



TALKING ABOUT CYPRUS #TOGETHER

KEY DISCOURSES BEHIND THE MARITIME DISPUTES

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
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1. BRIEF BACKGROUND (1/4)




- RoC: Ratification of UNCLOS in 1988
- Delimitation Agreements with
 - Egypt (2003)
 - Lebanon (2007)- not ratified by Lebanese Parliament
 - Israel (2010)

1. BRIEF BACKGROUND (2/4)



Offshore Exploration Licenses Republic of Cyprus





1. BRIEF BACKGROUND (3/4)

2004 Turkey objected agreement

2007-2009 Talat through Permanent Representation of Turkey to the UN

2011 Delimitation agreement → TPAO



1. BRIEF BACKGROUND (4/4)

- Announcement of gas discovery in 2011 flared-up the maritime disputes (2011-2020)
- Objective: discourses underpinning conflictual strategies of GrCy & TCy
- Q-methodology: tailor-made to measure “human subjectivity”
 - A. Concourse: bulk of statements regarding our topic
 - B. Q-sample: reducing the bulk to a manageable volume
 - C. P-Set & Q-sorting: recruiting opinion-leaders to rank statements
 - D. Factor analysis: how people are grouped together by virtue of similar ranking

2. CONCOURSE (1/3)

Table 1.1. Interviewees in the Republic of Cyprus (in chronological order)

Name of the interviewee	Professional Expertise	Date of interview	Code for the interviewee
Dr. Michalis N. Michael	Associate Professor of History at the University of Cyprus	8.11.2014	Interviewee 1
Dr. Nikos Moudouros	Member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus and adviser to the former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias (2008-2013) on Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot issues	18.11.2014	Interviewee 2
Pr. Andreas Theophanous	Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs and Ex Economic Advisor to former President of the Republic of Cyprus (September 1990-February 1993), Georgios Vasiliou	19.11.2014	Interviewee 3
Dr. Constantinos Adamides	Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nicosia, member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus	30.11.2015	Interviewee 4
Dr. Zenon Tziarras	Associate Lecturer at UCLAN with expertise in Turkish politics and foreign policy	3.12.2015	Interviewee 5
Dr. Charles Ellinas	CEO of Cyprus-based energy consultancy e-CNHC and former CEO for the Cypriot National Hydrocarbon Company (KRETYK)	4.12.2015	Interviewee 6
Dr. Thodoros Tsakiris	Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia's Business School, Research Associate of ESCP's London-based Research Center for Energy Management, director of the Energy & Geopolitics Program at Greece's seminal Foreign Policy think-tank ELIAMEP	10.11.2015	Interviewee 7
Nikos Rolandis	- Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1983) and Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism in the coalition-government formed up by the late President Clerides	11.12.2015	Interviewee 8
Dr. Harv Tzimitras	Director of PRIO (Peace Research Institute	21.12.2015	Interviewee 9

Table 1.2. Turkish-Cypriot Interviewees (in chronological order)

Name of the interviewee	Professional Affiliation-Expertise	Date of interview	Code name for the interviewee
Dr. Ayla Gürel	Senior Research Consultant of PRIO	11.11.2014	Interviewee 10
Pr. Ahmet Sözen	Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)- former member of the Turkish-Cypriot team in the UN-led peace negotiations	17.11.2014	Interviewee 11
Pr. Niyazi Kızılyürek	Member of the European Parliament (2019-2024)- first Turkish-Cypriot to ever achieve this/advisor to the Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades on Turkish affairs in the Geostrategic Advisory Council, and Dean of the Faculty of Humanities in the University of Cyprus	20.11.2014	Interviewee 12
Dr. Hayriye Kahveci	Analyst in energy politics	1.12.2015	Interviewee 13
Pr. Kudret Özersay	Former Turkish-Cypriot negotiator and founder of 'The People's Party'	18.12.2015	Interviewee 14

Type of open-ended interview questions		
Natural resources	Conflict	Ideas & policy-making
Exclusive Economic Zone & companies	Impediments for a settlement	Factors shaping decision on the monetization of gas reserves
Role of international & regional actors	Fears sustaining the conflict	Risks in every decision
Export options for reserves	Perceptions vis-à-vis each other	Geopolitics vs Market

2. Q-SAMPLE (2/3)

Cell structure as a “heuristic device for selecting statements”

Discourses	Vital Elements				
Type of claims		Ontology	Agency	Motivations	Natural /innatural relationships
	Definitive	“For the Greek Cypriots, the explorations constitute a sovereignty issue”	2	3	4
	Designative	5	6	7	8
	Evaluative	9	10	11	12
	Advocative	13	14	15	“Without a meeting with the Turkish Cypriots – not with Turkey - to discuss on these issues, the Greek Cypriots would find themselves under the ‘Damoclean sword’ of Turkey”.

2. P-SET & Q-SORTING (3/3)

P-set: 23 Gr.Cy & 21 TCy. sorting the items (2017-2018)

[illegible]

3. FACTOR ANALYSIS (1 / 3)

GrCy P-Set

	Q-Sort Coding Name	1	2	3
1	CS1	0,65	0,05	0,13
2	Jour1	-0,15	0,65	-0,37
3	PM1	0,89	0,06	0,25
4	NGO1	0,29	0,14	0,06
5	Jour2	0,19	0,58	0,03
6	NGO2	0,24	-0,02	0,47
7	Jour3	-0,05	0,57	0,08
8	EA1	0,36	0,11	0,34
9	NGO3	0,20	0,15	0,50
10	NGO4	0,08	-0,07	0,60
11	NGO5	0,02	0,51	0,20
12	EA2	0,25	-0,11	0,22
13	PM2	0,60	0,00	0,02
14	PM3	0,39	0,09	-0,15
15	EA3	0,28	0,04	0,03
16	PM4	0,57	0,17	0,02
17	PM5	0,50	-0,08	0,35
18	NGO6	-0,12	-0,10	0,49
19	NGO7	0,08	0,14	0,62
20	CS 2	0,78	-0,09	0,25
21	Jour4	0,20	0,62	-0,26
22	NGO8	0,26	0,27	0,29
23	Jour5	0,45	-0,08	0,34
	% Variance	16%	9%	10%

TCy P-Set

	Q-Sort Coding Name	1	2
1	PM 1	0,54	0,55
2	PM 2	0,47	0,45
3	EA1	0,52	0,41
4	EA2	0,77	-0,06
5	R1	0,46	-0,38
6	J1	0,06	-0,38
7	J2	0,71	0,22
8	NGO1	0,32	-0,20
9	NGO2	-0,12	0,61
10	NGO3	0,39	-0,16
11	EA3	0,34	0,23
12	NGO4	0,15	0,26
13	EA4	0,34	0,23
14	R2	0,51	0,32
15	NGO5	0,75	-0,34
16	R3	0,53	-0,20
17	R4	0,41	-0,36
18	R5	0,62	-0,05
19	PM3	0,36	0,00
20	J3	0,13	0,36
21	PM4	0,69	-0,02
	% Variance	23	11

- **Factor analysis**
- Insert rankings into software (Ken-Desktop Q-Software Analysis)
- How people group together by virtue of similar ranking
- 4 discourses (2 for GrCy- 2 for Tcy)

3. CONTRASTING DISCOURSES (2/3)

GrCy. Discourse 1: Gas as a geopolitical boost (8/23 participants)

No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value
36	The trilateral agreements between Cyprus-Egypt-Greece and Cyprus-Israel-Greece are oriented towards the right direction'	+3
32	There may be companies (ENI and TOTAL) that would not hesitate to confront Turkey. If they want to make the decision to go, they will go because they think that Cyprus' entitlement in this region is very strong.	+3
39	The most important stake in the energy debate is the guarantee of the sovereignty of the RoC and its rights. Therefore, the Greek Cypriots should be the ones making the decisions.	+2

TCy Discourse 1: Stimulating political equality (13/21 participants)

No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value
37	Turkish Cypriots are after decision-making. What they actually want is to have a say in the decision making.	+4
26	The presumption that Turkish Cypriots will prevent decisions from being taken, if they participate in a decision-making body on energy issues underlines another missing element in the Cyprus conflict: the federal culture.	+3
45	The Greek Cypriots shall not make the energy issue into the existential question for the RoC, as if the RoC's existence depends on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish Cypriots or not.	+3

3. CONTRASTING DISCOURSES (3/3)

GrCy. Discourse 2: Pipe dreams and imported national myths (5/23 participants)

No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value
13	The Turkish Cypriots believe that the way Greek Cypriots envisage to shape the new state entails for them the risk to vigorously become second class citizens.	+4
32	An important obstacle concerning the gas reserves of RoC is that under the current prices they cannot take any advantage of them, especially because these reserves lie offshore, in “ultra-deep” waters.	+3
39	The construction of a pipeline to Greece is not a feasible option due mainly to the depth of the waters and to the lack of Israel’s interest in investing in such a pipeline.	+3

TCy. Discourse 2: Micro-Politics (2/21 participants)

No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value
5	Turkish-Cypriot policy-makers played an important role in the 2011 crisis in order to promote their agenda.	+4
7	The Greek-Cypriot government initiated the whole energy endeavor to restore its shaken image after the 2011 Mari events and distract the attention from the economic reforms needed.	+3
9	All countries in our region, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt approached the whole debate purely from a political point of view having priority over the business logic.	+3



4. CONCLUSIONS(1/2)

Legal aspect complicated- but **who makes the decisions** at the core

Question of sovereignty < settlement

Greek-Cypriot fear: Turkish-Cypriots are Turkey's Trojan Horse

Turkish-Cypriot fear: Greek-Cypriots will treat as 2nd class citizens

Absence of MHS institutionalizes those fears

4. RECOMMENDATIONS (2/2)

Directorate General of Energy, Enlargement, ENP & EEAS developing an Eastern Mediterranean Energy Diplomacy Task Force

Framework unifying regional stakeholders & facilitating regional dialogue towards the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean as a gas hub

Industry players, legal & technical experts, energy analysts, parliamentary members of the energy affairs committees from environing states.

Agreements not legally binding but offer ideas for PCI (projects of common interest)

Questions of trust at play...

THANK YOU!

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