

A Case Study on the High Percentage of
'NO'-Votes in Five Dutch Municipalities
During the Dutch Referendum on the
European Constitution

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Abstract

The Dutch 'NO' during the Dutch referendum regarding the treaty establishing the European Constitution in 2005 was considered a political earthquake for the integration process of the European Union. A high percentage of 'NO'-voters (>80%) lived in the five Dutch municipalities of Urk, Reiderland, Staphorst, Pekela, and Oldebroek. In this research, the concept of partisanship, measured using the act of stable voting behaviour, is used to explain the high rate of 'NO'-votes in these municipalities.

The concept of partisanship argues that partisanship can influence voting behaviour during elections and referendums because individuals who display partisanship towards a political party are likely to follow the vote recommendation of that party. Therefore, based on this logic, it is assumed that, in these five municipalities, there was stable electoral support for the political parties opposed to the European Constitution. To prove or disprove this assumption, the political parties that enjoyed the highest level of electoral support during the Second Chamber elections from 1986 to 2003 and the European Parliament elections from 1989 to 2004 are examined.

This research found that in the municipalities of Urk, Staphorst, and Oldebroek there was stable electoral support for the political parties opposing the European Constitution during the European Parliament elections from 1989 to 2004. Thus, the assumption that partisanship can explain the high rate of 'NO'-votes in these municipalities can be partially answered positively.

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Introduction

In recent years, it has become clear that the European Union (EU) is subject to the threat of disintegration. What began with an economic crisis was followed by an immigration crisis and, finally, a political crisis in 2016. Led by populist leaders, Eurosceptic parties in the member states have altered the political map of the EU. With nationalistic motives, these parties hope to stifle the further integration of the EU, fearing a loss of national sovereignty.

Fortunately for the EU, the threat of disintegration did not proceed any further than the United Kingdom (UK), when the UK declared that it wished to leave the EU. Any further threat of disintegration disappeared when a series of national elections resulted in pro-EU outcomes. The President of the European Commission referred to this victory when he addressed the European Parliament (EP) during the State of the Union address in 2017. He stated that even though *'Europe was battered and bruised (...), the wind is back in Europe's sails'* (Juncker, 2017). However, he mentioned also that the window of opportunity will not always remain open, indicating that now is the time for the EU to progress: *'when the next clouds appear on the horizon – and they will appear one day – it will be too late'* (Juncker, 2017).

For the EU to progress, it must recognise what these 'clouds' are and how they can threaten the process of European integration. Throughout the history of the EU, it has faced periods during which further integration was halted. One of the most notable setbacks for European integration occurred when the Netherlands, following a national referendum, rejected the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe (hereafter: Constitution) in 2005. Considering that the Constitution was regarded as a great step forward for a more integrated and unified EU – a step needed to cope with external pressures and the EU's enlargement projects – the Dutch 'NO'-vote had a major European political impact (Piris, 2006).

Nationwide, 61.5% voted against the Constitution. The highest number of 'NO'-voters were in the municipalities of Urk (91.6%), Reiderland (84.6%), Staphorst (83.6%), Pekela (81.5%), and Oldebroek (80.3%). The Dutch referendum on the Constitution and the high percentage of 'NO'-voters in these municipalities is an interesting topic in the field of political science and the study of Euroscepticism. Therefore, it is unsurprising that several studies have been conducted on what influenced the Dutch electorate to vote against the Constitution. There are various approaches used to explain the outcome of this referendum, ranging from studying what influence the media had, to what influence the different campaigns of the different political parties had. In this current research, the concept of partisanship is applied to provide an explanation for the high percentage of 'NO'-voters in the

five Dutch municipalities of Urk, Reiderland, Staphorst, Pekela, and Oldebroek during the Dutch referendum on the Constitution in 2005.

The concept of partisanship is well used in the field of political science to analyse the voting behaviour of the electorate during elections and referendums. Positive correlations have been made between electoral voting behaviour for a political party and the degree of partisanship for that political party. According to supporters of the concept, voters who display partisanship towards a political party are influenced during elections and referendums to vote in line with the recommendation of that specific political party. Even though partisanship advocates are united in terms of how partisanship can influence voting behaviour, they differ in their stance on how partisanship can be measured. When introduced for the first time by Campbell, Miller and Stokes (1960), they viewed partisanship as a psychological feeling of identity and attachment an individual has for a specific political party (Miller et al., 1960). Richardson (1986;1991), however, introduced another type of partisanship, examining the behavioural aspect of an individual. Richardson argued that the act of stable voting behaviour can be considered as having a sense of partisanship.

In this research, a combination of Richardson's variant of partisanship and the notion that partisanship can influence voting behaviour during elections and referendums is used. Based on this combination, it is assumed that the high percentage of 'NO'-votes in these five municipalities is ascribed to a large level of electoral support, thereby indicating a sense of partisanship for the political parties opposed to the Constitution. This research addresses this assumption using the following research question (RQ):

RQ: Can partisanship for the political parties opposed to the European Constitution in the Dutch municipalities of Urk, Reiderland, Staphorst, Pekela, and Oldebroek explain the high rate of 'NO'-voters in these municipalities during the Dutch referendum on the European Constitution in 2005?

To answer the RQ, the concept of partisanship must be analysed. How is partisanship used to explain voting behaviour and how is it measured? To do this, the following set of sub-questions (SQs) must be answered:

SQ1: What is partisanship?

SQ1.1: How can partisanship explain voting behaviour during elections and referendums?

SQ1.2: How is partisanship measured?

Second, which political parties were actively in favour and actively against the Constitution (hereafter referred to as the political parties of the yes-camp and the no-camp) needs to be researched. To do this, the following second set SQs was formulated:

SQ2: Which Dutch political parties were active in the debate on the European Constitution in 2005?

SQ2.1: Were these parties for the European Constitution (the yes-camp) or were they against it (the no-camp)?

If there is stable voting behaviour in the five municipalities, which political parties do the electorate support and how large is that support? The following third set of SQs addresses this issue:

SQ3: Did the no-camp political parties enjoy a large and stable level of electoral support in these five municipalities, indicating a sense of partisanship for these political parties?

SQ3.1: If no, did the yes-camp political parties enjoy a large and stable level of electoral support in these five municipalities, indicating a sense of partisanship for these political parties?

Chapter 1. Literature review

The literature review consists first of an introduction to the concept of partisanship: how it is used in studies on other EU-related referendums, what role partisanship played during these referendums, and by whom it was introduced. Second, the literature review explains how scholars measure partisanship, then discusses the logic of Richardson (1986;1991) and his variant on partisanship.

For the Dutch referendum, many explanations of the result refer to the campaigns held (Aarts & Van der Kolk, 2005; Hobolt & Brouard, 2011; Lucardie, 2005; De Vreese, 2006). However, the intended scope for this research is based on studies conducted on other European-related referendums and what role partisanship played in the outcome of these. Originally mentioned in the book *The American Voter* by Campbell et al. (1960), partisanship became a well-used concept in political science to explain how a party can influence political judgements, policy preferences, presidential approval, and, most importantly, voter choice (Bartel, 2002; Green & Palmquist, 1990; Goren, 2002; Layman & Carsey, 2002). Miller et al. (1960) developed a theory of voter choice that became known as the Michigan model. In this model, they argued that partisanship has a great influence on US national elections:

Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections than the lasting attachment of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties. These loyalties establish a basic division of electoral strength within which the competition of particular campaigns takes place... Most Americans have this sense of attachment to one party or the other. And for the individual who does, the strength and direction of party identification are facts of central importance in accounting for attitude and behaviour.

(p. 121)

In addition to being used to analyse voting behaviour in national elections, the concept of partisanship has been used also in the analysis of voting behaviour in referendums, including those related to the EU (Pierce et al., 1983; Siune & Svensson, 1993; Kobach, 1994; Magleby, 1994; Trechsel & Kriesi, 1996; Sciarini and Listhaug, 1997; Midtbo & Hines, 1998; Hobolt, 2006, 2009; de Vreese 2006). Even though the literature suggests that political party considerations during referendums come second, and therefore the attachment to a party is less likely to influence voters (Hobolt, 2005: p. 89; de Vreese & Semetko, 2004: p.

700-1; Schuk & de Vreese, 2008: p. 104), Pierce, Valen, and Listhaug (1983) and Hobolt (2006) argued, though not as the only focus, that partisanship – to some extent – can influence the outcome of European-related referendums.

Pierce et al. (1983) studied the British and Norwegian referendums regarding membership of the European Community. They argue that partisanship is the primary force in referendum voting (p. 61). Hobolt (2006) agrees with the study by Pierce et al. (1983). In her research, she focuses on the two Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty. Her expectation was that, since the literature suggests that partisanship works as a predictor for election outcomes (Campbell et al., 1960; Butler & Stokes, 1969), the ‘partisan hypothesis’ may also apply to referendums (p. 629). Therefore, she argues that, *‘in referendums, voters are likely to follow the vote recommendation of the party that they identify with, all other things being equal’* (Hobolt, 2006: p. 629). In her conclusion, Hobolt (2006: p.641) explains that the statistical analysis of voting behaviour in the two referendums indicate that party endorsements had an influence on the outcomes. However, she states that partisanship is not the only factor that influences the voter: *‘partisan loyalty may not be sufficient to persuade voters to vote in a certain way’* (Hobolt, 2006: p. 641).

A major point of discussion is the how partisanship is defined and how it is measured. According to Converse and Pierce (1985), there is great debate on how partisanship is measured: some treat partisanship as a psychological term, other researchers feel more comfortable using signs of attitude and behavioural commitment, such as party membership or support over time at the polls (p. 143).

Using partisanship as a psychological term developed out of the logic of social identity formation, which argues that it is a human tendency for individuals to distinguish between in-groups and outgroups (Sumner, 1906). Applying this logic to partisanship suggests that, *‘identifying with a party may be akin to forming a social identity as a member of that party and, as a consequence, may cause the individual to adopt the party’s candidates and causes’* (Gerber, Huber & Washington, 2010: p. 720). However, treating partisanship as a psychological term, and thereby treating it as a form of identity, makes it rather unmeasurable. The problem is that the observed correlation between partisanship – as a form of identity – and political outcomes can originate from unobserved factors (Gerber et al., 2010: p. 721).

Pierce et al. (1983) and Hobolt (2006) use partisanship in their studies as a sense of identification with the political parties, but Richardson (1986, 1991) introduces a more measurable variant of partisanship. For research conducted on electoral outcomes in Japan

(Richardson, 1986) and for research conducted on electoral outcomes in the Netherlands, Britain, and West Germany (Richardson, 1991), Richardson revises the Michigan model in which partisanship is associated with psychology (or, as he likes to call it, psychological partisanship) (Richardson, 1991: p. 766). Instead of only measuring partisanship with psychological feelings, Richardson introduces another variant of partisanship that is based on the idea of stable voting behaviour. He argues that such behaviour has a sense of partisanship, no matter whether there is a psychological identification with a particular party or not (Richardson, 1991).

Richardson (1986) developed this additional concept during his research on electoral outcomes in Japan. What he discovered was that a large portion of the electorate voted consistently for the same political party during different elections, even though there was an absence of a stable identification with those parties (Richardson, 1986: p. 357). This was also apparent when Richardson (1991) transposed the concept to European countries. He demonstrated that even though a significant portion of the electorate in Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands had a stable voting history and a psychological attachment to a political party, another significant portion had a stable voting history but no psychological attachment (Richardson, 1991: p. 766). This was especially true in the Netherlands and West Germany. In these countries, even though people voted stably, they did not display any signs of having a psychological partisanship (Richardson, 1991: p. 766). Based on this finding, Richardson developed the idea of stable voting as evidence for stable partisanship. Whether there is a sense of identity with a particular party or not, stable voting behaviour is a variant of partisanship (Richardson, 1991: p. 766).

Not only did Richardson introduce this variant of partisanship, he argued, in line with the other scholars, about how partisanship influences voting behaviour. When he used past voting behaviour as an (independent) variable to analyse whether it influenced voting decisions (the dependent variable), Richardson (1986) argued that, '*patterned behaviour itself can induce later conformity in behaviour*' (p. 361). With this argument, he combined his variant of partisanship with the idea of partisanship being able to influence voting behaviour. This combination is used in this research to provide an answer to the RQ.

Another relevant factor is Richardson's (1986;1991) method for measuring voting stability. Richardson developed a stability index constructed from people's memory of their votes in the previous three elections for the study in Japan (Richardson, 1986: p. 361) and the previous two elections for the study in Europe (Richardson, 1991: p. 769). By analysing previous votes, Richardson assessed whether there was stable electoral support for a specific political party. He then linked the level of stability to the dependent variable of voting decision, concluding that stable voting behaviour majorly contributed to the outcome of the

dependent variable. He gathered his data via a secondary analysis of the evidence from national election surveys (Richardson, 1986: p. 362; Richardson, 1991: p. 755).

In the next chapter, how this research was conducted is explained, including why Richardson's scope is used – rather than the psychological variant of partisanship – and how the stable voting behaviour variant is used.

Chapter 2: Methodology

The goal of this research is to use Richardson's concept of partisanship to explain the high rate of 'NO'-votes in the five Dutch municipalities of Urk, Reiderland, Staphorst, Pekela, and Oldebroek. This chapter explains why the outcomes of the five municipalities for the Dutch referendum on the Constitution were chosen, why the concept of partisanship is used, what methodology is used to provide an answer to SQs 2 and 3, how data was collected for these answers, what problems were anticipated, and what was done to overcome these problems.

2.1 Choosing the five municipalities and the Dutch referendum on the Constitution for the case study

The reason for choosing the Dutch referendum on the Constitution and the outcomes in the five Dutch municipalities as focal points in this case study stems from the broader focus of this study, which is Euroscepticism and its influence on the integration process of the EU. One of the main challenges that the integration of the EU has faced during the past decade is the growing support for Euroscepticism. What is lacking, however, is a clear understanding of how Euroscepticism can negatively influence EU integration.

Therefore, when searching for a case that can be argued to have negatively influenced the integration process of the EU, the Dutch referendum on the Constitution seemed appropriate. In terms of EU integration, a successful implementation of the Constitution would have been a great success. Therefore, the Dutch 'NO' was a profound setback to the EU and the path of integration.

Rather than analysing the voting behaviour of the entire country, it was decided to analyse the voting behaviour of specific municipalities. Analysing several specific municipalities means less data, which enables the analysis of the voting behaviour to be more thorough considering the limited time available for this research.

The reason for choosing the municipalities of Urk, Reiderland, Staphorst, Pekela, and Oldebroek derives from the broader focus of this study – analysing the effects of Euroscepticism. Considering the high percentage of ‘NO’-voters in these municipalities, they can be considered hotspots of Euroscepticism. Thus, it can be argued that these municipalities provide a good focal point for this research.

2.2 Choosing the theory of partisanship

To provide an answer to the RQ, an in-depth case study was conducted on the five municipalities, their voting behaviour, and the Dutch political parties and their position on the proposed Constitution. This case study approach is based on the use of a specific perspective of the theory of partisanship. First, it is necessary to explain why the theory of partisanship is used, and second, to discuss the interpretation of Richardson on this theory specifically.

First, the concept of partisanship is, as mentioned in the literature review, a well-used variable for understanding voting behaviour during elections and (EU-related) referendums. Instead of measuring partisanship using the psychological reasoning behind it, the more measurable definition of partisanship, by Richardson (1991), is used (i.e. stable voting behaviour can be regarded as a variant of stable partisanship).

Second, the reason for measuring partisanship using this method in the five municipalities is because measuring an individual's psychological attachment and identification with a political party is difficult. Such an approach requires lengthy research involving many individuals. Considering the available time for this research, this lengthier approach was not possible.

2.3 Answering Sub-question 2

Before explaining how stable voting behaviour was measured in these five municipalities, it is necessary to explain which political parties' voting behaviour was measured. Both the electoral support for the political parties that were part of the yes-camp and the political parties that were part of the no-camp during the debate prior to the referendum on the Constitution were measured. The reason for this is a desire to provide a comprehensive analysis on whether partisanship can explain the high rate of ‘NO’-voters in the five municipalities. Measuring whether there was a sense of partisanship for the yes-camp political parties, as well as the no-camp, creates the possibility of an alternative answer if it transpires that there was no partisanship for the no-camp political parties in the five municipalities.

To assess which political parties were in which camp, and thereby provide an answer to SQ 2, an overview of the process prior to the referendum is provided by performing an analysis of secondary data. This overview offers a clear indication of which political parties were involved, what camp they were part of, and what their arguments were. Data for this overview were obtained from publications of the Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (DNPP) (Archive Centre for Dutch Political Parties), from scholars who have written on and studied the Dutch referendum, and from scholars who have written about the development of the Constitution in an EU context. The function, relevance, and reliability of these sources are explained, below.

The DNPP is a research centre that belongs to the University of Groningen. Its primary task is to gather and to catalogue the publications and activities of Dutch political parties (DNPP: about the DNPP). Since 1974, the DNPP has published a DNPP yearbook, in which they offer an overview of the most notable political events that political parties were involved in, what their stances were in the debates, and what role they played in the events. These yearbooks provide an objective source that is used by scientists, PhD students, and the media (DNPP: more about the DNPP). For this research, the yearbooks from 2003 (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 2004), 2004 (Hippe, Kroeze, Lucardie & Voerman, 2005), and 2005 (Hippe, Lucardie, Kroeze, Walle, Voerman, 2006) are used. These three yearbooks cover the entire process of the referendum – from the date the referendum was initiated, through its vote, and including the reaction following the result. However, the overview provided by these yearbooks on the process prior to the referendum is shallow. Instead of exploring the debate on the Constitution in-depth, the yearbooks offer a more general overview of which political parties participated and what their stance on the Constitution was.

Therefore, another set of sources was required, one that is more in-depth on the debate on the Constitution in the Netherlands. Thus, it was decided to perform an analysis of the relevant literature in which scholars discuss the Dutch referendum on the Constitution and the stances of the political parties during the debate prior to the referendum. The DNPP yearbooks provide important highlights during the debate, while the relevant literature provides deeper insights into the debate on the Constitution.

Furthermore, the development of the proposed Constitution in an EU context is discussed. Explaining the origin of the proposed Constitution, how it developed, and how it was designed makes it easier to understand the arguments of the political parties opposed to or in favour of the Constitution. Leaving out the EU context would create a gap in understanding the Dutch context.

2.4 Answering Sub-question 3


Once it is clear which political parties were involved, what their arguments were, and what side they supported, it is necessary to explain how their electoral support was measured. In this research, previous individual voting behaviour is not examined, but the past voting behaviour of an entire municipality is considered. Therefore, Richardson's method can only be transposed partially to this research. To measure the level of electoral support for each political party and the stability of this support in the five municipalities, thereby answering SQ 3, a psephology methodology was used. Data from the outcome of national Second Chamber (SC) elections of 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2003, and the outcome of the EP elections in 1989, 1995, 1999, and 2004 were analysed to learn which political parties enjoyed the highest level of electoral support and whether this support was stable.

The data were retrieved from the national election database developed by the Kiesraad (Dutch for Election Council). The Kiesraad is an initiative by the Dutch Government and functions as an information centre on topics related to referendums, elections, and suffrage (Kiesraad: over ons). An important part of the Kiesraad is the election database, in which they publish data on national elections, referendums and, regional and local elections from 1848 onwards (Kiesraad: verkiezingsuitslagen).

The choice of this specific timespan and these two elections for the data analysis needs to be explained. First, the time span is because, in 1986, the municipality of Urk was first classified a separate unit in the national election database. Before 1986, Urk was considered part of a larger entity. This means that using data prior to 1986 assumes that the outcome of elections in this larger entity represents Urk also.

Second, there are several reasons for choosing these two elections. First, a set of two elections provides a better indication of whether the electorate displays stable voting behaviour. Second, the choice of the national SC elections is because it has the highest turnout rate in comparison with other nationwide elections (see chart 1). A higher turnout rate provides a better representation of what the electorate thinks. Third, the EP elections were the best second option. Even though the EP turnout rates are the lowest of all nationwide elections (see chart 1), these elections included all the political parties that were part of the no- and yes-camp of the Constitution and the related referendum. Using the other elections in the dataset would mean the exclusion of political parties that did not participate in these elections.

Chart 1. Turnout rate (%) second chamber, local, European Parliament and regional elections. Source: (Kiesraad: verkiezingsuitslag)



2.5 Issues concerning the formulation of the sub-questions and retrieving data

There are several issues that need to be addressed. These issues are related to the formulation of SQ 3, the five municipalities, and the political parties involved during the debate on the Constitution. First, it should be explained what the term ‘large’ means, as used in SQ 3. The problem with the term ‘large’ is that it is subject to different interpretations. It can, for example, be argued that a large electoral support equals 50% or higher of the total vote. Therefore, the term ‘large’ must be defined.

Considering that the goal of this research is to examine whether partisanship – in terms of stable electoral support – for the no-camp political parties can explain the high rate of ‘NO’-votes in the five municipalities, the term ‘large’ in this research simply means a higher level of stable electoral support for the no-camp political parties than for the yes-camp parties. This is another reason why the political parties of the no-camp are considered in the analysis.

Regarding the issues related to the analysis of the voting behaviour of the municipalities and the political parties involved: First, the municipality of Reiderland came into existence in 1990 following a municipal reorganisation in which three municipalities were joined together: Beerta, Finsterwolde, and Nieuweschans. Considering that the dataset involves the SC elections from 1986 to 2003 and the EP elections from 1989 to 2004, data for the elections held before 1990 need to be taken from these three municipalities separately.

Second, similar to the Reiderland scenario, Pekela came into existence in 1990 after Oud Pekela and Nieuw Pekela were merged during a municipal reorganisation. As with the case for Reiderland, regarding the outcome of the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and of the EP elections of 1989, the elections of the then New and Old Pekela are included in the process of obtaining and analysing data and are subsequently considered during the discussion section.

Third, the dataset has two issues concerning the analysis of the electoral support for the political parties involved. First, one political party involved in the referendum debate had not existed previously. This means that for this political party, data on its electoral support were not retrievable. Therefore, this political party is not included in the data analysis.

Furthermore, two of the political parties (Christian Union (CU) and Green Left (GL)) that were part of the referendum debate were founded between 1986 and 2004 as the result of several political parties merging. This means it is necessary to explain whether the electoral support for the predecessors of these political parties is considered in the analysis process. The decision is different for each political party.

First, GL came into existence after four parties (the PPR, the PSP, the CPN, and the EVP) merged at the beginning of the 1980s. Since the dataset includes national elections from 1986 to 2003, the electoral support for the PPR, the PSP, the CPN, and the EVP must be considered in the data analysis also. However, analysing the dataset that includes these political parties would require a certain level of speculation. Therefore, it was decided not to include these parties in the data analysis because the merging process was not seamless and created internal conflicts within the parties. Therefore, it cannot safely be argued that electoral support for the PPR, the PSP, the CPN, and the EVP transferred to the GL when they merged. A confirmation of the merging process not being seamless can be found in the fact that, after these political parties merged into the GL, two other political parties came into existence that neglected the founding of the GL (Lucardie, van Schuur & Voerman, 1997).

Second, a similar process happened to the CU. The CU was founded in 2000 after the Reformed Political Federation (RPF) and the Reformed Political Coalition (GPV) merged. However, in this case, it can be argued that partisanship for the RPF and GPV was transferred to the CU. This argument is based on the two predecessors being considered the founding parties of the CU (ChristenUnie: Geschiedenis). Furthermore, the merging process was seamless, and the CU adopted the exact same position in terms of the EU as its predecessors (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). Finally, and developing further on the second argument, the predecessors of the CU formed a coalition with another political party of the

no-camp in the EP (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). Therefore, for the CU, it was decided to include its predecessors in the data analysis and in the discussion.

Chapter 3 - Data

3.1 Overview of the process prior to the referendum

In this chapter, an overview is provided of the process prior to the referendum. First, the proposed Constitution in an EU context is introduced. Then, there is an explanation of how the proposal of the Constitution was received in the Dutch context. This is done by describing the first steps regarding the initiation of the referendum and the stances of the political parties. An overview of which political parties were involved in the campaign and what side they supported is provided also. Then, each political party, (first the no-camp, then the yes-camp) is discussed separately to illustrate the variety of arguments and the key players in the debate.

3.1.1 The design of the Constitution and the Dutch political context

During the European Council meeting in 2001 in Laeken, the Heads of State and the governments of the EU member states entrusted the European Convention to design a Constitution that would profoundly reform the institutional provision of the European Treaties (Duff, 2006). The motives for reforming the European Treaties were based on the idea that the EU required deeper integration to cope with the increasing pressure from globalisation and the enlargement of the EU (Jacobs, 2005). It was argued that the increasing global structures of finance, production, and trade were weakening the boundaries of the nation-state. This weakening resulted in growing interdependence on transnational and supranational cooperation (Eriksen, Fossum & Menéndez, 2004). Furthermore, the enlargement of EU at the end of the 20th century increased pressure on the institutional arrangements of the time. Raising the number of EU member states to 25, the European Commission from 19 to 30 members, and the EP from circa 550 to over 770 drastically increased the need to reform the institutional arrangements (Jacobs, 2005).

Thus, the European Convention had to design a constitution that not only considered increasing external pressure, it also had to consider the internal demands from the member states and the demands of the Eurosceptics and the Federalists. By June 2003, the European Convention had developed the draft constitution, which was immediately accepted by the European Council as the basis for the new Constitutional Treaty (Jacobs, 2005). According to Jacobs (2005), *'the output of the Convention was also warmly applauded by the governments and parliaments of the various Member States, praised by the media and*

mostly positively discussed in scholarly writing' (p. 25). Essentially, the draft involved the following proposed changes: First, a simplified structure of the EU; streamlining the instruments and procedures would make the EU more efficient (Piris, 2006: Jacobs, 2005). Second, changes in the institutions of the EU, adapting it to the enlargement and providing a higher level of transparency and greater democracy (Piris, 2006: Jacobs, 2005). Third, changes in several key competences of the EU, such as its foreign policy and economic and monetary policy (Piris, 2006: Jacobs, 2005).

After the European Council adopted the draft, the process in which member states of the EU needed to ratify the draft of the Constitution began. Ten governments decided to organise national referendums to allow their citizens to decide directly on the ratification of the Treaty. The first referendum took place in Spain, where 76.7% voted in favour, with a low turnout of 42.3%. The second referendum took place in France, where 54.87% rejected the Constitution with a turnout rate of 69.4% (Piris, 2006). On the 1st June 2005, the Netherlands held a referendum. Even though it was a consultative referendum, not a legally binding one as in Spain and in France, the major political parties agreed that Parliament would follow the result of the referendum if the turnout rate was above 30% (Piris, 2006). With a high turnout rate of 62.8% and a clear majority of 61.6% against the Constitution, the result was considered a '*political earthquake in Europe*' (Piris, 2006: p. 9).

The idea for the Netherlands to hold a referendum on the ratification began in October 2002 when a majority of the SC requested that the Government organise a consultative referendum on the Constitution (Aarts & Van der Kolk: inleiding, 2005). When the Government did not take the initiative, the SC members Dubbelboer of the Labour Party (PvdA), van der Ham of Democrats 66 (D66), and Karimi of the GL decided to propose an initiative law that would make a consultative referendum on the Constitution possible (Dubbelboer, Ham & Karimi, 2003; Hippe et al., 2004: Aarts & Van der Kolk: inleiding, 2005). These three initiators were members of political parties that belonged to the yes-camp of the Constitution. When proposing the initiative law, the initiators and their political parties sincerely believed that the Dutch electorate was unanimous about the EU, only lacking a degree of participation (Aarts & Van der Kolk, 2005). Other political parties that belonged to the yes-camp were the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Their arguments in favour of the Constitution are presented after the discussion on the political parties that campaigned against the Constitution.

Even though the initiators of the consultative referendum were members of political parties in favour of the Constitution, the political parties belonging to the no-camp were the initiators of the campaign on the Constitution. The campaign against the Constitution began when the Socialist Party (SP) established the 'No Against this Constitution Committee' in 2003 (Hippe

et al., 2006). Later in the campaign, the SP continued to have a dominant role. The SP is, therefore, considered a key player in the no-camp (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). Other political parties that were against the Constitution and that are relevant for this research (see explanation given for the exclusion of one political party of the no-camp in the methodology section) are the CU, the Reformed Political Party (SGP), and the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) party (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015).

3.1.2. The political parties of the no-camp and their arguments

Despite having the same anti-Constitution position, the political parties of the no-camp were not unified in their arguments. This subchapter discusses each party of the no-camp and examines what their arguments were and what role they played in the campaign.

Socialist Party

The SP played a dominant role in the campaign for the 'NO'-vote. The SP was against the Constitution because they believed it would decrease the sovereignty and autonomy of the Netherlands (Hippe et al., 2006). The position of the SP was part of the larger context of the SP's disagreement with the European project. The SP was against the EU in general because they believed it served only the business and political elite, neglecting the demands of 'normal' citizens (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015; Voerman, 2005). An important campaign activity of the SP was the publishing of the 'No Against this Constitution' brochure, published with the support of the United Left coalition in the EP (Hippe et al., 2006). Considering that they were a key player in the debate against the Constitution, the outcome of the referendum was, for the SP, considered a great accomplishment (Hippe et al., 2006; Vollaard & Voerman, 2015).

Christian Union

Even though the CU was in general against the idea of a consultative referendum, it actively participated in the campaign against the Constitution (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). In April 2005, immediately before the start of the campaign for the referendum, First Chamber member Middelkoop, of the CU, wrote an article in which the CU argued against the Constitution (Hippe et al., 2006) based on two grounds. First, the CU argued that the Constitution would provide too much power to Brussels, weakening national authority and creating a federal 'United States of Europe' (Hippe et al., 2006; Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). Second, the CU stated that the preamble of the drafted Constitution lacked any reference to

the Christian tradition, which set the Constitution against the basic political values of the CU (Hippe et al., 2006; Voerman 2005).

Reformed Political Party

Even though the SGP initially voted in the SC against the initiative of Dubbelboer, Ham, and Karimi – because they were against the idea of consultative referendums in general – they did join the campaign against the Constitution, using a fierce ‘NO’ (Hippe et al., 2006). The SGP’s position against the Constitution had two main points. First, the SGP argued, like the CU, against the Constitution because it lacked any reference to the history of the Christian tradition in the EU (Hippe et al., 2006; Voerman, 2005; Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). Second, the SGP was against the Constitution because it believed it would deteriorate national autonomy (Hippe et al., 2006; Vollaard & Voerman, 2015).

List Pim Fortuyn

The LPF was, compared with the SP, the CU (and its predecessors), and the SGP, a newcomer in Dutch politics. The arguments of the LPF during its campaign against the Constitution were not specifically concerned with the Constitution. As with the SP, the LPF’s arguments must be placed within the context of its general disagreement with the EU. First, the main argument of the LPF against the EU was that it primarily functioned to serve the elite (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015; Voerman, 2005). Second, the LPF argued that the EU comprised undemocratic, non-transparent, and bureaucratic institutions (Hippe et al., 2006). Third, the LPF disliked the EU’s (im)migration policy. The LPF feared an increased flow of immigrants and a weakened border control for the Netherlands. Furthermore, the LPF were against European enlargement, which included the possibility of Turkey joining the EU (Hippe et al., 2006). In addition to these more general arguments, the LPF argued directly against the Constitution stating that it would take the process of European integration too far, and consequently that the national states would lose a great deal of their sovereignty (Voerman, 2005).

3.1.3 The political parties of the yes-camp and their arguments

The political parties in favour of the Constitution were, as with the no-camp political parties, unified in their position towards the Constitution but on different grounds. Even though,

initially, the yes-camp political parties did not plan to campaign for the Constitution, they decided to do so when the no-camp began actively campaigning (Hippe et al., 2006). The governing parties (the VVD, D66, and the CDA) were the first to take a positive position in the debate on the referendum, with the PvdA and GL joining them later (Hippe et al., 2006).

Christian Democratic Appeal

On the 14th May 2005, the President of the CDA faction in the SC announced, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the delegation leader of the EP, the campaign in favour of the Constitution (Hippe et al., 2006). One of the arguments the CDA presented was an argument of antithesis. The then Minister-President and the Minister of Justice, both members of the CDA, argued that a no-vote would threaten the peace and unification of the EU (Hippe et al., 2006). Furthermore, they not only argued that the Constitution would increase democracy in the EU and its competences (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015), they also emphasised the importance of European values (Voerman, 2005).

People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

The VVD was in favour of the Constitution, arguing that it would provide national parliaments with more authority over European policy (Hippe et al., 2006). During the campaign, the VVD published and co-authored several articles that argued why the Constitution would be positive for the Netherlands (Hippe et al., 2006). The VVD was generally in favour of further integration in the EU for economic reasons (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). This was also the main reason why the VVD was in favour of the Constitution; it emphasised the free market principles of the EU, increasing economic benefit (Voerman, 2005).

Labour Party

On the 1st May 2005, the leader of the PvdA, Wouter Bos, launched his party's campaign in favour of the Constitution. This followed the PvdA SC member Dubbelboer, along with two others, initiating a law to make a referendum on the EU possible. According to Bos, the EU would become more social, safer, less bureaucratic, and more democratic thanks to the Constitution (Hippe et al., 2006). The PvdA supported the further deepening of European integration, and thereby supported the Constitution, arguing that it would increase the social aspect of the EU (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015; Voerman, 2005).

Democrats 66

Member of the SC Van der Ham, of D66, was one of the initiators of the referendum. The general view of D66 on the EU included the argument that it is the best guarantee of peace, stability, and prosperity (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). For the Constitution specifically, D66 argued that the Constitution was especially economically beneficial for the Netherlands. Minister of Economy, Brinkhorst, of D66, like the CDA, used an antithesis argument, stating that saying no to the Constitution would put the Netherlands in a difficult situation creating a 'lockdown' – putting on hold EU related political processes (Hippe et al., 2006). Furthermore, D66 argued that the Constitution emphasised human rights (Voerman, 2005), an argument in line with D66's general view towards the EU.

GreenLeft

The GL held an active campaign for a yes-vote for the partially-GL-initiated referendum (Hippe et al., 2005; Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). The campaign was mostly led by the EP member Buitenweg, who argued that a no-vote would lead to the diminishing of a social and green EU (Hippe et al., 2006). The GL party argued in favour of the Constitution because they believed it would develop a more sustainable, greener, and social Europe (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015; Voerman, 2005).

3.2 Voting behaviour of the five municipalities (Urk, Reiderland, Staphorst, Pekela, and Oldebroek)

When obtaining data for the voting behaviour of the five municipalities, each municipality was considered separately, as was their voting behaviour in terms of the no-camp and the yes-camp during the SC and the EP elections. The data are presented in four charts per municipality. The first chart illustrates the electoral support during the SC elections for the no-camp parties; the second illustrates the electoral support for these parties during the EP elections; Charts 3 and 4 follow the same pattern, but for the yes-camp parties. Furthermore, all the data used in the charts are presented in the appendix.

Urk

Chart 2 displays the electoral support during the SC elections from 1986 to 2003 for the political parties that were part of the no-camp during the debate prior to the referendum. The chart depicts stable electoral support for the SGP and the CU (and its predecessors, the RPF and the GPV). The SGP enjoyed a steady level of support, around 33%. The CU and its predecessors enjoyed the second highest level of support (around 20%). When the CU was formed, this percentage remained the same. The LPF gained some support during the elections of 2002 but lost this in 2003. The SP had little to no support in Urk. The combined electoral support for these political parties was around 60% during these elections.

Chart 2. Electoral support (%) SC elections no-camp parties: Urk




Chart 3 displays the electoral support during the EP elections for the no-camp political parties in Urk. The coalition of the SGP-CU and its predecessors enjoyed the highest support, ranging from around 61% in 1989 to around 70% in 1994, then falling to around 63% in 2004. Neither the SP nor LPF enjoyed significant support during these elections. The accumulative electoral support for these political parties fluctuated between 61% in 1989 and 70% in 1994. The election support thereafter ranged between these two figures.

Chart 3. Electoral support (%) EP elections no-camp parties: Urk




Chart 4 displays the electoral support for the yes-camp parties during the SC elections in Urk. The CDA had the highest support. In 1986, the CDA had 45%, falling to 27% by 1998, then increasing again to around 45% in 2003. The other parties did not have significant support, ranging between only 1% and 5%. Thus, the accumulated electoral support of the political parties of the yes-camp is around the same level as that displayed for the CDA.

Chart 4. Electoral support (%) SC elections yes-camp parties: Urk





Chart 5 displays the electoral support during the EP elections for the yes-camp parties in Urk. As in the SC elections, the CDA enjoyed the highest support, ranging between 34% and 27%. The other parties had no significant support during these elections. Thus, the accumulated support does not differ significantly from that of the CDA.

Chart 5. Electoral support (%) EP elections yes-camp parties: Urk



Reiderland (Beerta, Finsterwolde, and Nieuweschans prior to 1990)

To present the voting behaviour of Reiderland, the voting behaviour of Beerta, Finsterwolde, and Nieuweschans – the municipalities that in 1990 merged to form Reiderland – needs to be included. The electoral support during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989, and the EP election of 1989, are displayed for these three municipalities. However, rather than displaying the SC and EP elections separately, as with the Urk data, the charts illustrate the support during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989. The charts for these three municipalities are, however, still divided according to the no- and yes-camp parties. For the elections post-1989, the electoral support in Reiderlands is presented in the same manner as for Urk, dividing the charts between the SC and EP elections and between the yes- and no-camp parties.

The LPF (SC), the CU (SC), the SGP-CU (EP), and the GL (EP) are not included in the charts for Beerta, Finsterwolde, and Nieuweschans because they did not exist during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 nor the EP election of 1989.

Beerta (1986 and 1989)

Chart 6 displays the level of electoral support for the no-camp parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989 in Beerta. What this chart illustrates is that there was little to very low electoral support for the no-camp political parties during these elections in Beerta.

Chart 6. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections no-camp parties: Beerta





Chart 7 displays the electoral support for the yes-camp parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989 in Beerta. In both the SC and EP elections, the PvdA enjoyed the highest level of support. During the SC elections, the PvdA had between 61% and 65%, and during the EP election, 55%. The VVD was the second best supported. During the SC and the EP elections the VVD had around 9% of the electoral support. The CDA and D66 had around 2% and 5% during the SC and EP elections, respectively. The accumulated support that the yes-camp parties enjoyed during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 was around 79%, and during the EP election of 1989, 69%.

Chart 7. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections yes-camp parties: Beerta



Finsterwolde (1986 and 1989)

Chart 8 displays the level of electoral support for the no-camp parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989 in Finsterwolde. It is apparent that, during these elections, there was little to no support for the parties that belonged to the no-camp.

Chart 8. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections no-camp parties: Finsterwolde





Chart 9 displays the electoral support in Finsterwolde for the yes-camp political parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989. The PvdA enjoyed the highest electoral support during these elections. In the SC elections, the PvdA enjoyed around 60% of the support, and during the EP election, 53%. The VVD were second, with around 8% of the electoral support during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and 5% during the EP election of 1989. The GL party, during the SC elections of 1989, enjoyed 14% of the electoral support. The other parties, D66 and the CDA, had a low level of electoral support, between 2% and 5% in both the SC and EP elections. The accumulated support for the yes-camp parties during the SC elections of 1986 was 74%, and during the SC elections of 1989, 91%. For the EP election of 1989, the yes-camp parties had an accumulated 62% of the electoral support.

Chart 9. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections yes-camp parties: Finsterwolde



Nieuweschans (1986 and 1989)

Chart 10 displays the level of electoral support in Nieuweschans for the no-camp parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989. The no-camp parties enjoyed little to zero support in Nieuweschans during the national SC elections of 1986 and 1989.

Chart 10. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections no-camp parties: Nieuweschans





Chart 11 displays the electoral support in Nieuweschans for the yes-camp parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989. As in Beerta and Finsterwolde, the PvdA enjoyed the highest electoral support during these elections, around 70%. The PvdA were followed by the VVD and the CDA, who both enjoyed around 10% support. The GL party had around 5% support during the SC election of 1989, and D66 had around 3%. The accumulated support for these parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 was around 92%, and during the EP election of 1989, 83%.

Chart 11. Electoral Support (%) SC and EP elections yes-camp parties: Nieuweschans



Reiderland

Following the merger of Beerta, Finsterwolde, and Nieuweschans in 1990, Reiderland was formed. The data are presented below displaying the SC and EP elections separately.

Chart 12 displays the electoral support for the no-camp parties in Reiderland during the SC elections from 1994 to 2003. The SP enjoyed stable electoral support of around 10% during the SC elections of 1998, 2002, and 2003. The LPF party was a strong newcomer during the elections of 2002 in Reiderland, obtaining around 23% of the votes. However, this electoral support was not stable since it decreased to around 5% in following elections. The CU and its predecessors had little electoral support during these elections. The accumulated support for the no-camp parties in 1994 was only 2% of the electoral support, increasing by 2002 to 35%, then falling to 17% in 2003.

Chart 12. Electoral support (%) SC elections no-camp parties: Reiderland




Chart 13 displays the electoral support for the no-camp political parties in Reiderland. During the EP elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004. The SP had between 8% and 15% of the vote during these elections. Then came the SGP-GPV-RPF coalition, which increased its electoral support from around 2% to 10% in the 1999 election. The SGP-CU coalition did not maintain this level of support, however, decreasing to just 1% in the following election. The LPF had around 3% of the electoral support during these elections. The accumulated support for the no-camp parties ranged from 9% in 1994 to 18% in 2004.

Chart 13. Electoral support (%) EP elections no-camp parties: Reiderland




Chart 14 displays the electoral support in Reiderland for the yes-camp political parties during the SC elections from 1994 to 2003. After Beerta, Finsterwolde, and Nieuweschans merged, the PvdA remained the best supported yes-camp party. The PvdA's electoral support fluctuated between 30% and 53% during these elections. All the other parties, except for D66, which was a little lower, had around 9% of the vote. The accumulated support for the parties of the yes-camp was around 68%.

Chart 14. Electoral support (%) SC elections yes-camp parties: Reiderland





Chart 15 displays the electoral support in Reiderland for the yes-camp political parties during the EP elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004. As in the SC elections, the PvdA enjoyed the highest level of support in Reiderland during the EP elections. This support was around 48% in 1994, decreasing to 27% in 1999, then climbing to around 48% in the following elections. For the CDA, this pattern was reversed. During the elections of 1994, the CDA's support was around 7%, increasing to 22% in the elections thereafter, but falling once more to around 7% in the 2004 elections. The VVD received steady support during these elections, at around 12%. This applies to GL also, with around 9%. The political party with the least support was D66, with around 5% in each election. The accumulated support for the yes-camp parties during the EP elections of 1994 and 1999 was 82%, and around 70% during the 2004 election.

Chart 15. Electoral support (%) EP elections yes-camp parties: Reiderland



Staphorst

Chart 16 displays the electoral support in Staphorst for the no-camp political parties during the SC elections from 1986 to 2003. The SGP enjoyed steady electoral support, with around 30% of the votes during each election, though this percentage slowly decreased from 1998 onwards. The CU, and its predecessors the RPF and the GPV, also enjoyed steady support during these elections. The RPF and the GPV had around 7% and 10%, respectively, during the elections of 1986, 1989, 1994, and 1998. Once they merged, the CU retained those votes, with around 15% in 2002 and 2003. The accumulated support for the political parties of the no-camp during these SC elections remained relatively stable at around 50%.

Chart 16. Electoral support (%) SC elections no-camp parties: Staphorst




Chart 17 displays the electoral support in Staphorst for the no-camp political parties during the EP elections from 1989 to 2004. The coalition of the SGP-CU and its predecessors, the GPV and the RPF, had a steady level of support, fluctuating between 54% and 64%. The other parties enjoyed little to zero support in Staphorst during these elections. Thus, the level of electoral support for the SGP-CU represents the total electoral support for the no-camp parties.

Chart 17. Electoral support (%) EP elections no-camp parties: Staphorst




Chart 18 displays the electoral support in Staphorst for the yes-camp political parties during the SC elections from 1986 to 2003. Even though the CDA's electoral support decreased in both the 1994 and 1998 elections, the party enjoyed the most electoral support of any yes-camp party. The CDA support remained relatively stable, between 27% and 32%, decreasing to around 19% during the elections of 1994 and 1998. The VVD and the PvdA both enjoyed steady electoral support of around 10%. This support fell a little during the 2002 to around 7%. The D66 party only had low support: 2% in 1986, increasing to 5% in 1994, then falling back to 2% and even lower. Finally, the GL, had a maximum of 2%. The accumulated support for the yes-camp parties during these elections was around 50%.

Chart 18. Electoral support (%) SC elections yes-camp parties: Staphorst





Chart 19 displays the electoral support in Staphorst for the yes-camp political parties during the EP elections from 1989 to 2004. As in the SC elections, the CDA enjoyed the highest level of support, ranging from 22% in 1989 and 2004, to 16% in 1994 and 1999. The PvdA and the VVD had around 8% during these elections. The D66 and GL had the lowest support, between 1% and 3%. The accumulated support for the yes-camp parties was around 37%.

Chart 19. Electoral support (%) EP elections yes-camp parties: Staphorst



Pekela

To analyse the voting behaviour of Pekela, the voting behaviour of Oud Pekela and Nieuw Pekela, the municipalities that merged in 1990 to create Pekela, need to be included. The electoral support during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989 are included for these two municipalities. However, instead of displaying the elections separately, the SC and the EP elections are displayed in the same chart. The charts are only divided between the yes- and no-camps.

The LPF, the CU, and GL are not included in the charts of Oud Pekela and Nieuw Pekela because they did not exist during the 1986 and 1989 elections. For Oud Pekela and Nieuw Pekela, the data are presented in the same manner as for the three municipalities that created Reiderland

Oud Pekela (1986 and 1989)

Chart 20 displays the level of electoral support in Oud Pekela for the no-camp political parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989. During these elections, there was very little support for the no-camp political parties in Oud Pekela.

Chart 20. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections no-camp parties: Oud Pekela





Chart 21 displays the electoral support in Oud Pekela for the yes-camp political parties during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989. During these elections, the PvdA enjoyed the highest level of support. During the SC elections, the PvdA enjoyed around 65% of the votes, and during the EP election, around 62%. For the other parties, the electoral support was also steady. The CDA had around 12% of the votes, the VVD around 6%, and D66 around 3%. During these SC elections, the political parties in the yes-camp enjoyed an accumulated support of 87% in 1986 and 96% in 1989. During the EP election of 1989, the accumulated support was 78%.

Chart 21. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections yes-camp parties: Oud Pekela



Nieuw Pekela (1986 and 1989)

Chart 22 displays the electoral support in Nieuw Pekela during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989 for the no-camp political parties. During the SC elections, the no-camp political parties had little to no electoral support. During the EP election of 1989, the coalition between the SGP, the GPV, and the RPF had around 6% of the electoral support.

Chart 22. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections no-camp parties: Nieuw Pekela





Chart 23 displays the electoral support in Nieuw Pekela during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and the EP election of 1989 for the yes-camp political parties. During these elections, the PvdA enjoyed the highest level of support, with around 51% of the vote. Next came the CDA, with a steady support of around 26%. Third, the VVD, with 10%. The D66 party had the lowest support, with only around 3%. The accumulated support for the yes-camp parties was around 93% during the SC elections of 1986 and 1989 and 85% during the EP elections of 1989.

Chart 23. Electoral support (%) SC and EP elections yes-camp parties: Nieuw Pekela



Pekela

The merger of Oud Pekela and Nieuw Pekela in 1990 led to the creation of Pekela. The data for Pekela consist of the SC elections from 1994 to 2003 and the EP elections from 1994 to 2004, and are presented separately.

Chart 24 displays the electoral support in Pekela during the SC elections from 1994 to 2003 for the no-camp political parties. After Oud Pekela and Nieuw Pekela merged, the SP increased its electoral support from 1% in 1994 up to 7% in 2003. In 2002, the LPF obtained the highest electoral support of the no-camp political parties, with around 17% of the vote. However, this percentage decreased in the following elections to around 4%. The CU and its predecessors, and the SGP, had little to no support during these elections, which was similar to before Pekela came into existence. The accumulated support for the electoral support

during these SC elections for the no-camp political parties increased over time from 5% in 1994, to 25% in 2002, and then fell to 12% in 2003.

Chart 24. Electoral support (%) SC elections no-camp parties: Pekela




Chart 25 displays the electoral support in Pekela during the EP elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004 for the no-camp political parties. The coalition of the SGP, the GPV, and the RDF had 7% support in the 1994 and 1999 elections. During the following elections, the support for this coalition, and then with the CU, decreased to 4%. The SP enjoyed a steady increase of support during these elections. In 1994, the SP had only 1%, but by the 2004 elections, support had increased to almost 7%. The LPF had 1% of electoral support during the elections of 2004. The accumulated support for the electoral support for the no-camp political parties during these EP elections was around 10%.

Chart 25. Electoral support (%) EP elections no-camp parties: Pekela




Chart 26 displays electoral support in Pekela during the SC elections from 1994 to 2003 for the yes-camp political parties. After Oud Pekela and Nieuw Pekela merged, the PvdA remained the political party with the highest level of support in the yes-camp. Except for the 2002 elections, the PvdA had a steady support of around 50%. Furthermore, both the VVD and the CDA enjoyed steady support during these elections also. Even though the CDA lost some electoral support after Oud Pekela and Nieuwe Pekela merged, its support during the elections from 1994 to 2003 remained around 15%. The VVD's support was the same as before Pekela came into existence, with a steady 10%. The accumulated support for the yes-camp parties in Pekela during these elections ranged between 87% in 1994 and 72% in 2003.

Chart 26. Electoral support (%) SC elections yes-camp parties: Pekela





Chart 27 displays the yes-camp parties' electoral support in Pekela during the EP elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004. The PvdA enjoyed the highest support, with around 41% in 1994 and around 48% in 2004. The CDA had around 18%. The VVD and GL both experienced around the same level of support, ranging between 9% in 1994, up to 13% in 1999, and falling to around 6% in 2004. Finally, D66 had the lowest support. The accumulated support for the yes-camp parties during these EP elections was around 83%.

Chart 27. Electoral support (%) EP elections yes-camp parties: Pekela



Oldebroek

Chart 28 displays the electoral support in Oldebroek during the SC elections from 1986 to 2003 for the no-camp political parties. During these elections, the CU, and its predecessor the RPF, enjoyed the highest level of support. The RPF had around 19% of electoral support, and the CU around 15%. The SGP enjoyed stable support of around 13%. Furthermore, the LPF had relatively high support during the election of 2002, reaching nearly 10%. However, this support was only brief, falling to around 3% in the next election. The SP enjoyed very little support during these elections. The accumulated support for the electoral support for the no-camp parties ranged between 29% in 1986 and 41% in 2002.

Chart 28. Electoral support (%) SC elections no-camp parties: Oldebroek




Chart 29 displays the electoral support in Oldebroek during the EP elections from 1989 to 2004. The coalition of the SGP-CU, and prior to 2004 with the predecessors of the CU, enjoyed the highest electoral support during these elections. The level of support increased from around 42% in the 1989 elections to around 54% in the 1999 elections, falling to around 39% in the 2004 elections. The other no-camp political parties had little to no support during these elections. Therefore, the accumulated electoral support for the no-camp political parties during these EP elections was the same as the electoral support for the coalition between the SGP and the CU and its predecessors.

Chart 29. Electoral support (%) EP elections no-camp parties: Oldebroek




Chart 30 displays the electoral support in Oldebroek during the SC elections from 1986 to 2003 for the yes-camp political parties. The CDA enjoyed the highest support during these elections. Except for the 1994 and 1989 elections, when its electoral support decreased, the CDA had around 39%. The PvdA enjoyed between 20% and 10% support, the VVD had around 7%, while GL and D66 had little support, between 1% and 3%. The accumulated support for the electoral support for the yes-camp parties during these SC elections remained steady at around 63%.

Chart 30. Electoral support (%) SC elections yes-camp parties: Oldebroek





Chart 31 displays the electoral support in Oldebroek during the EP elections from 1989 to 2004 for the yes-camp political parties. As in the SC elections, the CDA enjoyed the highest support, with around 30% throughout. The PvdA had around 16% in 1989 and 13% in 2004. The VVD had around 7% of the vote during these elections. The D66 party and GL enjoyed only a small amount of support, between 1% and 3%. The accumulated support for the yes-camp political parties during these EP elections remained steady at around 50%

Chart 31. Electoral support (%) EP election yes-camp parties: Oldebroek



Chapter 4 - Discussion

Now that the voting behaviour of the five municipalities has been analysed, it is necessary to discuss the data. The goal of this chapter is to find possible answers to the RQ. This is done by searching for similarities and differences between the five municipalities' electoral behaviour: how electoral support is distributed (to which political parties), how and whether this indicates a sense of partisanship, and what correlations there are between the outcome of the referendum and the distribution of electoral support and partisanship.

4.1 Stable voting behaviour

First, the election data illustrate that all the municipalities had stable voting behaviour. The political parties that enjoyed the highest support in the SC elections of 1986 and the EP elections of 1989 continued to have this support during the following elections. Thus, this research partially supports and extends Richardson's (1991, p. 766) study, in which he argued that a large portion of the Dutch population displayed stable voting patterns during the 1980s. However, this research only partially supports Richardson (1991), because he argued that the entire Dutch population voted stably, whereas this research is limited to five municipalities.

It is encouraging in terms of answering the RQ that the data indicate that the municipalities exhibited stable voting behaviour. If the data presented the opposite (i.e. that the municipalities had no stable voting behaviour) the discussion section would have ended here. Applying Richardson's logic to the stable voting behaviour of the five municipalities, it is possible to argue that there is a sense of partisanship in the municipalities. Therefore, a part of the RQ (more precisely, was there stable voting behaviour in the five municipalities, indicating a sense of partisanship) can be answered positively.

What remains to analyse is which political parties enjoyed the largest electoral support and whether this support was stable. The answers to these aspects are discussed, below.

4.2 'Large' electoral support – for which political parties?

Based on the combination of Richardson's variant on partisanship and the idea that partisanship influences voting behaviour, it was assumed that the high percentage of 'NO'-votes in the five municipalities could be attributed to a large and stable level of electoral support for the no-camp political parties against the Constitution. In the methodology chapter, it was argued that a large level of support for the no-camp political parties meant greater 'NO'-vote support than for the yes-camp parties in favour of the Constitution. However, the findings indicate that, for some municipalities, electoral support for the no-camp parties was both stable and larger than the electoral support for the yes-camp parties. In Urk, Staphorst, and Oldebroek, no-camp parties enjoyed large support during the EP elections. Surprisingly, however, during the SC elections in the same municipalities, this was

not the case. During the SC elections, the electoral support was either larger for the yes-camp parties (in Oldebroek), or equally divided between the yes- and no-camps (in Urk and Staphorst). Below, how the electoral support was distributed among the political parties in these municipalities is explained in greater detail.

First, in Urk, electoral support for the no-camp political parties during the EP elections was significantly higher than for the yes-camp parties. For the SC elections, the accumulated electoral support for the no-camp parties was only higher during the SC elections of 1994, 1998, and 2002, when the electoral support for the CDA, the only yes-camp party that enjoyed electoral support, fell.

Second, in Staphorst, electoral support was distributed in a similar manner to Urk. During the EP elections, the no-camp political parties enjoyed a significantly larger support than the yes-camp parties. As in Urk, the electoral support for the no-camp parties was distributed across the coalition of the SGP and the CU. Then, the SC elections followed the same pattern as Urk. The accumulated electoral support for the no-camp parties was only higher when the electoral support for the CDA fell during the elections of 1994, 1998, and 2002. As in Urk, even though the political parties enjoyed a higher level of electoral support, this was not significant.

Third, in Oldebroek, only during the EP elections did the no-camp parties enjoy a significantly larger electoral support than the yes-camp parties. During the SC elections, the yes-camp parties enjoyed higher support than the no-camp parties.

These findings provide an answer to the main RQ. As Urk, Staphorst, and Oldebroek voted in line with the voting recommendation of the political parties, they demonstrated a stable electoral voting pattern during the EP elections. Thus, the RQ can be answered (if only partially) positively. Applying Richardson's variant of partisanship and the idea of partisanship being able to influence voting behaviour in the cases of Urk, Staphorst, and Oldebroek and their high percentage of no-vote during the Constitution referendum, it can be argued that there was, during EU-related elections, a sense of partisanship for the no-camp parties. Furthermore, this sense of partisanship may have contributed to the high percentage of 'NO'-votes against the Constitution in these municipalities.

Before explaining why the words 'may have' are used, it is worth mentioning that it is positive for this research that electoral support in these municipalities for the no-camp political parties was found in the EP elections. It is positive because it makes it safer to link the electoral support during the EP with the high percentage of 'NO'-votes during the referendum – and thus safer to state the above answer to the RQ. Combining the high percentage of 'NO'-votes during the referendum with the high electoral support for the no-

camp parties during the EP elections makes it possible to argue that these municipalities, first, had a stable sceptical view towards the EU, and second, that this sceptical view is also represented in the high percentage of 'NO'-votes during the referendum on the Constitution.

The use of the words 'may have', rather than using words that exclude other possible factors that could have contributed to the high rate of 'NO'-votes in these three municipalities, implies that it is accepted that this research has limitations. Thus, it cannot be definitively argued that the stable electoral support for no-camp parties during European elections was due to a sense of partisanship. Nor can it be argued absolutely that such partisanship contributed to the electorate voting against the Constitution. The limitations of examining the influence of partisanship on referendum outcomes by considering only one factor (stable voting behaviour) is addressed by Gerber et al. (2010, p.721), who argued that, *'the observed correlation between partisanship and politically relevant outcomes may originate in unobserved factors'*.

The following section, based on the findings of this research, discusses which other unobserved factors may have influenced the high percentage of 'NO'-votes in these five municipalities. There are undoubtedly many other factors that contributed to the high percentage of 'NO'-votes in these municipalities. In addition, these unobserved factors provide recommendations for future research.

4.3 Focus areas for future research based on the findings of this study

This study's findings make it possible to make assumptions about what other factors could have contributed to the high percentage of 'NO'-votes in the five municipalities. The assumed factors are based on the existing of a clear distinction in the municipalities about which political parties enjoyed the highest electoral support. In three of the five municipalities (Urk, Staphorst and Oldebroek), the political parties with a religious background (CU, SGP and CDA) enjoyed the highest electoral support. In the other two municipalities (Pekela and Reiderland), one party clearly enjoyed the highest support (PvdA).

4.3.1 Clear distinction between the five municipalities

Based on the stable voting behaviour of the five municipalities and which political parties enjoyed the highest electoral support, there is a clear distinction between the municipalities. In Urk, Staphorst, and Oldebroek, the parties that enjoyed the highest political support were the CDA, the SGP, and the CU and its predecessors. These parties enjoyed either the highest or second highest level of support in these three municipalities. In Pekela and Reiderland, however, the PvdA had the highest support, followed by the CDA. This

distinction suggests that the voting outcomes of these municipalities may be related to, first, the dominant role of religion in the municipalities in which the SGP, the CU, and the CDA enjoyed the highest support; and second, related to the PvdA and its connection with its supporters.

First, a high level of electoral support for the CDA, the SGP, and the CU could mean that religion, more specifically Christianity, played an important role with the electorate in the municipalities of Urk, Staphorst, and Oldebroek, leading them to vote against the Constitution. This assumption is based on the SGP and the CU arguing against the Constitution because they believed it lacked any references to the influence of Christianity on the history of Europe. This assumption suggests that political values were secondary to religious values during the referendum, and that the electorate who voted for the CDA decided not to vote in line with the party's voting recommendation but followed the overall religious sphere of those municipalities. For future research, it would be interesting to provide answers to these assumptions and thereby to measure if, and if so, how, religion plays a role in voting behaviour during referendums.

Second, applying the combination of Richardson's variant of partisanship with the idea of partisanship being able to influence voting behaviour during elections and referendums to the high and stable electoral support for the PvdA in Pekela and Reiderland, it might be expected that these municipalities would vote in line with the voting recommendations of the PvdA, who campaigned in favour of the Constitution. However, the high percentage of 'NO'-votes in these municipalities indicates that the electorate did not vote in line with the voting recommendation of the party that enjoyed, prior to the election, a stable and large electoral support. Furthermore, even though the PvdA had the highest electoral support during the EP elections in Pekela and Reiderland, what happened to the electorate who initially supported the PvdA during both the SC and EP elections but during the referendum voted against the PvdA's voting recommendation? This suggests that either the PvdA lost connection with its supporters, or that another factor was more influential than the stable support for the PvdA. For future research – and especially for the PvdA – it becomes interesting to provide answers to these questions.

Conclusion

Based on Richardson's (1986;1991) belief that stable electoral support for a political party is a variant of a sense of partisanship, and thus partisanship can influence voting behaviour during elections and referendums, it was assumed that the high percentage of 'NO'-votes in the five municipalities of Urk, Reiderland, Staphorst, Pekela, and Oldebroek during the Dutch

referendum on the Constitution could be attributed to these five municipalities having a stable electoral support. Thus, this support indicated a sense of partisanship with the political parties against the Constitution. This assumption provided the RQ for this study.

By conducting an in-depth case study on these five municipalities and their voting behaviour during the SC elections from 1986 to 2003 and the EP elections from 1989 to 2004, and examining which parties were anti- and pro-European Constitution, an attempt was made to answer the RQ. The findings illustrated that only in the municipalities of Urk, Staphorst, and Oldebroek was there stable electoral support during the EP elections for the no-camp political parties. Therefore, the RQ could only partially be answered positively. Yes, using Richardson's variant of partisanship, there was a sense of partisanship in these three municipalities for the no-camp political parties. Furthermore, yes, this sense of partisanship may be able to explain the high rate of 'NO'-votes in these municipalities.

In addition, it was also positive for this study that a stable and large electoral support was found during the EP elections because this makes it safer to argue that the 'NO'-vote during the referendum stems from partisanship for the no-camp political parties because the outcomes of the referendum and the electoral support both represent a stable sceptical view towards the EU. However, it must be acknowledged that studying only a single factor has many limitations.

Regarding recommendations for future research, there are many unobserved factors that could have contributed to the outcome of the referendum in these five municipalities. The findings in this research suggest that the outcome can be addressed to the factor of religion and to an unobserved factor which made the supporters of the PvdA not vote in line with the party's voting recommendation.

Appendix

Data elections Urk

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvDA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	Accumulated
1986 (SC)	44,67	1,91	0,89	0,32	n.a.	47,79
1989 (SC)	40,9	1,28	1,21	0,49	0,23	44,11
1994 (SC)	32,44	2,07	0,72	0,37	0,13	35,73
1998 (SC)	27,49	2,79	1,33	0,25	0,38	32,24
2002 (SC)	33,27	0,67	0,43	0,26	0,12	34,75
2003 (SC)	45,37	1,13	0,73	0,17	0,14	47,54

	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvDA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated
1989 (EP)	34,45	1,22	0,8	0,45	n.a.	36,92
1994 (EP)	26,55	0,7	0,7	0,37	0,11	28,43
1999 (EP)	28,69	1,08	0,58	0,23	0,48	31,06
2004 (EP)	31,06	0,93	0,64	0,19	0,17	32,99

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	Accumulated
1986 (SC)	30,65	n.a.	0	n.a.	13,33	5,59	49,57
1989 (SC)	32,92	n.a.	0	n.a.	15,18	7,32	55,42
1994 (SC)	35,27	n.a.	0,03	n.a.	20,42	6,46	62,18
1998 (SC)	33,93	n.a.	0,32	n.a.	23,41	9,11	66,77
2002 (SC)	35,59	23,54	0,37	5,49	n.a.	n.a.	64,99
2003 (SC)	33,38	16,18	0,4	1,69	n.a.	n.a.	51,65

Data elections Reiderland (Beerta, Finsterwolde and Nieuwesches prior to 1990)

Elections Beerta

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
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1986 (SC)	4,84	9,86	61,17	1,47		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	77,34	n.a.
1989 (SC)	4,58	9,02	65,4	2,14	6,19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	81,14	6,19
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3,67	8,54	55,57	1,53	n.a.	n.a.	69,31

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	SGP- CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP- GPV- RPF (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	0,14	n.a.	0,09	n.a.	0,18	0,14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,55	n.a.
1989 (SC)	n.a.	n.a.	0,39	n.a.	0,19	0,19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,77	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,67	n.a.	0,73	n.a.	1,4

Elections Finsterwolde:

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	4,86	8,01	60,28	1,44		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	74,59	n.a.
1989 (SC)	5,18	7,57	62,05	2,45	14,09	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	91,34	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2,38	5,37	52,99	2,07	n.a.	n.a.	62,81

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	SGP- CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP- GPV- RPF (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	0		0,11		0,53	0,32	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,96	n.a.
1989 (SC)	0,06		0,11		0,5	0,33	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,31	n.a.	1,38	n.a.	1,69

Elections Nieuweschans:

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	7,58	8,47	70,65	3,31		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	90,01	n.a.

1989 (SC)	7,38	7,47	72,76	3,25	4,92	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	95,78	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6,37	6,29	69,3	1,9	n.a.	n.a.	83,86

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	SGP-CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP-GPV-RPF (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	0,08		0,16		0,16	0,08	n.a.	n.a.		n.a.	0,48	n.a.
1989 (SC)	0,09		0		0,18	0	n.a.	n.a.		n.a.	0,27	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,29	n.a.	0,44	n.a.	n.a.	0,73

Elections Reiderland

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	Accumulated
1994 (SC)	3,86	9,1	39,19	7,29	2,34	61,78
1998 (SC)	3,79	12,01	46,49	3,24	6,55	72,08
2002 (SC)	8,57	9,62	30,23	2,63	9,96	61,01
2003 (SC)	6,55	8,56	53,07	1,17	3,88	73,23

	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated
1994 (EP)	7,05	12	48,22	5,61	9,4	82,28
1999 (EP)	22,26	15,03	27,26	4,89	12,55	81,99
2004 (EP)	7,81	8,76	47,94	1	4,7	70,21

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	Accumulated
1994 (SC)	0,11	n.a.	1,31		0,7	0,15	2,27
1998 (SC)	0,03	n.a.	8,73		0,94	0,23	9,93
2002 (SC)	0,13	0,89	11,99	22,91	n.a.	n.a.	35,92
2003 (SC)	0,05	0,52	11,51	5,15	n.a.	n.a.	17,23

	SGP-CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP-GPV-RPF (EP)	Accumulated
1994 (EP)	n.a.	7,59	n.a.	1,57	9,16

1999 (EP)	n.a.	5,42	n.a.	10,94	16,36
2004 (EP)	0,79	15,1	2,8	n.a.	18,69

Data elections Staphorst

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	Accumulated
1986 (SC)	26,82	11,37	10,91	1,91	n.a.	51,01
1989 (SC)	27,6	8,58	11,01	2,61	0,81	50,61
1994 (SC)	19,24	11,09	9,37	5,44	0,4	45,54
1998 (SC)	19,07	12,4	11,57	2,57	1,49	47,1
2002 (SC)	27,56	8,16	5,9	1,63	1,31	44,56
2003 (SC)	32,8	8,59	9,54	0,98	1,19	53,1

	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated
1989 (EP)	21,26	8,16	10,25	1,92	n.a.	41,59
1994 (EP)	16,63	9,3	7,09	2,82	0,39	36,23
1999 (EP)	16,48	8,7	7,06	1,54	1,46	35,24
2004 (EP)	22,06	7,34	8,23	0,96	1,32	39,91

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	Accumulated
1986 (SC)	31,74	n.a.	0,01	n.a.	7,38	8,61	47,74
1989 (SC)	32,73	n.a.	0,01	n.a.	7,32	8,89	48,95
1994 (SC)	30,97	n.a.	0,12	n.a.	10,37	8,9	50,36
1998 (SC)	30,12	n.a.	0,69	n.a.	11,17	8,77	50,75
2002 (SC)	29,44	17,15	1,06	6,42	n.a.	n.a.	54,07
2003 (SC)	28,71	13,7	1,28	2,82	n.a.	n.a.	46,51

	SGP-CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP-GPV-RPF (EP)	Accumulated
1989 (EP)	n.a.	0,14	n.a.	56,94	57,08
1994 (EP)	n.a.	0,35	n.a.	62,51	62,86
1999 (EP)	n.a.	0,59	n.a.	63,61	64,2
2004 (EP)	54,33	1,27	1,26	n.a.	56,86

Data elections Pekela (Oud Pekela and Nieuw Pekela prior to 1990)

Elections Oud Pekela

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	11,7	6,17	67,24	2,36		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	87,47	n.a.
1989 (SC)	12,64	5,29	65,74	3,13	9,81	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	96,61	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11,13	5,01	61,93	1,9	n.a.	n.a.	79,97

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	SGP-CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP-GPV-RPF (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	0,2	n.a.	0,27	n.a.	0,77	0,5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,74	n.a.
1989 (SC)	0,56	n.a.	0,28	n.a.	0,61		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,45	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,59	n.a.	0,71	n.a.	2,44	n.a.	3,74

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	SGP-CU (EP)	SP (EP)
1986 (SC)	0,2	n.a.	0,27	n.a.	0,77	0,5	n.a.	n.a.
1989 (SC)	0,56	n.a.	0,28	n.a.	0,61		n.a.	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,59	n.a.	0,71

Elections Nieuw Pekela

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	26,92	10,11	52,02	2,92		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	91,97	n.a.

1989 (SC)	26,02	9,38	50,99	3,6	4,47	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	94,46	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	26,58	9,36	46,19	3,14	n.a.	n.a.	85,27

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	SGP-CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP-GPV-RPF (EP)	Accumulated (SC)	Accumulated (EP)
1986 (SC)	0,72		0,06		1,88	0,64	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3,3	n.a.
1989 (SC)	0,71		0,06		2,24	0,99	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3,01	n.a.
1989 (EP)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,25	n.a.	5,72	n.a.	5,97

Elections Pekela

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	Accumulated
1994 (SC)	13,84	9,52	46,21	8,32	8,33	86,22
1998 (SC)	13,21	11,75	49,43	3,77	10,61	88,77
2002 (SC)	18,58	8,86	32,23	2,73	10,39	72,79

	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated
1994 (EP)	19,66	10,17	41,67	4,9	8,83	85,23
1999 (EP)	21,72	12	36,55	1,89	14,43	86,59
2004 (EP)	16,46	7,32	48,08	1,42	5,84	79,12

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	Accumulated
1994 (SC)	0,25	n.a.	1,27	n.a.	3,26	0,57	5,35
1998 (SC)	0,17	n.a.	3,94	n.a.	2,86	0,71	7,68
2002 (SC)	0,3	2,42	5,99	16,37	n.a.	n.a.	25,08
2003 (SC)	0,16	1,96	6,8	3,77	n.a.	n.a.	12,69

	SGP-CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP-GPV-RPF (EP)	Accumulated
1994 (EP)	n.a.	1,25	n.a.	7,77	9,02
1999 (EP)	n.a.	4,57	n.a.	7,4	11,97

2004 (EP)	3,74	6,63	1,56	n.a.	11,93
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Data elections Oldebroek

Yes-camp

	CDA (SC)	VVD (SC)	PvdA (SC)	D66 (SC)	GL (SC)	Accumulated
1986 (SC)	36,95	8,71	20,41	2,53	n.a.	68,6
1989 (SC)	37,53	7,07	20,62	3,05	0,95	69,22
1994 (SC)	26,52	9,72	17,74	5,7	0,62	60,3
1998 (SC)	22,92	12,55	19,09	2,83	1,85	59,24
2002 (SC)	37,31	7,09	9,5	1,7	1,75	57,35
2003 (SC)	41,6	8,34	16,88	1,18	1,32	69,32

	CDA (EP)	VVD (EP)	PvdA (EP)	D66 (EP)	GL (EP)	Accumulated
1989 (EP)	31,19	6,07	16,18	2,19	n.a.	55,63
1994 (EP)	27,41	8,19	10,85	3,3	0,64	50,39
1999 (EP)	22,39	7,79	9,31	1,72	2,68	43,89
2004 (EP)	29,19	6,31	13,19	1,56	1,87	52,12

No-camp

	SGP (SC)	CU (SC)	SP (SC)	LPF (SC)	RPF (SC)	GPV (SC)	Accumulated
1986 (SC)	15,57	n.a.	0,02	n.a.	12,35	1,94	29,88
1989 (SC)	15,08	n.a.	0,02	n.a.	11,9	3,15	30,15
1994 (SC)	13,22	n.a.	0,3	n.a.	18,83	4,07	36,42
1998 (SC)	13,7	n.a.	1,35	n.a.	19,75	4,47	39,27
2002 (SC)	13,06	16,74	1,93	9,7	n.a.	n.a.	41,43
2003 (SC)	11,69	13,05	2,23	3,18	n.a.	n.a.	30,15

	SGP-CU (EP)	SP (EP)	LPF (EP)	SGP-GPV-RPF (EP)	Accumulated
1989 (EP)	n.a.	0,04	n.a.	42,22	42,26
1994 (EP)	n.a.	0,51	n.a.	47,67	48,18
1999 (EP)	n.a.	1,34	n.a.	54,09	55,43
2004 (EP)	38,84	2,41	1,35	n.a.	42,6

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