

The Dutch Battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina and CIMIC projects in the period 1996-2002 ¹

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 8]

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1. Introduction

Since the nineties the Netherlands armed forces have become increasingly active in humanitarian aid and reconstruction in countries where they have carried out peace operations. This activity implies close cooperation with civilian institutions, for which the concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has been developed over the past few years. For the armed forces CIMIC is not a policy objective in itself, but a tool for the purpose of force security, peacekeeping and reconstruction.

Nowadays the term CIMIC encompasses the coordination of and cooperation between military commanders and the civilian population, including national and local authorities as well as international, national and Non-Governmental Organisations and institutions that support a military mission.

Carrying out small-scale infrastructural projects is one of the most important CIMIC activities. Following a visit of the then Minister of Development Cooperation to the Dutch IFOR-battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996, DM 1,000,000 (ca. € 510,000) were made available for CIMIC projects, which formed the start of a whole programme. In the period 1996-2002 the Minister of Development Cooperation has granted nine allocations, amounting to a total of f 8,914,000 (€ 4,045,000).

This contribution examines the execution of these projects since 1996 by the Dutch IFOR (and later SFOR) battalion stationed in Central Bosnia.

2. History of the CIMIC projects

The history of these small-scale infrastructural projects of the Dutch armed forces goes back to the early eighties, when the UNIFIL battalion in Lebanon organised activities such as building schools, improving and starting up water management, processing of waste and giving medical help. During operation 'Provide Comfort' in Northern Iraq in 1991 Dutch Engineers and Marines assisted in the reconstruction of the remains of Kurdish villages. The financial support for these activities, however, was hardly structured: the contributions came from various parts of the Development Cooperation budget, amongst others the budgetary category of Emergency Aid and Humanitarian Emergencies.

The UNTAC operation in Cambodia proved a breakthrough. Partly as a result of a visit of the Ministers Ter Beek (MoD) and Pronk (Development Cooperation) the Marine battalion was given half a million Dutch guilders (€ 225,000) for so-called 'Pronk projects', to be carried out under the same conditions as the so-called 'Kleine Ambassade Projecten' - KAP (Small Embassy Projects) - that had been in existence since 1977. After a report on the progress of the Cambodian projects the Minister decided to donate an extra half million Dutch guilders. In the former Yugoslavia DUTCHBAT carried out a number of humanitarian projects around the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica, and in the peace operation in Haiti the Marines, too, got half a million guilders for such small-scale projects.

All these projects had to meet certain conditions, which were essentially the KAP criteria. Broadly speaking, the following requirements were set:

- small-scale and local initiative - this requirement implies that the costs of the project may not exceed f 50,000 (€ 22,500) and the request for the project must in principle be made by the local population;
- maximal use of locally purchased goods and materials;
- clearly defined groups, actively involved in the project, making a contribution to the best of their abilities;
- after rounding off the projects, the activities must be carried on by the population; the project may not have a charitable character;
- rehabilitation aid must not be given in the form of large deliveries of food and medicines, except when they are intended as a bridge to a more permanent solution;
- humanitarian projects have to be adjusted as much as possible to the activities of other aid organisations present.

For the Dutch military personnel executing these small-scale projects served as a means to increase the population's trust in them, which would enhance their peacekeeping task. Moreover, the population volunteered useful information sooner and this contributed to the security of the personnel.

3. Dayton Peace Agreement

The CIMIC activities of the Dutch battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) are taking place within the context of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). They date back to September 1995, when the United States and Russia pressed the presidents of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia to accept a peace settlement based on the territorial integrity of Bosnia, subsequently signed in Paris on 14 December of that year. According to the agreement, BiH was going to comprise one state, with a central government, a democratically elected president and parliament, one central bank and monetary system. Simultaneously, the state would consist of two separate areas, viz. the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republica Srpska. The Bosniacs (Muslims) and Bosnian Croats, who together formed the Muslim-Croat Federation, got 51% of the BiH territory, the remaining 49% going to the Bosnian Serbs in the Republic of Srpska.

The so-called Implementation Force (IFOR), established by UNSCR 1031 of 15 December 1995, was to create circumstances for the execution of DPA. IFOR was to assist in a step-by-step realisation (within the year) of the peace process and was allowed to use violence when necessary. At the end of 1996 IFOR was replaced by the (smaller) Stabilisation Force (SFOR). IFOR/SFOR oversees the implementation of the military aspects of DPA. The objective of DPA is the return to peace and stability and SFOR's task is to prevent hostilities and to foster stability in support of the peace process. Besides, DPA specifies that SFOR, within the possibilities that are given in the mandate, gives support to civilian organisations with a view to the return of all ethnic entities in Bosnia to their former homes.

4. General situation

The war in the former Yugoslavia cost nearly 280,000 dead/missing and 25,000 permanently disabled people. More than 2.5 million persons were displaced or fled abroad. At this moment some 660,000 or about 26% of the refugees and displaced persons have returned to their homes, with the return to minority areas being exceedingly slow.

At the political and economic level progress towards a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous country is rather slow. The three nationalist parties still exercise considerable political power. Apart from that, international help, which has been responsible for most of the post-

war economic growth of the country, amounts to at least 30% of the GNP and will be reduced in the coming years. The wealth generated inside the country itself will not be sufficient to support a reasonably functioning social welfare system. The average unemployment in BiH is close to 40% and causes a serious social-economic problem. It is especially the younger generation that are bearing the burden of this unemployment.

5. The Dutch battalion in Canton 6

5.1 Area of operations of the Dutch battalion

The Area of Responsibility (AOR) of SFOR is divided into three multinational sectors. The Dutch units, formed around the core of a mechanised battalion, are part of sector South-West. After two of the six battalions there were pulled out in 2000, the sector was restructured. The area covered by the Dutch largely corresponds to the Bosnian Canton 6 and lies entirely in the territory of the Muslim-Croat Federation. The area stretches 80 kilometres from northwest to southeast and 50 kilometres from southwest to northeast, a size comparable to the Greater London area.

5.2 Terrain and climate

The terrain in Canton 6 features a high central mountain range, which divides the area from northwest to southeast. Near the southwestern border of the Dutch battalion area there is another mountain range.

The weather shows the typical characteristics of a continental climate: hot to very hot summers (up to +40 degrees centigrade) and cold to very cold winters (up to -25 degrees centigrade). Many villages are difficult to reach by country roads or mountain paths, which in winter can only be used by APCs and in some cases only with special snow vehicles.

5.3 Refugee problem

All ethnic groups were involved in the war in the early nineties, when Canton 6 was the scene of heavy fighting, which resulted in extensive war damage. UN investigations have revealed that war crimes were committed in Canton 6. Before the war Canton 6 was home to 342,000 inhabitants: 43% Bosniacs, 39% Bosnian Croats, 12% Bosnian Serbs, and 7% others (a.o. Roma). The present population mainly consists of Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats, because the Bosnian-Serb community largely fled the area during and after the war. In Canton 6 live about 20,000 to 25,000 registered displaced persons (DP) who, having fled their original homes, have now returned to this Canton. At the moment some 115,000 original inhabitants of this area (20,000 Bosniacs, 41,000 Bosnian Croats, 35,500 Bosnian Serbs and 18,500 others) do not live here. Immediately after the signing of DPA this number was 186,000.

The number of returned Bosnian Serbs has increased sharply over the past eighteen months. After Sarajevo and Herzegovina-Neretna, Canton 6 has the highest number of returned DPs in BiH. Figures on Canton 6 over the year 2000 show that 13,588 persons (6,477 Bosniacs, 5,965 Bosnian Croats, 1,222 Bosnian Serbs and 24 others) registered as 'returner'. In 2001 8,641 persons (2,760 Bosniacs, 3,586 Bosnian Croats, 2,277 Bosnian Serbs and 17 others) registered. The figures for Canton 6 are not entirely reliable. A comparison of the figures of Canton 6 with those of UNHCR showed that about 80% of the 'returners' were registered by both organisations.

6. The Dutch battalion and CIMIC projects

The assignment for the Dutch battalion specifies the civil-military cooperation in Canton 6 as follows:

1 (NL) Mechbat carries out the area security in the assigned area, enforces the military stipulations of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), prevents the spreading of hostilities of the Armed Forces in BiH and supports the civilian organisations responsible for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the GFAP by guaranteeing a safe environment. 1 (NL) Mechbat supports civilian reconstruction within its possibilities. This will foster a durable stability and peace, making the presence of NATO forces unnecessary in the long run.

Besides, the operational order states that a subordinate task of the battalion is to pro-actively support civilian reconstruction. The desired end state is:

for people in BiH to live and work with each other in peace, as much as possible in a multi-ethnic society, under their own government and governmental institutions.

Within the context of this assignment the battalion maintains relations with international civilian organisations such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIB).

7. S-5 Section

The head of the S-5 section in the battalion staff at Bugojno is a major and he is in charge of CIMIC activities, including the small-scale infrastructural CIMIC projects. His official task is to liaise between the battalion and other parties. With a permanent staff of nine people, he maintains contact with the cantonal authorities, the Netherlands Embassy, international organisations (OHR, UNHCR, OCSE, IPTF, USAID, etc.) and NGOs (ASB, HELP, UMCOR, etc.). The S-5 section is divided over the camp sites in Bugojno and Novi Travnik.

The staff officer of the S-5 section, also 2iC, is a captain who operates from the battalion staff at Bugojno. From there he maintains contact with the local authorities and represents the head of the S-5 section. The other staff officer of the S-5 section is a captain who works with the other team in Novi Travnik, where he maintains contact with the authorities in his area.

All personnel working in the S-5 section rotate every six months with the battalion, except for the head. There is a transfer period of about a week, in which the details of the S-5 work in the designated area are covered and the new team can meet the authorities they will have to work with.

Concerning the execution of CIMIC projects, the S-5 was initially assisted by a Tactical Support Team (TST), with a staff of eight, that was mainly in charge of making 'area assessments' of the municipalities and manning the CIMIC/INFO centres. The TSTs have now been replaced by a Technical Support Group (Togp), with four personnel of DGW&T (Directorate of Civil Engineering) of the MoD: head Togp, a captain and overall coordinator; a structural engineer; an electrical engineer, and a heating engineer. Togp is in charge of assessing projects, tenders of contractors and monitoring the execution of the projects.

Civilian personnel is temporarily militarised.

8. Procedures for CIMIC projects

The procedures followed by the battalion for carrying out CIMIC projects are essentially based on those used by the DGW&T organisation in the Netherlands and at the moment they comprise the following (partly overlapping) steps:

1. Identification of projects (no 'stand alone' projects)

An agreement has been made with the cantonal and municipal authorities that they will propose programmes – which by definition will enhance the coherence in the projects -, indicating priorities and including an estimate of the costs. This requirement is intended to prevent

the authorities from 'selling' all reconstruction projects as priorities, allowing them to get rid of their responsibility for the choice to be made.

2. *Validation by the attached Togp*

The Togp assesses the technical aspects of the project. Until the most recent allocation the NL Embassy had to give its permission; this authority has now been given to the battalion.

3. *Inviting tenders*

The municipality involved is responsible for writing the tender, which is submitted to and evaluated critically for any imperfections by Togp.

4. *Contract or allotment*

When the definite tender is ready the various contractors are invited to make a bid on the project. Then, the necessary capacity and know-how of the contractors will be assessed by the Togp. Whenever possible, contractors from the local municipality are invited. The DGW&T requirement of at least two bids is easily met in the Dutch battalion area. It is standard practice to invite about 6 contractors for a bid: 3 bids from the municipality - provided the contractors have the proper qualifications-, and 3 bids from within the Canton or even from outside. In principle, the contractor with the lowest bid will be given the project. When the differences between bids are minimal, a local contractor may be given preference.

5. *Contracting*

The battalion arranges a financial contract with the municipality, which in turn arranges a contract with the contractor.

6. *Monitoring progress by Togp*

Togp monitors the progress of running projects through regular inspections.

7. *Completion of the project*

Togp inspects the completed project for any defects.

8. *Maintenance phase*

Any defects have to be put right by the contractor within two months after completion. When he fails to do so, a penalty clause fixed in the contract becomes effective.

9. *Payment (phased)*

Depending on the quantity of required material, there is phased payment. A first down payment of 30% takes place on signing the contract. Subsequently, two times 30% of the costs are paid. The last payment of 10% takes place two months after completion of the project. In case of small projects the total amount can be paid at once (minus 10%).

10. *Handover*

After the maintenance phase is over, the (responsibility for) the project is handed over to the municipality or any other body which was involved in the process.

11. *File building*

All documents pertaining to the project are filed and sent to the Comptroller of the Contingency Command in Banja Luka, who forwards them to the Netherlands. After completion of an 'activity number' the comptroller sends a financial overview to the MoD. Subsequently, the MoD will arrange a settlement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

9. Project criteria

The basic document for the CIMIC programme is the Memorandum from the Bureau of Emergency Aid of 21 March 1996, in which several criteria for the projects are specified.

1. *Local population*

According to the first criterion projects have to benefit the local population in the AOR. This is an obvious criterion and all projects do indeed meet the requirement. It may concern a number of families (as in house repairs), a village community (water supply) or an entire

municipality (in case of a hospital). The size of the group benefiting from a project may differ every time. In general the projects involve facilities for a residential community.

2. *Rehabilitation*

The second criterion states that priority should be given to repair of physical infrastructure. As reconstruction is also mentioned, this concerns repair of infrastructure that was damaged or destroyed in the conflict (rehabilitation). All projects are essentially infrastructural works, half of which can be seen as rehabilitation. The other half comprises real repairs, replacement or new infrastructural works. The criteria that apply here were intended for the first programme, which terminated on 31 December 1996. As far as is known, these criteria have not been formally reviewed since then. Since the beginning of 2001 the municipalities have taken care of the identification and the attention has probably shifted more towards new works.

3. *Involvement*

Involvement of the local population in the identification and execution is the third criterion. In general the local population (through the municipality) is indeed involved in the identification, but not usually in the execution. Since the beginning of 2001 the municipalities have been making priority lists. Before that time the Dutch battalion was leading in the identification process and had to take the initiative in visiting sites and institutions to find out where help was needed (as in the case of the Jajce hospital).

4./ 5. *Distribution over ethnic entities*

The fourth and fifth criteria refer to the distribution of the projects over the three communities. It is standing policy to distribute the projects evenly over all the municipalities and communities. However, seeing how the communities are scattered over the area, it is obvious that it is impossible to avoid projects that will only benefit one community. It is therefore attempted to carry out projects for the other two communities as well. Apart from Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, there is still a small group of Roma. A number of CIMIC projects benefit this minority group.

6. *Handover*

The sixth criterion refers to the handover of the projects. For all projects it is clear who are the owners and where the responsibility for maintenance lies. Usually the municipalities are the owners of the projects (schools, hospitals, etc.). In a few cases ownership lies with state companies (water supply, sports hall), a village community (water supply) and individual citizens (repair of houses). A well-regulated handover, however, does not necessarily guarantee durability.

7. *Coordination*

Coordination is central to the final criterion. Initially, the coordination was mainly directed at the 'international community' in the Canton, consisting of the Dutch battalion, UNHCR, OHR, (RRTF), OSCE and UNMIBH. Municipalities and NGOs did not take part in the meetings on a structural basis. Recently the 'Implementers' Club' has been set up as a coordinating body, in which the Central Bosnian Canton takes part along with the 'international community'.

10. Project realisation

The main effort of the CIMIC projects lies in the period between April and September as wintry conditions often hamper their execution. In this way an impulse is given to the local community and the project support rendered has a double effect. Understandably, the first Dutch battalions were more involved in a direct execution. In the first place, immediately after the conflict there was the need for quick repair of essential infrastructure like bridges and roads. In connection with this, the battalions (with engineer units) were better equipped for carrying out the projects themselves, in view of their materiel and expertise. Only in the initial

phases houses were repaired through CIMIC projects, but this practice was abandoned when it was felt that projects directed at an entire community would generate more positive attention than projects offering individual support.

The nature of these projects requires first of all the expertise of Toggp. However, the projects have to be carried out in a complex context and in identification as well as execution also social-political aspects play a role. The Royal Netherlands Army has recognised this and will attach G-9 personnel (CIMIC) of the staff of 1-DIV to the S-5 section of the battalion in the next rotation.

11. Durability

In the projects ownership usually lies with the municipalities, and it is clear for all projects who is responsible for maintenance after completion. Although the projects have been handed over, their durability is not guaranteed. The means at the disposal of the municipalities are limited. It is not uncommon that salaries are not paid in time and there is little money available for daily or periodical maintenance. A CIMIC project in 1996 was the repair of a roof of a sports hall in Novi Travnik. Recently, however, a CIMIC project for repair of the same roof was again carried out.

In many cases the durability of a project will be uncertain, mainly due to the dismal general economic situation and the high unemployment rate. These relationships give little reason for optimism. Furthermore, international organisations have picked up signs, indicating that there are doubts about the permanency of the return of displaced persons and refugees. Especially young 'returners' leave the country after all because of the high unemployment.

12. Other public activities

The CIMIC projects are instrumental in creating good relations between the population and the Dutch battalion and fostering force security. However, the battalion carries out more activities that contribute to that end. Thus, specific battalion materiel is used for jobs such as cutting back old high trees in the centre of Travnik. Other examples are the use of the battalion's heavy crane or the generator. In short, specific materiel is employed for the benefit of the population to assist in works for which the local authorities do not have the facilities themselves.

A new development in the battalion's CIMIC activities is the so-called Economic Reconstruction in Bosnia project. Since March 2001 reservists have participated in this project (also known as IDEA - Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities), giving advice to small businesses. The project is carried out in cooperation with the 'Defence-Business Platform' which was established on 3 November 1999 by the Minister of Defence and the then Chairman of the association VNO-NCW (a federation of Dutch Employers' Organisations). The objective of the 'Platform' is to foster a broad dialogue between the MoD and the world of business in order to enhance cooperation and mutual interests, while bearing in mind each other's responsibilities.

Besides, activities are supported by donations that the battalion receives from Dutch municipalities or army units. Apart from that, the battalion has been involved in monitoring projects that were financed by the Netherlands Embassy and carried out by other organisations in the AOR.

A special CIMIC project concerns the 'Humanitarian Reconstruction Project'. For each of the two valleys in the AOR there is a budget of KM 25,000 (ca. € 12,800). These funds can be used by patrols when they identify small needs among a population that lacks the means to alleviate them.

13. Developments of the programme

Carrying out CIMIC projects has become increasingly complex over time. Consulting the parties involved (on identification, planning and coordination) has become a more frequent phenomenon, the execution has become more developmental in character and certain activities are specifically linked with the return of DPs and refugees. Over all, the following developments can be distinguished:

- In the beginning, there was more direct execution by the Dutch battalion, which later on contracted out most of the projects.
- Identification has been transferred from the Dutch battalion to the municipalities.
- Coordination has been broadened over time and now also involves the cantonal authorities.
- Originally the programme was directed at reconstruction of infrastructure (damaged or destroyed in the conflict), but gradually there is more improvement of renewal of infrastructure.
- Initially, permission for individual projects rested with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then with the Netherlands Embassy and now with the battalion itself.
- The Technical Support Group (Togp) replaced the Tactical Support Team (TST) that was assisting in the execution of the CIMIC projects.
- Whereas initially it was the Directorate of Human Rights (DMV), and later the Directorate of Europe (DEU), of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that held the budget, since 1 January 2002 the Netherlands Embassy has been the budget holder.

Another change in the programme concerns the AOR of the Dutch battalion. Originally it included part of Republica Srpska, but since 1 May 2000 the battalion operated exclusively in Central Bosnia (Canton 6). Soon, however, the AOR will be extended somewhat to include three municipalities in Canton 7.

Originally, the programme was directed at repair of infrastructure, in other words reconstruction or rehabilitation (bringing back to a state of before the conflict). For quite some time a distinction was made between three phases in humanitarian aid: (1) emergency aid (in acute emergency situations, the providing of food, medical care, water/sanitary facilities and shelter/clothing), (2) rehabilitation, and (3) development. These phases were perceived as a continuum. However, problems arose with defining the ends of the first two phases. It was also argued that there was not really a continuum, as activities after a conflict would be immediately directed at emergency aid, rehabilitation and development simultaneously. In any case, in CIMIC projects there was only rehabilitation in the first instance. At the moment several projects can still be categorised as rehabilitation, but at a given time also development activities have been embarked upon (e.g. extension of water supply system, construction of play/sports grounds, improvement of roads, etc.). It is clear these initiatives do not concern repair, but the construction of new facilities.

With regard to CIMIC projects the MoD, too, distinguishes three phases, viz. 'peace-enforcing', 'peacekeeping', and 'nation/society building'. The first two phases correspond with rehabilitation, where in the first phase the emphasis lies on the most vital infrastructure and in the second on creating a situation that enables the return of refugees and displaced persons. In the third phase reconstruction is combined with measures stimulating the economy. In these phases a gradual takeover of activities by the population is assumed.

The third phase only contains elements of 'nation building', which is essentially part of development. Although in this phase infrastructural reconstruction projects are still mentioned, it is clear that several infrastructural projects cannot be categorised as rehabilitation,

but as development. So, the programme is gradually moving from rehabilitation to development.

In the context of Development Cooperation several points are deemed specifically important. They concern the build-up of capacity, reinforcing local institutions, fostering 'local accountability' and transparency, and developing a 'civil society'. CIMIC projects only pay explicit attention to the latter aspect. The fact is that, in connection with the Dayton Peace Agreement, CIMIC projects contribute to the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-cultural state, in particular with regard to the return of refugees and displaced persons. Several projects are specifically directed at stimulating this return (by restoring community facilities). Furthermore, certain initiatives are fostering cooperation between communities (e.g. the reconstruction of a road by the federal armed forces). There are also initiatives to integrate two parallel systems by means of CIMIC projects (e.g. realising a laboratory facility in one hospital which is also used by a hospital of another ethnicity). Finally, projects that benefit more than one community have priority and especially the distribution over the three communities is a guiding principle.

14. Conclusions

In fact the objective of CIMIC projects is a dual one: reconstruction linked with peace implementation/stabilisation. The objective is defined and formulated from the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for whom reconstruction is paramount. For the Dutch battalion, however, peace implementation/stabilisation takes pride of place. For the Dutch battalion reconstruction is in principle a means rather than an end, which does not mean that CIMIC projects are seen as anything less than a full task.

Central Bosnia was the scene of heavy fighting in 1992/1993 and the damage to and destruction of infrastructural works was in proportion. Since 1996 more than 300 CIMIC projects have been carried out, many of which were essential facilities, such as bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, power and water supply. Moreover, the majority of these projects are directed at community facilities. Countless facilities have been rehabilitated and often improved, compared to their pre-conflict state. Through these projects the population can again make use of facilities they have had to go without for a long time.

The CIMIC projects have not only improved the living standard of the population, they have also contributed to the return of refugees and displaced persons, including minorities.

A tour of Bosnia clearly reveals that the conflict did considerable damage to the infrastructure and that CIMIC projects have brought much repair. It is also without doubt that the highly valued help has contributed to reconstruction and that the role of the Dutch battalion in all this is much appreciated.

Peace implementation/stabilisation

The absence of indicators makes it impossible to measure the results for peace implementation/stabilisation. Several signs, however, are indicating that CIMIC projects were instrumental in furthering the primary task of the Dutch battalion:

- The number of incidents in Central Bosnia is relatively low.
- In comparison with other Cantons, the percentage of returned minorities is high.
- According to 'surveys', the acceptance of the Dutch battalion by the population in comparison to battalions of other nationalities is high.
- The relations with military, religious and political authorities are excellent.
- The Dutch battalion has not had a single threat directed against it.
- The number of incidents in the Republika Srpska part of the AOR increased after the British had replaced the Dutch battalion.

- The situation in the divided city of Vitez improved after the arrival of the Dutch battalion.
- The Dutch battalion has a good reputation.
- CIMIC projects make it easier to approach the population and are a good vehicle for the gathering of information.
- The first return of minorities took place in the AOR of the Dutch battalion.
- The Dutch battalion has a better reputation than battalions of nationalities that do not support reconstruction.

Finally, the question could arise whether by now enough ‘goodwill’ has been generated in order to continue peace stability without CIMIC projects. This would mean that an important instrument for maintaining contact with the population and the gathering of information would fall away.

It is also possible to consider whether the contribution could be lowered or phased out. This view is supported by the fact that the international cooperation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Netherlands has shifted to other parts of the country. On the other hand, the Dutch AOR will be extended before long. It has been shown that CIMIC projects contribute to peace implementation and therefore it stands to reason to also use this tool in the new area. If this instrument is to be retained for the present area, it seems inadvisable to lower the contribution. After all, enough means should be available for spreading the projects over the entire AOR and simultaneously over the three communities.

More questions regarding the continuation of CIMIC projects can be asked. Nevertheless, it is a fact that throughout the years the population has come to cherish certain expectations with regard to this support. The Dutch battalion has in this respect manoeuvred itself in a position of dependence. Besides, the question is how far the ‘goodwill’ of the population extends. Would we still be the best of friends if no CIMIC projects were carried out?

The above shows that there is hardly a choice with regard to the CIMIC projects. Terminating the CIMIC projects would more than likely bring an end to the good relations with the population, the reputation of the Dutch battalion and peace stabilisation.

Abbreviations

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASB	<i>Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund</i> [Workers-Samaritans-Association]
BiH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
DGW&T	Directie Gebouwen Werken & Terreinen [Directorate of Civil Engineering MoD]
DP	Displaced Persons
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
HELP	<i>Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe</i> [Help to self-help]
IDEA	Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Advice
IFOR	Implementation Force
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KAP	<i>Kleine Ambassade Projecten</i> [Small Embassy Projects]

KM	Konvertibilna Marka [KM 1 = DM 1; ca. € 0.50]
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RRTF	Reconstruction and Return Task Force
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
Togp	<i>Technische ondersteuningsgroep</i> [Technical support group]
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
TOR	Terms of Reference
TST	Tactical Support Team
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIB	United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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