|  |
| --- |
| THE HAGUE UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES |
| **The economic crisis and its repercussions regarding cooperation within the European foreign policy** |
|  |
|  |
| **Roxana Chirita** |
| **9/30/2013** |

|  |
| --- |
| **Professor supervisor: dhr. P.G. Nixon** |

*Page intentionally left blank*

**Table of contents**

**Acknowledgements – pg. 5**

**List of abbreviations – pg. 6**

**Executive summary – pg. 7**

**Introduction – pg. 9**

**Ch. I Methodology – pg. 12**

**Ch. II Literature review / Theoretical framework – pg. 14**

* Overview of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to the theories on European integration and European identity **– pg. 14**
* Defining the European Foreign Policy **– pg. 17**

A. Theories on European integration and European identity **– pg. 18**

B. Concepts **– pg. 22**

**Ch. III Research findings – pg. 24**

Q 1: to what extent is the current economic crisis affecting or influencing the member states ’ national foreign affairs policies, the relations between them and the EU as a whole? **– pg. 25**

A. The state of play of the European Union **– pg. 25**

B. The state of play of MS’ relations / foreign affairs **– pg. 26**

C. “The decline of Europe” and the rise of social movements **– pg. 28**

Q 2: to what extent will the economic crisis reshape the European Union, implicitly the common foreign policy? **– pg. 31**

A. Economic crisis reflects on EFP **– pg. 31**

B. EU: future economic perspectives? **– pg. 32**

C. EU on the international arena in the context of a multipolar world **– pg. 34**

**Ch. IV Discussions & Conclusions – pg. 38**

**List of References – pg. 41**

*Page intentionally left blank*

**Acknowledgements**

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincerest appreciation to the persons who guided, supported and encouraged me during the completion of my bachelor degree studies in European Studies at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. I would like, first, to recognize Prof. Dr. Dan Mercea, my dissertation supervisor, for his guidance, background knowledge and patience in the realization of this paper. Moreover, I would like to express my appreciation for Prof. P. Nixon for accepting to be my supervisor, considering the fact that my former supervisor had left the University. Secondly, I would like to thank my parents for their moral support and encouragements throughout my university studies and whilst writing my dissertation paper. Lastly, I would like to salute my teachers, work colleagues, friends and fellow students for their general knowledge, advice, tips and support.

**List of abbreviations**

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CFR – Council on Foreign Relations

ECI – European Citizens’ Initiative

ECFR – European Council on Foreign Relations

EEAS – European External Action Service

EFP – European Foreign Policy

EMU – Economic and Monetary Union

EU – European Union

GP – Global Policy

IR – International Relations

MS – Member States

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NSA – National Security Agency

LI – Liberal-intergovernmentalism

TEU – Treaty on European Union

SAIS – School of Advanced International Studies

USA – United States of America

**Executive summary**

The present document concludes my time as a European Studies bachelor degree student within The Hague University of Applied Sciences and it aims at discovering the possible repercussions of the economic crisis on the cooperation within the European Foreign Policy realm. It is intended to observe how the European Union is managing the implications of the most severe crisis in the post-war era by further struggling to assert its role on the international scene.

The topic proves to be a very complex one due to the fact that it is a current issue which is taking place as we speak. Therefore, the paper has been divided into three major parts: (1) the literature review, (2) the research findings and (3) the discussions & conclusions. Part one establishes the theoretical framework of this document by reviewing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, thus leading to the definition of the European Foreign Policy (EFP) and further discussing the theories of European integration and identity that are crucial for the subsequent understanding of the subject. In addition, by providing the reader with the concept of the EU as an actor/single entity on the international plane it is desired to emphasise the fact that, despite the rather odd organization of the ‘new political animal’, the EU had managed to overcome the majority of the impediments and managed to become not only a remarkable actor, but one that has succeeded to win a Nobel Peace Prize. Moreover, it was decided that the idea of a European Foreign Policy ought to be included given the complexity of the field discussed. Through the EFP notion it is sought to reiterate the continuous struggle of forming a single external policy and how this particular effort is bringing Member States together in fighting for the Europeanization of the EU’s foreign policy.

The major findings indicate the fact that, momentarily, the EU’s status quo is defined by an acute economic crisis which imperils the relations between Member States and, due to severe austerity measures, trends of nationalistic feelings, euro-scepticism and social movements followed by riots are intensifying across the old continent. As a consequence, MS are becoming reluctant to continue the battle for sustaining the EU and further developing a European Foreign Policy. However, even though Europe is traversing tumultuous times, with national divisions and civil disobedience, it finds the necessary power to assert its role as an international actor in world affairs. Overall, the EU ‘actor’ is maintaining itself as one of the important players in a multipolar world and, in order to further preserve its geo-political importance, it had enlarged to 28 MS, the last one being Croatia. It has been concluded that the European Foreign Policy is facing defining times for its future. The EU must find innovative solutions to its problems, but despite the highs and lows of the process, the unique European political organization appears to still be pleading for its values and for maintaining its role in International Relations.

**Introduction**

**European Foreign Policy – research background and research objective**

This paper aims to contribute to the general understanding of the European Foreign Policy and investigate whether there is a connection between the economic crisis – which might play a major role in the shaping of Member States’ foreign policies (taking into consideration their desire to act as absolute subjects) – and the formulation of, and projection of a European foreign policy in International Relations.

First, it is essential to acknowledge that the European Union has been categorized as a novel political entity which does not comply with the traditional views of International Relations theories due to the fact that it is not a state. Ergo it does not classify as a full sovereign body, and, apart that, it is formed by “fully fledged States as its component political entities” (Baere, 2008). As a consequence, fitting the EU on the international scene as an external actor has proved to be a challenge among International Relations and EU theorists considering its *sui generis* status: even though it is not a classical nation state, it is still able to exercise external policies and intervene in foreign matters – facts which transform the EU into a unique actor.

According the Stefan Lehne (EU expert and Carnegie Europe scholar), the European Foreign Policy (EFP) is an amalgam of three components: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Member States’ individual foreign policies, and the external action led by the European Commission (Lehne, 2013). Therefore, it is interesting to observe how Member States behave in developing a common EFP considering the fact that the essence of statecraft requires exactly the co-ordination of foreign policy (Ekengren & Sundelius, 2004). In addition, a proper cooperation requires shared sovereignty notwithstanding any national interest. However, the major problem encountered in the formulation of a coherent EFP proves to be the intergovernmental and supranational structure of the CFSP which is based on the principle of unanimity; thus, enabling the MS to follow their own interests and act as separate bodies – as it will be further clarified in this paper. As Stefan Lehne observes in his article, “*EU -Actor or Toolbox?”,* Member States do not transfer competencies to Brussels — they are merely committed to pursuing certain objectives together while continuing to “run their own national foreign policies in parallel”. As a consequence, they are conducting policies which comply with their national interest. Furthermore, considering the current economic situation, there is a possibility that the economic crisis might have an influence on the MS’ relations and the development of a collective foreign policy since sovereignty and economic interests are the two features that had always shaped the Member States’ domestic interests (Moravcsik, 1998). It is also important to indicate the fact that Member States are “determined to assert their status as full subjects of the international order”. Thus, the European Foreign Policy field could be characterised by emerging tensions between “the self-consciousness of the MS and their constitutional relationship within the Union” (Baere, 2008).

Second, for a clear understanding of the topic, it is necessary to further consider and emphasise the importance of several theories directly linked to the creation of the European Foreign Policy. Hence, the relevant ideologies challenging the European integration, namely the functionalist concept, the realist doctrine and the liberal-intergovernmentalist theory will be discussed, and, in addition, the identity theory will be explained through the concept of ‘Europeanization’. The selection of these theories was based on their relevance to the topic considering the fact that they all refer to cooperation between Member States and the different factors that might endanger this process which ultimately led to the evolution of the European Union. Additionally, an outline of the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be presented in order to provide a basic understanding of how the interaction between MS led to the creation of a common foreign policy (taking into consideration the above-mentioned theories) and to observe how the states’ interaction might be endangered by external forces (such as the economic crisis) which might influence the Member States’ national interests by causing clashes of ideas in the foreign policy field of activity.

The methodology that has been chosen for conducting the research on the discussed subject involves the analysing, in the field of foreign policy, of key concepts, theories and certain principles that are fundamental for the development of a common foreign policy at a European level, as well as empirical evidence that will lead to discussions and, lastly, a conclusion. The thesis is organised into three parts: 1) the first part is the literature review where several theories will be challenged in order to establish the basis of the topic. In addition, the necessary definitions of certain terms – that are essential for the further understanding of the topic – will be provided and there will be a focus on the conceptualization of the European Union as an international actor, as well as of the European foreign policy. 2) The second part presents the research findings which concentrate on the current state of play of the CFSP and the EU in the context of the ongoing economic crisis considering its different repercussions on the Member States’ cooperation and coordination of foreign policies by exposing the different social movements that had occurred due to austerity measures and that might endanger the proper functioning of the European foreign policy. Additionally, the future perspectives of the European Foreign Policy will be debated. 3) The third part will discuss the findings and it will end with the conclusions of this paper.

**I. Methodology**

As it has been previously stated, the aim of this thesis is to analyse whether the economic crisis is influencing the Member States’ foreign policies, hence the formulation of the common European foreign policy taking into consideration the tendency of MS of acting as absolute subjects irrespective of their commitment of performing collectively (as an Union) on the international plane. The research question and objective will help with the formulation of the content, challenging different topics focusing on distinctive theories which will establish the basis of the literature review and will lead to the empirical evidence expected to portray the current state of play of the European foreign policy.

The research method used for the purpose of this paper was the desk research technique. It was opted for this type of research in order to gain qualitative information – given the short extent of the thesis – and, therefore, background knowledge which will lead to a better comprehension of the subject. The research tools involved books, online and academic journals, global and European think-thanks’ websites, academic papers, related blog entries and universities’ online databases and libraries. The most used tools when conducting the research, besides the books, where the online versions of profile journals, such as The European Union Times, The Wall Street Journal, Global Policy (GP) Journal, Foreign Policy, GP Forum, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), etc. These sources were used on the grounds that they provide accurate information from all over the world since they are the most well-known journals covering the IR field of activity. Therefore, this type of selection enabled me to form a clear overview of, for example, the role of Europe on the international scene. Additionally, the information collected from profile journals focusing on European matters was crucial for the empirical part of the paper and for observing the present tumultuous time within the EU which might imperil the common foreign policy.

For a very accurate result, the information used was peer reviewed by academics and experts, especially the knowledge gathered from the internet databases, online libraries, blog entries and online journals. It is important to mention that the information acknowledged from news and articles might be biased to a certain extent or another since the media is well-known for their biased reputation, but it was carefully evaluated and the most relevant information was chosen. Ergo, the conclusion was reached by analysing and balancing the findings.

The time frame of the conducted research started in April and it finished at the end of August. Taking into consideration the actuality of the subject treated by this paper, the press was examined on a daily basis. The information gathered was later correlated to the theory and the books discussing the topics in question. In addition, the first step of the research was to seek for scholars who had studied the EU and developed theories on the formation of the Union which comprised, mostly, the relations between the MS, hence leading to the formulation of a common European foreign policy. The next step, after selecting the notable authors and books, was to move the research toward the topical articles concerning the EU, the economic crisis, the austerity measures and their repercussions on the MS’s relations and, finally, future perspectives on the state of play of the EU as an external actor. The selection of the journals, academic papers, blog entries, global and European think-thanks’ websites was an easy process due to the fact that, as a student interested in European Affairs and International Relations, I was already following the main news portals, websites, academic and economic journals such as the previously-mentioned publications. This method enabled me to conduct a coherent research because, as previously stated, by starting the research with the books covering the EU and the theories establishing it and its particular status in International Affairs; I was able to establish the foundation of this paper, thus starting the literature review. Following this step, the research moved towards the empirical evidence collected from online sources and journals in order to gain a thorough analysis on the current state of play of the EU, of the CFSP and of the MS’ relations in conjunction with the ongoing economic crisis.

The limitations encountered were not many given the timeliness of the subject and the abundance of information, but sometimes this fact proved to be problematic given the great amount of events taking place on the European continent as well as all around the world. Therefore, the information was carefully selected and included in the relevant topics of this paper. From the vast number of sources I decided to include 80 encompassing books, journals and academic articles, scholarly papers, online databases, etc.

**II. Literature review / Theoretical framework**

The scope of this first chapter is to contribute to what might be a ‘route map’ which will serve the reader as a guide in order to contribute to the understanding of the field of European foreign policy by exposing several definitions, theories and concepts, leading to the presentation of the empirical matters that will be dealt with fully in the following chapters in order to demonstrate the ongoing process of the evolution of the EFP in times of internal crises (here the economic crisis and the rise of different social movements as the aftermath of the economic situation), as well as international turmoil (the effectiveness of the EU in recent conflict areas, e.g.: Syria, Egypt; the relations with strategic partners, etc.).

It is necessary to understand certain terms which will be used throughout this paper in order to facilitate the reader`s comprehension of the subject. The term “globalised politics” will be used to exemplify the fact that traditional politics are being overrated and the emphasis is now put on politics which “take place above the state through political integration schemes such as the European Union and through intergovernmental organizations” (Globalization of Politics, 2013). In addition, by using the term “renationalized politics” it is desired to examine the extent to which the euro crisis has “eroded their [MS`s] sense of solidarity” and why MS are “more likely today to take their own national positions and initiatives without first coordinating with their partners” (Lehne, 2013).

**Overview of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to the theories on European integration and European identity**

The European Union did not come into existence in a short period of time. It needed more than six decades and several different processes – the integration of its Member States, the enlargement of the Union, the formation of common laws and institutions, and, finally, the struggle of forming an identity on the international arena – in order to evolve into the entity that we now acknowledge. Encountering great success in developing economic integration, the next logical move for the European Union was to strengthen its political cooperation, forming thus the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in order to consolidate its role on the international arena. The construction of a functioning CFSP had proved to be a long, difficult process because, in order to become a successful international actor, different foreign policy instruments must be integrated “into [a] well-coordinated external action” (Lehne, 2013). Therefore, for a proper understanding of the European integration process which had led to the evolution of a European foreign policy, the functionalist theory, the realist doctrine and the liberal-intergovernmentalism theory will be challenged.

The functionalist approach is the classical theory of regional integration and it is built around the ‘spill-over effect’ which implies that economic integration will lead to political integration. This assumption has proved to be correct because the EU commenced as a European Economic Community with six Member States and later evolved into a union comprising 28 MS which behave as a single political entity in International Affairs. Thus, the first step taken by the European leaders in moving forward on the political level was the “Davignon report” presented in 1970 at the Luxembourg Summit which had represented the starting point for the European Political Cooperation (EPC), that was later enshrined in the Single European Act (SEA 1987), and was characterised by consultation among MS on foreign policy issues. However, the EU was far from establishing a consolidated voice on the international arena, the most eloquent examples in this respect being the Persian Gulf War and Yugoslav crisis which had once again emphasised the uncoordinated reactions of the Member States. This lack of cooperation and coordination of the Member States could be explained through the realist doctrine which implies that cooperation between states is always limited by the continuous battle of the nation states’ interest to survive in an anarchical system. According to Kenneth Waltz, cooperation among states can be limited by the structure of international politics which implies that states are concerned that “a division of possible gains [...] may favor others more than itself” (Waltz, 1979). Therefore, cooperation is overshadowed by the constant urge of protecting the national interest. As a consequence, the EU had been labeled as “an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm” by Mark Eyksens, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1991.

The difficulties which had occurred during the creation of the EU and the CFSP were many, as it could be observed, but with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (or the EU Treaty) the European leaders had managed to overcome Eyksens’s statement. The new treaty abolished the three-pillar structure of the EU – the CFSP previously formed the second pillar of the former EU structure which was governed by intergovernmental cooperation and replaced the EPC – and provided the European Union with a legal personality on the international level (the EU is now able to sign international agreements, join international organizations and conventions as a single entity). Another feature that was provided by the EU Treaty was the Title V which governs the CFSP and which “constitutes a separate pillar of the European Union, since the way it operates and its inter-Governmental nature distinguish it from the traditional pillars of the Community, such as the single market and trade policy” (Union). Title V did not make any important changes in the decision-making process, because unanimity remains the main rule for the decisions adopted by the Council and the European Council in regard to CFSP while Member States are required to reach consensus, but it introduced a specific bridging clause which can enable the Council “to act by a qualified majority to adopt certain measures” (Union). Ergo, in order to achieve harmony and avert contradictions between the Community and the inter-Governmental types of activities governing the CFSP, Article 3 (ex Article C) provides that: "The Union shall ensure (...) the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. [...]”. Therefore the EU “shall organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity in relations between the Member States and between their peoples” as provided by the ‘Common Provisions’ of the TEU in Article 1. This new structure of the CFPS could be very well described by the Liberal-Intergovernmentalism (LI) theory because it assumes a three stage framework: where MS define their preferences, the bargaining at EU level is made through an intergovernmental model and the Member States’ devotion to create institutions. Consequently, LI sees integration as the process where the domestic interests of the member governments are merged, as also established by Andrew Moravcsik in ‘The Choice for Europe’, 1998.

In conclusion, the Lisbon Treaty or TEU shaped the CFSP giving it more power, reducing the highly institutionalized structure and created the European External Action Service – the EU’s diplomatic corpus – under the patronage of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (post currently held by Catherine Ashton). Notwithstanding this progress, the common European foreign policy (EFP) is still far from formulating a strong voice on the international scene, because, in a broad sense, the European foreign policy is based on three components: the CFSP, the Member States’ individual foreign policies and the external action led by the European Commission (Lehne, 2013) – as it was previously established . In addition, Member States are still reluctant “to submit their diplomacy to the strait-jacket of EU decision-making” because, paradoxically, even though they strive to unite and form a common foreign policy, they continue to safeguard their national interest (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004), as it shall be presented in the research findings. The reason behind this type of behaviour is due to the unanimity rule that governs the CFSP because MS are given the freedom to decide the “substance of their national foreign policy” (Lehne, 2013) even though they are bound by the principle of solidarity. Moreover, this type of behaviour expressed by the MS was displayed in the institutional arrangements of the common European foreign policy: by separating the CFSP from the ‘Community’ pillar, the MS “sought to minimize the role of supranational institutions and preserve national autonomy” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004). Additionally, the current economic conditions might contribute to the safeguarding of the national interests given the spill-over effect implied by the functionalist theory. Therefore, applying this theory to the general state of the EU will facilitate the understanding of how the economic realm plays a major role in shaping and achieving European political cooperation on external matters leading to a European identity. In defining the notion of the European identity or in other words, its actorness on the international scene, the concept of the ‘Europeanization’ of the foreign policy will be presented in order to provide a better insight of how, over time, through political cooperation, the European Community gained its reputation and image of a single entity and how the different matters taking place within the community had become European matters.

**Defining the European Foreign Policy**

The development of a single theoretical framework that aims to establish a singular interpretation of the common European foreign policy, since its delineation in the 1950s as a significant field of International Relations (IR), had proved to be a continuous challenge among the scholars and theorists who deal with this field of activity. It had appeared to cause controversy to the extent that the attempts of defining the European foreign policy have eroded “the existing consensus about the general subject” of foreign policy (White, 2004). This is due to the fact that EFP is an amalgam of three different matters, as was earlier illustrated in this paper (and established by Stefan Lehne, EU expert and scholar), hence the EFP cannot be categorised as a typical sort of foreign policy which implies its analysis around the state-centric philosophy, nor it can be conceived as an analysis that defines the traditional forms of national foreign policies given the *sui generis status* of the European Union. As a consequence, a single, conventional definition of the European foreign policy broadly accepted by academics has not been established until this point, but there are more interpretations of the subject. However, for the purpose of the discussed topic, EFP will be defined as the expression of the sum of EU Member States’ foreign policies together with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the external action led by the European Commission. Thus, the definition of the EFP will be that provided by Stefan Lehne in order to facilitate the demonstration of whether the economic crisis might imperil the coordination of MS’ foreign policies which ultimately lead to the projection of a common European external policy on the international scene.

1. **Theories on European integration and European identity**

*“The study of [...] integration should be both included in and subordinated to the study of changing patterns of interdependence”*

**–** Ernst Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*, 1975

Before presenting the theories on European integration and European identity, one must consider what Ben Tonra expressed in his book “*Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*” where he stated that, on one hand, the EU’s foreign policy is an ongoing puzzle with Member States that set overly ambitious goals. On the other hand, the same MS continue to act paradoxically by persisting to safeguard their abilities to conduct foreign policies independently, thus harming the role of the EU as an actor (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004). Given, thus, the complexity of the common European foreign policy, different theories must be considered when discussing the threats and challenges posed to it by the economic crisis. The first theories that will be considered are the theories defining the integration process, namely the functionalist, realist and liberal-intergovernmentalist thoughts which highlight the importance of political cooperation and integration among MS, the supremacy of national interest over the common goals of the EU foreign policy in times of unrest and, lastly, the complex, institutional process of the EFP.

The functionalist theory

The European Union is a unique type of political and economic organization. Its creation was a complicated process which evolved around different theories trying to contribute to the general understating of this new, multi-complex community. Integration was among the first processes to be adopted by the founding fathers of, then, the European Coal and Steel Community in order to overcome situations such as the ones created by the two World Wars that torn apart the entire continent. Notwithstanding their belief that the creation of the ‘United States of Europe’ (Geddes, 2004) would represent the salvation of the European continent, the leaders had to search for a different approach to the closer integration process – one that would not force countries to integrate too quickly or too far. Taking into consideration the fragile cooperation between states in the beginning of the post-war era, the founding fathers needed to find a solution that would allow countries to integrate naturally without feeling any pressures. Therefore, one of the philosophies that laid down the legal basis of the EU is the functionalist concept which is the classical theory of regional integration and implies that the “technocratic management of [the] economic and social policy leads to the formation of international agencies […] that promote economic well-fare” and by gaining legitimacy in the long-run they will develop “into a sort of government, though perhaps not a true state” (Desmond, 2000).

The functionalist theory was one of the core concepts adopted in the ongoing process of integration and formation of a true economic and political union, fact established by scholars such as Ernst Haas, political scientist and founding father of the neo-functionalist theory, in his book *The Uniting of Europe.* Haas believed that the European integration was emerging due to the spill-over effect and claimed that integration is: “A process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.” (Haas, 1950-1957). The “Monet Method” implies the same spill-over principle which indicates that economic integration will foster political integration through the creation of supranational institutions.

The integration theory proves to be a very complex one, approached by many academics. The literature discussing this topic is mainly concerned with the process of integration which appeared to be a long and problematic course of action considering the states’ opposition to give up part of their sovereignty on matters such as common defence strategies. Thus, integrating high politics (national interests/sovereignty) proved to be more difficult than integrating low politics (economic). But the process of integration within the economic sector is still ongoing and the neo-functionalist approach remains, yet, a valid theory that was not wrong in its predictions so far – even though it was declared ‘obsolete’ in the mid-1970s by Haas himself. A recent area where this theory can be best observed is the Eurozone: first, the creation of the European Economic Community in the 1980s led to the emergence of the Internal Market Programme in 1985 which removed the tariff barriers that prevented the free movement of goods between MS and, later, the free movement of services, capital and people. Thereupon, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was established in 1992-2002 and introduced the euro – “a seemingly logical step to encourage prosperity” (Jensen, 2010). In conclusion, the spill-over effect can be again observed in the creation of EMU and the present monetary policies. Hence, the neo-functionalist theory can be used in explaining how the Member States overcame their own interests and, by integrating relatively unrelated policy areas, how they managed to be successful in merging their external policies into a common goal.

The realist doctrine

The theories approaching the integration process of the EU are diverse and many, and together try to contribute to general understanding of the formation of the EU – a process which, on one hand, had encountered times of stagnation and, on the other hand, times of activity (especially starting with the mid-1990s when the EU experienced waves of enlargement) and integration, leading to the development of a common European foreign policy. The realist theory assumes, in a large context, that “in an anarchical world the ‘national interest’ will inevitably clash and co-operation will remain the exception to the rule” (Sjursen, 1998). In other words, the realist paradigm sees states as individual actors driven by military force to obtain power in a chaotic world where the actions and interests of the most powerful nations create the nature of the international system (Rosamond, 2000). Applying the realist paradigm to the European Union has been cause of debate among scholars because the EU lacks a clearly defined status given its elaborated organizational structure: a Union functioning due to intergovernmental organizations controlled by sovereign MS aspiring, more or less, to become a federation. Therefore, approaching the EU from a realist point of view proved to be challenging task for the scholars dealing with this doctrine, because the main issue is whether the theory should be applied to the EU as a corpus or solely to its MS.

As previously established, the classical interpretation of the realist theory is not enough to accurately describe the integration process within the EU, because one must understand that the EU is a new political animal constructed along federalist lines: an intergovernmental organization mainly controlled by sovereign Member States. Scholars such as Waltz (1993, 1999, 2000) and Mearsheimer (2001) focus on the balancing of power by states, whereas Grieco (1996) claims that “states – and especially relatively weak but still necessary partners – will seek to ensure that any cooperative arrangement they construct will include effective voice opportunities”. Thus, his “neorealist voice opportunities” provide a new perception for the “institutional rule trajectory” of the EU (Grieco, 1996), consequently, the theory of liberal-intergovernmentalism will be next examined.

The liberal-intergovernmentalism (LI) theory

Liberal intergovernmentalism, as established by Andrew Moravcsik in his book ‘The Choice for Europe’ in 1998, is largely seen as a three-step example which comprises: (1) a liberal theory of national preference formation with (2) an intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining and (3) a “credible commitments” model of institutional choice (Pollack, 2011). Therefore, LI sees institutions as a mean of building plausible commitments for member governments that remain the key actors controlling the integration course which is a “process of merging domestic interests” (Moravcsik, 1998). Moreover, the theory assumes that whenever the national interests experienced clashes, MS resorted to bargaining in order to achieve cooperation, hence integration. Additionally, LI assumes that national interests are driven by issue-specific preference functions – economic interests – and geopolitical ideas (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning, 2009) transforming the state into a product of social power relations.

This theory is analysed in order to better exemplify how the formulation of the CFSP is being affected by the financial crisis. As the supporters of this theory would argue, in the foreign policies and external affairs of the MS, the state is still the major central component rather than the EU itself. Therefore, the “grand theory” of liberal intergovernmentalism, as it was acclaimed by its two founders Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning, is becoming more and more relevant in depicting the behaviour of the MS in times of unrest: they appear to resume to intergovernmental bargaining transferring, thus, power to central institutions such as the European Parliament or Commission in order to achieve a unitary solution and facilitate the further process of integration – facts which will enable the EU to become an effective actor on the international plane.

Identity theory

The European Union is well-known for its special character: it is an entity composed of sovereign nations united by common goals, striving to achieve economic and political integration. This distinctive feature places the categorization of the EU as an international actor by IR theories in great difficulty because “the EU is neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional international organization nor an international regime” (Ginsberg, 1999). Nevertheless, finding a suitable explanatory framework for the concept of the EU’s identity, one must differentiate between the status of the Member States and the EU as an independent body, but it be must acknowledged that the EU’s identity is the sum of all its MS’s identities and actions. As a consequence, the EU is considered a ‘*sui generis actor*’ indicating that it is a unique ‘pilot project’ which is not commensurable to any other international structures.

The literature available on the identity of the European Union is diverse and many scholars had attempted to define the European identity, but considering the topic of this paper the identity of Europe will be analysed in regard to that of the European foreign policy identity, which is an outcome of the integration process. The actions undertaken by the MS in order to achieve cooperation and integration had led to the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to consolidate their relationships, overcome conflicts and create a European identity visible on the external plane. Moreover, taking into consideration the concept of shared sovereignty as an acknowledgement of interdependence – in my opinion the core principle of the CFSP – one must comprehend the supranational and institutional structure of the common European foreign policy. According to Haas, the European identity emerged as a spill-over from the instrumental behaviour towards integration (Haas, 1958). He believed that the identification with Europe was the actual driving force behind the process of integration. This theory proved to be applicable to the political integration process where the MS blended their national identities and formulated a European diplomatic corpus which enabled the EU to express its foreign policies in International Relations. This type of identity formation was also observed by Risse, who named this concept the ‘marble cake’ where the distinctive elements of an individual’s identity will merge together by influencing each other (Risse, 2004). Therefore, the European identity is referred to as the European foreign policy, being an accumulation of multiple identities merged into a singular one that aims to provide the EU with the title of an ‘actor’ on the international scene.

**B. Concepts**

Conceptualization of the EU as an international actor

To facilitate the inclusion of the new Member States and avoid tensions within the central and eastern bloc, the EU had at its disposal different policy instruments such as aid policies, trade, conditionality for cooperation and integration (Smith, 1998b). As also observed by Lucarelli and Manners, the EU’s special status on the international plane is characterized by two features that are not usually assigned to traditional sates: “1) a stabilising effect in contemporary world politics that Europe derives from its history and its historically-developed and formed values and principles; and 2) external relations inspired by an ‘ethics of responsibility’ towards others” (Lucarelli & Manners, 2006). One can conclude that the EU is an actor which is guided in its international actions by the use of soft-power: it acknowledges the principles of solidarity, liberty and diversity – as mentioned in the Lacken Declaration and in the European Convention – striving to achieve international security and a ruled-based international order by “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights [...]” (Council, 2003). These two special features will be best observed in the further analysis of the EU in regards to its actions on the international arena.

Conceptualization of the European foreign policy

Considering the factors which compose the European foreign policy – “divergent interests between the member states, domestic interests, or the institutional structure of [the] CFSP” (Sedelmeier, 2003) – the EU seems to have a long way until building its role as an international actor “that is capable of promoting collective foreign goals” (Sedelmeier, 2003). However, the EU managed so far to display its ‘actorness’ on the international scene, being the largest donor of the world and being able to intervene in different matters, such as the Arab Spring (Vaisse & Dennison, 2013) – subject for later discussion. In addition, the notion of the ‘Europeanization’ of foreign policy can be found in the literature concerning the national European foreign policies. One of the first scholars who acknowledged this concept was Ben Tonra in 1997, who discovered that, in different cases – such as in Denmark or the Netherlands – “political cooperation improved the effectiveness, broadened the range and increased the capabilities of foreign policy making”. Hill and Wallace established in 1996 that there is an ‘*engrenage*’ effect in foreign policy cooperation, meaning that foreign policy takes place at a European level where “officials and ministers who sit together on planes and round tables in Brussels and in each others' capitals begin to judge «rationality» from within a different framework” (Hill and Wallace 1996: 12). In addition, there are scholars who empirically demonstrated – based on mass public opinion and the elites’ discourses – that there is a progressive Europeanization of the national identities in a way that the EU had become a “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991). Furthermore, when analysing the national media coverage regarding different issues related to the EU, it can be noticed an Europeanization of the public spheres (Risse & Grabowsky, 2008), since the issues are referred to as European matters. As a result, this theory was put best into practice with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which created the diplomatic corpus of the EU, namely the European External Action Service which is run by the *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy* (post occupied by H.E. Catherine Ashton). This fact has ensured, thus, greater cooperation and consistency in the common European foreign policy given the transfer of powers from the institutions to the Member States (Dijkstra, 2013).

In conclusion, taking into consideration the complex theoretical framework trying the explain the “Europeanization” of the EU foreign policy, one might state that the leaders did not give up on their ambition of forming a strong European Union capable of asserting its role on the international arena, but in order to facilitate the continuous process of consolidating the EFP, Europe must focus its attention on its internal crisis in order to able to secure its geopolitical importance, ergo its actorness.

**III. Research findings**

**Q 1: to what extent is the current economic crisis affecting or influencing the member states ’ national foreign affairs policies, the relations between them and the EU as a whole?**

“*The current EU is not strong enough to get itself out of its present crisis or to prevent future ones. The choice that the eurozone’s leaders have been avoiding has become inescapable: economic and political integration or dissolution*”

**–** Jan Zielonka, 2012

The economic crisis that hit the global economy in 2007 is clearly without precedent. “[...] its size and extent are exceptional” (Commission, 2009) and the principal casualty of the euro crisis has proved to be the effort to create a more united and integrated Europe. Currently, the economic crisis has become so acute that it has led to “the emergence of mass opposition to austerity policies in Europe” (Steinberg, 2013) – actions that quickly transformed into a pan-European social movement also called “The European Spring” (Vila, 2013). As a result, the economic crisis has not only impaired the confidence in the EU’s future, but it “has also given rise to tensions among Member States and eroded their sense or solidarity” (Lehne, 2013). The European Union is now facing with an existential crisis, one which comprises a series of crises (as mentioned above: a political, economic and social crisis). Therefore, the main issue that will be further challenged within this chapter is establishing whether the deepening economic crisis is heightening “national divisions throughout Europe” (Steinberg, 2013) and what effects does it have on the European Union foreign policy as a whole taking into consideration the uncoordinated foreign policies of its Member States (Lehne, 2013).

1. **The state of play of the European Union**

As it was previously mentioned, the EU is facing chaotic times – fact also recognized by Angela Merkel in her speech at an event hosted by Deutsche Bank in Berlin this year, saying that “it is chaos right now” within the EU and “we need to be compatible” in order to succeed through this harsh period. Moreover, she claimed that Europeans must accept that “Europe has the last word in certain areas” in order to “be able to continue to build Europe”, but the same Angela Merkel later states that it is not necessary to abandon “national practices”. Thus, judging by her statements, one could conclude that even the one who is believed to be the 2nd most powerful person in the world (according to Forbes Magazine 2013) and the person who is also known as the leader of the EU does not have a clear, strong idea of what trajectory the EU should take, nor does the whole EU. As a consequence, it is clear that, right now, the EU is confronted with stagnation in elaborating new salvation plans.

The current state of play of the EU is accurately described by Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, who has admitted in a discussion on the topic regarding the implications of the European Union’s austerity policies on April 22, in Brussels, that:

 “*I am deeply concerned about the divisions that we see emerging: political extremes and populism tearing apart the political support and the social fabric that we need to deal with the crisis; disunion emerging between the centre and the periphery of Europe; a renewed demarcation line being drawn between the North and the South of Europe; prejudices re-emerging and again dividing our citizens, sometimes national prejudices that are simply unacceptable also from an ethical point of view*.”

The main source of these problems is the continued economic crisis which “has created centrifugal forces that are pulling European public opinion apart” (PewResearchCenter, 2013) and proves, once again, to be the cause of the existential European crisis. Therefore, the state of play of the EU is characterised by the unfortunate decisions taken by the European leaders in order to overcome the euro-crisis, while their unintended consequences are driving the EU apart. In addition, according to the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) report from 2013, *A Europe of Incentives*, “the result of this approach to the crisis has been to exacerbate the flaws of an integration process that has narrowed the space for political decisions at the national level without increasing it at the European level”. Therefore, the EU is stuck in an unprecedented situation: it lacks both a political, as well as an economic union; its citizens are becoming hostile to austerity measures and tired of the concept of a European Union; its MS encounter major lacks in coordinating their (foreign) policies and a possible downfall could emerge – subject for later discussions.

Judging by these facts, one could state that the EU is on the verge of falling apart. Considering the functionalist concept, as well as the realist thought, it could be established that the spill-over effect is now playing a negative role: the economic downfall has led to a political downfall (as it shall be noticed in the analysis of MS relations), proving that the realist paradigm is still applicable by observing how, in times of turmoil, the national interest prevails over the common, European interest. But the EU is yet determined to maintain its status on the international scene, the best example in this respect being the start of the EU-USA free-trade agreement talks. According to the European Commission, this is believed to “be the biggest bilateral trade deal ever negotiated”. In addition, the Member States managed to overcome their differences and, on 14th June 2013, despite the spying concerns over the EU – as a result of the notorious information leakage scandal involving Edward Snowden, former CIA and NSA employee – they were able to give the green light to the European Commission for starting the trade and investment agreement with the US. Therefore, a strong European Union adamant to make its voice heard in a multipolar world was projected.

**B. The state of play of the Member States’ relations / foreign affairs**

“*We live in an era in which the nationalist project is more seductive than any project of integration among nations*”

**–** Dimitri Sotiropoulos, University of Athens

It is important to, first, stress the fact that nations can display an active or a passive foreign policy (they can adopt a warlike behaviour or a pacifist behaviour), but, above all, they are actors on the international arena and their behaviour is influencing “international developments in accordance with their values and interests” (Lehne, 2013). Evaluating the case of the European Union where MS do not coordinate their interests and do not try to consider a “system of governance that relies more closely on the community method [...]” (Leonard & Zielonka, 2013), it should be observed that the state of play of their relations will be characterised by a real danger of degradation leading to a ‘disunited Union’ that would not be able to formulate a firm position in International Affairs.

Secondly, it has to be reminded that by acceding to the EU, Member States had willingly “decided to share their sovereignty in some areas in order to guarantee peace, stability and democracy within (and around) their borders, and to combine their efforts and be stronger in order to confront the economic, social and political challenges of the future [...]” (Piris, 2012). Nevertheless, the emergence of the economic crisis and the ongoing governmental austerity measures mutated Europe into an entity that suffers an acute decline in terms of economy, policy-making and peaceful internal relations, and that it is not able to perform as a single actor on the international scene. The aftermath of this situation led to hatred feelings between the rich (North) and the poor (South), “the leaders” and “the slackers” (Vaise & Dennison, 2013), and to the rise of concepts such as populism, extremism, euro-scepticism. Moreover, as a result of the harsh austerity measures, which are mainly led by Germany, and the “low-cost” Europe concept that is stimulating the current EU agenda, the “permissive consensus” for European integration has disappeared – “citizens are no longer willing to make sacrifices to support the European project [...]” (Leonard & Zielonka, 2013).

Therefore, “the European project now stands in disrepute across much of Europe” (Catan & Walker, 2013): wealthy MS, such as the Netherlands, are becoming reluctant to bail out the needy ones (e.g. Cyprus or Greece – which will need the third bail-out after 2014, as the president of the Euro group, Jeroen Dijsselbloem told the Dutch newspaper Het Financieele Dagblaad on 23rd August 2013); the southern hemisphere is encountering “depression-like conditions” (Walker & Blackstone, 2013); and there is a dangerously fast-growing level of rebellion in countries such as Greece (extremism had reached the level where the right-wing Golden Dawn party resorted to killing a leftist activist in the fall of 2013). As the crisis is advancing, the need for deeper integration is a prerequisite for the survival of the European Union, but judging by the Member States’ actions, one might state that the integration practice had become rather impossible given the difficulty of getting 27 MS to agree to measures and policies in a timely manner. An eloquent example in this regard is the issue of the arms embargo for Syria by the EU. This problem exposed a much divided European Union with MS that could not reach a common ground: Great Britain and France were the two countries which vehemently expressed the desire to lift the arms embargo, whereas the rest of the MS objected frenetically to this idea, claiming that providing Syria with arms would only lead to a degeneration of the conflict given the real possibility that the weapons could end up in the hands of the rebels. Even though countries such as the Netherlands, Czech Republic or Sweden expressed their concerns and lobbied for an extension of the deadline for lifting the embargo (which was scheduled for June 1, 2013), “Europe's major foreign policy actors seem to be charting the way ahead, with many other countries being reluctant bystanders at best” just as it was with the Libya intervention and the French military action in Mali (Marcus, 2013). In the end, the EU reached a compromise with the key help from Germany: the arms embargo was lifted, but all the EU measures against Syria will continue. These uncoordinated actions of the European Member States depict their current state of play: a certain level of renationalisation of MS’ foreign policies can be observed, where the strong leaders are asserting their own national positions and initiatives without taking into consideration their counterparts.

**C. “The decline of Europe” and the rise of social movements**

“*Populism is politics without policies; technocracy is policy without politics*”

**–** Chris J. Bickerton, Science Po

It is claimed by the academic world and media that the European Union might have a democratic deficit which, together with the acute economic crisis, led to the rise of technocracy and populism among its Member States. If we analyse the current situation of the EU relations, one might consider that the above statement might be true, but for a further understanding of this matter it is necessary to explore the history of policy-making of the EU and the recent political trends emerging in different Member States.

The European Union has been created on the basis of the “Monet method” that aimed for a technocratic formation of the EU, step by step, “through concrete achievements” (Kundnani & Leonard, 2013). The problem with Jean Monet’s vision of the future Europe lays in the fact that the cumulative strategy – first the creation of ECSC, followed by the establishment of a single market and in the end, achieving a single currency – has taken out more areas of the political sphere than ever. Thus, the more efficacious the project became, the more it restricted the powers of national governments encouraging, thus, a populist backlash.

One of the consequences of this approach is the emergence of the democratic deficit within the union, but some scholars argue that the EU surpassed this problem and it confronts now with a legitimacy problem. In the European Council on Foreign Affairs’ report, “*Think again: European decline*”, it is claimed that “the European Union is plenty democratic” because the European Commission (the institution which runs the EU) has its members appointed by directly elected national governments and the European Parliament – which has new lawmaking powers, such as deciding on the vast majority of EU legislation due to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (European Parliament & Lisbon Treaty) – is the only institution which has its members directly elected by voters. If it is to be compared with other countries, “even an ideal democracy, the EU has checks and balances, and requires bigger majorities to pass legislation” (Kundnani & Leonard, 2013). In addition, the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was established by TEU in order to increase direct democracy in the EU. Therefore, the EU does not have a democratic deficit, but it has a legitimacy problem which is most accentuated within the euro-zone given the technocratic method of constructing the European Union.

Having established that the source of the existential crisis of the EU is not only the democratic deficit, our attention should once again focus on the economic crisis. According to the Guardian UK, this crisis is the source of the malfunctioning state of play of the EU, of the rise of technocracy in Europe and of the emergence of populist trends. Why? The powerful states of the Union (a.k.a. Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France – not very much lately, etc.) are approaching a “two-class” principle where the decision-making process lacks transparency and the full participation of MS. Consequently, “decisions are taken behind closed doors by a self-imposed *directoire* and offered to others on a take-it-or-leave it basis” (Leonard & Zielonka, 2013). The best example to illustrate the previous statement is given by Brussels’ decision from 2011 to appoint two, unelected technocrats in Italy and Greece in order to save the EU from collapsing: former European commissioner, Mario Monti, and “a central banking bureaucrat” in Greece, Lucas Papademos (TheGuardian, 2011). The explanation given by the EU for this rather unusual changes is based on the fact that Europe must do everything in its powers to prevent the decay of the monetary union, implicitly that of the EU. As a consequence, it was decided “to suspend politics as normal [...]” and “give way to unelected experts who can keep the show on the road” and who are trusted to pass reforms according to the policy makers in Berlin, “the bloc’s top paymasters”, and the EU leaders (Barber, 2011).

This EU ‘salvation plan’ which includes the appointment of unelected technocrats without considering the will of the people has had critical impacts on the citizens: there is a growing trend of social movements (populism, mixed with extremism and euro-scepticism) which emerged in several euro countries. European citizens are becoming exhausted of the harsh austerity measures and fear that their political leaders are overwhelmed by the crisis, thus they demand new leaders who could first help the country and then the rest. Another factor that contributed to the emergence of these trends is the “eroded public trust in public authority” (Barysch, 2013) which felt dramatically since the instauration of the economic crisis, as well as the support for the European project which encountered a -15% drop in the last two years (2012 and 2013), according to Pew Research Center’s 2013 report, *The New Sick Man of Europe: the European Union*.

Experiencing an overall lack of trust in their public representatives and their soft policies, the nations turned to measures a country would most likely apply in a crisis period: stop immigration and diversity, fight the privileged elites and return to the needs of ordinary people. And since ordinary people surpass the elites within the EU, the “confused voters find the populists’ clear, simplistic messages appealing” (Barysch, 2013). Ergo, populist parties, such as: the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, the hard-left Syriza party and far-Right extremist neo-fascist Golden Dawn party in Greece, Lega Nord in Italy, Partido Popular in Spain, Front National in France, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, UK’s Independence Party and Denmark’s People’s Party emerged, and by means of social media they encountered great successes among the nationals. These new political trends in Europe suggest that if the union will “succumb to simple demonization and to exclusion” which will mark the falling toward “the dumbing down of representative politics”, being in danger of “making reformist populists into *de facto* revolutionaries” (Taggart, 2012); this could lead to the rise of power politics – were the national interest is put above any other interest, be it European or not – given the extreme and euro-sceptic measures applied in response of the economic crisis.

To conclude, as social movements are becoming popular among most of the nations, Europe should be concerned with other emerging trends as well. Member States are all actors both on the international scene, as well as within the EU, but if they adopt nationalist policies – here the attention should be directed especially toward France, which is the most “dispirited and disillusioned” country in the EU right now (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2013) and one which has a rich history attesting how nationalism is influencing its behaviour when formulating domestic and international policies – and extremist views, then it is clear that the worsening economic crisis is damaging the well-being of the union by turning its MS against each other. Ultimately these new trends diminish the state of ‘actorness’ of the EU on the international scene.

**Q 2: to what extent will the economic crisis reshape the European Union, implicitly the common foreign policy?**

As it was stressed throughout this paper, the European Union is not an ordinary international organization: it was created by sovereign nation-states which agreed to share sovereignty in order to achieve economic and political integration. This particular feature of the EU is also acknowledged as the *sui generis* character of the Union – fact which complicates the analysis of the EU as an international actor. In addition, considering the waves of euro-scepticism mixed with the rise of pessimism, populism, etc., the public trust in the EU is being eroded. The aftermath is characterised by the decline of EU’s actorness and credibility when engaged in external actions, as it was exemplified in the case of Syria arms embargo: EU presented a divided message which, in International Affairs, is inevitably devalued due to inconsistency in decisions. Hence, this section of the paper aims to examine the EU as a single entity on the international arena by displaying the CFSP and the options available directed at reshaping the internal structure of the EU as a mean of overcoming the acute financial crisis and redefining EU’s role in the emergence of a multipolar world.

1. **Economic crisis reflects on EFP**

The European foreign policy (EFP) emerged as a consequence of the devastated European continent after the Second World War, being mainly a response to the atrocities which destroyed any form of cooperation among the European nations. Ergo, the European Political Cooperation (the former name of the CFSP) “was created to prevent international problems from disrupting the Community and to a lesser extent, to make sure a common European voice was heard in international affairs” (Smith, 2004). In addition, it could be established that the level of effectiveness of the single European voice in world politics is directly commensurable with the MS’ ability to cooperate and achieve unanimity in decisions which concern external matters. However, taking into consideration the intergovernmental and supranational system that governs the EFP, it is important to acknowledge that even though MS are bound by technical means, they depend on cooperation when dealing with matters that occur on the international arena and which can affect the EU. Hence, they all have to behave according to the principle of solidarity. But once this principle is diminished, “it is hard to see European governments agreeing on much of anything, let alone politically sensitive areas of public policy, such as foreign affairs” (Korski, 2009). Therefore, looking at the current degraded state of play of the EU due to the economic crisis – where there is a clear division between South and North, where small MS cannot keep up with the big ones and where there is a level of reluctance encountered among the majority of the MS – the question would be: what is the next step for the EU in order to overcome the social, economic and political crisis which is destroying the ‘European dream’?

1. **EU: future perspectives?**

As demonstrated in the first part of the empirical evidence, the EU is the new sick man of Europe facing severe internal crises which are distracting the European leaders from further strengthening the role of Europe in international affairs. In addition, MS now fear that their sovereignty is undermined “by the way the euro crisis is conducted” (Traynor, 2013) because the ‘bail-out’ countries are not given any option in managing the crisis and are strictly imposed to behave according to the Troika (the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission) rules. Thus, there is a feeling that “a substantial part of democracy has vanished at the national” level (Leonard & Torreblanca, 2013) because the European citizens are not given the option to decide for their own country – the reason being the complex institutionalised structure of the EU. It is exactly this feature that contributed to the sudden and dramatic rise of populism, nationalism and pessimism among European citizens and nations, and, as a consequence, MS are starting to look at the concept of EU as a toolbox, rather than a dynamic entity.

The big three or the coalition of the willing (France, UK and Germany) appear to be the first states making use of the EU as just an apparatus without complying with the norms regulating the union. For example, France decided to act by itself in the Mali crisis and did not consult with any of its partners. The same France, together with UK, appeared to rule the decision of the EU in the case of Syria when the question of lifting the arms embargo was put on the table. Still enjoying the title of ‘creditor countries’ (having enough economic resources) they exerted their power by vehemently opposing the other 25 MS that did not agree to lift the arms embargo. Therefore, France and UK forced the EU to act as they dictated by starting to provide arms beginning with August 2013. These actions perfectly embody the lack of coherence, cooperation and solidarity among the MS. The Austrian vice-chancellor and foreign minister, Michael Spindelegger, stated after the summit concerning the above issue that “it’s regrettable that we have found no common ground”. Once again it is clear that the European foreign policy is following the realist theory where the national interest surpasses the common interest. As a consequence, the appearance of a three-tier Europe – the UK’s preferable option of a European Union – seems to be imminent and it can pose a real danger of disintegrating the EU.

A three-tier Europe would mean that the EU will be divided into three different cores: (1) the inner core or the euro-zone, (2) the pre-ins countries (states that aspire to join the euro-zone, e.g. Poland) and (3) the outs countries (nations that have decided to leave the euro-zone, e.g. UK) (Vaisse & Dennison, 2013). This idea is envisioned by some (especially by the British politicians) as the solution for solving the economic crisis and save the EU, but at the same time it is feared that this will represent the collapse of Europe because the “fluid border between the tiers will not hold” (Stefan Lehne – Carnegie Europe). Additionally, there will be inevitable spill-over effects “into other [non-currency related] policy areas [...] and other countries will eventually withdraw into some form of associate membership” (Philippe Legrain – policy advisor for the Commission) (Barysch, 2012) taking into consideration the possibility that the core would control the rest. Even though these visions started as just ideas a few years ago – in 2011 there were talks about a two-tier structure – it seems that this novel concept is beginning to become more and more real: the UK will hold a referendum in 2017 on the exit from the EU, France could be the next one given the acute level of disillusionment displayed by the nationals (more than half of the population is not in favour of the EU and 77% believe that European economic integration has made things worse for France (PewResearch, 2013) ). As a response, the European Council on Foreign Affairs warns that if this will materialise, the consequences will be disastrous for the EU and the European foreign policy.

A logical comprehension of an international actor is based on the fact that “a successful actor needs to integrate various foreign policy instruments into well-coordinated external action” (Lehne, 2013). Unfortunately, the EU is far from reaching this objective being limited by the amalgam of crises: financial, social and political. Considering what was demonstrated previously, the nature of the European foreign policy seems to be a hybrid one. On one hand, we have the big three (E3) that understand the European Union as a mean to reinforce their own policies. If we judge by the recent actions undertaken by the E3 and review their past actions it can be concluded that, when MS exert their national interests in the light of the EU’s weight, they deviate from the common interest – disrespecting the EU’s values and norms, thus providing empirical evidence that the national foreign perspective prevails over the European foreign policy. On the other hand, the European foreign policy as known from theories is established through cooperation and consensus among institutions empowered by the sovereign MS.Hence, the formulation of new positions on foreign policy challenges takes place in a highly institutionalised manner and “hardly ever takes place in isolation” (Lehne, 2013). In conclusion, the hybrid nature of EFP seems to be a paradox because even though the MS have to reach consensus when approaching external issues as required by the intergovernmental character of the EU, it is this feature to be considered “the ‘weakest link’ in the chain of EU activities” (Lehne, 2013) as it assures MS the freedom to act by themselves – CFSP being ruled by the principle of unanimity.

To summarise, the EU is traversing anarchic times where the economic crisis had led to national divisions which weakened the common foreign policy. The top discussions on the European agenda are currently concerned with the future of the EU and its reformation, while the concern for the EFP is left aside. Moreover, judging by the institutional or state-centric oriented character, the EU does not enjoy the features of a state fact which hinders the Union’s possibility to achieve an identity in world politics. However, the EU appears to find the power to activate on the international scene by keeping its role as the largest donor, being a Nobel Peace Prize beholder and it significantly improved its relations with Russia and China, as it will further clarified.

1. **EU on the international arena in the context of a multipolar world**

The European dream “*is a dream far better suited to the next stage in the human journey – one that promises to bring humanity to a global consciousness befitting an increasingly interconnected society*”

**–** Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream*, 2013

Considering the above statement, one might say that Europe is a utopian project which came into existence, but when checking reality, how much of this project was concreted? The EU brought humanity to a global conscious scale (fact confirmed by the Nobel Prize for Peace awarded in 2012), but considering the current state of play of the EU, it is hard to see the bright light of the future. In addition, the EU should be aware of the emergence of a multipolar world where the power is divided between the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the USA (which lately, due to multipolarity, “has gone from being a hyperpower to becoming the equivalent of a mere commentator on world affairs” – according to David Rothkopf, visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, in his article *America, Limited* 2013), because now more than ever, it is time for the EU to properly define its role in world politics. Further it will be examined how the EU behaved on the international arena and how did it respond to the different crises regarding its own internal crisis.

According to the annual Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013 – report released by the European Council on Foreign Relations – the common foreign policy of the EU proved a reasonable resilience to the economic crisis. Even though the European leaders had mainly focused on strategies aiming to solve the financial crisis, the Europeans had generally performed better in 2012 than in 2011. An overall analysis of the EFP actions reveals that Europe improved its score in relation to Russia and China, and continued to solidly perform in areas such as multilateral issues, the relation with the USA, the Middle East and North Africa. Notwithstanding the timid signs of stabilization, “Europe’s image and soft power continued to fade around the world, while its resources for defence and international affairs kept eroding” and there was identified a trend of ‘renationalization’ of the European foreign policy marked by the drop in leadership by the big three (Vaisse & Dennison, 2013). Therefore, it is clear that the economic crisis affected also the EU’s external actions, since the amount of financial expenditure allocated to defense and security was considerably reduced.

EU – Russia, China & the USA

In the relation with Russia, Europe showed signs of unity and coherence in its decisions, even though the general relations experienced a certain level of deterioration, given the EU’s dissatisfaction with the re-election of Putin as a President which represented the crackdown point of the relation. The major success encountered by Europeans was the “unanimity and clarity” wherewith the EU expressed its concerns about the new Russian laws that “re-criminalised slander and severely restricted [the] freedom of assembly as well as [the] working conditions for NGOs” (Vaisse & Dennison, 2013). In the light of these actions, the EU must now capitalize its unity and try to strengthen its diplomatic relations with Russia “in case things get worse before they get better” (Vaisse & Dennison, 2013).

The relation with China is overshadowed by the US which is a “frugal superpower” that is “pivoting” towards Asia – as Michael Mandelbaum, director of SAIS American Foreign Policy programme, stated. The EU assertiveness towards China regarding human rights violations improved in 2012 and it led to a “more restrained and balanced” relationship, but it did not have a major impact. Thus, the relationship with Beijing is yet “in short supply” (Vaisse & Dennison, 2013).

The status of the US-EU relation can be simply described as being complicated: the US is shifting its interest from the EU towards the emerging world power, focusing on strengthening its relations with Asia. In addition, the Obama administration proposed to, first, accomplish the need to do nation building at home and then to attach to its relationship with the world. But the EU still managed to maintain the relation with the US and even encountered great success, because the EU remains the most important partner of the US in the Middle East matters. The most remarkable achievements of the EU in connection to America were: the tighter sanctions imposed by the EU3 (Germany, UK, France) on Iran regarding its nuclear problem, the resistance of US diplomatic pressures concerning the Israel – Palestine matter and the great amount of activity displayed by the European External Action Service in Washington that are advancing European interests. But the EU-US relation shows signs of degradation considering “the differences between European reactions to disagreements with the US”, hence “only greater European unity” can assure the EU that it will “get the most of a resilient transatlantic relationship” (Vaisse & Dennison, 2013). However, the EU and the US announced the start of talks on a comprehensive trade agreement on the 17th of June 2013 fact which

EU – Middle East & North Africa

Given the acute economic crisis, Europeans did not have a very successful intervention as regards to the Arab Spring. According to the Scorecard they “could not break the frustrating diplomatic gridlock or prevent the bloody tragedy" in Syria for example, and concentrated especially in the close neighboring countries in order to try to stabilize the civil wars and ensure its borders security. But the limitations imposed by the euro-crisis did not permitted the EU to “move beyond limited pragmatic support to the transitions” as a consequence of the Arab Spring. Moreover, even though the predictions of the scorecard speculated that France and UK will not militate for the lifting of the arms embargo on Syria if the US showed support, the two European leaders demonstrated lack of cooperation and stubbornness when the other 25 MS opposed to the idea. Hence, it is once demonstrated that the EU’s actorness is hampered by national interests.

EU – Wider Europe

The EU relations with non-MS are overshadowed by the economic crisis and the emergence of a multi-ties Europe that is “downgrading the value of membership of the EU” (Vaisse & Dennison, 2013), but it has to acknowledge that the project of enlargements still continues: Croatia will join in 2014, Montenegro initiated accession negotiations and Serbia became a candidate in March. However, the EU fails to impose itself and act with a single voice, the most relevant example being Kosovo – the youngest European democracy which is still not recognized by five EU member states. Overall, when analysing the EU’s connection with Wider Europe it can be noticed little progress, even stagnation in cooperation and further developing relations.

**IV. Discussions and Conclusions**

The European Union was created around several theories and concepts being hoped that the formation of a new political entity which includes sovereign states would prevent a new World War. Since its establishment in 1952, the EU evolved into an innovative corpus which managed to pose serious difficulties to International Relations scholars and academics challenging the field of study due to its unusual structure: an entity where decisions are negotiated at intergovernmental level by individual states which operate through supranational institutions. Over time, institutions gained legitimacy and due to a long process of integration and cooperation among its Member States, the EU managed to assert its identity on the international scene. As a consequence, the concept of a European foreign policy came into existence. Scholars like Haas based the integration process on the spill-over effects stating that integration in the area of low politics (the economic and social affairs) will lead to the integration of high politics (national interests and international security). Haas proved to be right in his Neofunctionalist concepts and the EU showed that by creating an economic core – where the removal of trade and movement barriers would lead to the emergence of a single currency – it can make possible the achievement of cooperation among MS. This process is still ongoing and it can be best observed within the Eurozone where Member States coordinate their efforts into creating a single spending policy, Eurobonds, bailouts, stability mechanisms etc. that will further foster a form of integrated economic governance. Notwithstanding this successful process, the EU has been recently faced with a series of crises which were triggered by the economic crisis starting with 2008. The effects proved to be immediate and they were mostly displayed in the European foreign policy field, since the harsh austerity measures imposed by the European leaders eroded the MS’ sense of solidarity and cooperation. The immediate result of these actions was the rise of different social movements across the European continent. Serious forms of euro-scepticism, nationalism and populism depreciated the public trust in the European institutions, while the MS appear to be expressing tendencies of nationalism focusing on first guarding the national interest – the most eloquent example being the forms of anti-immigration policies adopted by some countries, such as the Netherlands which still denies the free movement of workers – and less on the EU as a whole. Consequently, the realist paradigm remains valid in its predictions which assume that in times of turmoil the national interest will clash with the process of cooperation. As it was presented in the analysis of the European foreign policy, Member States are following their own national positions without feeling the need to reach a consensus with their counterparts: considering the actions of France and Great Britain in regard to the arms embargo lifting on Syria where, despite the fact that they were the only two MS in favour of providing Syria with arms, they dictated their way during negotiations and managed to reach a favourable compromise with help from Germany. But, overall, the EU seems to be dealing with all these issues by managing to keep its authority on the international scene.

Judging by its last actions, the EU appears to be tackling these issues by approaching them from a strategic perspective. Therefore, strategy seems to be the new feature of the European foreign policy if analysing the present state of affairs of the field of activity. Member States lost their appetite in addressing major issues and they opt to seek solutions based on “a tactical mindset” as one observer expressed on Twitter: “Germany: able but unwilling; France: willing but unable; Britain: unwilling and unable” (Techau, 2013). This strategic type of behaviour could be regarded as the new normal state of affairs of the EU, where the “the post-war integrationist zeal and sense of togetherness is gone”, as Jan Techau argued in July 2013. The rise of social movements and the temptation of nationalism returned on the continent taking severe and strong forms and they draw the attention away from developing an ever stronger European Union which can maintain its geopolitical importance and role in world affairs. However, in contrast with the rise of nationalist feelings that are damaging the EU in its entirety, the process of integration can be particularly noticed within the Eurozone – MS are struggling to form stability mechanisms, are bailing out the MS in need, etc. – where the emergence of banking and fiscal unions had led to an “irreversible form of integrated economic governance in Europe” (Techau, 2013). The problem with this paradoxical situation – where there is economic integration, on one hand, and trends of nationalism, on the other hand – is that it puts Europe in great difficulty since the austerity measures are not as effective as they were expected and the European leaders appear to give up on the founding principles of the EU.

In conclusion, Europe is in immediate need of new ways of tackling the problems crossing it and it should seek fast and effective solutions to the amalgam of issues that are currently present. In order to be successful and strengthen its role in international affairs, the EU must resolve its internal crises ,first, by developing innovative solutions to the social movements (and other related problems) and become, therefore, attractive for its MS so that their interest in further developing and strengthening the EU will remain. The EU must show perseverance and impetus in tackling these issues and by managing this, nations such as the UK can renounce on the 2017 opt-out referendum and, therefore, still be part of the novel political entity of our century. On these grounds, the EU would be able to assert its well-deserved role on the international scene by further demonstrating that it deserved the honourable Nobel Price for Peace and contribute to the general well-fare of this world, where multi-polarity and civil wars are slowly becoming the ‘new normal’. To concluded, there is still hope for the EU and, considering the fact that there are signs of economic recovery, the European countries should once again refocus on the founding principles of the Union and try to further develop what has been called a novel political animal.

**List of References**

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spreas of Nationalism.* London: Verso.

Baere, G. D. (2008). *Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations.* Ney York: Oxford University Press Inc.

Baere, G. d. (2008). *Constitutional Principles of European Union External Relations.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Barber, T. (2011, November 11). *Eurozone turmoil: Enter the technocrats.* Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://www.ft.com/: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/93c5cb36-0c92-11e1-a45b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2U7AjBsGw

Barysch, K. (2012). *A multi-tiered Europe? The political consequences of the euro crisis.* Brussels: Centre for European Reform.

Barysch, K. (2013, April 10). *Is the euro responsible for populism?* Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/euro-crisis-responsible-populism

Catan, T., & Walker, M. (2013, May 13). *'Europe' Losing Some of Its Luster.* Retrieved May 19, 2013, from http://online.wsj.com/: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324031404578481272902309736.html

Commission, E. (2009). *Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses.* Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Council, E. (2003). *European Security Startegy.* Bruxelles: European Council.

Desmond, D. (2000). *Encyclopedia of the European Union.* Boulder / London: Lynne Reinner.

Dijkstra, H. (2013). *Approaches to Delegation in EU Foreign Policy: .* Retrieved June 02, 2013, from Maastricht University: http://www.fdcw.unimaas.nl/staff/files/users/274/Dijkstra\_Routledge\_preprint.pdf

Ekengren, M., & Sundelius, B. (2004). National Foreign Policy Co-ordination. In W. Carlnaes, H. Sjursen, & B. White, *Contemporary European Foreign Policy* (pp. 110-111). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Ernst, H. (1950-1957). *The Uniting of Europe.* Standford: Standford UP.

*European Parliament & the Lisbon Treaty.* (n.d.). Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/0042423726/Parliament-and-the-Lisbon-Treaty.html

Geddes, A. (2004). *The European Union and British Politics.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ginsberg, R. H. (1999). Conceptualizing the Europen Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap. *Journal of Common Market Studies* , 432.

*Globalization of Politics.* (2013). Retrieved May 02, 2013, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/: http://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/globalization-of-politics.html

Grieco, J. (1996). State Interests and Instutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Reinterpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union. In B. Frankel, *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (pp. 262-305). London: Frank Cass.

Haas, E. (1950-1957). *The Uniting of Europe.* Standford: Standford UP.

Haas, E. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe.* Standford: Standford University Press.

Jensen, C. S. (2010). Neo-functionalism. In *M. Cini; N. Pérez-Solórzano Borragán* (p. 76). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Korski, D. (2009, February 25). *What does the financial crisis mean for EU foreign policy?* Retrieved June 10, 2013, from European Council on Foreign Affairs: http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary\_financial\_crisis\_eu\_foreign\_policy\_korski/

Kundnani, H., & Leonard, M. (2013, April 29). *Think again: European decline.* Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://ecfr.eu/: http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary\_think\_again\_european\_decline

Lake, D. A. (2009, September). *The State and International Relations.* Retrieved June 11, 2013, from UC San Diego: http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeOxfordStateessayreview.pdf

Lehne, S. (2013, February 21). *Carnegie Europe.* Retrieved jUNE 10, 2013, from http://carnegieeurope.eu/: http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/02/21/promoting-comprehensive-approach-to-eu-foreign-policy/fiou

Lehne, S. (2013, February 14). EU Actor or Toolbox. London, United Kingdom. Retrieved May 02, 2013, from http://m.ceip.org/: http://m.ceip.org/2013/02/14/undefined/fi8e

Lehne, S. (2013, February 21). *Promoting a Comprehensive Approach to EU Foreign Policy.* Retrieved June 02, 2013, from http://carnegieeurope.eu/: http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/02/21/promoting-comprehensive-approach-to-eu-foreign-policy/fiou

Lehne, S. (2013, February 21). *Promoting a Comprehensive Approach to EU Foreign Policy.* Retrieved June 02, 2013, from Carnegie Europe: http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/02/21/promoting-comprehensive-approach-to-eu-foreign-policy/fiou

Leonard, M., & Torreblanca, J. I. (2013, April 24). *The remarkable rise rise of continental Euroscepticism.* Retrieved June 10, 2013, from The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/24/continental-euroscepticism-rise

Leonard, M., & Zielonka, J. (2013). *A Europe of Incentives: how to regain the trust of citizens and markets.* London: European Council on Foreign Affairs.

Lucarelli, S., & Manners, I. (2006). *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy.* Abingdon: Rouledge.

Marcus, J. (2013, May 28). *Syria arms embargo: EU divided despite consensus.* Retrieved June 04, 2013, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22688997

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Coice for Europe: Social Purpose and State power from Messina to Maastricht.* New York, United States of America: Cornell University Press.

Park, J. (2012, November 20). *Council on Foreign Affairs.* Retrieved May 24, 2013, from http://www.cfr.org/: http://www.cfr.org/eu/european-foreign-policy-euro-crisis/p29511

*Pew Research Global Attitudes Project.* (2013, May 13). Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://www.pewglobal.org/: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/13/the-new-sick-man-of-europe-the-european-union/

PewResearch. (2013, May 13). *The New Sick Man of Europe: the European Union.* Retrieved June 10, 2013, from PewResearch Global Attitudes Project: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/13/the-new-sick-man-of-europe-the-european-union/

Piris, J.-C. (2012). *The Future of Europe: towards a two-speed EU.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pollack, M. A. (2011). Theorizing the European Union: Realsit, Intergovernemntalist and Institutionalist Approaches. In E. Jones, A. Menon, & S. Weatherill, *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union* (pp. 1-21). Oxford: Oxfrod University Press.

Research, P. (2013, May 13). *The New Sick Man of Europe: the European Union*. Retrieved June 10, 2013, from PewReseacrh Global Attitudes Project: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/13/the-new-sick-man-of-europe-the-european-union/

Risse, T. (2004). European Institutions and Identity Change. What have we learned? In R. K. Hermann, T. Risse, & M. B. Brewer, *Transnational Identities* (pp. 247-271). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.

Risse, T. (2012). Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign Policy. *Global Policy, Special issue: Changing the Debate on Europe - the inaugural Dahrendorf Symposium* , 87-95.

Risse, T., & Grabowsky, J. (2008, March 04). European Identity Formation in the Public Sphere and in Foreign Policy. *RECON Working Papers* . Berlin, Germany: Recon Project.

Rosamond, B. (2000). *Theories of European Integration.* Houndsmills: MacMillan.

Sjursen, H. (1998). Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU's External Policy? *ARENA Working Paper* . Oslo, Denmark: ARENA Centre for European Studies.

Smith, M. E. (2004). *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steinberg, S. (2013, May 10). *Deepening Economic Crisis: Austerity Policies Heighten National Divisions throughout Europe.* Retrieved May 16, 2013, from http://www.infowars.com/: http://www.infowars.com/deepening-economic-crisis-austerity-policies-heighten-national-divisions-throughout-europe/

Stokes, B., Bell, J., & Gross, E. (2013, May 13). *The New Sick Man of Europe: the European Union*. Retrieved June 10, 2013, from PewReseacrh Global Attitudes Project: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/13/the-new-sick-man-of-europe-the-european-union/

Taggart, P. (2012, December 13). *The London School of Economics and Political Science.* Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/12/13/populism-has-the-potential-to-damage-european-democracy-paul-taggart/

Techau, J. (2013, April 23). *Is Europe Not hungry Enough for a Better Future?* Retrieved June 10, 2013, from Canergie Europe: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=51593

Techau, J. (2013, June 25). *Six EU Foreign Policy Questions for the Summer.* Retrieved July 27, 2013, from carnegieeurope.eu: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52207

Techau, J. (2013, July 09). *Welcome to Europe’s Painful New Normal.* Retrieved August 25, 2013, from http://carnegieeurope.eu/: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52336

Tekin, A. (2005, January 24). *On the futures of sovereignty.* Retrieved June 11, 2013, from yoksis.bilkent.edu.tr: http://yoksis.bilkent.edu.tr/doi\_getpdf/articles/10.1016-j.futures.2004.10.018.pdf

TheGuardian. (2011, November 13). *Europe: the rise of technocracy.* Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/13/europe-rise-technocracy-editorial

Tilikainen, T. (2001). To Be or Not to Be: An Analysis of the Legal and Political Elements of Statehood in the EU's External Identity. *European Foreign Affairs Review* *, 6*, 223-241.

Tonra, B., & Christiansen, T. (2004). *Rethinking European foreign policy.* Manchester: Manchester University Press 2004.

Tonra, B., & Christiansen, T. (2004). *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Torreblanca, J. I., & Leonard, M. (2013). *The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism.* London: European Council on Foreign Affairs.

Traynor, I. (2013, April 24). *Crisis for Europe as trust hits record low.* Retrieved June 10, 2013, from The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/24/trust-eu-falls-record-low

Union, E. (n.d.). *Building Europe through the Treaties.* Retrieved June 20, 2013, from http://europa.eu/: http://europa.eu/legislation\_summaries/institutional\_affairs/treaties/amsterdam\_treaty/a19000\_en.htm

Vaise, J., & Dennison, S. (2013). *European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013.* London: European Council on Foreign Affairs.

Vila, S. (2013, March 27). *The European Spring 2013 – A New Beginning?* Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://www.tni.org/: http://www.tni.org/article/european-spring-2013-new-beginning

Walker, M., & Blackstone, B. (2013, May 15). *Euro Crisis Mires Continent in Longest Slump Since War.* Retrieved May 16, 2013, from http://online.wsj.com/: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324767004578484192106471164.html

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics.* United States of America: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

White, B. (2004). Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe. In W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen, & B. White, *Contemporary European Foreign Policy* (pp. 11-12). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Wyles, J. (2013, May 23). *European Voice.* Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://www.europeanvoice.com/: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/the-spreading-pessimism-/77314.aspx