



Figure 1. Europe and the Southern Neighborhood. Copyright EU Neighbours.

Assessing EU Democratization

How did the European Union try to Fulfill its Policy Goals to Enhance Democratization in Tunisia?

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Date of Completion: May 20, 2020

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European Studies

Word count: 19,382

Executive Summary

This qualitative research assesses the European Union's (EU) democracy promotion, through the analysis of eight milestone policies, implemented between 1995 and 2014 in Tunisia.

The idea is that these policies should be analyzed over an extended period, rather than separately. This is because the international normative stance of the EU is relatively new, and therefore still an experiment.

The conclusion is that the democratization aims of the EU are primarily focused on commercial agreements, and there is a preference for stability over democratic reform. Furthermore, the policies appear to be quite vague in general.

However, the analysis over time reveals certain improvements: there is an increasing tendency towards prioritization of democratic reform, detailed explanation of strategy and transparency. Also, certain experiments are visible – especially the EU's aim to push regional cooperation to the intergovernmental level. Although the EU made certain mistakes, it proved to be transparent by acknowledging its errors, and to establish new strategies.

Since the European normative stance is relatively new, it is positive to see certain improvements over time, although very slow. Therefore, it is recommended to the EU, to clearly prioritize objectives in the policy documents, to define strategies with short and long term goals, to explain what the results of former policies were, what that means for the upcoming ones, and to improve agenda setting.

For further research, it is recommended to analyze the EU democratization initiatives over extended time frames again, with focus on main initiatives. The focus should be on how the policies evolve over time. It would obviously be interesting to compare future results with this research, to see how it progressed.

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1.Introduction

In 1993 the European Union (EU) came officially into existence under the Treaty of Maastricht. One of the main policies under this treaty is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which gives the EU international personality by “strengthening its security and enabling it to promote peace, international security, international cooperation, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights” (McCormick, 2015, p.396). The legal basis that falls under the Treaty of Maastricht is the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In article 21 it states that the action of the EU in the international order shall be guided by democracy and the rule of law (Vandamme & van Ooik, 2013).

The CFSP led to many further international initiatives, and one of them has been the aim of encouraging democracy in the southern neighborhood. This led to a series of policies that started with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. However, what has been the quality of this democracy promotion over time?

Most of the literature on this topic is negative and sceptical with regard to the democratization initiatives of the EU; however, most of the literature focuses on short time frames, specific policies and on the period before the Arab Spring (1995 – 2010). This research argues that short-term research does not form a good basis for the analysis of EU democratization since it leads to generalization. Second, it is important to take into account EU democratization after the Arab Spring, since the revolution has been of major influence for the southern neighborhood. Third, it would be too early to be sceptical towards EU democratization, since its international stance is relatively new and should be analyzed in the long run.

Therefore, this research measures the quality of EU democracy promotion over an extended time frame of 19 years, from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of 1995, to the European Neighborhood Policy Action plan of 2014, with focus on Tunisia. Of all countries in the

southern neighborhood, Tunisia has been one of the most committed to EU policies, and both actors have established strong ties resulting in a so-called “privileged partnership”. Sections of the policy documents about democratization have been analyzed in chronological order. This has resulted in the insights of how the aims of democratization evolve over time.

The central question of this research is “How did the EU try to fulfill its policy goals to enhance democratization in Tunisia?” In order to answer the central question, four sub-questions have been formulated: “How does the EU define democratization?”, “Is this EU definition of democratization in line with expert approaches on democratization?”, “How did the EU promote the policy goals of democratization before (1995 – 2010), during (2010 – 2011) and after (2011 – 2014) the Jasmine Revolution?” and “What was the effect of the EU policy goals on the democratization of Tunisia?”.

The research starts with a historical background of the EU as an international actor, the methodology, theoretical framework and literature review. This will be followed by the findings of primary research, on eight main EU policies of democratization. The discussion will compare the literature with the findings, in order to find out if the EU really has been an ineffective democracy promoter as is generally agreed, or in fact, is simply a young democracy promoter that is improving its policies, and learning from its mistakes.

2. Historical Background

Europe's Fall and Rise as a Global Actor

Before the World Wars, global national powers were generally European. These nation's ability to strength was guaranteed mainly because of their strong militaries that were able to maintain influence across borders, without reluctance to defend their interests with aggression (Levy, 1983).

These great powers came to an end because of the massive devastation of the World Wars, and mainly the United States (US) and Soviet Union (USSR) liberated Europe from the Third Reich. In the following decades, these nations were able to lift international power up to the next level, because of their enormous size, destructive potential, international military reach, and especially their nuclear weapons; which coined them as: "superpower". As a result, the global situation turned into a "bipolar" system, and all other states had to choose one side, or try to remain neutral - which was usually unsuccessful (McCormick, 2015).

Western Europe sided with the US, and its recovery was fostered thanks to the Marshall Plan; the billion dollar American initiative to recover Europe that started in 1948. Under influence of intellectuals, including Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, Europe entered into a peace project based on interstate cooperation that started with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. The ambition for Europe was high, and Robert Schuman - one of the founding fathers of the EU - even stated in his declaration of 1950: "With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent" (Schuman, 1950).

The ECSC was followed by a series of treaties that turned the EU, from an Economic Community in 1957, to a political community in the following years; Europe was initially mainly concerned by internal

issues, and rather than building militaries, it focused on settling itself economically. At the same time, the “bipolar” international system implied that Western Europe was militarily covered by the US through the NATO, and Eastern Europe by the USSR through the Warsaw Pact (McCormick, 2015).

The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought turbulent changes in the international order, and the EU was unharmonized with regard to global challenges. As a result, the leaders of the Community established the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1993 (CFSP) under the Treaty of Maastricht. As is stated by McCormick (2015) the CFSP would focus on “strengthening the security of the EU, promoting peace and international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, promoting international cooperation and promoting democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights (McCormick, 2015, p.396).

From Security to Democratization

The EU as an international actor was reborn and at the core of its security policy was the desire for the promotion of democracy, just as the EU described in its new legislation under the Treaty of Maastricht: “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation...” (Vandamme & van Ooik, 2013, p.11). As a result, the EU continued its development as an international actor through the establishment of several foreign policies, and the focus of the EU went towards the south. This resulted in the first political cooperation between the EU and the countries on the other side of the Mediterranean, the so called “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (EMP), which was signed in 1995 (McCormick, 2015).

As can be seen, Europe has undergone a significant metamorphosis in a relatively short period, which is unique in history. While it used to be the international hegemony that based its international reach on

hard power, it had to start from zero again after the World Wars. In the meantime, Europe completely lost its dominant role, and was surpassed by the increasingly powerful US and USSR. The only hope for Europe seemed to rebuild itself through peaceful projects and multilateralism that started with the ECSC in 1952.

It managed to obtain an international role again, although with a completely new character. European prosperity through multilateralism meant that its international stance would be based on soft power. Obviously, a continent notorious for its violent history would not aim to promote violence again. Therefore, the EU can be seen today as a “normative soft power”.

Now that an overview has been given about what the EU’s international normative stance is about, it is time to explain how the research will be conducted in the methodology. This will be followed by the theoretical framework, in which the EU definition of democratization is discussed and defined.

3.Methodology

Research Method

This is a qualitative research because it aims at describing data that is unable to be presented into numerical form (Greetham, 2014). The data is presented by describing the attitude of the EU as a normative power with focus on Tunisia, which provides valuable insights in order to understand the credibility of the EU as a “self-proclaimed normative power” (Thyen, 2018, p.4).

Techniques to write dissertations can be qualitative, quantitative or a combination of both. The choice made by the author is dependent on the topic. Quantitative research is used in the scientific sphere, based on measurable, empirical and statistical data that is able to be expressed in numerical form. The outcomes are meant to be solid and objective, and therefore mathematical models are used (Greetham, 2014). Generally, this type of research is done, as is stated by Greetham (2014), to present; for example, “population statistics, crime figures, economic and business data and scientific findings” (Greetham, 2014, p.192).

Qualitative research, on the other hand, is unable to convert data into numbers. As is stated by Greetham (2014), this type of research can be focused on the expression of “attitudes, feelings, opinions, ideas, customs and beliefs” (Greetham, 2014, p.193). Nonetheless, this form of research is able to present important information because it gives relevant insights to understand societies, individuals and cultures (Greetham, 2014).

This research evaluates the attitude, stance and belief of democratization initiatives by the EU as a normative power. The topic is abstract, however, it is important because all action starts with a certain attitude. This is not able to be presented in numbers; therefore, this research is based on the qualitative technique of policy analysis.

Policy Analysis

This research is a policy analysis with focus on the EU's democratization policies towards Tunisia. All sections that are related to democratization in these policies are evaluated according to the EU's stance on democratization, as is described in the legal basis of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). These stances are categorized based on the following principles: human rights, democracy, the rule of law, justice and economy.

Secondary Research

Secondary research is conducted based on the findings of influential academics with regard to the EU's policies of democratization.

Primary Sources

In order to find out how the EU tried to fulfill its policy goals to enhance democratization in Tunisia, the policy initiatives of the EU vis-à-vis Tunisia have been analyzed. There are many of these policy initiatives, however, a selection of 8 policies has been made. This selection is based on, as is stated by the EU itself: "The most important milestones in the framework of cooperation agreed between the EU and Tunisia..." (Ayadi, 2016, p.1). These policies are: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995), Association Agreement (1995/1998), European Neighborhood Policy (2004), ENP Action Plan (2005), Union for the Mediterranean (2008), SPRING Program (2011), Privileged Partnership (2012) and ENP Action Plan (2014).

Secondary Sources

The secondary sources consist of books and academic articles that have been selected based on their trustworthiness. Both are from the geopolitical academic sphere, from reliable and important authors. All academic sources used for this research have been retrieved from the following academic data bases: ResearchGate, Academia, Google

Scholar, Taylor & Francis Online and The Hague University of Applied Sciences.

Limitation

This research limits itself to desk research. This is done on the grounds that the policies entail enough explanation, and further motivations are not required. This could only damage the objectivity of the analysis.

4.Theoretical Framework

In this section the definition of democratization by the EU, and by academics are compared, discussed and concluded.

How Does the EU Define Democratization?

As is stated by the European Parliament (EP), the EU enhances the worldwide support of democracy as a priority. Additionally, it is stated that democracy is the only governance system that enables people to entirely fulfill their human rights, and is a crucial element for “development and long-term stability” (European Parliament, 2020, p.1).

The legal basis of EU democracy promotion is established in articles two and 21 of the TEU; and article 205 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (European Parliament, 2020). Article two of the TEU states: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (Vandamme & van Ooik, 2013, p.4).

Article 21 of the TEU states: “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnership with third countries, and international regional or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common

problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations” (Vandamme & van Ooik, 2013, p.11).

Article 205 of the TFEU states: “The Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant to this Part, shall be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union” (Vandamme & van Ooik, 2013, p.75), which refers to the former articles.

Is This EU Definition of Democratization in Line With Expert Approaches on Democratization?

According to Powel (2009a), democracy is just one of the many principles that are encouraged by the EU, and is not necessarily the most prominent one in its association with Tunisia, where (former) President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the empowered elite legitimize their authority by claiming their commitment for “stable development, modernization, and promoting secular values” (Powel, 2009a, p.193). As a result, Powel argues, it is complicated to establish democratic opposition since political actors that aim to enter the government, are generally put down for the sake of “stability”. Powel states that there is evidence that indicates that stability is increasingly preferred by EU policy-makers (Powel, 2009a).

Moreover, Powel explains that the EU has appeared biased during its democracy promotion in Tunisia, because it favored certain actors over others, which means that the EU did not necessarily promote democratization in essence. For example, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of 1995 (EMP) advocates for freedom of religion and calls for a better understanding of the cultures in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the EU never assists “Tunisian Islamist political or civil society organizations” (Powel, 2009a, p.202).

However, Manners (2002) explains that the key European promoted values of “peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for

human rights”, and the secondary values of “social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance” are rooted in European historical background (as is cited in Powel, 2009a, p.196). Moreover, as has been explained before, Article 21 of the TEU states: “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation...” (Vandamme & van Ooik, 2013, p.11).

Hydén (2000) describes democracy as a universal good and states that already established democracies have been willing to assist the development of democracy in other countries, in order to foster the democratization process (Hydén, 2000). While Hydén describes democracy as a “universal good”, Pavone (2015) states that democratization is Eurocentric in general, and that the first wave of the Western European democratization in the 19th century has been of influence for the democratization endeavor of the EU. Pavone describes this ideal as “Whiggish” (Pavone, 2015, p.1) because it holds the belief that a West-European style of democracy is fostered automatically by economic modernization, without regard to time and place (Pavone, 2015, p.1).

According to Kauffman (n.d.), democratization is the process that changes an autocratic regime into a democratic one. Kauffman states that in the mid-20th century, democracy increased strongly on international level, which thoroughly changed the global political landscape in one where democracy rules. As a result, global norms increasingly incorporate democracy, which makes it an important topic for policy makers, academics and activists, and results in influential important consequences - which include economic prosperity, security and respect for human rights (Kauffman, n.d.).

Patterson (2015) states that the substantial interest on democratization by scholars always incorporates “moods and challenges” (Patterson, 2015, p.185), derived from actual outcomes of democratic transition. For example, international politics has been

highly optimistic about democratization because it strongly increased from the mid-20th century onwards. However, the number of democratic transitions has declined in the course of the last two decades, and authoritarian resistance against democratization has become persistent (Patterson, 2015, p. 186).

According to van Hüllen (2012), the EU makes strong use of political dialogue and democracy support as partnership tools that are depended on the commitment of the related regime for their execution. The EU focuses on the execution of regime transition in the direction of the European ideal of “liberal (representative) democracy” (van Hüllen, 2012, p.119). Nevertheless, van Hüllen explains that “most observers agree that in practice, democracy promotion as an objective in EU external relations takes a backseat compared to the EU’s concern for stability in order to meet its economic and security interests (e.g. control migration, secure energy supplies). Furthermore, even measures marked as democracy promotion are sometimes ambiguous as it is not clear whether they are really intended to transform or rather to sustain the incumbent regime” (van Hüllen, 2012, p.119).

According to Hollis (2012), the EU promoted and justified its democratization policies based on the idea that they will support to establish ‘shared prosperity’ and an increase in jobs for all Mediterranean countries. Nonetheless, Hollis states that the Arab revolts in 2010-2011 were triggered by “gross disparities in wealth and high unemployment” (Hollis, 2012, p.81), and that by the way it operated, the EU has in fact “favoured regimes and practices that ultimately proved intolerable to a broad stratum of Arab society” (Hollis, 2012, p.81).

Theoretical Framework Conclusion

The EU’s stance on democratization in external relations is mainly established in its legal basis of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in

the articles two and 21. These articles state that EU's action in external relations shall be guided by: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men. These values can be distributed under the following main values: human rights, democracy, the rule of law and justice.

Nonetheless, there is critique towards this stance from the academic sphere. Most of the arguments state that the EU in practice is much more pragmatic than it promises in the TEU, and strongly committed to economic agreements, and on stabilization rather than on democratic reform. However, it seems that economic agreements are used as tools to enhance democracy promotion in the long turn. Therefore, it is relevant to analyze this dimension as well. To conclude, the benchmark to measure EU democratization towards Tunisia will be consistent of the following values: human rights, democracy, the rule of law, justice and economy.

5.Literature Review

In this section the democratization policies of the EU towards Tunisia, according to influential academics from the geopolitical sphere, are outlined. The Jasmine Revolution marked a significant change for Tunisia, because it resulted in the ousting of the autocratic Tunisian ex-president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, which paved the way for stronger support by the EU. Moreover, it is important to analyze how the EU reacted to the Jasmine Revolution as a normative power. Therefore, the literature review focuses on the time frames before, during, and after the revolution. Furthermore, there is a review on the literature about the effect of EU policies in Tunisia. Although this research focuses on the normative stance of the policies, it is obviously interesting to have a general view of the outcomes.

How did the EU Promote the Policy Goals of Democratization Before (1995 - 2010), During (2010 - 2011) and After (2011 - 2014) the Jasmine Revolution?

Before the Jasmine Revolution (1995 - 2010)

Powel (2009a) states that the EU became committed to encourage certain principles at the basis of its foreign policies, as it developed as an international power in the 1990s. The most important of these principles are democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Additionally, Powel explains that due to these international principles, the EU has been identified as a 'normative power' in the academic sphere (Powel, 2009a).

According to the European Commission (EC) (2019) the relationship between Tunisia and the EU is in mutual interest and aims at establishing a flourishing Tunisian democracy (European Commission, 2019a). Abderrahim et al (2018) state that the EU-Tunisia relations started in 1969 with a commercial agreement, when the EU was still the European Economic Community (Abderrahim et al, 2018).

As is stated by Powel (2009b), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of 1995 (EMP), stresses the necessity of democratic reform in Middle Eastern states, including Tunisia (Powel, 2009b). Voss (2010) states that the EMP started the ideal to create an extensive structure of collaboration between the EU and its enclosed neighbors (Voss, 2010).

As is stated by van Hüllen (2012), before the Arab Spring, there were already significant developments of domestic institutional development in the MENA region. At the same time the EU took part in activities in the area of democracy and human rights with its Mediterranean partners. This started giving the EU credibility on domestic institutional transition with regard to political participation, the rule of law and respect for human rights. However, the influence of the EU in authoritarian regimes “is conditional upon a certain degree of political liberalisation in the first place” (van Hüllen, 2012, p.118).

As is stated by Bassotti (2017), “during President Ben Ali’s twenty-year-long dictatorship (1989-2011), the EU did not apply any substantial pressure on the regime, in order to trigger top-down democratic reforms, nor did it engage with Tunisian civil society in order to stimulate bottom-up political change” (Bassotti, 2017, p.4).

As is stated by Ayadi (2016), before the Jasmine Revolution, EU policies towards Tunisia were limited to three fundamental senses, which resulted in a relationship of interests with the regime of Ben Ali. These three fundamental senses were: cooperation in the political, economic and socio-cultural sphere. After the revolution, two new fundamental processes were included: democratization and destabilization, which had significant consequences for EU-Tunisia relations, and the EU found an opportunity for enhanced collaboration (Ayadi, 2016).

1995: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)

The EMP was signed in 1995 in Barcelona with the objective of turning the Mediterranean in an area of shared prosperity, peace and stability. Cooperation was covered in the areas of: “political and security partnership, economic and financial partnership and social, cultural and human partnership” (Ayadi, 2016, p.17). It is a policy aimed at regional cooperation, both between the EU and the Mediterranean countries, and between the Mediterranean countries themselves (European Commission, 2020).

According to van Hüllen (2012), the Mediterranean democracy promotion policy of the EU is the “prototype of a ‘cooperative approach that aims at the active engagement of the target regimes in promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (van Hüllen, 2012, p.119). This objective is built on a joint devotion to human rights and democracy, which are the bases for certain instruments to promote democracy vis-à-vis its Mediterranean partners (van Hüllen, 2012). Nonetheless, it has been “extremely difficult” (van Hüllen, 2012, p.123) for Tunisia to collaborate with the EU, with regard to democracy and human rights. As a result, the EU has had little chance to assist domestic political transition with the use of “political dialogue, democracy assistance, and positive conditionality (van Hüllen, 2012, p.123).

Hollis (2012) states that while the EMP seemed to be a courageous initiative that assured to change the Mediterranean into a “shared geopolitical, strategic and economic space and through this to address some of the very problems that in the end led to the Arab revolts. In structural terms, however, the EMP failed to take serious account of institutional imbalances that would impede realization of the vision” (Hollis, 2012, p.83/83). Moreover, Hollis states that the EMP was more a way for Europeans to limit the influx of migrants into the Union “by throwing money at the problem” (Hollis, 2012, p.84).

1995/1998: Association Agreement (AA)

Tunisia was the first country in the Mediterranean to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in July of 1995 in Brussels. The partnership focuses on the promotion of sustainable development in the country, via strengthened “political dialogue and economic and financial cooperation” (Ayadi, 2016, p.11). It is a bilateral policy by the EU that only focuses on Tunisia.

As is stated by Abderrahim et al (2018), the first country to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in the context of the EMP was Tunisia in the mid-1990s. By then, there was not much room for the EU’s commitment to civil society; the main focal point was on economy, industry and administration (Abderrahim et al, 2018).

However, according to EU Neighbours (n.d.), the AA established the framework for EU-Tunisia collaboration in the political, economic, social, scientific and cultural field, within the EMP (EU Neighbours, n.d.). Ayadi (2016) states that the aim of this agreement is to promote sustainable development in Tunisia through increased political discourse and economic and financial collaboration, focused especially on the liberalization of trade and security issues (Ayadi, 2016).

As is stated by Enders & Jbili (1996), the AA of the EU-Tunisia relation paves the way for wider cooperation and large-scale trade liberalization in varied scopes. It creates the opportunity for Tunisia to increase the economic growth that it already made, and to further increase collaboration with the EU, including political matters. In the social aspect, the Agreement aims for discourse on social issues and recognizes priority spheres for dynamic collaboration, for example, limiting immigration into Europe through regional focus on growth assistance for Tunisia, aiming to reintegrate illegal immigrants into their country, fostering the role of women, and encouraging basic social needs, mainly for women and children. Furthermore, it strengthens the existing rights and obligations of expatriate laborers. It will be an influential project for the integration of the Tunisian

economy into the EU and world economy (Enders & Jbili, 1996).

According to Powel (2009a) the AA mentions almost nothing about the design of colloquial approaches. In fact, it states: “Cooperation shall be aimed at helping Tunisia to bring its legislation closer to that of the Community in the areas covered by this agreement” (as is stated in Powel, 2009a, p.198). Powel concludes that a state’s partnership with the EU is never seen as negative; this can only be positive, is assumed. In other words, EU policy makers believe that Europe’s way is the best (Powel, 2009a).

2004: The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)

The ENP was launched in 2004 in Brussels, after the significant enlargement of the EU in that year. Because of this enlargement, the EU aimed to omit dividing lines between itself and its neighbors. Through the ENP, the EU aimed at promoting “democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and social cohesion, as a basis for deepened political, cultural and social cooperation” (Ayadi, 2016, p.12). It is a bilateral agreement between the EU and Tunisia.

As is stated by Abderrahim et al (2018), the EU’s focus on civil society started gradually within the ENP, although dispersed at the beginning. However, this development was neither simple nor logical as it had to deal with resistance. Moreover, collaboration with civil society was seen as window-dressing and omitted in many cases, since it was perceived as a barrier to government relations. As a consequence, collaboration with civil society was restricted to the small number of organizations that were supplied with enough resources and magnitude to bargain at the level of policy-making, regularly because of cooperation with the regime (Abderrahim et al, 2018; Holden, 2003).

This reality of state-society engagement came to be known with the start of the Jasmine Revolution. Moreover, Abderrahim et al (2018) explain that this was when the EU realized that its focus had been too

much on the authoritarian leaders. Therefore, level of finance and initiatives through civil society started to grow after the revolution (Abderrahim et al, 2018).

As is stated by Hollis (2012), the ENP was an EU initiative in essence, in contrast to the EMP which was a multilateral agreement. Moreover, Hollis states that three factors contributed to the inauguration of the ENP. First, the EU realized that the economies and political situations of the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) were so unharmonized, that each country needed a unique approach. Second, the EU established it as a structure for collaborative relations with Belarus and Ukraine, which might become interested in joining the EU at some moment. Later on, the EU decided that this policy was applicable for the MPC's as well. Third, the ENP was established because of procedures in the Middle East after 9/11 and the US occupation of Iraq; in this context, the EU inaugurated the ENP as an initiative that would pursue the EU promised commitment to encourage good governance, economic stability, democracy and human rights. The EU was already experienced with this promotion in the MENA region because of the EMP (1995). This means that there was a sort of competition between the EU and the US (Hollis, 2012).

Nonetheless, Hollis explains that the ENP was confusing because it assumed that neighbors of Europe, who were not appointed to form part of the EU, could still profit from adopting certain elements of the *acquis communautaire* (*acquis*), while slowly harmonizing with EU standards. This resulted in disappointment because the EU did not understand that the *acquis* does not enhance universal goods. In other words, the involved laws and regulations support European necessities, with all the merits of EU membership, but not necessarily beyond it (Hollis, 2012).

According to Kostanyan (2017), the EU's action within the ENP depends on the domestic circumstances in the ENP countries. The more solid, democratic and friendly towards the EU the ENP country

is, the more consistent the implementation of the EU's instruments can be. It is broadly agreed that there is inconsistency among the varied objectives of the ENP. Particularly, it seems that the EU has prioritized its objective of stabilization above the objective of democratization (Kostanyan, 2017).

Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011) state that the study of the ENP measures in Tunisia reveal that they hold random, unclear and inconsistent standards, which affects the credibility of the EU's conditionality in a negative way (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2011).

Powel (2009a) argues that despite the courageous policy initiatives of the EU (EMP & ENP), "Tunisia continues to challenge those who seek meaningful, democratic government in the state (Powel, 2009a, p.194). Powel states that the EMP and ENP have "institutionalized the EU-Mediterranean (and therein the EU – Tunisia) relationship" (Powel, 2009a, p.195), and that it establishes the basis for democracy promotion in Tunisia (Powel, 2009a). Nonetheless, Powel believes that "through normative power, the EU does nothing more than 'promote itself' in Tunisia" (Powel, 2009a, p.195).

2005: ENP Action Plan 2005-2010

The ENP Action Plan was signed in 2005 in Brussels; in order to implement the purposes of the ENP in Tunisia. Its objective was to strengthen political dialogue, trade liberalization and economic, cultural, social, and financial collaboration, supporting good governance, democratic reforms, strengthening sectorial cooperation, applying poverty alleviation action and establishing people-to-people contact (Ayadi, 2016). It is a bilateral policy between the EU and Tunisia.

As is stated by Voss (2010), the Tunisian government resulted to be quite unwilling to EU guidance in the political normative sphere with regard to the Action Plan. With regard to political aspects, the Tunisian commitment to reform has been limited. However, with regard to

economic, social and development issues, Tunisia has been successful in the implementation of the goals. Therefore, Voss assumes that the EU supported indirectly authoritarian regime solidity. Moreover, instead of creating penal sanctions to achieve the purposes described in the Action Plan, the EU's pragmatic way of dealing prevails. Tunisia is primordially interested in regime firmness, while the EU is interested in regional stability. Therefore, a factual convergence between the aims of the EU and the Tunisian government is the case (Voss, 2010).

According to Sare Aydin (2012), the main purpose of the Action Plan is the search and establishment of reforms that assure democracy and the rule of law (as is stated in Sare Aydin, 2012). However, in general, the Action Plan is more open to cooperation and it aims at fostering harmonization of social and labor policies in order to get the Tunisian legislation to the rules and regulations of the EU (as is stated in Sare Aydin, 2012). Tunisia already had substantially liberalized its trade regime when the Action Plan was signed, this will be fostered through the Action Plan (Sare Aydin, 2012).

2008: The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

The UfM is a policy aimed at regional cooperation between both, the EU and the Mediterranean countries, and in between of the Mediterranean countries. It was designed as a revision for the EMP (1995) and signed in Barcelona. Its aim is to create harmonization and integration between the participants (European Commission, 2019b). It is built on the same three pillars of the EMP, namely: political and security partnership, economic and financial partnership and social, cultural and human partnership (Ayadi, 2016).

Hollis (2012) states that the creation of the UfM reveals that the EMP has been unsuccessful in realizing most of its purposes. The failure of meeting with the aspirations of Chapter 1 (Political & security partnership) has to do with Arab reluctance to collaborate with Israel on regional security, without an end to the Israeli takeover of the

Palestinian Occupied Territories, the Golan Heights (Syria) and the Sheba Farms (Lebanon). Chapter 3 (Partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs) has been successful to a certain extent, but only limited. The only assessable impact has been made in the area of Chapter 2 (Economic & financial partnership). Nonetheless, the ordinary Arab people almost did not benefit from it. Instead of finding a solution for these problems, the UfM arranged a number of commercial projects in the areas including energy, infrastructure, transport and environment. It introduced the concept of a joint presidency, consisting of a European and an Arab head of state. Which would elevate the partnership to the intergovernmental level, giving it a higher profile than the EMP. However, in practice this only took more bureaucracy, more costs, and diplomacy between states rather than engagement between businesses and civil society (Hollis, 2012).

Blanc Altemir & Ortiz Hernández (2014) state that the UfM was another failure of the Euro-Mediterranean relations, and that its foundation (the EMP) was already a misstep. The UfM was proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, who was candidate for the French presidency by then. It was presumed to be a failure because it did not acknowledge the disparities between the Mediterranean shores. Nonetheless, it is important to consider that the launch of the UfM has been confronted with three complicated factors. First, the economic crisis, which had negative influence on the financial grants to the UfM. Second, the UfM was polluted because of conflict in the Middle East; only in a few months after the inauguration of the UfM in Paris in July 2008, Israel started with the “Operation Cast Lead” over Gaza, from December 2008 till January 2009. Third, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 created uncertainty. It was unclear who should have the co-presidency from the EU side, what the role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy should be, and what the relevance would be of the European Service of External Action (Blanc Altemir & Ortiz Hernández, 2014).

During the Jasmine Revolution (2010 - 2011)

As is stated by Kaboub (2012), before the revolution, Tunisia was a “politically stable, westernized, highly educated, tolerant and relatively prosperous society” (Kaboub, 2012, p.1). Nevertheless, he explains that “the illusion of stability, economic prosperity, and growing liberal democracy was created by an elaborate set of smoke screens, propaganda PR messages, data manipulations, and vicious clamp downs on dissenting opinions” (Kaboub, 2012, p.2). The average Tunisian was living in a harsh reality; the middle class socio-economic level was becoming worse, while the business empire of President Ben Ali was substituting the traditional business class, limiting possibilities for investors, entrepreneurs and owners of small business. While Tunisia seemed to be a stable country, it was in fact a “ticking time bomb” (Kaboub, 2012, p.2). This resulted in the revolution, which ended with the ousting of President Ben Ali on 14 January 2011.

As is stated by Bremberg (2016) “...the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU met on 31 January 2011 and the ministers expressed their support for the “democratic aspirations” of the Tunisian (...) people” (Bremberg, 2016; Council of the EU, 2011).

Thyen (2018) argues that EU foreign policy has tended to favor regime firmness over democratization. The reaction of the EU towards the 2011 Arab revolts has proven its lean ability to foster political transition. While the EU publicly stresses its devotion to democracy, and the incorporation of civil society, the EU only supported the opposition’s call for freedom, where the tumble of the government had become unavoidable, as in Tunisia (Thyen, 2018; Behr, 2012). The EU carried on with the promotion of top-down reforms, where the revolts has not been able to change the regime (Thyen, 2018).

As is stated by Bassotti (2017) “when the uprising begun, the EU maintained a cautious ‘wait-and-see’ stance until the ousting of Ben Ali in early 2011. Only once the regime had fallen, did the EU relaunch its commitment to democracy promotion, expressing political support

for the regime change and providing funds to empower Tunisia's civil society" (Bassotti, 2017, p.4).

After the Jasmine Revolution (2011 - 2014)

As is stated by the European Parliament (2020) "Following the Arab Uprisings of 2011, the EU updated its European Neighbourhood Policy to adopt a 'more for more' approach, with support being linked to democratic transition and 'deep democracy'. Incentives – including deeper economic integration, greater financial assistance, enhanced mobility of people and access to the EU's internal market – were offered to those countries willing to undertake political reforms" (European Parliament, 2020, p.1).

As is stated by Bassotti (2017) "only once the regime had fallen, did the EU relaunch its commitment to democracy promotion, expressing political support for the regime change and providing funds to empower Tunisia's civil society. In the consolidation phase, which is still ongoing, the EU is making a genuine effort to ensure the success of this young democracy. In other words, the EU did not apply a 'democracy promotion' policy, which would imply preparing the ground for political change by actively promoting democratic values. Instead, the EU applied a 'democracy support' policy in Tunisia: once the regime collapsed, it supported the embryonic democracy throughout the establishment and consolidation process" (Bassotti, 2017, p.4&5).

As is stated by Ayadi (2016), the development of political collaboration between the EU and Tunisia following the Jasmine Revolution is portrayed by a strong merge of norms and values, however, also by new forms of criticism and challenges. For example, political dialogue should be strengthened with regard to the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions. And, the EU should assure firmness between its rhetoric and practice. Moreover, political cooperation should be between respected

interests, rather than based on supposed shared preferences (Ayadi, 2016). Moreover, the level of socio-cultural collaboration between the EU and Tunisia has increased significantly following the revolution, and the EU started focusing on the society, instead of on the government. (Ayadi, 2016).

However, the transition has also revealed the weak socio-economic situation during the authoritarian regime before the revolution, which means that thousands of educated young Tunisians left the country, to fight in Syria and Iraq because of a lack in opportunities (Ayadi, 2016).

2011: SPRING Program

The SPRING program is a policy aimed at bilateral cooperation between the EU and Tunisia, established as a reaction to the Jasmine Revolution. Its aim is to support Tunisia in its democratic transition with the challenges in the economic, political and social sphere. It was established on already existing initiatives. However, it included the “more for more” approach, which means that it would reward Tunisia for its commitment (European Union, 2011).

As is stated by Krüger & Ratka (2014), after the political change of January 2011, Tunisia suddenly became a priority for the EU. As a result, it strengthened support for the country. The new regional landscape opened the way for a modified policy towards the Arab Spring countries, and the neighborhood in general. Brussels claimed to endeavor a more conditional and differentiated approach. This aim was translated into the SPRING program (Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) in September 2011 and Tunisia became the main beneficiary of it (Krüger & Ratka, 2014).

As is stated by Ayadi (2016), Tunisia experienced changes after the revolution with regard to political, economic and social aspects, leaving behind long-lived status quos that were ruled by authoritarian and repressive regimes. Obviously, it led to questioning the EU policies

in the country, resulting in an in-depth examination of the EU policies towards Tunisia. This review resulted in the implementation of 'more for more' and a differentiation of ideas within the ENP of 1995. This consists principally of rewarding, with supplementary aid (technical and financial) those Mediterranean post-revolution countries that advance faster with democratic reforms. This policy has been of main benefit for Tunisia, because of its determined exercise of democratization (Ayadi, 2016).

According to Dandashly (2018), under the SPRING Program, Tunisia was the main beneficiary. The EU fostered its assistance for election through sending observation missions to observe the elections in, including, Tunisia. Moreover, the EU provided technical support to assist local authorities in Tunisia, to arrange parliamentary and presidential elections (Dandashly, 2018).

2012: Privileged Partnership

The EU-Tunisia relations got to a new milestone in 2012, with the inauguration of the Privileged Partnership based on three ideals: political collaboration, social and economic integration and people-to-people partnerships. It was inaugurated with the arrangement of a new EU-Tunisia Plan of Action for the interval 2013-2017, substituting previous strategic arrangements (Ayadi, 2016).

According to Abderrahim et al (2018), Tunisia was symbolically chosen as being an official "privileged partner" among its Arab neighboring countries by the EU in 2012. However, the EU has given these labels to a wide number of countries in the past, which makes it doubtful that this small symbolism will convince Tunisia of Europe's loyal commitment (Abderrahim et al, 2018).

2014: ENP Action Plan 2013-2017

The purpose of the 2013-2017 Action Plan is to consolidate democratic institutions and create the possibility for mediation of a Deep and

Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), fostering inclusiveness and lowering poverty in the economic agenda, together with broader commitment to EU principles and the continual aid for business growth in the varied areas of the economy (Ayadi, 2016).

According to Bassotti (2017), the Action Plan describes democracy and the rule of law as the first priority of the EU, and is one of the most important documents between the EU and Tunisia during their current relation (Bassotti, 2017).

What was the Effect of the EU Policy Goals on the Democratization of Tunisia?

Krüger & Ratka (2014) analyze the perception of EU policies in Tunisia after the Jasmine Revolution, especially from the civil society, which they believe is one of the main target groups of European policies in the aftermath of the revolution. Their conclusion is that Europe is an actor that is clearly present in Tunisia and has significantly innovated its policy from the start of the regime transition in January 2011. Europe's efforts in Tunisia are appreciated, although there is a level of critique regarding the "allocation of funds, concerning priority sectors, insufficient monitoring and follow-up and too bureaucratic procedures" (Krüger & Ratka, 2014, p.23). Moreover, Europe is seen as one of the most important global actors in Tunisia with growing action and political appearance. However, they do not necessarily link Europe with the European Union, and even less with particular policies, including the ENP, and Europe is not regarded as a unified structure (Krüger, & Ratka, 2014).

According to Dandashly (2014), although the EU supported the regime of Ben Ali in the past, it is regarded positively and as a legitimate actor (as is stated in Dandashly, 2014, p.25). Dandashly concludes this based on interviews with varied members of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly and government officials in 2013. Because of its soft power and historic relations, the EU has a better

image in Tunisia than other actors in the country (as is stated in Dandashly, 2014, p.25).

According to the democracy index of The Economist (2020), Tunisia was considered to be a “flawed democracy” in 2014, with a grade of 6.31 on a scale of one to ten (ten being the highest rate). Between 2011 and 2013, Tunisia was considered to be a “hybrid regime”. Before the Jasmine Revolution, the country was considered to be an “authoritarian regime” (The Economist, 2020).

From 2011 to 2014, the country has been improving, however, from 2006 to 2010, the country was declining in the democracy index (The Economist, 2020). From 2011 to 2014, the EU initiatives of: SPRING Programme (2011), Privileged Partnership (2012), and ENP Action Plan 2013 – 2017, could have supported Tunisia from a hybrid regime, to a flawed democracy. Nonetheless, from 2006 to 2010, the EU policies of: ENP Action Plan (2005-2010) and the Union for the Mediterranean (2008), do not seem to have had any possible effect, since Tunisia declined as an authoritarian regime from 3.06 to 2.79 (The Economist, 2020).

Similar findings are presented by Roser (2019), from “Our World in Data”. In his statistics, it is clear that between 1995 to 2010, Tunisia stayed almost at the same level as an “anocracy”. During these 15 years, the EU implemented the EMP (1995), the AA (1995/1998), the ENP (2004), ENP Action Plan (2005-2010), and the UfM (2008). However, similar to The Economist, Roser reveals that Tunisia rapidly developed from anocracy in 2010 to democracy in 2012, growing one index higher per year until 2014 (Roser, 2019).

The argument that EU policies after the revolution started improving is supported by Bassotti (2017), Krüger & Ratka (2014), Ayadi (2016) and van Hüllen (2012). Authors that regard EU democratization policies towards Tunisia before the Jasmine Revolution with scepticism are: Bassotti (2017), van Hüllen (2012), Hollis (2012), Abderrahim et al (2018), Kostanyan (2017), Del Sarto and Schumacher

(2011), Powel (2009a), Voss (2010), Blanc Altemir & Ortiz Hernández (2014) and Thyen (2018).

Now that an overview has been presented about how other academics regard the EU in its democracy promotion, the research will continue with its own analysis of the EU policies of democratization.

6.Findings

Below the relevant sections of the eight main policy initiatives of the EU vis-à-vis Tunisia are outlined. When applicable, categorization has been made under the following elements: introduction, democratic objectives, commercial objectives, mixed objectives, strategy, and acknowledgement.

Furthermore, an outline presents the number of times that values are mentioned. Although not essential, it provides an indication of what has been prioritized. Note that the policy “Privileged Partnership” of 2012 falls under the “ENP Action Plan” of 2014 (the last policy of this research).

1995: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)

Introduction

“stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history” (European Union, 1995, p.2).

“aware that the new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean constitute common challenges calling for a coordinated overall response” (European Union, 1995, p.2).

“resolved to establish to that end a multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants” (European Union, 1995, p.2).

“regarding this multilateral framework as the counterpart to a strengthening of bilateral relations which it is important to safeguard, while laying stress on their specific nature” (European Union, 1995, p.2).

Democratic Objectives

“convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights” (European Union, 1995, p.2).

“hereby agree to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants the EuroMediterranean partnership through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis (European Union, 1995, p.2).

“The participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal. To this end they agree to conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international law, and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability” (European Union, 1995, p.3).

“In this spirit they undertake in the following declaration of principles to (...) act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party” (European Union, 1995, p.3).

“develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, sociocultural, economic and judicial system” (European Union, 1995, p.3).

“respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any

discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex” (European Union, 1995, p.3).

Commercial Objectives

“sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership” (European Union, 1995, p.2).

“the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the EuroMediterranean partnership” (European Union, 1995, p.2).

“The participants emphasize the importance they attach to sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity” (European Union, 1995, p.4).

Value	Number of Times Mentioned
Democracy (or Democratic)	3
Human Rights	5
The Rule of law	2
Justice (or Judicial)	4
Economy (or Economic)	31

Key points

The first policy towards the Mediterranean, aimed at regional cooperation. Primordially meant for economic cooperation. It mentions human rights, democracy, the rule of law, justice and economy; however, it puts no emphasis on these principles. There is a lack of clear strategy and appears mainly symbolic.

1995/1998: Association Agreement (AA)**Introduction**

“CONSIDERING the importance of the existing traditional links between the Community, its Member States and Tunisia and the common values that the Contracting Parties share” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

“CONSIDERING that the Community, its Member States and Tunisia wish to strengthen those links and to establish lasting relations, based on reciprocity, partnership and co-development” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

Democratic Objectives

“CONSIDERING the importance which the Parties attach to the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the observance of human rights and political and economic freedom, which form the very basis of the Association” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

“DESIROUS of establishing and developing regular political dialogue on bilateral and international issues of mutual interest” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

“provide an appropriate framework for political dialogue between the Parties, allowing the development of close relations in all areas they consider relevant to such dialogue” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

“Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles which guide their domestic and international policies and constitute an essential element of the Agreement” (European Union, 1998, p.3).

Economic Objectives

“CONSCIOUS of the importance of this Agreement, based on cooperation and dialogue, for lasting stability and security in the Euro-

Mediterranean region” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

“BEARING IN MIND the economic and social disparities between the Community and Tunisia and desirous of achieving the objectives of this association through the appropriate provisions of this Agreement” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

“establish the conditions for the gradual liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital, - promote trade and the expansion of harmonious economic and social relations between the Parties, notably through dialogue and cooperation, so as to foster the development and prosperity of Tunisia and its people” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

Combined Objectives

“CONSIDERING recent political and economic developments both on the European continent and in Tunisia” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

“CONSIDERING the considerable progress made by Tunisia and its people towards achieving their objectives of full integration of the Tunisian economy in the world economy and participation in the community of democratic nations” (European Union, 1998, p.2).

Strategy

“A regular political dialogue shall be established between the Parties. It shall help build lasting links of solidarity between the partners which will contribute to the prosperity, stability and security of the Mediterranean region and bring about a climate of understanding and tolerance between cultures” (European Union, 1998, p.3).

Value	Number of Times Mentioned
Democracy (or Democratic)	3
Human Rights	2
The Rule of law	0
Justice (or Judicial)	3
Economy (or Economic)	40

Key points

Explanations of purpose and aims are presented in more detail. Strategy is mentioned, and great emphasis on the economy remains.

2004: The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)

Introduction

“With its historic enlargement earlier this month, the European Union has taken a big step forward in promoting security and prosperity on the European continent. EU enlargement also means that the external borders of the Union have changed. We have acquired new neighbours and have come closer to old ones. These circumstances have created both opportunities and challenges. The European Neighbourhood Policy is a response to this new situation. It will also support efforts to realise the objectives of the European Security Strategy” (European Union, 2004, p.2).

Mixed Objectives

“Since this policy was launched, the EU has emphasised that it offers a means to reinforce relations between the EU and partner countries, which is distinct from the possibilities available to European countries under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of

new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation” (European Union, 2004, p.3).

“The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development. Commitments will also be sought to certain essential aspects of the EU’s external action, including, in particular, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as abidance by international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution” (European Union, 2004, p.3)

“The Action Plans will draw on a common set of principles but will be differentiated, reflecting the existing state of relations with each country, its needs and capacities, as well as common interests. The level of ambition of the EU’s relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared” (European Union, 2004, p.3).

Strategy

“The method proposed is, together with partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfilment will bring them closer to the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated in jointly agreed Action Plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts” (European Union, 2004, p.3).

“Progress in meeting the agreed priorities will be monitored in the

bodies established by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or Association Agreements. The Commission will report periodically on progress accomplished. On the basis of this evaluation, the EU, together with partner countries, will review the content of the Action Plans and decide on their adaptation and renewal. Decisions may also be taken, on this basis, on the next step in the development of bilateral relations, including the possibility of new contractual links. These could take the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements whose scope would be defined in the light of progress in meeting the priorities set out in the Action Plans” (European Union, 2004, p.3).

“The Action Plans will provide a point of reference for the programming of assistance to the countries concerned. Assistance from existing sources will be complemented in the future by support from the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The present communication puts forward for discussion an outline of this instrument, building on the Commission’s communication of July 2003. Meanwhile Neighbourhood Programmes are being developed through existing support mechanisms. The Commission seeks to offer neighbouring countries additional support through instruments such as technical assistance and twinning. It is also conducting a survey of EU programmes and agencies where the participation of neighbouring countries may be in the interests of the enlarged EU and of neighbouring countries” (European Union, 2004, p.4).

Value	Number of Times Mentioned
Democracy (or Democratic)	17
Human Rights	20
The Rule of law	8
Justice (or Judicial)	13
Economy (or Economic)	53

Key Points

Strong introduction and explanation of its purpose. It is meant to omit dividing lines between an enlarged EU and the Mediterranean. There is an increase of strategy through the establishment of action plans and differentiated approaches to each country. The emphasis on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and justice is far more stronger than before. However, the economy remains the main concern by far.

2005: ENP Action Plan**Democratic Objectives**

“an upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation through enhanced political dialogue” (European Union, 2005, p.2).

“strengthening administrative and judicial cooperation” (European Union, 2005, p.3).

“the pursuit and consolidation of reforms which guarantee democracy and the rule of law” (European Union, 2005, p.3).

“enhancing political dialogue and cooperation in areas such as democracy and human rights, foreign and security policy, cooperation in the fight against terrorism, whilst promoting respect for human rights” (European Union, 2005, p.3).

Commercial Objectives

“the prospect of moving beyond the existing relationship to a significant degree of integration, including offering Tunisia a stake in the internal market and the possibility of participating progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes” (European Union, 2005, p.2).

“increased financial support: the EU will grant additional financial assistance to Tunisia to support implementation of the Association Agreement and of the operations identified in the Action Plan, in

particular to enhance the economy's ability to withstand competitive pressures and to strengthen institutional capacity as well as investments and infrastructure" (European Union, 2005, p.2).

Mixed Objectives

"The European Neighbourhood policy will go beyond existing ties to offer the EU's neighbours the prospect of a significant measure of economic integration through gradual integration in the internal market and deepening of political, cultural and social cooperation" (European Union, 2005, p.1).

"The European Union and Tunisia are determined to seize this opportunity in order to strengthen the ties between them and promote stability, security and prosperity on the basis of a partnership based on solidarity and common interests. The approach is founded on partnership, joint ownership and differentiation" (European Union, 2005, p.1).

"Tunisia and the EU want to give a new dimension to every aspect of the Association Agreement through the deepening of their political, economic, social, cultural and scientific ties and cooperation on security and environmental questions" (European Union, 2005, p.1).

"This EU neighbourhood policy sets ambitious goals based on the mutually recognised acceptance of common values such as democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, (...) poverty alleviation and the strengthening of political, economic, social and institutional reforms" (European Union, 2005, p.1).

"The neighbourhood policy will allow Tunisia to reinforce the strategic foundation of this choice whilst respecting its national identity and characteristics" (European Union, 2005, p.1).

"This Action Plan is the first step in a process covering a timeframe of three to five years. It will enable a more targeted implementation of the instruments provided for in the Association Agreement

between the EU and Tunisia with a view to bringing Tunisian economic, social and science structures more into line with those of the Union. The process also advances and supports the approximation of Tunisian legislation, norms and standards with those of the Union in the areas covered by the plan” (European Union, 2005, p.1&2).

“The Action Plan, which by virtue of its flexibility can be adapted to Tunisia’s needs and specificities, will also support the development and implementation of policies designed to promote economic growth, employment and social cohesion, reduce poverty and protect the environment, thereby contributing to the long-term objective of sustainable development” (European Union, 2005, p.2).

“cooperation on labour issues and social policy and the gradual approximation of Tunisian legislation to EU rules and regulations” (European Union, 2005, p.3).

“effective management of migration flows, including the possibility of concluding a readmission agreement with the European Community” (European Union, 2005, p.4).

Strategy

“The level of ambition of the future relationship will depend on the degree of commitment of both parties to common values and their capacity to implement undertakings made. The rate of progress of the relationship will acknowledge fully the efforts and concrete achievements in meeting jointly agreed priorities” (European Union, 2005, p.1).

“This Action Plan and the priorities it contains will be jointly prepared by Tunisia and the European Union who will work together in close cooperation on its implementation, evaluation and any necessary adaptations” (European Union, 2005, p.2).

“Progress in meeting the priorities contained in the Action Plan will be jointly monitored in sub-committees established by the Association Agreement. On this basis, the EU and Tunisia will review the content

of the Action Plan and decide on any adaptations and updates required. After three years, the EU and Tunisia may decide on the next step in the development of bilateral relations, including the possibility of new contractual links. This could take the form of a European Neighbourhood Agreement whose scope will be defined in the light of progress in meeting the priorities set out in the Action Plan” (European Union, 2005, p.4).

Short term

- “Further increase participation by all sections of Tunisian society in political life;” (European Union, 2005, p.4).
- “further develop the role of civil society;” (European Union, 2005, p.4).
- “encourage exchanges of experience between Tunisian and European members of parliament in all priority areas of the Action Plan;” (European Union, 2005, p.4).
- “set up a subcommittee under Article 5 of the Association Agreement with a view to developing structured political dialogue on democracy and the rule of law;” (European Union, 2005, p.4).
- “continue support to political parties so as to further strengthening their involvement in the democratic process” (European Union, 2005, p.4).

Medium term

- “Strengthen the efficiency of judicial procedures and the right of defence;” (European Union, 2005, p.4).
- “consolidate existing initiatives in the area of penal reform;” (European Union, 2005, p.4).
- “improve detention and prison conditions, in particular for the holding of minors, and ensure prisoners’ rights; trains prison staff; develop alternatives to incarceration; training and reintegration into society;” (European Union, 2005, p.4).

- “pursue and support reforms to the justice system, notably with regard to access to justice and the law and modernisation of the justice system” (European Union, 2005, p.5).

Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms

- “Ensure that national legislation complies with international law on human rights and with UN recommendations;” (European Union, 2005, p.5).
- “pursue and extend dialogue on human rights issues, particularly in the context of the UN Commission on Human Rights;” (European Union, 2005, p.5).
- “support training measures in the human rights field aimed at law enforcement agents” (European Union, 2005, p.5).
- “examine the possibility of accession to the optional protocols to international human rights conventions to which Tunisia is party” (European Union, 2005, p.5).

Monitoring

“The Action Plan will be submitted to the EU-Tunisia Association Council for formal adoption. The Action Plan will guide cooperation between the EU and Tunisia. The joint bodies established under the Association Agreement will advance and monitor the implementation of the Action Plan on the basis of regular report on its implementation”. (European Union, 2005, p.29&30).

“The two parties will conduct an initial review of the implementation of the Action Plan within two years of its adoption”. (European Union, 2005, p.30).

“The parties will jointly amend and/or update the Action Plan on a regular basis to reflect progress in addressing the priorities” (European Union, 2005, p.30).

Value	Number of Times Mentioned
Democracy (or Democratic)	7
Human Rights	12
The Rule of law	5
Justice (or Judicial)	11
Economy (or Economic)	30

Key Points

There is a strong emphasis on human rights, democracy, the rule of law and justice, which is explained in detail. Moreover, there is an increase in strategy through short and long term goals; and monitoring. The economy remains the leading concern.

2008: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

Introduction

“All of the EU’s Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with Europe. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has provided a means to address many strategic regional questions relating to security, environmental protection, the management of maritime resources, economic relations through trade in goods, services and investment, energy supplies (producing and transit countries), transport, migratory flows (origin and transit), regulatory convergence, cultural and religious diversity and mutual understanding. However, the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe, the importance of our links, the depth of our cultural and historical relations and the urgency of the strategic common challenges we face, need to be revisited and given greater political prominence” (European Union, 2008, p.2).

“The European Council of 13/14 March 2008 approved the principle of a Union for the Mediterranean and invited the Commission to present proposals defining the modalities of what will be called

“Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” (European Union, 2008, p.2).

Democratic Objectives

“The partnership has also overseen efforts to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and continues to promote the embracing of all human rights and freedoms” (European Union, 2008, p.3).

“The Commission has consulted with all partners involved in the European Union and the Mediterranean, in order to gain a clearer picture of their priorities and to see how best to channel a new political and practical impetus into the process” (European Union, 2008, p.2).

Mixed Objectives

“The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue, and political dialogue is a regular item on the agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean ministers’ and senior officials’ meetings. It represents a strong commitment to regional stability and democracy through regional cooperation and integration, and aims to build on that consensus to pursue the path to political and socio-economic reform and modernisation” (European Union, 2008, p.2).

“A number of shortcomings need to be addressed if the Partnership is to become the multilateral support to jointly agreed policies in political, security, economic, social, educational and cultural cooperation. There is a need to reassert in political terms the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all participants. There is mutual concern about the perceived lack of co-ownership by Mediterranean partners. Another area to be addressed is the lack of institutional balance between the weight of the EU on one side, and the Mediterranean partners on the other” (European

Union, 2008, p.4).

“The challenge of a new initiative is to enhance multilateral relations, increase coownership of the process and make it more visible to citizens. Now is the time to inject further momentum into the Barcelona Process” (European Union, 2008, p.4).

“It should build on and reinforce the successful elements of the existing Barcelona Process. Thus the Barcelona Declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain valid and its "three chapters of cooperation" (Political Dialogue, Economic Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, Social and Cultural Dialogue) will continue to constitute the backbone of Euro-Mediterranean relations” (European Union, 2008, p.4).

“Following the views expressed by most EU Member States and Mediterranean Partners, the Commission considers that the current structures of the Barcelona Process, and in particular the Euro-Mediterranean Senior officials meetings, the Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings and the experts’ meetings should be preserved and reinforced where possible. Political and economic dialogues are a major feature of the multilateral dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations and should continue to operate” (European Union, 2008, p.4).

Acknowledgement

“The Commission has made an analysis of the achievements of the Barcelona process and its contribution to dialogue, peace, stability and prosperity in this region, shared by the EU and some of its closest partners. They have also taken into account the shortcomings and difficulties in this process of multilateral co-operation which the EU has pursued since 1995. This Communication takes these factors into account and sets out the Commission’s proposals for developing the “Barcelona process: Union for the Mediterranean” (European Union,

2008, p.2).

“the persistence of the conflict in the Middle East has challenged and stretched the Partnership to the limit of its abilities to preserve the channels of dialogue among all partners” (European Union, 2008, p.2).

“the aim of advancing and reforms and engaging more decisively in the process of strengthening governance and participatory democracy, has been tempered by global and regional events” (European Union, 2008, p.3).

“A very positive feature of the last decade has been the way in which dialogues with different political and economic agents -civil society, including women’s organisations and the media – have become more central to the process” (European Union, 2008, p.3).

“In sum, the Partnership has witnessed a strong promotion of multilateral and bilateral relations, but now needs a qualitative and quantitative change, to spur investment and employment creation and optimise the use of human resources” (European Union, 2008, p.3).

“An additional deficit of the Barcelona Process has been its weak visibility and the perception by citizens that little is done to tackle their daily problems and their real needs. More engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into tangible realities” (European Union, 2008, p.4).

Strategy

“This new initiative will give a new impulse to the Barcelona Process in at least three very important ways:” (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“– by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners;” (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“– by providing more co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and” (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“– by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region”. (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“All dimensions of the process will be open to all participants on an equal footing” (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“A clear signal of the intention to upgrade the relationship will be the proposed decision to hold biennial summits of Heads of Government. The first Summit, due to take place in Paris on 13 July 2008 under the incoming French Presidency, should take the formal decision to launch “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”, and establish its structure, functioning and main goals. The conclusions of the summit should also include a political declaration, and possibly a short list of concrete regional projects to be set in motion. The conclusions should be adopted by consensus” (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“Subsequent summits will follow this format by adopting a political declaration, endorsing a broad two-year work programme for the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” and agreeing on a number of concrete regional projects. Foreign Affairs Ministerial meetings will also take place between summits to review progress in the implementation of the summit conclusions and prepare the next summit meetings” (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“In principle the summit meetings should take place alternately in the EU and in Mediterranean partner countries. Countries hosting summit or ministerial meetings of the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” should invite all countries which are parties to the initiative” (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) has reaffirmed itself as the Parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process providing a framework of debate, open dialogue and free exchange of views. It gives impetus to the Partnership by adopting resolutions and recommendations. The role of the Euro-Mediterranean Assembly will be the legitimate parliamentary

representation of a Union for the Mediterranean. The Commission strongly supports the strengthening of the role of the EMPA in relations with Mediterranean partners” (European Union, 2008, p.5).

“During the consultations and contacts held by the Commission it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stronger partnership that should come through greater co-ownership of the different processes. Two proposals have received overall support from partners: the establishment of a co-presidency and the setting-up of a joint secretariat. Co-Presidency” (European Union, 2008, p.5&6).

“Establishing a co-presidency will increase and improve the balance and the joint ownership of our cooperation. They will be the co-presidents of the Partnership as a whole. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU, and the other from the Mediterranean partner countries” (European Union, 2008, p.6).

“Given the complex regional environment, the selection of the co-president from the Mediterranean partner countries will require consensus. The co-presidency from the Mediterranean side should be chosen for a period of two years. The country assuming the co-presidency on the Mediterranean Partner side may host the summit of the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” (European Union, 2008, p.6).

“Another key instrument for enhancing co-ownership and promoting a more balanced partnership will be an improved system of institutional governance and the creation of a new secretariat. In order to make the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” more visible and relevant, it should have a strong project focus” (European Union, 2008, p.6).

“Improved institutional governance: A reinforced and more balanced and enhanced governance will be attained by setting-up a committee of specifically appointed representatives from all Member States, Mediterranean Partners and the Commission. They will

constitute a Brussels based committee to be called “Joint Permanent Committee” composed of permanent representatives from the respective missions in Brussels” (European Union, 2008, p.6).

Value	Number of Times Mentioned
Democracy (or Democratic)	3
Human Rights	1
The Rule of law	0
Justice (or Judicial)	0
Economy (or Economic)	15

Key Points

It includes acknowledgement of shortcomings during the predecessor policy EMP. Moreover, it introduces a new strategy to enhance cooperation through the inauguration of a committee for state representants. There is a low emphasis on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and justice. However, it states that it will build on already existing dynamics.

2011: SPRING Program

Introduction

“Brussels, 27 September 2011” (European Union, 2011, p.1).

“The Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth – the SPRING Programme, adopted today - directly responds to the events of the Arab Spring. Initiatives supported by SPRING will focus specifically on two of the renewed EU policies in the region” (European Union, 2011, p.1).

Democratic Objectives

“The main aim is to respond to the pressing socio-economic challenges that partner countries of the southern Mediterranean region are facing and to support them in their transition to democracy. Support

provided through the SPRING programme will be tailored to the needs of each country, based on an assessment of the country's progress in building democracy and applying the 'more for more' principle. 'More for more' means that the more a country progresses in its democratic reforms and institutional building, the more support it can expect from the SPRING programme" (European Union, 2011, p.1).

Commercial Objectives

"Results are expected in a number of areas including a better regulatory framework for business, increased numbers of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs); as well as a reduction in internal social and economic disparities" (European Union, 2011, p.1).

Strategy

"Initiatives supported through the SPRING programme will complement already- ongoing activities in partner countries, supported at EU level or bilaterally by EU Member States, as well as by other donors. Initiatives will be identified by EU Delegations working closely with partner governments, EU Member States and international stakeholders. All Southern Neighbourhood partners' countries will benefit from the programme. Depending on conditions in each individual country, it is expected that initial support in 2011 may go to Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco" (European Union, 2011, p.1).

"Depending on the rhythm of reform in each country, concrete results are expected in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic governance, freedom of association, expression and assembly and free press and media. Improvements in public administration, rule of law and fight against corruption — are also anticipated" (European Union, 2011, p.1).

Value	Number of Times Mentioned
Democracy (or Democratic)	5
Human Rights	1
The Rule of law	0
Justice (or Judicial)	0
Economy (or Economic)	3

Key Points

Decided to enhance cooperation on already existing dynamics, the so-called “more for more” approach. Moreover, it is determined to reward Tunisia for its commitment. For the first time it mentions democracy more than the economy.

2014: ENP Action Plan (includes 2012 Privileged Partnership)

Introduction

“Tunisia and the European Union are bound by a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement that came into force in March 1998. On the basis of that agreement, an EU-Tunisia Action Plan under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was approved by the two parties in May 2005 for a period of five years. Within this framework EU-Tunisia relations have developed and matured substantially. The presentation in March 2010 of a Tunisian proposal to attain an advanced status¹ gave a further impetus to these relations and marked a significant deepening of relations in the areas of political relations, security, economics, trade and various sectors, and in people-to-people contacts” (European Union, 2014, p.3).

“When the current ENP Action Plan expired in 2010, it was deemed appropriate to negotiate and conclude a new Action Plan based on the objectives and ambitions of the joint document on privileged partnership. However, pending the conclusion of the new Action Plan, both parties agreed in September 2010 to continue to apply the 2005

Action Plan” (European Union, 2014, p.3).

“EU-Tunisia relations are conducted in the broader context of a region where the overall political situation has been in a state of flux since early 2011” (European Union, 2014, p.3).

Mixed Objectives

“The Joint Communication ‘A new response to a changing neighbourhood’² outlined a new approach which aims at a higher level of differentiation, allowing each partner to develop its links with the EU based on its own aspirations, needs and capacities, but also on mutual accountability and the degree of commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and the capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities. This new Action Plan clearly sets out the priority objectives of EU-Tunisia relations, while taking full account of the privileged partnership and the comprehensive scope of EU-Tunisia relations” (European Union, 2014, p.3).

“The European External Action Service (EEAS), in close cooperation with the European Commission and the EU Member States, has held exploratory talks with Tunisia which have resulted in an agreement on a draft Action Plan, including the list of priority measures to be carried out under the Plan. At the last EU-Tunisia Association Council meeting on 14 April 2014 both sides noted that they had reached an agreement. The finalisation of technical consultations on each side was notified through an exchange of letters” (European Union, 2014, p.3).

“The new EU-Tunisia Action Plan sets out specific measures for the fulfilment of the parties’ obligations under the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement. It also provides a broader framework for further strengthening EU-Tunisia relations to achieve a significant measure of economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation, in accordance with the overall objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean

Agreement. Pursuant to the European Neighbourhood Instrument Regulation³, the Action Plan is a key point of reference for setting the priorities of the Union under the ENP. The ENP, as a single policy framework, will continue to act as a catalyst, based in particular on partnership and joint ownership, as well as performance-driven differentiation and tailor-made assistance. The European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ('High Representative') annex hereto the text of a joint proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken by the European Union within the EU-Tunisia Association Council on the adoption of a recommendation on the implementation of the Action Plan” (European Union, 2014, p.3&4).

“The European Commission and the High Representative therefore request the Council to adopt the attached joint proposal for a Council Decision” (European Union, 2014, p.4).

Value	Number of Times Mentioned
Democracy (or Democratic)	1
Human Rights	1
The Rule of law	1
Justice (or Judicial)	0
Economy (or Economic)	2

Key Points

Defines the relation with Tunisia as privileged and aims at increasing cooperation in already existing areas, which might be a reason why there is not a strong emphasis on values. Below an overview of the key points is presented.

Overview of Evolvement

Policy	Characteristics	Improvement
1995: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)	The first policy towards the Mediterranean, aimed at regional cooperation. Primordially meant for economic cooperation. It mentions human rights, democracy, the rule of law, justice and economy; however, it puts no emphasis on these principles. There is a lack of clear strategy and appears mainly symbolic.	Not applicable
1995: Association Agreement (AA)	Explanations of purpose and aims are presented in more detail. Strategy is mentioned, and great emphasis on the economy remains.	Clearness and strategy
2004: European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)	Strong introduction and explanation of its purpose. It is meant to omit dividing lines between an enlarged EU and the Mediterranean. There is an increase of strategy through the establishment of action plans and differentiated approaches to each country. The emphasis on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and justice is far more stronger than before. However, the economy remains the main concern.	Transparency, strategy, democracy
2005: ENP Action Plan	There is a strong emphasis on human rights, democracy, the rule of law and justice, which is explained in detail. Moreover, there is an increase in strategy through short and long term goals; and monitoring. The economy remains the leading concern.	Strategy

2008: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)	It includes acknowledgement of shortcomings during the predecessor policy EMP. Moreover, it introduces a new strategy to enhance cooperation through the inauguration of a committee for state representants. There is a low emphasis on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and justice. However, it states that it will build on already existing dynamics.	Acknowledgement and new strategy (intergovernmental cooperation)
2011: SPRING Program	Decided to enhance cooperation on already existing dynamics, the so-called “more for more” approach. Moreover, it is determined to reward Tunisia for its commitment. For the first time it mentions democracy more than the economy.	Decided to reward Tunisia in its democratic reform
2014: ENP Action Plan (Privileged Partnership 2012)	Defines the relation with Tunisia as privileged and aims at increasing cooperation in already existing areas, which might be a reason why there is not a strong emphasis on values.	Enhanced cooperation

The policies appear to evolve in certain matters. Along the way, the strategy explanation increases in clearness. Transparency becomes present, especially because of acknowledgement of errors. Experiment appears, especially through the intergovernmental initiative of the UfM. Furthermore, commitment increases. However, this became easier because of the downfall of the autocratic regime.

7. Discussion

In this section the opinions of academics on EU democracy promotion are compared with the results of the policy analysis. The discussion is distributed again over the eight main policies, in order to get insights about how they evolve over time.

1995: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)

The EMP states in its first paragraph that the future relations between the EU and the MPC's (Mediterranean Partner Countries) will be kept on the "privileged nature of the links forged by the neighbourhood and history". The "links forged by neighbourhood" sounds logical - since both actors are close to each other. However, the "privileged nature of history" does not. This is because Tunisia has been a former European colony, in which contemporary European values were not generally met. Defining this historical relationship as "privileged" means that the EU ignores its imperialist former stance. Moreover, the EMP is based on a multilateral agreement. The argument by Pavone (2015) that democratization is Eurocentric appears to be reasonable.

However, this "Eurocentrism" disappears quickly; in the third paragraph, the EU states that the relation with Tunisia will be "with due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants". In the fourth paragraph it states that the aim is to encourage "bilateral relations (...) while laying stress on their specific nature". This contradicts with the promise in the legal basis, where the EU states that it "shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation", including democracy and the rule of law. Stating that it will regard local characteristics in its foreign policy gives the impression of pragmatism. In this regard, the argument of Powel (2009a) seems reasonable because he states that "democracy is just one of the many principles that are encouraged by the EU, and is not necessarily the most prominent one in its association with Tunisia". Moreover, Powel states that "stability is

increasingly preferred by EU policy-makers". Van Hüllen (2012) similarly argues that "most observers agree that in practice, democracy promotion as an objective in EU external relations takes a backseat compared to the EU's concern for stability, in order to meet its economic and security interests". Moreover, van Hüllen argues that "even measures marked as democracy promotion are sometimes ambiguous as it is not clear whether they are really intended to transform or rather sustain the incumbent regime". Hollis (2012) claims that the EMP was more a way for Europeans to limit the influx of migrants into the Union "by throwing money at the problem".

The sixth paragraph states that the EMP "requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights". Furthermore, it aims at "sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures". These objectives only correspond to the EU legal basis if they are guided by democracy and respect for human rights; it is not clearly prioritized. Moreover, Hollis (2012) states that "the EMP failed to take serious account of institutional imbalances that would impede realization of the vision."

Then, the EMP states that in order to meet the objectives requires "strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals". Regular intervals is open to a broad interpretation and might pave the way for procrastination, which in turn might lead to disregard. Moreover, it is stated that "The Ministers for Foreign Affairs will meet periodically in order to monitor the application of this Declaration and define action enabling the objectives of the partnership to be achieved". Aiming to meet "periodically" is not a decisive stance; it is open to interpretation and might lead to neglect.

1995/1998: Association Agreement (AA)

The AA states in its first paragraph that it considers “the importance of the existing traditional links” between the involved parties. In comparison with the first paragraph of the EMP, this stance does not sound Eurocentric and seems to be an improvement. It acknowledges traditional important links and does not characterize these as privileged.

However, the second paragraph states that the AA wishes to strengthen these links, in order to “establish lasting relations, based on reciprocity, partnership and co-development”. Another pragmatic stance, especially because of “reciprocity”. Of course, it might be that the EU wished to start pragmatic, which relates to the argument of Pavone (2015) in which he states that EU democratization is “Whiggish” because of the supposed belief that a West-European style of democracy is fostered automatically by economic modernization, without regard to time and place. Moreover, the argument of Abderrahim et al (2018), that during the AA there was not much room for the EU’s commitment to civil society and that the main focal point was on economy, industry and administration, seems applicable.

The third paragraph states that “the observance of human rights and political and economic freedom (...) form the very basis of the Association”. Although this basis still has roughly two components (political and economic), there is a matter of prioritization in contrast to the EMP. Nonetheless, the second paragraph has a less normative stance than the third. It is strange to see that a paragraph mentioning “very basis” comes after a paragraph that states “reciprocity”. It would be logical if the “very basis” of a policy would be mentioned at its very basis. Therefore, this indicates a matter of indecisiveness. At the very beginning contradictions seem to appear again.

Paragraph 5 states “CONSIDERING the considerable progress made by Tunisia and its people towards achieving their objectives of full integration of the Tunisian economy in the world economy and

participation in the community of democratic nations". However, it does not mention a timeframe of this progress, which would be important for monitoring, it sounds as an empty statement.

Paragraph 6 states "CONSCIOUS of the importance of this Agreement (...) for lasting stability". The focus of Europe on stability rather than on democratic reform seems to be present again.

Paragraph 8 states "BEARING IN MIND the economic and social disparities between the Community and Tunisia." This obviously is an important realization and might be an improvement of the EMP, where Hollis (2012) explains that it failed to bear this in mind, which resulted in failure.

Paragraph 9 states "DESIROUS of establishing and developing regular political dialogue on international issues of mutual interest. "Desirous" does not sound as decisive as would be, for example, "determined". Moreover, "regular political dialogue" is again a passive statement.

The second paragraph of article 1 states that the agreement aims to "provide an appropriate framework for political dialogue between the parties (...) in all areas they consider relevant to such dialogue". This is peculiar since the AA starts with mentioning that its very basis is "the observance of human rights and political and economic freedom".

Although the AA does not have a decisive role and lacks prioritization, Enders & Jbili (1996) state that it paves the way for wider cooperation, increasing Tunisia's economic growth and further increase collaboration with the EU in political matters. It can be seen as a start towards democratization through economic integration according to Europe's soft power and multilateralism. However, Powel (2009a) explains that the Association Agreement aims at helping to get Tunisian legislation closer to that of Europe in the areas covered in the AA. Powel concludes that EU policy makers believe that Europe's way is the best and can only be seen as positive. Similar to Pavone, Powel seems to characterize the EU as Eurocentric. Nonetheless, the EU

appears to be quite passive and inconsistent in its aims.

2004: The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)

The ENP starts by stating that it is established as a result of EU enlargement. This means that the external borders of the EU became different and this is accompanied by opportunities and challenges. It is true that 2004 was a year in which many countries joined the EU. However, these countries were generally in the east of Europe. Therefore, including Tunisia in a policy that particularly focuses on eastern enlargement is doubtful. These regions have a total different nature and historic relations with Europe. Moreover, the policy is meant to deal with the new bordering countries of the EU. This is not related to Tunisia.

However, it also states that it aims at strengthening relations between the EU and partner states in a distinct way than among the European countries under article 49 of the TFEU (Treaty on Functioning of the European Union). Moreover, it aims at preventing the increase of dividedness between the amplified EU and its neighbors; and giving them the chance to take part in several EU activities, through stronger political, security, economic and cultural co-operation. Furthermore, it aims at establishing certain priorities with the partner countries that aim at getting these countries closer to the EU. These priorities will be included in jointly agreed Action Plans. This will result in a privileged relationship in which development will be based on the commitment to common values “principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations and the principles of market economy as sustainable development”.

There is a matter of a general set of principles. However, it will be “differentiated reflecting the existing state of relations with each country, its need and capacities, as well as common interests”.

Nevertheless, Hollis (2012) argues that although the promise of the EU to differentiate their approach to the states, the ENP was still confusing because the involved laws and regulations support European necessities, with all the merits of EU membership, but not beyond it. Hollis made a similar statement under the EMP.

Although the ENP has been born under the auspices of EU enlargement to the east, it promises a differentiated approach with regard to each country. It acknowledges that an enlarged EU might create dividedness between the EU and its neighbors, and the ENP aims at getting the neighboring countries closer to the EU. Per country, certain priorities will be set up, and these will be included in jointly agreed action plans. Development will be based on democratic values and it will be monitored.

In contrast to the EMP and the AA, the ENP seems to be a well thought out policy that – instead of naming certain broad objectives, respecting the status quo of autocratic states, and unclear plans of action – aims at differentiated approaches with focus on local circumstances per country through action plans. Its tone is more determined and precise. Moreover, in contrast to the former policies, the ENP starts with a detailed introduction that explains the context for the inauguration of the ENP. This is positive because it presents EU reasoning, rather than the spontaneous beginnings of the former two policies, this makes it more transparent.

However, Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011) state that the ENP holds random, unclear and inconsistent standards. This is agreed as well by Kostanyan (2017) who states that the ENP is strongly dependent on the openness of the regime and that the EU prioritized stabilization over democratization.

The argument of Abderrahim et al (2018) that the focus of the EU on civil society slowly started within the ENP seems to be clear. However, Powel (2009a) states that Tunisia kept on challenging those who were in search of meaningful, democratic government in the state.

Moreover, he states that the ENP institutionalized the EU-Tunisia relationship and that this forms the basis for democracy promotion in the country. However, Powell claims that the EU only promotes itself in Tunisia, through normative power.

Holden (2003) states that collaboration with civil society was restricted to the small number of organizations that were supplied with enough resources and magnitude to bargain at the level of policy-making, regularly because of cooperation with the regime, which the EU found out only with the start of the Jasmine Revolution. Abderrahim et al (2018) explain that this is why the EU started to focus more on the civil society rather than on the state, after the revolution.

Last but not least, Hollis (2012) reveals that the ENP is partly founded on competition, because of US operations in Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11. Since the EU was already experienced with the promotion of democracy in the MENA region, it found itself obligated to continue this commitment after the settlement of the US with similar stances; although different than the EU, through the use of hard power.

2005: ENP Action Plan 2005-2010

The ENP Action Plan starts with the statement that it will go “beyond existing ties to offer the EU’s neighbours the prospect of a significant measure of economic integration through gradual integration in the internal market and deepening of political, cultural and social cooperation”. In comparison to the former policies, the ENP declares its aim of political cooperation through economic integration. In the former policies, the EU appeared inconsistent and messy. Although some academics agree that this ideal is “Whiggish”, there is at least a certain tactic to be found, between the economic and political aims of the EU; rather than simply naming certain objectives without prioritization.

However, Voss (2010) states that the EU has indirectly supported the authoritarian regime through this policy. He explains that Tunisia

successfully implemented the economic, social and development aims of the EU. Nonetheless, the country has been unwilling to EU support in the political sphere. Instead of developing penal sanctions to achieve political purposes, the EU simply kept with its pragmatism.

In contrast to former policies, the ENP states its acknowledgement that “the level of ambition of the future relationship will depend on the degree of commitment of both parties to common values and their capacity to implement undertakings made”. This declaration might be a result of the limited effects of the former policies. However, as is stated by Voss, instead of establishing penal sanctions, the EU seems to hold back. While starting with the ambitious goal of establishing cooperation that “will go beyond existing ties” the passive stance of the EU becomes visible again and is a signal that indeed, stabilization is preferred over democratization. However, establishing penal sanctions would be a form of hard power. Taking into account the multilateral history of the EU, this is not what the EU aims for. The support of an autocratic regime in the name of stability might be seen as bridge that will lead to democracy in the long run.

The EU seems able to reward Tunisia through the statement “this could take the form of a European Neighbourhood Agreement whose scope will be defined in the light of progress in meeting the priorities set out in the Action Plan. This is obviously a positive incentive. It also aims at further increasing “participation by all sections of Tunisian society in political life” and “further develop the role of civil society”. This seems to be an improvement of the ENP, which did not prove to be successful with regard to the civil society organizations. Another positive aspect is that it aims at encouraging “exchange of experience between Tunisian and European members of parliament in all priority areas of the Action Plan”. This is a good way to establish transparency, which is essential in the sphere of democracy promotion. Moreover, it aims at setting up a “subcommittee under Article 5 of the Association Agreement with a view to developing structured political dialogue on

democracy and the rule of law". And also "continue support to political parties so as to further strengthening their involvement in the democratic process".

These initiatives are aimed at the short term. The aim to encourage democracy appears to be stronger than in the former policies. However, with regard to the support of political parties in the democratic process, there is critique to be found. Powel (2009a) states that the EU favors certain actors over others. Powel explains that the EU never assists "Tunisian Islamist political or civil society organizations". Therefore, the EU does not promote democratization in essence. However, as is explained by Manners (2002) democracy is rooted in European historical background. Therefore, it might be that the EU perceives Islamic political groups as incapable to deal with democratic values, since they have a different history. Again, the Eurocentric stance of the EU seems to appear. However, the EU states in article 21 of the TEU that "The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation." Besides, as is stated by Kaboub (2012) Tunisia was a westernized society, and the call for democracy has been triggered by the Tunisians themselves.

In the medium term, the Action Plan aims to support "the efficiency of judicial procedures and the right of defence". Also, to "ensure that national legislation complies with international law on human rights and with UN recommendations". Although there is no deadline, and the terms "short and medium term" are vague, there is definitely ambition to be found. It is also positive to see that "the two parties will conduct an initial review of the implementation of the Action Plan within two years of its adoption".

2008: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

The policy states at the beginning that "the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe, the importance of our links, the depth of

our cultural and historical relations and the urgency of the strategic common challenges we face, need to be revisited and given greater political prominence.” Moreover, it states that it will fall under the Barcelona Process. In other words, it was a modification of the EMP (1995), and established on the same three pillars: Political Dialogue, Economic Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, Social and Cultural Dialogue.

According to Hollis (2012) the UfM was a prove that the EMP had been unsuccessful in realizing its purposes. The only significant impact had been made under Chapter 2: Economic & financial partnership. However, ordinary Arab People did not benefit from it. Hollis explains that the UfM continued with arranging commercial projects, instead of finding solutions.

Key features of the UfM are: “upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners” - this promise has been made repeatedly since 1995. “Providing more co-ownership to our multilateral relations” – a typical stance by the EU that indicates the preference of stability over reform. “Making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region”.

The UfM explains that “the shortcomings and difficulties in the process of multilateral co-operation which the EU has pursued since 1995” has been taken into account. Moreover, it states that it developed a clearer picture of priorities “to see how best to channel a new political and practical impetus into the process”.

While the partnership has been willing to encourage democracy and political pluralism “this has been tempered by global and regional events”. It obviously would be interesting to know which events exactly. This would establish more transparency.

It confesses that the EMP (1995) is perceived by citizens as a policy that has not been able to “tackle their daily problems and their real need”. Therefore, it states that “more engagement and new catalysts

are now needed to transform the objectives (...) into tangible realities". The problem that EU support has not been visible by ordinary citizens in Tunisia has been stated as well by Kaboub (2012), especially in the economic sphere. It is positive that the UfM recognizes and confesses this issue and is determined to find a solution for it.

Later on it explains "the Partnership has witnessed a strong promotion of multilateral and bilateral relations, but now needs a qualitative and quantitative change". This is basically the same that is being states all the time; to improve already existent dynamics between the actors. Not a promising statement.

It wants to bring the partnership to the intergovernmental level through the establishment of a "new secretariat" and through the establishment of a "committee of specifically appointed representatives from all Member States, Mediterranean Partners and the Commission". Hollis (2012) explains that this initiative, in practice "only took more bureaucracy, more costs, and diplomacy between states rather than engagement between businesses and civil society". However, it was the first time that the EU tried this, therefore it was an experiment. Although a failure, it reflects the goodwill of the EU to enhance cooperation.

As is stated by Blanc Altemir & Ortiz Hernández (2014), the UfM resulted in a failure because it did not recognize the disparities between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. This statement has been made by Hollis (2012) before. However, Blanc Altemir & Ortiz Hernández explain that difficult factors surrounded the establishment of the UfM, including the economic crisis and conflict in the Middle East. These factors might have had negative influence on the policy.

2011: SPRING Program

SPRING is the abbreviation for "Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth". Obviously an original name since it was the EU's

response to the Arab Spring (Jasmine Revolution for Tunisia). However, this response was adopted quite late in September 2011, while the Tunisian autocratic President had left the country on 14 January of the same year. The argument of Bassotti (2017), that the EU “maintained a cautious ‘wait-and-see’ stance until the ousting of Ben Ali in early 2011” seems to fit. Moreover, Bremberg (2016) states that “...the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU met on 31 January 2011 and the ministers expressed their support for the “democratic aspirations” of the Tunisian (...) people”. Nonetheless, it took a half year before the EU published the SPRING initiative through a memo.

Thyen (2018) states that the EU only supported the opposition’s call for freedom, where the tumble of the government had become unavoidable, as in Tunisia. Bassotti agrees on this by stating “only once the regime had fallen, did the EU relaunch its commitment to democracy promotion”. Nonetheless, Krüger & Ratka (2014) state that Tunisia suddenly became a priority for the EU after the political change of 2011, and that the EU strengthened its support for the country.

The memo states that the SPRING initiative “will be tailored to the needs of each country, based on an assessment of the country’s progress in building democracy and applying the ‘more for more’ principle”. This means that “the more a country progresses in its democratic reforms and institutional building, the more support it can expect from the SPRING programme”. Ayadi (2016) explains that after the revolution, Tunisia left behind long-lived status quos that were ruled by authoritarian and repressive regimes. This led to an in-depth examination of EU policies towards Tunisia which led to the ‘more for more’ approach.

Furthermore, the SPRING promises that “depending on the rhythm of reform in each country, concrete results are expected in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic governance, freedom of association, expression and assembly and free press and media. Improvements in public administration, rule of law and fights

against corruption – are also anticipated”. Dandashly (2018) states that Tunisia was the main beneficiary of the SPRING program because the EU fostered its assistance for election through sending observation missions to observe the elections in the country. Moreover, the EU provided technical support to assist local authorities in Tunisia to arrange parliamentary and presidential elections. As is revealed by the democracy indexes of the Economist (2020) and Roser (2019), Tunisia entered in the democratic transition from the year 2011 onwards.

2014: ENP Action Plan (includes 2012 Privileged Partnership)

As is stated by Abderrahim et al (2018) Tunisia was symbolically chosen as a “privileged partner” of the EU in 2012. However, they state that these labels had been given to a wide number of countries before, and therefore it is doubtful that this symbolism will convince Tunisia of Europe’s loyal commitment.

This “privileged partnership” would be implemented under the ENP Action Plan of 2014. The policy states that “EU-Tunisia relations are conducted in the broader context of a region where the overall political situation has been in a state of influx since early 2011”. Moreover, it states that “it takes full account of the privileged partnership and the comprehensive scope of EU-Tunisia relations”. Also, it states that “it also provides a broader framework to further strengthening EU-Tunisia relations to achieve a significant measure of economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation”.

The recognition of Tunisia as a privileged partner is obviously a friendly symbol of the EU. The promise that it will enhance political collaboration is one that has been ongoing in all the policies. However, the democracy indexes of The Economist (2020) and Roser (2019) reveal that Tunisia has been improving between 2011 and 2014 towards a “flawed democracy” and a “democracy”.

According to Krüger & Ratka (2014) civil society members report that Europe is an actor that is clearly present in Tunisia and has significantly

innovated its policy from the start of the regime transition in 2011. However, there is critique regarding the “allocation of funds, concerning priority sectors, insufficient monitoring and follow-up and too bureaucratic procedures”. Also, they state that Europe is seen as one of the most important global actors in Tunisia with growing action and political appearance.

Dandashly (2014) states that although the EU supported the regime of Ben Ali in the past, the EU is regarded positively and as a legitimate actor in Tunisia.

Nevertheless, Bassotti (2017) claims that Tunisia would have become a democracy with or without the assistance of the EU. He states that the EU established “democracy support” instead of “democracy promotion”. This increased once the regime fell down.

8. Conclusion

The EU's preference for stability over democratization is agreed by van Hüllen (2012), Voss (2010), Bassotti (2017), Abderrahim et al (2018), Enders & Jbili (1996), Kostanyan (2017), Sare Aydin (2012) and Kaboub (2012). When analyzing the history of the EU, it is based on multilateralism and soft power. Therefore, the EU will not try to encourage its ideals with aggression, rather through commercial agreements. This might be Whiggish, as is stated by Pavone (2015), however, it is a logical strategy by the EU; because its own democratic system is mainly funded on commercial agreements.

Moreover, the statement of van Hüllen (2012), that EU democracy support is dependent on the commitment of the partner regime, is obviously true. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the EU should aim for hard power, or simply ignore its surrounding neighborhood. Moreover, the EU's commitment to human rights is one of its priorities in external relations. Therefore, their emphasis on stability is more lucrative than would be the use of sanctions or hard power. This is the reason why the critique of Voss (2010) about "the EU's reluctance to establish penal sanctions" is invalid.

Powel (2009a) states that the EU has been biased because of its reluctance to assist Tunisian Islamist political or civil society organizations. Nonetheless, the EU stresses in its legal basis that it will encourage the principles that inspired its own creation. This is not related to the Islam. Whether that is Eurocentric, as Pavone finds, is not relevant. Fact is that the EU is a prosperous region, therefore it aims to avoid dividing lines between itself and its neighbors. And the only reference that it has to do that, is its own path to prosperity. Moreover, democracy has been demanded by the Tunisians themselves.

Van Hüllen states that democracy promotion of the EU takes a backseat compared to the EU's concern for stability. However, there

is nothing wrong with the aim to establish a “win-win situation”. Moreover, this is in fact what the EU wishes to establish: “a region of shared prosperity”.

The analysis of the policies in the time frame of 19 years reveals that the EU tries to make certain improvements over time. Hollis (2012) states that the EMP (1995) failed to take serious account of institutional imbalances. Nonetheless, this was the reason why the EU established the UfM (2008), in which it confesses recognition of this issue. Also, the fact that the UfM pushed regional cooperation to the intergovernmental level is a sign of the EU experiment to find an effective strategy to cooperate with its neighbors, even if this did not succeed.

Powel (2009a) states that the AA (1995/1998) does not mention “colloquial approaches”. However, the ENP Action Plan 2005-2010 established an improvement through detailed explanation of its approach.

As is agreed by Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011), and Kostanyan (2017), the ENP is unclear with regard to its aims, which seems to be true because it does not prioritize goals. However, the following ENP Action Plan 2005-2010 improves this vagueness by stating that it aims to encourage political cooperation through the gradual integration of Tunisia in the internal market.

The EU thanks its post-war recovery to multilateralism, mainly based on economic cooperation that spilled over in political cooperation. Just as it states in its legal basis, the EU will encourage the principles that inspired its own creation into the wider world. Therefore, this action will be through the use of soft power, multilateralism, stabilization, and economic cooperation, with the aim of democratization in the long run. Indeed, EU democratization is an experiment that should be analyzed carefully over an extended time frame, instead of criticizing it prematurely.

In order to answer the research question of “How did the EU try to

fulfill its policy goals to enhance democratization in Tunisia?”, the answer is: with an experimental approach consistent of soft power, multilateralism, prioritizing economic cooperation at first, while slightly aiming at increasing political cooperation. Although this did not succeed before the Jasmine Revolution, it have been courageous initiatives that aimed to improve over time. After the revolution, it was much easier for the EU to increase its democracy support, and that is what it proved to do.

Strong improvements between 1995 and 2014 are not visible. However, the analysis over time reveals certain improvements: there is an increasing tendency of prioritization of democratic reform, detailed explanation of strategy and transparency. Also, certain experiments are visible – especially the aim to push regional cooperation to the intergovernmental level - which reveals the EU’s commitment. Although the EU made certain mistakes, it proved to be transparent by acknowledging its errors, and to establish new strategies. This sign is positive because it indicates EU commitment to promote the values in which it believes, and which have credibility because of pacifying the continent.

9.Recommendation

For the European Union it is recommended to establish clear priorities in the policy initiatives. Although improvement is visible over time, the policy documents remain quite vague and contradicting. It is recommended to start the policy documents with the main aims, and to continue with less important matters. Also, it is important to have a clear strategy, and short and long term goals. This is essential for effective monitoring. Moreover, it is salient to explain what the outcomes were of former policies. This creates transparency about why certain measures are, or are not, implemented. Furthermore, it is important to improve agenda setting. The policies often use terms as “regular”. It is better to use words as “weekly” or “monthly”, since “regular” is open to endless forms of interpretation.

For further research, it is recommended to analyze EU democratization over extended periods again, with focus on milestone policies. The milestone policies generally form the basis for smaller initiatives, therefore it is important to focus on these.

At this stage, it is not reliable to do research on specific EU policies, since the EU as a normative actor is a relatively new phenomenon and therefore an experiment. Rather, the focus should be on analyzing the evolvement of the policies. It would be interesting to assess the EU again, in comparison with the outcomes of this research to see how it progressed.

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European Studies Student Ethics Form

Your name: Maurik Grootes

Supervisor: F.J. Brinkman

Instructions:

Before completing this form you should read the APA Ethics Code (<http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx>). If you are planning research with human subjects, you should also look at the sample consent form available in the Final Project and Dissertation Guide.

- a. Read section 2 that your supervisor will have to sign. Make sure that you cover all these issues in section 1.
- b. Complete section 1 and, if you are using human subjects, section 2, of this form, and sign it.
- c. Ask your project supervisor to read these sections (and the draft consent form if you have one) and ask him/her to sign the form.
- d. Always append this signed form as an appendix to your dissertation. This is a knock-out criterium; if not included the Final Project/Dissertation is awarded an NVD.

Section 1. Project Outline (to be completed by student)

(i) Title of Project: How did the EU try to enhance democratization in Tunisia?

(ii) Aims of project:

Full Title of Project: How did the European Union try to fulfill its policy goals to enhance democratization in Tunisia? The aim is to assess the democratization policies of the European Union towards Tunisia from 1995 to 2014. Since the inauguration of the EU in 1993 it has proclaimed itself at a normative power. There is a significant amount of critique towards this stance in the academic sphere. However, this critique is mainly based on short time frames. This research will analyze the democratization policies over an extended time-frame and see how they evolve over time. The aim is to avoid generalization and find a more reliable conclusion.

(iii) Will you involve other people in your project – e.g. via formal or informal interviews, group discussions, questionnaires, internet surveys etc. (Note: if you are using data that has already been collected by another researcher – e.g. recordings or transcripts of conversations given to you by your supervisor, you should answer 'NO' to this question.)

No

If yes: you should complete the section 2 of this form.

If no: you should now sign the statement below and return the form to your supervisor. You have completed this form.

This project is not designed to include research with human subjects. I understand that I do not have ethical clearance to interview people (formally or informally) about the topic of my research, to carry out internet research (e.g. on chat rooms or discussion boards) or in any other way to use people as subjects in my research.

Student's signature

Date

12 May 2020