

Migration Policy in Italy: Beyond Closed Ports

**A Comparative Analysis of the Migration Policies of Italy and their Influence on
the EU**

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Executive summary

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the policy changes that Italy and the European Union (EU) experienced due to the EU migrant crisis. The European country that, besides Greece and Spain, has been most affected by problems of irregular migrant arrivals by the Mediterranean Sea, is Italy. The wave of migrants has increased the complexity of the border control management in Italy as one of the front line EU Member States, and challenged the effectiveness of their national asylum system. Whenever the national security of one of the Member States is in danger, an evolution of governmental policy follows directly. At the same time, this threat challenges the EU's effective management of its external relations. Hence, the central question of this research looks closer at "In what ways did the Renzi government and Conte government in Italy between 2014 – 2018 respond to EU migration policy and to what extent has it changed the Italy-EU relationship?" In order to better understand the changes that the Italian governments have gone through in the years of crisis, various research methods were used to reach an adequate answer to this question. The information used in this research mainly originates from extensive desk research with parts collected through qualitative methods in the means of semi-structure interviews with Dutch diplomats specialised in Italian policy based in Rome. The findings of this research have shown that although the EU provided contribution, Italy was confronted by a lack of solidarity among other EU Member States and faced serious problems in its own legal asylum system because of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). These results proved that there was a certain case of influence on the Italy-EU relationship. As reaction to these intra-Union problems and the malfunctioning of the CEAS, the Italian government took its own diplomatic lead in protecting Italian borders and launched Mare Nostrum. This search and rescue operation pressured the EU to improve the decision-making over migration and to provide valuable assistance to Italian maritime forces. In this EU migrant crisis period the EU emerged as the 'superpower', yet for the greatest part it was Italy who took responsibility to tackle this crisis. These developments in the times of an influx of migrants led to the establishment of the current far-right wing and populist coalition that took back its sovereign and nationalistic stance in Italy. The Renzi government, with its morality and humanitarian perspective, aimed to rescue and welcome migrants in need of protection. The Conte government presents a complete opposite approach, and aimed for stricter measures and to 'close the Italian ports'. Moreover, the enhanced cooperation of the EU in Libya was a step forward to assure EU's active presence in its external relations. Therefore, the EU migrant crisis in Italy has undoubtedly inspired the EU to improve foreign policies. With the help of these changes, the Central Mediterranean route experienced, since 2012, the greatest drop in the numbers of irregular migrants by the end of 2018.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIDA:	Asylum Information Database
CEAS:	Common European Asylum System
DG HOME:	Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DPM:	Deputy Prime Minister
EASO:	European Asylum Support Office
EC:	European Commission
ECFR:	European Council on Foreign Relations
ECRE:	European Council on Refugees and Exiles
EEAS:	European Union External Action
EP:	European Parliament
EU:	European Union
EUNAVFOR MED:	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
EASO:	European Asylum Support Office
EUTF:	European Union Trust Fund
IAS:	Italian Asylum System
IOM:	International Organization for Migrants
Lega:	Lega Nord
M5S:	MoVimento 5 Stelle
MS:	Member State
MSs:	Member States
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
PD:	Partito Democratico
PM:	Prime Minister
SPRAR:	System of Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees
UN:	United Nations
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

1. Introduction

Migrants, people, each one had a story, a hope, a dream. Escaping conflicts, poverty and instability drives desperate people in the hands of smugglers to risk the dangerous journey overseas from Africa to Italy. In the words of Pope Francis to the European Parliament: “*We cannot allow the Mediterranean to become a vast graveyard*”, which refers to the European migrant crisis (Euranet, 2014). The flow of migrants has reached increased proportions since World War II – the European Union (EU), together with Norway and Switzerland, reached a record of 1.3 million migrant applications into Europe (European Parliament, 2017).

The migrant crisis marked a crucial junction in Italian politics and has since triggered discussion of socioeconomic and security issues. Italy’s geopolitical position has always been evident, which can be traced back to the decades of the Roman Empire, and remains a crucial role in European externalisation strategies. Moreover, the second outbreak of civil war in Libya, in 2014, produced a long-established disturbance in Europe’s field of externalised migration controls. This has led to a strong and direct impact on Italy’s security and migration policies and on its relationship with EU institutions and other member states (Lindley, 2014).

Since 2011, Italy has not stopped requesting, even demanding, the EU for a more balanced distribution of costs and responsibilities associated with the control, search and rescue, and protection tasks along the most sensitive stretch of the EU’s external borders. Those claims strongly have been reinforced in 2013 when a major shipwreck occurred in Lampedusa on 3 October with more than 300 victims. This pushed the Italian government to launch “Mare Nostrum”, an expensive and large-scale search and rescue operation. Meant as a unilateral action of responsibility aimed at achieving leverage to gain more European solidarity, Mare Nostrum was a visible success yet a political failure. Cynicism and egotism reached a peak when other European member states argued that Mare Nostrum had led to an unplanned ‘pull factor’ stimulating more migrants to travel to the EU. Afterwards, the EU was accused by Italy of failing in delivering visible results in response of the growing humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean. Consequently for Italy, the level of public support for the EU was found at a historical low (Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2016).

Italy’s intensifying tensions with Brussels and increased pressure with its obligation to process asylum claims has been the inspiration behind the development of the main question: In what ways did the Renzi government and Conte government in Italy respond to the EU Migration policy between 2014 – 2018 and to what extent has it changed the Italy-EU relationship? This thesis aims to present, through the perspective of Prime Minister (PM) Matteo Renzi and Giuseppe Conte, the

responses to EU migration policy. Researching these responses will lead to the EU-Italy relationship and the other way around on the topic of migration.

The following sub questions are proposed to answer the main question:

1. What was the migration policy during the Renzi government?
2. What has been the migration policy during the Conte government till January 2019?
3. What are the similarities and differences in policies of both governments regarding migration?
4. To what extent did the EU contribute on migration policies in Italy during Renzi's and Conte's government?

In order to answer the main question, this thesis examines the divergent ways of approaching migration policy by the Italian Prime Ministers and the EU. This dissertation is divided into four chapters; firstly, the methodology section will provide a brief overview of the research methods that were conducted. Secondly, a theoretical framework and a clear policy analysis on migration of the Italian government and the EU are designed by means of a literature review. Thirdly, the main question will be answered by presenting an overview of findings of the research based on the sub questions above mentioned. Lastly, the final chapter demonstrates the conclusions of this thesis altogether.

2. Methodology

This chapter shows an overview of the different methods that were used in order to answer the main question of this thesis. The aim of this thesis was to explain and clarify the differences and similarities of the responses to migration policy in Italy and place these aspects in a comparison with the previous PM Matteo Renzi and current PM Giuseppe Conte. Moreover, it was focused to outline potential conflict situations between Italy and the EU. Additionally, the following sections explain the specific methods applied, that consist of a mix of both primary and secondary research, and qualitative data. Finally, further aspects that apply for this research such as the interviews and limitations are discussed.

2.1 Type of research

The central question of this research, *‘In what ways did the Renzi government and Conte government in Italy respond to the EU Migration policy between 2014 – 2018 and to what extent has it changed the Italy-EU relationship?’* is an extensive question. The first two sub questions: *‘What was the policy on migration during the Renzi government?’* and *‘What has been the migration policy during the Conte government till January 2019?’* contain descriptive aspects. According to Zincone and Caponio, the national immigration policy-making process in Italy can be divided into two categories: a) policy analysis on top-level decision-making processes by the Italian government, parliament and civil service; and b) a study adopting a more governance-oriented approach, that investigates the relationship between government and civil society (Zincone & Caponio, 2005). In order to focus this thesis on organisations of the government, a policy analysis on top-level was employed to examine the responses of Italy and the EU. This provided more insight into the perspectives of the key institutions and central politicians regarding this research.

The third sub question, *‘What are the differences and similarities in policies of both governments regarding migration?’* was formulated for the following reason: as reported by Fedele, a difference in the approach of migration can be seen emerging in the far-right coalition (Fedele, 2003). Far-right parties are, often, highly active on migration and mostly raise problems of public security and control of illegality. In contrast to center-left parties, which are more concerned with social inclusion. Therefore, to answer the third answer sub question, both far-right and center-left ideologies and perspectives were employed to examine the comparison of both Prime Ministers.

The fourth sub question, *‘To what extent did the EU contribute on migration policies in Italy during the Renzi and Conte government?’* was created to directly explain the EU’s set of regulations for Italy to implement and what influences and endorsements existed for Italy and vice versa. In order to understand the complexity and difficulty for the decision-making of the Italian

government regarding migration, it is required to outline the directives of the European Union and the Italian government itself. Moreover, the sub question investigates whether or not Italy and the EU applied these directives and policies. In sum, this chapter will eventually lead to an overview, and thus analysis, of events and developments that occurred on migration.

2.1.1 Secondary research

In researching the motives behind the responses to the migration policies of PM Renzi and Conte, it became evident that a detailed understanding of the overall concept was required. Therefore, it was relevant to research background information on the migrant flows, politicians, policies, laws and decision-making through qualitative secondary data. By conducting desk research vital information was gained through qualitative secondary data from academic sources such as books, journals and articles. This method is chosen since it permitted reliable information that was shared by scholars who are experienced in political fields. This dissertation examines relevant theories and concepts, which form the pillar of this study, such as migration, EU policy, border control, security and political ideologies.

Furthermore, information concerning policies has been obtained through databases of Italian authorities, official EU institutions and other governmental organizations. Documents of official institutions, for statistics and policies, were used more frequently to make the outcome of the findings more reliable. In analysing the approach to migration of the Italian government, the policies from 2014 – 2018 were focused on, because this period gives clear insight into the government's current response to migration.

2.1.2 Primary research

This dissertation required primary research data by obtaining individual interviews and observing other interviews that were published by official news channels, such as BBC News, Euronews and Al Jazeera. Moreover, focus groups and observations are primary sources engaged in conducting appropriate data. According to Boeije, a common method of gathering primary qualitative data is the use of interviews and observations (Boeije, 2010). By the use of a narrated methodology it was possible to set a clear understanding of decision-making. Travelling to Rome, the political capital of Italy, and conducting interviews with experts on migration policy in Italy was an added value to this thesis. By conducting interviews with experts it is possible, as a researcher, to use your own instruments to gain valid knowledge of a specific individual's culture. In order to gain inside information on migration policies and Italian politicians, emails were sent to the following organizations: the Embassy of the Italian Republic in The Hague, the Dutch Embassy in Rome and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome. A brief overview of the interview was included in the emails and it was requested to conduct the interview face-to-face. Interviews are known to be

time-consuming; therefore, the preference was to conduct structured interviews that took no longer than 25 minutes.

Unfortunately, not all requests were accepted by the organizations. Coordinators of the Embassy of the Italian Republic and Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised me to contact the Dutch Embassy in Rome. Luckily, two experts working at the Dutch Embassy were happy to participate in this research and consented doing an interview. The interviews conducted with Karlijn Rensink and Aart Heering took place on a Monday, 18 December, in the building of the Embassy, Rome. Karlijn Rensink is an experienced EU policy advisor and Aart Heering has been an Italian correspondent for more than nine years that both work for the government. However, this thesis does not publish the content of the interviews because the interviewees wanted the interview to stay strictly confidential. The interviews remain relevant for this thesis, because it generated more food for thought, more objectives and it was valuable to see the other side of the coin.

2.2 Limitations

One limitation that will influence the outcome of this study is that the migration policy of PM Conte is still changing. Therefore, at the time of writing this dissertation, it may be difficult to conclude how strategies of PM Conte turned out. Thus, the conclusion will be based upon actions implemented before January 2019.

Another limitation was the time limit regarding the deadline of June 2019. This research managed to include interviews with two experts, yet it was challenging and time consuming to attract other participants who are close to the migrant policy field in Italy. Moreover, more visits to Italy would have yielded better and more results.

Further, the subject of this study can be seen as highly sensitive. Migration is often marked as controversial; therefore, civil servants felt hesitant in expressing opinions and views on the Italian government and requested anonymity. The interviewees only agreed if their information was only used as intellectual nourishment.

3. Theoretical framework

The causes and consequences of Arab Spring migration to Europe

Since 2013, the EU has been facing the worst migrant crisis since the end of World War II. The influx of migrants grew significantly with the Arab Spring, and the evolutions of the Syrian conflict in particular (Banu Salameh, 2017). Migration from the Arab Spring countries refers to what is called the push-factors in the countries of the Arab Spring and the pull-factors of the receiving European member states. These motives can be categorized in a mix of political, economic, and social factors.

Political factors

Middle Eastern countries such as Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Egypt have witnessed a range of political conditions over 2011 and onwards, as a result of rebellions of suppression that erupted into a widespread development of chaos, civil war, persecution, instability, and widespread violence (Joffe, 2013). Moreover, Libya is considered as a failed state (UK Parliament, 2018). These circumstances led to sudden waves of migration to the EU with Libya's capital, Tripoli, as departure point and from there continue through the Mediterranean. In 2011, the exposures of illegal-border crossings in the EU started to overflow and left the Italian island of Lampedusa with thousands of Tunisian refugee arrivals. The wave of Sub-Saharan Africans that earlier migrated to Libya, followed in 2012, escaping the upheavals in the post-Qaddafi era (Council for Foreign Relations, 2018). The conflict in Syria has had a significant influence, and its implications have spread to all neighbouring countries (Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon), as well as to Arab countries and the EU. These implications were that, about one third of the Syrians have lost their homes during the outbreak of civil wars, and more than two million found refuge in neighbouring countries such as Turkey, but many also fled to the EU.

Economic factors

The levels of poverty and unemployment are high in the countries of Arab Spring compared to EU countries, which results in a low spending power per capita. During the years between 2011 – 2014 the gross national income has not increased, corruption has increased, and all economic structural adjustment programs in cooperation with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have failed (Krizek & Zahorik, 2017). Since the economic push factors in the Arab Spring countries are a cause of migration to the EU, the economic attractors can be found in EU member states, in which their economy makes it more feasible to sustain a migrant wave (Cakmak, 2017).

Social factors

Evidence suggests that an increase of social tribulations such as rape, prostitution, and intoxication are also seen in the refugee areas. Moreover, social factors related to economic factors such as poverty, hunger, unemployment, and low standards of living have a social and psychological impact on the society in which they arise (UNHCR, 1997). Generally, citizens from countries of the Arab Spring experience deteriorating conditions of social, economic life, exclusion and social inequality which often result in malnutrition and other problems. Combined with the political and economic combined with the political and economic factors, these factors have contributed to the migration of people from African and Middle Eastern to the EU (NRC, 2018).

Impact on EU member states

The cause of the Arab Spring pushed more than 65,000 irregular migrants through the “Mediterranean Route”, according to Frontex (Frontex, 2018). Currently, Europe has witnessed a rise in mixed-migration trends, where economic migrants and asylum seekers travel together. The mass influx from the Arab Spring countries has become a major political challenge to EU member states, resulting in enormous pressure and political division on how best to deal with the problem of migration.

Since asylum seekers, migrants and refugees are entitled to different extents of aid and protection under international law; it is crucial to distinguish these three groups. According to the United High Commissioner of Refugees, an asylum seeker terms a individual that is escaping persecution or conflict, and consequently pursuing international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees. If the claim of an asylum seeker has been approved, he or she is defined as a refugee. Contrary to a (economic) migrant, who is an individual whose main drive for leaving his or her origin country is economic benefit (UNHCR, 2016). The term ‘migrant’ is used as an umbrella term, and therefore this thesis will use ‘migrant’ to categorize all three groups in one.

This thesis focuses on Italy because this country is known to carry burdens of irregular migrant arrivals by sea, which causes political challenges, and much information was available for this case study. Italy serves as one of the central entry-point for EU-bound migrants because of their geographical location to the Mediterranean Sea. Libya functioned as the main point of departure for the majority of refugees and migrants trying to reach Europe during the EU migrant crisis. Libya’s shortest route to reach the EU is via Italy, including three days of travel by boat. The Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya to Italy was the most popular route for migrant smugglers in 2014: over 170,000 migrants crossed the border illegally into Italy. (IOM, 2015). This route has been one of the most active and dangerous and has dealt with the most with human trafficking gangs who smuggle migrants from Libyan shores by wooden and rubber boats to bring them to Italian shores, where NGO ships are rescuing them and allowing them to enter the country.

Therefore, there are many irregular migrants in Italy and thus this thesis will provide special attention to 'irregular' migration.

Irregular migration

The term 'irregular' is theoretically problematic, as extended in the following subsection. A reason for this is that it is still linked to the other term most commonly used in this context: illegal. The use of 'illegal' can be criticized in various ways. One connotation is its link with criminality. This has been stressed by the United High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2014) who has been concerned that criminal offence of illegal working may have a disproportionate impact upon victims of trafficking with international protection needs. UNHCR's immigration bill even recommends a legal defence for illegal working migrants to avoid wrongful prosecutions and delays in naturalisation processes. Another suggestion is that defining persons as 'illegal' can be regarded as denying their humanity.

The two other terms that are often used in this framework are 'undocumented' and 'unauthorised'. The first term is avoided in this thesis because of its vagueness. It is often used to signify migrants who not have been documented, or recorded, and sometimes to label a migrant without documents (passports and visas). These situations do not apply to all irregular migrants, yet 'undocumented' is often used to cover them all.

Common European Asylum System

The enforcement of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 established the foundations for a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). This turned asylum and immigration into an part of supranational EU competences. The CEAS clarified legal foundations for a common system among EU Member States. The first plans to develop a common system on asylum were made, based on the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the Geneva Protocol in 1967 (Chetail, De Bruycker, & Maiani, 2016).

The European legislation of a common asylum system was developed together with special institutions, such as the European Asylum System Office (EASO) to monitor and harmonize the improvement of national policies regarding migration. In this same process, the European Council (EC) adopted several directions and directives, such as the Dublin Regulation to hold member states accountable for its responsibility for the asylum applications.

Entry-point states such as Italy bear independent accountability for migrants under the Dublin Regulation. This EU regulation defines that the first country of arrival is exclusively accountable for examining migrant asylum applications and that asylum seekers must stay in this first country.

Migrants are legally faced with the possibility to be deported back to the country they originally entered (European Commission, 2019). To facilitate the cooperation between members states of Europe, institutions such as Frontex and EASO are responsible for harmonizing a consistent asylum system.

Italian migration law and policy

For centuries, Italy experienced waves of immigration and has been an attractive host country destination for immigrants with favour to economic objectives. The beginning of the influx was generated by the oil crisis in the early 1970s. Italy was a prominent example of classical immigration flows; in the aftermath of World War II a significant wave of Italians immigrated to the Northern-European countries as labour migrants. Since then, the in- and outflow of migration has reversed, transforming Italy from an emigration country to an immigration destination. The shift has been recognised to push factors in the sending countries, such as conflict and poverty, as well as the development of restrictions on immigration in the older immigration destinations, which had the unintentional effect of transforming Southern EU borders into second-best choices for international migrants (Gattinara, 2016)

In the early stages, the debate was characterized by a high degree of consensus among political actors, whom saw migration particularly from the views of labour relations. The first law was approved in 1986, in which a definition of the system of controls and employment of foreign workers to Italy was established. Thus, the concept of family unification and providing measures to regularize migrants already resident in Italy was introduced. Shortly after, in 1990, small government parties and radical right oppositions started to challenge 'the right to immigrate' and developed a new form of nationalism. An important event in the late 1990s marked a new change in Italian migration policy: the *Turco-Napolitano* law passed by a center-left coalition government, which aimed to challenge the opposition parties on irregular migration. The new law introduced new measures concerning expulsion, including a quota system for employment-related migration (Garau, 2014). The Italian right-wing parties such as Forza Italia continued to ask for stricter control and demanded the government criminalize irregular migration. Silvio Berlusconi, who entered the Italian office in 2001, branded irregular migrants as a potential threat to the Italian society (Friedman, 2015). All these events can be characterized as typical, traditional Italian politics. The following chapter will outline the most recent events, comparing the previous center-left government to the current right-wing government.

4. Findings: Renzi's policy

This chapter seeks to answer how the Renzi government has dealt with migration and the motives behind the policy reforms. This chapter investigates the events and will highlight the most relevant policy amendments. Because the Renzi government ruled for four years, and thus a much longer period compared to the Conte government, more attention will be given to this chapter of Renzi's policy.

4.1 The coalition

On February 2014, following tensions between PM Enrico Letta and Matteo Renzi, President Giorgio Napolitano removed Letta as PM. The Partito Democratico (PD) leadership voted with great majority in favour of Renzi's call for a new government. After PD backed the proposal, and President Napolitano accepted PD's outcome, Renzi was made PD's party leader and new PM. Renzi served as the third PM in a two-year time span and was not chosen by the public. The youngest PM in Italian history had indicated that the new reform-coalition would remain in government until 2018. In May 2018, the next regular parliamentary election would take place. The Renzi government was the 65th Italian coalition, with a great majority of PD members, from 22 February 2014 until 7 December 2016. Renzi's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paolo Gentiloni, succeeded Renzi as PM from 12 December until 1 June 2018 after Renzi resigned as PM. Hence, little changed with Gentiloni as PM under the same coalition, but what he did is assign a new Minister of Interior: Marco Minniti. This Minister made legislative proposals on migration, which were important in 2017 because it took a new and successful approach on how to increase migrant arrivals from Libya. Minniti was the initiator on cooperating with a third party country such as Libya.

4.2 Statistics


The topic of migrant arrivals in Italy has been receiving growing attention in the media from Renzi's government during its first few years of being in office, but also by the EU and its organizations and agencies. Between 2014 and 2016, at least 500,000 irregular migrants reached Italy via the Central Mediterranean route, and more than 11,000 lost their lives attempting the crossing (Europol, 2016). Some migrants were successfully smuggled, when others were rescued at sea and disembarked on Italian shores. Towards the end of 2013, when shipwrecks of hundreds of drowned migrants were found in Lampedusa, new maritime border control operations were set up in the Central Mediterranean and successfully scaled up (European Commission, 2016). The steady shipwrecks in the recent years have triggered a more institutionalised approach to surveillance operations – in which Italians were the first to take action. More about these operations will be described in the extended sub paragraph.

In 2013, with 42,925 arrivals shifted to 170,100 arrivals. According to Europol (Europol, 2016), this was a consequence of smuggler practices. In 2015, a drop occurred with 153,842 migrant arrivals. This resulted in an increasing development of participating non-governmental organisations (NGO’s). Despite these efforts, the amount of arrivals and deaths began to get bigger. In 2016, figures show that a record of irregular sea arrivals in Italy was reached with 18% surge compared to 2015, with 181,436 irregular migrant arrivals. Reported by UNHCR, a great majority of sea arrivals in 2016 came from Africa (see figure 1) (UNHCR, 2016).

Figure 1: Most common nationalities of irregular sea arrivals in 2016

Figure 2: Most popular routes of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean

Countries of origin	Percentage
Nigeria	21%
Eritrea	11%
Guinea	7%
Ivory Coast	7%
Gambia	7%
Senegal	7%
Mali	6%
Sudan	5%
Somalia	4%



Source: European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/irregular-migration-mediterranean-strategic_note_issue_22_0_en.pdf

An important exposure of the geographic distribution is that a majority of rescued irregular migrants in the Mediterranean Sea are most likely not refugees, because it is proven that 70% come from regions not shattered by oppressing regimes and violent wars. Therefore, overburden occurs for the Italian asylum system due to the overload with claims of people, who instead of protection seek an improvement of their living conditions (European Parliament, 2017). According to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE, 2018), the number of sea arrivals decreased from 181,436 in 2016 to 119,310 in 2017. In addition, the overall drop of detected illegal crossings in the Central-Mediterranean route dropped by 60% from 2016 to 2017, according to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex, 2018).

4.3 Actions

The turning point in response to migration began in October 2013 when a shipwreck occurred in Lampedusa, which cost the lives of 366 African migrants. The Italian government immediately

launched a large military border-control operation that deployed sea and air forces in the search and rescue zones of Italy, Malta, and Libya under the name of *'Mare Nostrum'*. The direct translation of Mare Nostrum is originally from Latin, which means "our sea" and refers to the era of the Roman Empire. The Romans claimed the Mediterranean as their sea only, because the Romans dominated both sides of the sea. Despite public support, operation *Mare Nostrum* sparked politically controversy, given the name that incidentally means our sea, which is a nationalist approach to politics. Moreover, Italy felt as if the country was unfairly bearing the burden for all other Member States due to the high costs. Mare Nostrum ended in October 2014 (Greco, 2016).

From November 2014 until 1 February 2018, EU Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex launched operation *'Triton'*, which seized the patrolling activities in the Mediterranean. Contrary to Mare Nostrum, Renzi requested Triton to focus more on sea border patrol close to the Italian coasts in its first nine months rather than search and rescue. However, from July 2015, Triton enlarged its recourses and extent its actions to a line of 138 maritime miles southwards of Sicily. Moreover, Italy received more support from the EU after the twin shipwrecks in the Central Mediterranean in June 2015 that left 1,200 migrants dead or missing (European Commission, 2016). This event marked a new approach, convincing EU Foreign Ministers to introduce operation *'Sophia'*, which exclusively operates within the Libyan search and rescue zone (EUNAVFOR MED, 2019).

The search and rescue operations and sea border patrols, to which Italy contributed the most, proved that the Renzi government had undertaken numerous initiatives to promote a more active EU presence in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2014, the Italian Navy and Custom Police and the Italian Coast Guard combined were responsible for 75% of the rescue efforts in the Mediterranean Sea. Up to 2016, with the help of French, German, Dutch and UK Non Governmental Organizations (NGO's), the Italian Navy and Custom Police still remained one of the most contributing actors and were responsible of 46% of all rescue efforts (European Commission, 2016)

Minniti, followed as Minister of Interior who took the office in December 2016, took a new approach on dealing with migration policy. Dealing with Libya's broken dictatorship and its absorbent borders were Minniti's cornerstones of his attempts to combat migrant smuggling and reducing irregular migration. The justification for this approach according to Minniti: "*What Italy did in Libya is a model to deal with migrant flows without erecting borders and barbed wire barriers,*" to which he adds, "*It's a way of stemming the flow that Europe could adopt*" (Paravicini, 2017).

In nine months, Minister of Interior Minniti presented a code of conduct for NGO's that operated ships that rescue migrants in the Mediterranean, forbidding any organization to enter Italian ports,

even if they did have authorisation. The code, based on 13 provisions, was submitted for NGO's to sign on 1 August 2017. Although the code was not a binding legal instrument, the Code should not be dismissed as an empty declaration of intentions. Ultimately, the Italian authorities are the only institutions that can give NGO's authorization to disembark migrants, and they are subject to Italian control when in Italian waters and ports (Cusumano, 2019). This code of conduct is seen as one of the stricter measures of the Renzi government and was supported well by the Italian people because it was orientated on national security.

In February 2017, Minniti focused on the Libyan government and made a new migration policy that included an anti-trafficking agreement, also called as “a peace deal” between tribes of the Fezzion region – in the south of Tripoli. After inviting the tribal chiefs in a 72-hour negotiation in Italy, Minniti convinced the Libyans to sign the “Permanent Peace and Reconciliation Agreement”. In this memorandum, it was agreed that, starting summer 2017, Italy would help re-launch the Libyan Coast Guard to stop boats from departing Libya for Europe, in exchange for a special responsibility in the stabilisation of Libya and help to build an economy – a policy that was endorsed in the outcomes of a Foreign Affairs summit in July 2017 (Wintour, 2017). The Minister of Interior called his unique approach the “desert diplomacy” and the accord with Libya meant, “sealing the border of Europe”.

At the same time, the Renzi government actively supported EU-Africa bonds that were aimed to deepen cooperation with the sub-Saharan African countries. The Renzi government published a Migration Compact to the European Commission in which Italy presents its lessons learned, along with an analysis in order to reinforce an external action strategy. Moreover, the Renzi government pledged €200 million in funds to facilitate African countries. This national fund seeks to boost African security forces, in Niger, Libya and Tunisia in order to reduce the irregular migrant arrivals in Italy. Moreover, the Renzi government pleads for the facilitation of access to African countries to European markets (with an insurance of capital availability for growth and sustainable prosperity schemes), together with other financing initiatives (facilitation of payments and their re-investments). In return, Italy offers cooperation on returns and readmissions, focusing on operational agreements, which speed up identification and the delivering of travel documents (Matteo Renzi, 2015).

4.1 Views

Matteo Renzi, originally a center-left man, played an important role in advancing proposals on migration, in which he called for a truly collective management of the irregular migrants based on the principles of solidarity and humanitarian perspectives. The emphasis of Renzi was pleading for a more reasonable burden share and to reform the EU right of Asylum. The underlying cause was the pressure from the EU to Italy, which became extremely high because of the registration process

and relocation of migrants. According to the Asylum Information Database, the Italian legal system became overwhelmed with the registration numbers, which resulted in long asylum procedures and unauthorised migrants in Italy (AIDA, 2018). Therefore, Renzi aimed to reform the Dublin Regulation, which assigns asylum seekers to the EU country they first enter, and has vowed to make the migrant crisis the key issue on Europe's agenda (Coticchia & Davidson, 2019). Renzi accused the EU of unequal burden share among other member states in relocating migrants and claimed that Italy received a lack of solidarity of the EU. Moreover, in Renzi's Migration Compact to the European Commission (EC), the PM stressed his importance on African Development Aid as a broader European Strategy, hence enlarging the EU security perspective. The Italian PM pleaded for a more global EU agenda, in which the effective roots of problems should be not understated (Matteo Renzi, 2015).

As soon as Gentiloni succeeded Renzi, the new Italian PM decided that the measures for irregular migration needed to become stricter. Gentiloni appointed Marco Minniti as the new interior Minister for a good reason. Minniti is a former member of the communist party and a left-wing man of order. Moreover, in the Italian Parliament, Minniti is known as the expert in secret service. It is believed that his skills in secret services resulted in the successful migration policies – in which not every deal is publicly published and therefore secret – that caused dramatic drops in migrant arrival numbers. With the closing of borders in Turkey and other EU countries, it was decided by Minniti to adopt more cooperation with Libya in the new migration laws. Minniti called his desert diplomacy the only solution to combat terrorism and the immense flow of irregular migrants to Europe. His perspective was that the borders of Libya were vital to all southern EU frontline Member States. Moreover, the interior Minister believed that a good relationship with the tribes of the southern Sahara was required to establish control, because Minniti saw them as 'the guardians of the Libyan borders'. Minniti is known for its frequent statement in which he explains that fear is a form of legitimacy – one democracy is required to listen to another and accept it. In contrast to populists, the interior Minister mentioned, which thrive of fear. Minister of Interior said: *"I am convinced that there is no equation between terrorism and migration. That is an error of approach* (Wintour, 2017).

Many EU organizations such as UNHCR and the United Nations (UN) criticized Minniti's migration policies. According to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL, 2018), people smuggled into Libya face torture, forced labour and sexual exploitation while they are held in places of detention that are overcrowded, with insufficient food and clean water. Moreover, UNHCR reported that amongst migrants who suffer abuse, also pregnant women and new-born babies are placed in detention (UNHCR, 2017). Gentiloni responded, and claimed that more recourse for migrants in Libyan camps is required, yet he calls Italy's migration policy very

positive and that it reduced migrant arrivals. Moreover, according to Gentiloni, Italy occurred as role model for the EU on its measures to reduce migrant arrivals (Scherer, 2017). In similar views as Renzi and Minniti, Gentiloni advocated for multilateral approaches and the need for a common policy on migration with more external factors in third party countries such as Libya, Niger, and Chad. In addition, Gentiloni spoke out many times against populism, calling it a threat free global trade. Instead of supporting populism, Gentiloni believed that the creative wisdom of politics, Italy could assure that policies with support growth go hand in hand with social inclusion.

In sum, in Renzi's own words "*the emotional reaction of the shipwrecks played a role in shaping migration policy*" (Coticchia & Davidson, 2019). Italy played a leading role in the time of Renzi's government, in which the Italian forces were extremely relevant. Renzi tried to "internationalize" the search and rescue operations, moving from an emergency to a broader approach. Gentiloni continued to implement Renzi's perspectives into its new policies, in which Minniti played a major role, which were focused on cooperating with third party countries in Africa. The numbers of migrant arrivals dramatically dropped after 2017 and the route through the Central Mediterranean closed down.

5. Findings: Conte's policy

This chapter aims to provide the relevant information about the migration policy during the Conte government. As mentioned, the Conte government had a shorter time span than the Renzi government, namely six months. Therefore, this chapter presents a shorter overview of statistics and a more extensive overview of actions of a smaller amount of time than the previous chapter. Moreover, a representation of the views of the Conte coalition will be outlined up to January 2019.

5.1 The coalition

The Conte government, led by Giuseppe Conte, forms the 66th Italian coalition. Two parties are leading the Conte government: the MoVimento 5 Stelle (M5S), also known as the Five Star Movement, and Lega Nord. After weeks of political deadlock and negotiations to form a coalition from March 2018 until end of May 2018, the leader of M5S, Luigi Di Maio, and the leader of Lega, Matteo Salvini, proposed private law professor and advisor of M5S, Giuseppe Conte a role as the PM. It was said that Conte would be the new “defence attorney for the Italian people” (Kirchgaenessner, 2018). Both Di Maio and Salvini serve the Italian republic as Deputy Prime Minister. Moreover, Di Maio serves as the Minister of Economic Development, Labour and Social Policies. The leader of the populist party M5S received the majority vote and parliamentary seats in the Italian general elections of March 2018. The far-right Lega, led by Matteo Salvini, received the most seats in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, yet did not receive an absolute majority. Lega emerged as main political force, in which Salvini also serves as the interior Minister. This new coalition is therefore also called as “the government of change”, after the political agreement to propose an independent PM signed by the two parties (Horowitz, 2018).

5.2 Statistics

Fewer migrants attempted the Central Mediterranean crossing toward Italy in 2018, leading to a drop in migrant arrivals, as attitudes of migration shifted towards a growing anti-migrant sentiment. According to UNHCR (UNHCR, 2018), the numbers of migrants that arrived in Italy fell to 23,370 in 2018, from over 119,369 in 2017. In addition, there is a decline of 80.3% from 2018's total year. IOM Rome also provided details that the top nationality of migrant arrivals by sea is represented by Tunisia. Arrival numbers from West-African countries, such as Nigeria, are also down to 1,250 (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Arrivals by sea to Italy – Nationalities – Main countries of Origin 2015-2018

Main countries of Origin	2015	2016	2017	2018
Tunisia	N/A	1,207	6,151	5,002
Eritrea	39,162	20,718	7,052	3,302
Sudan	8,932	9,327	6,221	1,619
Nigeria	22,237	37,551	18,158	1,250
Côte d'Ivoire	3,772	12,396	9,507	1,050
Mali	5,826	10,010	7,118	876
Guinea	2,801	13,342	9,701	810
Estimated total	82,730	104,551	63,908	13,927

Retrieved from: <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-110833-2018-deaths-reach-2160>

5.3 Actions

Right after the formation, Di Maio and Salvini started to work together on migration policy. Both parties heavily campaigned against irregular migration, with famous slogans on T-shirts and banners such as “Italians first” and “pack your bags”. The alliance of M5S and Lega left many immigrants as well as Islamic communities in Italy worried (Al Jazeera, 2018).

The first step towards migration policy was the joint policy document that was unveiled by Salvini and Di Maio, which contained proposals to deport an estimated 500,000 irregular migrants and therefore make more detention centers. Additionally, the Deputy PMs want to examine migrant rescue missions at sea after the migrants are disembarked on Italy’s shores. There is also an appeal to reform the Dublin Regulation. For the Islamic community, mosques and their imams are mandatory to be authorised with the state. Immediate closure will follow if a mosque is unauthorised, and plans for building new mosques and their funding’s are bound to scrutinized. (Giuffrida, 2018).

Salvini continued to introduce startling policies that dominated the headlines for the rest of 2018. Due to his preoccupation with migration, Salvini chose Libya as his first official trip abroad. As mentioned earlier, Libya has become fertile ground for migrant smugglers. Because of its role as a bridge for desperate migrants who will jeopardize their lives to cross from Africa to Europe, Libya now forms a crucial point for Conte’s migration policy planning.

Salvini travelled to Tripoli in hope of building on the work of his forerunner, Minniti. Minniti had sought to introduce a “good currency” to boost Libya’s failing economy. Despite the success of decreasing migrant arrival figures due to this policy, reports claimed that Minniti’s “good currency” was not a metaphor and even resulted in expulsion. After the UN Security Council sanctioned the commander of Tripoli’s coastguard for his involvement in migrant smuggling, it became clear that Italy’s funds that were sent to Libya fell under corrupt means. (European

Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Therefore, it was Salvini's task reshape the mission and evolve this policy.

During a joint press conference with Ahmed Maiteeq, a member of the Libyan Presidency Council, on 25 June 2018, Salvini stated a vision for a renewed policy: *"we will jointly support with Libyan authorities the setting up of reception and identification centers south of Libya, to help Libya as well as Italy, block migration"* (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Maiteeq rejected this plan, arguing that Libya would not permit foreign powers to operate camps on its territory because the Libyan law would not allow it. In seeking to suppress Libyan discontent with the policy, the Conte government has since clarified that the new detention centers would be in Niger, Mali, Chad and Sudan rather than Libya.

Moreover, Salvini wants to see the UN Security Council lift the arms embargo on Libya, which he portrayed as weakening the Libyan coastguard's ability to fully cooperate with Italy's demands. The interior Minister claims that the situation is dangerous, because migrant smugglers ignore the arms embargo while official authorities – who are blocked by the UN – stay unarmed (Al Jazeera, 2018). In July 2018, Salvini vowed to block foreign marine ships with rescued migrants on board from disembarking in Italian ports, covering prohibitions that are placed first on NGO ships. Amongst many examples is Salvini's blocking an NGO-ship 'Aquarius' with an estimated 600 migrants on board wanting to enter Italy. This ship, employed by first aid organizations such as Doctors Without Borders and SOS Méditerranée, ended up having to go to Spain with the help of an Italian escort (The Local Italian, 2018). After this event, Salvini continuously blocked NGO-ships.

The Salvini Decree, a decree-law on migration and security known as the Asylum Reform of September 2018, was approved by the Council of Ministers and introduced in-depth measures to the Italian Asylum System (IAS). The Italian Ministry of Interior precedes measures to minimise the right of humanitarian status to avoid people from applying for asylum claim in Italy. Furthermore, this Decree-Law also limits the System of Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) to advantages of international protection and unaccompanied children. This means that asylum seekers with a claim would now be disqualified from the SPRAR and can only access initial reception centers for a short-term, where living conditions that often don't meet medical requirements for healthy living. (Asylum Information Database, 2018).

5.4 Views

The new Italian government led by Giuseppe Conte had two key priorities in 2018. The first was economic policy, focusing on fiscal deficits and the welfare system. This assignment was given to M5S's leader – Luigi Di Maio. The second was the migration challenge, and the reduction of the

record flows that Italy experienced since 2013, was directly given to Lega's leader – Matteo Salvini (Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2018). Di Maio's role as Minister of Labour and Economic Development was to reform policies regarding jobs, taxes and social issues. Salvini role as Minister of Interior campaigned on migration and was committed to put migration at the top of his political agenda to accelerate the repatriation of migrants.

Clearly, Matteo Salvini, who campaigned on anti-immigration, was the one to initiate and implement new migration policies during the Conte government between May 2018 – January 2019. Salvini's 'Italians-first' and far-right mentality, aimed for hard-line migration policies: counter illegal migration; strengthen Libyan Coast Guard capacities, establishing migrant camps in Libya's southern border countries, block migrant arrivals by banning NGO-rescue ships and close unauthorised mosques to decrease Islamic movements. Statements such as that "migrants will only see Italy on postcards" received much backlash from various EU institutions such as UNHCR and the UN due to human rights violations (Sharman, 2018). Salvini pointed the finger of blame at migrant smugglers, who said were responsible for deaths at sea. Moreover, the interior Minister claimed that his goal was to protect its external borders, not to share the problem with other EU member states but to solve the problem at the source. In several interviews, he defends Italy's migration policy with the conclusion that "Italy has done more than it should", and that "the party is over". Nonetheless, Salvini does want to welcome and remain the residence of refugees, pregnant women and children and that protection is reserved for humanitarian cases.

In the other party of Conte's government, the M5S, Di Maio supported Salvini's migration policy with Italy's economic position in the EU. The Minister of Economic Developments and Labour threatened to veto the next seven-year EU budget if the EU would not change its tune on migration. Moreover, one of the statements of Di Maio regarding migration was his accusation of that "France never stopped colonizing Africa". Italy's Deputy PM blamed Macron for the on-going migrant waves of Africa to Europe. Di Maio addresses that France is one of the main causes for the migrant crisis. "People are leaving Africa in parts, because some EU countries, led by France, have never stopped being colonizers." (Reuters, 2019) Di Maio refers to France, which prints its currency in many of African countries, and with that currency the French debt is financed. Evidence suggests that Di Maio's stance on migration is in line with Salvini and pleads for investments on the root causes of the crisis.

Many Italians claim that Di Maio and Salvini are the true leaders of the Conte government, which results in people believing that PM Conte has no power. Despite these allegations, Salvini and Di Maio have always stated that most power lies with PM Conte. At the Italian Mediterranean Dialogues, Conte said in his closing remarks that addressing the migration issue meant undoing the work of migrant smugglers, making migration flows more manageable and above all reducing the

number of victims at sea. Moreover, the PM calls migration a long-term challenge and called the EU for a coordinated, concrete and effective response (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

In sum, the Conte government has been divided into two parties: the M5S and Lega – therefore, the key priority of migration shifted 100 per cent to interior Minister Matteo Salvini. His earlier campaigns in March 2018 established a great anti-immigrant stance in which he vowed to stop illegal migration. Salvini's approach is believed by scholars to be categorized as 'sovereign'. Yet, Salvini is determined to follow his own rules to 'protect his state' in its migration policy.

6. Findings: Differences and Similarities

During the years of the Renzi government, Italy faced a massive influx in migrants crossing the Mediterranean to Italian shores. The greatest challenge for Renzi was how to deal with the boats of migrants arriving from North Africa. After May 2018, numbers of sea arrivals plummeted by more than 80%. However, the Mediterranean remains the sea route that caused most casualties. The Conte government still faces the migratory challenge with thousands of migrants who are unaccounted for. This chapter outlines the differences in approaches of both governments and the most relevant similarity regarding their policies.

6.1 Renzi: An Humanitarian Approach

The approach of the Renzi government can be explained by the general center-left policies that thrive off humanitarian perspectives. The Democratic Party was the biggest party of the Renzi government that operated in the field of migration. According to Keith and McGowan (Keith & McGowan, 2018), center-left parties tend to support migration because ‘they defend a universalist position of solidarity with often marginalized and oppressed communities’. On one side, it is expected for center-left parties to treat vulnerable and unprotected groups such as refugees and migrants with ‘open, generous and solidaristic means’. On the other side, center-left parties have supported preventive and exclusionary policies for two reasons. First, in the late 19th century, employers used migrant labour to overpower wages and break strike movements. Second, the reaction of the native workers towards migrants has often made center-left parties electorally vulnerable (Consterdine, 2018).

In this case, migration confronts the Renzi government with ideological pulls, which is international solidarity versus welfare state, contradicting with labour market protectionism. Moreover, the far-right always pose a problem to center-left parties, as the populist far right have rallied migration and targeted the center-left’s traditional voters. In response, social democratic parties may adopt a tougher stance on migration.

Migration is likely to divide its own party as one’s opposition. Renzi was foremost focused on domestic political reforms. According to Coticchia and Davidson, Renzi viewed foreign policy as a policy area of secondary importance, which meant a very limited tolerance for any foreign policy moves that would divide the Democratic Party or require sacrifices within his own party (Coticchia & Davidson, 2019). This can be found in Renzi’s response to the massive influx in migrants crossing the Mediterranean during the first years of his government. For example, Renzi sought to move search and rescue operations from the successful but expensive Italian Mare Nostrum to make the EU responsible for search and rescue. Short after, Renzi became more critical of EU disproportions on resettlements and asylum claims, arguing that all EU member states must help

equal the burden share of the migrant crisis. By following the Italian public opinion rather than to oppose it, Renzi maximised his chances of future electoral success.

After Renzi resigned as PM having been defeated in the Constitutional Referendum in December 2016, his party member Gentiloni succeeded the role of Italian PM. The composition of Gentiloni's coalition was almost identical to Renzi's cabinet, yet there are significant differences. Some authors emphasize a significant difference in terms of the communication style between Renzi and Gentiloni. Others found a great difference between the style (towards the EU) and policy (Coticchia & Davidson, 2019). For example, Gentiloni initiated a harsher migration policy such as enforcing military engagement in North African countries.

With Minniti as the new Minister of Interior and his stricter stance, the policy to let the Italian military patrol in Libyan waters to stop migrant trafficking and peace agreement with Libyan tribes helped the Democratic Party trying to remain popular with its traditional constituents. With the upcoming Italian elections in March 2018, immigration became a key point of debate (Shah, 2018). During the last months of the Renzi government, Italy has experienced a growth in far-right, populist, and anti-immigration activities. The high numbers of migrant arrivals and the amount of funding that was invested in migration led to social confrontation, anger and chaos with the Italian people. The leader of Lega, Salvini, took the opportunity to strike back at the Renzi government saying: *"We need to free ourselves from a sense of guilt. We do not have the moral duty to welcome into Italy people that are worse off than ourselves."* The numbers of migrant arriving in Italy was causing an "serious social alarm", which was perfectly used by Lega and Five Star Movement to win votes, and to turn Italy's new government into a far-right and populist government (Ellyat, 2018).

6.2 Conte: An Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Approach

Deputy Minister Salvini made a number of proposals on migration during the Conte government of 2018. Salvini's party, Lega, has a far-right ideology, which explains his approach to migration policy. To get closer to identifying features of far-right characteristics, it is important to focus on the necessary features rather than the possible ones. In the modern era, political supporters of the far-right are most often conceptualized as the antithesis of liberal democracy. Herewith on one hand, it is characterized by its rejection of the 'fundamental values' that represents human rights, and pluralism; a state based on the rule of law, of the democratic constitutional state. While on the other hand, it also can be distinguished by absolutism and dogmatism (Carter, 2005). The term dogmatism can be linked to Salvini's political ideology, in which Salvini lays down principles as undeniably true, without considerations of evidence or opinions of others (Ceccorulli & Labanca, 2014). For example, the Conte government presented the migrant situation after May 2018 as an 'emergency state' whereas Salvini still called it a 'crisis', while the numbers of migrant arrivals

reported by various EU institutions were on a historical low. Moreover, Salvini categorizes irregular migrants as migrants with criminal intentions, and thus a threat to Italians, and demands immediate deportations (Brooks, 2019).

Ever since Salvini and Di Maio won the elections in March 2018, the two Deputy Prime Ministers have been focusing on the “rhetoric of exclusion” which was also used in the contemporary discourse on migration reform as the “anti-immigration rhetoric” (Perea, 1997). As Lega’s and M5S’s anti-immigration discourse flowed across Italy, the focus of deporting migrants broadened considerably. Discourse about immigration reform became a way of expressing anger about demographic changes brought on by migration, targeting anyone that might look suspicious as ‘immigrant’, ‘foreign-looking’ or ‘un-Italian’. By removing or reducing these migrants, migration reform would in theory “do something” about “problems” facing Italian citizens, such as problems in the economy, national security, social system and health care (Bloch & Chimienti, 2012).

For Salvini, irregular and illegal migrants are not the only problem; migration is a threat to the “nation” because it will ‘disturb’ the singular, predominantly white-European, Italian-speaking culture. These migrants are being referred as ‘transnationals’ that threaten a singular vision of Italy because they allegedly bring “multiculturalism”. For example, ‘Italy’s war on Roma’ refers to Salvini’s proposal of any non-Italian Roma must be expelled from the country. It becomes even more shocking to people when Salvini demands the Italian Ministry of Interior to count all Romas (BBC News, 2018). Another example is how Salvini continuously declares that “We cannot fill Italy with Africa” and that “Africa does not belong in Italy”, which targets all African legal residents and unauthorised migrants (Salvini, 2018).

According to (Perea, 1997), “A non-white majority is envisioned if today’s migration continues” and can be referred directly to Salvini’s comments as “Italy will not become Africa”. These emerging views on migration set the context for national migration reform proposals that target all migrants. Denying benefits such as housing, a job, protection, food and financial compensation would take away the attraction of people to come to Italy.

In all, Conte’s legislative program for migration reform would deny any assistance to foreign vessels or NGO rescue ships from entering Italian ports. NGO rescue ships are also referred as ‘seafaring taxis’ by the Conte government, and said “migrants will only see Italy on postcards” is considered by many a movement of xenophobia (Sharman, 2018). The Conte government has shaped a “closed ports policy” to stop migrants from claiming asylum in Italy and to be rescued by Italian authorities. Moreover, the government has promised to deport hundreds of thousands of migrants. Considered as an easy sell to the public, yet it will be more complicated because of the many nationalities of irregular migrants. To carry out returns, it is required to have agreements

with the countries of origin. Therefore, Salvini has been negotiating with third party countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Niger.

6.3 Similarities

The similarities between the previous and current Italian coalition has become clear when looking into the policies of Minniti and Salvini. Both Ministers mainly focused their migration policy on preventing boats from Libya arriving on Italy's shores. By proposing peace deals to the Libyan government, Minniti and Salvini asked to break any links with migrant smugglers, and that Italy, Europe, and the international community were ready to help Libya financially. The aim of this approach is according to senior policy advisor at the European Council, Mattia Toaldo: "*The original sin is striking a deal to keep migrants in Libya*" (ECFR, 2019). Also, the public opinion showed major support for Minniti's policies because his policies gave people a sense of security. It is no secret that Salvini praised Minniti as Minister and called him and role model on the area of migration policy. Salvini continued to follow the previous Minister its footsteps and maintained negotiations with the Libyan government to build detention centers and to protect the Libyan borders.

To conclude, there are great differences in ideologies of both governments that motivate their migration policies. In addition, the greatest similarity can be found in the policy in which both interior Ministers invested in cooperation with third party countries to prevent as many migrants from being smuggled to Italian shores.

7. Findings: Contribution of the EU

The European Commission, Parliament, and Council are controlled by subsidiarity and deep political sensitivity. The EU as main responsible actor on migration policies is always engaged between Member States that wish to see more reasonable interference into their governance and policies. This chapter will outline the EU's response to Italy's migration challenge.

In 2014, the EU main attention focussed on how to reduce the tragic casualties in the Central Mediterranean. The hundreds of migrants that drowned or died near Lampedusa enforced the EU to launch the Task Force Mediterranean, controlled by the Italian government and European Commission, and the start of Mare Nostrum. Although Mare Nostrum saved more than 100,000 lives over the year up until 2015, the sense of urgency increased drastically. In June 2014, the EU created new regulations to strategically notify policy amendments until 2019, with new concepts to put forward (Collett & Le Coz, 2018).

During the first months of 2015, central Mediterranean crossings increased that shocked the EU and therefore created an increasing phase of reaction. Mid-April, two overcrowded migrant boats sank; more than 800 lives were lost. As a lack of response, the EU developed a ten-point plan outlined by officials in The Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home), a few days later endorsed the first EU Council meetings dedicated to the issue of migrant management (European Commission, 2016). In this meeting, calls were made to support search and rescue operation Triton, and more common importance on ways to tackle migrant smugglers, with a Common Security and Defence Policy navy operations.

The EU launched EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Med Operation Sophia in June 2015 as to specify a more widespread approach to the migrant crisis that emerged in the EU, Africa and Middle East. The goal was to operate actions against migrant smugglers by shutting down criminal networks and block their business model. A year later, Operation Sophia was broadened to involve more guidance of the Libyan navy and Coastguard in cooperation with Italian authorities. Until December 2018, Operation Sophia was extended and improved the commands to boost the transparency of information on migrant smuggling activities with Italian judicial authorities, Frontex and EUROPOL.

In May 2015, The European Commission invested in additional recourses such as the emergency relocation scheme and improved alternatives for naval operations. The key amendment was to create a set of 'hotspots'. The bigger aim was to create EU interventions on the ground in Italy and Greece to identify, register, and acquire fingerprints from incoming migrants. Achieving these three connected objectives was vital to the success of the CEAS, primarily to account a country for its responsibility for asylum applications, but also to establish relocations. The Italian authorities

led the implementation of EU's new project, with direct support from EU agencies, such as the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and Frontex, coordinated by DG Home.

During the summer months of 2015, the response to the crisis was slow. EU Member States started to create their own response; it even occurred that some Member States were willing to invoke the Temporary Protection Directive. Meanwhile, President Juncker proposed to make the emergency relocation scheme bigger: instead of 40,000 individuals, at least 160,000 individuals should be relocated in different Member States. Moreover, amendments would be implemented the CEAS and border-management. The response of the EU Commission focussed on advancing longer-term EU policy objectives. Member States such as Germany and the Netherlands started to cooperate on plans to participate on helping to reduce migrant flows from Turkey to Greece and Italy. This resulted in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan on 29 November 2015 with help of peacekeeping from DG Home, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), and the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Collett & Le Coz, 2018).

In October 2015 the European Commission established the EU Emergency Trust-fund to stabilise and invest in the origin of problems that causes irregular migration from Africa to the EU. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) is at the time of writing worth over €3.1 billion – EU Member States have invested €234 million and €2.9 billion comes from the EU Development Fund (CONCORD, 2017). The purpose of EUTF is to cope with the problems of irregular migration and movements of people in countries of origin, transit and destination in North Africa. The EUTF differs from other financial projects because of its governmental anticipation that these recourses will contribute to a fall of irregular migration and that these projects are located in geographical areas seen as places of origin, transit and destination of irregular migrants.

The European Commission continued to develop EU responses to long-term policies in 2016-2017, in ways re-evaluating its inadequate actions: extending amendments on asylum reform, regularly update and evaluate proceedings, create more preparations for emergency and increase financial support, and later, present new strategies for cooperation with third party countries to tackle irregular migration (Orsini & Roos, 2017).

The EU actively endorsed the peace deal between Italy and Libya. To support the execution of the Libyan Political Agreement, the EU ensures close cooperation with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to work on the alliance of government, safekeeping and monetary preparations, and support for future Libyan elections. By the end of 2018, the EU had sent €70 million in mutual investment across several sectors. The main goal of the EU regarding migration

in Libya is the protection for migrants and the support for local communities to cope with the challenge (EEAS, 2018).

To conclude, the EU launched EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia to enhance border patrols in the search and rescue zones. With maritime operations, the goal was to tackle migrant smuggling operations. After shocking events, the EU started to prioritise migration and developed new strategies to tackle root causes of irregular migration. Moreover, the EU established hot spots in Italy and introduced an emergency relocation scheme to help Italy with the overburden of registrations. The European Commission established the TFEU to invest in African countries to re-establish their states and supported Italy with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.

8. Discussion

The main objective of this research was to investigate the approaches of Italian migration policies and to what degree it has influenced the Italy-EU relationship. The subject of this study is the analysis of the complexity among migration policy under challenging circumstances. Highlighting the reasons why the previous and current coalition proposed specific policies provided valuable insights and perspectives, which reflect those of the national interest in Italy. This thesis answered first the four sub questions in order to answer the main research question: ‘In what ways did Renzi and Conte as Prime Ministers of the Italian government respond to EU Migration policy between 2014 – 2018 and to what extent has it changed the Italy-EU relationship?’ In this chapter, the main question will be answered.

8.1 The responses of Renzi, Conte and the EU

This thesis first examined the migration policies during the Renzi and Conte government to answer the main question. Moreover, the contribution of the EU is examined. Analysing the statistics of the years when the Renzi and Conte coalition took charge explained the reason why both governments carried out specific actions. It is important to understand that the first years of Renzi’s presidency included the highest numbers of migrant arrivals by sea, and thus caused an emergency situation wherein the PM acted. Contrary to the Conte government, that made much more stricter policies while they dealt with a much lower number of migrant arrivals. An overview of the specific actions that were implemented is shown in Figure 4, 5 and 6.

Figure 4: Responses of Renzi government

Specific actions that have been implemented
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Launch of search-and-rescue operation Mare Nostrum ➤ Launch of border-patrol operation Triton ➤ Code of Conduct for NGO-ships ➤ Anti-trafficking memorandum with Libya ➤ Development Aid in Africa ➤ Migration Compact with the EU
Specific actions that not have been implemented
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Legal consequences for unauthorised NGO-ships</i>

Figure 5: Responses of Conte government

Specific actions that have been implemented
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Closing Italian ports with the NGO-ship ban ➤ Lift arm-embargo Libyan authorities ➤ Setting up detention centers in Niger, Chad and Sudan ➤ Removal of ‘humanitarian protection’ ➤ New methods granting and removing Italian citizenship ➤ Lengthening time for migrants that sent to CPR Centers (Repatriation Centers) ➤ Closing down of detention centers
Specific actions that not have been implemented
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Setting up detention and identification centers in Libya</i> ➤ <i>Deportation of 500,000 migrants</i>

Figure 6: Responses of the EU

Contribution of the EU in 2014 – 2018
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Establishment of hot-spots in Taranto, Trapani, Messina, Pazzallo and Lampedusa ➤ Relocation scheme among other EU Member States ➤ Launching EUNAVFOR-Med operation ‘Sophia’, under control of Italian authorities ➤ Further development in Africa and specifically Libya ➤ Enhanced monitoring sea border-patrols
Failed actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Equal burden share among EU Member States</i>

Moreover, a comparison will be made between the responses of Renzi and Conte’s presidency. As described earlier, a dramatic decline is observed in migrants arriving in Italy based on statistics. To illustrate, the numbers of migrant arrivals in 2014 was 170,100, a little less in 2015 with 153,842, yet it rocketed to an historical record in 2016 with 181,436, compared to 119,369 in 2017. The immense drop in numbers occurred in 2018, with 23,370 arrivals.

When comparing the approach of Renzi as PM, it has been demonstrated that there is an unstable line in high numbers of migrant arriving in Italy after the implementation of operations Mare Nostrum and Triton. To be more specific, when looking at the Central Mediterranean route, a decline has been observed in 2015 compared to 2014, however again a great increase in 2016. The numbers reached a sudden plunge in 2017. In response to measures taken by Gentiloni and Minniti, who succeeded Renzi but still formed the same coalition, agreements with Libyan authorities were made in order to stop migrant smugglers from trafficking people through the dangerous route to

Europe through Italy. Additionally, the response of the EU with measures taken by their institutions, migrant smugglers started to test alternative routes in 2017, such as through Morocco. In 2018, the Central Mediterranean route witnessed the largest decline in the amounts of irregular migrants and plunged with 80% compared to 2017.

When looking into possible reasons behind the enormous drop in migrant arrivals, it has been determined that the main reason is the lack of safe migration channels towards Italy to reach Europe. The cooperation between Italy and Libya, which was established by Marco Minniti, has been extremely successful for lowering the traffic of migrant smugglers in the Central Mediterranean. Praised by Deputy Minister Salvini, the cooperation with Libya has been further established and extended with development aid for Libya and its borders. Although Libya rejected Salvini's proposals to build detention and identification centers in the region, the Deputy PM has been able to build them in the southern borders of Libya to achieve the goal of stopping migrant trafficking. As result, in the winter of 2018, Tunisia replaced Libya as the central departure point for migrants identified in the Central Mediterranean route. (Frontex, 2018) Moreover, the possibilities for migrants to reach Italian shores have been more limited than ever because of the strict measures and the hard anti-immigrant stance of the Conte government.

To sum up, it is clear that the years of Renzi's presidency in 2014 – 2016 have been the most challenging in terms of the high numbers. The numbers in 2017 – 2018 finally started to drop, which leaves the assumption that the measures of Minister of Interior Minniti have been the most emerging. The most striking finding through investigating the responses of the Italian coalitions is that, it is highly possible that Minniti was the 'mastermind' behind stopping the migrant flows through the Central Mediterranean route and that Salvini took his ideas and acted upon it as if these policies were made by himself. Salvini certainly took the credit for the immense drop of numbers in 2018, which was presented as 'the success' of the Conte government.

Moreover, the contribution of the EU did help Italy, yet it can be confirmed that it was not sufficient enough. The establishment of hot spots was aimed at partly relieving burden that Italy experienced due to of the Dublin Regulation. The problem was that the relocation scheme was effective for only two years in 2015 – 2017, but had serious design problems. To meet the requirements for relocation, migrants were examined based on their nationality and their latest charges for international protection. Directives specify that only if the charge was above 75%, authorisation to relocate a migrant to another EU Member State followed. (European Commission, 2018). The problems regarding the registrations and identifications for Italian legal authorities remained. An additional problem was that some EU Member States openly rejected relocations, or when they accepted it, they reacted with a slow response. According to Orsini and Roos, in September 2015, approximately 40,000 relocations assigned to Italy should take place. However,

only 9,754 migrants had been transferred to other EU Member States. Moreover, it is a fact that the numbers of arrivals surpasses the registration and detention ability of the four Italian hotspots. For instance, in the first quarter of 2017, flows of 3,000 migrants a week arrived on Italian shores. This happened while the hotspots can only receive 1,600 migrants at once while registration takes weeks (Orsini & Roos, 2017).

8.2 The effects on Italy-EU

In accordance with the expectation, the responses of the Renzi and Conte government to migration policy have influenced the relationship with the EU. The influences of Italy on the EU have been both positive and tension increasing. First, an analysis of the relationship on migration with the Renzi government and the EU will be drawn. There will first be made an analysis of the relationship on migration with the Renzi government and the EU. Secondly, the relationship between the Conte government and the EU will be outlined.

According to the government's perspective, as well as written by various scholars on the topic, Renzi has obtained positive influence on the EU regarding migration. Two main outcomes can be highlighted. First, Italy played a leading diplomatic role in the Mediterranean. Mare Nostrum gave Renzi great assets in the "battle" it was fighting in the EU on migration. Prominent EU leaders such as President Juncker supported Italy in its efforts towards dealing with migration and "officially praised" Italy for this (Reuters, 2016). The EU Commission openly supported the Renzi government in asking for a Frontex mission to replace Mare Nostrum. The Triton search and rescue operation caused a triple funding, approved by EU leaders, for more search and rescue operations. At the same time, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, urged the EU to follow Renzi in taking responsibility following dramatic shipwrecks off the shores of Lampedusa (Greco, 2016). Italy was the prominent actor "on the ground", also due the availability of skills and experienced personnel. The EU handed the Command of EUNAVFOR-Med to the Italian judicial authorities, since Italy is the only country that is exercising jurisdiction over spotted migrant smugglers (Cusumano & Gombeer, In deep waters, 2018). The EUNAVFOR-Med followed the instruction of the Italian Coast Guard, for all search and rescue procedures. Furthermore, the Italian EUROSUR-National Coordination Center (NCC), based in the Italian Ministry of Interior, decided where to disembark vessels with migrants. In sum, Renzi shaped the EU missions and the training of local forces that patrol Libyan coasts.

Secondly, the Renzi government influenced the EU Agenda on migration. As Renzi's Under-Secretary Sandro Gozi said, "The Italian agenda became the EU agenda" (Gozi, 2018). Renzi held a debate on the need to reform the Common European Asylum System, and also focused on more developmental aid to Africa as part of a broader EU strategy, in other words enlarging the EU

security perspective. Italy profoundly shaped the decisions of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, to focus on greater cooperation with third party countries. According to Coticchia and Davidson, thanks to the Renzi government, the EU accepted the renewed centrality of the Mediterranean, considering the Italian frontiers as EU borders (Coticchia & Davidson, 2019). As the Special Advisor to Frederica Mogherini said, the EU institutions supported Renzi's policy on migration, which highlighted that the Migration Compact truly shaped the EU migration "partnership frameworks". Italy influenced the EU to adopt a more global EU Agenda that understates the effective roots of problems. Moreover, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, stresses how Italy convinced the EU to shift its attention on the region of North Africa and the Sahel and to re-define its policy towards this region. In September 2015, Germany opened its doors to welcome all Syrian asylum-seekers, followed by Merkel's statement in which she admits that the Dublin Regulation no longer works. Juncker decided to relocate 120,000 migrants across the EU and to reform the Dublin Regulation (Garces-Mascarenas, 2015).

Further, Italy's relationship with the EU has weakened since the far-right Conte government took the office in Rome in June 2018. Tensions between Rome and Brussels have risen on various occasions since the new coalition took power. CNBC EU News describes the Conte government's attitude as a "vote-winning" strategy, and states that the relationship is much more fractious now than in the past (Amaro, 2019). Analysts consider that for the M5S and Lega, a conflict with Rome would be a blessing and that it will strengthen their "Italy first" line. Now with the lowering numbers of migrants, the migration challenge is no longer a threat to Italy, yet the Conte government still displays it as a 'crisis' in its country and thus exploits migration. As Piccoli said, it seems that Salvini is using migration as a political strategy for its domestic reasons. One example is that the Deputy Ministers are now 'declaring war' on Brussels with its demand on raising its budget and thus defending its own domestic financial markets. Meanwhile, Salvini and Di Maio have been using the anti-migration stance as a way to bolster their popularity and to maintain public support for winning future elections, such as the elections for the European Parliament (Piccoli, 2019).

However, the Conte government is less likely to use migration to start a debate with Brussels, yet by pushing for a big-spending, deficit-busting budget, the Italian government can expect influences from Brussels. In September 2018, Di Maio and Salvini declared that they have agreed on budget deficit of 2.4% of GDP for 2019 (Euroactiv, 2018). This can be interpreted as a war that Italians can not lose, even if the EU Commission hands down a fine, or rejects the budget, because the Conte government will use it as an example of Brussels' interference in domestic affairs. Therefore, it seems as if the Conte government is side lining itself from EU policy making. Economic policy proves a subject of discontent between Italy, under presidency of Conte, and the

EU. Moreover, Italian officials in Brussels reported to Rome that they believe France, which has increased spending, receives preferential treatment from the EU on this matter. Tensions between Italy and France are rising due to domestic politics in their countries, policy differences and personal acrimony between Di Maio, Salvini and Macron.

To summarize, Italy, as one of the founding members of the EU, remains a prominent member with close relationships to other European Member States. Results indicate that the Renzi government certainly accomplished positive results concerning the European Agenda regarding migration and heavily influenced new reforms on EU migration policies. The Renzi government successfully promoted their national interest to the EU and gained support for its migration policies. Yet, the Conte government has been less than cooperative with the EU. Instead of working on joint migration policies, Conte focuses on domestic issues and national interest. Salvini's 'asylum reform' removed humanitarian protection status for migrant that challenged EU's existing policy frameworks, and was done at the same moment when Germany abandoned EU search and rescue operation 'Sophia'. It seems that the current coalition tries to provoke Brussels with its migration policies and takes risks in jeopardising relationships with other Member States, while they have no intention to leave the EU (Kington, 2019). In short, the Conte government is visibly practising its influence on the EU with migration, yet the real debate is about the budget.

9. Conclusion

This thesis concluded research on how the Renzi government and Conte government responded to migration policy in Italy and to what extent it influenced the relationship between Italy and the EU. As expected, the strategies and styles of both governments are significantly different. Even though a short time span of the Conte government is analysed, Conte still decided many measures during the first six months. With this in mind, one can expect the Italian Minister of Interior, Salvini, to tackle more issues on migration and create more measures regarding deportation and documentation.

A comparison was made between the situations regarding migration during 2014 – 2018 of Renzi, Gentiloni (under the Renzi coalition), and Conte as Italian PM. Firstly, what stands out is that more migrants arrived since the implementation of Renzi's search and rescue policies. In the years of Renzi's presidency, more migrants made use of the Central Mediterranean route. When Gentiloni succeeded Renzi as PM, the coalition started to take more strict measures to stop the traffic of migrant smugglers to Italy. Also the cooperation of the EU in Italy's peace-deal missions in Libya makes it harder for migrants to travel to Europe, because migrant smugglers adapted alternative routes such as the Western Mediterranean route via Morocco. The actions turned out positive for Italy, as can be seen from the numbers of 2018: with a major drop of 80% the number of migrant arrivals by sea reached an historical low. One could argue that the migrant crisis is over, yet the new working methods of migrant smugglers remain very dangerous for migrants, which illustrates the fact that the numbers of migrants that died or went missing are the same through 2017 and 2018. With this being mentioned, Italy is still actively tackling the migration issue. Another surprising outcome was to see that the lower the numbers of migrant arrivals, the stricter the policies became in Italy. This indicates that the success-strategy of the Conte government is largely focussed on migration. It is questionable whether this is truly about protecting Italian borders or other motives such as gaining more budgets from the EU. It is, however, clear that the implemented actions of the Renzi government to put migration on the European Agenda as a priority and to create a decrease in migrant arrivals have been successful.

Taking all in consideration, the main research question can be answered as follows: the Renzi government responded with migration policies that were focused on legal and safe directives and to help migrants in need. From a humanitarian perspective, the Renzi government worked hard for solidarity among EU member states and successfully promoted the Italian Agenda on migration into the European Agenda. The decline of migrant arrivals in 2018 was mainly because of Minniti's policies and EU's contribution to invest in Libya. The Conte government has been responding with a hard anti-immigrant stance despite the low numbers. The Italian public that experienced anger and xenophobia towards migration heavily influenced the Conte government

response. Salvini is determined to continue to tackle migration with strict measures. It can be concluded that the Conte government maintains avoiding its obligations towards the CEAS and the Dublin Regulation. It is assumed that Conte's coalition is prepared to risk all they can to promote burden sharing by dodging their responsibilities towards the CEAS, as long as the EU does not give into Italy's national interest. As such, from a EU perspective, the CEAS will remain incomplete and is persistently bound to fail.

In conclusion, it is doubtful whether the approach of the Conte government will remain the same and if it will, and to what extent, influence its relationship with the EU because it is still on going. Finally, the policy instruments of the Italian government that aim at achieving the decline of migrant arrivals have shifted through the years but have proven to be effective in the last two years. For this reason, apart from the humanitarian concerns, the migration policies can be called successful since the number of migrants to Italy is the lowest since the beginning of the EU migrant crisis.

10. Recommendation

The results based on this research seem to prove that the EU response was not sufficient enough to help Italy with the burdens regarding identification, registration and relocation. This means that more attention must be given to greater cooperation with third party countries in Africa that are causing the root problems of the migrant waves, with focus on peace building to create an inclusive society with priorities of better human rights and healthy living conditions. Future research could also analyse what would be an effective long-term approach to tackle the root problems and on how to prepare the EU for new migration challenges.

In sum, two things are important. First, the EU should provide more alternatives for the Italian asylum infrastructure. Second, it is suggested that other Member States should be open to approve on reforming the Dublin Regulation to create more solidarity. In this way, encouragements towards the Conte government for dodging responsibilities could be blocked.

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12. Appendices

Appendix I: Student ethics form

Student Ethics Form

European Studies Student Ethics Form

Your name: *Lily Rijk*
Supervisor: *Mrs Kuytenburg.*

Instructions/checklist

Before completing this form you should read the APA Ethics Code (<http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx>). If you are planning research with human subjects you should also look at the sample consent form available in the Final Project and Dissertation Guide.

- a. Read section 3 that your supervisor will have to sign. Make sure that you cover all these issues in section 1.
- b. Complete sections 1 and, if you are using human subjects, section 2, of this form, and sign it.
- c. Ask your project supervisor to read these sections (and the draft consent form if you have one) and sign the form.
- d. Append this signed form as an appendix to your dissertation.

Section 1. Project Outline (to be completed by student)

- (i) Title of Project: *Migration Policy in Italy - Beyond Closed Ports*
- (ii) Aims of project: *To research/analyse the responses of the previous and current Italian government regarding migrational and to research their influences on the EU.*
- (iii) Will you involve other people in your project – e.g. via formal or informal interviews, group discussions, questionnaires, internet surveys etc. (Note: if you are using data that has already been collected by another researcher – e.g. recordings or transcripts of conversations given to you by your supervisor, you should answer 'NO' to this question.)


YES NO

If no: you should now sign the statement below and return the form to your supervisor. You have completed this form.

This project is not designed to include research with human subjects. I understand that I do not have ethical clearance to interview people (formally or informally) about the topic of my research, to carry out internet research (e.g. on chat rooms or discussion boards) or in any other way to use people as subjects in my research.

Student's signature _____

date *28.5.2019*



If yes: you should complete the rest of this form.

Section 2 Complete this section only if you answered YES to question (iii) above.

(i) What will the participants have to do? (v. brief outline of procedure):

Participants will have to answer questions in a personal interview (semi-structured style).

(ii) What sort of people will the participants be and how will they be recruited?

The participants ~~are~~ are experts in the field of EU (migration) policy. The first expert is specialised in Italian politics and a Italian correspondent for the Dutch government. The second is an advanced EU policy advisor and

(iii) What sort stimuli or materials will your participants be exposed to, tick the appropriate boxes and then state what they are in the space below?

Questionnaires[]; Pictures[]; Sounds []; Words[X]; Other[].

is first secretary political affairs in Rome.


(iv) Consent: Informed consent must be obtained for all participants before they take part in your project. Either verbally or by means of an informed consent form you should state what participants will be doing, drawing attention to anything they could conceivably object to subsequently. You should also state how they can withdraw from the study at any time and the measures you are taking to ensure the confidentiality of data. A standard informed consent form is available in the Dissertation Manual.

(vi) What procedures will you follow in order to guarantee the confidentiality of participants' data? Personal data (name, addresses etc.) should not be stored in such a way that they can be associated with the participant's data.

Informed consent. Participants will be aware that interviews are recorded. The recordings will only be shared with the interviewer and will ~~not~~ stay strictly confidential.

Student's signature: date: 28.5.2019

Supervisor's signature (if satisfied with the proposed procedures): date: 28.5.2019



Appendix II: Informed consent form

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

1. Research Project Title: *In what ways did the Renzi government and Conte government in Italy respond to the EU Migration policy between 2014 – 2018 and to what extent has it changed the Italy-EU relationship?*
2. Project Description (1 paragraph): *This project presents a comparative analysis of the migration policies of Italy and their influence on the EU. Researching a policy analysis of two different governments will lead to insights of an complex crisis situation and Italy's position within the EU.*

If you agree to take part in this study please read the following statement and sign this form.

I am 16 years of age or older.

I can confirm that I have read and understood the description and aims of this research. The researcher has answered all the questions that I had to my satisfaction.

I agree to the audio recording of my interview with the researcher.

I understand that the researcher offers me the following guarantees:

All information will be treated in the strictest confidence. My name will not be used in the study unless I give permission for it.

Recordings will be accessible only by the researcher. Unless otherwise agreed, anonymity will be ensured at all times. Pseudonyms will be used in the transcriptions.

I can ask for the recording to be stopped at any time and anything to be deleted from it.

I consent to take part in the research on the basis of the guarantees outlined above.

Signed: _____

Date: 13-12-2018

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

1. Research Project Title: *In what ways did the Renzi government and Conte government in Italy respond to the EU Migration policy between 2014 – 2018 and to what extent has it changed the Italy-EU relationship?*
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Signed: _____

Date: 13-12-2018