' and 'general fear of crime'.
H_4	Citizens experience the situational fear of falling victim of crime as relatively more disturbing, because they are confronted with clear situations that people associate with a high potential or acute risk of personal victimisation of crime.
H_5	Citizens are aware of crime risks to their private self in daily life and try to avoid falling victim of crime by adjusting their behaviour.
H_6	Personal fear of crime is fed by the psychological trait of risk sensitivity.
H_7	Avoidance behaviour operates as a fear suppressor to the personal fear of crime.
H_8	Psychological defense mechanisms suppress personal fear of crime.
H_9	When citizens experience collective efficacy at the neighbourhood level, their fear of crime will be suppressed at this particular level.
H_{10}	The absence of personal influence on the risk of crime at the societal level functions as a catalyst for general fear of crime.
H_{11}	The experience of societal discontent functions as a catalyst for societal fear of crime.
H_{12}	General fear of crime is best understood as an expression of societal discontent.

7. Measuring 'the fear of crime'

The central research question for this chapter is:
What are the relative roles of 'personal fear of crime' and 'general fear of crime' in the generic explanation of 'the fear of crime' and what are the explanatory elements for these sub-concepts?

We will answer this research question by testing the hypotheses that were based on both the theoretical framework (chapter 3) and the qualitative research findings (chapter 5) of this book.


Fig. 18. – Sub-concepts of the fear of crime.

As outlined in the operationalisation, the concept of 'the fear of crime' is divided into the sub-concepts of 'situational', 'personal' and 'general fear of crime', with the latter broken down further into 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime' (fig. 18). All sub-concepts were provided with operational definitions as a theoretical basis for empirical measurement of 'the fear of crime' (see chapter 5).

7.1 Sample characteristics

The local governments of Amsterdam, Hilversum and Zaltbommel sent a personally addressed invitation to participate in the survey to a total of 11400 respondents, with 3800 respondents in each municipality. A copy of the questionnaire was included with the invitation, as was a return envelope (Babbie 1998:259), although respondents were also able to complete the questionnaire online (Billiet & Carton 2001:288). The invitation was delivered to the selected citizens around the 2nd of April 2015.

Selected respondents received a reminder letter two weeks later and were given the opportunity to request a new questionnaire and return envelope (Babbie 1998: 261). The closing date of data collection was set on the 8th of June 2015. During the data collection period, no specific *extreme* shock events took place in the local, national or international contexts that could have influenced the results. The topic of 'the fear of crime' was held to be of enough importance and appeal (Billiet & Carton 2001:308) to a sufficient number of potential respondents to reach the targeted response rate of 20 percent for all three populations[22].

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[22] For the sample of Amsterdam, additional reminder phone calls were made by OIS Amsterdam in the week after the reminder letter to reach this response.

7.1.1 Response rates

Multiple strategies were used to reach a response rate of 20 percent for all three municipalities, but the actual response rate achieved is largely dependent on the willingness of respondents to participate (Billiet & Carton 2001:286). In total, 2796 respondents completed the survey, making the total response rate 23 percent. The response rate for Amsterdam was quite low with just under fifteen percent[23] (tab. 4). This specific non-response was most probably due to the rather extensive length of the questionnaire used (Biliet & Carton 2001:314). And probably for that same reason, most respondents chose to complete the survey by postal correspondence (De Vaus 2001:190-191).

Please see chapter five of this book for more details on the quantitative research design.

	Total	Amsterdam	Hilversum	Zaltbommel
Response rate	23.30% (n=2796)	14.76% (n=561)	31.37% (n=1192)	28.19% (n=1043)
Postal completion	74.8% (n=2091)	60.2% (n=338)	77.3% (n=921)	79.8% (n=832)
Online completion	25.20% (n=705)	39.8% (n=223)	22.7% (n=271)	20.2% (n=211)

Tab. 4 – Response rates and methods of completion.

7.1.2 External validity

'Representative samples are necessary if we are to generalise from results obtained in a sample to the wider population that the sample is meant to represent' (De Vaus 2001:184). Representativeness of the three sample populations was checked for three characteristics: *age*[24], *geographical location*[25] and *political preference*[26]. As with every sample, the samples for Amsterdam, Hilversum and Zaltbommel are not perfect reflections of the research populations:

> For *age* there was clear under-representation in the age categories of '20 to 29 years', '30 to 39 years' and '40-49 years', and an over-representation of '50 to 64 years' and '65 years and older' for all three samples[27].

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[23] This was the case for two other large surveys (with other samples) for the municipality of Amsterdam at that time as well.

[24] By performing a χ^2 test for the variable 'age' (A2) and the demographic numbers of the municipalities as provided by the Dutch Statistics (CBS 2014).

[25] By performing a χ^2 test for the variable 'district' based on the respondents' post code (A7) and the demographic numbers of the municipalities as provided by the Dutch Statistics (CBS 2014).

[26] By performing a χ^2 test for the variable 'political preference' (A9) and the results of the elections for the provincial parliaments that were held on the 18th of March 2015, shortly before the surveys were completed, via: Verkiezingensite.nl (2015).

[27] $\chi^2_{Amsterdam}(5) = 59.76 > \chi^2_{crit}(5) = 20.51$; p= .001;
$\chi^2_{Hilversum}(5) = 228.46 > \chi^2_{crit}(5) = 20.51$; p= .001;
$\chi^2_{Zaltbommel}(5) = 179.22 > \chi^2_{crit}(5) = 20.51$; p= .001.

The sample population was a good reflection of the *political preferences* of the citizens of *Amsterdam*, but not for those of Hilversum and Zaltbommel[28]. The *Hilversum* sample had an under-representation of preference for 'VVD' (3.6%) and 'PVV' (3.4%) and an over-representation for '50PLUS' (2.7%) and 'D66' (5.6%), while the *Zaltbommel* sample had an under-representation of preference for 'SGP' (6.7%) and an over-representation for 'D66' (5.6%).

For *geographical location* there were clear differences for all three samples[29]. The *Amsterdam* sample had an under-representation of respondents from the districts of 'Nieuw-West' (5.5%), 'Oost' (2.6%) and 'Zuidoost' (1.8%) and an over-representation from 'Centrum' (5.5%) and 'Zuid' (2.6%). The *Hilversum* sample had an under-representation of respondents from the district of 'Oost' (4.9%) and an over-representation from 'Noordwest' (2.7%) and 'Hilversumsemeeent' (1.4%). The *Zaltbommel* sample had an underrepresentation of respondents from the districts of 'Brakel' (6.2%) and an over-representation of respondents from the town centre of 'Zaltbommel' (8.9%).

Comparing response and non-response groups (Billiet & Carton 2001:312) showed that non-response was prevalent among the sub-groups of the working-aged, lower-educated and urban-living respondents. These groups are held respectively to have less time to contribute, to see less relevance in their contribution and to be invited to contribute to research too often (Billiet & Carton 2001:314). But despite these shortcomings, these three samples provided a rich and differentiated quantitative view on characteristics and explanations for 'the fear of crime'.

7.2 Descriptive statistics
This section explores the descriptive statistics for the cognitive and affective elements of the sub-concepts of 'the fear of crime'. We will then investigate differences between men and women, age groups and the samples of the three municipalities.

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[28] $\chi^2_{Amsterdam} (9) = 11.41 < \chi^2_{crit} (9) = 14.68$; p= .10;
$\chi^2_{Hilversum} (5) = 48.48 > \chi^2_{crit} (9) = 7.88$; p= .001;
$\chi^2_{Zaltbommel} (10) = 50.26 > \chi^2_{crit} (10) = 29.59$; p= .001.

[29] $\chi^2_{Amsterdam} (6) = 31.94 > \chi^2_{crit} (6) = 22.46$; p= .001;
$\chi^2_{Hilversum} (5) = 25.95 > \chi^2_{crit} (5) = 20.51$; p= .001;
$\chi^2_{Zaltbommel} (3) = 27.54 > \chi^2_{crit} (3) = 16.27$; p= .001.

7.2.1 Explorations of cognitive and affective elements

In this first exploration of cognitive and affective aspects of 'the fear of crime', we will explore the descriptive statistics for (I) the standard items, as well as the four sub-concepts of the fear of crime: (II) 'situational'; (III) 'personal'; (IV) 'neighbourhood' and (V) 'societal fear of crime'.

Standard items

The first survey question was *'Do you ever feel unsafe?'* (V1A). It was accompanied by the question *'Do you feel unsafe rarely, sometimes or often?'* (V1B). These are the Dutch standard items to measure fear of crime.[30] After these two unspecific items, both questions were geographically specified at the levels of the neighbourhood (V2A.1 & V2B.1) and Dutch society (V2A.3 &V2B.3).[31] An overview of the results is provided in the table below (tab. 5). Most feelings of unsafety were expressed by respondents in respect of the unspecific item (V1A) and the geographically specified item for Dutch society (V2A.3).

	Feels unsafe	Rarely	Sometimes	Often		
Unspecific	64% (n=1653)	46% (n=844)	49% (n=889)	5% (n=85)	$\dot{x} =$ 1.58	$s =$ .58
	Feels unsafe	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**		
Neighbourhood	43% (n=1122)	45% (n=497)	48% (n=532)	7% (n=79)	$\dot{x} =$ 1.62	$s =$ .61
	Feels unsafe	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**		
Dutch society	64% (n=1653)	35% (n=571)	58% (n=932)	7% (n=107)	$\dot{x} =$ 1.71	$s =$ .58

Tab. 5 - Results for the standard items.

Correlation coefficients for these items were quite high (tab. 6). But these correlations are easy to understand, given the literal overlap of the items. But still, the unspecific standard item (V1A) shows significant resonance with the contexts of both the neighbourhood (V2A.1) and society (V2A.3).

	Unspecific (V1A)	Neighbourhood (V2A.1)	Dutch society (V2A.3)
Unspecific (V1A)	1.00	.56*	.57*
Neighbourhood (V2A.1)	.56*	1.00	.39*
Dutch society (V2A.3)	.57*	.39*	1.00

* = sign. correlation at the .01 level

Tab. 6 – Correlation coefficients for the standard items.

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[30] The standard items were added to the questionnaire in order to relate to previous studies. They are *not* reflections of our operationalisation of the fear of crime. Instead, a multitude of items was used in the following, to measure the breadth of the phenomenon. Please see Vanderveen 2006 and Pleysier 2010 for extensive critiques of the validity of these standard items.

[31] Some items related to place of residency were also added to the questionnaire due to the specific interest of the local governments with which we collaborated. But the results from these items are not relevant from a theoretical or empirical point of view, because they (I) are not part of the scope of this research and (II) provide too shallow an insight. Therefore, we will not discuss these items in the following.

Situational fear of crime

The questionnaire also contained situational items (V18.1 to V18.7) and photograph items (V19.1 to V19.4) to *approach* the concept of 'situational fear of crime'. Four of the situational items (V18.1-V18.4) were based on earlier social psychological studies of the fear of crime (Van der Wurff 1992, Pleysier 2010). The other three (V18.5-V18.7), as well as the photograph items (V19.1-V19.4), were based on the 'mental maps' reflected by respondents in the qualitative empirical part of this study.

The items used to approach 'situational fear of crime' (V18.1 to V19.4) form a reliable scale together (α=.92). The results for the *scale* of these items are as follows (tab. 7):

Feels … in reaction to the situation and photograph items			
1 - 'very safe' or 2 – 'safe'	5.4% (n=130)	$\dot{x} =$ 3.59	$s =$ .74
3 - 'not safe or unsafe'	38.9% (n=934)		
4 - 'unsafe' or 5 - 'very unsafe'	55.7% (n=1335)		

Tab. 7 – Results for the situational fear of crime scale.

Clearly, a majority of the respondents indicated that they felt some sense of unsafety in relation to these situational items. When additionally asked 'Are there any other situations or locations in which you feel unsafe?' (V19B), 26.2% of the respondents (n=734) answered 'yes'. The answers to the subsequent string variable with a request for short description (V19B_YES) were coded (n=1325), with a maximum of three codes per answer (mean amount of codes was 1.8). The most frequently added codes are categorised in the table below (tab. 8).

Situations associated with feeling unsafe in…	
Darkness	20.9% (n=277)
Travelling	13.1% (n=174)
Travelling *by public transport*	5.4% (n=72)
Being alone	10.1% (n=134)
Locations associated with feeling unsafe in…	
Train stations	8.8% (n=117)
Parks or green areas	6.4% (n=85)
Carparks or garages	3.8% (n=50)
City or town centres	2.1% (n=28)
Tunnels	1.7% (n=22)
Night life areas	1.4% (n=19)
Shopping malls	0.7% (n=10)
Stereotypes associated with feeling unsafe with….	
Immigrants	2.8% (n=37)
Loitering youths	2.3% (n=30)

Tab. 8 – Associations to 'situational fear of crime'.

The respondents associated the *experience* of 'unsafety' with situations of darkness, travelling and being alone. Furthermore, they especially related 'unsafety' to locations of train stations, parks or green areas, and carparks or

garages. The stereotypes that respondents associated with were immigrants and loitering youths. So, despite personal variances, respondents sketched quite a consistent picture of situations, locations and people they hold to be 'unsafe'. These quantitative insights strongly align with the 'mental maps' that respondents gave voice to in the qualitative section described in the previous chapter

Specific crime thoughts
A respondent's specific crime thoughts were addressed at several levels of psychological reference. The first was at the personal level, with a string variable about the specific type of crime that respondents thought about when assessing their personal chance of falling victim of crime in the coming twelve months (V4B). Subsequent string variables related to their thoughts about the most frequently occurring type of crime in the neighbourhood (V5B.1) and in Dutch society (V5B.3). Specific thoughts about the risk of crime for the private self-correlated mostly with assessments of the most common crime in the context of the neighbourhood (tab. 9) [32].

Respondents had less specific crime thoughts about actual crime at the personal level (1391 codes) than at the neighbourhood (2233 codes) and societal (2557 codes) levels. At all levels, 'burglary' was answered most frequently, followed by 'theft' (tab. 7-9). Respondents also thought extensively about 'violence' as the most often occurring type of crime at the societal level (tab. 9).

	Self (V4B)	Neighbourhood (V5B.1)	Dutch society (V5B.3)
Self (V4B)	1.00	.35*	.17*
Neighbourhood (V5B.1)	.35*	1.00	.28*
Dutch society (V5B.3)	.17*	.28*	1.00

* = sign. correlation at the .01 level

Tab. 9 – Correlation coefficients for the specific types of crime items.

Personal fear of crime
When it comes to the sub-concept of 'personal fear of crime', crime seems to be a *contained problem* for most respondents. At the same time they feel a fairly significant personal influence over the prevention of victimisation (tab. 10).

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[32] In order to compare the answers given by the respondents, the same codes were used for the coding of answers to the string variables V4B, V5B.1 & V5B.3.

Assessment of one's chance of falling victim of crime in the coming twelve months (V4A)			
1 - 'no chance'	6.8% (n=170)		
2 - 'very small' or 3 - 'small' chance	47.7% (n=1186)	$\dot{x} =$	$s =$
4 - 'not a small not a big chance'	29.4% (n=731)	3.40	1.12
5 - 'big' or 6 - 'very big' chance	16.1% (n=399)		

Thinks about a specific type of crime while assessing one's chance of falling victim of crime in the coming twelve months (V4B*)			
Does *not* think about a specific type of crime	54.8% (n=1343)		
Thinks about anti-social behaviour	4.9% (n=137)		
Thinks about actual crime	31.8% (n=889)	*	*
Thinks about burglary	19.5% (n=546)		
Thinks about theft	13.0% (n=364)		

Indicated to have ever fallen victim of crime in the past (V3A) 12.3% (n=341)			
Has fallen victim of anti-social behaviour (V3B*)	2.2% (n=63)		
Has fallen victim of actual crime (V3B*)	8.4% (n=69)	*	*
Has fallen victim of burglary (V3B*)	1.3% (n=86)		
Has fallen victim of theft (V3B*)	3.1% (n=40)		

Assessment of one's influence over the prevention of falling victim of crime (V8)			
1 - 'no influence'	10.7% (n=275)		
2 - 'very small' or 3 - ' small' influence	18.6% (n=675)	$\dot{x} =$	$s =$
4 - 'not a small not a big influence'	26.6% (n=684)	4.08	1.49
5 - 'big' or 6 - 'very big' influence	44.1% (n=1126)		

Assessment of the magnitude of the problem of crime to oneself (V7)			
1 - 'not a problem'	23.8% (n=611)		
2 - 'very small' or 3 -'small' problem	31.0% (n=793)	$\dot{x} =$	$s =$
4 - 'not a small not a big problem'	22.0% (n=563)	3.21	1.58
5 - 'big' or 6 - 'very big' problem	23.3% (n=596)		

* = *String variable*, analysis of coded answers with a maximum of 3 codes per answer.

Tab. 10 – Descriptive statistics for the cognitive items of 'personal fear of crime'.

Neighbourhood fear of crime

Fear of crime is experienced as slightly more problematic at the level of the neighbourhood (tab. 8). The majority of respondents assessed crime to occur 'sometimes' in their neighbourhood. At this level of reference, respondents appeared to have more specific thoughts about the risk of crime. At the same time, respondents assessed their influence over the prevention of crime in the neighbourhood to be less than at the personal level (tab. 11).

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Assessment of the occurrence of crime in the neighbourhood (V5A.1)			
1 - 'never'	3.3% (n=84)		
2- 'rarely'	28.6% (n=722)	$\dot{x} =$	$s =$
3 - 'sometimes'	52.6% (n=1326)	2.80	.73
4 - 'often'	15.5% (n=390)		
Assessment of the most occurring type of crime in the neighbourhood (V5B.1*)			
Does *not* think about a specific type of crime	27.7% (n=774)		
Thinks about anti-social behaviour	4.3% (n=120)		
Thinks about actual crime	60.5% (n=1692)	*	*
Thinks about burglary	48.8% (n=1303)		
Thinks about theft	16.7% (n=446)		
Assessment of one's influence over the prevention of crime in the neighbourhood V9.1			
1 - 'no influence'	17.5% (n=448)		
2 - 'very small' or 3 - 'small' influence	26.3% (n=675)	$\dot{x} =$	$s =$
4 - 'not a small not a big influence'	27.0% (n=693)	3.55	1.54
5 - 'big' or 6 - 'very big' influence	29.1% (n=748)		
Assessment of the magnitude of the problem of crime in the neighbourhood (V6.1)			
1 - 'not a problem'	13.1% (n=367)		
2 - 'very small' or 3 - 'small' problem	31.5% (n=802)	$\dot{x} =$	$s =$
4 - 'not a small not a big problem'	27.8% (n=707)	3.53	1.46
5 - 'big' or 6 - 'very big' problem	26.2% (n=668)		

* = *String variable*, analysis of coded answers with a maximum of 3 codes per answer.

Tab. 11 – Descriptive statistics for the cognitive items of 'neighbourhood fear of crime'.

Societal fear of crime

Fear of crime at the societal level (tab. 12) was clearly most problematic to respondents. The respondents generally assessed crime to occur more 'often' in Dutch society, while their thoughts about crime were less specific than at the level of the neighbourhood. Given their assessment of having a smaller influence over the prevention of crime at the societal level, crime becomes a 'big' problem in Dutch society for the majority of respondents.

Assessment of the occurrence of crime in Dutch society (V5A.3)			
1 - 'never'	0.5% (n=12)		
2- 'rarely'	3.5% (n=84)	$\dot{x}$ =	s =
3 - 'sometimes'	28.9% (n=702)	3.63	.58
4 - 'often'	67.2% (n=1634)		
Assessment of the most occurring type of crime in Dutch society (V5B.3*)			
Does *not* think about a specific type of crime	37.1% (n=1036)		
Thinks about anti-social behaviour	4.2% (n=117)		
Thinks about actual crime	54.0% (n=1509)	*	*
Thinks about burglary	22.0% (n=658)		
Thinks about theft	14.3% (n=426)		
Thinks about violence	13.7% (n=410)		
Assessment of one's influence over the prevention of crime in Dutch society (V9.3)			
1 - 'no influence'	17.5% (n=448)		
2 - 'very small' or 3 - 'small' influence	26.3% (n=675)	$\dot{x}$ =	s =
4 - 'not a small not a big influence'	27.0% (n=693)	2.77	1.47
5 - 'big' or 6 - 'very big' influence	29.1% (n=748)		
Assessment of the magnitude of the problem of crime in Dutch society (V6.3)			
1 - 'not a problem'	1.4% (n=31)		
2 - 'very small' or 3- 'small' problem	5.3% (n=120)	$\dot{x}$ =	s =
4 - 'not a small not a big problem'	18.5% (n=416)	5.08	1.04
5 - 'big' or 6- 'very big' problem	74.8% (n=1683)		

* = *String variable*, analysis of coded answers with a maximum of 3 codes per answer.

Tab. 12 – Descriptive statistics for the cognitive items of 'societal fear of crime'.

Recap of the cognitive items
Let us draw together the explored cognitive items for 'situational', 'personal', 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime'. Compared with the standard items for 'personal', 'neighbourhood' and 'societal' fear of crime, the items for 'situational fear of crime' lead to relatively more 'fear of crime'. In general, the number of respondents who consider crime to be a 'big' or 'very big' problem seems to be a function of (I) experienced influence over the prevention of crime, and (II) estimations of the occurrence of crime. From the psychological levels of reference of the private self, to the neighbourhood, to society, experienced influence over the prevention of crime decreases and crime is experienced as more problematic.

Respondents consistently thought most about the specific crime risk of burglary at all three levels of reference. But the further away respondents thought crime to be, the more abstract their thoughts about crime became: respondents reflected most specific thoughts about crime at the neighbourhood level. Their thoughts became less specific when asked about the most frequently occurring type of crime in Dutch society. Specific thoughts about the private risks of specific crimes seemed to be *suppressed*. So – as was observed for the standard items above - crime has relatively most *cognitive* significance to the respondents as a problem at the level of Dutch society.

Personal vs. societal fear of crime affective elements[33]

Let's turn to the affective elements of the sub-concepts of 'the fear of crime' in more detail now. The respondents were asked to label their emotions when considering their own chance of falling victim of crime (V12A), as well as their emotion when they consider crime in Dutch society (V13A). The correlation coefficient for these two items is .38 and this correlation is significant on the .01 level. But the reliability of the two items (α=.54) shows that the emotion labelling was actually different (tab. 13).

	1 - Irritation	2 - Anger	3 - Worry	4 - Fear	5 - Stress		
Personal (V12A)	11.1% (n=277)	29.3% (n=728)	27.4% (n=682)	27.5% (n=683)	4.7% (n=116)	$\dot{x}$ = 2.85	s = 1.09
Societal (V13A)	13.2% (n=336)	25.7% (n=656)	48.4% (n=1237)	11.2% (n=287)	1.5% (n=38)	$\dot{x}$ = 2.62	s = .90

Tab. 13 – Labelling of primary emotions related to personal and societal fear of crime.

At the personal level (V12A), the average emotion labelling by the respondents is a mixture of 'anger', 'fear' and 'worry'. The emotion when thinking about crime in society (V13A) is primarily labelled as 'worry', with undertones of 'anger' and 'irritation'. Affective elements are assessed to appear slightly more frequently at the societal level than at the personal level (tab. 14):

	1 - Rarely	2 - Sometimes	3 - Often		
Personal (V12B)	35.3% (n=850)	48.4% (n=1163)	16.3% (n=392)	$\dot{x}$ = 1.81	s = .69
Societal (V13B)	16.8% (n=405)	51.6% (n=1245)	31.7% (n=765)	$\dot{x}$ = 2.15	s = .68

Tab. 14 – Assessments of occurrence of emotions related to the personal chance of falling victim of crime and crime in Dutch society.

This corresponds with the results of the standard items described earlier for personal (V1B)[34] and societal (V2B.3)[35] fear of crime. But reliability analysis - with rather low alphas of respectively .42 and .55 - shows that the specific affective items (V12B & V13B) actually measure *other aspects* than the general assessment

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[33] As discussed in section 5.3.2, the respondents were *not* asked to label and estimate the occurrence and duration of affects for 'neighbourhood fear of crime', since the test survey - completed by 411 respondents from an online citizen panel from the municipality of Amsterdam - consistently showed no or little variation in answers when asked about affective elements at the neighbourhood and societal levels. Additionally, many test respondents indicated this task of dividing affective aspects at the neighbourhood and societal level to be *too abstract* for them. Therefore, we only asked the respondents about the extremes of 'personal' and 'societal fear of crime', with 'societal fear of crime' functioning as an anchor concept to the larger concept of 'general fear of crime'.

[34] Sign.corr. for V12B & V1B on the .01 level, corr. coefficient = .39; α = .42.

[35] Sign.corr. for V13B & V2B.3 on the .01 level, corr. coefficient = .27; α=.55.

items. The affective elements are also estimated to last longer at the societal level than at the personal level (Tab. 15).

In short, 'societal fear of crime' clearly exceeds 'personal fear of crime' when it comes to the affective aspects of the sub-concepts.

	1 – Very short	2 - Short	3 – Long	4 – Very long		
Personal (V12C)	24.2% (n=562)	62.9% (n=145)	11.3% (n=262)	1.5% (n=35)	$\dot{x}$ = 1.90	s = .64
Societal (V13C)	16.9% (n=411)	65.2% (n=158)	15.9% (n=386)	2.0% (n=48)	$\dot{x}$ = 2.03	s = .64

Tab. 15 – Assessments of duration of emotions related to the personal chance of falling victim of crime and crime in Dutch society.

7.2.2 Gender, age group and municipality differences
So far, we have treated all 2796 respondents as being part of one research population, while in fact they need to be divided into several sub-populations. The aim is to search for differences and similarities between relevant sub-groups, to get a better understanding of the nature of the fear of crime. There are many ways in which a sample population can be divided into sub-populations, but the choice was made to distinguish sub-populations on the basis of gender, age groups and municipalities.

The search for differences started by firstly calculating the χ^2 score to discover the significance of differences (see appendix IV, tab. 1, 3 & 5). Then the means and standard deviations were analysed in order to identify the actual magnitude of the observed differences (see appendix IV, tab. 2, 4 & 6).

Gender differences[36]
When we analyse the descriptive statistics related to differences between men (n=1084) and women (n=1561), we see that *women are slightly more sensitive than men on almost every explored aspect of the fear of crime*. Two observed gender differences catch the eye:
(I) Women think they have more influence over the prevention of crime in the neighbourhood (V9.1) than men do; and (II) men are less likely than women to consider crime to be a 'big' problem in Dutch society (V6.3).

When we look at gender differences more precisely, we see that men and women only agree on:

i. The extent to which they had fallen victim of crime in the past twelve months (V3A);
ii. The extent to which they think about a specific type of crime when they estimate their own chance of falling victim of crime (V4B);

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36   See appendix IV, tab. 1 & 2.

   iii.   Their estimation of the frequency (V2B.1 & V13B) and duration (V12C & V13C) of experienced emotions.

This last point of consensus between men and women (iii) must, however, be understood properly, since men used less intense labels to label their emotions related to the fear of crime than women did (V12A & V13A).

Age group differences[37]
We also searched for differences between age groups of '20 to 29 years' (n=248); '30 to 39 years' (n=343); '40 to 49 years' (n=453); '50 to 64 years' (n=839) and '65 years and older' (n=849). The observed differences between the age categories appear to have quite a nuanced structure.

The older respondents are, the *less*…

   i.   they think that crime occurs in their neighbourhoods (V5A.1);
   ii.   they experienced being a victim of crime themselves (V3A);
   iii.   they think crime to be a problem for themselves (V7);
   iv.   influence they experience over the prevention of crime in general (V8; V5A.1; V5A.3);

… and the *more*…

   v.   frequently they experience feelings of unsafety in Dutch society (V2B.3);
   vi.   they think crime to occur 'often' in Dutch society (V5A.3);
   vii.   they think crime to be a problem in Dutch society (V6.3);
  viii. they assessed the occurrence of affective elements at the personal (V12B) and societal (V13B) levels;
   ix.   they tend to think about specific types of crime one might fall victim of (V4B);
   x.   situational feelings of unsafety they expressed (sit_foc_scale).

So, the older respondents are, the more sensitive they are to the fear of crime *in general*. But this has a more precise explanation, as: (I) they are more sensitive to the *affective elements* of the fear of crime; and (II) they worry more particularly about crime in *Dutch society* than about the risk of crime to their private selves.

Municipality differences[38]
Differences between the answers of respondents from the municipalities of 'Amsterdam' (n=561), 'Hilversum' (n=1192) and 'Zaltbommel' (n=1043), were not significant in respect of the standard items (V1A & V1B). But the more specific items showed some interesting patterns.

The assessments of the occurrence of crime at the level of the *neighbourhood* (V5A.1) appear to correspond with the relative crime rates within the

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[37]   See appendix IV, tab. 3 & 4.
[38]   See appendix IV, tab. 4 & 5.

municipalities[39]. The respondents from Amsterdam appeared quite 'streetwise' in dealing with the risk of crime, as they were less likely to express feelings of unsafety in reaction to the situational items (sit_foc_scale). They expressed the greatest feelings of influence over preventing themselves falling victim of crime (V8), as well as preventing crime in the neighbourhood (V9.1). At the same time, they were most likely to assess crime to occur in their neighbourhood (V4A.1) and held crime in their neighbourhoods to be the most problematic (V6.1). Strikingly, they assessed the *smallest chance* of falling victim of crime themselves (V4A), while they actually fell victim of crime the most (V3A).

A reversed structure became visible for the respondents of Zaltbommel, who were most likely to express feelings of unsafety in Dutch society (V2A.3 & V2B.3). They also thought crime in Dutch society to occur more 'often' (V5A.3) and to be most problematic (V6.3). Although they fell victim of crime less frequently and assessed crime in their neighbourhood to occur less (V4A.1), they thought they had the *biggest chance* of falling victim of crime themselves (V4A).

So, the respondents who were actually most likely actually to experience problematic crime *nearby* (Amsterdam) paradoxically considered themselves to have the *smallest* chance of falling victim of crime and *vice versa* (Zaltbommel). We will search for explanations for this remarkable finding in the structural equation models later in this chapter (section 7.4.6).

Recap of gender, age and municipality differences
There were some recurrent findings for differences in gender, age and between the municipalities. First of all, women consistently showed slightly more sensitivity to the fear of crime than men. Older respondents appeared to be more sensitive to the affective elements of the fear of crime and to worry more about crime in Dutch society in particular. The municipalities had clear differences, since the respondents who experienced problematic crime in their neighbourhood and fell victim of crime the most (Amsterdam) thought they had the smallest chance of falling victim of crime and *vice versa* (Zaltbommel).

7.2.3 Sub-conclusion for the descriptive statistics
Oversight of the descriptive results strongly supports the following sub-conclusion: 'general fear of crime' and, especially, 'societal fear of crime' exceed 'personal fear of crime' in respect of both the cognitive and affective aspects. Respondents seem to evaluate 'societal fear of crime' as most frequently occurring and most problematic. So, for the majority of the respondents, crime is primarily experienced as a *distant* problem at the level of Dutch society.

For one quarter of the respondents, however, crime is experienced as a *nearby* problem – at the level of the neighbourhood. Experiencing crime as a proximate problem does not translate into a higher estimation of one's personal chance of

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[39]   Amsterdam had 102533 crimes registered for 2014, Hilversum 5459 and Zaltbommel 1178.

falling victim of crime. The opposite was observed instead: those respondents who thought they had most chance of falling victim of crime in the coming twelve months had actually fallen victim of crime the least and they assessed the least crime in their own neighbourhoods. This is where the concept of 'the fear of crime' appears to stop following lines of logic in our data. More complex explanations need to be found in order to understand the complex nature of 'the fear of crime', drawing on insights offered within previous theoretical and qualitative chapters. But we must first work towards an *inferential position* for the relevant sub-concepts, before turning to explanatory elements.

7.3 Reliability, scales & dimensions of concepts

To enable the use of structural equation modelling (SEM) in the explanatory part of this chapter (section 7.4), we will now search for coherence among items that were intended to measure elements of theoretical concepts. This was done by checking on their correlation coefficients and reliability (by calculating Cronbach's alpha).

The next step was factor analysis. Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) was the exploratory factor extraction method of our choice, for the following reasons: (I) the factors were expected to have fairly *simple patterns* based on relatively *few indicators* (De Winter & Doudou 2011:695); (II) furthermore, we expected the factors to be *correlated* (ibid:708) due to their theoretical similarity; and (III) our goal with factor analysis was to find out whether or not there were *substantial differences* (ibid:708; Thompson 2004) between the factors. Inter-correlation between the factors was expected due to them being the outcomes of the same 'underlying factors' or 'hypothetical constructs' (Kim & Mueller 1978:15). This made *oblique rotation* the most suitable strategy for our factor rotation.

7.3.1 Personal vs. situational fear of crime

The items used to measure 'personal fear of crime' (V1A; V1B; V4A; V4B_HIC; V7; V8; V10.1; V11.1; V12B & V12C) and 'situational fear of crime' (V18.1 to V18.7 & V19.1 to 19.4) showed significant correlations at at least the .05 level. But the strongest correlation coefficients were within the separate categories. Their combined reliability is rather good ($\alpha = .84$), but this was primarily due to the items related to 'situational fear of crime', since those related to 'personal fear of crime' seemed to add little reliability to the scale.

Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) showed four eigenvalues >1 (6.43; 2.16; 1.22; 1.10). With theoretical considerations in mind, two factors were interpreted. These two factors explain 37.96% of variance and their correlation coefficient is .23.

		1	2
Personal FoC	V1A	.13	.13
	V4A	.01	.01
	V4B_HIC	-.04	.10
	V7	.06	-.10
	V8	-.04	-.18
	V10.1	-.01	**.69**
	V11.1	.13	**.72**
	V12B	-.03	**.34**
	V12C	.01	.19
Situational FoC	V18.1	**.42**	.09
	V18.2	.04	.00
	V18.3	.09	-.03
	V18.4	.25	.02
	V18.5	**.46**	.03
	V18.6	**.68**	.06
	V18.7	**.54**	.08
	V19.1	**.81**	.01
	V19.2	.23	.04
	V19.3	**.81**	.00
	V19.4	**.53**	-.08

Tab. 16 – Factors for items of 'situational' and 'personal fear of crime'.

The first factor (tab. 16) shows relatively low loadings on the items of 'personal fear of crime' and high loadings on the items of 'situational fear of crime', while the second factor shows roughly equivalent, but mirrored loadings. This presents a strong empirical argument for treating 'personal fear of crime'[40] and 'situational fear of crime'[41] as separate concepts.

For the concept of 'personal fear of crime', reliability is relatively poor with an alpha of .68. But this is due the fact that it comprises an assembly of very diverse cognitive and affective elements.

7.3.2 Neighbourhood and societal fear of crime

The items used to measure 'neighbourhood fear of crime' (V2A.1; V5A.1; V5B.1_HIC; V6.1) and 'societal fear of crime' (V2A.3; V5A.3; V5B.3_HIC; V6.3; V10.2; V11.2; V13B; V13C) show significant correlations at the .05 and .01 levels. But, again, the strongest correlation coefficients are within the separate categories.

	1	2	3	4	5
1	1.00	.20	.39	.13	.33
2	.20	1.00	.15	.11	.27
3	.39	.15	1.00	.07	.20
4	.13	.11	.07	1.00	.02
5	.33	.27	.20	.02	1.00

Tab. 17 – Correlations matrix for the factors of the items for neighbourhood and societal fear of crime.

Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) showed five eigenvalues >1 (3.22; 1.55; 1.31; 1.95; 1.05). All five factors were interpreted. Together these five factors explain 49.03% of variance. Correlations between the five factors (tab. 17) are not high in general, except for the moderate correlations of factor 1 with factors 3 and 5.

		1	2	3	4	5
Neighb.	V2A.1	-.09	**.32**	.06	-.05	**.52**
	V5A.1	.04	**.77**	.04	.00	-.12
	V5B.1_HIC	-.10	.05	.02	**.56**	-.01
	V6.1	.10	**.68**	-.05	.03	.14
Societal	V2A.3	.13	-.14	.04	.02	**.67**
	V5A.3	**.48**	.10	.06	.07	-.04
	V5B.3_HIC	.08	-.05	-.01	**.51**	.00
	V6.3	**.56**	.08	-.06	.09	.17
	V10.2	**.79**	-.04	.04	-.05	-.04
	V11.2	**.74**	-.02	.04	-.08	.00
	V13B	-.01	-.05	**.96**	.01	-.07
	V13C	.05	.03	**.54**	.00	.10

Tab. 18 – Factors for items of neighbourhood and societal fear of crime.

The first factor (tab. 18) shows relatively low values on the items of 'neighbourhood fear of crime' and high values on the items of 'societal fear of crime'. The second factor is roughly equivalent to the first. The third factor only has relatively high loadings on the affective aspects of 'societal fear of crime' (V13B & V13C). And the fourth factor only has high loadings on thinking about high-impact crime at both levels of the

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40   Significant correlation between all items at the .05 and .01 level; α = .68.
41   Significant correlation between all items at the .01 level; α = .92.

neighbourhood (V5B.1_HIC) and society (V5B.3_HIC). The final factor primarily has high loadings on the standard items of both neighbourhood (V2A.1) and societal fear of crime (V2A.3).

This factor analysis leads to the conclusion that while cognitions and feelings of unsafety at the level of the neighbourhood and Dutch society may co-vary for some respondents, they are essentially separate concepts in the experience of respondents. Therefore, neighbourhood fear of crime[42] and societal fear of crime[43] will be treated as separate concepts, albeit in the knowledge that they correlate on some aspects for some respondents.

7.3.3 Avoidance behaviour

The items used to measure 'avoidance behaviour' (V20.1 to V20.8) show significant correlations between all variables at the .01 scale. Combined, their reliability is rather good (α= .81), but some items (V20.5 to V20.8) contributed relatively little to this scale.

Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) showed two eigenvalues >1 (3.02; 1.26). These two factors explain 46.91% of variance and their correlation coefficient is .48.

	1	2
V20.1	.86	-.12
V20.2	.64	.08
V20.3	.69	.12
V20.4	.85	-.05
V20.5	.22	.40
V20.6	.01	.67
V20.7	-.08	.67
V20.8	.28	.27

Tab. 19 – Factors for the items of 'avoidance behaviour'.

Relatively high loadings are seen for the first factor (tab. 19) on the first four items (V20.1 to V20.4) and for the second factor on the last four items (V20.5 to V20.8). These factors are fairly straightforward to explain from a theoretical point of view, since the first is about avoidance *behaviour*, while the second is more about a *psychological state of mind* when dealing with the risk of crime in the public sphere. For the concept of 'avoidance behaviour'[44], the choice was made to separate the items from the second factor (V20.5 to V20.7).

7.3.4 Social disorganisation

The items used to measure 'social disorganisation' in neighbourhoods (V17.1 to V17.5) show significant correlations between all variables at the .01 scale. Combined, their reliability is quite good (α= .70) and factor analysis (PAF) showed that they formed a single factor, explaining 33.07% of variance.

7.3.5 Societal discontent

The items used to measure 'societal discontent' (V22.1 to V22.10) show significant correlations at the .01 scale. Combined, their reliability is good (α= .88) and factor analysis (PAF) showed that they also form a single factor, explaining 43% of variance.

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[42] Significant correlation between all items on the .01 level; α = .62.
[43] Significant correlation between all items on the .01 level; α = .74.
[44] Significant correlation between all items on the .01 level; α = .82.

7.3.6 Conservatism, authoritarianism & dispositional fear

		1	2
A.	V21.1	.76	-.01
	V21.3	.87	-.04
C.	V21.4	.83	.01
	V21.5	.80	.04
D.	V14.1	.02	.72
	V14.2	-.01	.72

Tab. 20 – Factors for the items of 'authoritarian sentiments', 'societal conservatism' and 'dispositional fear'.

The correlation matrix for the items used to measure 'authoritarian sentiments' (A. - V21.1 & V21.3), 'societal conservatism' (C. - V21.4 & V21.5) and 'dispositional fear' (D. - V14.1 & V14.2) show significant correlations at the .01 level.

Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) showed two eigenvalues >1 (3.15; 1.37). These two factors explain 61.92 % of variance and their correlation coefficient is .29. The first factor (tab. 20) has high loadings on the items of 'societal conservatism' and 'authoritarian sentiments' with low loadings on the items of 'dispositional fear'. The second factor mirrored the first.

This advocates 'dispositional fear'[45] to be a separate concept in the experience of respondents. The option of treating the items of 'societal conservatism' and 'authoritarian sentiments' as separate concepts is more theoretical, since, empirically speaking, co-variation suggests they are part of the same factor. But looking at the correlation matrix for these items (tab. 21), we see that the correlations between each pair of items (in bold) is relatively high.

		V21.1	V21.3	V21.4	V21.5
A.	V21.1	1.00	.742**	.574**	.560**
	V21.3	.742**	1.00	.673**	.641**
C.	V21.4	.574**	.673**	1.00	.786**
	V21.5	.560**	.641**	.786**	1.00

** Correlation is SIGNIFICANT at the 0.01 level.

Tab. 21 – Correlations between the items used to measure 'authoritarian sentiments' and 'societal conservatism'.

So, 'authoritarian sentiments'[46] and 'societal conservatism'[47] will be used as separate concepts in the following, although it is clear that these concepts are aligned.

	1	2	3
1	1.00	-.28	-.04
2	-.28	1.00	-.08
3	-.04	-.08	1.00

Tab. 22 – Correlations matrix for the factors of 'psychological defenses'.

7.3.7 Psychological defenses

The items used to measure psychological defenses (V14.7 to V14.12) have significant correlations at the .01 level for all items. Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) showed three eigenvalues >1 (1.59; 1.17; 1.03). These three factors explain 33.57% of variance. Correlations between the factors are negative (tab. 22).

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[45]   Significant correlation between all items at .01 level; α = .68.
[46]   Significant correlation between all items to .01 level; α = .88.
[47]   Significant correlation between all items to .01 level; α = .85.

	1	2	3
V14.7	.10	-.07	**.60**
V14.8	**.79**	-.01	.13
V14.9	**.36**	.03	.01
V14.10	.17	**.77**	-.16
V14.11	-.05	**.32**	.02
V14.12	-.23	.22	.15

Tab. 23 – Factors for the items used to measure 'psychological defenses'.

For the first factor (tab. 23), we see that two general indicators of defenses - 'tending to ignore unpleasant facts' (V14.8) and 'being frequently told not to show feelings' (V14.9) - are connected with negative loads on the crime-specific defenses of 'displacement' (V14.11) and 'suppression' (V14.12).

For the second factor, we see a crucial role for the crime-specific defense of 'rationalisation' (V14.10) and relatively smaller roles for 'displacement' (V14.11) and 'suppression' (V14.12), with low and even negative loadings on the general indicators of defenses (V14.7-V14.9).

For the third factor, we see coherence between the general indicator of defenses of 'being good at keeping problems out of one's mind' (V14.7) and 'tending to ignore unpleasant facts' (V14.8) with the crime-specific defense of 'suppression' (V14.12).

In contrast with previously discussed concepts, all elements of psychological defenses must be seen as *separate cognitive phenomena that can co-exist* (Sandler 1985, Cramer 2006; Valliant 1992). This is supported by the general weak reliability of the items used (α = .08). But since the nature - *being unconscious* - and the function - *bolstering the self-image* – of these phenomena are of the same order, it is justified to treat them as a latent construct together.

7.3.8 Vulnerability
The items used to measure psychological (V16.1) and physical vulnerability (V16.2) have a correlation coefficient of .44, which is significant at the .01 level. Their reliability is rather low (α= .61). But Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) showed that together they formed a single factor, explaining 44.28% of variance. Therefore they are held to form one concept of 'vulnerability'.

Now that we have a clear inferential position for each of the relevant concepts, we can turn to the actual explanatory models. The observed items used to compose the latent variables in the structural equation models correspond with the dimensions for these concepts, as explored in the previous section.

7.4 Structural equation models
All initial structural equation models were based on the theoretical models outlined in the theoretical chapters, the qualitative results and previously observed patterns in the descriptive statistics. The procedure followed was to get the goodness-of-fit statistics to reach *acceptable values* at four levels: the total survey population (n=2796), and the subpopulations of the municipalities of Amsterdam (n=561), Hilversum (n=1192) and Zaltbommel (n=1043).

The choice was made to use the method of *maximum likelihood with missing values* (mlmv) to produce the structural equation models, because missing values were *not* missing completely at random, but appeared to follow structures in some other variables. Due to (I) the relatively large sample sizes and (II) the expected complexity of the models, rather large chi square values were expected[48]. This compelled us to weigh the chi square values against the degrees of freedom and incorporate the comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and coefficient of determination (CD) values into the decision of acceptance. For our models, the acceptance threshold of both the CFI and TLI were set at .80 and the RMSEA was not to exceed the upper limit of .08 in order to be accepted. In general, a CD score of 1 corresponds with a perfect fit of the model with the initial data, so this is the CD we aimed for.

The next section discusses the resulting structural equation models for the sub-concepts of 'personal', 'neighbourhood', and 'societal' fear of crime. By way of conclusion, we will present an integrative model and focus on the internal structure of the cognition of crime as a significant threat to the private self.

7.4.1 Personal and situational fear of crime model

	Observations	ρ	χ^2/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	CD
Total	2793	.00	8.49	.90	.89	.05	1.00
Amsterdam	560	.00	2.93	.87	.86	.06	1.00
Hilversum	1191	.00	4.28	.88	.89	.05	1.00
Zaltbommel	1042	.00	3.72	.90	.89	.05	1.00

Note. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CD = coefficient of determination

Tab. 24 – Goodness-of-fit statistics, personal and situational fear of crime model.

Fig. 19 – Personal and situational fear of crime model, standardised coefficients.

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[48]   Please see section 5.3.2 for further details.

'Personal fear of crime' (tab. 24 & fig. 19) is influenced by sentiments of '*societal conservatism'* (λ=.32). As was already clear from the previous factor analysis, 'societal conservatism' is connected to '*authoritarian sentiments'* (Ψ=.80). And, to a moderate extent, both elements are connected to the trait of '*dispositional fear'* (Ψ_{Cons} =.28 ; Ψ_{Auth}=.23). 'Personal fear of crime' is clearly suppressed (λ=-.42) by '*psychological defenses'*. '*Situational fear of crime'* has only relatively little impact on '*personal fear of crime'* (λ=.09). While '*situational fear of crime'* itself is influenced by the trait of 'dispositional fear' (λ=.48), 'societal conservatism' (λ=.18) and 'authoritarian sentiments (λ=.10). Ultimately 'a*voidance behaviour'* is most strongly predicted by 'situational fear of crime' (λ=.60) and 'dispositional fear' (λ=.17), while the influence of 'personal fear of crime' is not significant.

7.4.2 Neighbourhood fear of crime model

	Observations	ρ	χ^2/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	CD
Total	2788	.00	9.32	.94	.92	.05	1.00
Amsterdam	559	.00	2.76	.93	.91	.06	1.00
Hilversum	1189	.00	5.17	.93	.91	.06	1.00
Zaltbommel	1040	.00	3.69	.95	.93	.05	1.00

Note. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CD = coefficient of determination

Tab. 25 – Goodness-of-fit statistics, neighbourhood fear of crime model.

Fig. 20 – Neighbourhood fear of crime model, standardised coefficients.

Neighbourhood fear of crime is most strongly predicted by the experience of '*social disorganisation'* (λ=.35). The influence of 'societal discontent' could not be estimated. In the neighbourhood fear of crime model (tab. 25 & fig. 20), '*authoritarian sentiments'* (λ=.08) and '*societal conservatism'* (λ=.03) play a far less prominent part than they did in the previous model (fig. 2 & tab. 2.) – their effects are not significant in this model. But we do see their close mutual relationship again (Ψ=.79), as well as their relationship with the trait of '*dispositional fear'* (respectively Ψ=.24 and Ψ=.30), which itself does not have a significant influence on 'neighbourhood fear of crime'.

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7.4.3 Societal fear of crime model

	Observations	ρ	χ^2/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	CD
Total	2792	.00	9.84	.89	.86	.06	.99
Amsterdam	560	.00	3.12	.85	.82	.06	.99
Hilversum	1191	.00	4.45	.90	.87	.05	.99
Zaltbommel	1041	.00	4.42	.88	.85	.06	.99

Note. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CD = coefficient of determination

Tab. 26 – Goodness-of-fit statistics, societal fear of crime model.

Fig. 21 – Societal fear of crime model, standardised coefficients.

When we turn to the societal fear of crime model (tab. 26 & fig. 21), we see that this sub-concept of the fear of crime is most strongly predicted by 'societal conservatism' (λ=.28), followed by the experience of 'societal discontent' (λ=.24). 'Societal conservatism' relates to the respondents' '*media usage*' (Ψ=.24) in this model. The related (Ψ=.80) '*authoritarian sentiments*' were also related to 'media usage' (Ψ=.34) and turned out to be of direct influence (λ=.15) as well. Respondents' socio-demographic characteristics of 'gender' (λ=.14) and 'educational level' (λ=.05) were of significant influence at this level of reference. Respondents' 'governmental trust' suppressed 'societal fear of crime' (λ=-.15), while their 'political orientation' (λ=.09), tending towards right-wing conservatism, led to more 'societal fear of crime'. A higher 'educational level' (λ=.05) also led to more 'societal fear of crime'.

'Societal discontent' appears to share its influences with the concept of 'societal fear of crime', but there are some clear differences. 'Societal discontent' is most strongly predicted by sentiments of '*societal conservatism*' (λ=.34) and to a lesser amount by the related '*authoritarian sentiments*' (λ=.14) as well as the trait of '*dispositional fear*' (λ=.14)*.* When we look at the influence of the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics we see that 'age' (λ=.15) and 'gender' (λ=.09) have direct influences on 'societal discontent'. A higher 'educational level' (λ=-.10) led to less 'societal discontent'.

7.4.4 Integrative fear of crime model

	Observations	ρ	χ^2/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	CD
Total	2795	.000	9.25	.79	.77	.05	1.00
Amsterdam	560	.000	2.93	.74	.73	.06	1.00
Hilversum	1192	.000	4.68	.78	.77	.06	1.00
Zaltbommel	1043	.000	3.98	.79	.78	.05	1.00

Note. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CD = coefficient of determination

Tab. 27 – Goodness-of-fit statistics, integrative fear of crime model.

Fig. 22 – Integrative fear of crime model, standardised coefficients.

When we combine the key elements from the previous three models (tab. 27 & fig. 22), we see that the distinct concepts of 'situational, 'personal', 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime' are weakly related in general. Only 'neighbourhood' and 'personal fear of crime' (Ψ=.10) as well as 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime' (Ψ=.02) are related significantly. 'Personal', 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime' are all predicted by '*authoritarian sentiments'.* The influence of the strongly related (Ψ=.80) sentiments of '*societal conservatism'* was only significant for 'societal fear of crime'.

When we look at the left-hand side of the model, we see the most important influences of the previous three models. 'Avoidance behaviour' is most strongly predicted by 'situational fear of crime' (λ=.68), which itself appears as a function of the trait of '*dispositional fear'* (λ=.65). 'Personal fear of crime' is suppressed by '*psychological defenses'* (λ= -.50) and the influence of 'personal fear of crime' on 'avoidance behaviour' is relatively small (λ=.09). 'Societal fear of crime' is predicted by '*societal discontent'* (λ=.26), while 'social disorganisation' predicts 'neighbourhood fear of crime' (λ=.25).

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7.4.5 The internal structure of crime as a problem to the private self

With this knowledge of the underlying elements and inter-relationships of the sub-concepts of the fear of crime, we will try to explain the paradoxical observation made earlier in respect of the descriptive statistics (§3.3): the respondents who experienced problematic crime in their neighbourhood most frequently and who had fallen victim of crime the most (Amsterdam) thought they had the smallest chance of falling victim of crime and *vice versa* (Zaltbommel). This observation raises the following question: how does crime –experienced as a *nearby* problem in one's neighbourhood and/or *distant* in society – turn into a significant threat to the private self, or does it not? To answer this question, we will zoom into the *internal structure* of crime experienced as threat to the private self.

	Observations	P	χ^2/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	CD
Total	2786	.00	14.70	.89	.86	.07	.91
Amsterdam	559	.00	3.66	.90	.87	.07	.71
Hilversum	1189	.00	7.19	.88	.85	.07	.77
Zaltbommel	1034	.00	5.86	.89	.86	.07	.93

Note. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CD = coefficient of determination

Tab. 28 – Goodness-of-fit statistics, internal structure of crime as a problem to the private self.

Fig. 23 –Internal structure of crime as a problem to the private self, standardised coefficients.

Crime - situated either in the psychologically *nearby* context of the neighbourhood or in the *distant* context of Dutch society – turns into a significant 'problem to the private self' (tab. 28 & fig. 23) through one's 'estimated chance of personal victimisation' (λ=.47). In particular, the assessment of *nearby* crime - in the form of the 'estimated occurrence of crime in the neighbourhood' (λ=.26) influences one's 'estimated chance of personal victimisation'. The related (Ψ=.19) assessment of *distant* crime - in the form of the 'estimated occurrence of crime in society' - is of less influence (λ=.12). One's assessment of 'vulnerability' also has considerable influence over the estimation of one's 'chance of personal victimisation' (λ=.08).

This concept of 'vulnerability' is theoretically held to be a product of 'gender' and 'age', because generally women and the elderly assess themselves to be more vulnerable to fall victim of crime. We now observe significant covariance between 'vulnerability' and the 'estimated occurrence of crime in society' (Ψ=.09). This is in line with earlier descriptive observations (see section 7.2.2), that older respondents worried more about *distant* crime in specific and that women are more sensitive to crime than men in general. The cognition of 'crime as a problem to the private self'

leads respondents to report 'avoidance behaviour' (λ= .26), but also "activates" 'psychological defense mechanisms' to a stronger magnitude (λ= .43). We already know from the previous sections (sections 7.4.1 & 7.4.4) that these 'psychological defenses' strongly suppress the larger concept of 'personal fear of crime' (fig. 2 & 5).

7.4.6 Explaining municipality differences
Having observed the internal structure of the cognition of 'crime as a problem to the private self', we can now search for more detailed explanations for the observation made earlier: that the respondents who actually experienced *nearby* problematic crime the most (Amsterdam) paradoxically thought they had the *smallest* chance of falling victim of crime themselves and *vice versa* (Zaltbommel). The goal is to search for *significant differences*[49] for the respondents of Amsterdam compared to respondents from Hilversum and Zaltbommel, which could explain this observation.

	Amsterdam	Hilversum	Zaltbommel
Personal fear of crime ←			
Situational fear of crime	.08	.10*	.02
Psychological defenses	-.54*	-.49*	-.44*
Authoritarian sentiments	.04	-.00	.11
Societal conservatism	.26*	.35*	.26*
Situational fear of crime ←			
Dispositional fear	.52*	.42*	.52*
Authoritarian sentiments	.22*	.11*	-.04
Societal conservatism	.08	.22*	.22*
Avoidance behaviour ←			
Situational fear of crime	.43*	.67*	.59*
Personal fear of crime	.11*	.06	-.00
Dispositional fear	.31*	.13*	.16*

*Significant, *p* < .05

Tab. 29 – Path coefficients for the three municipalities for the personal and situational fear of crime model.

In this context, it is interesting to look at path-diagram differences for the 'personal and situational fear of crime model' (tab. 26) and the 'the internal structure of crime as a problem to the private self' model (tab. 29).

As shown in the table on the previous page (tab. 29), at face value the respondents from Amsterdam show the strongest suppressive function of 'psychological defenses' to 'personal fear of crime'. Another initial impression is that they also

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[49]   Here we used the *Likelihood Ratio* (LR) *Test*, calculating the difference between: (I) the χ^2-value of the SEM with constraints for the path coefficient of our interest in *all* municipalities and (II) the χ^2-value of the SEM with constraints for the path coefficient of our interest *only* in the municipalities of Hilversum and Zaltbommel (See Bollen 1989:292; Ullman & Bentler 2013:675-676 for details).

reported most 'avoidance behaviour' due to 'personal fear of crime'. But *Likelihood Ratio* tests showed *no* significant difference for the functions of both 'psychological defenses'[50] and 'avoidance behaviour'[51] for the Amsterdam respondents compared with respondents from Hilversum and Zaltbommel.

	Amsterdam	Hilversum	Zaltbommel
estimated chance of personal victimisation ←			
estimated occurrence of crime in neighbourhood	.36*	.26*	.30*
estimated occurrence of crime in society	.00	.12*	.09*
Vulnerability	.08	.08	.08*
crime as a problem to the private self ←			
estimated chance of personal victimisation	.50*	.50*	.44*
Psychological defenses ←			
crime as a problem to the private self	.46*	.40*	.46*
Avoidance behaviour ←			
crime as a problem to the private self	.34*	.26*	.20*

*Significant, *p* < .05

Tab. 30 – Path coefficients for the three municipalities for the 'crime as a problem to the private self' model.

When we look at the path coefficients for the 'crime as a problem to the private self' model, at face value it seems that Amsterdam respondents show the strongest activation of 'psychological defenses' and 'avoidance behaviour' as a result of the cognition of 'crime as a problem to the private self' (tab. 30). *Likelihood Ratio* tests for the significance of these differences showed that the respondents from Amsterdam did have a significantly stronger[52] activation of 'avoidance behaviour' as a result of the cognition of 'crime as a problem to the private self'. But the activation of 'psychological defenses' as a result of the same cognition was *not* significantly stronger[53].

This leads us to the conclusion that the respondents from Amsterdam reported a stronger activation of 'avoidance behaviour' due to the cognition of 'crime as a problem to the private self', compared with the respondents of Hilversum and Zaltbommel. The respondents for all three municipalities showed a similarly strong activation of 'psychological defenses' and a similar suppressive function of such defenses to 'personal fear of crime'.

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[50] LR = 2.87 < χ^2_{crit} (1) = 3.84; p= .05.
[51] LR = 3.00 < χ^2_{crit} (1) = 3.84; p= .05.
[52] LR = 5.12 > χ^2_{crit} (1) = 3.84; p= .05.
[53] LR = 2.06 < χ^2_{crit} (1) = 3.84; p= .05.

These insights provide an integrated explanation for our paradoxical observation that respondents from Amsterdam assessed the smallest chance of falling victim of crime themselves, while: (I) Amsterdam has the highest crime rates by far; (II) respondents from Amsterdam actually fell victim of crime the most; (III) respondents from Amsterdam assessed of the occurrence of crime in the neighbourhood to be the most frequent; and (IV) respondents from Amsterdam experienced crime to be a neighbourhood problem the most.

The paradoxical observation can be explained as respondents from Amsterdam showed: (I) a basic suppressive function of psychological defenses to personal fear of crime; (III) reported most avoidance behaviour as a consequence of the cognition of 'crime as a problem to the private self'; and (IV) showed the strongest activation of avoidance behaviour as a result of the cognition of crime as a problem to the private self. In this way a psychologically *nearby* perceived threat of crime becomes cognitively neutralised.

7.4.7 Summary of structural equation models
We will now summarise our findings from the structural equation models. Acceptable structural equation models were produced for all sub-concepts of 'the fear of crime', at the level of the total survey population, as well as the survey populations for the three municipalities. Correlations between the sub-concepts of the fear of crime were rather low, except for 'neighbourhood fear of crime' and 'personal fear of crime'.

All sub-concepts of 'the fear of crime' turned out to be predicted by the aligned concepts of 'societal conservatism' and 'authoritarian sentiments'. And these concepts are both related to the individual trait of 'dispositional fear'. This all makes a good argument for a general *risk sensitivity* underlying the fear of crime at multiple levels of psychological reference.

'Situational fear of crime' is both theoretically and statistically different from 'personal fear of crime' and provides a stronger prediction for the reported 'avoidance behaviour'. 'Avoidance behaviour' is directly influenced by the trait of 'dispositional fear'. So, people who tend to be generally anxious show more avoidance behaviour. And the less psychological distance is experienced between the risk of crime and the private self, the more that avoidance behaviour is activated.

The experience of 'social disorganisation' is the strongest predictor for 'neighbourhood fear of crime'. This 'neighbourhood fear of crime' is significantly correlated to 'personal fear of crime'. And this highlights the *indirect* importance of the evaluation of the local social climate to the personal fear of crime. But 'personal fear of crime' is strongly suppressed by 'psychological defenses'. Respondents appeared motivated *not* to think of the risk of crime as a near threat to the private self.

The final sub-concept of 'societal fear of crime' is primarily influenced by sentiments of 'societal conservatism' and 'societal discontent', with which it shares its predictors. This calls for 'societal fear of crime' and 'societal discontent' to *co-exist*.

Experiencing crime – whether *nearby* in the neighbourhood or *distant* in society - can turn into the cognition of crime as a problem for the private self. This stems from an individual incorporating the assessment of crime - in both the neighbourhood and society - into the assessment of one's personal chance of falling victim of crime. Assessing crime as a *nearby* problem– in one's neighbourhood – leads to a stronger activation of avoidance behaviour: *conscious* acts to minimise the personal risk of crime, on top of a general *unconscious* suppressive function of psychological defenses against the personal risk of crime. In this way, respondents cognitively neutralised their cognition of a *nearby* threat of crime.

7.5 Quantitative conclusions

The quantitative analyses presented in this chapter will form the basis of a conclusion to answer the research question of this chapter. This conclusion will be based on the empirical assessment of our initial hypotheses, based on the theoretical framework and qualitative findings of this study.

We will assess the tenability of these hypotheses in light of the descriptive and inferential results.

H_1	Citizens' personal fear of crime is experienced as relatively less problematic, since general fear of crime is experienced as more problematic.

This hypothesis is verified by the descriptive statistics. 'General fear of crime' and especially 'societal fear of crime' exceed 'personal fear of crime' in occurrence, frequency and problematic nature.

H_2	Most citizens experience the risk of crime to be controllable at their personal level, but uncontrollable at the societal level.

As psychological distance grows - from the private self to the neighbourhood, to society – respondents' perceived influence over the prevention of crime did indeed decrease.

H_3	The situational fear of falling victim of crime is, to citizens, a psychologically different concept from 'personal fear of crime' and 'general fear of crime'.

Factor analysis for the items of 'situational fear of crime' and 'personal fear of crime' showed two factors and this verified the two theoretical concepts to be empirically separate concepts.

H_4	Citizens experience the situational fear of falling victim of crime as relatively more disturbing, because they are confronted with clear situations that people associate with a high potential or acute risk of personal victimisation of crime.

The respondents – men included – did indeed express more fear of crime when reacting to the situational items and photograph items than they reflected on the measurement items of 'personal fear of crime'.

H_5	Citizens are aware of crime risks to their private self in daily life and try to avoid falling victim of crime by adjusting their behaviour.

'Situational fear of crime' turned out to be a stronger predictor for 'avoidance behaviour' than 'personal fear of crime'. So, the more specific the items were, the more they actually predicted 'avoidance behaviour'. The respondents' cognitions about their *personal* chance of falling victim of crime primarily led them to avoidance behaviour in order to consciously mitigate the personal risk of crime.

H_6	Personal fear of crime is fed by the psychological trait of risk sensitivity.

The direct influence of risk sensitivity on 'personal fear of crime' could *not* be verified, but there was an indirect effect through the related 'societal conservatism' and 'authoritarian sentiments'. The influence of these traits and sentiments suggests a basic risk sensitivity underlying 'the fear of crime' at multiple levels of reference.

H_7	Avoidance behaviour operates as a fear suppressor in respect of the personal fear of crime.

'Avoidance behaviour' could *not* be verified as a negative predictor of 'personal fear of crime'. It even emerged as being predicted *by* 'personal fear of crime'. 'Avoidance behaviour' is therefore more the result of 'personal fear of crime' than a suppressor of it. To be more precise: 'avoidance behaviour' is the result of the cognition of 'crime as a problem to the private self'.

H_8	Psychological defense mechanisms suppress personal fear of crime.

'Personal fear of crime' is indeed strongly suppressed by 'psychological defenses'.

H_9	When citizens experience collective efficacy at the neighbourhood level, their fear of crime will be suppressed at this particular level.

This hypothesis was verified with collective *in*efficacy being part of a larger set of indicators for 'neighbourhood problems' that predicts 'neighbourhood fear of crime' to a considerable extent. The assessment of collective efficacy turned out to have an indirect effect on 'personal fear of crime' through its correlation with 'neighbourhood fear of crime'.

H_{10}	The absence of personal influence over the risk of crime at the societal level functions as a catalyst for general fear of crime.

Experienced influence over the prevention of crime could *not* be verified as having a direct effect on societal fear of crime, but thoughts about crime did become less specific from the neighbourhood to the place of residency, to society, logically leading to fewer possibilities to prevent or avoid crime.

H₁₁	The experience of societal discontent functions as a catalyst for societal fear of crime.

'Societal discontent' - with multiple indicators related underlying to societal problems – did indeed strongly predict 'societal fear of crime'.

H₁₂	Societal fear of crime is best understood as an expression of societal discontent.

The direct influence of 'societal discontent' could *not* be verified for 'situational', 'personal' or 'neighbourhood fear of crime'. And 'societal fear of crime' and 'societal discontent' appeared to share their predictors. 'Societal fear of crime' therefore seems to *co-exist* with 'societal discontent', rather than being a direct expression of it – especially in light of the fact that 'societal fear of crime' and 'societal discontent' share predictors.

It is time to answer the research question for this chapter:
What are the relative roles of 'personal fear of crime' and 'general fear of crime' in the generic explanation of 'the fear of crime' and what are the explanatory elements for these sub-concepts?

The descriptive statistics made clear that 'general fear of crime' and, especially, 'societal fear of crime' exceed 'personal fear of crime' in assessed occurrence, frequency and problematic nature. 'Neighbourhood fear of crime' had a significant correlation with 'personal fear of crime', which highlights an *indirect* importance of the assessment of the local social climate to 'personal fear of crime'.

In general, the respondents reflected a sense of 'control' over the risk of crime at the personal level. But their control over crime becomes increasingly tenuous as *psychological distance* increases from the private self to the neighbourhood to society. As this psychological distance grows, perceived influence over the prevention of crime decreases, while crime is assessed to occur more and is perceived to be more problematic. Thoughts about specific personal risks of crime appeared to be quite vague, although respondents simultaneously had clear ideas about specific crime risks in their neighbourhood. Personal thoughts about specific crime risks seemed to be *suppressed* in some way: respondents appeared motivated not to think about specific personal risks of crime.

Inferential statistics showed that all of the fear of crime's sub-concepts share the related predictors of 'societal conservatism' and 'authoritarian sentiments', both of which are related to the trait of 'dispositional fear'. This indicates a *general risk sensitivity* for the risk of crime to be at the root of the fear of crime, at all explored levels of reference.

The respondents' 'avoidance behaviour' was best predicted by 'situational fear of crime', which was a theoretically and statistically separate concept from 'personal fear of crime'. A broader 'societal discontent' amplifies 'societal fear of crime', while 'personal fear of crime' was strongly suppressed by 'psychological defenses'.

Assessing crime as a significant threat psychologically *nearby* the private self leads to a stronger activation of avoidance behaviour. In addition, psychological defenses suppress personal fear of crime in general. Together, these two concepts explain the reflected sense of 'control' experienced by the respondents over the risk of crime at the personal level: the risk of crime to the private self is *suppressed* unconsciously through psychological defenses in general; and the nearer one experiences the threat of crime to the private self, the more one will additionally restrain one's personal fear of crime by adopting more avoidance behaviour.

8.   Fearing crime at a safe distance

Critical voices hold 'the fear of crime', as we generally know it, to be '(…) a product of the way it has been researched rather than the way it is' (Farrall et al. 1997:658). The many critiques lead to the conclusion that it is highly likely '(…) that levels of fear of crime (…) have been hugely overestimated' (Ditton et al. 1999:676). In this chapter we will summate insights from the empirical results of historical discourse analysis, mixed method interviews and survey research. We will evaluate these results on the basis of our extended theoretical framework, in order to reach a general conclusion resting on the answers to our research questions. We will then discuss suggestions for future research, our methodological limitations and the practical implications of our findings.

It turns out that we are not obliged '(…) to accept that between a third to two-thirds of the western society are 'fearful', 'angry', or 'worried' about crime 'some' or 'a lot' of the time' (Farrall & Gadd 2004:5). When a multi-dimensional view is taken, 'the fear of crime' becomes less thorny a 'social problem', since it no longer appears to impinge '(…) upon the well-being of a large proportion of the population' (Farrall et al. 1997:658). The majorities of our studied Dutch populations – citizens from the very different municipalities of Amsterdam, Hilversum and Zaltbommel - appeared to be fearing crime *at a safe distance*. Crime as a *nearby* experienced threat is cognitively neutralised through a combination of psychological defense mechanisms and avoidance behaviour, while crime as a threat at the safe distance of society is amplified by societal discontent.

8.1 Taking a multi-dimensional perspective

Rather than relying on implicit definitions of 'the fear of crime', we treated the concept as '(…) a complex allocation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments on the personal as well as the societal level' (Pleysier 2010:43). As a consequence, we conceptualised 'the fear of crime' as a set of four sub-concepts: (I) situational fear of crime; (II) personal fear of crime; (III) neighbourhood fear of crime; and (IV) societal fear of crime. All four sub-concepts are held to contain cognitive and affective elements, as well as to carry an expression of values. In sum, we treated 'the fear of crime' as a set of attitudes (please see section 4.3.3 for details).

Through taking this *social psychological approach* (see Farrall et al. 2000; Jackson 2008), we have searched for fresh and valid explanations for the previously replicated observation that citizens simultaneously perceive a growing threat of crime to their society and a low risk of falling victim of crime themselves (Van der Wurff & Stringer 1989, Brantingham et al. 1986, Hindelang et al. 1978, Van den Herrewegen 2011:52, Elffers & De Jong 2004:46, Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, de Graaf & Boutellier 2012).

Aligned with Pleysier and Cops (2016), the aim of this research was 'to integrate social psychological concepts related to the individual's identity and evaluation of his position in an increasingly complex society, to enhance our understanding of the fear of crime concept' (Pleysier & Cops 2016:3). More theoretical and empirical work '(…) needed to be done so that cross-level interactions (…) can be better explained and interpreted (Wilcox-Roundtree & Land 1996:176, also see Pleysier & Cops 2016:17, Farrall et al. 1997:674, Hale 1996:84, Jackson & Gouseti 2014:9). Overall, this approach focuses a new and more nuanced light on the "social problem" of 'the fear of crime', making it highly plausible that 'societal concern about crime has been transmuted into a personal problem of individual vulnerability' (Ditton & Farrall 2000:xvi). Besides replication, additional explanations were found.

8.2 Answering our research questions

We will now discuss in turn the answers to our sub-questions that contribute to this insight. We began with an historical research question:

1. *When and how did the fear of crime become a social problem and what was the concept's initial meaning?*

'The fear of crime' emerged in the United States of America as a "social problem" through political initiation. But this could only happen because the critical conditions were unintentionally set. A local republican campaign billboard targeting what we now know as 'the fear of crime' was documented in Pittsburgh as early as October 1949. And this was fifteen years before the concept is generally held to have been introduced, by Lee (2007).

Clearly, political initiative and political influence on the governmental research agenda were of crucial influence to the emergence of 'the fear of crime' as a 'social problem'. Historical research shows that the American public was more concerned about the Vietnam war, civil rights, integration and racial discrimination at the time politicians were stressing the problem of 'the fear of crime' (Loo & Grimes 2004; Loo 2009). The concept clearly flourished against a background of social unrest and functioned as a lightning conductor in the public debate on these matters.

The Dutch history of the concept is quite similar and had multiple Anglo-Saxon influences in the form of political inspiration and early American research reports. Dr. Willem Drees Jr successfully addressed the topic in the Dutch parliament for the first time on October the 11th 1973. From then on, the conservative right wing continued to stress the topic. During the political debates, 'the fear of crime' became linked to the epitome of societal instability of that time: civil disobedience. By May 1977 the entire Dutch political spectrum appeared preoccupied by the 'social problems' of 'crime' and 'fear of crime' (D'66 1977; CDA 1977; RKPN 1977; VVD 1977; DS'70 1977; SGP 1977).

We now know that the *initial meaning* of 'the fear of crime' was certainly *not* a reflection of actual public worries or fears about the personal chance of falling victim of crime. 'The fear of crime' was initially a highly politically influenced concept, which proved itself successful in making free-floating worries about social instability tangible for political discussion, because the concept filled a *discursive space* '(…) in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach common judgment' (Hauser 2009:86).

With reference to then newly available crime statistics, Dutch politicians from the conservative right wing pre-supposed a rising feeling of unsafety among the Dutch public. But survey research from that time (Fiselier 1978, Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976) showed the Dutch public to be worrying about crime *in general* only to a limited extent. Nonetheless, in their debates, Dutch politicians implicitly framed abstract public sentiments - which actually strongly resonate with our sub-concept of 'societal fear of crime'– as 'personal fear of crime'. So initially, on a large scale, neither the American nor the Dutch public appeared actually to fear falling victim of crime themselves.

Now, roughly forty years later, a similar picture has emerged in the answers to our qualitative research question:

2. *What explanations do citizens give for 'the fear of crime' and how do they explain their 'personal' and 'general fear of crime'?*

Spontaneous associations with the question 'Do you ever feel unsafe?' led to a rich - but surprisingly broadly shared - network of public "crime knowledge", understood through the concept of 'mental maps'. These mental maps made the risk of crime *tangible* for the respondents, by means of socialisation, crime talk, media messages and other forms of indirect victimisation situating this risk in the contexts of: (I) the big city; (II) travelling after dark; (III) wooded or green areas; (III) using ATM machines; and (IV) being home alone after dark. These mental maps motivate an individual's avoidance behaviour. And this provides individuals with a sense of control over their personal risk of criminal victimisation.

This sense of control appeared to be further strengthened by the activation of three 'psychological defense mechanisms', which were hypothesised only to influence 'the fear of crime' by Ruiter, Abraham and Kok (2001) and Coston & Finkenauer (2004). We found the following psychological defense mechanisms to be active in preventing an individual from experiencing even anticipated 'personal fear of crime': (I) displacement; (II) suppression; and (III) rationalisation. These unconscious cognitive manoeuvres were accessed by analysing respondents' coded narratives. Together, these manoeuvres appeared to protect the individual from disturbing cognitions related to the fear of crime at the level of the private self and they ultimately warded off negative emotions.

When respondents talked in more detail about their sense of control, they sensed it was deceptive: there always remains a chance of falling victim of crime, whatever avoidance behaviour is displayed. When this idea was articulated, the respondents clearly did not like it. In sum, the respondents appeared highly motivated to think of the risk of crime as a *distant* threat: as 'a general, abstract category (…) social problem' (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:22-23).

When discussing crime in the neighbourhood, respondents actively compared their own neighbourhood with more deprived and more criminal neighbourhoods, even in other cities. It became apparent that a sense of collective efficacy was crucial for the establishment of respondents' feelings of local control over the risk of crime. But collective efficacy appeared to occur only rarely, as respondents tended to have only superficial contact with their neighbours. Even so, respondents implied that weak ties – in the form of a common goal of achieving social control – were present, through a form of trust that arose simply from knowing neighbours' faces (also see Crawford 2006).

Touching upon the topic of 'societal fear of crime' changed the atmosphere in nearly every interview. Through their articulation of strong emotions, respondents clearly showed they were angry and worried about the problem of crime at the level of Dutch society. A sense of crime as a growing problem was broadly shared in society.

The absence of personal influence over this problem, combined with a lack of confidence in politicians to act against crime, created a backdrop for the topic of crime to open up a broader discourse of societal discontent. Within this discourse, the problem of crime is connected to a broad variety of other troublesome problems in Dutch society.

In sum, respondents expressed their 'personal fear of crime' as a *potential* problem, but one that is actually perceived to be *under their control*. They actively referred to avoidance behaviour in explaining their sense of control. Additionally, their narratives exposed the activation of psychological defense mechanisms, which appeared to neutralise cognitions about a nearby threat of crime. In relation to 'general fear of crime', a sense of control was generally absent, since respondents were very sceptical about politicians and governments really combatting crime in society.

Fear of crime at the level of Dutch society appeared to be accelerated by the problem of crime being linked with many other troublesome problems within the discourse of societal discontent. So, 'personal fear of crime' appeared to be lessened by two mechanisms: avoidance behaviour and psychological defense mechanisms. 'General fear of crime', on the other hand, appeared to be catalysed by a reduced sense of personal and governmental control, as well as the connection of the problem of crime to a broad set of troubling problems - such as immigration, unemployment rates and consequences of individualisation - within a discourse of societal discontent.

These qualitative insights, together with insights from our extended theoretical framework, led to the formulation of several hypotheses for the answer to our quantitative research question:

3. *What are the relative roles of 'personal' and 'general fear of crime' in the generic explanation of 'the fear of crime' and what are the explanatory elements for these sub-concepts?*

Analysis of the descriptive statistics from our survey of the citizens from three very different municipalities – Amsterdam, Hilversum and Zaltbommel – showed clearly that crime is experienced as a *distant* social problem by the majority of the respondents. Remarkably, the cognition of a *nearby* threat of crime in one's neighbourhood did not translate into a heightened 'personal fear of crime': the opposite mechanism was actually observed.

To answer our quantitative research question, 'general fear of crime' and especially 'societal fear of crime' exceed the significance of 'personal fear of crime' on both cognitive and affective aspects. So, the 'general fear of crime' and more specifically 'societal fear of crime' play relatively the most significant roles in providing a generic explanation of 'the fear of crime', since 'personal fear of crime' only proved to be significant to a small number of respondents.

Earlier multi-dimensional studies of 'the fear of crime' have already showed that the public primarily experiences a growing threat of crime in their society, while simultaneously assessing their own chance of falling victim of crime to be relatively low (Van der Wurff & Stringer 1989, Brantingham et al. 1986, Hindelang et al. 1978, Van den Herrewegen 2011:52, Elffers & De Jong 2004:46, Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, de Graaf & Boutellier 2012). This finding was replicated in the present study, which combined qualitative and quantitative methods, but our social psychological focus offered solid explanations for the observation.

Explanatory analyses, which were based on the hypotheses resulting from qualitative observations and the extended theoretical framework (see section 5.2.4), revealed the following detailed explanatory elements in relation to the sub-concepts of 'the fear of crime':

- The connected concepts of 'societal conservatism' and 'authoritarian sentiments' were found to underlie the studied sub-concepts of 'personal', 'neighbourhood' and 'societal fear of crime'. Both 'societal conservatism' and 'authoritarian sentiments' relate to the trait of 'dispositional fear'. This strongly suggests that the umbrella concept of 'risk sensitivity' reinforces 'the fear of crime' in general.

- 'Psychological defense mechanisms' were verified for the suppression of 'personal fear of crime'. 'Avoidance behaviour' primarily appeared as a function of the theoretically and empirically separate concept of 'situational

fear of crime'. And 'personal fear of crime' showed a rather low correlation with 'neighbourhood fear of crime'.

- 'Neighbourhood fear of crime' was found to be primarily a function of a perception of 'social disorganisation', including a lack of both social efficacy and social capital. It was not possible to estimate an influence of 'societal discontent' on 'neighbourhood fear of crime'.

- 'Societal fear of crime' appeared to be strongly influenced by the concept of 'societal discontent'.

- The more one experiences a psychologically *nearby* threat of crime, the more one turns to avoidance behaviour. This avoidance behaviour supplements the basic neutralising function carried out by 'psychological defense mechanisms'. Together these concepts keep the threat of crime at a *safe distance* – at least psychologically.

8.3 General conclusion: *fearing crime at a safe distance*

Now that we have answered our final sub-question, we can answer the main research question of this research:

At what level of psychological distance do citizens primarily experience 'the fear of crime' and how do they construct it?

Citizens, from three very different Dutch municipalities, primarily experience 'the fear of crime' as a psychologically *distant* problem at the level of Dutch society. Even those who perceive crime to be a significant *nearby* risk in their neighbourhood do not translate this into a heightened fear of personal victimisation. Instead, this cognition becomes neutralised by psychological defense mechanisms and additional avoidance behaviour.

Ultimately, then, citizens appear to construct 'the fear of crime' as a *social problem*. They sometimes or often worry about the problem of crime in Dutch society, but only for a short time. In the experience of citizens, therefore, there is a significant *psychological distance* between their private selves and the risk of crime. They primarily worry about crime on the basis of their collective identity as a member of Dutch society.

Does this qualify 'the fear of crime' to be an expression of 'unrealistic optimism' or 'risk denial' (e.g. see Fromm 2005)? I think not. Such a view would, in my opinion, contribute further to 'rude debates about the rationality of public opinion' (Jackson 2004a:962) that miss the actual core of the concept (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:18, Pleysier 2011:36). At the heart of the fear of crime, the potentially most problematic aspect – a perception of the fear of crime as a psychologically *nearby* and thus personally relevant threat – appeared to be cognitively neutralised. And this, to a great extent, mitigates the fear of crime as a social problem, because its

problematic nature is often derived from the high impact it was supposed to have on individuals' lives.

We now know that this impact is, in fact, cognitively neutralised. This bolsters the argument that individuals' avoidance behaviour should actually be seen as an expression of a 'functional worry that motivates vigilance and routine precaution' (Jackson & Gray 2010:1, also see Fattah 1993, Hale 1996, Warr 2000 and Ditton & Innes 2005). There is much to suggest that *before* the worry gets dysfunctional, it will be adapted cognitively as the individual makes an unconscious identity switch, due to the activation of psychological defense mechanisms.

This is not true, however, for all individuals. There remains a minority of citizens who show a *dysfunctional* fear (see Gray, Jackson & Farrall 2008) of crime, but their number proved to be much smaller than is generally thought and articulated in public discourse. This has probably always been the case. As was evident among Dutch citizens in 1973 (see Fiselier 1978:141-148), worries about crime were relatively more widespread, but did not have a serious impact on citizens' lives.

It is highly unlikely that the social psychological and psychological dynamics underlying the fear of crime have changed dramatically in the meantime. So, fear of crime has probably always been - and probably always will be - a problem at a safe psychological distance from the public. And so, it is very likely that '(...) standard research tools have simultaneously misunderstood and misrepresented the nature of this social problem' (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:47).

8.4 Methodological limitations

Despite our best efforts, some methodological limitations were simply impossible or too time-consuming to overcome. We will comment in turn on the limitations of our historical discourse analysis, interviews and surveys.

8.4.1 Historical discourse analysis

Unfortunately, it was not possible to interview any Dutch politicians who had been active in the early days of the 'fear of crime' in the Netherlands and would have had memories of the debates at the time. Many of these politicians have now died and those who are still alive are too old to respond to such highly detailed questions. The Minister of Justice of that time – Dries van Agt – kindly answered my request for an interview with a letter, in which he stated his memory on this topic 'has become too sloppy and worn out' to answer my questions. The (auto)biographies used to capture the personal memories of politicians do not have the specific depth that a focused interview would have provided.

Nor was it feasible to trace the journalists who had written the newspaper articles on the political debates and research results concerning the fear of crime and interrogate their memories of the backgrounds to their articles. Then again, these articles were probably not such major events in their careers that they would still have detailed memories of them. It was also impossible to access radio material on

the political debates and research reports, although the radio was a major source of political information for the public at that time.

The analysis of the Dutch public perspective was entirely based on two surveys (Fiselier 1978, Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976) and neither survey was particularly detailed when it came to 'the fear of crime'. There could well be more useful survey results from that time, considering highly relevant social problems, but these were not found.

Finally, the social context of the Netherlands in the 1960s was only accessed through academic reflections on this turbulent time (Spierenburg 2013; Kennedy 2007b). We could therefore have gained only a partial understanding of the social atmosphere of the day. It is highly likely that we have merely a rather clinical interpretation of that period, based on hindsight.

8.4.2 Interviews
Limitations related to the interviews arise from the composition of our group of respondents. Lower-educated respondents and respondents with a right-wing or moderate political orientation were less represented. Their explanations for 'the fear of crime' therefore had relatively less possibility to surface in our analyses.

More generally, the analyses of the interviews would ideally have involved independent coding of all 30 interview manuscripts. This would have enabled computation of the 'inter-coder-reliability-coefficient' (see Saldaña 2012:27; Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002). In this study, coding was initially done by the author, and then checked by a research assistant. This procedure could have directed the assistant's interpretation.

This is especially the case for our exploration of the activation of 'psychological defense mechanisms' related to the respondents' 'personal fear of crime'. We must acknowledge the fact that these are highly subjective interpretations (see Cramer 2006:13). Although we followed the guidance of psychological defense experts Cramer (2006) and Valliant (1992) as far as inter-personal checks on the coding of narrative material were concerned, this remains an inter-personal interpretation of a highly abstract mechanism being activated, albeit based on a theoretically underpinned codebook.

In addition, the sub-concept of 'neighbourhood fear of crime' was not given much attention by our interview respondents. The interviews may therefore not have represented the full potential impact of this sub-concept of 'the fear of crime', since more attention was directed towards the contrasts between 'personal' and 'societal fear of crime'.

8.4.3 Survey
The same limitation applies for the survey. 'Neighbourhood fear of crime' was a supposititious sub-concept in the survey as a result of our qualitative results. As was discussed in relation to the research design, the affective items related to this

sub-concept had to be dropped due to test respondents reporting problems with these items. This may have influenced our results to the extent that we did not grasp the total breadth of this sub-concept.

If structural equation modelling had been used in combination with multilevel analysis (e.g. Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal & Zheng 2007), we could have checked on neighbourhood characteristics that influence the respondents' fear of crime. But this combination of methods would have placed too many requirements on the sampling strategy (see Hox 2010) for it to be realised.

The sample populations also involved some limitations that stem from self-selection of the respondents. The three municipalities showed limitations in terms of the incorporation of respondents aged 20 to 49 years old. And the sample populations for the populations of Hilversum and Zaltbommel showed a slight under-representation of respondents with a political preference for right-wing, conservative political parties. For all three sample populations there were some limitations in the geographical areas incorporated.

The survey items used are open to critique also. Some items related to sub-concepts of 'the fear of crime' contain the word 'how', which is held to be highly suggestive. In addition, some items relate to rather unclear geographical areas, such as 'the neighbourhood' and 'Dutch society' (see Farrall & Gadd 2004). Although these items were based on theoretical and qualitative insights, they still have limitations in terms of their validity. But these compromises were considered acceptable in order to achieve understandable items.

The same is true for the items on 'psychological defense mechanisms'. The insights of scientific experts (Cramer 2006; Valliant 1992; Bond 1992) were incorporated in the formulation of these items, and we also consulted test respondents about them, but they remain theoretically and qualitatively inspired *approximations* of the concepts rather than valid items related to these concepts.

Last but not least, the direction of relationships between items always remains difficult to argue (see De Vaus 2001:177-181). Despite our analytical strategy of structural equation modelling, '(…) there is of course nothing in structural equation modelling that magically transforms correlational data into causal conclusions' (Hox & Bechger 1998:368). Our analyses are in essence *hypothetical* measurements of causal relations, rooted in our qualitative and theoretical insights (also see Bagozzi & Yi 2012, Bollen & Pearl 2013, Davis 1985).

8.5 Practical implications
Despite these important methodological limitations, our results still offer a new and rich insight into the nature of 'the fear of crime'. The results also have much relevance for practitioners aiming to combat this social problem. Earlier quantitative research among practitioners (see Spithoven 2014) showed that they lack conceptual focus and have little to no understanding of the causes of fear of crime.

A first implication is not to treat all 'fear of crime' as similarly problematic. Quite simply, too much conceptual variance is hidden within this umbrella concept. A similar claim can be made for insights based on the highly criticised standard items, which sketch too vague an image of 'the fear of crime' to function as a basis for policy goals. There is a need for conceptual differentiation when it comes to the practical understanding of 'the fear of crime'.

Given the complexity of the concept of 'the fear of crime', a *reserved policy ambition* seems most appropriate, because the fear of crime's influences are mostly beyond the reach of any government: how does one counter individual psychological characteristics of risk sensitivity, perceptions of vulnerability, or how one makes sense of the broader society that one is part of? Unfortunately, '(…) there is no single "magic bullet" for fear reduction' (Grabosky 1995, 3).

The most promising avenue for potential interventions are *custom-made interventions* targeting clear local problems that underlie what we called '*neighbourhood fear of crime'* (also see Henig & Maxfield 1978; Hale 1996; Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010; Weisburd & Eck 2004). Every problematic form of neighbourhood fear of crime requires new analysis of its locally specific causes. If such causes are found and they realistically fall within the remit of institutions, the institutions should formulate clear policy goals together, before implementing the policies in an integrated manner (see Bennett 1991). Care must be taken to incorporate local history and specific local explanations in the understanding of 'neighbourhood fear of crime' (see Hale 1996, Pain 2000) and one must also be very aware that the concept has a symbolic function as well as strong influences from the level of broader society (also see Hollway & Jefferson 2000:33; Loader, Girling & Sparks 2000:66, Farrall et al. 2009:12, Cops 2012:32).

Given the fact that a certain degree of fear of crime would stimulate a relatively *functional* degree of avoidance behaviour (see Gray, Jackson & Farrall 2008) – and the fact that citizens can accept a certain degree of unsafety (see Van den Herrewegen 2011) - the advice for politicians, governors, mayors and practitioners is not to be hasty in treating 'the fear of crime' as a relevant and highly important problem (also see Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009). Instead, we would advise an approach that focuses on seeking explanations and ways to influence these, when one is *locally* confronted with something we understand to be a *disturbed form* of neighbourhood fear of crime.

This type of highly localised fear of crime would translate into indicators of repeated qualitative signs – phone calls, e-mails, etc. – from different citizens claiming to feel unsafe in their neighbourhood. In quantitative terms, it would translate into a significantly heightened 'neighbourhood fear of crime'. A recommended response would be to ask colleagues or advisors with advanced quantitative skills to compare the newly available quantitative survey data with:

i. Data from a previous survey of residents from the same neighbourhood, with a comparable sample of neighbourhood residents, based on exactly the same specific fear of crime indicators;

ii. Another - comparable – neighbourhood, based on comparable samples of neighbourhood residents and exactly the same specific fear of crime indicators. But comparison with a set of comparable neighbourhoods would be even better.

Even if such insights are realised and they verify a *disturbed* neighbourhood fear of crime, one would be well advised to check for the possibility that a relatively strong perception of 'social disorganisation' may have been translated locally into this heightened 'neighbourhood fear of crime'. In every situation, though, it is wise to get reliable qualitative supplementations to explanations of neighbourhood fear of crime, from *multiple neighbourhood residents*, before focusing one's ideas about the causes of 'neighbourhood fear of crime' and ways to combat them.

It may be possible to find locally specific explanations for a *disturbed* neighbourhood fear of crime, should this be confirmed*.* Realistic counteractions might be found in the consolidation of instrumentally *weak ties* between residents and professionals in a neighbourhood, since these 'are often the most useful form of social organisation for getting things done' (Crawford 2006:963). It might be wise to bring a highly experienced social worker or community worker into your network of locally involved organisations. Be aware that such an approach would generally not translate into the often strived for quantitative results at levels of 'the fear of crime'. But is it not the experienced quality of governance that should be most important?

To sum up, do not jump to the conclusion that 'the fear of crime' is problematic. Not all fear of crime is actually *dysfunctional* or *problematic* to citizens. So, fine-tune and supplement your view on 'the fear of crime' from this more rational and realistic perspective.

8.6 Suggestions for future research

For future research, we would strongly recommend a similar multi-dimensional operationalisation and mixed-method empirical explorations of 'the fear of crime', with due attention to the interwoven nature of the fear of crime's sub-concepts (also see Hirtenlehner & Farrall 2013, Farrall et al. 2009, Girling et al. 2000; Jefferson & Hollway 2000; Taylor et al. 1986). Only in this way can we do justice to the complexity of the concept (also see Lee & Farrall 2009:212-213, also see Pleysier 2010:151, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:46, Hale 1996:132).

We would especially welcome replicative research into the conceptual difference between 'personal' and 'general fear of crime'. Our conclusion on the differences between the municipalities in respect of the various elements of 'the fear of crime' offers an initial insight into the influence of urbanisation and specific local

conditions, but this insight is in need of replication research on a broader scale, with samples from more highly diverse municipalities.

Furthermore, much more work could be done – both theoretically and empirically – to expand our understanding of 'the fear of crime' from an integrated psychological and social psychological perspective (also see Farrall et al. 2000; Jackson 2008; Pleysier & Cops 2016). Many interesting avenues of research could open up if the tradition was enriched by embracing a much needed qualitative approach (also see Vanderveen 2006, Pleysier 2010, Ditton & Farrall 2000, Hale 1996).

Focusing in on the individual elements explored, more research could be done in respect of:

I. The influence of the characteristic of risk sensitivity and its sub-concepts (also see Sjöberg 2000; Farrall et al. 2000; Jackson 2011; Doran & Burgess 2012);

II. The influence of psychological defense mechanisms and unconscious psychological influences in general (also see Hollway & Jefferson 2000);

III. The concept of situational fear of crime (also see Farrall et al. 1997; Gabriel & Greve 2003);

IV. The content of citizens' mental maps (also see Pleysier 2010; Sparks 1992; Lupton 1999);

V. The nature of behavioural aspects of the fear of crime (also see Liskia, Sanchirico & Reed 1988, Hale 1996, San-Juan et al. 2012, Doran & Burgess 2012) and such behaviour as expressions of a 'functional worry that motivates vigilance and routine precaution' (Jackson & Gray 2010:1, also see Fattah 1993, Hale 1996, Warr 2000 and Ditton & Innes 2005);

VI. Further theoretical extensions and empirical explorations of 'societal fear of crime' (also see Hale 1996; Ditton & Farrall 2000; Farrall et al. 2000);

VII. Further efforts to achieve conceptual clarity (also see Vanderveen 2006, Hale 1996).

Since 'the fear of crime' '(…) is not a stable entity that enlightened researchers will someday know "the truth" of' (Lee & Farrall 2009:211), we are still in serious need of more fundamental and actually cumulative development of knowledge (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987; Fattah 1993; Pleysier 2010; Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009). The research tradition on 'the fear of crime' has suffered from 'overly restrictive methodological and theoretical framework(s)' (Hale 1996:132) for long enough.

8.7 Some final words…

The last word has not been spoken on 'the fear of crime'. Nor has this intellectually challenging concept yet been overly researched in a critical manner. We might not ever be able to capture the full complexity of this ambiguous concept, but we can certainly deepen our insight into its nature. This can be achieved by taking a theoretically and methodologically broader approach, as done in this research.

We must move further beyond the situation in which public fears - such as the fear of crime - are largely misunderstood. The majority of the public does not have a common implicit, dysfunctional and problematic conceptualisation of their 'fear of crime'. To most, crime is a problem *at a safe distance*. And that might be the case for many other public fears too.

The challenge nowadays is both to take seriously and to relativise collective sentiments on troubling problems such as crime. The majority of my respondents felt a high level of personal control over their own lives, but worry about problems not being taken care of properly in their society. It is tempting to deal with this public perception as a negative fact. But how could citizens worry about these topics to such a clear extent if they no longer cared about their society?

Much contemporary societal discontent could well be covering up the public's historically strong need for belonging. They *do* care about their society and that is exactly why they express such strong emotions. But many unconscious individual and collective processes lie below the surface. And a great deal of projection is occurring also. So, let us take a step back and search for the real meanings that often remain hidden in the volume of the messages, as we did for 'the fear of crime' in this research. Only in this way we can sustainably provide citizens with what they actually need collectively, rather than continue to feed the collective spiral of discontent. It is all a matter of perspective.

Summary

'The fear of crime' is "upon everybody's tongue" nowadays (Farrall & Gadd 2004:1). The concept is widely accepted as social problem across the globe (Gray, Jackson & Farrall 2008, Garland 2001) as it is held to impinge '(…) upon the well-being of a large proportion of the population' (Farralll et al. 1997:658). But do we actually have a valid picture of a genuine 'social problem of striking dimensions' (Ditton 1999:83)? Critical voices say we don't. 'The fear of crime' - as we generally know it - is seen by them as '(…) a product of the way it has been researched rather than the way it is' (Farrall et al. 1997:658). And still, 45 years after the start of research, 'surprisingly little can be said conclusively about the fear of crime' (Ditton & Farrall 2000:xxi).

This research contributes to a growing body of knowledge - from especially the last fifteen years - that treats 'the fear of crime' as '(…) a complex allocation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments on the personal as well as the societal level' (Pleysier 2010:43). One often replicated and paradoxical observation catches the eye: citizens perceive a growing threat of crime to their society, but consequently perceive a low risk that they themselves will fall victim of crime.

Taking a social psychological approach (e.g. see Farrall et al. 2000; Jackson 2008), we will search for suitable explanations for this paradoxical observation in the fear of crime's research tradition. The aim of this research is 'to integrate social psychological concepts related to the individual's identity and evaluation of his position in an increasingly complex society, to enhance our understanding of the fear of crime concept' (Pleysier & Cops 2016:3).

We started off with an historical overture, tracking the fear of crime's American footprints back to fifteen years before it was previously held to have emerged (Lee 2001, 2007). The concept clearly started off with a local Republican campaign in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as early as October 1949. Around fifteen years later, the concept gained its political momentum at the national level, against the background of a *discursive space* (Hauser 2009) opening up on newly available crime statistics and already existing public unrest about racial tensions. A similar story goes for the concept's history in the United Kingdom.

Our *historical discourse analysis* revealed a strongly aligned history in the Netherlands. The Dutch history of the concept started with words by Willem Drees Jr in the Dutch parliament on October 11th, 1973. After this political initiation, the concept gained momentum very quickly, since it successfully made free-floating worries about social instability tangible for political discussion. The meaning of 'the fear of crime' was highly politically influenced, from the very beginning. 'Fear of crime' was merely rooted in collective sentiments of social worries, rather than individual crime fears.

After this detailed study of the concept's history and initial meaning, we turned to a review of the literature. We collected insights on the etiology of the fear of crime at several layers of psychological reference: the individual, neighbourhood and societal levels. We also added insights related to the sub-concept of situational fear of crime, and explored what is known about citizens' adjusted behaviour. The conclusion drawn from the literature review is that the research tradition, disappointingly, is still 'trapped within an overly restrictive methodological and theoretical framework' (Hale 1996:132).

The second theoretical chapter supplemented this problematic body of knowledge, primarily from a *social psychological* view. First, a more structured and broader exploration of the etiology of 'societal fear of crime' was added. We then delved into the psychological and social psychological dynamics underlying risk perceptions in order to end up with an accumulated and renewed conceptual clarity. This extended theoretical framework laid the foundation for the operationalisation of 'the fear of crime' in the subsequent chapter, accompanied by a tailor-made research design containing '(…) a broad range of techniques that healthily complement, contrast and challenge one another' (Jackson 2004b:57). Everything was set for the first empirical step.

Thirty highly diverse respondents were interviewed for the qualitative empirical stage of the research for this book. The respondents' free associations led to the discovery of five so-called 'mental maps', which strongly resonated with the sub-concept of 'situational fear of crime'. The subsequent sorting of a set of photographs related to fear of crime led to four perspectives. Two could be interpreted as accentuations of 'personal fear of crime', while the other two accentuated 'societal fear of crime'. After sorting the photographs, the respondents were asked semi-structured questions based on the extended theoretical framework.

It became clear that the respondents had a clear sense of control over the risk of crime to themselves, due to a convergence of avoidance behaviour and psychological defense mechanisms. But the respondents' societal fear of crime appeared to be amplified by broader sentiments of societal discontent and political anger. Twelve hypotheses were formulated on the basis of these qualitative findings and the extended theoretical framework.

These hypotheses were tested in the subsequent quantitative empirical stage, which involved samples from three highly different Dutch municipalities: Amsterdam, Hilversum and Zaltbommel. The descriptive statistics of these samples showed that 'general fear of crime' – and especially 'societal fear of crime' – exceeds 'personal fear of crime' on both the cognitive and affective aspects. 'The fear of crime' clearly is a distant problem at the level of Dutch society for the majority of the respondents. And, remarkably, the respondents from Amsterdam feared crime the least although they actually fell victim of crime the most.

Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) led to rich insights into the etiology of the fear of crime's sub-concepts: elements of a general risk sensitivity were found at the root of all explored sub-concepts of 'the fear of crime'; psychological defense mechanisms strongly suppress personal fear of crime; neighbourhood fear of crime is mainly the result of social disorganisation; and societal fear of crime is strongly amplified by a more general societal discontent. In addition, structural equation models were found to explain the relatively low personal fear of crime among citizens of Amsterdam – indicating a stronger activation of avoidance behaviour, as a result of assessing crime to be a significant and psychologically nearby threat. Psychological defense mechanisms additionally provided the respondents with a sense of control over their personal risk of crime.

This multi-dimensional study of 'the fear of crime' has shown that citizens are highly motivated to *keep the trouble of crime at a safe distance*. And this explains why 'the fear of crime' has been - and will probably remain to be - a distant and abstract social problem instead of an imminent personal threat, even if it is assessed to be a highly significant risk outside one's own front door.

When citizens experience fear of crime, as such, politicians and other institutions would serve them well by taking seriously this sharpened accentuation of an important public sentiment. Why scare or reassure citizens, if they are already functionally adapted to the risk of crime and if this problem is cognitively neutralised before actually becomes dysfunctional to them? Citizens already keep the trouble of crime at a safe distance, as they probably do with many other "public fears" that governments and institutions nowadays aim to combat. It is time for a more rational focus of policy and practice towards a multitude of "public fears".

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Appendices

Appendix I - Photographs used for Q-sorting (Chapter 5)

Nr.	Description	Intended indicators
1. © Georg Silckers 2005 (wikimedia.org)	**Block of flats with dish antennae** Primarily accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 1. Social change **Neighbourhood influences** 1. Urbanisation 2. Social composition
2. © Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013	**Dog dirt on the pavement** Primarily accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 5. Societal discontent **Environmental orientation** 3. Physical incivilities **Risk sensitivity** 8. Level of tolerance
3. © NOS 2013 (nos.nl)	**Online news item about cybercrime** Accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Risk sensitivity** 7. Specific crime fear 10. Conservatism **Personal awareness** 2. Exposure 4. Identification 5. Closeness
4. © Edwtie 2013 (wikimedia.org)	**The Dutch parliament** Accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 5. Societal discontent **Risk sensitivity** 9. Authoritarianism 10. Conservatism

5. © Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013	**Warning to be careful when using an ATM machine** ─────────── Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Personal awareness** 2. Exposure 4. Identification 5. Closeness **Coping strategies** 1. Avoidance behaviour **Risk sensitivity** 7. Specific crime fear
6. © Peter Stam 2012 (Alblasserdamnieuws.nl)	**Youths on a broken-down bench at night** ─────────── Accentuates both *personal* and *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 4. Societal detachedness 5. Societal discontent 7. Symbolic crime concerns **Environmental orientation** 2. Social incivilities 9. Dangerous other(s) **Coping strategies** 1. Avoidance behaviour **Risk sensitivity** 8. Level of tolerance
7. © Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013	**Drugs deal** ─────────── Primarily accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 7. Symbolic crime concerns **Environmental orientation** 2. Social incivilities **Coping strategies** 1. Avoidance behaviour **Risk sensitivity** 8. Level of tolerance **Neighbourhood influences** 6. Neighbourhood problems

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8. © Dutch national government 2002	**Men in a tunnel at night** Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Environmental orientation** 9. Dangerous other(s) **Sense of vulnerability** 1. Physical vulnerability 3. Ecological vulnerability **Risk sensitivity** 5. Contemporaneous offences 7. Specific crime fear **Coping strategies** 1. Avoidance behaviour
9. © Philipp Hertzog 2004 (wikimedia.org)	**International flags with EU flag** Accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 1. Social change 5. Societal discontent **Risk sensitivity** 10. Conservatism 11. Passivism
10. © Joejukes 2005 (Flickr.com)	**Abandoned alley at night** Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Environmental orientation** 4. Limitation of sight 5. Lurk lines **Coping strategies** 1. Avoidance behaviour **Risk sensitivity** 5. Contemporaneous offences 7. Specific crime fear **Neighbourhood influences** 1. Urbanisation

11. © axeltoul 2011 (Flickr.com)	**Individuals** Accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 1. Social change 4. Societal detachedness 6. Disrupted sense of community **Environmental orientation** 8. Sense of anonymity
12. © Túrelio 2008 (wikimedia.org)	**Car break-in** Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Environmental orientation** 2. Social incivilities **Coping strategies** 1. Avoidance behaviour 2. Preventive measures **Risk sensitivity** 8. Level of tolerance
13. ©Eastlaketimes 2009 (flickr.com)	**Burglary** Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Risk sensitivity** 7. Specific crime fear **Personal awareness** 5. Closeness **Coping strategies** 2. Preventive measures **Neighbourhood influences** 6. Neighbourhood problems

14. © Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013	**Pickpocket** ____ Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Coping strategies** 1. Avoidance behaviour 2. Preventive measures **Personal awareness** 2. Exposure 5. Closeness
15. © *Unkown*	**Anti-social behaviour** ____ Accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 5. Societal discontent 6. Disrupted sense of community **Risk sensitivity** 8. Level of tolerance **Neighbourhood influences** 1. Urbanisation **Environmental orientation** 2. Social incivilities 9. Dangerous other(s)
16. © Rafael Matsunaga 2007 (flickr.com)	**Falling stock rates** ____ Accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 1. Social change

17. © Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013	**Young woman threatened with a knife** Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Risk sensitivity** 5. Contemporaneous offences 7. Specific crime fear **Sense of vulnerability** 1. Physical vulnerability 3. Ecological vulnerability **Personal awareness** 4. Identification **Environmental orientation** 9. Dangerous other(s)
18. © Advocatheek1 2007 (wikimedia.org)	**Statue of justice** Accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 1. Social change 5. Societal discontent **Risk sensitivity** 4. Authoritarianism
19. © Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013	**Bicycle theft** Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime	**Personal awareness** 5. Closeness **Coping strategies** 1. Avoidance behaviour 2. Preventive measures **Neighbourhood influences** 6. Neighbourhood problems **Environmental orientation** 2. Social incivilities

20. © Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013	**Nightlife violence** ──────── Accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 5. Societal discontent 7. Symbolic crime concern **Neighbourhood influences** 1. Urbanisation **Environmental orientation** 2. Social incivilities 9. Dangerous other(s)
21. © Nathan Meijer 2012 (Flickr.com)	**Youths fighting the police** ──────── Primarily accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 5. Societal discontent 7. Symbolic crime concern **Risk sensitivity** 8. Level of tolerance 9. Authoritarianism
22. © Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013	**Traffic aggression** ──────── Accentuates *general* fear of crime	**Societal influences** 5. Societal discontent 7. Symbolic crime concern **Risk sensitivity** 8. Level of tolerance 9. Authoritarianism

| 23.

© Thalina Kardux-Koeleman 2013 | **Robbery**

Primarily accentuates *personal* fear of crime | **Personal awareness**
5. Closeness

Coping strategies
1. Avoidance behaviour
2. Preventive measures

Sense of vulnerability
1. Physical vulnerability
3. Ecological vulnerability

Environmental orientation
2. Social incivilities
9. Dangerous other(s)

Risk sensitivity
5. Contemporaneous offences
7. Specific crime fear |

Number of photographs that accentuate

Personal fear of crime	11
General fear of crime	11
Both personal and general fear of crime	1

Appendix II – Interview guide (Chapter 5)

Introduction and instruction

Mention the following:

- The topic of the interview.
- Length of the interview (Max. 1.5 hours).
- It is all about the opinion, point of view and feeling of the RESPONDENT.
- There are no good or bad answers.
- Everything the respondent says will be treaded confidentially.
- Anonymous report of the interview in publications.
- It is no problem if the respondent does not want to answer a question.
- It is always possible to stop the interview or to withdraw as a respondent.
- The interview will be recorded to report ad verbatim.

Sign the informed consent form in twofold (one exemplar for the respondent)

Give an outline of the interview:

- Open question.
- Set of photographs to sort.
- Questions about the photograph sorting.
- Questions about the respondent's self.
- Questions about the respondent's neighbourhood.
- Questions about Dutch society.

Free associative question

Do you ever feel unsafe? (Maximum of 15 minutes)

Photograph sorting

Let the respondent sort the 23 photographs. Tell him/her to take their time and that it is all about his/her associations with the photographs, for which there are no right or wrong interpretations.

Instruction:
First divide the set into three separate piles: 1 – photographs you worry about in daily life; 2 – photographs you do *not* worry about in daily life; and 3 - ones you are not sure about. Then sort the three piles into the sorting grid.

Questions about the photograph sort

1. Ask about the photograph in the left corner - in the category 'I do not worry about this in daily life at all (-4)':
   Why did you put this specific photograph in this position within the sorting grid?

2. Ask about the two adjacent photographs (-3):
   Why did you put these specific photographs in this position within the sorting grid?

3. Ask about the photograph in the right corner – in the category 'I strongly worry about this in daily life (+4)':
   Why did you put this specific photograph in this position within the sorting grid?

4. Ask about the two adjacent photographs (+3):
   Why did you put these specific photographs in this position within the sorting grid?

5. Ask the respondent to look over his/her total photograph sort and ask whether or not anything stands out that has not been discussed yet.

Personal fear of crime

---

1. *Do you ever worry in daily life about crime you could fall victim of yourself?*
   - types of crime
   - reasons for thinking about it
   - more or less chance then before?
   - degree of personal chance
   - consequences of victimisation

2. *Do you ever try to prevent yourself from falling victim of crime in daily life?*

3. *Do you ever experience emotions or feelings about your chance of falling victim of crime in daily life?*
   - What kind of emotion(s) or feeling(s)?
   - How often?
   - How intense?

Topics to discuss:

- Risk sensitivity
- Specific crime fear(s)

- Physical vulnerability
- Psychological vulnerability
- Socio-economic vulnerability

- Indirect victimisation – personal victimisation story of an acquaintance
- Indirect victimisation – personal victimisation story of a neighbour
- Indirect victimisation – personal victimisation story of a significant other

- Indirect victimisation – recent crime story in local news
- Indirect victimisation – recent crime story in national news

- Direct victimisation – personal victimisation in the past (ASK CAREFULLY)
- Direct victimisation – coping
- Direct victimisation – present effect(s) of victimisation

- Do you pay attention to your surroundings if you get into an unfamiliar situation? What do you pay attention to?

Neighbourhood fear of crime

1. *Can you please describe your neighbourhood to me?*

2. *Do you ever worry about crime in your neighbourhood in daily life?*
   - types of crime
   - reasons for thinking about it
   - more or less chance then before?
   - degree of chance
   - consequences

3. *Do you ever try to prevent crime in your neighbourhood in daily life?*

4. *Do you ever experience emotions or feelings about crime in your neighbourhood in daily life?*
   - What kind of emotion(s) or feeling(s)?
   - How often?
   - How intense?

Topics to discuss:

- Previous events of crime in the neighbourhood
- Previous events of anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood
- Unrest
- Tensions
- Fights

- Age / ethnicity / educational level / income of residents
- Moving / mobility
- Like-mindedness

- Number of people living on income support / being unemployed / single-parent families / singles / immigrants / loneliness

- Quality of the houses
- Quality of (social) facilities
- Future perspective of the neighbourhood

- Organisational capacity of the neighbourhood
- Informal social control in the neighbourhood

- How well do you know your neighbours?
- Do you have friends or family living nearby?

- Mutual trust
- Mutual expectations
- Looking after one another

Societal fear of crime

1. *Do you ever worry about crime in Dutch society in daily life?*
    - types of crime
    - reasons for thinking about it
    - more or less chance then before?
    - degree of chance
    - consequences

2. *Do you ever try to prevent crime in Dutch society?*

3. *Do you ever experience emotions or feelings about crime in Dutch society in daily life?*
    - What kind of emotion(s) or feeling(s)?
    - How often?
    - How intense?

Topics to discuss:

- Public attention to crime
- Political attention to crime
- Media attention to crime
- Crime aversion

Societal change:
Do you think Dutch society has changed over the past fifty years? In what way?

Topics to discuss:

- Mutual trust in Dutch society
- Sense of belonging in Dutch society
- *Do you ever worry about the direction in which Dutch society is heading?*
- Speed and intensity of societal change
- Authoritarian sentiments
- Conservatism
- Governmental control
- Individual responsibility
- Future perspective of the Netherlands: political/economical/…

Ontological insecurity (ASK <u>VERY</u> CAREFULLY):
Do you ever have the sense that:

- *… the world around you is changing too fast for you?*
- *… there are threats in our society that could strike at any moment?*
- *… life is vulnerable?*
- *… you are on your own?*
- *… you have little influence over your own life?*
- *… you are unhappy about your personal life?*
- *… you worry about your personal health?*

Closing questions

1. Did we miss anything in this interview that you would like to mention?

2. How did you experience the interview?

Do not forget to:

1. … ask the respondent to fill in the demographic questionnaire.

2. … note the numbers of the photographs in the correct categories of the sorting grid.

3. … thank the respondent for his/her time and contribution to the research.

Appendix III – Questionnaire (Chapter 5)

Questionnaire

Thank you for taking the time to fill in this questionnaire! It contains 24 questions on specific topics and ten background questions. Most questions ask you to answer by marking the checkbox of the answer of your choice. For some other questions, you are asked to write down your answer. If you do not want to answer a question, please check the 'no answer' box. If you don't know the answer to a question, please check the 'don't know' box.

Topic questions

1| Do you ever feel unsafe?	Is that often, sometimes or rarely? V1_B				
	often	some-times	rarely	don't know	no answer
□ yes → V1_A □ no	□	□	□	□	□

2| Do you ever feel unsafe in:		Is that often, sometimes or rarely?				
		often	some-times	rarely	don't know	no answer
1. your neighbourhood? V2_A_1	□ yes→ □ no	□	□	□	□	□
2. your place of residency? V2_A_2	□ yes→ □ no	□	□	□	□	□
3. Dutch society? V2_A_3	□ yes→ □ no	□	□	□	□	□

3| Have you fallen victim of crime (once or more) in the last 12 months?

□ yes → □ no V3_A	V3_B (STRING)	no answer
		□
	Please give a short description of what happened	

4| What chance do you think you have of falling victim of crime in the coming 12 months?
V4_A

no chance	very small chance	small chance	no small/no big chance	big chance	very big chance	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

4a| Are you thinking about a specific type of crime here?

☐ yes → ☐ no *V4_B*	V4_B_YES (STRING) *Please give a short description of what you are thinking about*	no answer
		☐

5| How often do you think crime occurs in:

	never	rarely	sometimes	often	don't know	no answer
1. your neighbourhood? *V5_A_1*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. your place of residency? *V5_A_2*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Dutch society? *V5_A_3*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

5a| What do you think is the most frequently occurring type of crime in:		don't know	no answer
1. your neighbourhood?	V5_B_1 (STRING) *Please describe*	☐	☐
2. your place of residency?	V5_B_2 (STRING) *Please describe*	☐	☐
3. Dutch society?	V5_B_3 (STRING) *Please describe*	☐	☐

6| To what extent do you think crime is a problem in:

	not a problem	very small problem	small problem	not a small / not a big problem	big problem	very big problem	no answer
1. your neighbourhood? *V6_1*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. your place of residency? *V6_2*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Dutch society? *V6_3*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

7| To what extent do you think crime is a problem for yourself? *V7*

not a problem	very small problem	small problem	no small / no big problem	big problem	very big problem	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

8| To what extent do you think you have influence over preventing yourself falling victim of crime? *V8*

no influence	very small influence	small influence	not small / not big influence	big influence	very big influence	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

9| To what extent do you think you have influence over preventing crime in:

	no influence	very small influence	small influence	not small / not big influence	big influence	very big influence	no answer
1. your *V9_1* neighbourhood?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. your place of residency?*V9_2*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Dutch society? *V9_3*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

10| Do you think that in the <u>past</u> five years:	has decreased	stayed the same	has increased	don't know	no answer
1. your chance of falling victim of crime has decreased, stayed the same or has increased? *V10_1*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. crime in Dutch society has decreased, stayed the same or has increased? *V10_2*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

11| Do you think that in the coming five years:	will decrease	will stay the same	will increase	don't know	no answer
1. your chance of falling victim of crime will decrease, will stay the same or will increase? *V11_1*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. crime in Dutch society will decrease, will stay the same or will increase? *V11_2*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12| When you think about <u>your chance of falling victim of crime</u>,
what feeling do you experience <u>primarily</u>?   ATTENTION: Only pick 1 answer.   *V12_A*

stress	fear	worry	anger	irritation	don't know	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
					→ go to question 13	→ go to question 13
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓		

12a| How *often* do you experience that feeling?   *V12_B*

rarely	sometimes	often	don't know	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12b| How *long* does that feeling last on average?   *V12_C*

a very short time	a short time	a long time	a very long time	don't know	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

13| When you think about <u>crime in Dutch society</u> now,
what feeling do you experience <u>primarily</u>?   ATTENTION: Only pick 1 answer   *V13_A*

stress	fear	worry	anger	irritation	don't know	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
					→ go to question 14	→ go to question 14
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓		

13a| How *often* do you experience that feeling?   *V13_B*

rarely	sometimes	often	don't know	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

13b| How *long* does that feeling last on average?   *V13_C*

a very short time	a short time	a long time	a very long time	don't know	no answer
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

14 | Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:	strongly agree	agree	neutral	disagree	strongly disagree	no answer
1. I tend to react in a fearful way. *V14_1*	□	□	□	□	□	□
2. I usually expect the worst. *V14_2*	□	□	□	□	□	□
3. I'm easily scared when I'm home alone. *V14_3*	□	□	□	□	□	□
4. I enjoy having a clear and structured way of living. *V14_4*	□	□	□	□	□	□
5. I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. *V14_5*	□	□	□	□	□	□
6. I usually make *V14_6* important decisions quickly and confidently.	□	□	□	□	□	□
7. I'm good at keeping problems out of my mind. *V14_7*	□	□	□	□	□	□
8. I tend to ignore unpleasant facts. *V14_8*	□	□	□	□	□	□
9. I'm often told that I don't show my feelings. *V14_9*	□	□	□	□	□	□
10. I'm actually not that worried about my chance of becoming a victim of crime. *V14_10*	□	□	□	□	□	□
11. Other people have more chance of falling victim of crime than I do. *V14_11*	□	□	□	□	□	□
12. I prefer not to think of my own chance of falling victim of crime. *V14_12*	□	□	□	□	□	□
13. The media pay too much attention to crime. *V14_13*	□	□	□	□	□	□
14. Politicians pay too much attention to crime. *V14_14*	□	□	□	□	□	□
15. People like to hear and read sensational stories. *V14_15*	□	□	□	□	□	□

15| Which of the following descriptions fits your experience of crime best?
ATTENTION: Only pick one answer.   *V15*

		no answer
1| I am worried about crime in Dutch society. I think especially violent crimes are horrible. But bicycle theft, pickpocketing and car break-ins do not belong in our society either.	☐	
2| Crime is one of the many things we deal with the wrong way in the Netherlands. We don't tackle it strongly enough, so nothing changes. I can get angry about that.	☐	☐
3| I sometimes feel unsafe because I hear and read so much about burglary and violence for instance. I hope that something like that won't happen to me. That is a really unpleasant thought. That is why I pay attention. I don't want to fall victim of crime.	☐	
4|Everybody is responsible for themselves, to avoid falling victim of crime. That is why I pay attention. But I am not fearful. Because I pay attention, I have a smaller chance of falling victim of crime.	☐	

16| Imagine you come face-to-face with crime, do you think that you:

	definitely not	probably not	probably	most probably	don't know	no answer
1. are able to defend yourself with words if necessary? *V16_1*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. are able to defend yourself with physical force if necessary? *V16_2*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. will call the police? *V16_3*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. will say something to the offender(s)? *V16_4*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

17| Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.

	strongly agree	agree	neutral	disagree	strongly disagree	no answer
1. We are not interested in each other in my neighbourhood. *V17_1*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. I do not want contact with my neighbours. *V17_2*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. My neighbourhood has became worse in a short time. *V17_3*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. A lot of people in my neighbourhood have a different background to me. *V17_4*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. I trust my neighbours. *V17_5*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

18|Imagine yourself to be in the following situation, how safe would you feel?
ATTENTION: Pick the answer that comes up first.

	very unsafe	unsafe	not unsafe / not safe	safe	very safe	no answer
1| You are home alone at night. It's already late when somebody rings your door. You are not expecting anybody. V18_1	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2| You are at the bus stop nearest your home, during the day. A group of 16-year-old boys shows up. They start to vandalise the bus stop. V18_2	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3| You are off to visit friends in a neighbourhood you are not familiar with. While you are looking for the right street, you notice a group of youngsters following you. V18_3	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4| You are approaching your home at night. You see two men near a parked car down your street. When they see you, they start to walk towards you. V18_4	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5| You were on a night out in a city you visit regularly. It's already late and you are walking to the station by yourself. On your way, you see a group of drunk youngsters. V18_5	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6| You spend an evening with friends in your place of residency. Late at night you cycle home by yourself. Due to a diversion you have to go through an unlit park to get home. V18_6	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7	You are on your way to get cash from an ATM machine. Nobody is around. But as you are using the ATM machine, you suddenly hear two people speaking quietly to each other. V18_7	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

19| Imagine you are walking <u>alone</u> and <u>see</u> the following situation, how safe would you feel?

	very unsafe	unsafe	not unsafe / not safe	safe	very safe	no answer
	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

19a| Are there any other situations or places in which you feel unsafe?

		no answer
☐ yes → ☐ no V19_B	V19_B_YES (STRING) Please describe	☐

20|People sometimes take certain measures to reduce their chance of falling victim of crime. How often do you lessen your chance by:

	never	rarely	sometimes	often	don't know	no answer
1. staying inside the house after dark? V20_1	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. keeping the door closed when somebody rings your doorbell after dark? V20_2	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. taking a roundabout way or avoiding certain locations? V20_3	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. not travelling alone after dark? V20_4	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. using extra locks on your bicycle, car or doors? V20_5	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. paying attention to your surroundings? V20_6	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. consciously adopting a self-confident attitude? V20_7	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. leaving valuable things at home? V20_8	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

21| Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.

	strongly agree	agree	neutral	disagree	strongly disagree	no answer
1. Sentences are too soft in the Netherlands. V21_1	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. All types of crime are unacceptable. V21_2	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. We have tolerated too much for too long in the Netherlands. V21_3	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. The Netherlands has strongly changed in a negative manner. V21_4	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. I worry about the direction in which things are heading in the Netherlands. V21_5	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Politicians have promised us many things in the past but they have not fulfilled any of their promises. V21_6	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

22| To what extent do you worry about ___ in the Netherlands?

	no worry	very slight worries	slight worries	strong worries	very strong worries	don't know	no answer
1. people's standards and values *V22_A_1*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
2. people coming from abroad *V22_A_2*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
3. that people are more by themselves than before *V22_A_3*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
4. unemployment rates *V22_A_4*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
5. politics *V22_A_5*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
6. the tougher nature of society *V22_A_6*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
7. people's extreme ideas *V22_A_7*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
8. Europe's influence *V22_A_8*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
9. the influence of international tensions *V22_A_9*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
10. the chance of a terrorist attack *V22_A_10*	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

22a| Are there any other things you worry about in Dutch society?

		no answer
□ yes → □ no *V22_B*	V22_B_YES (STRING) *Please describe*	□

23|Do you think that the government does enough to counteract crime? *V23*

yes	a little	no	don't know	no answer
□	□	□	□	□

24|To what extent does the topic of crime influence your vote during political elections? *V24*

no influence	very little	little	not little / not much	much	very much	no answer
□	□	□	□	□	□	□

- BACKGROUND QUESTIONS -		
A1| What is your gender? *A1*		
□ Male	□ Female	□ No answer
A2| What is your age? *A2*		
□ Under 20 years	□ 20 - 29 years	□ 30 - 39 years
□ 40 - 49 years	□ 50 - 64 years	□ 65 years and older
□ No answer		
A3|What is your highest completed educational level? *A3*		
□ No education		
□ Lower education		
□ Vocational education		
□ Higher education		
□ No answer		
A4| Where were you born? *A4*		
□ The Netherlands		
□ Elsewhere in Europe (not Turkey), North America, Australia, New Zealand, New-Guinea, Indonesia or Japan.		
□ Africa, Latin America, Asia (not Indonesia or Japan) or Turkey		
□ No answer		

A5| Where were your parents born?	
Mother A5_1	*Father A5_2*
□ The Netherlands	□ The Netherlands
□ Elsewhere in Europe (not Turkey), North America, Australia, New Zealand, New-Guinea, Indonesia or Japan.	□ Elsewhere in Europe (not Turkey), North America, Australia, New Zealand, New-Guinea, Indonesia or Japan.
□ Africa, Latin America, Asia (not Indonesia or Japan) or Turkey	□ Africa, Latin America, Asia (not Indonesia or Japan) or Turkey
□ No answer	□ No answer

A6| What description suits you best? *A6*	
□ Paid work/independent	□ Unemployed
□ Volunteer	□ Disabled
□ Housekeeper	□ Student
□ Retired	□ No answer

A7| What is your post code? *A7 (STRING)*

_____ (4 numbers) ___ (2 letters) *please fill in*   □ No answer *A7_Codes*

A8| What is your income-level (without partner)? *A8*

□ Less than € 33,500 a year before tax / less than € 1,800 a month after tax

□ About € 33,500 a year before tax / about € 1,800 a month after tax

□ More than € 33,500 a year before tax / more than € 1,800 a month after tax

□ No answer

A9| Imagine elections for the parliament were happening next month - which party would you vote for?*A9*

□ Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)   □ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)▯

□ ChristenUnie (CU)   □ Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)▯

□ Democraten 66 (D66)   □ Socialistische Partij (SP)

□ GroenLinks (GL)   □ Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)

□ Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)   □ 50Plus (50PLUS)

▣ Partij voor de Dieren▯(PvdD)   □ I don't know yet

□ No answer

A10| How does news reach you?

□*A101* Mostly via television _____*A10_1 (STRING)*_____   *please fill in the name of the channel*

□*A102* Mostly via radio _____*A10_2 (STRING)*_____   *please fill in the name of the channel*

□*A103* Mostly via newspaper_____*A10_3 (STRING)*_____   *please fill in the name of the newspaper*

□*A104* Mostly via internet_____*A10_4 (STRING)*_____   *please fill in the name of the website/app*

□*A105* Mostly via social media_____*A10_5 (STRING)*___   *please fill in the name of the social media*

□*A106* Otherwise,   _____*A10_6 (STRING)*_____ *please fill in*

□*A107* No answer

Do you have any remarks or additions to what is discussed in this questionnaire?

REMARKS (STRING)

Please fill in

**You can send the completed questionnaire back for free using the enclosed self-addressed envelope.
Thank you very much for your help!**

Appendix IV – Gender, age & municipality differences (Chapter 7)

Variable 1	Variable 2	χ²	Df	Critical value χ²	P	Sign. diff.?
General fear of crime measurement						
V1A	gender	59.98	1	10.83	.001	Yes
V1B	gender	17.47	2	13.82	.001	Yes
Situational fear of crime						
sit_foc_scale	gender	270.44	4	18.48	.001	Yes
Personal fear of crime						
V3A	gender	.01	1	3.84	.05	No
V4A	gender	17.40	5	15.09	.01	Yes
V4B	gender	.00	1	3.84	.05	No
V7	gender	15.49	5	11.07	.05	Yes
V8	gender	10.56	5	11.07	.05	Yes
V12A	gender	159.97	4	18.47	.001	Yes
V12B	gender	9.90	2	9.21	.001	Yes
V12C	gender	3.70	3	7.81	.05	No
Neighbourhood fear of crime						
V2A.1	gender	30.23	1	10.83	,91	Yes
V2B.1	gender	1.08	2	5.99	.05	No
V5A.1	gender	8.86	3	7.81	.05	Yes
V6.1	gender	20.82	5	20.51	.001	Yes
V9.1	gender	36.26	5	20.51	.001	Yes
Societal fear of crime						
V2A.3	gender	31.08	1	10.83	.001	Yes
V2B.3	gender	14.05	2	13.82	.001	Yes
V5A.3	gender	28.07	3	16.27	.001	Yes
V6.3	gender	94.78	5	20.51	.001	Yes
V9.3	gender	32.20	5	20.51	.001	Yes
V13A	gender	66.45	4	18.47	.001	Yes
V13B	gender	5.68	2	5.99	.05	No
V13C	gender	7.14	3	7.81	.05	No

Tab. 1 - χ² test results for gender differences.

	Men		Women		Total	
	Men		**Women**		**Total**	
General fear of crime measurement						
V1A*	$\dot{x}$ = .55	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ =.70	s =.46	$\dot{x}$ = .64	s =.48
V1B*	$\dot{x}$ =1.50	s =.57	$\dot{x}$ = 1.62	s =.58	$\dot{x}$ =1.58	s =.58
Situational fear of crime						
sit_foc_scale*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.28	s =.72	$\dot{x}$ = 3.79	s =.67	$\dot{x}$ = 3.59	s =.74
Personal fear of crime						
V3A	$\dot{x}$ = .13	s =.33	$\dot{x}$ = .12	s =.33	$\dot{x}$ = .12	s =.33
V4A*	$\dot{x}$ =3.34	s =1.12	$\dot{x}$ =3.15	s =1.11	$\dot{x}$ =3.40	s =1.12
V4B	$\dot{x}$ = .45	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = .45	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = .45	s =.50
V7*	$\dot{x}$ =3.12	s =1.58	$\dot{x}$ =3.30	s =1.56	$\dot{x}$ =3.21	s =1.58
V8*	$\dot{x}$ = 4.11	s =1.46	$\dot{x}$ = 4.10	s =1.48	$\dot{x}$ = 4.08	s =1.49
V12A*	$\dot{x}$ = 2.59	s =1.06	$\dot{x}$ = 3.04	s =1.07	$\dot{x}$ = 2.85	s =1.09
V12B*	$\dot{x}$ = 1.82	s =.72	$\dot{x}$ = 1.80	s =.67	$\dot{x}$ = 1.81	s =.69
V12C	$\dot{x}$ = 1.91	s =.66	$\dot{x}$ = 1.89	s =.62	$\dot{x}$ = 1.90	s =.64
Neighbourhood fear of crime						
V2A.1*	$\dot{x}$ = .36	s =.48	$\dot{x}$ = .47	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = .43	s =.49
V2B.1	$\dot{x}$ =1.60	s =.60	$\dot{x}$ =1.64	s =.62	$\dot{x}$ =1.62	s =.61
V5A.1*	$\dot{x}$ = 2.76	s =.71	$\dot{x}$ = 2.83	s =.74	$\dot{x}$ = 2.80	s =.73
V6.1*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.46	s =1.44	$\dot{x}$ = 3.58	s =1.47	$\dot{x}$ = 3.53	s =1.46
V9.1*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.55	s =1.50	$\dot{x}$ = 3.58	s =1.56	$\dot{x}$ = 3.55	s =1.54
Societal fear of crime						
V2A.3*	$\dot{x}$ =.58	s =.49	$\dot{x}$ = .69	s =.46	$\dot{x}$ = .64	s =.48
V2B.3*	$\dot{x}$ = 1.65	s =.60	$\dot{x}$ =1.74	s =.56	$\dot{x}$ =1.71	s =.58
V5A.3*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.56	s =.60	$\dot{x}$ = 3.67	s =.55	$\dot{x}$ = 3.63	s =.58
V6.3*	$\dot{x}$ = 4.91	s =1.07	$\dot{x}$ = 5.19	s =.99	$\dot{x}$ = 5.08	s =1.04
V9.3*	$\dot{x}$ = 2.69	s =1.43	$\dot{x}$ = 2.86	s =1.49	$\dot{x}$ = 2.77	s =1.47
V13A*	$\dot{x}$ = 2.45	s =.92	$\dot{x}$ = 2.73	s =.87	$\dot{x}$ = 2.62	s =.90
V13B	$\dot{x}$ = 2.14	s =.70	$\dot{x}$ = 2.15	s =.66	$\dot{x}$ = 2.15	s =.68
V13C	$\dot{x}$ = 2.02	s =.66	$\dot{x}$ = 2.03	s =.61	$\dot{x}$ = 2.03	s =.64

* = $\chi^2_{obs} > \chi^2_{crit}$

Tab. 2 – Means and standard deviations for gender differences.

Variable 1	Variable 2	χ²	Df	Critical value χ²	P	Sign. diff.?
General fear of crime measurement						
V1A	Age	9.58	5	11.07	.05	No
V1B	Age	7.47	5	11.07	.05	No
Situational fear of crime						
sit_foc_scale	Age	219.44	20	45.31	.001	Yes
Personal fear of crime						
V3A	Age	16.54	5	15.09	.01	Yes
V4A	Age	79.56	25	52.62	.001	Yes
V4B	Age	22.66	5	20.51	.001	Yes
V7	Age	62.64	25	52.61	.001	Yes
V8	Age	62.64	25	52.61	.001	Yes
V12A	Age	66.43	20	31.41	.05	Yes
V12B	Age	20.15	10	18.31	.05	Yes
V12C	Age	17.28	15	25.00	.05	No
Neighbourhood fear of crime						
V2A.1	Age	7.22	5	11.07	.05	No
V2B.1	Age	30.86	10	31.41	.05	No
V5A.1	Age	37.12	15	30.58	.01	Yes
V6.1	Age	29.69	25	37.65	.05	No
V9.1	Age	153.60	25	52.62	.001	Yes
Societal fear of crime						
V2A.3	Age	6.89	5	11.07	.05	No
V2B.3	Age	30.86	10	29.59	.05	Yes
V5A.3	Age	27.13	15	25.00	.001	Yes
V6.3	Age	94.78	25	52.62	.001	Yes
V9.3	Age	87.22	25	52.62	.001	Yes
V13A	Age	56.07	20	45.31	.001	Yes
V13B	Age	72.56	10	29.56	.001	Yes
V13C	Age	39.10	15	37.70	.001	Yes

Tab. 3 - χ² test results for age differences.

	20-29 years		30-39 years		40-49 years		50-64 years		65 years and older		Total	
General fear of crime measurement												
V1A	$\bar{x}=.70$	$s=.46$	$\bar{x}=.64$	$s=.48$	$\bar{x}=.62$	$s=.49$	$\bar{x}=.64$	$s=.48$	$\bar{x}=.61$	$s=.49$	$\bar{x}=.64$	$s=.48$
V1B	$\bar{x}=1.55$	$s=.55$	$\bar{x}=1.53$	$s=.58$	$\bar{x}=1.55$	$s=.58$	$\bar{x}=1.59$	$s=.57$	$\bar{x}=1.61$	$s=.60$	$\bar{x}=1.58$	$s=.58$
Situational fear of crime												
sit_foc_scale*	$\bar{x}=3.28$	$s=.72$	$\bar{x}=3.33$	$s=.73$	$\bar{x}=3.44$	$s=.69$	$\bar{x}=3.60$	$s=.71$	$\bar{x}=3.89$	$s=.70$	$\bar{x}=3.59$	$s=.74$
Personal fear of crime												
V3A*	$\bar{x}=.13$	$s=.34$	$\bar{x}=.15$	$s=.36$	$\bar{x}=.16$	$s=.36$	$\bar{x}=.12$	$s=.33$	$\bar{x}=.09$	$s=.28$	$\bar{x}=.12$	$s=.33$
V4A*	$\bar{x}=3.39$	$s=1.06$	$\bar{x}=3.32$	$s=1.19$	$\bar{x}=3.44$	$s=1.04$	$\bar{x}=3.43$	$s=1.14$	$\bar{x}=3.41$	$s=1.13$	$\bar{x}=3.40$	$s=1.12$
V4B*	$\bar{x}=.42$	$s=.49$	$\bar{x}=.46$	$s=.50$	$\bar{x}=.41$	$s=.49$	$\bar{x}=.52$	$s=.50$	$\bar{x}=.41$	$s=.49$	$\bar{x}=.45$	$s=.50$
V7*	$\bar{x}=3.12$	$s=1.52$	$\bar{x}=3.28$	$s=1.60$	$\bar{x}=3.25$	$s=1.51$	$\bar{x}=3.28$	$s=1.56$	$\bar{x}=3.11$	$s=1.62$	$\bar{x}=3.21$	$s=1.58$
V8*	$\bar{x}=4.16$	$s=1.44$	$\bar{x}=4.16$	$s=1.45$	$\bar{x}=4.41$	$s=1.32$	$\bar{x}=4.20$	$s=1.42$	$\bar{x}=3.77$	$s=1.60$	$\bar{x}=4.08$	$s=1.49$
V12A*	$\bar{x}=3.10$	$s=1.14$	$\bar{x}=3.02$	$s=1.10$	$\bar{x}=2.82$	$s=1.11$	$\bar{x}=2.75$	$s=1.04$	$\bar{x}=2.82$	$s=1.08$	$\bar{x}=2.85$	$s=1.09$
V12B*	$\bar{x}=1.70$	$s=.69$	$\bar{x}=1.72$	$s=.68$	$\bar{x}=1.83$	$s=.71$	$\bar{x}=1.87$	$s=.70$	$\bar{x}=1.80$	$s=.68$	$\bar{x}=1.81$	$s=.69$
V12C	$\bar{x}=1.86$	$s=.66$	$\bar{x}=1.86$	$s=.68$	$\bar{x}=1.84$	$s=.60$	$\bar{x}=1.93$	$s=.63$	$\bar{x}=1.92$	$s=.62$	$\bar{x}=1.90$	$s=.64$

Tab. 4 – Means and standard deviations for age differences

$* = \chi^2_{obs} > \chi^2_{crit}$

	20-29 years		30-39 years		40-49 years		50-64 years		65 years and older		Total	
Neighbourhood fear of crime												
V2A.1	$\bar{x}$ =.39	s =.49	$\bar{x}$ =.44	s =.50	$\bar{x}$ =.39	s =.49	$\bar{x}$ =.44	s =.50	$\bar{x}$ =.44	s =.50	$\bar{x}$ =.43	s =.49
V2B.1	$\bar{x}$ =1.61	s =.57	$\bar{x}$ =1.58	s =.62	$\bar{x}$ =1.58	s =.61	$\bar{x}$ =1.65	s =.60	$\bar{x}$ =1.63	s =.64	$\bar{x}$ =1.62	s =.61
V5A.1*	$\bar{x}$ =2.77	s =.77	$\bar{x}$ =2.88	s =.74	$\bar{x}$ =2.82	s =.71	$\bar{x}$ =2.87	s =.71	$\bar{x}$ =2.70	s =.73	$\bar{x}$ =2.80	s =.73
V6.1	$\bar{x}$ =3.48	s =1.48	$\bar{x}$ =3.57	s =1.46	$\bar{x}$ =3.54	s =1.45	$\bar{x}$ =3.55	s =1.47	$\bar{x}$ =3.49	s =1.44	$\bar{x}$ =3.53	s =1.46
V9.1*	$\bar{x}$ =3.43	s =1.54	$\bar{x}$ =3.66	s =1.44	$\bar{x}$ =3.97	s =1.47	$\bar{x}$ =3.72	s =1.49	$\bar{x}$ =3.15	s =1.57	$\bar{x}$ =3.55	s =1.54
Societal fear of crime												
V2A.3	$\bar{x}$ =.64	s =.48	$\bar{x}$ =.62	s =.49	$\bar{x}$ =.64	s =.48	$\bar{x}$ =.67	s =.47	$\bar{x}$ =.62	s =.49	$\bar{x}$ =.64	s =.48
V2B.3*	$\bar{x}$ =1.62	s =.55	$\bar{x}$ =1.56	s =.57	$\bar{x}$ =1.68	s =.56	$\bar{x}$ =1.73	s =.58	$\bar{x}$ =1.79	s =.58	$\bar{x}$ =1.71	s =.58
V5A.3*	$\bar{x}$ =3.51	s =.64	$\bar{x}$ =3.56	s =.60	$\bar{x}$ =3.59	s =.58	$\bar{x}$ =3.66	s =.55	$\bar{x}$ =3.68	s =.54	$\bar{x}$ =3.63	s =.58
V6.3*	$\bar{x}$ =4.85	s =1.12	$\bar{x}$ =4.81	s =1.12	$\bar{x}$ =5.02	s =1.02	$\bar{x}$ =5.09	s =.98	$\bar{x}$ =5.31	s =.96	$\bar{x}$ =5.08	s =1.04
V9.3*	$\bar{x}$ =2.76	s =1.51	$\bar{x}$ =2.83	s =1.36	$\bar{x}$ =3.03	s =1.43	$\bar{x}$ =2.85	s =1.47	$\bar{x}$ =2.54	s =1.48	$\bar{x}$ =2.77	s =1.47
V13A*	$\bar{x}$ =2.56	s =1.01	$\bar{x}$ =2.57	s =.98	$\bar{x}$ =2.59	s =.93	$\bar{x}$ =2.61	s =.86	$\bar{x}$ =2.67	s =.85	$\bar{x}$ =2.62	s =.90
V13B*	$\bar{x}$ =1.97	s =.69	$\bar{x}$ =1.98	s =.68	$\bar{x}$ =2.08	s =.71	$\bar{x}$ =2.26	s =.67	$\bar{x}$ =2.19	s =.64	$\bar{x}$ =2.15	s =.68
V13C*	$\bar{x}$ =1.93	s =.63	$\bar{x}$ =1.92	s =.62	$\bar{x}$ =1.94	s =.65	$\bar{x}$ =2.07	s =.62	$\bar{x}$ =2.09	s =.63	$\bar{x}$ =2.03	s =.64

* = $\chi^2_{obs} > \chi^2_{crit}$

Tab. 4 – Means and standard deviations for age differences
(continued)

Variable 1	Variable 2	χ^2	Df	Critical value χ^2	P	Sign. diff.?
General fear of crime measurement						
V1A	Municipality	.43	2	5.99	.05	No
V1B	Municipality	8.37	4	9.49	.05	No
Situational fear of crime						
sit_foc_scale	Municipality	37.31	8	26.12	.001	Yes
Personal fear of crime						
V3A	Municipality	15.10	2	13.82	.001	Yes
V4A	Municipality	37.82	10	29.59	.001	Yes
V4B	Municipality	7.25	2	5.99	.05	Yes
V7	Municipality	14.23	10	18.31	.05	No
V8	Municipality	38.33	10	29.59	.001	Yes
V12A	Municipality	9.04	8	15.51	.05	No
V12B	Municipality	50.97	4	18.47	.001	Yes
V12C	Municipality	11.42	6	12.59	.05	No
Neighbourhood fear of crime						
V2A.1	Municipality	.87	2	5.99	.05	No
V2B.1	Municipality	3.88	4	9.49	.05	No
V5A.1	Municipality	131.19	5	22.46	.001	Yes
V6.1	Municipality	114.21	10	29.56	.001	Yes
V9.1	Municipality	22.42	10	18.31	.05	Yes
Societal fear of crime						
V2A.3	Municipality	46.98	2	13.82	.001	Yes
V2B.3	Municipality	13.13	4	9.49	.05	Yes
V5A.3	Municipality	120.80	6	22.46	.001	Yes
V6.3	Municipality	126.05	10	29.59	.001	Yes
V9.3	Municipality	18.29	10	18.31	.05	No
V13A	Municipality	11.09	8	15.51	.05	No
V13B	Municipality	61.05	4	18.47	.001	Yes
V13C	Municipality	20.62	6	16.81	.01	Yes

Tab. 5 - χ^2 test results for municipality differences.

	Amsterdam		Hilversum		Zaltbommel		Total	
	General fear of crime measurement							
V1A*	$\dot{x}$ =.64	s =.48	$\dot{x}$ = .64	s = .48	$\dot{x}$ = .63	s =.48	$\dot{x}$ = .64	s =.48
V1B*	$\dot{x}$ = 1.53	s =.59	$\dot{x}$ =1.61	s = .57	$\dot{x}$ =1.58	s =.58	$\dot{x}$ =1.58	s =.58
	Situational fear of crime							
sit_foc _scale*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.42	s =.74	$\dot{x}$ = 3.65	s =.73	$\dot{x}$ = 3.60	s =.73	$\dot{x}$ = 3.59	s =.74
	Personal fear of crime							
V3A*	$\dot{x}$ =.17	s =.38	$\dot{x}$ = .12	s =.32	$\dot{x}$ = .11	s =.31	$\dot{x}$ = .12	s =.33
V4A*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.20	s =1.13	$\dot{x}$ = 3.42	s =1.12	$\dot{x}$ = 3.49	s =1.11	$\dot{x}$ =3.40	s =1.12
V4B*	$\dot{x}$ = .47	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = .47	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = .42	s =.49	$\dot{x}$ = .45	s =.50
V7	$\dot{x}$ = 3.21	s =1.59	$\dot{x}$ = 3.23	s =1.58	$\dot{x}$ = 3.18	s =1.56	$\dot{x}$ =3.21	s =1.58
V8*	$\dot{x}$ = 4.19	s =1.43	$\dot{x}$ = 4.15	s =1.50	$\dot{x}$ = 3.94	s =1.49	$\dot{x}$ = 4.08	s =1.49
V12A	$\dot{x}$ = 2.92	s =1.13	$\dot{x}$ = 2.84	s =1.08	$\dot{x}$ = 2.83	s =1.07	$\dot{x}$ = 2.85	s =1.09
V12B*	$\dot{x}$ = 1.62	s =.67	$\dot{x}$ = 1.88	s =.69	$\dot{x}$ = 1.83	s =.69	$\dot{x}$ = 1.81	s =.69
V12C	$\dot{x}$ = 1.85	s =.68	$\dot{x}$ = 1.90	s =.61	$\dot{x}$ = 1.93	s =.64	$\dot{x}$ = 1.90	s =.64
	Neighbourhood fear of crime							
V2A.1	$\dot{x}$ = .47	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = .43	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = .41	s =.49	$\dot{x}$ = .43	s =.49
V2B.1	$\dot{x}$ = 1.67	s =.63	$\dot{x}$ = 1.63	s =.60	$\dot{x}$ = 1.59	s =.61	$\dot{x}$ =1.62	s =.61
V5A.1*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.08	s =.69	$\dot{x}$ = 2.82	s =.71	$\dot{x}$ = 2.63	s =.73	$\dot{x}$ = 2.80	s =.73
V6.1*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.95	s =1.34	$\dot{x}$ = 3.59	s =1.40	$\dot{x}$ = 3.24	s =1.53	$\dot{x}$ = 3.53	s =1.46
V9.1*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.56	s =1.47	$\dot{x}$ = 3.61	s =1.54	$\dot{x}$ = 3.47	s =1.56	$\dot{x}$ = 3.55	s =1.54
	Societal fear of crime							
V2A.3*	$\dot{x}$ = .52	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = .66	s =.48	$\dot{x}$ = .70	s =.46	$\dot{x}$ = .64	s =.48
V2B.3*	$\dot{x}$ = 1.62	s =.59	$\dot{x}$ = 1.71	s =.59	$\dot{x}$ = 1.76	s =.57	$\dot{x}$ =1.71	s =.58
V5A.3*	$\dot{x}$ = 3.41	s =.65	$\dot{x}$ = 3.63	s =.57	$\dot{x}$ = 3.74	s =.50	$\dot{x}$ = 3.63	s =.58
V6.3*	$\dot{x}$ = 4.70	s =1.05	$\dot{x}$ = 5.09	s =1.02	$\dot{x}$ = 5.27	s =.99	$\dot{x}$ = 5.08	s =1.04
V9.3	$\dot{x}$ = 2.88	s =1.48	$\dot{x}$ = 2.80	s =1.45	$\dot{x}$ = 2.68	s =1.47	$\dot{x}$ = 2.77	s =1.47
V13A	$\dot{x}$ = 2.54	s =.89	$\dot{x}$ = 2.62	s =.90	$\dot{x}$ = 2.66	s =.90	$\dot{x}$ = 2.62	s =.90
V13B*	$\dot{x}$ = 1.93	s =.68	$\dot{x}$ = 2.20	s =.67	$\dot{x}$ = 2.21	s =.67	$\dot{x}$ = 2.15	s =.68
V13C*	$\dot{x}$ = 1.96	s =.67	$\dot{x}$ = 2.03	s =.62	$\dot{x}$ = 2.06	s =.64	$\dot{x}$ = 2.03	s =.64

* $= \chi^2_{obs} > \chi^2_{crit}$

Tab. 6 – Means and standard deviations for municipality differences.