

# Politics and International Organizations: four cases in The Hague and Geneva

Prepared for the IIAS Congress in Morocco, June 2014

Study Group IX "Civil Service and Politics"

Rosa Groen, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, [r.s.groen@hhs.nl](mailto:r.s.groen@hhs.nl)

## Abstract

*In Western Europe, cities that host International Organizations (IOs) have to deal with more and more competition. The last decade many IOs settled in Eastern European and Asian countries. Distributing IOs over several cities in Europe for reasons of political balance and give-and-take among governments play a role in these decisions. However, policy networks are more and more operational in these negotiations. Apart from the political and administrative actors, others – as private actors and external lobbyists – play a role as well. This often leads to increased complexity and ineffective decisions. This paper examines four cases in which political gameplay influenced the location decision-making of IOs in The Hague and Geneva. First, I will introduce the subject, research method and the four cases. Second, I will discuss how public policy networks are increasingly complicating factors to the settling processes of IOs. Third, a reconstruction of the settlement processes of four IOs will illustrate this.*

## Introduction

Whereas in the 1960s there were only very few cities hosting IOs and INGOs, nowadays almost every city plays along. Recently big cities, mostly in Asian, African and Eastern European countries, have become more attractive for IOs (Manninen, 2008).

Consequently, IOs have a wide range of possible host cities and therefore obtained a stronger position in settlement negotiations. And when they have already settled in a city they have a strong position in the negotiations concerning their special needs, as cities are eager to retain them.

In this rapidly globalizing world, with more cities to choose between and fewer new IOs, 'traditional' Western European host states and cities need a stronger and more active way of promoting themselves in order to attract and retain IOs. Local and national governments have different strategies to adjust to these developments and change their way of attracting and retaining IOs.

A crucial factor in the changing strategies of national governments concerning IOs is diplomatic and political gameplay. Depending on the type of IO, a special committee - e.g. European, UN- or NATO-related - decides which city will be the best settling place for the IO. National governments can vary with their offers with different incentives, paying rent for several years, providing diplomatic immunity and statuses to the future employees and other advantages. Distributing IOs over several cities in Europe for reasons of political balance and give-and-take among governments as well as the diversity of nationalities in IOs also play a role in these decisions.

In this paper I discuss four cases in which politics influenced the location

decision-making of international organizations in The Hague and Geneva. Local and national policy documents were analyzed and the case study method will be applied, by following the classical *process-tracing procedure*. For this procedure, semi-structured in-depth interviews with policy-makers and participants of the settlement campaigns were required. Besides, evaluation reports and other primary sources were analyzed.

Two cases are examples of IOs that settled in the 1990s: the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva (1995) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague in 1997. The other two are examples of IOs that seriously considered settling in The Hague and Geneva more recently, but were decided to settle in other cities: The Green Climate Fund (GCF) settled in Songdo, South Korea (2012, instead of Geneva), and the *Collège européen de police* (European Police College, CEPOL) settled in Budapest, Hungary (2014, instead of The Hague).

The increasing interaction of different actors and Policy Networks (PN) in the decision-making process complicated this process more and more. By describing the lobbying process and the number and roles of the actors involved in the location decision-making of the four IOs, this paper illustrates how the increase of PN resulted in less effective and even inefficient decisions.

## Policy networks involved in the settlement process of IOs

In Public Administration (PA) research, bureaucracy and policy networks (PN) have been extensively studied the past decades. The PN approach used in this paper is, as defined by Blanco et al.: a network within a longstanding feature of government that focuses on cross-sectoral and cross-national variations, highlights the existence of different types of policy networks and as informal relations, that are difficult to manipulate (Blanco, Lowndes, & Pratchett, 2011; Giaque, Resenterra, & Siggen, 2009).

Important here, is the general idea that the increase of bureaucracy as well as the use of PN complicates politics and government more and more. As Peters states, there are several reasons for the increased range of governmental activity (Peters G. B., 2010). Examples are the increasing concentration of people in urbanized areas, the increasing complexity of modern economic and social life and the expanded role of governments by the internationalization of economies and of social life in general.

Another reason for the increased range of governmental activity – and indeed complexity – is the amalgam of private and public actors in decision- and policy-making. More and more, PN operationalize decision-making. Godroij argued that the characteristics of PN – multiformity, interdependence, participation of many actors and partial conflict – are the reason for decreased effectiveness. PN are basically characterized by multiformity and interdependence. Multiformity – involvement of a relatively large number of actors, each bringing in different goals, visions and interests – and interdependence – the realization of goals by one actor has positive or negative consequences for the other actors – thus form PN in which many actors govern a policy field. Not only can political interests overrule expertise in PN. Also, effectiveness can be

harmed because the influence of many parties on policy formulation can bring about inadequate compromises. Finally, efficiency may be damaged because much energy has to be invested in communication and bargaining (Godroij, 1995). My argument here is that this is more and more the case.

In the 1990s, PN were less extended, less mixed with other interest groups and political actors, less complex. In the last decades, PN have become more complex and policy decisions less efficient. By describing two settling processes of International Organizations (IOs) in the 1990s and two in the 2010s, I will illustrate how the complexity of these processes increased. And thereby, how the efficiency of decision-making decreased.

## The World Trade Organization, Geneva 1995

The World Trade Organization (WTO) opened its doors in 1995. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the preceding organization to the WTO, was already located in Geneva. This played a major role in the decision-making process. The GATT started its work in 1947, as an organization overseeing the multilateral trading system. The 128 governments that signed the GATT-agreements were officially known as “GATT contracting parties”. Upon signing the new WTO agreements (which included the updated GATT, known as GATT 1994), they officially became known as “WTO members” (WTO, 2014).

The idea behind creating this new institution first emerged in 1990, when proposals called for revising the terms of the multilateral trading system (VanGrasstek, 2013). An informal proposal came from John H. Jackson, a legal scholar and former US official. Jackson identified some shortcomings of the GATT and wrote a book about the ‘birth defects’ that needed to be corrected. He presented the argument for replacing GATT with a true IO. The main improvement would be for the WTO charter to ‘perform the role of an institutional agreement for service trade agreements and services sector agreements’ (VanGrasstek, 2013). Jackson wanted a ‘common, unified, panel procedure that would become a part of each of the various dispute settlement procedures of the ‘sheltered treaties’ as well as dealing with issues arising under the WTO’. The main difference between the GATT as it existed and the proposed WTO, were his proposed sheltered agreements: instead of requiring all members to adopt all agreements, these would become optional for acceptance.

The location was decided to be Geneva after considering two other cities: Bonn and Brussels. The last one withdrew. The Germans had made a video to submit their proposed city. Switzerland made a report on Geneva. The actors involved in the location decision-making were the 128 WTO-members and a supplemented preparatory commission - the *prepcom* - that contained a small number of around 20 members. The Hungarian ambassador was the head of that *prepcom*. This committee wrote a report to the GATT Council, and they decided by consensus (Director, 2014).

Many other IOs were in Geneva, so cooperation was possible. Another factor that

played a role were several issues of conditions of work for the delegations: tax issues, privileges and immunities. Besides, the spouses could work in the country, which was a great incentive. Finally, a negotiation took place between the *prepcom* and the governments of Germany and Switzerland. Other incentives were: parking spaces for diplomats at the airport, new underground parking spaces for the WTO specifically, the transmission of the GATT building into a newly constructed WTO building, and lots of premises (Director, 2014). The decision-making process took one year.

### Actors involved in the location decision: WTO

The actors involved were the 20 members of the *prepcom*, the 128 WTO-members and the local and national governments of the candidate countries. The Canton of Geneva and to some extent the city of Geneva (only for the building facilities) were actors of the Swiss bid.

## Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague 1997

In 1992 the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva completed twenty years of work on the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Convention is one of the most complex international arms control agreements ever adopted (Kenyon & Feakes, 2007). The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the implementing body of the CWC, which entered into force in 1997.

Before the OPCW opened its doors in The Hague, a period of five years of location decision-making and settlement processes took place. From the start, four countries signed up to host the organization: Austria, The Netherlands, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. The last one was dropped from the list after not responding in time at the questionnaire containing 92 questions regarding the nature of the bid. There remained three candidates as host cities: Vienna, The Hague and Geneva.

The generally accepted idea at the time was that the IO would obviously settle in Geneva, the location where the discussions for the CWC took place. Nevertheless, a campaign team started opting for The Hague as the ideal location of the organization that arose from the CWC negotiations (Hoekema, 2014). The strongest points for The Hague as host city for the OPCW were the international airport Schiphol, The Prins Maurits Laboratory in Rijswijk (TNO/PML) and the active role The Netherlands played in the CWC negotiations in Geneva, in the person of Dr. Jack Ooms who was the only delegate who continuously participated over the full twenty-year course. Other examples of The Netherlands' practical commitment to the negotiations were its involvement in the international inter-laboratory tests and its hosting of the first national trial inspection to be conducted at a chemical industry facility (Kenyon & Feakes, 2007). Although it was the first time for the Netherlands to join an international competition for the seat of an international organization, the process went swiftly. The Ministry of Defense contributed a maximum of NLG 35 million (approx. EU 20 million) to the bid, on top of the initial sums of NLG 8 million (EU 5 million) from the Ministry of

Economic Affairs and the City of The Hague.

### **Actors involved in the location decision: OPCW**

The actors involved in the settlement process of the OPCW were thus the national government (the ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs) and the local government (the City of The Hague). Others were a professional lobbyist hired by the City of The Hague, the 40-member Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the G-21 countries, the non-aligned countries within the CD (Kenyon & Feakes, 2007, pp. 25-7).

### **The lobbying campaign**

The G-21 countries were a strategic 'target' for the lobbyist of the City of The Hague. A large numbers of the non-aligned countries had Islam as their main religion; a central element of the campaign focused on the 'multiracial character and tolerance' of the Dutch society. Another part of the lobbying process was aimed at the G40, the UN countries in the Conference of Disarmament. After a visit of the heads of all delegations to The Hague, the ambassadors were asked to fill in and return a questionnaire on their opinions of the trip and their views of The Hague as the seat of the organization. With this information, the targeted lobbying began. The delegates of the countries were all approached differently.

During the visit of the delegates, the initials of the OPCW were featured on the KLM aircraft and during the return journey the pilot announced that they were in a hurry, as Geneva airport closed in the middle of the evening (whereas Schiphol airport operates 24/7). This was an element of 'blackmailing' to the other obvious choice: Geneva. There was the added sense of urgency within the team as the time frame was tight; in conflicts worldwide chemical weapons were involved.

In June 1992, all visits to the three cities were completed and the head of the German delegation, Ambassador Von Wagner, was elected as chairman of the ad hoc committee for the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention with a mandate to complete the negotiations before the end of the year. He asked the head of the Pakistan delegation, Ambassador Ahmed Kamal, as 'Friend of the Chair on the question of the seat of the organization' (Kenyon & Feakes, 2007). Ambassador Kamal chose the procedure to discover the consensus for a single candidate. Each delegation was to inform him privately of their preference. The city with the smallest number, Geneva, had to withdraw. In the second round of informal consultations, Vienna withdrew. All in all, it took another 5 years before the building was finished and the work could begin (Van Krieken & McKay, 2005).

### **The Green Climate Fund, Songdo 2012**

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) opened its doors in 2013. The GCF is a fund within the framework of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) founded as a mechanism to transfer money from the developed to the developing world, in order to assist the developing countries in adaptation and mitigation practices to counter climate

change (Green Climate Fund, 2014). The Green Climate Fund was designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention.<sup>1</sup>

The decided location was not Geneva but Songdo, South Korea. However, Geneva had a very good chance of hosting this IO. In its offer, it stressed Geneva's 'excellent living and working conditions' and provided the GCF with a funding of 15.5 million US dollars to establish and operate the Fund (FDFA, 2012). Five other countries submitted their candidacy to host the GCF in April 2012. In October the decision was made. There were various stages of the location decision-making process. In the six months between April and October 2012, the six candidate countries did a campaign. The possible host cities were Geneva (Switzerland), Warsaw (Poland), Bonn (Germany), Windhoek (Namibia), Mexico City (Mexico) and Songdo (Republic of Korea). The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs was dealing with the campaign in Switzerland.

### **Actors involved in the location decision: GCF (Songdo)**

The Governing Instrument for the Fund was the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Focusing on the PN involved in the lobbying process of Geneva, there were the following: the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Environment and Finance. Other members of the government went to conferences, visits, etc., as well. The host country section was involved (ministry of Foreign Affairs, the division of International Organizations in Bern), the Canton and City of Geneva. The 24 members of the GCF Board were involved. The most important actors were in the Host Country Evaluation Committee that was constituted of six members with equal representation between developed and developing countries: Indonesia, Egypt, Spain, Belize, The USA and the Czech Republic. None of them were from one of the candidate countries. The Interim Secretariat played an administrative, logistical and technical role until the independent Secretariat was established (Board of the Evaluation Committee, 2012). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) in Washington D.C. provided meeting rooms and other logistical support.

### **The lobbying process**

The methodology of the Board was guided by 'the principles of equity, efficiency and effectiveness' (Board of the Evaluation Committee, 2012). All Committee members signed a declaration of impartiality and confidentiality. After the offers were handed in, the Committee sent out a questionnaire, building on the evaluation criteria agreed by the Board. Based on the initial expressions of interest, presentations made at the first Board meeting and additional information submitted through the questionnaire, the Committee members conducted individual evaluation of the offers (Board of the

---

<sup>1</sup> The secretariats of the UNFCCC and of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) took the administrative steps to set up the Interim Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund as an autonomous unit within the UNFCCC secretariat premises to provide technical, administrative and logistical support to the Board until the independent Secretariat was established (Board of the Evaluation Committee, 2012).



Evaluation Committee, 2012, p. 4). The Interim Secretariat assisted the Committee members in conducting the evaluation. The Committee invited representatives of the six candidates for meetings at the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in Washington D.C. During closed meetings with the representatives of each candidate, the Committee focused on an interactive and open discussion seeking clarification on the expressions of interest and the questionnaire submitted.

Nevertheless, as a member of the Swiss FDFA stated in an interview, it mattered whether the country was hosting one of the meetings of the Board (Swiss FDFA, 2014). All candidates could apply for hosting a Board meeting. The first was in Geneva in August 2012, the following meeting was in September in Washington D.C., another was held in Berlin and the final meeting was in Songdo. Other factors, apart from the content of the reports and the location of the meetings, played a role as well. A member of the FDFA stated:

*Of course, there were also political considerations. Last year there was a certain tendency towards the emerging countries, states in Asia, new cities. Regionally alliances between the Board members and political decisions played a major role in the negotiations. Considerations and instructions to vote for certain countries were effectuated. (...) On the paper the Republic of Korea looked good, but Korea is geographically inconvenient and most experts on climate change are not located in that area.*

The Committee evaluated three out of the six candidate countries positively (green light) on all criteria: Germany, Korea and Switzerland. As the procedure prescribed, the Committee's report circulated to the Board and all host country candidates for their review. Each candidate country had the opportunity to provide a written statement regarding its offer and the report. The Board undertook the following steps towards adopting an outcome by consensus: the Co-Chairs consulted with members of the Board on a confidential basis to determine whether a consensus existed. Failing that, the Board utilized the decision-making process (Board of the Evaluation Committee, 2012, p. 28);:

- 1) A series of confidential ballots of Board members; 2) Following each round of balloting, the candidate country with the least support was eliminated; 3) Each member was permitted one ballot in each round; 4) In the final round of two candidate countries, the candidate country receiving the majority of support was selected for the Board to then be endorsed by consensus; 5) In the event of a tie, the balloting process is repeated until a majority is reached; 6) The Board will adopt the outcome of the process by consensus

The outcome of the Board selection process would be communicated to the COP for endorsement through the report of the Board. As there were three candidates with a 'green light' on all the criteria<sup>2</sup>, the members of the Board voted in several rounds. Geneva and Songdo were the last two possible host cities for the Fund. And, as a member of the Swiss FDFA summarized: *"The voting was secret. Regional groups voted for their*

---

<sup>2</sup> Legal Status, Privileges and immunities, Financial arrangements, administrative and logistical support to the Fund, Local facilities and conditions and Other relevant information.

*own regional constituency, represented the board members. The Board decided. This was a group of 24 people of 24 countries. The number was based on the usual contribution.”*

## **The European Police College, Budapest 2014**

The *Collège européen de police* (CEPOL) is a European Union Agency established in 2005 with the mission of developing a network for senior police officers from police forces in Europe and encouraging cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime by means of training (Hankiss, 2013). The Agency was located in Bramshill, UK. In 2012 the UK informed the European Parliament and the Council of the EU that it no longer wished to host the seat of CEPOL on its territory. The National Policing Improvement Agency of the UK was decided to be replaced by a new College of Policing elsewhere. Because CEPOL was sharing the facilities with this this Agency, they had to leave Bramshill as well (European Union, 2013). The following countries presented their cities as candidates to host CEPOL: The Netherlands (The Hague), Hungary (Budapest), Spain (Ávila), Finland (Tampere), Greece, Italy (Rome) and the Republic of Ireland. In 2012 the Member States agreed on a revision of the agencies. If possible, some agencies would have to be combined. For that reason, the European Commission and the Dutch government decided to propose a union of Europol and CEPOL.

In the treaty of CEPOL, the location in the UK was mentioned. Therefore, the Council had a role in the process as well, as new statutory papers of CEPOL were necessary. The European Parliament required the practical application of the Lisbon Treaty and asserted its role as co-legislator (with the Council). However, the Council decided informally to transfer the seat of CEPOL to Budapest, without taking the Parliament's position. This frustrated the members of the LIBE Committee of Parliament.<sup>3</sup> But then again, characterizing informal governance in the EU is the nature of actors involved in these informal processes (Peters B. G., 2006).

### **Actors involved in the location decision: CEPOL**

The actors involved in the decision-making process of CEPOL were the Member States of the EU, the European Commission, the Council, the bilateral embassies, the agencies, the interior ministers of the EU, the European Parliament. In the candidate countries, the ministries of external affairs and the local governments of the cities were involved (Netherlands Permanent Representation, 2014). The countries had to present their candidature in front of the LIBE commission of the European Parliament.

### **The lobbying process**

The location decision-making process politicized in 2013. Instead of being a decision on the most suitable and efficient location, other interests dominated the process. It grew

---

<sup>3</sup> The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) is a standing committee of the European Parliament.



towards an institutional battle between the European Parliament and the Council (Cesaro, 2013). The Salzburger Forum (SF) - eight Eastern European Member States<sup>4</sup> - lobbied against The Netherlands, as they interpreted the union of Europol and CEPOL as a loss for the European Police Agency. As a concession, the Netherlands dissociated from the union of Europol and CEPOL. There were two options in the Dutch bid:

- CEPOL would be in the same building as Europol, but with an own front door and front office;
- CEPOL would have an own floor in another building, but sharing the facilities with Europol.

Although The Netherlands and the Commission proposed against their earlier idea of uniting Europol and CEPOL, the SF started a lobbying campaign against The Netherlands' bid. As a Netherlands' Representative stated in an interview:

*The decision-making procedure was not as it should have been. The Eastern European countries voted for Hungary. There was a lobby against the Netherlands' bid. The Eastern European countries, under the Lithuanian Presidency, argued that would the Dutch bid win, CEPOL will be united with Europol anyway. The others believed this argument and therefore most of the countries voted for Hungary.*

Following this unilateral decision, seven Member States have submitted their bid to host CEPOL in one of their cities: Spain (Avila), Finland (Tampere), Greece, Hungary (Budapest), Ireland, Italy (Rome), Netherlands (The Hague). During the JHA Council in Luxembourg on 8 October, the Hungarian application has been accepted by an informal decision. For its part the European Parliament had been taken completely out of this decision, which could not be expressed on the seven candidates (Cesaro, 2013).

After two rounds of presentations, Hungary and The Netherlands were the winners. The Hungarians were the only ones to present their bid to the Parliament, under pressure of the Council. They did not want the Parliament to have a say in the matter. With only one country presenting the EP had no choice.

The reaction of the Netherlands' Permanent Representative wasn't particularly gentle: *At first, we made a report on how the procedure took place. We decided not to publish it, because we would seem like 'bad losers'. But the thing is, the Dutch bid was the most effective one and the decision was based on political gameplay. As member states we decided to cut costs of the agencies, but I would say: 'Commission, practice what you preach'. If we really wanted to cut the costs, the Member States should have voted for the Netherlands' bid, as the fusion between Europol and CEPOL was the most economic and efficient option. Zero Sum Game: the traditional Member States are convinced now that the Eastern European countries can form a block as well.* (Netherlands Permanent Representation, 2014).

---

<sup>4</sup> Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania.

## Discussion of findings

Table 1 shows that the number of actors were more modest in the first two cases, and that the second two cases show a large amount of actors within Policy Networks. What was too little considered in the beginning, however, was the variety of IOs and the different contexts in which the PN should be analyzed. The described contexts are very different, as the first two IOs are intergovernmental organizations (WTO and OPCW), the third IO is a UN organization and the fourth a European organization. These backgrounds are not comparable, neither are the different types of PN. Not to mention that four cases cannot prove anything. They can illustrate the argument but not provide substantially evidence.

Nevertheless, according to some of the interviewed campaign members and foreign ministers, the last two cases were not decided on efficiency, but more on political powers, gains and other such rationales.

**Table 1. More actors equal less efficiency?**

<b>International Organization:</b>	<b>PN involved in the location decision-making:</b>	<b>Number of actors (average):</b>	<b>Type of PN:</b>
<b>OPCW 1995</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The national ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs</li> <li>- local governments (the City of The Hague and the other candidate cities)</li> <li>- a professional lobbyist hired by the City of The Hague</li> <li>- 40-member Conference on Disarmament (CD)</li> <li>- the G-21 countries, the non-aligned countries within the CD.</li> </ul>	68	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National ministries</li> <li>- Local governments</li> <li>- Lobbyist</li> <li>- Internal Conference</li> <li>- Inter-governmental actors</li> </ul>
<b>WTO 1997</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 20 members of the <i>prepcom</i></li> <li>- 128 WTO-members</li> <li>- the local and national governments of the candidate countries</li> <li>- Canton of Geneva</li> </ul>	153	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internal WTO committee</li> <li>- External Members of the WTO</li> <li>- National governments</li> <li>- Local Government</li> <li>- Regional government</li> </ul>
<b>GCF 2012</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)</li> <li>- Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)</li> </ul>	< 200	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Intergovernmental committee</li> <li>- National governments</li> <li>- Specialized divisions of national governments</li> <li>- Regional government</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Environment and Finance</li> <li>- division of International Organizations in Bern</li> <li>- Canton and City of Geneva.</li> <li>- The 24 members of the GCF Board</li> <li>- Host Country Evaluation Committee (6 members from Indonesia, Egypt, Spain, Belize, The USA and the Czech Republic.</li> <li>- The Interim Secretariat</li> <li>- Independent Secretariat was established</li> <li>- The Global Environment Facility (GEF) in Washington D.C.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Members of the GFC Board</li> <li>- External evaluation committee</li> <li>- Interim Secretariat GCF</li> <li>- Independent Secretariat GCF</li> <li>- External facility and policy center</li> </ul>
<b>CEPOL 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Member States of the EU</li> <li>- European Commission</li> <li>- European Council</li> <li>- the bilateral embassies</li> <li>- the EU Agencies</li> <li>- interior ministers of the EU</li> <li>- European Parliament (EP)</li> <li>- In the candidate countries, the ministries of external affairs and the local governments of the cities</li> <li>- the LIBE commission of the EP.</li> </ul>	< 500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU Member States</li> <li>- Commission</li> <li>- Council</li> <li>- Embassies</li> <li>- EU Agencies</li> <li>- EU Interior ministers</li> <li>- EP</li> <li>- National and local governments of candidate countries</li> <li>- LIBE commission</li> </ul>

Table 1. Policy Networks involved in the location decision-making of 4 IOs: number and types of actors.

## Conclusions

The more politicized a location decision-making process, the more complex the Policy Networks are. Multiformality and interdependence form PN in which many actors govern a policy field. As we have seen, political interests can overrule expertise in PN (as shown in the last two cases. Besides, effectiveness can be harmed and efficiency may be damaged. These were the statements I wanted to illustrate by describing the four cases. The first two cases from the 1990s clearly have less actors involved, but then again: the opposite could be illustrated as well by choosing completely different cases.

The description of the four cases might illustrate that the more complex and intertwined the actors in PN are, the less efficient and effective decisions are eventually made. Furthermore, different procedures are followed when power based decisions are made. Further research is needed on the types of actors involved. The public sector

actors and private sector actors are intertwined, and there is also a hybrid for informal governance that may have both public and private sectors actors involved. This is relevant for this type of research, as characterizing these actors can unravel how location decisions for IOs are made.

## References

- Berg, C. v. (2011). *Transforming for Europe. The Reshaping of National Bureaucracies in a System of Multi-Level Governance*. Leiden: Leiden University Press.
- Blanco, I., Lowndes, V., & Pratchett, L. (2011). Policy Networks and Governance Networks: Towards Greater Conceptual Clarity. *Political Studies Review*, 9 (3), 297-308.
- Board of the Evaluation Committee. (2012). *Report of the Host Country Evaluation Committee*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund.
- Cesaro, G. (2013, 10 24). *Quand la forme fait la substance: CEPOL et Europol au centre du bras de fer institutionnel entre Parlement et le Conseil*. Retrieved 6 9, 2014, from EU-Logos: [http://www.eu-logos.org/eu-logos\\_nea-say.php?idr=4&idnl=2963&nea=137&lang=fra&lst=0](http://www.eu-logos.org/eu-logos_nea-say.php?idr=4&idnl=2963&nea=137&lang=fra&lst=0)
- Decisio, B. L. (2005). *Internationale organisaties in Den Haag. Economische betekenis*. Amsterdam: Decisio.
- Director, D. o. (2014, February 25). The WTO in Geneva. (R. Groen, Interviewer)
- European Union, C. o. (2013). *Regulation Amending Decision 2005/681/JHA establishing the European Police College (CEPOL)*. The Council of the European Union. Brussels: Interinstitutional file.
- FDFA, F. D. (2012). *Switzerland's offer to host the Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund in Geneva*. Bern: FDFA.
- Giauque, D., Resentera, F., & Siggen, M. (2009). Modernization route and relations between political and administrative spheres in Switzerland. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 75 (4), 687-713.
- Godroij, J. (1995). Public Policy Networks: Analysis and Management. In W. J. Kickert, & F. A. Vught, *Public Policy & Administration Science in The Netherlands* (pp. 177-195). London : Prentice Hall / Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Green Climate Fund. (2014). *About the Fund*. Retrieved May 5, 2014, from Green Climate Fund: <http://www.gcfund.org/home.html>
- Hankiss, Á. (2013, 10 15). *Ágnes Hankiss. Member of the European Parliament*. Retrieved 6 7, 2014, from EPP Group: [http://hankissagnes.hu/news\\_display/cepol\\_hq\\_letter\\_to\\_the\\_meps\\_1/](http://hankissagnes.hu/news_display/cepol_hq_letter_to_the_meps_1/)
- Hoekema, J. (2014, March 31). The settling process of the OPCW. (R. Groen, Interviewer)
- König, T., & Bräuninger, T. (1998). The Formation of Policy Networks: Preferences, Institutions and Actors' Choice of Information and Exchange Relations. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 10 (4), 445-71.

Kenyon, I. R., & Feakes, D. (2007). *OPCW. The Creation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. A Case Study in the Birth of an Intergovernmental Organisation*. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.

Kliest, T., Limonard, B., & Verbeek, R. (2008). *Be our Guests. Beleidsdoorlichting Nederland als gastland van internationale organisaties*. IOB Evaluaties. Den Haag: Buitenlandse Zaken.

Luisa Ortega, M., & Erp, K. (2014, April 13-17). *National Model United Nations New York 2014*. Retrieved April 24, 2014, from National Model United Nations: [http://nmun.org/nmun\\_ny.html](http://nmun.org/nmun_ny.html)

Manninen, A. (2008). Monitoring urban change and identifying future potentials: the case of the European Urban Audit and the State of European Cities Report. *Urban Research & Practice*, 1 (3), 222-229.

Meijers, E., Spaans, M., Louw, E., Hoogerbrugge, M., & Priemus, H. (2013). *Den Haag Internationale Stad. Verkenning ontwikkelingsfactoren*. Technische Universiteit Delft, Faculteit Bouwkunde. Delft: OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment.

Mercer. (2012, december 3). *Mercer 2012 Quality of living Ranking Highlights - Global*. Retrieved juli 4, 2013, from Mercer: <http://www.mercer.com/qualityofliving#top5>

Netherlands Permanent Representation, t. t. (2014, April 2). First Secretary for Security and Justice. (R. Groen, Interviewer)

Peters, B. G. (2006). Forms of informality: Identifying informal governance in the European Union. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 7 (1), 25-40.

Peters, G. B. (2010). *The Politics of Bureaucracy. An introduction to comparative public administration*. New York: Routledge.

Rhodes, R. (2008). Policy Network Analysis. In R. E. Goodin, M. Moran, & M. Rein, *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy* (pp. 425-47). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sassen, S. (2007). The Places and Spaces of the Global. In D. Held, & A. McGrew, *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies* (pp. 79-105). Cambridge: Polity.

Swiss FDFA, M. (2014, April 22). Green Climate Fund. (R. Groen, Interviewer)

Tanda, C. (2014, 1 12). *Siège du CEPOL: la candidature de Budapest examinée par le Parlement Européen*. Retrieved 6 8, 2014, from Le portail de référence pour l'espace de liberté, sécurité et justice: <http://europe-liberte-securite-justice.org/2014/01/12/siege-du-cepole-la-candidature-de-budapest-examinee-par-le-parlement-europeen/>

The Harvard Sussex Program. (2008). *The Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)*. Retrieved April 24, 2014, from The OPC/PC History Project: <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/OPCW-PC%20History.html>

Van Krieken, P. J., & McKay, D. (Eds.). (2005). *The Hague: Legal Capital of the World*. The Hague: TMC Asser Press.

VanGrasstek, G. (2013). *The History and Future of the World Trade Organization*. Geneva: WTO Publications.

WTO. (2014). *The 128 countries that had signed GATT by 1994*. Retrieved 5 5, 2014, from World Trade Organization : [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/gattmem\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm)