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5/3/2019

# The effectiveness of EU Official Development Assistance to South Sudan

An analysis of SORUDEV and EU-TAPP

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14,346 WORDS

## 1. Executive Summary

The main purpose of this dissertation is to provide an analysis on the effectiveness of European Union Official Development Assistance to South Sudan in the areas of agriculture, food security and local governance. For this, existing literature was reviewed to understand the theoretical framework surrounding development aid and to establish the various scholarly opinions on the effectiveness of aid. On the one hand, qualitative research methods were used to examine the evolutions of the socio-political situation in South Sudan and the European Union's development cooperation policy. On the other hand, quantitative research was used to analyze the disbursements and commitments made by the EU to South Sudan since its independence and to study the effectiveness of two distinct development projects: Smallholder Food Security and Livelihoods Project 2014-2017 in WBeG State and the EU Technical Assistance for Subnational Capacity Building in Payroll and Public Financial Management. Several conclusions on the effectiveness of the projects were drawn by comparing the initial objectives and the results achieved by the projects. This dissertation argues that despite a number of positive outcomes generated by the projects, there is a clear discrepancy between the overall objectives and sub-goals and the results achieved. As such, from this perspective, the two projects were considered ineffective. Still, the research revealed that these outcomes were greatly affected by political instability, outbreaks of violence and economic volatility, factors which could not be addressed by any of the projects analyzed. Lastly, this paper revealed that accurate data was challenging to gather, not only from the South Sudanese governmental authorities, but also from the European Union to a certain extent.

This investigation is deemed important because there is a lack of independent literature, not commissioned by the European Union, to analyse the effectiveness of its development projects.

*Keywords:* European Union, Official Development Assistance, South Sudan, Agriculture and Food Security, Local Governance, SORUDEV, EU-TAPP.

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## 2. Introduction

The EU stands out as one of the most important regional organizations of the twenty-first century. While its focus remains devoted to internal integration, the EU acknowledges that it cannot be an isolated unit. To this end, the Union has taken up a leading role in the realm of international relations, forging good relations with its economic and political partners across the globe while using its voice to advocate for the values it considers important: democracy, social welfare, human rights and liberalism.

The EU's development cooperation policy is an important tool which serves both missions. While Europe's formal relations with the developing world date back to the integration process itself, the shape and focus of these relations has been significantly altered since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, notably due to successive enlargements, different rates of global development, the reorganization of international trade under the patronage of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000 (Holland & Doidge, 2012).

The evolution of the EU development cooperation policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa is of particular interest due to the historically charged relationship between the EU and its African partners. The origins date back to the colonial occupation, when European powers dominated different parts of Africa, leaving negative repercussions on the continent, as most states did not have an efficient or cohesive state structure. Development aid started to be provided to former colonies with the commencement of the European integration process and the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The European Development Fund (EDF) was established through the same treaty, with the specific purpose of supporting the development of former European colonies. Thus, the EU's development policy has its roots in Europe's colonial past and started with an association relationship with 18 former colonies of the founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) through the Yaoundé Convention in 1963, followed by Yaoundé II in 1969, which included more African states in the scope of EU's development policy. The Oil Crisis in the 1970s marked the adoption of a global perspective on development as well as a globalised aid approach at the EU level. The next step was the Lomé Convention in 1975, which represented a transition from colonialism to equality and mutual cooperation (Holland & Doidge, 2012).

This system came to an end towards the end of the 1990s as the EU development paradigm shifted again. In 2000, the Union developed a fragmented approach to Africa, based on the division of the continent into two macro-regions, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, with the former being managed by the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and the latter by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in 2000, includes 48 sub-Saharan

African countries and has as objectives the promotion of economic, social, cultural development as well as the integration of the ACP countries into the world economy (Kaya, 2017).

Currently, the Union and its member states remain the largest development aid donor in the world, having provided more than 75.7 billion euros in Official Development Aid in 2017. This amount represents 0.50% of the EU GNI, bringing the EU closer to reaching the 0.7% ODA target set by the DAC members in 1970. By means of comparison, the average of non-EU members of the DAC Committee is 0.21% (European Commission, 2018).

One important ODA receiver in Sub-Saharan Africa is South Sudan, the continent's newest country, which received more than 750 million USD from the EU over the course of six years (OECD, 2018). This research focuses on the changes generated by the aid, particularly in the areas of agriculture and food security as well as local governance in the South Sudanese context, thus aiming to provide an answer to the following central research question: ***“How effective has EU development aid to South Sudan been in the areas of agriculture, food security and local governance?”***. In the circumstances of this research, the term “effective” refers to analysing the socio-economic changes directly generated in these specific fields by EU development aid, with the intention of reaching the conclusion of whether the aid has been successful in achieving its initially desired results or intent.

In order to assess the effectiveness of EU ODA to South Sudan, this paper will firstly investigate the reasons why development aid is needed and why the EU is sending ODA to South Sudan. Secondly, it provides an overview of the structure of the aid provided in terms of type of assistance, organization and funds it is allocated from. Thirdly, it focuses on the impact that EU development aid has had on agriculture and food security, particularly in terms of the productivity of small farmers and strengthening markets and value chains by analysing one specific development project: SORUDEV. Fourthly, the paper examines the impact of EU development aid in terms of local governance, with a focus on public financial management, by analysing the project EU-TAPP. Lastly, conclusions are drawn on the effectiveness of the previously examined projects.

### 3. Methodology

This section aims to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the methods used during the research and writing phases. First, quantitative desk research is highlighted as a principal approach. Afterwards, qualitative desk research is briefly discussed as a research method. Lastly, the research limitations are outlined to provide the reader with an explanation concerning the gaps that can be found throughout the dissertation.

To begin with, during the research process, both qualitative and quantitative desk research were used to collect secondary data, or sources which derive from previous research, studies or the academic world (Johnston, 2014).

#### a) Qualitative desk research

Qualitative desk research is defined as a scientific method of research to gather non-numerical data, which refers to concept definitions, characteristics, meanings or metaphors (Ospina, 2004). The use of qualitative desk research was deemed most appropriate to collect secondary data on the different topics reviewed by the thesis, such as an overview of the historical and social background of South Sudan and to analyse the evolution of the development policies of the European Union. Academic literature from books, peer-reviewed journals and published expert reports was the basis for collecting this information. The use of books has been recurrent especially in the establishment of the theoretical frameworks surrounding development, the various dimensions of aid and to gather different scholarly opinions on the general effectiveness of development aid. Books were also used to provide an overview of the evolution of the development aid policies of the EU. This paper also made use of academic literature from journals as the basis for the different development theories and to describe the history of South Sudan. These articles were gathered through The Hague University Online Library Database and Google Scholar. Furthermore, the thesis made use of official agreements published by the Government of South Sudan and by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as OECD recommendations and United Nations resolutions. Thus, qualitative desk research was used more predominantly in the first chapters of this thesis.

#### b) Quantitative desk research

This paper uses as a principal approach quantitative desk research as it was deemed to be the most feasible approach for the requirements of this dissertation. According to the OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, quantitative data can be defined as data expressing a quantity, amount or range, which uses various measurement units (OECD, 2006).

As such, secondary data was gathered using reports published by the IPC – Integrated Food Security Phase Classification to describe the food security and nutrition situation in South Sudan, by the OECD to gather information on the distribution of financial flows to South Sudan and most importantly staff

working reports issued by the European Commission on the EU's instruments for financing external actions. The latter were used to compile graphics and charts concerning the disbursements and commitments made by the European Union, as well as to classify them by financial instrument. Quantitative data was also gathered through EU Aid Explorer, a tool of the European Commission which provides access to data on development and humanitarian aid around the world, including data on the financial contributions made by the EU per development project. Lastly, quantitative data was gathered through Action Fiches, Evaluation Reports and Midterm Reports issues by the European Commission concerning specific development projects. The data collected referred to the specific quantitative results achieved by said projects.

#### c) Research limitations

The limitations to a research are defined as the “characteristics of design or methodology that impacted or influenced the interpretation of the findings from [the] research” (Price & Murnan, 2013). This dissertation faced some limitations due to several reasons outlined hereunder.

Firstly, the dissertation relied heavily on secondary data. One of the risks arising from this choice is that the data collected is an interpretation of the researcher. On the other hand, due to constraints in time and feasibility, secondary data was deemed the best option for the completion of this thesis.

Secondly, no interviews were conducted to collect primary data due to a lack of response to interview requests. None of the seven people contacted via email or LinkedIn replied, which left important gaps in analyzing the effectiveness of the development projects financed by the EU. Thirdly, the European Union does not provide a clear overview of the projects or disbursements made in any specific country. The information needed for this thesis was scattered across various annual reports and staff working documents and was found predominantly in the financial annexes of the staff working reports. Furthermore, the web tool EU Aid Explorer provides incomplete data on the projects, as the vast majority of them lack descriptions, links to official documents and in some cases information on the recipient or on the financial instruments used for the disbursement. Lastly, there are a number of methodological challenges in assessing the effectiveness of aid which are further discussed in the latter part of the literature review.



#### 4. Literature review

This chapter presents a review of the literature to date on the topic of effectiveness of development aid, and more specifically on the theoretical framework surrounding development aid. The purpose of the literature review is to provide an analytical overview of the literature published prior on the topic of this thesis, thus placing the research conducted in the context of the existing literature and to interpret major issues surrounding the effectiveness of development aid.

As such, this chapter firstly presents what ODA is and what are the political and commercial dimensions of aid. Secondly, the main development theories are reviewed. Thirdly, the focus shifts onto different views on whether aid works and the methodological challenges of assessing and measuring the impact of aid.

##### a) What is Official Development Assistance?

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines Official Development Assistance (ODA) as the resource flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions on the DAC List of ODA Recipients by official agencies which meet two criteria. Firstly, the main objective of the aid is the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries. Secondly, ODA is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25%, using a fixed 10% rate of discount. ODA does not include however export credits or trade financing. Similarly, any type of military aid and the promotion of donor's security interests as well as funding for cultural exchanges, loans and credits for primarily commercial objectives do not count as ODA (OECD, 2018). Yet this definition leaves crucial questions unanswered: the motives of providing aid are not considered: it could be to help the donor, to help the recipient or to help both, as the development objective can be primary or not. Also, this definition is largely donor-driven, as it is the donors who decide how much to give, the form in which aid is given and it is also the donors who decided how development aid should be defined.

##### i. A snapshot of the history of ODA

ODA was initiated in the early 1950s, after World War II, as many advanced industrialized countries started to provide emergency relief to former colonies to alleviate poverty. In 1961, the UN General Assembly designated the 1960s as the "United Nations Development Decade", urging the advanced industrialized members to provide 1% of the GNP as ODA for developing countries, thus aiming to put into practice the global community's collective spirit of cooperation (Nowak, 2014).

The 1970s were declared the "Second United Nations Development Decade", as donors were urged to increase their ODA to GNI to 0.7% in order to achieve a 6% annual economic growth in developing countries by the middle of the decade. Meanwhile, the focus of ODA shifted towards social

development and NGOs became important agents for international development cooperation (Nowak, 2014).

The 1980s marked a decrease in ODA, due to the Oil Crises and world-wide recession, although levels of public awareness and participation were heightened for sustainable development in the 1990s. The discourse on ODA broadened, now including the environment, women, migration, labour, poverty and health, as well as efficiency and effectiveness of aid (Nowak, 2014).

The 2000s and 2010s are the Golden Age of International Development Cooperation as the international community endorsed the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals respectively (Nowak, 2014).

It is against this backdrop that a closer look will be taken at the different ways in which aid is provided.

## ii. Types of aid

The OECD identifies eight general types of aid. Firstly, *budget support* is a type of aid through which the donor relinquishes the control of the funds provided by sharing the responsibility with the recipient. Budget support is split into general budget support, a method of financing a recipient country's budget through a transfer of resources to the recipient government's national treasury to support macroeconomic reforms and sector budget support, which is a financial contribution to the recipient government's budget which focuses however on sector-specific concerns. Secondly, *project-type interventions* refer to projects financed by donors to reach specific objectives within a defined time frame, a defined budget and a defined geographical area. Thirdly, *core contributions and pooled programmes and funds* refer to funds aid over to NGOs, either local, national or international, to other private bodies, PPPs, research institutes or multilateral institutions. The remaining types of aid are *experts and other technical assistance, scholarships and student costs in donor countries, debt relief, administrative costs not included elsewhere* and *other in-donor expenditures*, which refer to contributions that do not give rise to a cross-border flow (OECD, 2019).

Essentially, the EU focuses on two aid delivery methods. In contexts where the political situation is stable, the Commission provides budget support as a way of strengthening the country ownership and to finance national development strategies. The second method is sector approach, which can fall under budget support or project-type interventions and which ensures greater coherence between the allocation and use of resources and spending and of expected results. Budget support disbursements accounted for 18% of all EU development aid in 2017, with sub-Saharan Africa being the largest recipient of BS in volume (42.2%) (European Commission, 2019).

### iii. The various dimensions of aid

There are generally six main cluster of motives which have historically influenced donor decisions to allocate aid: (1) to assist recipients to achieve their development goals; (2) to help address emergency needs; (3) to show solidarity; (4) to promote donor-country commercial interests; (5) to further own national strategic and political interests; and (6) because of historical ties. As such, the history of aid-giving has been one of competing pressures swinging back and forth between on one hand motivations of poverty reduction, solidarity, altruism and on the other hand the motivation of different forms of self-interest (Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, 2008).

#### *Political dimensions of aid*

Current aid allocations are still significantly shaped by non-developmental criteria, with the most notable relating to concerns about regional and global security and political relations (Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, 2008). Former colonial ties are still significant in explaining aid allocation patterns, especially in the case of the European Union. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa is a clear example of the Union's focus on former African colonies and their stabilization, as the EUTF's main aim is to address root causes of irregular migration and to contribute to better migration management. Thus, the Union is trying to promote not only regional stability, but also to manage the migratory flows to its territory originating from the African continent by improving migration governance, addressing the drivers of irregular migration, the effective return of displaced persons as well as their readmission and reintegration in their respective societies (European Commission, 2019).

#### *Commercial interests in aid-giving*

Aid-giving has been linked with commercial interest since it was first provided, most directly through the tying of aid to the purchase of goods and services from the donor country. Indirectly, aid can be tied in a number of ways, such as through the provision of aid to lower the costs of firms in bidding for tenders or through subsidizing export-credit schemes. Informally, aid can be tied through pressuring the recipients to purchase goods and services from commercial companies which are donor-based (Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, 2008). Aid-tying has been the subject of particular attention for several decades, with the OECD leading initiatives to reduce aid tying. As such, members of the OECD's DAC agreed to the objective of untying their bilateral ODA to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The latest report published by the OECD in 2018 on the DAC Untying Recommendation finds that most DAC members untied all or almost all of their ODA to LDCs and HIPCs, with the share standing at 88% in 2016. Still, aid tying remains a considerable issue as in 2015 and 2016, 65% of aid contracts were awarded to companies originating from the donor country (OECD, 2018). Although the OECD has issued recommendations related to aid-tying, the decision-making power of aid-giving rests with the donor countries.

Overall, the conclusion is that political and commercial criteria are motives which matter greatly in aid allocation and have a profound effect on the overall contribution of aid to the development goals.

#### b) Development theories

The following section will synthesize the main aspects of the four major theories of development: modernization, dependency, world-systems and globalization to better frame the theoretical explanations used to interpret development efforts carried out in the developing countries.

##### i. Modernization theory

The modernization theory emerged in the 1950s as an explanation of how the industrial societies developed following World War II, particularly those in North America and Western Europe. This theory is based on Rostow's model which describes five stages of development: traditional society, precondition for take-off, the take-off process, the road to maturity and a high mass consumption society. As such, this theory argues that development of Third World countries depends primarily on the import of technology, expertise and capital and their integration into the world market and that least developed nations must follow and implement the societal models of the developed world (McKay, 2008).

##### ii. Dependency theory

The dependency theory is a development theory which came about as a response to the modernization theory and became popular in the 1960s based on the papers of Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch. Briefly, the theory argues that resources flow from underdeveloped states - "the periphery", to wealthy states - the "core", enriching the latter at the expense of the former. The poor states are continuously impoverished while the rich ones are enriched due to the way in which poor states are integrated into the world system (McKay, 2008).

##### iii. World-systems theory

The World Systems Theory was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein who argued that some countries benefit in the world economic system while others are exploited. The world systems theory is established on a three-level hierarchy, which consists of a core, periphery and a semi-periphery. The main idea is that the core dominates and exploits the periphery for labour and raw materials while the peripheral countries are dependent on core countries for capital. As such, the theory emphasizes the social structure of global inequality (McKay, 2008).

##### iv. Globalization theory

Lastly, the Globalization theory approaches global inequality through a different perspective, by focusing on the international economic transactions in an increasingly integrated world market. The focus of this theory is strengthening communications and international ties. Ultimately, this

integration is believed to have a positive influence on economic development and on the improvement of social indicators (Shareia, 2015).

These four theories have been used to explain the different approaches of the international community towards aid in the last century. Although these approaches shifted over time, the challenges in assessing the impact of aid have remained the same, as the following section explains.

#### c) Does aid really work?

The impact of official aid has been disputed since its inception, with views varying across the spectrum. From one perspective, Jeffrey Sachs is optimistically arguing in “The end of poverty” that more commitment will lead to more effective poverty alleviation and that the international community should focus on the effective provision of aid (Sachs, 2006). Meanwhile, William Easterly presents an opposing angle in “The White Man’s Burden”, arguing that the West’s efforts to aid have done more ill than good, as the West has favoured “planners” - optimists with over-arching goals, instead of “searchers” - people who respect context and empower individuals. In short, aid given to unstable governments is a poor idea and the accountability of the recipients of aid should be improved (Easterly, 2006). At the other end of the spectrum, Dambisha Moyo argues in “Dead Aid” that aid to African countries has only fostered dependency, corruption and perpetuated poor governance and poverty. As such, aid is seen as simply free money which does not provide any incentives for the recipients and distorts economic development (Moyo, 2009).

Thus, scholarly opinions vary greatly with regards to the ways in which aid should be provided and whether it is in fact impactful. Still, common ground was found concerning the challenges related to assessing the impact of aid.

#### Challenges in assessing the impact of aid

Most disputes regarding the impact of aid can be linked to two sources: evidence and methods of assessments. As such, scholars identify four challenges based on these two sources, which are crucial in analysing the effectiveness of EU ODA in South Sudan. Firstly, **the purpose challenge** refers to aid being delivered in a variety of forms with different purposes which have been discussed in the previous sections of this literature review. Secondly, **the poor data challenge** refers to the difficulty of accessing proper data to measure the effectiveness of aid. On the one hand there are questions regarding the accuracy of official aid data, as there are usually significant differences between amounts of ODA recorded by donors and the amounts of aid received by recipient governments. Data on growths needs to be accurately assessed, which is challenging even in industrialized economies, let alone in underdeveloped countries where the national accounts of statistics are of poor quality. Similarly, figures used in many analyses do not include NGO activities funded by private donations and

the general assumption that the impact of aid is instantaneous is problematic, while in reality different forms of aid take different time-periods to have an impact. As such, time-specific assumptions result in inaccurate conclusions. Thirdly, **the attribution challenge** refers to the difficulty of showing a causal link between the aid provided and the outcomes and outputs achieved, as many factors can influence or contribute to reaching final outcomes. Lastly, **the counterfactual challenge** refers to the problem of the lack of having a similar counterfactual situation for comparison. This is in fact a methodological challenge, as there is no possibility of comparing the well-being of the same community before aid is given and after it was provided, as there is no identical “control” group against which comparisons can be made. A possible solution to this challenge is to undertake random-sampling evaluations, by comparing the outcomes of aid projects on beneficiaries with a random sample of non-participants in aid programmes (Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Work?, 2009).

It is within this context that the effectiveness of the European Union’s development aid to South Sudan will be investigated.

#### 5. Why is development aid needed in South Sudan?

This chapter will firstly delve into the historical and political background of South Sudan, with a view to painting a comprehensive picture concerning the events which led to South Sudan’s need for development aid. Secondly, the paper will assess the current situation on the ground, in terms of agriculture and food security as well as local governance. The chapter will conclude by examining the reasons behind the EU’s involvement in terms of ODA to South Sudan.

##### a) Historical and Political Background

The Republic of South Sudan is a landlocked country in East-Central Africa and the continent’s newest country, having proclaimed independence in 2011 from The Republic of Sudan following decades of unrest and conflict. The capital, the seat of the government as well as the largest city is Juba. The following section will provide an essential analysis of the most relevant historical and political events which shaped the current socio-politico-economic situation in South Sudan to give a better understanding of the underlying tensions and grievances in the South Sudanese context.

To begin with, the territory of modern South Sudan as well as the Republic of Sudan were under Egyptian occupation during the Muhammad Ali dynasty and later on governed as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium until Sudanese independence was reached in 1956. During the condominium, the north and the south were administered as two separate regions until 1946, when they were merged into one without consultation of southern leaders who feared being politically dominated by the larger north. Internal tensions concerning the north-south relationship heightened after the signing of the

1953 agreement to grant independence to Sudan, due to a lack of political commitment to create a federal government which would have granted the south substantial autonomy. As such, an uncoordinated insurgency started to take shape in 1955 in the South's rural areas, which gradually developed into a secessionist movement that later formed the Anyanya guerrilla army (de Waal, 2016).

The former Republic of Sudan was affected by two major civil wars, whose grievances are important for understanding the divisions and tensions existing in the Sudanese society as a whole. The First Sudanese Civil War took place between 1955 and 1972, when the Sudanese government fought the Anyanya rebel army, whose purpose was achieving greater representation for the marginalized communities and more regional autonomy. The grievances at the origin of this conflict date back to the times when Sudan was governed as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. The movement was paralysed however by internal ethnic divisions and in 1971, former army lieutenant Joseph Lagu overthrew the Southern leader and for the first time gathered all the guerrilla bands under one unified command structure: The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The SSLM was the first organization which could speak for and negotiate on behalf of the entire south. The first civil war was concluded with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1972 and the establishment of the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region, which existed until 1983, when the Second Sudanese Civil War broke out (de Waal, 2016).

The Addis Ababa Agreement failed to eliminate the tensions that originally caused the war and the north-south conflict reignited in 1983, when the President of Sudan declared the entire Sudan an Islamic state under Shari'a law. This provoked further tensions as the religious structure of Sudan as a whole remains largely unchanged from the Egyptian-British rule: the north being predominantly Muslim and the south being primarily inhabited by Christians and traditional African religions, such as the Nuer Religion and Dinka Religion. Tensions further exacerbated as The Southern Sudan Autonomous Region and The Addis Ababa Agreement were abolished in June 1983. The Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) was formed as a direct response under the command of John Garang and the Second Sudanese Civil War broke out between the central Sudanese government and the SPLA/M (de Waal, 2016). Scholars are divided on the root causes of the conflict: on one hand the conflict is described as ethnoreligious, as the Muslim central government imposed the Sharia law on the non-Muslim southerners, which led to violence and eventually civil war (Bassam, 2008). On the other hand, it can be argued that the root cause is an exploitative governance, dating back to the Egyptian-British condominium, when the south was governed similarly to other British east-African colonies, such as Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, while northern Sudan was closer to the

Arabic-speaking Egypt. In 1946, as the British tried to integrate the two areas, Arabic was declared the language of administration throughout the entire country, meaning that the English-speaking southern elite was unable to hold administrative positions. Following decolonization, most political powers were given to the elites based in Khartoum, the current capital of the Republic of Sudan, which further created unrest in the south. To exemplify, in the post-colonial government of 1953, the Sudanization Commission, charged with the administration of the independent Sudan, was staffed by 794 northerners and 6 southerners (DeRouen & Heo, 2007).

The government of Sudan fought the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) until 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, southern autonomy was restored, and an Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan was formed. An estimated two million people died as a result of fighting, famine and diseases caused by the war and four million people in Southern Sudan are estimated to have been displaced at least once during the war. The CPA stipulated that the south be granted a six-year period of autonomy followed by a referendum of its final status which passed with 98.83% of the vote and led to the south's independence on 9 July 2011 and the creation of the Republic of South Sudan (de Waal, 2016).

Although independence was proclaimed in 2011, internal conflict remained present in South Sudan. A political power struggle erupted in December 2013, as the President Kiir accused his former deputy Riek Machar and ten others of attempting a coup d'état. Machar denied any involvement in a coup d'état and fled to lead the SPLM-IO (Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition). Violence broke out between the SPLM/A and SPLM-IO, the military headquarters near Juba University were attacked, the army was sent on the streets of the capital, Juba International Airport was closed indefinitely, and a dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed. The state-owned SSTV went off-air for several hours and returned by broadcasting a message from President Salva Kiir who declared that the coup d'état had been foiled and orchestrated by soldiers allied with the former Vice President (Vinograd, 2017). This led to the South Sudanese Civil War, which, according to the UN killed thousands of South Sudanese in more than a week of violence. The unrest also took an ethnic dimension, as Kiir's Dinka tribe was pitted against Machar's Nuer. Although the first ceasefire agreement was reached in January 2014, fighting erupted again and was followed by multiple ceasefires which were not respected. Negotiations were mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD, the African Union, the United Nations, China, the EU, the USA, the UK and Norway. The Compromise Peace Agreement was signed in August 2015, which enabled Machar to return to Juba in 2016 and be appointed vice president (IGAD, 2015). Fighting broke out again in Juba in July the same year, plunging the country back into conflict. The fighting spread throughout the city and over 300 people were killed



and over 40 injured (Aljazeera, 2016). The SPLM-IO was forced to flee to the Equatoria region and Machar was replaced as vice president as he fled into exile in South Africa. Taban Deng, the rebel's chief negotiator took office as vice-president, sparking more tensions as according to Machar's spokesman, Deng had been dismissed the night before, which would have made the appointment illegal (Aljazeera, 2016). An additional dimension of the conflict became the fighting which erupted between the opposition supporting Taban Deng and those loyal to Machar. Rebel in-fighting has also become a major part of the conflict, as rivalry has grown among Dinka factions led by the President and Malong Awan, a South Sudanese military and political figure, who contributed the majority of the government's fighting force in the war (Vinograd, 2017) .




An arms embargo was successfully passed on South Sudan in July 2018 through the UNSC (United Nations Security Council, 2018). Furthermore, as neighbouring Sudan faced continuous economic problems as it relies on revenue from transporting oil from South Sudan, it brought both President Kiir and the SPLA-IO to Khartoum to hold talks which concluded with another ceasefire signed in June 2018. The two parties agreed to form a transitional government which would govern for the remaining three years leading to national elections and for the African Union and IGAD to deploy peace-keepers to South Sudan. The ceasefire was violated only a few hours after coming into effect, as clashes took place in Wau State(ref). A power-sharing agreement was reached in August 2018, named the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (IGAD, 2018), which allowed Machar to return to South Sudan and become one of the five Vice Presidents. To further reinforce the peace deal, President Kiir ordered the release from prison of an adviser to Mr. Machar along with rebel spokesman. The 550 parliament seats were also divided, with 332 being attributed to Kiir's group and 128 to Machar's faction (Aljazeera, 2018). However, continued attacks and violations were still reported, particularly by Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. In a media briefing which took place in October 2018, Mr. Lacroix stated that: "we still see some hotspots of violence and so we acknowledge this progress and, at the same time, we recognize there can be challenges in immediately achieving a total cessation of hostilities" (UN Mission in South Sudan , 2018). Further reports of violations come from Angelina Teny, a senior member of the SPLM-IO, who blamed governmental forces for allegedly attacking rebel strongholds in Central Equatoria and the former Unity state. Still, no statements have been issued on these latest developments by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, CTSAMM, a body formed by IGAD to monitor ceasefire violations (Tanza, 2018).

## b) Situation on the ground

Having previously analysed the historical socio-political situation in South Sudan with a view to understanding the root causes of the current issues surrounding the South Sudanese society, this section will give an overview of the situation on the ground in the areas of food security and local governance as well as a brief overview of the situation of the internally displaced persons. This is essential to understand the context in which the two development projects have been carried out.


## i. Agriculture and Food Insecurity in South Sudan between 2015-2018

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN developed the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) in 2004. The IPC is a common global system which is used by governments, NGOs, UN agencies and civil society to classify the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition in different regions across the world (FAO, 2018). The IPC distinguishes between Acute Food Insecurity, Chronic Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition, further providing a classification scale based on different severity levels and phases as it can be seen in the table below.

IPC CLASSIFICATION		
Acute Food Insecurity	Chronic Food Insecurity	Acute Malnutrition
Food insecurity which threatens lives or livelihoods at a specific point in time, regardless of the context, causes or duration (IPC, 2018).	Food insecurity which is mainly attributed to structural causes, including intra-annual seasonal food insecurity and which persists over time (IPC, 2018).	Acute malnutrition is indicated by thinness of individuals and/or presence of oedema (IPC, 2018).
CLASSIFICATION SCALE		
<u>5 Severity Phases</u>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Minimal/None</li> <li>(2) Stressed</li> <li>(3) Crisis</li> <li>(4) Emergency</li> <li>(5) Catastrophe/Famine</li> </ul>	<u>4 Severity Levels</u>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Minimal or no CFI</li> <li>(2) Mild CFI</li> <li>(3) Moderate CFI</li> <li>(4) Severe CFI</li> </ul>	<u>5 Severity Phases</u>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Acceptable</li> <li>(2) Alert</li> <li>(3) Serious</li> <li>(4) Critical</li> <li>(5) Extreme Critical</li> </ul>

(IPC, 2019)


This section provides data on food insecurity in South Sudan in the period 2015-2018 based on the IPC severity levels. In **September 2015**, nearly one in every three people in South Sudan, which is around 3.9 million people, were severely food insecure and 3.6 million people were considered to be 'stressed'. The peak of food insecurity of that year was reached in Unity State, where an estimated 30,000 people were facing catastrophic food insecurity, at IPC Level 5 (UNOCHA, 2015).



Sources: IPC TWG

Figure 1 (UNOCHA, 2015)

The situation worsened in July 2016, when approximately 4.8 million people were estimated to be food insecure and more than one million children under the age of five were estimated to be acutely malnourished, including more than 273,600 who were severely malnourished. It is estimated that about 50% of harvests had been lost in areas affected by violence and



Sources: FSL Cluster

Figure 2 (UNOCHA, 2016)

farmers were unable to plant or harvest due to insecurity and restrictions on freedom of movement, with a cereal deficit of 50% being reported in 2016. Livestock has also been affected by conflict, as it has been killed, looted or exposed to increased risk of disease, partly because of irregular migration routes taken by cattle herders as a result of the conflict (UNOCHA, 2016).

As of **January 2017**, 3.8 million people were estimated in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The number increased to almost 5 million in April 2017 and culminated with Famine being declared by the government in Leer and Mayendit counties of Greater Unity State, as approximately 100,000 people were affected by famine (IPC, 2017). Although Famine was no longer occurring in Leer and Mayendit counties as of **June 2017** due to sustained multi-sector humanitarian assistance, an estimated 6.01 million people (accounting for 50% of the South Sudanese population) were severely food insecure, experiencing IPC Phases 3,4 and 5, which is the highest number of people ever to experience food insecurity in South Sudan (IPC,




Figure 3, (IPC, 2017)

2017). In **September 2017**, 56% of the total population, which amounts to 6 million people, was in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and 25,000 people were experiencing catastrophic conditions and extreme food gaps (IPC, 2017).

The latest IPC report concerning food security in South Sudan was published in **September 2018** and estimates that 6.1 million people, 59% of the total population, faced Crisis (IPC Phase 3) at the peak of the lean season (July-August 2018), of whom 47,000 were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and 1.7 million were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Food security improved slightly in September relative to the

IPC CLASSIFICATION FOR SOUTH SUDAN FOR SEPTEMBER 2018




Figure 4 (IPC, 2018)

lean season and further improvements are predicted in the post-harvest period between October and December 2018, with the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse is likely to reduce to 4.4 million, which is about 43% of the total population, with 26,000 people remaining in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The IPC further reports that the overall situation of acute malnutrition slightly improved in

2018 compared to the same period of the previous year, with no county reporting extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition in 2018. A total of 31 counties in the states of Warrap, Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei reported critical levels of acute malnutrition, 20 counties in the states of Lakes, Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile reported 'Serious' levels of acute malnutrition. Furthermore, the majority of the counties where data was available in Central and Western Equatoria recorded 'Alert' and 'Acceptable' levels of acute malnutrition (IPC, 2018).

ii. IDPs and number of victims

According to the US Council on Foreign Relations, over 50,000 people were killed during the civil war (CFR, 2019), with a possibility of the real estimate being much higher. According to a study published by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in September 2018 (Checchi, Testa, & Warsame, 2018), around 383,000 excessive deaths were recorded in South Sudan since December 2013, as a result of the prolonged conflict, with the highest mortality, approximately 190,000 deaths projected for Jonglei, Unity and the southern state hubs, Eastern, Central, Western Equatoria. Although South Sudan experienced consistently elevated death rates during the war period, the peak was reached in 2016 and 2017, with males being affected the most.




Figure 5 Map of South Sudan counties, showing the average estimated excess death rate between December 2013-April 2018 (Checchi, Testa, & Warsame, 2018)

In addition, the latest Humanitarian Bulletin issued by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – OCHA at the end of September 2018, reports that there are 1.96 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and 2.47 million South Sudanese refugees in the neighbouring countries. The conflict has now displaced one in three South Sudanese people, with an estimated 80% of the refugees hosted within the country being women and children (OCHA, 2018).

### iii. Local governance

The following section will provide an overview of the local governance system and the impact that the civil war has had on local governance structures and public financial management in South Sudan. The aim is to provide context to the subsequent analysis of the EU-TAPP project.

The Local Government Act of 2009 regulates local governance in South Sudan, directing the establishment and division of local governance functions to the ten states – now 32, 79 county governments – now 180, and their sub-structures at the sub-county and village levels, which are referred to as payam and boma respectively. According to the Act, the local governments are charged with the delivery of basic social and economic services, while the state governments provide support and supervision and the national government sets the policy environment and provides funding. Service Delivery Frameworks have been developed by the government under the Local Services Support (LSS) Joint Plan of Action (JPA). The Service Delivery Frameworks focus on primary education, rural water and sanitation, primary health care and small-scale infrastructure as well as the strengthening of local government public financial management (European Commission, 2018).

Although the local government system and the local service delivery mechanisms have been severely weakened by decades of conflict, South Sudan has made significant progress in defining the legal and policy framework for decentralization as well as the establishment of basic local government structures as set out in the Transitional Constitution of 2011 and the Local Government Act.

One of the key challenges in the area of local governance is the fact that South Sudan only allocates a fraction of government spending to the social sectors and to basic infrastructure, with spending in these sectors being largely donor-driven. To exemplify, following the 2013 political crisis in South Sudan, conflict re-emerged with its northern neighbour, Sudan, which resulted in the inability to export oil, the principal foreign exchange earner. This led in turn to the collapse of government revenues and cutbacks in the centrally financed local government capital investment grants. As such, the sole source of funding for service delivery became the Local Government and Service Delivery Project Payam Development Grant founded by the World Bank (Public Administration International, 2019).

Furthermore, although recent data concerning government spending is unavailable, 60% of government spending during the first three quarters of the fiscal year 2014/2015 went to salaries and security-related salaries accounted for 60% of the total salary expenditure on a monthly basis. In an attempt to better support local service delivery the government has undertaken to gradually re-orient the budget. As such, in the fiscal year 2014/2015 has sent transfers to state and local governments worth SSP 2.5 billion. By means of comparison, the total national expenditure of that fiscal year

amounted to an estimated SSP 10.8 billion. While the national government vouched to strengthen its monitoring of these funds, Europe Aid reports that the widespread absence of internal controls, capacity bottlenecks and political interference over budget execution have in fact prevented the money from reaching local service delivery units (European Commission, 2018).

As such, despite the fact that the South Sudanese government has created the policy framework for local governance and basic service delivery, there remain significant challenges in the implementation and delivery phases.

#### c) Why is the EU providing ODA to South Sudan?

It is important for the European Union to rally behind South Sudan's state- and nation-building efforts through developmental support as Europe and Africa have close historical, cultural and geographical ties. The EU-Africa relations are framed by the Joint Africa EU-Strategy (JAES) adopted in 2007 and reaffirmed in Brussels in 2014 through the 4<sup>th</sup> EU-Africa Summit. The strategy focuses on the cooperation on five strategic area, including peace and security, democracy, good governance and human rights as well as human development (EEAS, 2016).

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in 2000, constitutes the main framework of the EU's development policy towards 48 sub-Saharan African countries, including South Sudan. The major pillars of this agreement are the promotion of economic, social and cultural development of ACP states, as well as contributing to peace and security. The agreement also emphasises the link between sustainable development and poverty reduction and divides the ACP countries into sub-groups, allowing for different policies to be built on the basis of national characteristics. Furthermore, the agreement was structured around a strong political conditionality in spite of opposition of ACP states, as the violation of core values of the EU such as respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles may lead to the suspension of partnerships. For the first time, the EU recognized the importance of non-state actors such as civil society, local actor and private sector, constructing a participatory approach to development. Economically, the agreement shifted from reciprocal trade preferences to non-reciprocal trade preferences and introduced performance-based aid allocations in aid management through the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EPA's regulate the opening up of sub-Saharan African countries' markets to EU exporters and products over a period of up to 12 year, while differentiating between countries in terms of economic level and placing the least developed countries at the top the Union's pyramid of preferences (Kaya, 2017).

The influence of global aid trends can also be explicitly seen in the Cotonou Agreement. According to Brown, the agreement's extension of political conditionality as well as the suspension of cooperation in case of serious breach of EU principles indicate the alignment of the EU with the international



development paradigm: EU's relations with the developing world have been politicized through political conditionalities and post-colonial relations have also been weakened in terms of development cooperation (Brown, 2004).

## 6. The EU's ODA explained

The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with a clear overview of the EU's general development strategy and its evolution, while focusing on the ODA provided to South Sudan over the period 2011-2016 in terms of disbursements and commitments, financial instruments used and sectors targeted. Lastly, it presents an outline of the total projects financed in the areas of food security, agriculture and local governance.

### a) The EU's Development Strategy

The European Union's development strategy is further outlined in the European Consensus on Development, a shared vision and framework for action for development signed by the three main EU institutions – the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union – in June 2017. The new collective European development policy focuses on poverty reduction and alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals, as its objectives have been translated into four frameworks for action which focus on people, planet, prosperity and peace. The Consensus also emphasises the Union's commitment to enhance interlinkages between development, peace and security and humanitarian aid, as well as to combine traditional development assistance with private-sector investments and domestic resource mobilization (European Commission, 2019).

The EU remains collectively the biggest donor for international aid in the world, providing over €50 billion annually to help eradicate poverty and advance global development. The following chart provides an overview of aid spending trends in the period 2007-2016 (European Commission, 2019).

#### What has happened to aid spending in the last 10 years?

Period: 2007-2016 | Currency: USD (Billion) | Data source: OECD




Figure 6 (European Commission, 2019)



The aid delivered by EU institutions is of particular interest for this research, as the paper focuses on the effectiveness of the aid delivered through the funding instruments of the European Union and not on the ODA disbursements made by individual member states. According to official data, the EU Institutions provided \$18.63 billion of development aid in 2016 throughout the world, as it can be seen from the following infographic (European Commission, 2019).




Figure 7 (European Commission, 2019)

#### b) EU's ODA to South Sudan explained

The following section will focus on the ODA delivered to South Sudan by EU Institutions in the period 2011-2016, with a view to evaluate the evolution of the DA in the period following the independence and up until 2016, when the most recent data is provided.

The following table comprises data gathered from EU Aid Explorer, the European Commission's web tool which provides access to data on development and humanitarian aid around the world.

Year	ODA provided by EU Institutions	Comments
2011	0	Although no ODA was provided by the EU Institutions, the EU Member States were collectively the largest ODA donor (\$193,6 million)
2012	\$46,866,355	While the EU Institutions and EU Member States remain collectively the largest ODA donor to South Sudan in 2012, the EU Institutions alone are the 7 <sup>th</sup> largest donor of 2012.
2013	\$128,311,785	The EU Institutions and EU Member States remain the largest ODA donor, with the EU Institutions ranking the 3 <sup>rd</sup> ODA donor overall in 2013.
2014	\$225,661,380	The United States surpasses the EU Institutions and EU MS in terms of ODA, disbursing \$797,2 million compared to \$784,8 disbursed by the EU

		collectively. The EU Institutions remain the 3 <sup>rd</sup> overall ODA donor in 2014.
2015	\$134,407,793	The EU collectively becomes once again the leading ODA donor, while the EU Institutions alone rank the 3 <sup>rd</sup> overall ODA donor in 2015.
2016	\$224,021,297	The EU remains collectively the largest ODA donor of 2016 while the EU Institutions rank 3 <sup>rd</sup> overall.

(European Commission, 2019)

According to the Commission's Directorate for International Cooperation and Development, the EU's developmental assistance in South Sudan focuses on basic services delivery, with an emphasis on education and primary health, on agriculture and food security, with an emphasis on enhancing the productivity of small farmers, strengthening markets and value chains and the construction of rural roads, on justice and reconciliation and on public financial management with the aim of improving local governance, transparency and accountability. The main vehicle for the assistance is the EUTF – the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, under which the EU has made available approximately 139 million euros since 2015 (Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development, 2019).

The following graph was compiled using data provided by EU Aid Explorer and illustrates the evolution of ODA delivered by the EU Institutions to South Sudan in the period 2011-2016.




Figure 8 (European Commission, 2019)

Although the EU Institutions delivered no ODA to South Sudan in 2011, a clear ascending trend can be observed for the period 2012-2014, followed by a sharp decrease in 2015, which can be justified by a general fall of 0.5% of net disbursements of by EU Institutions in that year (OECD, 2016). The ODA increased once again in 2016, following the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of July 2015, which was described by the former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as a “global framework for financing sustainable development” (United Nations, 2015).

All of the following tables and charts gather data from the Annual Reports and Staff Documents issued by the European Commission on the EU’s Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in the period 2012-2016. The chart below shows the overall evolution of EU’s ODA commitments and disbursements to South Sudan in millions of euros.




Figure 9 (European Commission, 2013), (European Commission, 2014), (European Commission, 2015), (European Commission, 2016), (European Commission, 2018)

Generally, disbursements outweigh significantly the commitments of ODA made by the European Union, with the exception of the year 2013, when only 51% of the development assistance promised was in fact disbursed. The Commission tried to implement budget support and adopted a EUR 85 million State Building Contract, which was aimed at covering the salaries of health and education workers on the Government’s payroll system for two fiscal years. Despite the signature of a Financing Agreement for a State Building Contract in December, the first disbursement could not be made before the end of the year as politico-military conflict broke out on 15 December 2013 in South Sudan and because the country failed to meet the key prior action on exchange rate liberalisation.

The following chart illustrates the evolution of EU's ODA disbursements to South Sudan by main OECD sectors.




Figure 10 (European Commission, 2013), (European Commission, 2014), (European Commission, 2015), (European Commission, 2016), (European Commission, 2018)

The previous table clearly illustrates the focus of EU development aid to South Sudan in the five-year period. The main emphasis was clearly placed on humanitarian aid, which is attributed to the civil war as well as the overall fragile socio-politico-economic situation in the country. Social Infrastructures was the second most financed sector, followed by Budget Support, food aid and food security.

The following chart illustrates the evolution of EU's total ODA disbursements to South Sudan broken down by instruments.




Figure 11 (European Commission, 2013), (European Commission, 2014), (European Commission, 2015), (European Commission, 2016), (European Commission, 2018)

The main instrument used for disbursements by the EU was the EDF, which is generally the Union's most used fund for the provision of aid to ACP countries and OCTs. The EDF is financed by direct contributions from the EU Member States and has its own financial rules. The total financial resources of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF, which covers the period 2014-2020 amount to 30.5 billion EUR. The 11<sup>th</sup> EDF was created in June 2013, by an intergovernmental agreement, as it is not part of the EU Budget. The legal basis for the EDF lies within the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 and revised every five years (European Commission, 2019).

c) [Overview of EU Development Projects in South Sudan in the areas of food security and agriculture](#)

The web tool EU Aid Explorer was used to create an overview of the EU's development projects in the areas of food security and agriculture. The data extracted was put together in the form of a table to be found under Appendices 1. The parameters used for the search of projects were development project search, the location chosen was South Sudan, the donor chosen was EU Institutions and the sectors were Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing and Food. The search generated 45 projects as it can be seen in the table. The data extracted concerned the project name, the start and end dates, the total disbursements and commitments, the names of the financial instrument used for the disbursement and of the implementing partners in South Sudan (European Commission, 2019).

Having analyzed the data generated, it can be noted that the majority of the projects are funded through the EDF and that the EC DEVCO is also a major contributor with ODA. Furthermore, commitments are made only for the projects financed by EC DEVCO and all the projects financed through the EDF have no commitments (European Commission, 2019).

While the previous charts illustrate the evolution of ODA allocated by the EU Institutions annually and by instrument, the table above shows that the duration of the development projects is generally of more than three years, which means that although disbursements vary and may appear to be less in some years, the explanation is that disbursements are made according to the evolution of the project.

Looking at the implementing partners, the recurring ones are the Recipient Government, which is the Government of South Sudan, Developing country-based NGOs and Private Sector Institutions. This is in line with the EU's strategy on development underlined in the European Consensus on Development which is that of bringing together traditional development assistance and private-sector investments, represented in this case by Private Sector Institutions (European Commission, 2019).

d) [Overview of EU Development Projects in the area of local governance](#)

The overview concerning EU's development projects in the area of local governance was also compiled using EU Aid Explorer. The data extracted was gathered in a table to be found under Appendix 2 and the parameters used for the search of projects were project location: South Sudan, sectors - Economic Recovery and Infrastructure, Coordination and Support Services, Government and Civil Society, Social Infrastructure and Services and donors – EU Institutions Total.

The search generated 131 projects, out of which only 11 are presented in the table to be found in Appendix 2. Upon regarding all project descriptions, only 11 fit the field of local governance or public financial management, hence their selection. The majority of the remaining projects generated by the search were aimed at improving the macroeconomic situation in South Sudan and were thus not

focused on local governance. In addition, there are no search parameters for local governance or public financial management as a sector for projects (European Commission, 2019).

According to the data compiled, the projects were founded through the EU Budget, the EDF and by the EC DEVCO and were largely focused on improving the responsiveness of local governance structures in certain states, providing technical assistance for subnational capacity building and to provide support to basic service delivery at the subnational level. Only two out of the eleven projects had commitments and the recurring recipients were the Government of South Sudan and various non-governmental organizations. While a few projects lacked information on their duration, the average duration of the remaining projects was of two to three years. Furthermore, the projects financed by the EC DEVCO had once again commitments, as well as one founded through the EDF (European Commission, 2019).

#### 7. Smallholder Food Security and Livelihoods Project 2014-2017 in WBeG State (SORUDEV)

This chapter provides an overview of the objectives, results and challenges of the **SORUDEV Smallholder Food Security and Livelihoods Project 2014-2017 in WBeG State** in South Sudan. The chapter concludes with an analysis on the effectiveness of the project by comparing the results achieved with the initial objectives.

##### a) Overview of SORUDEV

The project was managed and implemented by the Hope Agency for Relief and Development (HARD) and was co-funded by Christian Aid. The data collected originates from mid-term reviews published in July 2016, as no final reports were published to this date. The project commenced in February 2014 and ended in February 2017. As for the financial data, the EU funds contracted were 2,000,000 EUR and the EU funds disbursed were 1,527,689 EUR. The funds were disbursed from the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF (European Commission, 2017).

The overall objective of this project was to contribute to increased food security, enhanced livelihoods of rural households and reduced vulnerability in Western Bahr el Ghazal State. The specific objective of this project is the increased agricultural production and income of smallholder farmers in WBeG State (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

The project also had four specific projects results to be achieved.

1. Result 1: Increase the area of land cultivated using animal traction without corresponding decrease in crop yields;
2. Result 2: Increased promotion and adoption of appropriate agricultural practices for 1500 smallholder farmers;

3. Result 3: Increased diversification of crops grown through integrated fruit trees, vegetables and cassava farming;
4. Result 4: Improved post-harvest handling and management and increased adoption of post-harvest storage facilities and marketing of surplus farm produce (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

The project aimed to provide material and technical support to 3,000 households spread across 24 bomas and covering 11 payams, targeting approximately 35,000 persons. Indirectly, the final beneficiaries the project aimed to reach were the whole population of WBeG State, amounting to approximately 433,000 persons through increased food availability, incomes and improved use of agricultural technologies (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016), (Volpe, 2017).

b) Results achieved:

Looking at result 1, the knowledge on the use of draught animals for cultivation increased from 19% at baseline to 27%, reaching 1,350 farmers. This was equivalent to a 42% rise and exceeded the targets for 2014 and 2015 by 6% and 3% respectively and 1.5% for 2016. Furthermore, compared to the beginning of the project when only 17% of farmers used animal ploughing, in the 2015 season the percentage rose to 29%, marking a 71% change. The number of animal traction trainers trained was targeted at 250, however only 90 people were trained. In terms of the average land area cultivated per household in feddans, at the midterm review there was a 55% increase, from 2 to 3.1 feddans. The number of ox-plough sold through agro dealers did not reach the target set at mid-term, which was 1700. Compared to the baseline, which was 0, the target achieved was of 250. Lastly, the percentage of farmers using animal traction increased by 72%, reaching 29% compared to 17% at baseline. This was insufficient however, as the target was set at 50% (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

The second result to be achieved, which referred to the increase of promotion and adoption of appropriate agricultural practices for 1,500 smallholder farmers also showed insufficient achievements. The number of field days to be held was set at 11, but only 3 field days were in fact organized. Eight Farmer Field Schools were established, compared to the 10 Schools target. Moreover, 28 farmers were trained in fruit tree management, which did not come close to the 200 set goal and only 916 farmers were practicing improved farming practices compared to the 5,000 farmers target. The number of CAD officials trained exceeded the target by 60%, as 16 officials received formal training. 2,442 farmers were accessing extension services, almost half of the 5,000 farmers target. Lastly, no payams were reached through participatory land use planning, compared to the target of 11 (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).



The third result to be achieved, which focused on the increased diversification of crops grown through integrated fruit trees, vegetables and cassava farming showed more positive outcomes. The target for cassava bulking sites established was reached and the number of vegetable gardens established, the number of farmers trained in conservation agriculture/vegetable farming, the number of simple water extraction technologies installed in vegetable gardens and the percentage of quantity of vegetables sold were all exceeded.

Still, zero progress was made on the number of individual cassava cutting bulking farms established, on the number of farmers selling fruit trees and on the number of fruit trees sold. The number of farmers engaged in commercial fruit tree production only increased by 14% compared to the baseline and the number of farmers engaged in commercial vegetable production only increased by 8% compared to the baseline (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

Result number 4 dealt with the improvement of post-harvesting handling and management and only showed positive outcome in terms of the number of households trained in post-harvest management, which increased by 130% compared to the baseline. The project also aimed for 400 farmers to have surplus produce, yet only 125 farmers met the target, which is a 31% increase from the baseline. Only a 50% increase compared to the baseline was reached in the number of farmers trained on leadership, the number of farmer groups trained on dynamics, the number of farmer groups legalized and the number of farmer groups leaders trained (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

The specific objective of the project, which dealt with increased agricultural production and income of smallholder farmers in the State was divided into three sub-goals. Unsatisfactory achievements were met in terms of yields for three main crops per feddan increased by 50% in at least 3,000 supported households. The targets for sorghum were not met, only 217 kg were produced at mid term, compared to the 246 kg target; the target for groundnut was almost reached at 412,6 kg compared to 413 kg target and the increase in yield of maize decreased by almost 50%, reaching 80,5 kg compared to the 254 kg target. The second sub-goal referred to the increase of the monthly household income by 40% in at least 900 supported households and was very close to being achieved. The income reached 771,4 SSP, marking a 35% increase but still not meeting the 800 SSP target. Lastly, the third sub-goal referred to the increase of the proportion of food consumed derived from own production in at least 3,000 households. The target set was at 90%, compared to the 64% baseline. Still, only a change of 1% was achieved, meaning that this sub-goal was not met (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

Finally, the overall objective of the project was to contribute to increased food security, reduced vulnerability and enhanced livelihoods of rural households in WBeG State. However, very little

progress was reached. In terms of the increase in the length of food stocks in months, the baseline was 3.2 months and the target was 4.8 months. Only a 9% change from the baseline was registered. In terms of the reduction in distress sale of livestock, no change occurred throughout the project. Similarly, the reduction in monthly expenditure on food per household was not satisfactory, as only a 54% change from the baseline was registered. Lastly, the average number of meals per day did not increase. In fact, a 9% decrease from the baseline was noted. If at the beginning at the project the baseline was 1.9 meals, the target set was 2.85 meals, at the mid-term review the results were 1.72 meals (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

#### c) Challenges in implementation

The first challenge reported by the project team was the reluctance of farmers to embrace improved practices. The dependency syndrome and cultural stereotypes among locals are also reported to be impediments as the “no handout” approach of the project was not appreciated by the farmers who were used to free inputs from other agencies operating in the area. The project team reported strong cultural attachments to traditional agro practices, as many rely on artisanal systems (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

Second, regional insecurity caused by the inter-communal killings in Wau County lead to the displacement of project farmers and subsequently the temporary withdrawal of project staff from the affected Bomas. Third, the capacity of farmers to afford participating in loan schemes and inputs at market prices was negatively affected by inflationary effects which reduced the value of SSP and consequently the value of the income earned by farmers. Similarly, project budgets and farmer savings were impacted by the fixed exchange rate and the volatility of prices. The overall worsening economic situation of households also lead to the rapid sale of produce, migration to towns and tree cutting (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

Fourth, poor infrastructure presented a challenge in terms of deteriorating road conditions during the wet season which affected the delivery of supplies to the project sites. This led to delays in activities and increase in project costs (Cardno Emerging Markets Ltd, 2016). Fifth, poor rain resulted in the early drying up of planted crops, thus negatively affecting crop performance and reducing production potential. Lastly, conflict and tension between farmers and pastoralists in Jur River County was caused by wet season livestock migrations through farmland under long-term crops as well as dry season movements of livestock to riverine areas (ASAL Consulting Limited, 2016).

#### d) How effective was the project in reaching its initial goals?

Overall, the project did not reach its objective by the midterm review which was in fact published in July 2016. The project did not significantly increase food security, reduce vulnerability or enhance the

livelihoods of rural households in WBeG State. Unsatisfactory results were observed in terms of the average number of meals per day, the length of food stocks in months. Unsatisfactory results were observed in terms of the number of ox-plough sold through agro-dealers, the percentage of farmers using animal traction, the number of farmers trained in fruit management, the number of farmers practicing improved farming practices. Furthermore, no progress was made in terms of the number of farmers selling fruit trees and the number of fruit trees sold. The increase of the proportion of food consumed derived from own production was also unsatisfactory.

Still, progress was achieved in some areas, notably concerning the number of cassava bulking sites, the number of farmers trained in conservation agriculture farming, the number of simple water extraction technologies installed in vegetable gardens and the percentage of quantity of vegetables sold. Likewise, progress was made concerning the number of households trained in post-harvesting management and the monthly household income almost reached its target.

#### 8. EU Technical Assistance for Subnational Capacity Building in Payroll and Public Financial Management (EU-TAPP)

Having concluded that there are few development projects financed by the EU in South Sudan in the area of local governance, the following section will focus on analyzing the effectiveness of one specific project. First, the project and its initial objectives will be described, followed by an overview of the results achieved. Lastly, conclusions will be drawn on whether or not the final outcomes match the original aims.

##### a) Overview

The Technical Assistance for Subnational Capacity Building in Payroll and Public Financial Management, or EU-TAPP, was a three-year project founded by the European Union, which had the general aim of strengthening public financial management at the central, state and local level in South Sudan. More specifically, the objective was to increase the capacity of local governments with regards to the implementation and execution of existing policies and directives in the fields of PFM and payroll in all ten states of South Sudan. EU-TAPP was implemented from August 2014 to the end of July 2016, hence the ten-state structure in South Sudan, and the implementing partners were Ecorys and VNG. The project was carried out by a core national team and state-based teams in seven out of ten states, due to security reasons. The total disbursements made for this project throughout the period 2014-2016 amounted to approximately 5,160,000 USD and were made through the EDF. An additional 325,000 USD was disbursed for an evaluation project of the EU-TAPP (AECOM International Development Europe SL, 2016).

One of the identified objectives of the EU-TAPP project was to “support local governments (LGs) in meeting the requirements set by the LG PFM Manual: planning and budgeting; financial management and accounting; and preparing and submitting quarterly budget performance reports/financial reporting” (Ecorys; VNG International, 2016). The LG PFM Manual is in fact a set of guidelines created by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Local Government Board of South Sudan and includes various procedures, forms and policies to ensure sound PFM at a local level and enable LGs to effectively deliver basic services (Ecorys; VNG International, 2016).

In order to reach this objective, EU-TAPP used a Standardized Approach to deliver capacity building activities to county governments across the country. This approach involved the use of a standardized tool, a standardized implementation process as well as the LG PFM Manual.

The Action Fiche of EU-TAPP identifies four specific results to be achieved by the project:

1. Result 1: Equip county and local government staff with skills and knowledge in local government PFM including planning, budgeting, accounting and reporting and in producing an audit trail of payment of salaries using the Electronic Payroll system;
2. Result 2: Properly account for all resources at the county level;
3. Result 3: Counties and States are able to provide the necessary documentation for a satisfactory audit of the budget lines in conditional salary transfers to both states and counties in the sectors of health and education.
4. Result 4: Counties demonstrate progress in properly using and accounting for all local revenue and transfers according to indicators defined as part of the LSS JPA monitoring framework (European Commission, 2015).

Measuring the effectiveness of this particular project relies on interpreting if the four previously mentioned goals were achieved in the end. However, the wording of the goals themselves raises issues of interpretation. Looking at Result 3, a “satisfactory audit” can be interpreted differently depending on the assessor.

#### b) Positive outcomes generated by EU-TAPP

According to the final evaluation report of EU-TAPP the following results were achieved.

At the start of the project, no county in South Sudan was producing quarterly financial reports routinely. This changed by the midterm evaluation of the project when 42 counties were providing quarterly budget performance reports. At the end of the project however, only 19 counties provided QBPR within the 30-day requirement, which was attributed to regional conflict and instability. Also, 44 out of the 46 counties in the states non-affected by the outburst of conflict prepared 2015/16

budgets in the format recommended by the manual. Furthermore, no counties were uploading payroll reports by sector at the beginning of the project, compared to 16 counties at the end of it. Eight of the ten states had functioning County Transfer Monitoring Committees which reviewed the quarterly budget performance reports and monthly payroll reports submitted by counties (ECORYS, 2016).

Under the EU-TAPP programme, significant achievements have occurred thanks to on-the-job training of local officials; these efforts need to be sustained over time to entrench positive behaviour within key public administrations. The EU-TAPP state teams identified the county staff members who had not yet undergone formal training on the LG PFM Manual and organized short training workshops of one to three days. A total of 44 workshops covering 481 staff were conducted across the seven states and 531 staff members received on-the-job training on the application of procedures in the manual. Similarly, 67 county officials received training in the form of workshops on budget execution. Lastly, the performance of the participating counties could be assessed using a standard assessment tool which enables comparisons based on key PFM indicators (ECORYS, 2016).

Furthermore, 1000 copies of the LG PFM Manual were printed and distributed to county officials by the EU-TAPP team, as well as 200 copies of six different Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Guidelines. Training materials were centrally collected, reproduced and distributed, including the LG Budget Preparation Template, the LG Quarterly Budget Performance Report Template and copies of finance forms and laws and regulations such as the LG Act, the PFM Act and procurement regulations. The purpose of their distribution was to support capacity building and instruct county staff on how to use them in practice (ECORYS, 2016).

A Conditional Grants Tracking Tool was introduced in 2015 to track transfers made by a state to counties to increase accountability and monitoring on the compliance of states and counties in terms of transfer guidelines and conditions. The transfers covered by this tool refer to salaries, block grants and operational transfers in education, health, water and departments administration. Through this tool, a clear overview is provided regarding the amount of money transferred by the government to the state and by the state to each county. In this way, the tool tracks the balance not transferred by state to county, which appeared to be significant in all the counties analysed (European Commission, 2015).

Lastly, monitoring and reporting on PFM performance was an important part of EU-TAPP. A quarterly assessment was conducted on the performance of each county in the form of a “County Dashboard”, which provided a snapshot of selected PFM indicators for each county (Institute of Development Studies, 2017).

#### c) Unresolved issues following the end of EU-TAPP

Despite the positive outcomes, there were still a number of unresolved issues at the end of the project. Most counties were still incapable of executing their budgets and of consistently and accurately reporting in a timely fashion on their budget and payroll performance. Further support was also needed for state systems and capacities as the transfers from the state to the county level remain low due to non-compliance regarding budgeting and execution by the states. To exemplify, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning transferred a primary school capitation grant to the State Ministries of Finance in the fiscal year 2014-15. Only 24% of this amount was in fact transferred to the primary schools. Likewise, only half of the county salaries and 42% of the county operating transfers from the previously mentioned ministries was transferred to counties, leaving out an important amount and raising questions of budget accountability (Institute of Development Studies, 2017).

One further issue identified is that no county had received a single payroll from state payrolls for all county staff by the end of the project. There was still confusion from the part of county line departments, as they still considered themselves organizationally a part of a state ministry instead of the county government and directions from County Administration Departments concerning changes made to splitting county and state payrolls were not followed (European Commission, 2015).

Lastly, the Conditional Grants Tracking Tool showed that 17 out of the 18 counties tracked had a substantial balance not transferred by state to county. In some cases, this balance even exceeded the total of transfers made by the state in the quarter analysed. The 18<sup>th</sup> county, Duk in Jonglei state received in fact more money than it was supposed to (Ecorys; VNG International, 2016).

#### d) Opportunities for improvement

Having analysed the objectives and outcomes of this project, several opportunities were identified. Taking into consideration the political context of South Sudan, where the implementation of the peace agreement was uncertain, a modular and flexible approach could enable this type of project to be more reactive to a constantly evolving situation and can in the end achieve a higher impact. Such an approach would help target more quickly the areas in need of prompt, short-term support. As such, further implementation would combine a core team of long-term experts on the ground who could mobilize in a quick manner short-term expertise to address the emerging needs linked to the desired policy response (Institute of Development Studies, 2017).

Finally, this project has shown that support and technical assistance are far more effective if they are targeted at government-led policy change which has tangible policy outcomes. Due to the unstable political situation in South Sudan, many reforms were not translated into any changes of direction. As such, an appropriate approach would be to support the implementation of specific measures related

to economic and financial management only if the issue requires urgent short to medium term support and if there are credible actions taken by the government to implement reforms (Institute of Development Studies, 2017).

e) Did EU-TAPP meet its initial objectives?

Looking at the 1<sup>st</sup> result to be achieved, the programme was successful in organizing numerous workshops and trainings: 44 workshops on the LG PFM manual, on-the job training on the application of the procedures covering 531 staff members and trainings on budget execution for 67 county officials. Still, this is no clear indicator on whether the programme managed to equip the staff with the skills and knowledge intended since budget reports were still not delivered on time and inconsistencies were still found in the reports submitted.

The second result was not achieved since counties did not properly account for all their resources at the end of the project. Despite promising results concerning the quarterly budget reports during the mid-term evaluation of the project, the situation worsened significantly at the end of the project. Only 19 of the 46 counties provided quarterly budget reports in due time due to changes made in the state structure and confusion created regarding the subsequent role of county officials.

The third and fourth results were partially achieved. The programme created a working framework to monitor if the counties were respecting the guidelines through the “County Dashboard” and satisfactory results were recorded by the team. The Grant Tracking Tool demonstrated progress for accounting local revenue and transfers, yet major discrepancies were still observed in the funds that the counties should receive and that they actually received, thus influencing the proper usage of those revenues.

## 9. Conclusions

As mentioned in the introduction, the issue of the effectiveness of EU official development aid is of extremely high relevance and complexity. Indeed, the methodology highlighted the difficulty of finding sources which dealt with the issue in depth and which presented accurate and complete information. As highlighted on various occasions throughout this dissertation, the data provided by the European Union was often incomplete and spread across multiple reports and channels. The thesis' scope was difficult to reach as projects generally lack final completion reports, despite their completion stage dating back to three or four years.

This dissertation surveyed a number of aspects. Firstly, the evolution of the EU development cooperation policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa was thoroughly discussed in the introduction, touching on the legal agreements and pillars at the base of this policy. Secondly, the literature review provided an overview of the concept of official development aid together with its history, its dimensions, its theoretical framework, the different scholarly perspectives concerning aid and the methodological challenges in assessing its impact. Thirdly, the chapter "Why is development aid needed in South Sudan" was useful to understand the historical and political developments which created the current grievances in South Sudan. The research conducted for this paper revealed that a clear understanding of the cultural, political and social developments within a society are of utmost importance in implementing and analysing development projects. As such, a thorough investigation of the historical background as well as the current situation on the ground in South Sudan was deemed necessary before delving into the analysis of the effectiveness of the projects. Indeed, this chapter revealed that the political, military and ethnical turmoil in South Sudan has its roots dating back prior to the country's independence and has continuously harmed efforts of state building and development.

Fourthly, the chapter "The EU's ODA explained" provided a comprehensive analysis of the EU's development strategy, which was further used to explain the delivery of aid to South Sudan. Indeed, the Union's focus rests on interlinking development assistance with private-sector investments and domestic resource mobilization, which was subsequently revealed through the tables to be found in the appendices. Although the reoccurring implementing partner for many projects was the South Sudanese government, the projects analysed were completed in collaboration with NGOs and private companies.

The next chapter, "SORUDEV", focused on the development project with same name and presented a brief overview of its objectives followed by the results achieved and the challenges met in its implementation. The chapter concluded with a comparison between the objectives set and results met, revealing that this particular project was not effective. While it could be argued that the project was ineffective or that it set too ambitious of a target, it is important to emphasize that various



external factors negatively affected the results. To exemplify, regional insecurity caused by violence and economic destabilization expressed through a weak fixed exchange rate, inflation and volatility of prices were factors that could not be addressed by the SORUDEV project team. Similarly, poor infrastructure affected the distribution of supplies to the project sites and poor rain negatively affected crop performance. Furthermore, cultural barriers were encountered, as local farmers were reluctant to collaborate and embrace the practices proposed by the SORUDEV team.

Lastly, the chapter “EU-TAPP” focused on the project bearing the same name which operated in the area of local governance and public financial management. Once again, although significant progress was made in supporting the local governments in meeting the requirements set by the LG PFM Manual, the specific results to be achieved were not completely met. Indeed, the situation on the ground prior to the commencement of the project revealed that local and county government staff were equipped with zero or very basic knowledge on the requirements set by the manual. Valuable progress was made through on-the-job trainings and workshops and some sort of accountability system was created through the implementation of the Grant Tracking Tool. Still, progress was slowed noticeably due to political instability and regional violence. The project started at a later date due to an outbreak of violence, the state structure was changed by the President mid-way through the project, with the increase in the number of states creating confusion on the roles of the local and county government staff. Still, the Grant Tracking Tool was a very valuable result, indeed only implemented for a few months due to lack of political willingness. The tool created a system of accountability which did not exist before and considerably improved transparency in the months it was implemented.

The poor data challenge which was discussed in the literature review was present in the analysis of both projects and revealed that proper data was indeed very difficult to access. As expected, the South Sudanese government had a very poor account of national statistics. Although considerably more data was made available by the European Union, the EU Aid Explorer tool has proven largely inefficient and information regarding the projects it founded was scattered across a large number of documents which were in turn very difficult to find across the multitude of EU websites and web tools.

Looking back on the main research question of this paper, “How effective has EU development aid to South Sudan been in the areas of agriculture, food security and local governance?”, the research found that analysing the effectiveness of specific development projects is extremely complex and does not provide a straightforward answer. If the effectiveness of the two projects was to be analysed strictly from the perspective of whether their initial objectives were met, the answer would be no. However, this research revealed that in fragile contexts, such as South Sudan, economic instability and outbreaks

of violence can greatly affect the progress made by development projects. As such, from the onset, there are very slim chances that development projects can achieve their goals in unstable environments.

In conclusion, although neither project was successful in meeting its original targets, they both generated significant progress in their respective fields and have had a positive and meaningful impact on the South Sudanese agriculture, food security and local governance. Further development projects are still required however from the international community and the European Union in particular, to support state-building efforts in South Sudan.

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## 11. Appendices

## a) Appendix 1

Project Name	Start Date	End Date	Total Disbursements	Total Commitment	Donor	Implementing Partners
Support to Land Governance in South Sudan in the scope of the Voluntary Guidelines	2015	2017	301.858 USD	0 USD	EU Budget	Private Sector in Provider Country
A financial audit of grant contract: Food Security Recovery Programme in Lakes State DCI FOOD/2009/217398	2015	2015	20.422 USD	0 USD	EU Budget	Other
Promoting the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Land Tenure in South Sudan	2015	2015	16.187 USD	0 USD	EU Budget	Donor country-based NGO
Support to implementing partners of SORUDEV, ZEAT BEAD, FSTP and PRO ACT	2016	2016	153.058 USD	0 USD	EDF	Private Sector in provider country
Sustainable Agricultural Development through Strengthening Extension, Inputs Supply and Services	2015	2019	2.643.050 USD	0 USD	EDF	FOA
Agricultural Marketing and Transformation Investments Programme (AMTIP)	2015	2018	1.507.950 USD	0 USD	EDF	Third Country Government (Delegated co-operation)
Enhanced local value addition and strengthening value chains	2015	2017	985.668 USD	0 USD	EDF	UNIDO
Enhanced local value addition and strengthening value chains	2015	2017	939.279 USD	0 USD	EDF	UNIDO
Support to implementing partners of SORUDEV, ZEAT BEAD and FSTP	2015	2016	229.006 USD	0 USD	EDF	Private Sector in Provider Country
Support to implementing partners of SORUDEV, ZEAT BEAD and FSTP	2015	2016	61.331 USD	0 USD	EDF	Other

Construction of Prefabricated Office Building for the Land Governance Technical Assistance	2015	2015	95.807 USD	0 USD	EDF	Other
Construction of Prefabricated Office Building for the Land Governance Technical Assistance	2015	2015	10.646 USD	0 USD	EDF	Private Sector in Provider Country
Enhanced Knowledge and Education for Resilient Pastoral Livelihoods in South Sudan	2014	2018	2.734.910 USD	0 USD	EDF	FOA
Increased agricultural production and income for smallholder farmers affected by displacement in Warrap State of South Sudan	2014	2017	1.509.710 USD	0 USD	EDF	Developing country-based NGO
Implementation of SORUDEV Smallholders Component in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State	2014	2017	1.175.180 USD	0 USD	EDF	Developing country-based NGO
Strengthening Smallholder Animal Traction Capacity and Extension Services in Lakes State	2014	2017	738.458 USD	0 USD	EDF	Developing country-based NGO
Smallholder Food Security and Livelihoods Project, 2014 - 2017	2014	2017	1.107.105 USD	0 USD	EDF	Developing country-based NGO
Smallholder Food Security and Livelihoods Project, 2014 2017	2014	2017	852.579 USD	0 USD	EDF	Developing country-based NGO
Implementation of SORUDEV Smallholders Component in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State	2014	2017	754.285 USD	0 USD	EDF	Developing country-based NGO
Strengthening Smallholder Animal Traction Capacity and Extension Services in Lakes State	2014	2017	738.458 USD	0 USD	EDF	Developing country-based NGO
Increased agricultural production and income for smallholder farmers affected by displacement in Warrap State of South Sudan	2014	2017	734.476 USD	0 USD	EDF	Developing country-based NGO



Technical Assistance for the Developing of an Agricultural Pest Management Strategy in South Sudan	2014	2014	40.886 USD	0 USD	EDF	Global Crop Diversity Trust
Technical Assistance for the Developing of an Agricultural Pest Management Strategy in South Sudan	2014	2014	16.173 USD	0 USD	EDF	Global Crop Diversity Trust
Agriculture and Food Information System for Decision Support (AFIS)	2013	2017	2.263.050 USD	0 USD	EDF	FOA
Agriculture and Food Information System for Decision Support (AFIS)	2013	2016	3.060.590 USD	0 USD	EDF	FOA
Agriculture and Food Information System for Decision Support (AFIS)	2013	2016	2.996.760 USD	0 USD	EDF	FOA
Smallholders Component of South Sudan Rural Development Programme SORUDEV	2013	2016	1.101.570 USD	0 USD	EDF	Other
Technical Assistance to the Land Governance Development in South Sudan	2013	2015	171.370 USD	0 USD	EDF	Recipient Government
Provision of technical assistance to the Rural Development and Food Security sector support by the European Union in South Sudan (Food Security Themat	2013	2014	159.307 USD	0 USD	EDF	Other
Provision of technical assistance to the Rural Development and Food Security sector support by the European Union in South Sudan (Food Security Themat	2013	2014	106.138 USD	0 USD	EDF	Other
Technical Assistance to the Land Governance Development in South Sudan	2013	2014	53.027 USD	0 USD	EDF	Recipient Government
Technical Assistance to Support the International Conference on	2012	2012	87.613 USD	0 USD	EDF	University, college or other teaching institution, research

Agriculture for South Sudan						institute or think tank
FED/2012/301-272-TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON	2012	2012	127.238 USD	0 USD	EDF	University, college or other teaching institution, research institute or think tank
Improved Food Security and Income for Rural Smallholders	2014	2019	102.867.321 EUR	135.832.565 EUR	EC DEVCO	NGOs and Civil Society
South Sudan Rural Development Programme (SORUDEV)	2012	2016	56.969.951 EUR	85.685.111 EUR	EC DEVCO	UN
Support to Land Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the scope of the Voluntary Guidelines	2014	2017	25.108.934 EUR	20.323.603 EUR	EC DEVCO	Recipient Government
Technical Cooperation and Economic Governance Facility (TCEGF) II	2014	2017	3.862.173 EUR	7.966.541 EUR	EC DEVCO	Private Sector Institution
"Support measures for the Food Security Thematic Programme in the Annual Action Programme 2013"	2014	2015	17.462.606 EUR	8.028.500 EUR	EC DEVCO	Private Sector Institution
Technical Cooperation and Economic Governance Facility (TCEGF)	2012	2015	4.544.529 EUR	9.316.913 EUR	EC DEVCO	Other
Enhanced local value addition and strengthening value chains	2015		1.738.092 EUR	0 EUR	EC DEVCO	UNIDO
Enhanced local value addition and strengthening value chains	2015		1.738.092 EUR	0 EUR	EC DEVCO	UNIDO

(European Commission, 2019)

## b) Appendix 2

<b>Project Name</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>End Date</b>	<b>Total Disbursements</b>	<b>Total Commitment</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Implementing Partners</b>
Promoting Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Good Governance in Western Equatoria	2012	2015	304,171 USD	0 USD	EU Budget	International NGO
Increasing the Responsiveness of People's Representatives in Local Governance Structures in Four States of South Sudan and the Local Government Board	2012	2015	81,788 USD	0 USD	EU Budget	Developing country-based NGO
Increasing the Responsiveness of People's Representatives in Local Governance Structures in Four States of South Sudan and the Local Government Board	2012	2015	11,534 USD	0 USD	EU Budget	Developing country-based NGO
PROMOTING CIVIL SOCIETY, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN WESTERN EQUATORIA	-	-	399,879 USD	0 USD	EU Budget	-
INCREASING THE RESPONSIVENESS OF PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN FOUR STATES OF SOUTH SUDAN AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD	-	-	41,401 USD	0 USD	EU Budget	-

Final evaluation of EUTAPP	2016	2016	325,080 USD	0 USD	EDF	Recipient Government
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR SUB NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING IN PAYROLL AND PFM	2014	2016	3,129,760 USD	0 USD	EDF	Recipient Government
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR SUB NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING IN PAYROLL AND PFM	2014	2016	1,192,930 USD	0 USD	EDF	Recipient Government
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR SUB NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING IN PAYROLL AND PFM	2014	2016	849,939 USD	0 USD	EDF	Recipient Government
Support to Basic Service Delivery in South Sudan	2013	2019	0 USD	112,852,000 USD	EDF	Recipient Government
Support to Basic Service Delivery in South Sudan	2014	2016	4,789,545 EUR	9,579,090 EUR	EC DEVCO	Recipient Government

(European Commission, 2019)