Becoming a Foreigner in Your Own Country

Home- and host-country effects: the second-generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands

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Executive summary

The year 2018 marks the fiftieth anniversary of Turkish migrants settling in the Netherlands. A significant number of Turks, approximately 400,000, currently live in the Netherlands; many are born there, and know Turkey only from visiting it on holiday. Integration has been successful for the majority of the migrants but there is still a sense of double belonging, stuck in between two cultures, that exists among the first- and second-generation Turks. This sense of foreignness really does exist and the main reasons behind this phenomenon are the different social, cultural and economic backgrounds of the Turks, which are considerably different from other migrant groups in the Netherlands. Rejection by the host society led the early guest worker Turks to withdraw and form 'ethnic niches'. An important means of reducing rejection and promoting integration can be achieved by increasing knowledge about each other between the Dutch and Turk citizens through the formation of cultural and religious institutions.

This dissertation outlines the most important facts and describes the backgrounds of the Turkish migrants in the Netherlands as well as the current dominant problems and challenges that the children of these migrants are facing within the framework of ongoing integration. The aim of this study is to measure the degree of loyalty towards Turkey of second-generation Turkish immigrants living in the Netherlands. Therefore, the research question is as follows: 'What factors influence the children of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands to feel strongly connected with Turkey, and in what ways can the Dutch government improve its current approach to the social integration of second-generation Turkish immigrants?' This question is answered by means of desk research and expert interviews.

Additionally, the literature review establishes an understanding of why the second-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands feel strongly connected with Turkey. It also provides an overview of the relevant theories included in this study. At the same time, the perspective of the second-generation Turkish migrants is also consulted and considered within this thesis. The findings demonstrate that the majority of second-generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands are strongly connected to the country of their parents' origin. It could be argued that the social and political climate of the Netherlands from 2002 onwards has influenced the integration process of this group significantly. More specifically, the negative Dutch attitude toward non-Western Islamic immigrants has led Turkish youth to feel alienated. Finally, Turkey's increasing engagement with its diaspora in Europe has also made it clear that the Turkish community encompasses divided loyalties.

This research has led to the following recommendations that would help the Netherlands improve its current approach to the integration of second-generation Turks. The government should make every effort to foster inclusiveness and diversity. This will combat potential labour market discrimination and decrease the amount of people that feel that they do not belong in Dutch society.

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Preface

This dissertation has been written to complete the European Studies programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. The subject of this thesis is the different types of factors that influence diasporic behaviour; more specifically, it focuses upon second-generation Turkish migrants. This research has grown from my commitment to social awareness, with an emphasis on understanding the mutual feelings of discomfort among second-generation Turkish immigrant children living in the changing social climate of the Netherlands. In this way, I hope to contribute to the society in which I am living.

Like many people, my ancestry traces back to more than one country. Whilst I was born and raised in the Netherlands, my family background has its roots firmly based in Turkey. I have a healthy sense of perspective in that my parents were among the fortunate immigrants who were able to afford to reside in predominantly white neighbourhoods. Still, however, socio-cultural and political integration was not an easy process as a child of Turkish immigrant parents, attending an all-white school and living in a relatively small Dutch town. Having many Dutch friends in my social network, Turkish friends accused me of not being 'Turkish enough' and speaking 'like a Dutchman'. On the other hand, my Dutch friends sometimes characterised me as 'too Turkish' or 'too militant'.

Consequently, I learnt to become a chameleon, offering to each friend the version of myself she or he would find the most acceptable. As time went by, I developed a sense of double belonging to the society in which I live, and where my parents are from, and where I am not recognised as a fully fledged member. It is a cliché but true: you are an allochtoon in the Netherlands and an almanci in Turkey. I have two hearts, one Dutch and one Turkish. Consequently, my environments have created much of who I am today; I am Dutch although I am not Dutch.

Finally, yet importantly, I would like to thank everyone who has supported me during the writing process of this thesis. Foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Mr. Van den Bergh, for all the support and guidance that he has given me during our meetings. Furthermore, I would like to thank my friends and family for all their support and motivation during this project.

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List of Acronyms

- EU: European Union
- MP: Member of Parliament
- Almanci: German-like
- NOS: Dutch Broadcasting Foundation
- CBS: Statistics Netherlands
- PKK: The Kurdistan Workers Party
- AKP: The Justice and Development Party
- WRR: The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy

1. Introduction

"The place in which you are living and working is now your homeland and new motherland. Stake a claim to it. Open more businesses, enroll your children in better schools, and make your family live in better neighborhoods, drive the best cars, and live in the most beautiful houses. That is because you are the future of Europe. It will be the best answer to the vulgarism, antagonism, and injustice made against you. " *The New York Times, 'You Are the Future of Europe,' Erdogan Tells Turks, 2017*

The above is a quote from Turkey's President Recep Tayip Erdogan addressing Turkish citizens currently living in Germany, as well as the large Turkish populations in the Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom, during the run-up to a Turkish constitutional referendum in 2017. The Netherlands, and also other member states within the European Union (EU), have expressed discomfort with Turkey's increasing influence over its diaspora (Arkilic, 2018). The Turkish community currently living in European countries amounts to approximately 5.5 million people (MFA Turkey, 2011). Accordingly, diplomatic tensions between the Netherlands and Turkey escalated when Dutch authorities prevented pro-Turkish government campaign activities, which had been scheduled in Rotterdam. Since then, the Netherlands has formally withdrawn its ambassador to Turkey and stated that no new Turkish ambassador will be accepted in The Hague (Akkermans, 2018). Turkey's diplomatic relations with the Netherlands are under significant stress, and they are likely to remain difficult in advance of Turkey's parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for 2019.

The immigration of Turks to Europe has a long history stretching back several decades. The majority of the nations of Europe have sizeable immigrant populations, both of European and non-European origins. Western European countries, especially the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland, experienced a rise in immigration after the Second World War (Munz, 1992). Furthermore, the number of asylum seekers, refugees, and illegal migrants gaining entrance to Western Europe increased significantly during the 1980s and beyond. Migration has always been the process by which different ethnic, cultural, language, and religious groups have come into contact presenting both migrants and host communities with many challenges, and migration has been a touchstone of EU political debates for decades (Hugo, 2005). Over the last years , Turkey, including its considerable diaspora which is the largest Muslim immigrant group in Europe, has emerged as a country of public discussion in the Netherlands (Landman, 2005). Ethnicity has now become more salient as a political and social cleavage than at any other time in a global world that is becoming increasingly connected.

Originally, Turkish migrant workers were recruited to Europe as a temporary measure owing to shortages in manpower, but over time they settled permanently and were joined by their families. This eventually led to changes in lifestyles and many problems of adaption (Şen, 2007). A significant number of Turks, some 400,000, live in the Netherlands; many are born there and know Turkey only

through holiday visits. At the same time, Turks living in the Netherlands are considered insular, identifying themselves less strongly with the majority society, in comparison with members of other migrant groups such as the Surinamese and Antilleans (Statistics Netherlands CBS, 2016). For this reason, second-generation Turkish migrants – the children of the original migrants born in the country of immigration – remain strongly connected to their home country. Previous studies by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP, 2015) have demonstrated that this group attaches great value to the Turkish part of their identity. These second-generation Turkish individuals, who have grown up between two worlds, naturally live in a condition of double belonging. This study aims to determine the extent to which this could prove to be difficult for Dutch society and how the government can counteract this tendency.

Turkey's intensifying tensions with Europe and increased engagement with its diasporic community in the Netherlands has been the inspiration behind the development of the main question: What factors influence the children of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands to feel strongly connected with Turkey, and in what ways can the Dutch government improve its current approach to the social integration of second-generation Turkish immigrants? The current thesis attempts to present, through the perspective of Turkish migrant children, the factors that contribute to an increased feeling of belonging in the context of the rising populism that is plaguing the country. Researching these aspects could elucidate this cultural discourse, which, in turn, could lead to insights into the attitudes of second-generation Turkish migrants towards their history, position, contemporary problems in Dutch society, and the potential roles the government may be able to play.

The following four sub-questions have been designed to answer the main question:

1.   Who are Turkish immigrants and when is one considered as a second-generation Turk in the Netherlands?

2.   What kind of controversies do Turkish immigrant children experience in the Dutch society?

3.   To what extent does rising nationalist sentiments among Turkish immigrants prove to be a difficulty for the Dutch society?

4. What current social integration policies are used in the Netherlands?

In order to answer the main question, this paper identifies the multiple ways in which their country of origin influences second-generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. The dissertation is divided into four chapters: firstly, the methodology section provides a brief overview of the research methods that were used. The methods used for this dissertation consisted mostly of primary sources, meaning existing scientific articles and explorative expert interviews. Then, a theoretical framework and clear overview of the topics concerned is formed by means of a literature review. In the third section, the main question is answered by presenting a brief summary of the findings of the research and interviews. Following this, the final chapter presents the conclusions of the paper as a whole.

2. Methodology

This chapter presents an outline of the different methods that were used in order to answer the research questions of this dissertation. The aim of this study was to explain and clarify what obstacles and limitations the children of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands experience and place these in a broader context. Appropriate justifications are provided for the forming of particular sub-questions. In addition, the following sections explain the specific methods utilised, which consist of a mix of primary and secondary research, and quantitative and qualitative data. Finally, additional aspects of the study such as the interviews, ethical limitations and potential threats are discussed in detail.

2.1 Type of research

The central question of this research, '*What factors influence the children of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands to feel strongly connected with Turkey, and in what way can the Dutch government improve its current approach to the social integration of second-generation Turkish immigrants?*', is a comprehensive question. The first two sub-questions: '*Who are Turkish immigrants and when is one considered a second-generation Turk in the Netherlands?*' and '*What kind of controversies do Turkish immigrant children experience in Dutch society?*' contain descriptive aspects. The motive behind the first and second sub-questions as descriptive was that both sub-questions describe the findings regarding the push-and-pull factors of migration and the demographics of Turkish migrants in Dutch society. This further elucidates the various effects of transnational migration on young people born in the Netherlands of Turkish parentage.

The third sub-question, '*To what extent could rising nationalist sentiments among Turkish immigrants prove to be difficult for Dutch society?*' was formulated for the following reasons. According to Benedict Anderson's theory within Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, every individual belongs to a vast body of people, most of whom are never known but with whom a common interest is shared (Anderson, 1983). There is evidence to suggest that children of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands, particularly from different socioeconomic backgrounds, differ in their ways of life and fertility behaviour compared to the host population. In order, therefore, to answer this third sub-question, a transnational perspective was employed to examine the sense of belonging and membership of second-generation Turkish immigrants. This provided more insight into the perspectives of the very people who are subject to this research.

The final sub-question, '*What are the social integration policies used in the Netherlands?*' was generated to identify the Dutch government's role in the process of creating unity, and the inclusion and participation of Turkish migrants in society. In answering this important question, it was necessary to enter into an examination of the various policies adopted by the Dutch government to counteract this tendency to feelings of alienation within the society. This chapter provides an impressive

overview of the current and past effects of policies on the organisation of Turkish immigrants and the formation and expression of their collective identity.

2.1.1 Secondary research

In researching the contributing factors that influence the young descendants of Turkish migrants living in the Netherlands with regard to feeling connected to the country of their parents' birth, it became evident that an in-depth understanding of certain concepts was required. For this reason, desk research was conducted in order to acquire background information on the history, culture, and social position of Turkish immigrants as well as governmental policies on integration in the Netherlands. Accordingly, essential information was retrieved through qualitative secondary data from the databases of different universities. The existing literature permitted the examination of relevant theories and concepts, which form the backbone of this research, such as migration, nationalism, identity, and social integration.

Furthermore, information regarding national policies has been gathered through the databases of the Dutch authorities and organisations working for the government. Documents published by the government were favoured above other sources, as the government is the intended audience of this study. This has resulted in some of the sources being used more frequently in order to remain as close to the original source as possible to make the outcome more reliable. In analysing the Dutch policies on integration from the 1960s onwards, special attention was given to the policies from 2014 onwards, because this period provides a clear insight into the government's current approach to social integration. The results of the secondary research were simultaneously utilised for the preparation of the primary research.

2.1.2 Primary research

The initial objective of this study was to gather primary research data by conducting individual interviews and secondary research data by collecting quantitative data. Personal interviews, focus groups, and observations are primary sources employed in obtaining sufficient data. According to (Easton, 2000), the most common sources of data collection in qualitative research are interviews and observations. Using a narrative methodology, with a large number of individuals, enabled this thesis to understand experiences. In addition, multiple views on an experience provide a richer and more plausible representation of a lived experience. Therefore, this study reviewed the perspectives of seven Turkish migrants' children to gain a better understanding of their positions in Dutch society.

Given the emphasis on personal predispositions, preferences and motivations, it was crucial for this research to be in-depth. All the interviews, conducted in April, 2018, covered a wide range of topics so that the respondents felt at ease and free to talk. The topics included social life, the use of the Turkish language, Dutch politics, and Turkish politics. During this research, the interviews were scheduled through the author's social network as little information and knowledge is readily available on this subject. Social media platforms, such as the Facebook groups; *Support Network for European Studies*

Students and *Turken Bijeen*, were valuable sources through which to encounter the target group. This study exclusively refers to the first names of participants in order to preserve interviewee anonymity and confidentiality. The resulting data obtained by the semi-structured interviews offers a complete picture of an insider's perspective.

Moreover, the primary data was partly derived from interviews that asked experts in-depth questions. For this study, an interview was conducted with a Turkish-born Dutch politician, Tunahan Kuzu, who has been an MP since 2012 and is the parliamentary group leader of a party called *Denk*, or Think. It positions itself as Europe's first party with a pro-immigrant stance, run by people from immigrant backgrounds (Siegal, 2016). *Denk* secured three seats in the 2017 Dutch House of Representatives elections. The interview with Mr. Kuzu, representing the Netherlands' largest minority Turkish population, provides insights into the socioeconomic and cultural factors affecting Turkish migrants and their children.

The second interview was held with Vincent Walet, a policy officer focusing on the social integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, who has worked for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment since 2002. This Ministry is responsible for the development of labour market policies, including migration and the free movement of workers, benefits and re-integration, income policy, and work-life balance. The interview was used to gain more background information upon government efforts to improve the social position of Turkish children and young people in Dutch society.

2.2 Limitations

There were some limitations to this research methodology. The first limitation is the limited amount of time that was available with regard to the deadline of June, 2018. This study managed to interview seven young people of Turkish descent between the ages of 18 to 26 years living in the Netherlands. It was challenging and time consuming to attract participants to take part in the interviews. The conducted interviews were advantaged by the author's own Turkish cultural and ethnic background, which encouraged respondents to feel more comfortable with sharing their views, opinions, and feelings without fearing the social prejudice of an 'outsider'. However, in an ideal situation, an increased number of participants would generate a better understanding and representation.

In addition, the interviewed experts saw this evaluation as a useful tool for determining the effects on a sense of self and collective belonging in first- and second-generation Turkish migrants. The in-depth interviews were an essential part of this thesis in terms of validity and reliability. However, one should keep in mind that a critical approach towards the interpretation of the collected data, which consist mainly of opinions, is required. In total, two interviews with experts in this field were conducted and more would have been ideal. The expert interview narratives resulted in eleven pages of transcription. Due to the volume of the data, the tape-recorded interviews were translated from Dutch to English whilst being analysed. For this reason, this study does not include any quotes in the original language.

3. Literature review

In this section, the relevant literature used in the construction of this dissertation is described. This literature review provides an overview of what has been written in the fields concerned by analysing immigration in a holistic manner. This chapter serves to explain various theoretical concepts in order to develop distinct and more insightful knowledge about the topic of this study. This means beginning with an abstract theoretical framework regarding the fields of human migration, as the community of immigrants of Turkish descent in the Netherlands comprise a significant percentage of the Dutch population, as well as populations throughout Western Europe, including Germany, France, and Belgium. Following this, the fields of diaspora and transnationalism are discussed in order to explore the history and topicality of 'Turkishness' as discourse, with a special focus on the rising populism in the Netherlands. To conclude the chapter, the results are presented in detail.

3.1 Defining migration

In order to achieve a better understanding of the migration processes, this chapter introduces the concept of human migration. Throughout history, groups and individuals have traveled in many directions for various reasons within the world. Since the late nineteenth century, numerous theories have been developed in contrasting sociological scientific disciplines, which aim at understanding the processes that stimulate immigration. It is, therefore, important to review the different views in order to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of migration. The Oxford Dictionary defines an *immigrant* as 'a person who comes to live permanently in a foreign country' (Oxford Dictionary, n.d.). The etymology of immigrant can be traced back to the classical Latin word *immigrantem,* which is related to 'emigrant', which means to move in. The term was, therefore, originally linked to the movement of a person or persons, but nowadays has achieved a much broader meaning

In order to understand what motivates people to migrate, one has to understand what is involved in the term migration. Relationships with the term migration, as mentioned in the earlier paragraph, imply multiple options: mobility may be many-directional and multiple, temporary or long-term, voluntary or forced (Harzig, 2009). Within a range of options, male or female migrants decide to move away from their roots in the place of origin to a new country in search of improving their life chances. Many scholars have supplied characteristics that define the concept of human migration. Ernst Georg Ravenstein's (1834-1913) articles on migration, the first of which was published more than 140 years ago, laid the foundation for the majority of modern research on migration. Ravenstein argues in his study that the motivations for migration are connected to the so-called 'laws' of migration (Ravenstein, 1885). His most important laws, or perhaps the most relevant generalisations concerning this dissertation are: '(…) migrants generally move to improve their economic circumstances; every migration flow generates a counter flow; migrants going long distances tend to go to great centres of commerce' (Noel Castree, 2013). It becomes apparent, however, that Ravenstein's theoretical model is

exclusively concentrated upon the process of labour migration, while more recent theories have tried to explain why migration continues once it has begun.

Along similar lines, the so-called push-pull model as an explanation of the causes of international migration is one of the most commonly recognised theoretical concepts in the migration literature (Schoorl, 2000). The representatives of this perspective provide a number of push factors in the country of origin, that is, a sending country that causes people to move away, in combination with a number of pull factors that attract migrants to a receiving country (Portes & Borocz, 1989). Pull factors include higher standards of living and improved employment opportunities. The fundamental assumptions are that the more disadvantaged a place is, the more probable it will produce migration. In addition, Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) states in his article 'Preconceptions of Economic Science', which incorporates the relevant factors regarding why international migration begins, that migration results from the uneven geographical distribution of labour and capital. According to this neoclassical economic theory, workers tend to move from countries or regions where labour is abundant and wages low to countries where the rewards for their labour will be higher than those received at home (Veblen, 1900). In light of these characteristics, it is, therefore, reasonable to assume that workers preferably migrate from India to Qatar and from Turkey to the Netherlands and not vice versa.

3.2 The Netherlands' waves of immigration

From a historical perspective, transnational migration or the movement of human populations between states, is not a new phenomenon either for the Netherlands, or for Europe. For centuries, the Netherlands experienced successive waves of immigration and has been an attractive host country destination for immigrants with regard to political, religious, and economic objectives. Until 1945, Western Europe's migration history was predominantly marked by emigration through conquering, colonising, occupying, or fleeing to 'areas of settlement' around the globe. However, in the course of decolonisation and during the economic boom that followed the Second World War, the Netherlands and its neighbouring countries faced large migratory flows from their former overseas colonies (Münz, 1994). Post-war immigrants can be differentiated in terms of the following migration categories: immigrants from former colonies, those who were recruited for unskilled jobs (guest workers), and more recently, refugees. Castles and Millers (2009) state that there has been a 'globalisation of migration', which is 'the tendency for more and more countries to be crucially affected by migratory movements at the same time' (Castles & Miller, The Age of Migration, 2009). Between 1946 and 1963, repatriates from the Dutch East Indies, present-day Indonesia, began to arrive in the Netherlands. (Schrover, 2013). Only a few years later this line of immigration resumed – this time from the West. A sizeable wave of immigrants from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles also decided to migrate to the Netherlands in the 1970s. The post-colonial immigrants came from highly diverse backgrounds in terms of education, employment opportunities, and religion, but almost all were legally Dutch citizens with the exception of the Moluccans. This, in turn, gave them an advantage over other immigrant

groups. Consequently, decolonisation and post-colonial immigrations have had a significant impact on the social and cultural structure of the Dutch population (Bosma, 2004). In short, the society of the Netherlands underwent a complete transformation.

Western European countries began to recruit workers from the less developed countries around the Mediterranean region in the 1960s. The Dutch government respectively concluded bilateral recruitment agreements initially with Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and subsequently the former Yugoslavia, Morocco, and Turkey. The strong demand for temporary migrant labour acted as a pull factor for migration. All the fast-growing industrial economies imported labour until early 1970, especially for lower-skilled jobs (Castles, 1986). Furthermore, the governments of European countries encouraged and revived labour migrants admitted for short periods in order to make room for other migrants. As a direct consequence, many guest workers from Southern Europe returned home after working in the Netherlands. The labour-based migrations, also known as the *gastarbeiter* (i.e. guestworker or foreign worker) system of immigration, offered apparent confirmation of Ravenstein's laws that males predominate in long-distance migration. From 1960 to 1980, nearly 80% of immigrants from Turkey to the Netherlands were men who left behind their wives, children and parents (Schrover, 2013). The majority of Turkish migrants came from villages in central Turkey or along the Black Sea coast; those who came from large cities (Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara) were in the minority (Avci, 2006). Chain migration, a term used by scholars to refer to the social process of migrants, led to the formation of clusters of migrants from the same region, who shared the same background and provided new employment opportunities for friends and family members (Papastergiadis, 2004). Consequently, a significant number of migrants in different European countries originate from the same regions in Turkey, or even the same villages.

In 1973, the petrol embargo led to a worldwide economic recession, and the increasing unemployment throughout Europe was a major turning point that forced governments to terminate all imports of foreign labour (Abadan-Unat, 2011). The migrants could choose between returning permanently or remaining when the systematic recruitment of guest workers ended. The theory was that by terminating recruitment, most migrants would leave the country fairly soon. Rather than leaving, however, they sought to finance the entry of their wives and children. As a result, many guest workers decided to remain and bring their families to the Netherlands through family reunification (Schrover, 2013). Furthermore, this halt to labour migration motivated many people to enter Europe illegally through asylum systems or family reunification. Appertaining to the labour migration of the so-called illegal labourers, many Turks went abroad on tourist visas to seek employment, and once there regularised their status or worked without authorisation (Abadan-Unat, 2011). According to one study conducted in the mid-1970s, almost half of migrants originally entered the Netherlands as tourists (Penninx, 1979). In addition, from the 1980s onwards, the arrival of political refugees, displaced persons, and asylum seekers influenced the size and structure of the international migration flow to

Western Europe. During that period, conflicts in politically unstable areas in the world, for example, Cold War tensions and proxy wars, resulted in an ever-growing stream of refugees. By the end of the 1980s, the worldwide refugee population had increased to nearly 15 million (UNHCR, 2000). Although it is difficult to distinguish between economically and politically motivated refugees, the rise of illegal workers was indirectly related to the strategies adopted by European governments in order to end legal migration.

3.3 The meaning of immigrant

Many researchers have considered immigrants to be individuals who uproot themselves, leave behind home and country, and face the process of incorporation into a different society and culture. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that first-generation migrants, particularly from different socioeconomic backgrounds, differ in their ways of life and behaviour compared to the host population. A lack of economic security, language skills, full acceptance, and failures in social adoption plagued earlier immigrants in the host countries (Hugo G. 2005). For example, the overwhelming majority of Turkish migrants came from the poorest classes and predominantly rural areas of Central and Eastern Anatolia, the most important recruitment regions for large-scale migration. For this reason, their educational standards were lower than the national average, and they had no experience in industrial work (Akgündüz, 2008). At the same time, another aspect of the guest worker system of immigration became apparent: it was based on the inferiority and separation of the foreigner. According to Castles, the native people of European societies did not promote the integration process of immigrants as equals, but as economically disadvantaged and racially isolated minorities (Castles, 1986). Generally, guest-worker migrants were considered short-term entrants, who would exclusively enter and work during economic booms but return home during periods of recession (Constant & Massey, 2002). Those excluded migrants were thus forced to participate in political activities to improve their situation in the receiving country, such as obtaining more political, social and economic rights, and combating discrimination.

On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the gradual shift from temporarily residing and working to permanent settlement meant a significant alteration from one paradigm to another. Following the cessation of circular migration by labour migrants after the government had closed its borders, the majority of Turkish labour migrants – called guest workers – became permanent residents and brought their families to the new country rather than returning to their relatives (Prevezanos, 2011). Faced with this settlement of immigrants, the Dutch authorities were forced to rethink their migration policies. As a result, the Netherlands launched the implementation of an innovative policy called the 'ethnic minorities policy' which recognised the ability of ethnic minorities to develop their own institutions in fields such as culture, religion, and language (Vasta, 2007). According to Willet, 'multiculturalism as an ideology has been defined as aspiring towards a plurality of cultures with all members of society seeking to live together in harmony, while maintaining separate cultures' (Willett, 1998). During the

1970s, the Dutch government embraced this ideology by supporting and financing the organisation of migrants by their country of origin. Governmental subsidies were extensively provided to immigrant foundations and associations if activities were presented as 'cultural' and 'authentic'. For example, Turkish religious movements and institutions (i.e. Milli Görüs, Diyanet, SICN, and Hizmet) in the Netherlands became part of the social order among the immigrant community in addition to their religious functions. The majority of these institutions usually had a transnational orientation (Ramadan, 2016). The sending states were strongly involved with their citizens abroad, and the Dutch authorities encouraged these ties because it was believed that this would facilitate the potential return of these immigrants (Schrover, Dutch Migration History and the Enforcement of Essentialist Ideas, 2010). As a result, the Dutch government fostered an ethnic 'othering' that often led the immigrants to becoming isolated and withdrawn from the larger society, and inclined to live in segregated communities dependent on networks of friendship or family relationships (Gideon, Van Kempen, & Van Ham, 2008).

In 1971, the Dutch word *allochtoon* was introduced for the first time to soften the word 'immigrant', and avoid a negative connotation. According to Statistics Netherlands, an individual is considered an *allochtoon* if born outside the Netherlands, or has at least one parent born outside the country (CBS, 2016). Theoretically, the King of the Netherlands, Willem-Alexander, is also an *allochtoon*, being the son of a German father and a half Dutch, half-German mother (Boogaard, 2016). However, in the everyday usage of the term *allochtoon*, it tends to be reserved primarily for anyone with a non-Western background, and more specifically for Muslims. The word 'Western' is not used in its geographical sense, but rather as a way of measuring the distance from Dutch mainstream cultures (Bosma, 2004). Additionally, Edward Said contributed important aspects to the concept of *Othering* in his influential work *Orientalism* (1979). Orientalism is affiliated with the representation of the Self (Occident) and the Other (Orient) in which the Self is privileged:

> 'The development and maintenance of every culture requires the existence of another different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity... whether Orient or Occident… involves establishing opposites and otherness whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation of their differences from us' (Said, 1978).

Said argues that deep-rooted attitudes towards other cultures and/or ethnic groups are still present within societies, and questions the way in which foreign cultures are represented as inferior to Western culture. In other words, this theory suggests that migrants are often perceived as the 'other' and observed with suspicion by the receiving communities.

Moreover, official documents of the Dutch government on immigrants systematically distinguished between Western and non-Western immigrants. In 1979, all minorities (post-colonial and labour migrants) were merged into the single category of non-Western allochthone native residents (Bosma,

2004). The Dutch authorities listed certain groups of migrants and labelled them as ethnic minorities. Even so, not all groups were included because not all groups were considered problematic. Turks and Moroccans were, but Chinese, for instance, were not. Consequently, the Netherlands moved away from the 'integration while retaining one's own identity' policy approach towards immigrants from the 1980s onwards. The former multicultural approach evolved into more of an assimilation perspective under a more acceptable label as the government stated that the Netherlands had a multicultural character, but that migrants had to respect and honour the norms and values of Dutch society (Schrover, Dutch Migration History and the Enforcement of Essentialist Ideas, 2010). In the same period, the increasingly widespread belief emerged that multiculturalism policies had been responsible for integration failures. While multiculturalism emphasises the participation of immigrants along with the perseverance of cultural differences, assimilation underlines the importance of immigrants adapting to the mainstream society. From this ethnocentric perspective, it was expected that immigrants abandon their own traditions and habits in order to absorb life in the Netherlands, their new state of residence (Lutz, 2017).

3.4 The position of Turkish migrants in relation to the Netherlands

As previously mentioned, Turkey has been one of the largest providers of labour migration and undocumented migration to Europe. Theoretically, 'diaspora' is used when referring to national groups living outside a homeland, whereas 'transnationalism' is generally used to indicate migrants' ties across countries, and all sorts of social formations including active networks, groups and organisations (Dokter & Hills De Zárate, 2016). While the diaspora is an old concept and transnationalism more recent, both theories are essential to the academic literature and public discourses (Faist, 2010). This is particularly important in terms of illustrating an alteration in the way Turkey identified its citizens abroad as a diaspora. In the 1990s, 'Europe-Turks' became a general term in the Turkish language, used to refer to people from Turkey living in Europe, and recognising their permanent residence (Aydın, 2014). Accordingly, sending states have developed various strategies for engaging with their emigrant communities in order to maintain ties and control populations abroad (Mencutek & Baser, 2017). For this reason, the involvement of the Turkish authorities with their communities across Europe are considered diaspora policies because the initial objective is to develop and strengthen the associations and organisations for people originating from Turkey.

It could be argued that Turkish culture greatly differs from Dutch culture and this has led to integration issues over the past decades. Early Turkish immigrants faced forms of discrimination and prejudice that they had never experienced in their home country (Portes & Rumbaut, The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation, 2001). The Turkish migrants in the Netherlands can be considered a diaspora as its members differ from the majority in society in terms of their identity, their way of life and because of the disadvantages that they feel and experience. The socialisation hypothesis, a principal component of Inglehart's (1990) theory regarding the development of Western cultural

values, assumes, for instance, that first-generation immigrants maintain the fertility behaviour of their sending country, while second-generation immigrants relate to fertility behaviour as natives of the receiving country (Sangster & Reynolds, 1996). Inglehart claims that second- and third-generation migrants significantly reflect many aspects of the ways of life of the native people of the receiving country (Akinyemi & Omoyeni, 2013). In other words, the social behaviour of the new generation changes over time to reflect that of the host population.

In addition, the concepts of nativism and xenophobia refer to the preference for native-born people and the fear of immigrants who are newcomers to a country. This fear of the 'others', who are considered to be outsiders, is based on racial, ethnic, national or religious differences (Fernandez, 2013). Populist leaders often use these concepts to distance the minority group from the majority group in society. Negative perceptions of Islam, with its range of religious and cultural differences, have existed since the first conflicts between the Muslim world and Europe. However, Islamophobia is a modern phenomenon having its roots in the integration of the Muslim immigrant communities in Western Europe. More specifically, the integration of the Netherlands' Islamic minority was perceived as a fiasco in the nineties. (Scheffer, 2000) Notably, Turkish Muslims constitute the largest group of Muslims from a single country of origin within the Netherlands. Nativism and xenophobia in the Netherlands have continued to rise within state-recognised political parties, specifically following the attacks of September 11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh. These incidents negatively affected the attitude of the Dutch towards ethnic minorities. As a consequence, the common experience of increased racial profiling drew immigrant Muslim groups, especially the youth, closer together

Nowadays, Turks are the largest labour migrant group in Western Europe, numbering up to five million, making them the largest Turkish diaspora in the world. Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium have the highest Turkish populations in the EU (Katzenson, 2015). Many Turks entered Europe through the guest worker programmes before a second period of immigration started, directed by the reunification of families, which contributed considerably to the rising number of Turks. In the receiving countries members of Turkish families who have come to Europe since the 1960s but who were born in the receiving country represent the third and current phase (Katzenson, 2015). This generation grew up and attended school in their host country. In 2017, 3,862,753 Dutch residents, or 22.6% of the population, had one or two immigrant parents. Among these, 2,173,723 Dutch residents, or more than half are non-Western *allochtoon* immigrants (Straaten, 2017). According to a January 2018 Statistics Netherlands (CBS) report, there are 400,367 residents who have at least one Turkish parent, making the Netherlands, after Germany, the world's second largest host country of Turkish immigrants (CBS, 2018).

The common definition of second-generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands is that they are the offspring of the primary or first-generation migrants. These children were born and raised in the host

country of their ancestors. No matter how long ago their families settled in the Netherlands, many second-generation Turks struggle to feel accepted by Dutch society as a whole. Often, they do not have any direct connections to their (grand)parents' home country except through vague memories of their relatives and neighbours from summer holidays and short visits (Kilinc, 2014). At the same time, in light of increasing tensions, many in the Netherlands are concerned about the loyalty of the country's Turkish immigrants (Pleitgen, 2016). The majority of the Turkish second generation, like their immigrants parents, are established in the larger cities, especially in Amsterdam, Den Haag, and Rotterdam. This group is generally concentrated in working class neighbourhoods that are often associated with welfare dependency, poverty, crime, and since the 1990s, also with Islam.

4. Findings: contemporary controversies

4.1 Two homelands

In recent years, the impact of migration and the increasing ethnic diversity on social cohesion and, in particular, generalised trust have become an intensely debated topic in the Netherlands. The integration of second-generation Turkish migrants into Dutch society has become subject to much discussion within the media, political discourse, and public opinion. Young people of Turkish descent, mainly between 18 and 25 years old, living in the Netherlands are generally strongly focused on their Turkish roots, heritage, and culture. This is the culture of their parents and grandparents, while they were born and raised in liberally oriented Dutch society. Many feel they belong to two different cultures, since they were born in a place that they consider their own country, and, at the same time, they are bound to a family with a different culture. Therefore, having grown up between the influences of two different cultures – that of their parents and that of the country in which they were born – encourages a sense of being caught between two places, and uncertainty regarding which is most like home to them. In addition, Dutch-Turks have frequently been misrepresented in the Netherlands. Turkish workers have generally been referred in the official Dutch discourse as '*Gastarbeider'* (guestworker), '*Buitenlander'* (foreigner), and/or '*Allochtoon'* (co-citizen) – terms that underline their 'otherness'. (Kaya, 2001).

> The Dutch language is the only language that artificially distinguishes between background characteristics of its population. As long as Dutch politicians continue to use terminologies like 'Pleur op' (Get out) by Mark Rutte, 'Rot toch op' (Get lost) by Ahmet Aboutaleb, 'Marokkanen hebben een etnisch monopolie op overlast' (Moroccans have an ethnic monopoly on nuisance) by Diederik Samson, immigrant groups will be forced to come closer to each other because they feel addressed by their cultural identity. The mainstream media often represents Muslim people in a negative light by associating them with problematic behaviour, alienating these groups from Dutch society. However, if a Moroccan does something well, for instance when Affellay scores a goal, then he is suddenly Dutch (Kuzu, 2018).

Interestingly, Tunahan Kuzu confirms the argument that multiculturalism and integration have become intense topics for debate in which some immigrants in the Netherlands are stamped with a sense of otherness. Crimes committed by immigrants, for example, which gain widespread media attention, are often interpreted as representative of the group. The aforementioned statement in which certain Muslim groups are associated with negative attitudes amplifies the fact that the Dutch political and social climate does not always provide a sense of unity to its citizens of non-Western origin. Kuzu criticises the politicians and media for emphasising cultural differences and problematising the identity of being Muslim. In addition, this encourages people of Turkish descent within the Netherlands to emphasise their connections with their Turkish identity. Changing power relations between citizens

and certain events increases the distance experienced by alienated Muslim immigrants, including Turks, towards the majority groups in the Netherlands.

4.1.1 Multilayered cultures

At the same time, Turks living outside the borders of Turkey are formally defined as either '*gurbetçi'* (someone with a Turkish origin who works in another country), or '*Hollanda'daki vatandaşlarımız*' (our citizens in the Netherlands) in Turkey. Both terms carry rather negative connotations in Turkey. The labels also include terms such as 'foreigner', 'German-like' (*Almancı*), 'conservative', 'nationalist' and/or 'lost generations. All these representations have gained popularity in both the Netherlands and Turkey. The Dutch-Turks are portrayed as being rich, having a luxurious life in the Netherlands, and losing their Turkishness. 'Here in the Netherlands we are called *yabancı* (foreigner), and there in Turkey they call us *Almancı*' is a refrain one hears often especially amongst Dutch-Turkish youth (Kaya, 2001).

> There is a bit of a misconception out there that people from Turkey assume that the Turks in the Netherlands are wealthy. The majority of Turks, including myself, in West-Europe come from Turkey's rural, poorer areas such as villages near Kayseri, Yozgat or Konya etc. They annually return to Turkey for holidays in their shiny cars. Suddenly Turks in Turkey just see the European Turks that used to be poor with a considerable pattern of expenditure. It is therefore not surprising that people believe that we have extravagant lives in Europe (E2).

As mentioned earlier, second-generation Turkish immigrants are collectively labelled in the Netherlands by their parents' country of origin, regardless of how long ago they came to live in the Netherlands. The above participant states that this particular group are also identified as Turks from abroad in Turkey. Locals treat them as if they are foreigners in Turkey, although they share the same cultural background and connections with the native population. This demonstrates that plural allegiances among second-generation Turkish immigrants are in contradiction to one another and affect their feelings of belonging. As a result, the developed bicultural identity increases the difficulty of maintaining both identities simultaneously.

4.2 Growing nativism

In contrast, the rise of nativism helps to explain the propagation of anti-immigrant rhetoric, especially among extreme right-wing groups in the Netherlands. However, nativism is by no means exclusively a 'phenomenon of the right' (Fernandez, 2013). It can take various forms in the context of cultural diversity and immigration, from privately held personal opinions to editorials in popular media, political platforms, or public policy recommendations. For example, the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte highlighted the 'significance of Dutch values' in an open letter published just weeks before the general elections of 2017 (Kroet, 2017). According to Rutte, 'If you reject our country fundamentally, I would rather see you go. Act normally or leave' (Mark Rutte, 2017). In other words, he instructed people to leave the Netherlands if they did not like the country's values.

This narrative draws attention to an important commonality amongst the developing attitudes of the Dutch political parties. In recent years, the particular topic of Dutch identity has been shaped by right-wing politics purely in terms of who is Dutch and who is not, with regard to sharing norms and values. The majority of second-generation Turks in the Netherlands, regardless of their socioeconomic backgrounds, are by definition Dutch citizens by birth. They were born in the Netherlands and do not know life anywhere else. It is clear that Rutte's statement categorises anti-social behaviour as essentially a conflict of values that can be solved through only one option – by being shown the door. These double standards driven by nativism may create extreme feelings of alienation among immigrant groups, including second-generation Turks.

4.3 Social interactions

Furthermore, according to the report '*Werelden van verschil'* by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), 24% of Dutch-Turks live in segregated neighbourhoods in accordance with the chain migration model (SCP, 2015). These neighbourhoods with a high proportion of immigrants provide many useful social contacts. Second-generation Turkish migrants generally have a large circle of Turkish friends. This arises from the fact that they often share the same norms and values which help them to better understand each other. E3's narrative below best demonstrates this assumption:

> I live in a neighbourhood where many Turkish families live. Of course, it is important for me to have Turkish friends. If I have to be honest, my Turkish friends share the same humour. So if jokes are made, or expressions, these friends are able to understand them directly without explaining. In addition, Turkish people share a special connection. When you meet someone you do not know, it is common to ask '*nerelisin'* (where are you from). This is a good way for us to break the ice (E7).

As this example illustrates, social environments strongly affect attitudes towards mainstream society among second-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. The Turkish language is commonly used in the 'friend space'. This form of ethnic heterogeneity arouses a greater self-consciousness and awareness of Turkish unity. One might expect that the ethnic backgrounds of second-generation Turk friends would be diverse. This is not the case. On the other hand, second-generation Turkish migrants are socially and economically integrated by being fluent in the Dutch language, but somehow aware that they are different, thus, they must constantly renegotiate their Turkish and Turkish-Dutch hybrid identities. As a result, mutual incomprehension may arise during interactions between different residents of the same society.

> Both my parents came from Turkey. I am myself born and raised in the Netherlands. In general, I speak a combination language of both Dutch and Turkish with my family. However, I have to admit that I do not feel completely Dutch because the society never recognising me as a fully fledged member was a blockade to feel at home. I went to university, and as you may know, foreigners are a minority in the higher education system. You could count them on one hand. I

noticed that students like myself with immigrant backgrounds, especially Turks, were often seeking out each other in class (E5).

Moreover, the integration paradox refers to the phenomenon of the more highly educated and structurally integrated immigrants turning away from the host society. The SCP study also clearly demonstrates that in the Netherlands children born of Turkish immigrant parents score unsatisfactorily on the points of host country orientation, a sense of feeling Dutch, and engagement in social interactions with natives (SCP, 2015). Among all the immigrant groups in the Netherlands, the Turks are the most oriented towards their country of origin and the most distanced from the host society. This solidarity may pose a dilemma for second-generation Turks because it results in having to oscillate between Turkey and the Netherlands.

5. Findings: nationalist sentiments in a second-generation diaspora context

5.1 Unity among Turks

Benedict Anderson argues that attributes of identities are imagined. Traditions that appear or claim to be old are often recent in origin and sometimes invented. He observes, 'Every individual is supposed to belong to a particular community. The majority of people are acting, talking, and dressing according to where they come from' (Anderson, 1983). According to Anderson, a nation is imagined because a member of the community will never know all of the fellow members, but still identifies him/herself as a part of the same nation. For this reason, the transmission of the nationalist feelings of the second-generation Dutch-Turks is predominantly conditioned and mediated through the ethnic community and parental influence.

Transnational links reflect a different set of homeland-related practices from abroad, such as the consumption of media, religious practices, and political mobilisation. Modern telecommunications such as the internet, cheap telephone rates, and the increasing amount of Turkish-printed media facilitate the links back to Turkey from abroad. However, promoting nationalism is not a private enterprise. The Turkish government and institutions deploy resources, from controlled media to political parties, to circulate patriotic values in order to incorporate their citizens who live abroad and create a sense of common belonging with those citizens. What makes Turkish nationalism truly exceptional are the many ways in which it is naturally expressed in daily life. As an extension of this idea, it is often repeated in the media that *'Türkun Türkten başka dostu yoktur'* (There is no other friend to a Turk than a Turk) (Kancı & Altınay, 2014).

> Being a Turk is an important part of my identity. Dutch people are soft; they do not care if someone says something negative about their nation or family. Turks always help each other and you do not even have to know that person well. For instance, thousands of Turks from Europe travel to Turkey during the summer holidays by car. It happens a lot that a Turkish family gets stranded along the side of the road. Turks from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany etc. often offer assistance, because they do not want to see that another Turk is suffering. Let others take this feeling of unity as an example (E4).

The above account is a good example of how members of the second generation reinforce their Turkish identity. It also illustrates that their understanding of being Turkish is related to a sense of helpfulness towards one another. The inclination to be proud is a generalised feeling within the Turkish community. These particular attributes enable them to create an imagined positive identity for themselves, which is supported by Anderson's theory. In addition, one may consider this argument to be a process that binds second-generation Turkish individuals culturally to their ethnic community in the Netherlands.

> My father comes from Turkey, and my mother is a blonde Dutch woman so officially I am half Dutch and half Turkish. Most people do not even see that I am not completely Dutch. I grew up without my father since he left us when I was a child. Also, I have never been in Turkey and do not know the Turkish language. If someone asks me my heritage, I tell him or her that I am Turkish. Even though I do not know the language and culture of my father, I feel connected to Turkey. I know that it sounds strange (E3).

5.2 Turkey's diaspora policies in Europe

From 2002 onwards, Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has attempted to develop a number of diaspora policies to maintain, cultivate, and deepen relations with its emigrants with the aim of creating a mobilised transnational community (Aydın, 2014). The field of migrant transnational practices encompasses a wide range of phenomena such as transnational election campaigns and cross-border voting, migrant rallies against injustices in the country of origin, and demonstrations to defend their rights in the country of migration (Schlenker, 2015). The interview below highlights this situation:

> 2016 marked a turning point about the image of Turkey. Up until 3 years ago, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands were considered quite positive because of their willingness to start a business etc. Turkey was seen as safe and a popular holiday destination. This has changed 180 degrees. Starting with the arrest of Ebru Umar, the demonstrations in support of President Erdogan following the failed coup, the tensions within the Dutch-Turkish community in the wake of the suppression of anything considered Gülen, and the diplomatic row between the Dutch and Turkish government, Turkey is now viewed as a third world regime. Something like Iran: unreliable and backward (E6).

The Turkish government has made no secret of its desire to increase its influence over the diaspora in Western Europe. The above narrative confirms that recent events have affected the general image of Turkey and its diaspora in in the Netherlands. The Turkish government promotes conservative social values and a collective identity marked by religion, which has been welcomed by the majority of 'conservative' Turkish migrants in Europe. Diaspora populations with stronger grievances against host states are more likely to be encouraged by the outreach efforts of their homeland (Arkilic Z. , 2016). Consequently, the status of Turkish immigrants as a group has become increasingly divided between Turkey and the Netherlands.

Of even more concern has been the profound political polarisation, ethnic tensions, and sectarianism that have come to dominate the Turkish community in the Netherlands. For many years, Turkey has openly emphasised its diaspora policies, even in the Netherlands. Since 2014, Turkish citizens abroad have been able to vote in elections at special voting booths, and are becoming a significant force for Turkey (Lepan, 2018). After the failed coup attempt, this foreign policy has become more proactive and noticeable. It is common for a diplomatic mission to maintain contact with civil society

organisations, however, the Dutch government does not consider it appropriate that foreign authorities influence the individual lives of Dutch people and the choices they make (Asscher, 2017).

5.2.1 The Netherlands concerns over Turkish interference

Moreover, the Netherlands has expressed discomfort with Turkey's increasing sway over its diaspora. Diplomatic tensions were further escalated when Dutch officials detained a Turkish government minister to prevent her from speaking at an election rally in Rotterdam. Hundreds of protesters waved Turkish flags and demanded to see the minister. The feelings of isolation of many Turks motivated them to openly declare a higher loyalty to Turkey than to the Netherlands (Gumrukcu & Escritt, 2017). As a direct result, a growing number of voices in the media and politics have begun to challenge the value of multiculturalism. The events in response to the rally in Rotterdam were evidence that the integration of Turkish immigrants has failed according to the party leader of the Christian Democratic Appeal, Sybrand Buma (Groen & Kuiper, 2017).

> There were approximately 300 people at the rally in front of the Turkish Consulate General in Rotterdam. The Netherlands is home to some 400,000 people of Turkish origin. Why is this small group of people identified to represent the entire Turkish community and the so-called failed integration? And why does it become an issue when protesters demonstrate with Turkish flags, while everyone remains silent when supporters of the PKK wave the flags of a terrorist group? It is clear that the media has cultivated the general image of Turkey and especially Erdogan as inferior (Kuzu, 2018).

In the above narrative, the interviewee argues that the small group of demonstrators are not representative of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. He criticises the negatively loaded public opinion and general perception of Turkey. This perception makes it difficult to possess a nuanced understanding of the current Turkish government because pointing out the 'good things' apparently makes one pro-Erdogan and addressing disagreements puts one in the anti-Erdogan position. He also believes that allowing PKK sympathisers to display the banners of an outlawed organisation, while at the same time condemning AKP supporters, is an example of double standards in the Dutch media.

5.3 Reinforced Turkish distrust

Since a failed coup in 2016, the simmering trend under the surface of Turkish society has been revealed. The general distrust of Turks towards others and their deep scepticism of the West are reflected in the high level of polarisation in the Turkish media. Distrust in the news in Turkey is more than twice the international average (Yanatma, 2017). As a result, the country is divided into two almost equal camps – the supporters of the AKP and those who oppose it. As a result, 'us versus them' is the main rhetoric in their statements:

> My mother has called me often 'vatan haini' (traitor) because I don't support Erdogan. It is not only policy disputes that cause polarisation, even my family is becoming divided over politics.

> Most people of my generation in the Netherlands are also Erdogan supporters, but they do not even know why. Look, I am not a political person but I strongly condemn the Turkish government for jailing journalists, blocking Wikipedia and censoring Twitter (E5).

The taciturnity of Turkish society toward other societies, a perception of isolation, and a sense of detachment have leaped from Turkey to its diaspora in Europe, including the Netherlands. One might anticipate a striking difference between the younger members of the Netherlands population with Turkish roots and their parents with regard to the level of fervour in support of the AKP. However, that is apparently not the case. This may be because children often imitate the behaviours and attitudes of their parents, and adopt their political viewpoints. In addition, Dutch-Turkish nationals have been collecting signatures on a petition in support of media neutrality since 2016. The group has 9,541 signatures, and believe that the Dutch Broadcast Foundation (NOS) is deliberately presenting biased and misleading journalism on topics concerning Turkey (Akkoc, 2016). This is another notable point that highlights the distrust of certain Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands towards the mainstream Dutch media.

6. Findings: the policy challenges of ethnic diversity

6.1 Preservation of one's own identity

From 1960 until 1979, the Dutch government did not enact an integration policy because in that time it was not deemed necessary. Government policy, to a great extent, was based on the concept of temporary residence in the Netherlands. The labour migrants were encouraged to preserve their social, cultural, and religious identities to facilitate their return to their countries of origin (Oostindie, 2010). A fundamental objective of the Netherlands was that it should not become an immigration country. In the late seventies, the first Etnische minderheden rapport (Ethnic minorities policy) by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid) articulated what was still a controversial realisation, that is, that migrants would stay long-term in the Netherlands (WRR, 1979). The report argued for a policy revision that would recognise the permanent residence of particular immigrant groups and lead to a policy aimed at the integration of these groups.

This narrative demonstrates that the official attitude of the Dutch government did not prioritise strengthening the social and economic position of minorities for almost 20 years. It also suggests that there was no such thing as a social integration policy in that period, and that by not recognising the permanent presence of migrants it was no surprise that certain ethnic groups, including Turks, would experience and accumulate cultural and socio-economic difficulties in the Netherlands. Members of the Turkish community and their children were often at a disadvantage due to a poor command of the Dutch language and their distance from the Dutch culture. The objective of the WWR's report to improve the socio-economic position of migrants may, therefore, be regarded as a realisation of this.

6.1.1 Institutionalising transnational migrants activities

In 1997, the Dutch government established the 'LOM', Landelijk Overleg Minderheden (national minorities' consultation platform), which included representatives from different migrant organisations (Kasem, De Jong, & Buller, 2016). Such consultation bodies enabled many migrant associations to voice their opinions on issues which concerned them. The consultation committee also had seats for umbrella organisations representing the largest ethnic groups in the Netherlands. In addition, major actors in the Turkish landscape in the Netherlands such as Islamitische Stichting Nederland (also known as the Dutch branch of Diyanet), Hizmet and Milli Görus were considered official consultation bodies. The government subsidised the cost of an office for each group (Van Dam, Wielenga, & Kennedy, 2014). The LOM was even subject to law: the Dutch government was obliged to consult migrant organisations when it came to government policies concerning minorities. This provided the government with the opportunity to address minority groups in matters of policy making and implementation.

This demonstrates that the aim of the LOM policy was to pursue policies benefitting minorities. Such consultations stimulated the provision of signals concerning important developments and perceptions

of the minority groups in the Netherlands. Moreover, governmental subsidies were effective instruments for developing relevant social networks and encouraging organisations to become more dependent upon them. This incorporation enabled the government to adequately engage in dialogues with minorities and intervene when tensions arose. At the same time, one must keep the considerable religious and ethnic diversity of the Turkish population in mind. Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are from a country with large regional differences in wealth, education, ethnic composition (Kurds, Alevites), and religious life (conservatives, liberals). These differences influenced the integration process of this particular group.

6.2 Polarised Dutch society

The relationship between the government and the migrant organisations was, however, subject to change in the following years. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, politics and everyday life in Netherlands society became sharply polarised. Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, and the murders of the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, the political debate on the role of multiculturalism in the Netherlands reached new heights (Van Der Veer, 2006). Both in politics and in the media, the focus shifted to the idea of Islam and Muslims as posing a threat to Dutch culture (Maliepaard, 2012). These events had a devastating impact on the political and intellectual climate in the Netherlands, damaging its longstanding reputation for tolerance and diversity.

As a direct consequence, in 2005, the Balkenende cabinet of the Netherlands organised a meeting aimed at strengthening social cohesion and inclusion. More specifically, the issue was addressed through focusing on decreasing the divisions between different communities. The government wanted to establish a dialogue with religious and ethnic organisations because it was believed that Dutch society was somehow disintegrating (Bril, 2005). At the same time, there were increased concerns about radicalisation among Dutch Muslim youth and the lack of social integration with regard to Turks and Moroccans (Coolsaet, 2008). The media often associated these developments with each other.

This narrative demonstrates that the governmental efforts were aimed at strengthening the ties between the immigrant and indigenous populations. These efforts at improving relations by the government of Prime Minister Balkenende proved to be an important aspect in calming tensions and rebuilding trust between the ethnic groups in the Netherlands. The government has always been aware of the public debate concerning increasing demands for the integration of immigrants in general, and Muslims in particular. In addition, the intolerance towards Islam and the threat of Muslim extremism affected the immigrant policy preferences of the Dutch government considerably in consecutive years:

> The mandatory consultation with migrant organisations was abolished because it was no longer considered desirable. The so-called gedoogkabinet Rutte I (a minority cabinet made up of the right-wing liberal party VVD and the Christian Democrats, supported by the anti-immigrant party PVV)

turned off LOM's money tap in 2011. As a result, policy on minorities to integrate migration groups transformed into general policy. From that point onwards, there was no specific policy on ethnic groups anymore such as Dutch-Turks or Dutch-Moroccans (Walet, 2018).

The interviewee states that the government took measures to discontinue the LOM structure. The main reason for abandoning this system was because it was believed that target group policy was no longer relevant in this time. Policy based on ethnicity was, therefore, no longer considered relevant from the government's perspective. Regular meetings with consultative bodies for the development and integration of minorities were not arranged from that point onwards. One might argue, however, that the consequences following the abolition of exclusive interlocutor associations and organisations have led to an interrupted relationship between the government and former consultative bodies.

6.3 The social position of the new generation

The social integration of immigrants refers to the extent to which minorities are incorporated into the social climate of the host society. It is often related to the immigrant's position in the labour market, their education level, and their participation in the receiving state. The picture that emerges from the SCP's report indicates that the position of second-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands is improving considerably. Objective indicators with respect to the dimensions of work, education and social life demonstrate that this group is currently making progress (SCP, 2015). On the other hand, the same report illustrates a striking degree of uneasy feelings amongst highly-qualified Turks in the Netherlands. More than half of this particular group do not feel accepted by Dutch society even though they are socially integrated and have obtained university degrees.

Interestingly, second-generation Turkish immigrants argue that they do not feel accepted by Dutch society even though they were born and raised in the Netherlands. This may be linked to the reputation of the Turkish community that has been damaged following the demonstrations in which demonstrators waved Turkish flags outside the Turkish consulate in the Dutch city of Rotterdam that gained widespread media attention. According to Walet, negative representations of the Turkish immigrants are harmful to the integration process because the group then becomes labelled in general.

Labour market discrimination could also be correlated to this phenomenon of feeling alienated. More specifically, it is common knowledge that people with a non-Western migrant background are disadvantaged in the Netherlands labour market. The position of this group has hardly improved in recent years. Employers may favour Mark over Mehmet during economic recessions in tight labour market conditions. For this reason, combating discrimination and improving the position of those with a migrant background is an important spearheading project of the Dutch government:

> I regret to say that not everyone in our society is given equal opportunities in the labour market. Dutch citizens with a non-Western migration background are often more likely to be unemployed and have lower incomes. This is neither acceptable nor desirable. The 'Programma Verdere

Integratie op de Arbeidsmarkt' (Programme further integration on the labour market) will tackle the underperforming employment position of the Dutch with a migration background (Koolmees, 2018).

According to this letter from the current Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, the Dutch government policies will deal with labour market discrimination. The renewed approach does not make a distinction between ethnicities and includes all migrant groups, including the Turkish community. Before hiring an applicant for a job position, bias may occur with regard to ethnic minority groups during the selection process in which the employer evaluates the pool of applicants. This programme, as in the above example, demonstrates that the government is actively making efforts to improve the levels of tolerance and the inclusion of all migrant groups in the Dutch labour market.

Additionally, the EU has ascertained the network of Turkish Diyanet imams and mosques across Europe. The Dutch government has stated that religion, in particular, should not be mixed with politics such as the places of worships are operated by Diyanet, which is the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey. In the Netherlands, the chairman of the country's Diyanet admitted that he had collected information on Gülen sympathizers and passed it on to Ankara, leading to Dutch officials to criticize the "long arm" of the Turkish state (Tieleman, 2016). The former Minister of Social Affairs and Employment's letter to Parliament both praised and criticised the contribution of the Turkish imams to the Dutch society:

> Imams play an exemplary role and maintain authority within the community. The imams who know about Dutch society are essential for integration. The Dutch government invested therefore in the setting-up and implementation of Islamic schooling programmes in the Netherlands. Deployed Diyanet-imams from Turkey with a Turkish civil servant status often do not have proper knowledge of the local language and culture of the host country and do not follow any vocational training. This is because newcomers from Turkey are not subject to an integration requirement because of a judgement by the Administrative High Court in the light of the Association agreement between Turkey and the EU (Asscher L. F., 2016).

The narrative above demonstrates the significant influence of Turkey's religious network in Europe. For example, the majority of Turkish-Dutch mosques in the Netherlands are connected to Diyanet. It is, therefore, no surprise that such Islamic infrastructures could become an instrument used to shape public Dutch-Turk opinions. After all, many imams are employed by Turkey and this would allow the Turkish state to take on the role of 'calling the tune, paying the piper'. However, imams are meant to form a bridge between Muslims and Dutch society. This, in turn, could lead to the assumption that a Diyanet-imam working in a mosque may constantly find himself in tension between the expectations of the majority from the host society, the Turkish government agency, and the expectations of the believers.

7. Discussion

The main objective of this research was to measure the degree of solidarity among second-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. Many Turkish immigrant children, born and raised in the Netherlands, emphasised that they struggle to feel at home in the so-called multicultural Dutch society. The subject of this study is of societal importance because the Turkish community, in particular, is considered less integrated than other immigrant groups in the Netherlands (CBS, 2018). Highlighting the reasons why individuals feel strongly connected to Turkey provided valuable insights and perspectives which fundamentally reflect those of the Turkish population in the Netherlands. This thesis attempted to first answer the four sub-questions in order to be able to answer the main research question: 'What factors influence children of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands to feel strongly connected with Turkey, and in what way can the Dutch government improve its current approach to the social integration of second-generation Turkish immigrants?'

The dissertation first examined the current situation in the Netherlands to answer the main question. Analysing the patterns of association between the multiple categories of identification among the Turkish second generation demonstrated that growing up between two cultures stimulates the development of a sense of double belonging. It is important that Turkish immigrants consider themselves to be full members of Dutch society but second-generation Dutch-Turks in the Netherlands are still confronted with many obstacles. The majority of this group has a profound and consistent sense of being demonised by the host society of their parents. It is interesting to note that in the scientific literature the Dutch government utilised the term 'allochtoon' to differentiate non-Western minority groups from the majority (Bosma, 2004). Tunahan Kuzu, a Dutch politician of Turkish origin, points out that such words create their own reality: Turks who speak the language perfectly, even those who have Dutch nationality and seldom visit Turkey have been regarded not as Dutch but 'allochtonen' for decades. This form of classification highlights the fact that the descendants of Turkish migrants were considered outsiders and from the migrant's perspective not welcomed as part of the country. This corresponds with Said's definition of othering as described in the literature review, 'The construction of identity involves establishing opposites and otherness whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation of their differences from us' (Said, 1978). One could argue that the first request of second-generation migrants is not a house or a job like their ancestors or parents, but to be accepted by society. This explains why many members of this group feel neglected and produce alienation and distance from mainstream society.

Furthermore, in recent years, it has become apparent that not just the far right, but conservative, centre-right, social democratic, and even far left politicians have begun to question the social integration of Islamic minorities in the Netherlands. Sharply diverging reactions to violent incidents (such as the September 11 attacks and the killing of Theo van Gogh,) illustrated the increasing

polarisation of Dutch society. This was visible in tensions that resulted from the combination of immigration, an exclusionist national identity, the nation-state, and democracy itself. More specifically, Muslims were exposed to competing pressures: experiencing liberal values from their peers, the media, and the schools and workplaces they encounter; and conservative values at home. As a consequence, it is plausible that these opposing forces in the everyday lives of Islamic minorities, including Turks, induced them to draw closer together. At the same time, the results from the analyses in Chapter 4.3 are generally in line with earlier SCP research on the descendants of Turkish immigrants (SCP, 2015). The study found that almost a quarter of the second-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands live in neighbourhoods with a high proportion of non-Western immigrants. This is in accordance with the chain migration model because the literature states that immigrants are more likely to move to places in which their relatives live (Papastergiadis, 2004). Additionally, second generation Turks who participated in this study argue that they have predominantly Turkish friends within their environment. This is in contrast with the theory described in the literature review that the social behaviour of migrants changes over time to reflect similarities with those of their peers in the host country (Sangster & Reynolds, 1996). According to the classic view, cultural differences between natives and immigrants will gradually diminish over time, encouraging their integration into the social networks of the host society. However, limited personal contact with members of a class-homogeneous group can potentially impact their integration and social opportunities.

The most striking outcome to emerge from the results is that the vast majority of persons born in the Netherlands with Turkish parents stated that being Turkish is important to them. The attitudes of the children of Turkish immigrants raised in the Netherlands to their parents' national identity is important because these attitudes create a sense of belonging and unity among Turks. According to Anderson, 'The community is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them' (Anderson, 1983). Anderson's concept provides striking confirmation of why there are close connections among Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. The influence of the Turkish identity and a general sense of mistrust places them in a vulnerable environment, within which they are liable to unite. Second-generation Turks may also be socialised into conservative values by their parents and their ethnic community. For this reason, the indication that this particular group favours their Turkish identity above the Dutch implies that the Turkish-Dutch population have not been fully integrated, and that to a certain extent Dutch society is not providing a solid foundation that allows for Turks to feel at home. It is not surprising that second-generation Turks have a closer link with their parents' culture since the representation of the contemporary Dutch identity carries a political weight, in which the bar for people with immigrant backgrounds is set high. Although Turkish immigrants live in the Netherlands for almost fifty years, many natives still consider White natives as true Dutchmen, and Dutch-Turks as hyphenated Dutch. This attitude creates a distance between the Turkish community and the majority group in society.

In addition, the state engagement of Turkey with its diaspora abroad has changed in tone over the last decade. The Netherlands and other European states have expressed discomfort with Turkey's increasing influence over its citizens. It is not an easy position to find oneself in as a Dutch-Turk, caught in the middle between the Netherlands and Turkey. The AKP's numerous electoral victories could, in part, be attributed to support from the Turks in Europe. Whether this support has done them any good, however, is questionable. Tensions between supporters and opponents of President Erdogan following the failed coup have been increasing in Turkish communities in the Netherlands. The results of the analyses illustrate a certain political polarisation among Turkish migrants, even within the family circle. Already facing serious problems related to integration, the migrants' support of Erdogan appears to have made their lives more difficult, not simpler. For example, the Dutch authorities' dismissive attitude to Ankara's political campaigning among Turkish emigres in the Netherlands has brought resentments to the fore. The Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte's statement mentioned in section 4.3, 'Act normal or leave', was considered a bitter pill for many Dutch Turks because it confirmed their suspicions that the Dutch regard the Turks and their compatriots as of a lower status. Rutte's message represents the populist language that politicians reserve for people they consider non-Dutch. It is, then, accurate to depict certain double standards with regard to the concept of Dutch citizenship. Second-generation Turkish young people who have misbehaved in the Netherlands have been ordered to leave the country of their birth while statements of this kind have never been made to individuals who promoted their political affiliation to terrorist organisations such as the PKK. These events do not foster the relationship between the Dutch government and the Turkish community. Therefore, it is reasonable that the Turks feel let down once more by the Netherlands.

One should keep in mind that this thesis chapter discusses medians – there are, of course, fully integrated Turks in the Netherlands. The SCP report presents a wide range of positive developments for second-generation Turks with regard to socioeconomic factors: the majority of this group is able to fit into Dutch society, receives an education, and finds a job (SCP, 2015). On the other hand, the social integration of this diverse generation's ancestors was not an easy process at all and was extensively analysed in Chapter 6. Early unskilled first-generation immigrants were disadvantaged because the Dutch authorities did not prioritise the social integration of 'gastarbeiders' for almost 20 years, which, in turn, led to a lack of equal opportunities in education and employment. The results demonstrate that the national minorities' consultation platform could be considered the first wake-up call to the Dutch government with regard to its overall policies towards ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. This platform provided minority groups, including Turks, with the opportunity to have their voices heard and form organisations at a national level. The Dutch government's financial support to immigrant foundations and associations could plausibly be attributed to the embraced multiculturalism ideology (Willett, 1998). As Willet (1998) stated, this ideology has been defined as 'Aspiring towards a plurality of cultures with all members of society seeking to live together in harmony, while

maintaining separate cultures'. As a direct consequence, ties between Turkey and migrant organisations have continued to exist because the Turkish state's sense of responsibility towards its citizens abroad is rooted in the strength of Turkish nationalism. In addition, cultural activities within these organisations focused on closer relations with Turkey rather than the Netherlands, which further encouraged the isolation of Dutch-Turks from mainstream society. In other words, the findings demonstrate that the Dutch government's early engagement with Turkish migrant organisations in the Netherlands in order to promote social integration, even with the best intentions, worked counterproductively in the long term.

The children of contemporary migrants in the Netherlands are a generation that have grown up in the shadow of changing immigrant policies. The constant changes in Dutch policymaking when it comes to social integration was because earlier policies proved insufficiently effective in achieving integration, and second, major shifts in public opinion forced the government to embark on alternative approaches. The increasing rhetoric of politicians concerning the dangers of multiculturalism fuelled the success of far-right parties and populist politicians. According to the critics of multiculturalism, the Netherlands has allowed excessive immigration without demanding enough integration (Lutz, 2017). The realisation of the Dutch government that the consultative bodies proved not to be as effective as anticipated occurred during a period of tension within the society. This meant that many migrant organisations that were dependent on governmental subsidies were forced to close because the funding came to an end. From that point onwards, the number of migrant organisations in which community members, among other things, could come together for any type of social gathering decreased. The decision to cut government spending on such organisations discouraged the transnational ties of Dutch-Turks with their homeland. For this reason, it should not come as a surprise that the divorce has been a thorn in the side of the Turkish community.

Furthermore, if it has not been enough that the negative stereotypical images of Muslims in Dutch society have increased, all eyes in Europe have recently turned to the President of Turkey, Recep Tayip Erdogan, who has been in power since 2003. Turkey's intensified crackdown on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has not gone unnoticed and is now widely acknowledged in the EU. At the same time, the Turkish president's blend of charisma, defensiveness, nationalism, and a commanding (even authoritarian) presence are some of the various dynamics that underlie his popularity among the Turkish diaspora in Europe. It is interesting to observe that the majority of the Dutch population with Turkish roots support the leadership of Erdogan. This could, on the one hand, be explained by the fact that the 'gastarbeiders' generation originally came from the conservative rural areas of Turkey, the regions where the AKP has the most support. The findings illustrate that certain Dutch politicians, decision makers, and media view Erdogan as a major obstacle to the integration of their Turkish minorities. Some claim that Erdogan's practices are far from universal democratic standards and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that his supporters in the Netherlands are not

integrated. Measuring the integration level of a Turkish-origin Dutch citizen by their political preference presents a clear bias in terms of understanding social integration. It is contradictory to predict that Dutch-Turks are integrated if they are against Erdogan but not integrated if they support Erdogan. Openly supporting another country's head of state as a Dutch citizen could be considered somewhat inconsiderate, but Dutch-Turks would hardly have encountered such trepidation if they had been Dutch citizens of Venezuelan heritage supporting their president Nicolas Maduro. In other words, this trend reflects the existence of heightened anxiety about Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands.

The images of Turks and Turkey presented by the European press are often negative because of the chronic instability of Turkish politics. This situation has a particular influence on the way Dutch people perceive Turks in the Netherlands. Public opinion about Turkish immigrants is built on prejudices that have no objective ties with the daily lives of these immigrants and their children. Vincent Walet, a policy officer focusing on the social integration of ethnic minorities, further explains that the Turkish community's poor image and intolerance by the native population can lead to social exclusion and even discrimination. In fact, Turkey and Erdogan are popular among the majority of highly educated second-generation Turks, who possess a stronger bond with their parents' home country than the Netherlands, nursed by the feeling that they are treated as second rate citizens in their country of birth. According to Walet, the 'integration paradox' refers to the phenomenon that the more highly educated immigrants, despite being structurally integrated, are increasingly turning away from the host society, rather than becoming more oriented toward it (Walet, 2018). The second-generation's sentiment is, therefore, remarkable and undermines the present-day society since these people are Dutch-born young people, that is, Dutch nationals educated in the Netherlands.

Finally, the results reveal that second-generation Turkish individuals may experience a lack of fair employment opportunities. The lack of a social identity and unequal opportunities for employment for these individuals creates a vulnerable environment, in which they are likely to feel unwanted in the country in which they were born. The Dutch government is aware of this development and has designed programmes for vulnerable groups in society to prevent racism and discrimination in the workplace. It is striking that these programmes are designed to improve the labour market position of all ethnic minorities and the government is not considering a specific policy aimed at Turkish youth. It became apparent while researching the current labour market situation in the Netherlands that the position of Turkish youth needs to be addressed. Turks, in particular, have a higher risk of being in a disadvantageous position in the Dutch labour market because the reputation of Turkish expatriates is not positive at this moment in comparison to other migrant groups (Asscher L. F., 2016). Reputations take a long time to build up but can be destroyed in an instant and accordingly one might suggest that it would be beneficial if greater attention were to be paid to Turks in future by the government.

8. Conclusion

This section is devoted to the conclusion of this study, focusing on the identity formation of young people of Turkish descent living in the Netherlands, and the factors that are of influence concerning the acceptance of their Dutch and Turkish identities. The dissertation aimed to answer the following main research question: 'What factors influence the children of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands to feel strongly connected with Turkey, and in what ways can the Dutch government improve its current approach to the social integration of second-generation Turkish immigrants?'. In order to answer the main question, the methodology section first outlined the multiple methods that supported the research objective. The literature review, provided in Chapter 3, established the background information on global migration and the position of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. Moreover, the findings chapter presented more insights into the concept of living in a multicultural society as a member of a diasporic community from the target group's perspective, along with the possible effects of developments within Dutch society, and media behaviour. The role parents play in the second-generation identity formation, along with the influence of Turkey and the current president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and finally the Dutch government's approach in social integration policy fields were also examined. The discussion chapter followed the analysis of the results. All of these chapters led to the conclusions below.

Firstly, Turkey was one of the most important sending societies of the international migratory system upon which industrial development in the Netherlands depended. The section on the Gastarbeider programme demonstrates how great a role the Dutch governmental policy has played in, and continues to play in, the level of integration of the Turkish community. The Netherlands stance regarding not becoming an 'immigration country' and policies that were meant to encourage the Turks to maintain their cultural and linguistic ties to Turkey did not encourage Turks to integrate further than was necessary to function in Dutch society. These results were not surprising because neither the Dutch nor the Turks were concerned with the challenges of integration, since no one thought the first labourers would remain in the Netherlands. Turkish immigrants, often from rural areas of the country, established and sustained familial, economic, political, and cultural links to their home societies at the same time as they organised themselves along ethnic and religious lines to preserve their identities, which, in turn, affected the integration of their offspring. In other words, cultural diversity was highly valued and multiculturalism allowed the Netherlands to seem tolerant by showering minorities with rights, while at the same time segregating them.

The most important result from this research is that the Turkish migrant children who were born in the Netherlands state that they have developed a dual national consciousness and feelings of belonging to both Turkey and the Netherlands. Being defined by Dutch society as 'allochtoon' or foreigner left many Turkish individuals searching for an identification that would enable them to redefine

themselves with an emphasis on their Turkishness. This encouraged many members of the younger Turkish generation in the Netherlands to embrace their parents' Turkish identity. In general, young people of Turkish descent tend to have a strong focus on an ethnically homogenous group of friends. The majority of this group cannot define themselves as either Turkish or Dutch. As a result, Turkey remains a physical reality and has the significance of a geographical motherland for the second-generation, despite their limited knowledge of Turkish customs, rituals and traditions.

Furthermore, the obstacles that Turkish second-generation migrants encounter in the Netherlands are many and diverse, and derive both from inside their own groups and from institutional structures and other forces in Dutch society. Right-wing populism and anti-immigrant sentiments have been brewing particularly post-September 11th, 2001. From that point onwards, Turkish youth have been increasingly exposed to certain social and political pressures. Additionally, the Turkish diaspora has tended to be a factor uniting rather than dividing Turkey and Europe for decades. Turkey, under the 16-year rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's governments, was once praised as a bridge between Western and Islamic civilisations. Many individuals from Turkey living in the Netherlands support the Islamic-Conservative AKP ruling party. However, nearly two decades later, Turkey has become one of Europe's problems. The study results paint the picture of an ever-growing political division among the Turkish community between the opponents and supporters of the Turkish president in the Netherlands. Dutch politicians, authorities, and public opinion have often expressed discomfort with the Dutch citizens with Turkish heritage who mobilise for the purposes of the Turkish government.

Despite all this, the number of second-generation Turks who have succeeded in getting a better education is growing, and they are now equipped to seek employment. The majority of Turkish-Dutch citizens are well integrated in the community. At the same time, individuals from this particular group are more likely to experience labour market disadvantages because of Turkey's current damaged image and reputation. One could argue that Turks in the Netherlands experience difficulty being accepted even when integrated which places them in a significantly vulnerable position. The Dutch government should do their utmost to prevent the future escalation of this issue. In that respect, the results indicate that highly educated people with Turkish roots feel more strongly connected to Turkey than to the Netherlands. This contributes negatively to the integration process and feelings of unity with the Netherlands for Turkish immigrants.

Taking everything in to consideration, the main research question could be answered as follows. Second-generation Turkish immigrant children are generally regarded as foreigners, although they are not first-generation immigrants. Negative feelings about immigrants among the general Dutch public have reinforced thinking in terms of us and them. The strong political pull from Turkey is also a factor that has caused the second-generation Turks to become unbalanced. Public opinion about the Turkish government and its supporters has shifted from heartfelt sympathy to undisguised antipathy in the

Netherlands. Finally, policy instruments of the Dutch government that aim at achieving integration have shifted dramatically but proved to be effective in the past decades. For this reason, apart from the highly educated Turks who feel unwanted in the Dutch society, the integration of the second generation Turks measured by standard economic, social, and cultural indicators can be called a success since they are more similar to their Dutch peers than their parents ever were.

9. Recommendations

It is assumed that European societies will become even more ethnically and culturally diverse in the near future. One could suggest that it is the responsibility of the Dutch government to be sufficiently prepared for the potential consequences of this. For future research, it might, therefore, be interesting to broaden the scope of participants to represent a much broader group of target people. The study's narratives provide a plausible picture of how second-generation Turks feel in the Netherlands. However, in an ideal world more opinions and perspectives would be consulted to offer a more representative context.

The research aimed to provide the Dutch government with recommendations on how to improve its social integration of second-generation Turks through policy in order to fulfil their needs. The results based on the research seems to speculatively prove that a more inclusive society would have positive effects. This means that there is a call to build the Netherlands into a country which is cohesive, fair, and inclusive with people who prioritise the values of fairness and inclusion. The one thing that has to be clear is that there must be no double standards when it comes to social integration. If we want to support the futures of immigrants and their children, it would be strongly advisable to cease referring to the nationalities of the parents of immigrant children. The government should, therefore, implement measures to combat potential labour market discrimination. This will decrease the amount of people that feel that they do not belong in Dutch society.

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11.Appendices

9.1 Appendix 1: Personal Interview Tunahan Kuzu

Interview vragen voor de heer Kuzu, volksvertegenwoordiger in de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal

Zou je kunnen uitleggen hoe het komt dat kinderen van Turkse migranten die geboren en getogen zijn in Nederland, zich zo aangetrokken voelen met het land waar hun (voor)ouders vandaan komen?

"Ik denk dat het in de eerste plaats te maken heeft met een historisch perspectief, waarbij eigenlijk de eerste- en tweede generatie migranten, die geboren en getogen zijn in Turkije, constant leefden met het verlangen om terug te keren naar het land van herkomst. Die tijdelijkheid dat de familie zou terugkeren zorgde altijd voor een vurige verlangen van heel veel mensen waar ook kinderen mee werden opgevoed. Inmiddels denk ik dat we te maken hebben met een situatie waarbij we een kantel punt al hebben bereikt. We hebben het over een opgroeiende derde- en vierdegeneratie die tegelijkertijd een positie pakt in de Nederlandse samenleving. Steeds meer jongeren krijgen door dat het een nostalgisch verlangen is die waarschijnlijk nooit werkelijkheid zal worden. En eigenlijk is de eerste- en tweede generatie zich ook bewust dat het puur verlangen zijn.

Toen de eerste generatie in de jaren 60 hiernaartoe kwam was het eventjes geld verdienen en terug keren naar het land van herkomst. Vervolgens kwamen de oma's. Nadat de oma's kwamen, werden tegelijktijdig vaders, ooms, moeders en tantes meegebracht. De opa's bleven in Nederland om nog meer geld te verdienen. Vervolgens zagen ze dat de kinderen hier geboren werden en wilde niet los komen te staan van hun klein kinderen en besloten om te blijven."

Push- en pull factoren

"Als je gaat kijken naar de cijfers van terugkeerders dan zie je dat met name dat hoger opgeleide jongeren deze stap maken. En dat zijn niet eens de mensen van de eerste en tweede generatie, de getallen van deze groep zijn relatief beperkt. Bepaalde factoren spelen een belangrijke rol bij de hoogopgeleide jongeren. Als je kijkt naar de push factoren dan hebben we het vooral over de politieke- en maatschappelijke klimaat in Nederland. In dat klimaat in de afgelopen 15-20 jaar, wordt constant de achtergrond van mensen benadrukt en de identiteit geproblematiseerd. Het moslim zijn, de Islam, het Turks zijn, en Turkije wordt geproblematiseerd waardoor mensen zich vervreemd voelen in het land waar ze zijn geboren en getogen.

Een pullfactor is de economische situatie in Turkije. Tijdens de crises jaren vanaf 2007was het in Turkije beter dan in Nederland waardoor veel jongeren kansen zagen om daar aan de slag te gaan. Vaak liep dit af met een deceptie. Ten voorbeeld: ik heb in mijn jonge jaren gewerkt in een aantal

ziekenhuizen in Istanbul. De cultuur is gewoon heel anders. Daarnaast organiseerde de studentenvereniging Anatolia in die periode een symposium in een bomvolle aula van de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Ruim 800 mensen waren toen geïnteresseerd om te wonen en werken in Turkije. Besef je vooral heel goed dat je sterker geworteld bent in Nederland dan dat je eigenlijk beseft. We hebben het dus over wonen en werken in Turkije, maar de voertaal is Nederlands. Dat is al een hele interessante gewaarwording.

Kijk, als mensen aangeven dat ze vanwege economische kansen een betere bestaan kunnen opbouwen, dan zeg ik dan ben je vrij om te gaan. Mijn opa heeft destijds dezelfde overweging gemaakt. Straks zal ik even terugkomen op die deceptie. Maar als je je laat verjagen vanwege het politieke- en maatschappelijke klimaat, dan ben ik een van de personen die zou zeggen dat je juist daartegen moet strijden en je positie moet opeisen. Als we het hebben over de gemeenschappen die onvoldoende tot hun recht komen, dan heb je sterke persoonlijkheden en hoogopgeleide mensen nodig. Dit om ervoor te zorgen dat die positie van gemeenschappen te versterken en verbeteren.

Als we het hebben over de deceptie dan is het dat de jongeren die te maken krijgen met een enorme cultuurshock. Afspraken maken is een heel rekbaar begrip in Turkije. De manier waarop mensen met elkaar omgaan: in Nederland zijn we gewend om dingen vast te leggen, op papier te zetten en vervolgens om ons daaraan te houden. In Turkije worden afspraken gemaakt op basis van het uitgesproken tegenover elkaar en daar komen veel misverstanden bij kijken. Veel mensen die dus die overstap wagen komen binnen een jaar terug. "

Naar aanleiding van een aantal gebeurtenissen (o.a. referendum, coup, rellen) is het beeld over Turkse Nederlanders aanzienlijk verslechterd in Nederland. Beïnvloedt dit het gevoel dat ze zich niet thuis voelen in de Nederlandse samenleving?

"Ik begrijp je punt. Laat ik eerst even reageren op "mislukte integratie". Wat is integratie dan? 16 jaar geleden ging integratie vooral over het leren van de taal, werken, deel uitmaken van de samenleving en onderdeel uitmaken van de maatschappij. Tegenwoordig zie je dat allerlei andere begrippen erbij worden gehaald om aan te geven dat integratie zogenaamd mislukt zou zijn. Als je feitelijk gaat kijken, volgens het Centraal Plan Bureau, dan zie je dat er in de afgelopen 25 jaar objectieve vooruitgang is geboekt. Hier heb je het over allerlei zaken zoals taalbeheersing, inkomensniveau, opleidingsniveau en ondernemerschap die objectieve vooruitgang duiden. Tegelijkertijd heerst er in het maatschappelijke- en politieke klimaat een beeld dat deze integratie mislukt zou zijn, en met name de Turkse gemeenschap.

Als je dan gaat doorvragen over waar zit dit dan in, dan heeft men het over mensen die met vlaggen rondlopen op de Erasmusbrug en mensen die protesteren voor het Turkse consulaat. We hebben ongeveer 400.000 mensen met een Turkse achtergrond in Nederland. Op de Erasmusbrug stonden 1200 personen en voor het Turkse consulaat 300 mensen. Waarom worden deze mensen als norm

aangeduid voor de zogenaamde mislukte integratie van Turken in Nederland, terwijl aan de andere kant al die objectieve indicatoren wijzen op vooruitgang.

Wat is het probleem dan? Waarom is het een issue als mensen met een Turkse vlag gaan demonstreren en is het geen enkel probleem als personen met een Israëlische of PKK-vlaggen rondzwaaien? Dat heeft te maken met de beeldvorming in Nederland dat is gevoed en gecultiveerd in de afgelopen 20 jaar over mensen met een migratie achtergrond, moslims, en in het bijzonder in de laatste 3 jaar over Turkije en Erdogan. Ja, er gaan een aantal dingen fout in Turkije. Rechtstatelijke onderwerpen zoals vrijheid van pers, vrijheid van meningsuiting gaan niet goed en is in een dalende trend. Niemand ontkent dat. Maar er gaan ook heel veel dingen goed. Denk aan economische vooruitgang, kijk naar de infrastructuur en gezondheidszorg etc. Het is anno 2018 onmogelijk in Nederland om dit genuanceerde verhaal over te brengen. Als je de dingen benoemd die goed gaan, dan ben je pro-Erdogan, als je de dingen benoemd die fout gaan ben je anti-Erdogan. Dit maakt het onmogelijk om hierover een opvatting te presenteren om dat je in kampen wordt verdeeld.

Waar wij, met name als Turkse gemeenschap, van af moeten komen is dat we niet meegaan in dat kampenspelletje. Tegelijkertijd moeten we met elkaar beseffen dat wij hier in Nederland gewoon zullen blijven. Het is daarvoor nodig om onze positie op te eisen op een aantal vlakken. Hierbij moet je denken aan onderwerpen zoals politiek, economie, juridisch, wetenschap en media. De huidige beeldvorming is gecultiveerd door de media. Wij hebben een onderzoek gedaan naar wat de Tv-programma Nieuwsuur heeft uitgezonden tussen februari 2018 tot en met maart 2018. Ruim 20% van de tijd gaat over Turkije. Ik zie tegenwoordig dat heel veel mensen met een Turkse achtergrond via de snelle communicatietechnieken van de huidige tijd enorm bezig zijn met sociale media en het nieuws in Turkije. De komst van DENK is er juist op gericht om dit te veranderen. Turkse jongeren praten niet meer over Turkse partijen zoals AKP, CHP of MHP maar hebben het steeds vaker over DENK vs. de PVV of D66 in de Tweede Kamer. In België waar men Vlaams spreekt en Nederlands kunnen volgen zie je dat de Turkse mensen alle Nederlandse Kamerleden kennen vanwege het effect van sociale media. "

Klopt het dat de tweede generatie Turkse jongeren sterk naar binnen is gebogen vergleken met andere migrant groepen in Nederland?

"Dat hangt ervan af welke maatstaf je hanteert. Ik heb ook gezien dat volgens een onderzoek van het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau integratie wordt aangeduid op basis van contact tussen autochtonen en allochtonen. Dan zie je het contact van mensen met een Turkse achtergrond met autochtone bevolking achterblijft in vergelijking met andere groepen in Nederland. Ik vind dat sowieso een hele foute gedachten. Het duidt namelijk op een richtingsverkeer. Dus als een Turkse Nederlander op deze indicator goed wilt scoren moet hij of zij veel contact hebben met autochtonen. Waarom is niet

andersom en waarom wordt integratie niet gemeten vanuit het contact van Nederlanders met 'buitenlanders'?

Wat je ziet is dat mensen, met name jongeren, herkenbaar uit mijn tijd, en vooral na de aanslagen van 9/11 en de verschillende aanslagen op Europese hoofdsteden steeds meer naar elkaar toe trekken. Wanneer je mensen dan constant gaan aanspreken op hun moslim zijn, of Turks zijn, dan gaan mensen vanzelfsprekend samen komen om dezelfde ervaringen te delen. Dat is hoe sociologie werkt en gemeenschappen werken. Als je groepen het gevoel geeft dat ze onderdeel zijn van de samenleving en dat ze erbij horen, dan zou dit minder gebeuren.

Nederlands is overigens de enige taal waar kunstmatig onderscheid wordt gemaakt op basis van achtergrondkenmerken. Een van de eerste punten toen wij DENK begonnen was daarom het afschaffen van die woorden. Een half jaar later kwam het Wetenschappelijk Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid met een soort gelijk advies. Zo lang politici terminologie hanteren als "pleur op" van Rutte, "rot op" van Aboutaleb, "Marokkanen hebben een etnisch monopolie op geweld" van Samson, "je moet Marokkanen vernederen voor hun eigen groep" van Spekman. Als je dat soort taal hanteert dan trekken mensen naar zich toe omdat ze aangesproken worden op dat stukje deelidentiteit. In de media zie je dat wanneer iets in een negatief daglicht gesteld moet worden, dat erbij wordt gehaald dat de Turk of Marokkaan iets heeft gedaan. En wanneer de voetballer Ibrahim Affelay een doelpunt maakt voor Oranje dan is het een Nederlander en plotseling geen Marokkaan meer. Ik denk dat in de afgelopen jaren er bij een deel van de mensen in de media daar bewustwording over is ontstaan, maar er zijn een aantal media die bewust dit blijven doen. Dan heb ik het over de Telegraaf, Geenstijl en PowNed. Deze rechtse media die het vanzelfsprekend blijven doen om het sentiment te creëren waardoor een aantal politieke partijen daaruit electoraal belanden. Op deze manier creëer je kloven op basis van identiteit. Dit doorbreken kost tijd, hard werk, doorzettingsvermogen en met name veel verantwoordelijkheidsbesef. "

Wat zou de overheid beter kunnen doen in de toekomst bezien vanuit jouw perspectief?

"Inclusiviteit is het sleutelwoord. Dit betekent dat je een gemeenschappelijke identiteit gaat ontwikkelen. Ten eerste, die dubbele maat moet eruit. Er wordt vaak gesproken in politiek laatste jaren over de betekenis van de Nederlandse identiteit. Het wordt door partijen, met name aan de rechterkant van het politieke spectrum en waar linkse partijen vaak mee zijn ingegaan, gedefinieerd als eenduidig en eenvormig. Vaak worden de kenmerken van de Nederlandse identiteit omschreven door etnische en cultureel nationalisme en 'Hollander' zijn. Ik zou bijna kunnen zeggen dat dat niet meer het Nederlanderschap van vandaag is. Wat mij betreft gaat Nederlanderschap over burgerschap, dat houdt in dat we met elkaar plichten hebben. Tegenover deze plichten staan rechten. In die grondrechten hebben wij allerlei vrijheden verworven. Die vrijheden en verworvenheden worden voor groepen Nederlanders op basis van achtergrondkenmerken en etniciteit verschillend uitgelegd.

Ten tweede is dat we identiteit verder ontwikkelen en die gemeenschappelijke identiteit zit hem dus in het Nederlanderschap. Het besef hebben met elkaar dat de identiteit van Nederland wordt gevormd door verschillende deelidentiteiten die ieder persoon heeft. Ik zelf: ik ben Nederlander, Turks, Rotterdammer, vader, zoon en echtgenoot. Iedereen heeft zo zijn kenmerken. De optelsom van deze verschillende deelidentiteiten op een grote hoop is de identiteit van Nederland. Dat betekent ook dat je beleidsmatig werk moet maken op een aantal terreinen zoals bestrijden van racisme en discriminatie. Ons antidiscriminatiebeleid in Nederland is momenteel erg soft. Discriminatie mag wat mij betreft harder aangepakt worden en ook op een andere manier. "

Wat voor rol spelen nationalistische sentimenten bij de integratie van Turken in Nederland?

"Wanneer je gaat kijken naar de grote groepen in Nederland dan zie je dat ze verschillende kenmerken hebben, wat ze tegelijkertijd uniek maakt. Kijkend naar de Marokkaanse gemeenschap is er een overkoepelende noemer die veel sterker is dan bij de Turkse gemeenschap, het moslim zijn. De Surinaamse en Antilliaanse gemeenschap kenmerkt zich door enorm veel verschillen maar wat wel overheerst is 400 jaar kolonialisme. Wat heel veel Turkse mensen hebben is dat ze beschikken over een trots omdat ze onder andere nooit gekolonialiseerd. De Turkse Nederlandse komen vaak uit conservatieve gebieden in Turkije. Het punt is dat de gemeenschappen die hier naartoe zijn gekomen vaak analfabeet waren, met het idee dat ze hier alleen moesten werken. Ze waren niet bezig met zelfontwikkeling of die van hun kinderen. De ontwikkeling zien we opgang komen vanaf de derde generatie.

Ik zal je even wat achtergrondinformatie met betrekking tot integratie geven. In 1963 kwamen de eerste mensen met een Turks of Marokkaanse achtergrond naar Nederland. Tussen 1963 en 1981 was er helemaal geen sprake van integratiebeleid. De eerste minderheidsnota dateert uit 1891. Toen besefte de overheid dat er qua beleid iets ontwikkeld moest worden. Van 1981 tot 2002 was integratie vooral gericht op het behouden van eigen taal en cultuur omdat het idee was dat deze mensen op den duur terug zouden keren. Vanaf 2002 was het gericht op assimilatie. Dit zorgde ervoor dat mensen van de tweede en derde generatie, die overigens goed weten wat hun grondwetten zijn, kregen sterk in de gaten dat het haaks stond op de vrijheid van verenging.

Wanneer je bijvoorbeeld spreekt over Diyanet of Milli Görus etc. was dat de minister deze partijen als officieel overlegorgaan zag. Door instrumenten zoals subsidies werden deze verengingen in het begin afhankelijk gemaakt. Vervolgens werd de geldkraan dichtgedraaid. Op deze manier sloop je een organisatie en gemeenschap. Dit is vooral de stijl van met name de PDVA geweest, waarbij een top en onderlaag werd gecreëerd. Mensen vanuit de onderlaag werden naar boven gehaald om een positie te krijgen. Via die positie moest er controle uitgeoefend worden op een gemeenschap. Het probleem is dat deze gemeenschap zo divers is dat ze zich niet laat controleren door een Markoush of Aboutaleb."

9.2 Appendix 2: Personal Interview Vincent Walet

Interview vragen voor de heer Walet, beleidsmedewerker directie Samenleving en Integratie bij het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijk

"Het beeld wat wij hebben dat klopt. Er is ook een onderzoek geweest van het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau in 2015, met de titel: Wereld van verschil. Uniek aan dat onderzoek was dat ze naar de sociaal culturele integratie van vier verschillende bevolkingsgroepen (Turkse, Surinaamse, Antilliaanse en Marokkaanse) in Nederland. Onderzoeken en statistieken gaan meestal over sociaaleconomische integratie. Het beeld van de Turkse Nederlanders is dat de sociaaleconomische integratie eigenlijk best goed gaat want jongeren studeren vaker, vinden een baan etc. In dat rapport komt er ook naar voren dat van die vier groepen, als je de Turkse Nederlanders met de Marokkaanse Nederlanders vergelijkt, dan valt op dat op punten als veel contact hebben met Nederlanders, je oriënteren op Nederland, Nederlander voelen, dat een deel van de Turkse Nederlanders dat minder heeft dan de Marokkaanse Nederlanders. Ik zou overigens zeggen dat de Surinaamse en Antilliaanse een aparte groep zijn aangezien ze waren opgegroeid in Nederlandse de koloniën en spraken al Nederlands.

Vaak wordt met integratie sociaaleconomische factoren bedoeld; volg je een opleiding, draai je mee in de samenleving, vind je een baan, kan je een draai vinden in Nederland. Op deze criteria doen de Turkse Nederlanders het best goed. Dan heb je iets dat heet de integratie 'paradox', dat is in het onderzoek verder uitgelicht. Uit het onderzoek bleek dat 20% van de Turkse Nederlanders gesegregeerd leeft. Dat zijn vaak mensen van de eerste generatie, misschien die nooit goed de taal hebben geleerd. Volgens de theorieën van integratie zou het eigenlijk bij elke generatie beter moeten gaan. Dat is een beetje internationaal erkend. Uiteindelijk gaat de groep namelijk op in de mainstream.

Dan komt er uit het onderzoek naar voren dat de helft van de Turkse jongeren, zelfs als ze hoogopgeleid zijn, en geïntegreerd zijn, zich toch niet geaccepteerd voelen. Dat is best wel apart. Dat rapport gaat er niet dieper op in en als je zou nadenken hoe dat komt, dan heeft dat enigszins te maken met arbeidsmarktdiscriminatie voor mensen met een migrantenherkomst.

Wat zijn de effecten van het woord allochtoon?

Dat is een vervelend woord. Het is een stempel. Twee jaar geleden werd in de Tweede Kamer aan minister Asscher gevraagd moeten we daar niet eens mee ophouden, met die allochtoon-autochtoon onderscheid. Het CBS heeft die woorden ook afgeschaft. Ze maken wel onderscheid tussen Westerse en niet-Westerse migranten. Maar die woorden allochtoon en autochtoon worden niet meer gebruikt.

Allochtoon is een gek woord want het betekent van vreemde herkomst. Dat is iets waar we naar geluisterd hebben. "

"Ik moet wel zeggen dat het woord ooit in de jaren 70 was bedacht door wetenschappers. Het was goed bedoeld. Ze wilde onderscheid maken want ze kregen te maken met migratie. Dat woord heeft een hele verkeerde bijklank gekregen. Op het ministerie spreek ik consequent over Turkse Nederlanders, Marokkaanse Nederlanders etc. Gisteren heeft de Wetenschappelijk Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid een rapport uitgebracht over diversiteit. Zij spreken over ''inwoners van herkomst uit een ander land'''. Dat noemen we dan inclusief taalgebruik.

Arbeidsmarktdiscriminatie bestrijden is heel belangrijk want het treft meerdere groepen met een migratieachtergrond. Dat is op dit moment een speerpunt van het nieuwe kabinet. Deze soort discriminatie is niet iets wat recentelijk is geïntroduceerd. Als de economie goed gaat valt het minder op want de werkgevers hebben dan weinig te kiezen. Als het slecht gaat met de economie dan kiezen ze misschien eerder voor Mark dan voor Mohammed. Bij de werving en selectie krijgt men dan te maken met vooroordelen. Ons boodschap naar werkgevers met betrekking tot arbeidsmarktdiscriminatie was: vooroordelen hebben we allemaal, het zou jammer zijn als u bij de werving en de selectie niet bewust bent van uw vooroordelen. Dan loopt u ook niet de kans dat u de beste kandidaat mist. "

Integratie met behoud van identiteit werd gestimuleerd in de jaren 1970.

"Kijk met betrekking tot de formatie van organisaties hadden we vroeger de LOM-structuur (landelijk overleg minderheden). Hierin zaten heel veel migrantenorganisaties, niet alleen Turkse in. Er zat zelfs een wet onder; in die wet stond dat de overheid verplicht met deze organisaties moest overleggen over het minderhedenbeleid. De Turkse gemeenschap is verdeeld zoals je weet: links, rechts, Koerden, alevieten, religieus etc. Het verplichte overleg werd uiteindelijk afgeschaft en de structuur van organisaties afgebouwd. Dat is gedaan door het gedoog kabinet van Rutte I. We spreken die organisaties nog steeds regelmatig maar eerst waren ze vaste overlegpartners en kregen ook subsidies. Ik ben vier jaar geleden bij de directie Integratie en Samenleving komen werken. Toen was die afschaffing al gerealiseerd. De overheid heeft sindsdien een andere relatie gekregen met al die groepen.

Wat was de impact van deze nieuwe houding van de overheid?

De relatie is toen veranderd. Eerst was de overheid verplicht om de mening van de minderheidsgroepen te vragen. Doelgroepenbeleid werd niet meer wenselijk geacht na een tijdje. Dus het minderhedenbeleid, het beleid om groepen met een migratie herkomst te integreren, werd algemeen beleid. Niet meer een groep in het bijzonder dus. Op een bepaalde moment was er een omslag van doelgroepenbeleid, we hadden specifiek beleid voor Turkse Nederlanders, Marokkaanse Nederlanders etc. en op een bepaald moment werd het uiteindelijk dus algemeen beleid.

Een aantal historische gebeurtenissen waren belangrijk. Zo was 9/11 in 2001, vervolgens werd Pim Fortuyn in 2002 vermoord en Van Gogh werd vermoord in 2004. Hierdoor werd Nederland een heel erg gepolariseerd land. Toen had je kabinet Balkenende en was er een breed initiatief maatschappelijke (BIM) binding. Het idee was dat mensen niet meer op een goede manier met elkaar in gesprek gingen en dat alles een beetje uit elkaar viel. Daarna kwamen er ook andere zorgen over radicalisering, maar dat staat los van de integratie van Turkse en Marokkaanse Nederlanders. In de media werd dit wel vaak in verband gebracht.

Laten we het hebben over de huidige situatie. Banden met de Turkije op het overheidsniveau is verkoeld. Verder is het beeld over Turkije en de mensen heel erg veranderd. Hoe wordt hier vanuit de overheid naar gekeken?

Dat beeld die jij schetst is vooral door de media bevestigd. Het is geen geheim dat de regering in Turkije de Turken in West-Europa een handreiking probeert te bieden of om daar invloed op uit te oefenen. 2016 was het sleuteljaar. Eerst kwam er een bericht naar buiten dat men aangifte kon doen tegen Erdogan. Daarna kreeg je de aanhouding van de Nederlandse journaliste Ebru Umar. Toen had je in juli de mislukte staatsgreep. Vervolgens waren veel Nederlanders verbaasd dat er zoveel mensen met Turkse vlaggetjes rondzwaaiden in Rotterdam. Bovendien had je ook vervelend gedoe met de Gülen scholen die leerlingen verloren. Daar heb ik overigens verder geen mening over. Daarnaast waren ook spanningen, zoals ouders die niet meer wisten wat ze moesten doen. Nog even over die mensen met vlaggetjes, dat heb ik Asscher ook heel vaak horen zeggen. Turkije mag best een mening hebben over wat er in Nederland gebeurd. Wij hebben ook een mening over wat er in Turkije gebeurd.

Betekent het dat als je een andere mening hebt, niet goed geïntegreerd bent?

De minister zei: in Nederland mag je over alles een andere mening hebben. Je hebt vrijheid van meningsuiting. Je moet in Nederland wel gewoon mee doen. Opleiding volgen, zorgen dat je aan het werken bent. Als je dat niet kan, dan hebben we een uitkering dan helpen we je. Daarover heeft hij ook veel besproken met een aantal Turkse clubs in Nederland. Dat noemen we dan ook het spanningsoverleg. Minister Asscher heeft vijf of zesmaal alle Turkse organisaties naar het ministerie geroepen. Dat waren onder andere Diyanet, Milli Gorus, Hizmet (gülen), HTIB, HAK-DER. Op die manier hadden we een soort brede vertegenwoordiging. Deze gesprekken waren begonnen omdat we ons zorgen maakte over die spanningen vier jaar geleden al. Toen was de oorlog in Syrië trouwens in volle gang bezig. Die minister heeft steeds aan al die clubs voorgelegd; je mag best met elkaar oneens zijn. Er was een klimaat van bedreiging en intimidatie dus de minister zei als je zelf de vrijheid neemt, gun het ook een ander. Het unieke aan die spanning overleg was dat al die verenigingen die van nature niet met elkaar overleggen, wel met de minister aan tafel zaten. Ik denk niet dat die bedreigingen vanuit die organisaties zelf kwamen. Wij zaten natuurlijk met de bestuurders aan tafel. Wat wij ook vonden was dat die spanningen ook slecht waren voor de integratie. Wat je net aangaf, toen dus in

2016 in de media allemaal berichten kwamen van; zijn de turken eigenlijk wel loyaal? Wij vonden dat iedereen een mening mag hebben als je maar niet gaat intimideren of andere dingen doet.

Als dat beeld heel erg naar voren komt, dan is dat slecht voor integratie. Wanneer die Turkse jongen dan gaat solliciteren, dan denkt die werkgever op een bepaalde manier over Turken. Die spanningen waren dus op zich slecht en je moet ervoor zorgen dat dingen niet uit de hand lopen. Het bestrijden van de spanningen stond wel in dienst van het bevorderen van de integratie. Anders krijgt een groep een etiket opgeplakt. Als die spanningen optreden, en als er dan veel media-aandacht voor is, is dat slecht voor de hele Turkse gemeenschap. Nederlandse werkgevers denken als ze een Turkse jongen zien dat diegene misschien meer bezig is met Turkse dingen. Dat is dan niet bevorderlijk voor de beeldvorming.

Dat de LOM-structuur is afgeschaft was volgens mij een gevolg van dat doelgroepenbeleid. Eerst had je het doelgroepenbeleid met alle specifieke migranten en toen kwam er een omslag naar algemeen beleid. Bijvoorbeeld: in de arbeidsmarkt, als er een Nederlandse jongen in een achterstandsbuurt wijk woont dan moeten we hem ook gewoon helpen. Dezelfde instrumenten moeten gebruikt worden. Dit speelde in de jaren negentig een belangrijke rol.

Hoe denkt u dat we in de komende tijd deze problemen met Turkse jongeren het beste kunnen aanpakken?

Uit het onderzoek is gebleken dat deze groep sociaaleconomisch gewoon geïntegreerd is, en geen significante problemen vormen. Maar als 50% van de hoogopgeleide Turkse jongeren zich niet geaccepteerd voelen in de samenleving, dan is dat best wel een zorgwekkende conclusie. Turkije mag een mening hebben over Nederland. Rutte en Asscher hebben vaak gezegd dat Turkije niet in Nederland moet gaan inmengen. En als Turkije dan soort dingen probeert, zoals het toen daar op leek met het versturen van brieven tijdens verkiezingen, is de lijn van het kabinet dat ze Turkije daarop aanspreken. Dat gaat dan via het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. Landen mogen elkaar officieel daarop aanspreken wanneer er dit soort dingen gebeuren. Het ergste was toen in maart mevrouw Kaya toch naar Nederland was gekomen. Toen was de lijn van het kabinet; we hebben duidelijk gemeld dat we dat niet willen hebben. De diplomatieke relaties werden nogal bekoeld. Landen willen niet dat je met bepaalde bevolkingsgroepen gaat bemoeien. Europese Turken mogen gewoon stemmen voor Turkse verkiezingen. Volgens mij is de invoering van deze stemrecht een recente ontwikkeling, want het bestaat pas 5 a 6 jaar.

Gericht naar de toekomst, heeft minister Asscher met die Turkse organisaties overlegd over spanningen, maar dat had ook een doel, gericht op integratie. Volgens mij gaat minister Koolmees daar ook gewoon mee door. Dat weet ik niet helemaal zeker. Tot een half jaar geleden was dit mijn portfolio specifiek bezig met die spanningen. Je zou jezelf kunnen afvragen waarom voelen die hoogopgeleide Turkse jongeren zich niet geaccepteerd in Nederland? Hierbij kan je denken aan

arbeidsmarktdiscriminatie, ze zijn vaak moslim en de toenemende intolerantie tegenover islam is geen positieve ontwikkeling. Daar worden ook dingen aan gedaan bij het ministerie. Turkije wordt erop aangesproken dat dat ze wel een mening mogen hebben, maar niet mogen inmengen. Dat is hoe het beleid eruitziet. We houden goed in de gaten wat er speelt, houden vinger aan de pols en proberen de binding te verbeteren door algemene maatregelen. Turkije heeft ook kritiek op Nederland, dat Turken worden gediscrimineerd. In 2016, heb ik met collega's veel overleg gehad met Turkse organisaties en gemeentes die met dit soort beleid bezighouden, om ervoor te zorgen dat je weet wat er speelt.

Kwamen er nieuwe problemen naar voren tijdens de gesprekken met die Turkse organisaties?

Elk groep had natuurlijk zijn eigen verhaal. De ene had meer last van bedreigingen dan de andere groep. Minister Asscher zei altijd dat we hier zijn om dat soort dingen te voorkomen. En als er hele erge dingen zijn, moet je gewoon aangifte doen. Met elkaar praten is beter dan niet met elkaar praten. En naar de toekomst toe: daar kan ik je ook iets over toesturen via de e-mail. Er waren een aantal hogescholen in Nederland die imamopleidingen aanboden. Turkse en Marokkaanse moskeeën halen vaak imams uit het land van herkomst. De imams die uit Turkije komen worden over het algemeen betaald door Diyanet (Presidium voor Godsdienstzaken). Het zou beter zijn als imams meer over Nederland weten zoals het spreken van de taal. Die imams uit Turkije komen blijven maar een paar jaar in Nederland. Hiervoor moet je dus een imamopleiding in Nederland hebben en die waren er ook. Alleen er waren onvoldoende aanmeldingen in verband met het beroepsperspectief. De imams van Diyanet, ambtenaren in dienst van Turkije, krijgen gewoon een normaal salaris maar de imams in een gemiddelde moskee in Nederland niet. De moskeegemeenschap moet dit namelijk zelf betalen. Veel mensen die de opleiding afronden werken vaak bij gevangenis. In ieder geval, er is weer een initiatief om een imamopleiding van de grond te laten komen om imams op te leiden met een Nederlandse achtergrond. Dat is belangrijk voor de integratie naar de toekomst toe.

9.3 Appendix 3: Student Ethics Form

Student Ethics Form

European Studies
Student Ethics Form

Your name: Onur Karacan

Supervisor: Bert van den Bergh

Instructions/checklist
Before completing this form you should read the APA Ethics Code
(http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx). If you are planning research with human subjects you should also look at the sample consent form available in the Final Project and Dissertation Guide.

a. [ ] Read section 3 that your supervisor will have to sign. Make sure that you cover all these issues in section 1.
b. [ ] Complete sections 1 and, if you are using human subjects, section 2, of this form, and sign it.
c. [ ] Ask your project supervisor to read these sections (and the draft consent form if you have one) and sign the form.
d. [ ] Append this signed form as an appendix to your dissertation.

Section 1. Project Outline (to be completed by student)

(i)   Title of Project:
Becoming a Foreigner in Your Own Country. Home- and host-country effects: the second-generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands

(ii)   Aims of project:
To research why Turkish immigrants are strongly connected to their country of origin and whether the Dutch government can improve its current approach of dealing second-generation Turkish immigrants.

(iii)   Will you involve other people in your project – e.g. via formal or informal interviews, group discussions, questionnaires, internet surveys etc. (Note: if you are using data that has already been collected by another researcher – e.g. recordings or transcripts of conversations given to you by your supervisor, you should answer 'NO' to this question.)

YES

If no: you should now sign the statement below and return the form to your supervisor. You have completed this form.

This project is not designed to include research with human subjects . I understand that I do not have ethical clearance to interview people (formally or informally) about the topic of my research, to carry out internet research (e.g. on chat rooms or discussion boards) or in any other way to use people as subjects in my research.

Student's signature _____ -   date :11/06/2017

If yes: you should complete the rest of this form.

Section 2 Complete this section only if you answered YES to question (iii) above.

(i) What will the participants have to do? (v. brief outline of procedure):

Participants will have to answer questions in a semi-structured style personal interview. The questions are adjusted to each individual depending on their expertise.

(ii) What sort of people will the participants be and how will they be recruited?

The participants are experts in the field related to the topic. The first participant is specialized in the integration of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. The second participant is a Dutch Member of Parliament with Turkish origin. The remaining participants, also known as the target group, are second-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. The participants are contacted through e-mail communication.

(iii) What sort stimuli or materials will your participants be exposed to, tick the appropriate boxes and then state what they are in the space below?

Questionnaires[ ]; Pictures[ ]; Sounds [ ]; Words[x]; Other[ ].

(iv) Consent: Informed consent must be obtained for all participants before they take part in your project. Either verbally or by means of an informed consent form you should state what participants will be doing, drawing attention to anything they could conceivably object to subsequently. You should also state how they can withdraw from the study at any time and the measures you are taking to ensure the confidentiality of data. A standard informed consent form is available in the Dissertation Manual.

(vi) What procedures will you follow in order to guarantee the confidentiality of participants' data? Personal data (name, addresses etc.) should not be stored in such a way that they can be associated with the participant's data.

There is an informed consent form for every participant. The participant will be made aware that interviews are recorded. The recordings of the interviews will only be shared with the supervisors through an electronic dossier and will not be posted online or shared with any other party. The transcribed interviews will only include the participants name and function with permission of the participant.

Student's signature: .... date: ...11-06-2018

Supervisor's signature (if satisfied with the proposed procedures): .... date: 11/6/2018

9.4 Appendix 3: Informed Consent Forms

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

1) Topic: What factors influence children of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands to feel strong connected with Turkey, and in what way can the Dutch government improve its current approach of dealing with second-generation Turkish migrants' social integration?

2) Project Description: the project attempts to present, through the Turkish migrant children's perspective, factors that contribute to an increased feeling of belonging in the context of rising populism plaguing the Netherlands. Researching those aspects, could lead to insights into the second-generation Turkish migrants' attitude towards their history, position, and contemporary problems in the Dutch society.

If you agree to take part in this study please read the following statement and sign this form.

I am 16 years of age or older.

I can confirm that I have read and understood the description and aims of this research. The researcher has answered all the questions that I had to my satisfaction.

I agree to the audio recording of my interview with the researcher.

I understand that the researcher offers me the following guarantees:

All information will be treated in the strictest confidence. My name will not be used in the study unless I give permission for it.

Recordings will be accessible only by the researcher. Unless otherwise agreed, anonymity will be ensured at all times. Pseudonyms will be used in the transcriptions.

I can ask for the recording to be stopped at any time and anything to be deleted from it.

I consent to take part in the research on the basis of the guarantees outlined above.

Signed: Date: 16/04/2018

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

1) Topic: What factors influence children of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands to feel strong connected with Turkey, and in what way can the Dutch government improve its current approach of dealing with second-generation Turkish migrants' social integration?

2) Project Description: the project attempts to present, through the Turkish migrant children's perspective, factors that contribute to an increased feeling of belonging in the context of rising populism plaguing the Netherlands. Researching those aspect, could lead to insights into the second-generation Turkish migrants' attitude towards their history, position, and contemporary problems in the Dutch society.

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Recordings will be accessible only by the researcher. Unless otherwise agreed, anonymity will be ensured at all times. Pseudonyms will be used in the transcriptions.

I can ask for the recording to be stopped at any time and anything to be deleted from it.

I consent to take part in the research on the basis of the guarantees outlined above.

Signed: _____   Date: 29/05/2018