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Introduction

Estimates of the number of victims of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 vary from half a million, 800 000 to one million. And it seems that no one will ever know for sure. But even if those numbers vary, isn't the Rwandan genocide 'proof enough that the devil is among us, and that in the spring of 1994, he just happened to be in Rwanda?' (Kapuscinski, 2001)

Despite the UN convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the moral obligations of the international community to halt and prevent crimes against humanity, the Rwandan genocide took place. Is it therefore possible to prevent genocide? And what is genocide? How does genocide work? How do individuals become perpetrators of such atrocities? Those questions are legitimate after years of violent conflict, mass atrocities and genocide across the globe such as Cambodia, Srebrenica, Myanmar, and Darfur, to name only a few.

It is argued throughout this essay that genocide is an understandable process. Genocide is a clear, logical process that is not sparked from one day or another by a single instigator. It is a result of many different factors which will be outlined in this essay, based on the detailed case study on Rwanda.

The point of this essay is not to blame the international community for its non intervention and moral cowardice in the Rwandan genocide, but merely to give guidelines for effective prevention. This essay is an analysis of genocide, of the 'extraordinary human evil' behind it (Waller, 2001). It is explained that mainly through this clear and detailed analysis of the process, can genocide be effectively prevented.

Moreover, it will be argued that, under the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, prevention of such atrocities is not an option but the sole responsibility of the entire international community.

Understanding Genocide

It would be easier not to understand genocide. It would be easier to think of such atrocities as irrational and therefore non preventable. The process of understanding genocide can be considered as a way to justify such acts. Understanding is giving reasons - and if such atrocities do find an explanation through various reasons, they can be considered as half forgiven. It is debated here that genocide is a process, often following the same steps. This understanding is only an explanation of the steps that perpetrators are *most likely* to take. It would be a mistake to consider that at each step of the process, perpetrators do not have the choice to take other decisions.

Genocide is a full process; it does not erupt from nowhere but follows certain identifiable steps and is sparked by different instigators (often spread out over a long period of time, as seen with Rwanda). In this part the instigators that spark such atrocities will be looked at closely in order to understand the roots of genocide. The different phases of genocide in order to engender good prevention will also be analyzed.

This process of genocide will then be illustrated in an upcoming part by a case study on the Rwandan genocide.

The instigators of genocide

In the following section it will be attempted to understand genocide through a description of the different instigators, which added together lead to mass killings and ethnic cleansing. Much has been said about the roots of genocide and many theories have been constructed over the years. Huttenbach for example, goes as far as arguing that genocide is only one of the many aspects of humanity's mass suicide (2007).

First of all, it would be a mistake to consider genocide as a non-human act. Every human being has in itself the power to commit 'extraordinary human evil' (Waller, 2001). It is considered here that genocide is a part of 'human nature'. It is foolish to be certain that in a situation such as Rwanda in 1994 or Nazi Germany, one would not have taken the same steps and decisions as the perpetrators of genocide. This kind of thinking leads to the dehumanization of genocide, making it inaccessible to

proper understanding and therefore to effective prevention. As it is argued that genocide is part of human nature, it is necessary to explain the different conditions and factors that lead an individual to committing actual acts of genocide.

The instigators of genocide are analyzed on two different levels (that are obviously intertwined): the individual and the political elite. Firstly, on the level of the individual, it is important to understand how ordinary people are shaped to become perpetrators of genocide of another group (there therefore needs to be at least two groups involved in the process). Secondly, it is argued that there is no genocide without strong leadership, organization and collective action. Those three factors, as debated in the upcoming part often emanate from the government. Therefore, on the level of the political elite it will be important to understand ‘why [...] political elites choose a policy of genocide instead of some other less catastrophic and irrevocable policy’ (Hiebert, 2008). It will therefore be explained further on why political elites come to consider genocide as the ‘only possible policy option’ (Hiebert, 2008).

Mass killings and ethnic cleansing are sparked throughout years of history by different factors and it is a mistake to explain genocide only in terms of ethnicity. The first step to understanding the process of genocide is to understand those factors that shape ordinary individuals into actual perpetrators of genocide. Although many scholars offer different reasons and instigators for such acts, we consider the following, based on the example of Rwanda and past research, as main instigators for acts of genocide by individuals:

Fig. 1 – Four main instigators for acts of genocide


- 1) A rising bitterness and frustration,
- 2) An extreme ethnocentrism,
- 3) The power of the group and a strong ideology,
- 4) The non-fulfillment of the human basic needs and difficult life conditions

The four instigators mentioned above will be explained based on the work of James Waller who offers a useful ‘explanatory model of extraordinary human evil’ (2001). His study on the different instigators

of genocide is used here as a basis for an explanation of the four instigators in Fig. 1. The explanation of those instigators will be illustrated through the example of the case study on Rwanda.

The following is an explanatory scheme of the four dimensions explanation that Waller outlines in his article 'Perpetrators of Genocide: An Explanatory Model of Extraordinary Human Evil' (2001):

Fig. 2 – An explanatory model of human evil (Waller, 2001)



First, is important here to emphasize the fact that acts of genocide are not perpetrated only by psychologically deranged individuals. Genocide is, as Waller mentions, 'a distant biological capacity' (2001) which we all possess as individuals, it is at 'the core of human nature' (2001). Waller states that human nature has strong 'tendencies and instincts to extreme violence and aggression' (2001). This constitutes the first base for genocide. If every individual has in its core the tendency, the psychological ability to participate in acts of genocide, it still needs to be exacerbated, sparked by

different intertwined factors. 'The primary, and only, self is fundamentally altered as a result of the power of potent social forces generated by the situation or organization' (Waller, 2001).

1) *The rising bitterness and frustration*

Throughout years of submission to the Tutsis, the Hutus inevitably came to be increasingly frustrated, filled with extreme bitterness. It is this past woundedness that creates ground for further violence. Here, although Waller mentions the 'escalating process of brutalization, gradual desensitization and habituation to atrocities' (2001) in his fourth dimension (the 'power of the situation' – see Fig. 2), we consider the process of brutalization and desensitization as being part of the creation of the rising bitterness and frustration (see Fig.1, number 1). Living for years in a violent environment obviously leads to the desensitization of the individual. It is considered that the rising frustration of the Hutus, emanating from years of slavery, submission and non-recognition from the society lead to the very process of brutalization. Added together, those factors of brutalization and desensitization shape the individual into a possible perpetrator of genocide. Growing up in a culture of hatred, in an environment constantly in conflict, one becomes used to violence and atrocities and therefore does not consider its actions as criminals anymore. Here it is argued that if the entire society does not consider violence and atrocities as criminals, the less likely the individual is to consider its own actions as criminals. And in that spirit, the individual is therefore more likely to actually commit such acts.

This first factor is clearly recognizable in the case study on Rwanda. The Hutus were shaped by years and years of submission to the Tutsis, violence, countless atrocities and discrimination against them because of their ethnicity. 'Discrimination between Tutsi and Hutu was part of everyday life' (Meredith, 2006). Hutus were gradually shaped into perpetrators of extreme violence, atrocities, mass killings and genocide by years of frustration, bitterness and anger. This first factor emphasizes the fact that perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide were ordinary people shaped by outside influences into *génocidaires*. However, the frustration and bitterness accumulated by the Hutus had to be exacerbated by further factors in order to lead to genocide.

2) *An extreme ethnocentrism*

For genocide to take place, the ability to categorize a group of person into 'them', the 'other' or the 'enemy' is necessary. This ability is what is called here ethnocentrism.

‘Virulent ethnocentrism [is] a deep and violently aggressive sense of the ‘Other’, resulting from the apparent tendency of people across time and cultural space to subdivide others into ‘them’ and ‘us’ (Sandole, 2002)

There needs to exist a large targeted victim group in order for genocide to be perpetrated. And the victim group is defined, its identity constructed (Hiebert, 2008). As Hiebert outlines it, there is a need for three ‘switches’ to be ‘turned on’ in order for genocide to take place (2008): first, the members of the victim group lose their status within the political community and are constructed as outsiders, they become foreigners in their own country. Second, the victim group is seen as a dangerous enemy, a mortal threat to the perpetrating group. Third and paradoxically, the victim group is considered as sub-human (2008). This process of dehumanization of the victim group can be identified in the case study on Rwanda. The Tutsis were seen as no more than cockroaches, savagely murdered with rudimentary tools of everyday life and considered as sub-humans: ‘Ever since the idea of Hutu hegemony had taken hold during the 1950’s, Hutu politicians had portrayed the Tutsi minority as an ‘enemy’, seeking to re-impose their rule over Rwanda’ (Meredith, 2006).

This extreme ethnocentrism can only be exacerbated (created even) by a strong, powerful and influential group which is, as aforementioned, often embodied by the political elite of a government. This will be explained further on when talking about the implication of the political elite in the process of genocide. However here is important to note that for a whole population to become perpetrator of mass atrocities, this ethnocentrism has to be extreme and exacerbated, fueled throughout the whole genocide in each individual.

3) *The power of the group and a strong ideology*

Genocide is always carried out by a large group of individuals (the Holocaust, Burma, Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia, the Janjaweed in Darfur...). Because: ‘as collectives, we engage in acts of extraordinary evil, with apparent moral calm and intensity of supposed purpose, which could only be described as insane were they committed by an individual’ (Waller, 2001). The power of the group and the collective ideology is crucial in the process of genocide. The feeling of belonging to a certain group shapes the individual. In a group, the individual is alienated; it belongs to the group, agrees to the ideology, and follows the actions of the group. The individual regresses and is likely to forget its own morals, values and ideas under the influence of the group (Waller, 2001). The Rwandan genocide is a perfect example of the importance of this collective mentality. Killings were spread all over the


country, perpetrated by ordinary Rwandan citizens who had probably never committed any crime in the past.

The belonging to a group also exacerbates the ethnocentrism aforementioned: ‘Ethnicity is a component of identity shared with [...] members of an identity group’ (Sandole, 2002). Hutus belonged to the ethnic group of the Hutus, fighting against the Tutsis. Hutus recognized themselves and felt they belonged to the movement of the *Hutu Power*.

Furthermore, in the case of Rwanda, the belonging to one of the two groups has been an important pattern throughout history, which renders the alienation of the individual much more likely to happen. The ‘deep rooted historical memories of assault and loss’ (Sandole, 2002) against the Hutus as a group made the complete alienation of the individual possible in order to prepare the mass killings of 1994.

4) *The non-fulfillment of the basic needs and difficult life conditions*

Fig. 3 – Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (from Simons, Irwin & Driennen, 1987)



It is argued here that if the basic human needs outlined by Maslow are not fulfilled, an individual is much more likely to alienate in the group, to lose its morals, values and principles and to commit atrocities. The non-fulfillment of the basic needs affects the individual leading him to join the group and comply with the collective ideology.

In the case of Rwanda, the safety needs were clearly not met. The Hutus could not possibly feel safe throughout years of submission to the Tutsis who enslaved and excluded them from society. As tension rises, and if one does not feel safe in such an environment, the more likely one will be exposed to the use of violence: 'In a crisis situation, anyone is ready to kill the next one in order not to be killed' (Smith, 2003). If the safety needs are not met the individual becomes fearless and will kill in despair for its own survival.

The needs of belongingness are met by the power of the group. The individual, if excluded from society for a long period of time (such as the Hutus), will find relief in the group. This need of belongingness is intertwined with the need for esteem. In the need for esteem, the individual seeks recognition and identity. This recognition is provided by the group. Belonging to a group provides the individual with a clear identity through recognition from the rest of the members of the group: 'Ethnicity is a component of identity shared with, in each case, members of an identity group' (Sandole, 2002).

Those basic human needs are largely influenced by difficult life conditions: economical struggle, conflicts over land and oil, environmental issues... In Rwanda, as aforementioned, the struggle over land was an issue long before the genocide of 1994: the cattle of the Tutsis were largely expanding, land became scarce, and, as Rwanda is a small country, Hutus peasants were driven away ever further: 'Whereas in the 1950's a typical peasant hill community consisted of about 110 people per square kilometer, [...] by the 1990's it had reached an average of 420' (Meredith, 2006).

Furthermore, in the 1980's, the Habyarimana regime encountered growing economic difficulties: 'A sharp drop in coffee prices cut farmer's income by half. Drought blighted food production. The government's budget in 1989 had to be slashed by 40 percent. Gross domestic product in 1989 fell by 5.7 percent' (Meredith, 2006).

Those difficult life conditions contribute to the exacerbation of the non-fulfillment of the basic human needs, shaping the individual into a desperate, possible perpetrator of genocide.

It is important here to emphasize the fact that genocide should be analyzed on two different levels. The individual is shaped by different factors as outlined above. However, as aforementioned, there is no genocide without overwhelming leadership, collective action and organization as mentioned above. The reason why political elites choose the extermination of a whole race as a policy option and how

they come to shape the citizens into perpetrators or accomplices of genocide will therefore be analyzed.

Some international powers might comfort themselves in the explanation of genocide as purely ethnic. However, it will be argued here that there are more aspects to the Rwandan genocide. Mainly, it is emphasized here that genocide was not only emanating from ethnic roots and history, but that there was also an extremely strong political influence to it without which the genocide would probably not have taken place. Therefore it will be explained ‘why [...] political elites choose a policy of genocide instead of some other less catastrophic and irrevocable policy’ (Hiebert, 2008).

Firstly, and based on the case study on Rwanda, the struggle for power is considered as the basis for political elite to decide on genocide as a policy option. The political elite considers the victim group as a threat to its monopoly on power and therefore comes to consider the elimination of the victim group as the only solution in order to maintain power. The Hutus in power, the *akazu* of Madame Agathe mainly, were drunk with power and gradually came to despise Habyarimana for signing the Arusha Accords, granting some power to the Tutsi RPF: ‘The guerillas are to participate in government and in the parliament, and to make up 40 per cent of the army. But such a compromise is unacceptable to the *akazu* clan. They would thereby lose their monopoly on power, something they will not agree to. They declare that the hour of final reckoning has arrived’ (Kapuscinski, 2001). Not only did the Hutu political elite had in mind the eradication of the Tutsi population, they were also planning the extermination of the Hutu opposition, illustrating their irrational fear of losing absolute power over the country. The Arusha Accords, although considered as peace agreements by the rest of the world, made it clear to the Hutus that they would soon lose their absolute monopoly on power: ‘It is they [the *akazu*] who formulate the ideology that will legitimize genocide as the only possible solution, the only means of ensuring Hutu survival’ (Kapuscinski, 2001).

Based on the article of Maureen Hiebert, the three following steps are considered as necessary to engender genocide: ‘first, members of the victim group lose their (often marginal) status within the political community and are constructed as outsiders, to whom rights and obligations are no longer owed. Next, they come to be seen as dangerous enemies whose continued physical presence is seen to pose an overwhelming threat to the political community [...] Finally, the victims are viewed as sub-humans who can be killed without compunction’ (2008). Those three ‘switches’, as Hiebert considers them, are clearly recognizable in the case of Rwanda.

Victims constructed as outsiders: The Hutu political elite, through the extensive use of media propaganda, managed to create a ‘Tutsi identity’ which was ground for further marginalization. The Tutsis were largely considered as outcasts from the Rwandan society, considered as colonizers from the Nile region: ‘A key part of the ideology was the myth that Tutsi were invaders who had overrun Rwanda [...] and enslaved the Hutu – an alien group, therefore they had no legitimate status in the country’ (Meredith, 2006).

Victims seen as dangerous enemies: As mentioned earlier, the Tutsi population was largely considered as a threat to Hutu’s monopoly on power. Therefore they were seen as ‘dangerous enemies’: ‘Hutu politicians had portrayed the Tutsi minority as an ‘enemy’ seeking to re-impose their rule over Rwanda’ (Meredith, 2006). Based on this assumption, the belief that there was not enough room in Rwanda for both Tutsis and Hutus grew ever bigger: ‘There is not room enough [...] for two nations so foreign and mortally at odds with each other’ (Kapuscinski, 2001).

Victims viewed as sub-humans: Paradoxically to the second ‘switch’, this third one is of great importance. The Tutsis went by the name of ‘cockroaches’ (DesForges, 1999), emphasizing their inhumanity. Considering the victim group as sub-humans enables the perpetrators to commit their crimes without any trace of guilt. The process of viewing the victims as non-human is a way of legitimizing the genocide.

Genocide is not only the result of ongoing ethnic tensions and conflicts, but also emanates from the government. This is especially relevant in Rwanda. The whole population participated in the slaughter of the Tutsis – therefore it is important to understand how numerous individuals came to commit such crimes. However, ‘the genocide [...] was caused not by ancient ethnic antagonism but by a fanatical elite engaged in modern struggle for power and wealth using ethnic antagonism as their principal weapon’ (Meredith, 2006). It is important to highlight the role of the political elite because, as aforementioned, there is no genocide without government. Therefore genocide should be understood on the level of the individual, influenced by many factors, and on a political level: ‘Genocide is a rational choice not because of the ideas or perceptions upon which it is based but because of the decision-making process that leads to its perpetration’ (Hiebert, 2008).

Genocide as a process

If genocide is a rational choice, it follows rational steps that can easily be identified. Those steps will be analyzed based on the work of Stanton, president of Genocide Watch, in the upcoming part in order to go further in the understanding of the process of genocide.

1) Classification

Stanton describes the step of classification as the ability of a population 'to distinguish people into "us and them" by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi' (1998). This ability, in the case of Rwanda, has been present and ongoing throughout years of history. For centuries the differences between the Hutus and Tutsis were exacerbated. As Stanton mentions, 'Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide' (1998).

2) Symbolization

Here the symbolization is that of the existing classifications mentioned above. Stanton mentions that symbolization and classification are part of human nature (1998), but so is, as aforementioned, the ability to commit acts of extraordinary evil. If this kind of evil is coupled with symbolization and classification, it is likely to lead to the third step of genocide. It happened as such in Rwanda. At first Tutsis were symbolized by their cattle, and later on, the Belgians introduced the racial identity card in order to differentiate Hutus from Tutsis and vice versa: 'When combined with hatred, symbols may be forced upon unwilling members of pariah groups: the yellow star for Jews under Nazi rule, the blue scarf for people from the Eastern Zone in Khmer Rouge Cambodia' (Stanton, 1998).

3) Dehumanization

This ability has been described earlier. In Rwanda, this process of dehumanization was largely conducted by the media (Radio Milles Collines). 'One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases' (Stanton, 1998). In Rwanda, Tutsis went by the name of 'cockroaches' and their only physical presence was considered a plague.

4) Organization

'Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility' like the Interahamwe in Rwanda and the Janjaweed in Rwanda (Stanton, 1998). In Rwanda, the preparations to mass slaughter were clear: 'The army, which numbered five thousand, is

expanded to thirty –five thousand’ (Kapuscinski, 2001), and ‘by the end of 1993 there were hidden stockpiles of firearms, grenades, machetes and axes [...] A large number of lists were drawn up identifying people regarded as ‘the enemy’ and their accomplices’ (Meredith, 2006).

5) *Polarization*

Polarization refers to the process of excluding the victim group from society. As mentioned earlier, the Hutus created and exacerbated through massive propaganda, the identity of the Tutsis, marginalizing them completely from society: ‘Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction’ (Stanton, 1998).

6) *Preparation*

At this stage, ‘Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up. Members of victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols’ (Stanton 1998). In the case of Rwanda, those lists were prepared a long time ago, and the first victims of the slaughter were carefully selected like, for example, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the prime minister of Rwanda. ‘With lists prepared well in advance, soldiers from the Presidential Guard and Interahamwe militia men hunted down prominent moderate Hutus [...] all regarded as opponents standing in the way of the *genocidaires* (Meredith, 2006).

7) *Extermination*

The genocide begins at this stage as if nothing could stop it. Stanton describes this stage as extermination and not genocide: ‘It is “extermination” to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human’ (1998). Over 800 000 individuals perished in Rwanda during this stage.

8) *Denial*

During the phase of extermination, Radio Milles Collines was broadcasting the constant message to fill up the graves, ‘not yet full’ (Meredith, 2006) of Tutsi corpses. This, in the case of Rwanda, can be considered as preparation for denial: ‘The perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the witnesses’ (Stanton, 1998). However, here, we argue that the Rwandan political elite as a perpetrator of genocide did not exactly have the will to deny the extermination of the Tutsis. On the other hand, they orchestrated a genocide perpetrated by the whole population, neighbors killing neighbors, family killing family, so that, in the end, not only the

political elite but the entire population of Rwanda had blood on its hands. And how do you bring to trial an entire population?

Genocide is a clear process. It follows the same stages and steps most of the time. It is a rational, explainable and understandable act. And it is therefore preventable; mainly it is preventable long before the actual phase of extermination. In order to illustrate how the individual comes to be shaped into a perpetrator of genocide through various factors; why the political elite chooses genocide as a policy option; and how genocide is a process following eight different steps, the following part consists of a detail case study on the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

The genocide

Rwanda is a closed country, stuck in between small Burundi (under Belgian rule, the two countries formed the kingdom of Ruanda-Urundi), and the bigger Uganda, Tanzania and Congo. Rwanda on the map of the world is no more than a forgotten piece of green hilly land: and it was, together with Burundi, the last country of the continent to be reached by the Europeans in the late 19th century (History World).

Early History

The history between the Hutus and the Tutsis goes back centuries in the past. Hutus and Tutsis followed a well organized scheme of castes as Ryszard Kapuscinski describes it: first came the ‘Tutsis cattle owners (14 percent of the population)’, then the ‘Hutu farmers (85 percent of the population) and finally the ‘Twa laborers and servants (1 percent of the population)’. The three Rwandan castes were all part of one same tribe: ‘the Banyarwanda, a single nation’ (Kapuscinski, 2001). Therefore Hutus and Tutsis shared the same culture, the same language (kinyarwanda) and the same values under their same and unique nation, the Banyarwanda, which is something of an exception in the multi tribal continent of Africa. Those castes followed the scheme of a traditional middle age system, a feudal system:

‘The country was ruled by [...] the ruling caste: the Tutsis. [...] The Hutus, on the other hand, constitute the much more numerous and subordinate caste of farmers. [...] The Tutsi was the lord, the Hutu his vassal. The Hutus lived by cultivating land. They gave a portion of their harvest in exchange for protection and for the use of a cow. Everything according to the feudal order – the dependence, the customs, the exploitation’ (Kapuscinski, 2001)

As depicted by Kapuscinski, the size of their cattle made the Tutsis what they were: cattle represented ‘wealth, prestige, power’ (2001). The Tutsis, similarly to other tribes across the continent did not eat their cows but fed from their milk and blood. The cows were sacred and therefore left untouched as a symbol of Tutsi power over the Hutus. Therefore, as Meredith points out in ‘The State of Africa’, ‘discrimination between Tutsis and Hutus was part of everyday life’. The differences between the two

communities were clearly defined long before the European colonization or the 'African Shoah' (Smith, 2003) of 1994.

German colonization

The first European to enter Rwanda was Count von Götzen in 1894 on a trip to visit the Tutsi king Rwabugiri (History World). However this does not have its importance, as years earlier, in 1885, at the end of the Berlin Conference, European states had divided the African continent amongst them and Germany had been awarded Rwanda as a small slice of the cake: 'The conference lasted until February 26, 1885 - a three month period where colonial powers haggled over geometric boundaries in the interior of the continent, disregarding the cultural and linguistic boundaries already established by the indigenous African population' (Rosenberg) . However, the Germans did not move into Rwanda right away - the Rwandan population lived 9 years as a colony without knowing it (Kapuscinski, 2001). It is clear, that even though Rwanda was considered a part of Germany, the German government did not take any interest in the national activities of the country. What needs to be pointed out when talking about German colonization, is the fact that since they only had a few agents of their government in Rwanda, they relied heavily on the Tutsis as the rulers of the country. Therefore: 'German officials [...] identified Hutu and Tutsi as distinct and separate ethnic groups. [...] they relied on the Tutsi as the ruling aristocracy to enforce control, enabling them to extend their hegemony over the Hutu' (Meredith, 2006). In doing so the Germans participated actively in exacerbating the existing differences between the two communities although both were part of the same ethnic background. It is important to see that even without exerting any or little power, the Germans managed to reinforce the frustration, the anger and the bitterness between Hutus and Tutsis by making a clear distinction between the two groups.

Belgium colonization

After World War I Germany lost its Rwandan colony to Belgium on a decision of the League of Nations (Meredith, 2006). Similarly to Germany, at the beginning, Belgium did not take any active interest in the ruling of the country, relying mainly, as the Germans did, on the Tutsi elite to run the

country (Kapusinski, 2001). However, as Germany had done years ago, Belgium contributed to render the differences between Hutus and Tutsis even more radical:

‘In the 1920’s, they introduced a system of identity cards specifying the tribe to which a holder belonged. In cases where appearance was indecisive or proof of ancestry was lacking, a simple formula was applied: those with ten cows or more were classified as Tutsi, those with fewer were Hutu. The identity cards made it virtually impossible for Hutus to become Tutsi’ (Meredith, 2006)

This system of identity cards was an extreme (if not the most extreme) way to define the differences and mostly to widen the gap between the two communities, making it almost impossible for this gap of differences to ever reduce. ‘The Belgians considered the Tutsis to be superior to the Hutus. Not surprisingly, the Tutsis welcomed this idea, and for the next 20 years they enjoyed better jobs and educational opportunities than their neighbors’ (BBC, 2008). Going even further in this racial discrimination, the Hutus were subject to forced labor supervised by the Tutsis (History World).

The tensions

With such a turbulent history it is no surprise that both communities conflicted as a result of ongoing frustration and bitterness. However no one could have imagined the apocalypse of 1994 as a result of those tensions and ongoing conflicts. The first noticeable conflict between Hutus and Tutsis arises in 1959 (Kapusinski, 2001) as a result of Belgian policies, the rush to independence and land problems as the size of the Tutsis’ herd increased:

‘The Tutsis’ herds increase and need ever more grazing land. There is but one way to create new pastures: by taking land from the pastures [...], by ejecting the Hutus from their territories’ (Kapusinski, 2001)

It seems the conflict was sparked off over land disputes, as Kapuscinski describes it: the Tutsis herds growing and the Hutus being driven away from their lands, ‘there is no room, there is no land’ (2001). The dispute over land between the two communities is logical; no one is responsible for cattle growing ever bigger and land being too scarce. Those land disputes inevitably led to political agitation in the

country. The Hutus published the *Hutu Manifesto* in 1957 ‘which challenged the entire administrative and economic system in Rwanda’ (Meredith, 2006), harshly criticizing the overwhelming power of the Tutsis over the Hutus and calling for the power of the majority to rule. And majority meant Hutus. In addition to those perturbations, Rwanda is asking for independence from the Belgians. The Tutsis, on which the Belgians were relying so heavily to rule the country, are demanding their freedom: ‘And they want it immediately, something for which the Belgians are utterly unprepared. So Brussels abruptly switches tactics: it abandons the Tutsis and begins to support the more submissive, docile Hutus’ (Kapuscinski, 2001).

As a result, in 1959, the first racial conflict erupts in Rwanda when a Hutu political activist is almost beaten to death by a group of Tutsi militants in Gitirama (Meredith, 2006). Hutu violence spreads all throughout the country at an incredible pace. Tutsis are murdered, driven away to neighboring countries as refugees by the Hutus: ‘The peasants set fire to the households of their lords, slit their throats and crushed their skulls. Rwanda flowed with blood, stood in flames. [...] It is estimated that tens of thousand of Tutsis were murdered and as many fled to neighboring states’ (Kapuscinski, 2001). It is then, after the massacres, especially noticeable that the Belgians switch sides from supporting the Tutsis to the Hutus: ‘In early 1960, Logiest [Belgian official] began dismissing Tutsi chiefs, appointing Hutus in their places’ (Meredith, 2006). And how could the Hutus not take advantage of those changes? After years of persecution and submission, they finally were offered the chance to rule their country and take revenge on their Tutsi lords. It is important here to point out that taking revenge is not necessarily a logical option – Hutus could have gotten the power, restore equality amongst the two communities and stay in power for as long as they could.

Independence

Rwanda is granted independence from Belgium in 1962, at the same time as Burundi, and even though the UN is pressuring for both countries to merge into a single nation, it is decided they will each go their separate ways (History World). The new Rwandan government is led by Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu activist and militant, head of the ‘*Parti du mouvement de l’emancipation du peuple Hutu*’ (Party of the Hutu Movement for Emancipation) (History World). The name of his party speaks for itself, setting in stone the way the country would be run from then on. And then starts the Rwandan drama. Tutsi persecution, as expected, spreads throughout the country; and over time, is fueled by Tutsi exiles’ attempted invasions in the country (Kapuscinski, 2001).

The all too famous, Juvenal Habyarimana enters the picture of the Rwandan drama in 1973 when he stages his bloodless coup against the government of Gregoire Kayibanda (Kapuscinski, 2001). Habyarimana instituted a one-party dictatorship over Rwanda (Kapuscinski, 2001). Everyone in the country was expected to join the party of Habyarimana from their time of birth, the '*Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement*' (MRND – National Revolutionary Movement for Development) and the racial identity cards were reinforced (Meredith, 2006). An important protagonist behind Habyarimana was Agathe Kanzinga, his wife, at the center of her *akazu* (literally meaning little house) constituted of her brothers, a cousin and army officers (Meredith, 2006). The country was run by 'a greedy family of voracious, despotic, petty chieftains' and Habyarimana stayed in power for twenty one years, until his death in 1994 (Kapuscinski, 2001). During this period, 'Tutsis faced the same discrimination as before, but no additional harassment' (Meredith, 2006). Habyarimana received considerable support from the French government, later accused to have played a role in the genocide. The concept of the '*francophonie*' is a crucial part of the relationship between the two countries. Every French child learns in Geography classes about countries in the world speaking the French language and the ultimate importance of the '*francophonie*'. Those French speaking countries are considered a part of France. Attack a French speaking country and you attack France itself. Therefore France had 'nurtured ambitions about Rwanda since the 1970's', the country being part of the francophone network' (Meredith, 2006). Meanwhile, Tutsi exiles, numbering up to 500 000 in the neighboring countries of Rwanda, were campaigning for their right to return home; the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) was created by a group of well trained Tutsis officers enrolled in the Ugandan army (Meredith, 2006).

The RPF was described by its founders as having the purpose not only 'to promote the return of the Tutsis, by force if necessary, but to support the wider cause of political reform in Rwanda. It sought [...] to overthrow a bankrupt regime and establish a democratic government' (Meredith, 2006). The RPF strikes Rwanda on October 1st, 1990 after deserting the Ugandan army the night before (History World) – and France enters the picture when Habyarimana picks up the phone and rings Paris in a call for help against the invasion of the RPF (Kapuscinski, 2001).

Although the majority of European countries have separated from their colonial past at that time, France has not followed this trend and Mitterand, head of state at the time, was a close friend of Habyarimana (Meredith, 2006). The call of Habyarimana that day was interpreted by Paris as an opportunity to finally strike in the name of protection of the '*francophonie*' against the '*anglophonie*', the mighty Anglo-Saxon threat by sending military aid to Habyarimana, under Anglo-Saxon threat (the

RPF being accused of not being '*francophone*') (Gouteux, 1998). Once French aid reached Rwanda, together with troops from Belgium and Zaire, the RPF invasion was quickly aborted.

Meanwhile, the attack created grounds for further hate campaigns against the Tutsis run by the government who pictured the Tutsis in Rwanda as accomplices of the evil RPF (DesForges, 1999). A wave of repression flowed not only over the Tutsi population of Rwanda but also on the Hutus opposed to the government and therefore considered as accomplices of the enemy fueled by the media, notably the Radio Mille Collines (Meredith, 2006). It is around Madame Agathe that the Hutu extremists gather (rather than around their president Habyarimana), creating some sort of secret society named the 'Hutu power'; their aim, 'was not merely to eliminate the Tutsi threat but to rid Rwanda of Hutu *ibyitso* [accomplices]' (Meredith, 2006).

The Arusha Accords

The Arusha Peace Accords of 1993 were aimed at restoring peace between the RPF and the Habyarimana government after some preliminary talks in Paris, encouraged by the French government. Under international pressure, Habyarimana signed the treaty providing for 'the establishment of a broad based transitional government to include Habyarimana and his allies, opposition parties and the RPF' (Meredith, 2006). As expected, the extremist *akazu* of Madame Agathe was strongly opposed to this treaty and Habyarimana lost much of his credibility: 'such a compromise is unacceptable to the Akazu clan. They would thereby lose their monopoly on power, something they will not agree to. They declare that the hour of final reckoning has arrived' (Kapuscinski, 2001). The Arusha Accords were considered a 'victor's deal' for the RPF (Stettenheim). The plane of Habyarimana on its return from Arusha in Tanzania, together with Burundian president, was shot down by unknown perpetrators on April 6, 1994 (History World). Habyarimana was considered as having signed a pact with the enemies. This event ignited the all too famous genocide of 1994:

'Although at the time of the signing of the Arusha Accords many considered it to be the best peace agreement in Africa [...], much of the subsequent commentary views the Accords as having contributed to the violence in 1994 [...] In hindsight the warning signs appear clear, but for many participants at that time the magnitude of the impending crisis was not apparent' (Stettenheim).

The genocide

‘Most perished not on account of bombs or heavy machine guns; instead they were hacked and bludgeoned to death with the most primitive weapons- machetes, hammers, spears and sticks. [...] Through mass participation in the criminal act there would arise an all-unifying feeling of guilt, so that every citizen, having on his conscience another’s death, would be haunted from that moment by someone else’s inalienable right to retaliation’ (Kapusinski, 2001)

This is the shocking particularity of the Rwandan genocide: everyone was participating. Everyone became a perpetrator of this genocide. The numbers vary but from 800 000 to 1 million Rwandans were slaughtered in a period of around 100 days. The following is a timeline of those 100 days, describing the role of the different perpetrators of the genocide as it is better understood as such.

April 6 1994 - ‘President Habyarimana and Burundi's President Cyprien Ntaryamira killed when rocket strikes plane outside Kigali Airport’

April 7 1994 - Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and some Hutu officials murdered together with ten Belgian UN soldiers (the soldiers were tortured and then murdered)

The Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armees Rwandaises) and the *interahamwe* (Habyarimana’s militia, composed of young from his party) set up roadblocks and go from house to house killing Tutsis and moderate Hutu politicians. Thousands die on the first day. U.N. forces stand by while the slaughter goes on. They are forbidden to intervene, as this would breach their "monitoring" mandate

April 8 1994 - The RPF launches a major offensive to end the genocide and rescue 600 of its troops surrounded in Kigali. The troops had been based in the city as part of the Arusha Accords

According to UNAMIR, one of the French planes supposed to be used for repatriation of European expatriates in Rwanda was full of arms destined to the Rwandan Armed Forces

- April 9 1994 -** France and Belgium send troops to Kigali in order to start evacuating the expatriates (Amaryllis Operation). The French government also evacuates Agathe Habyarimana, 'Madame Agathe' together with her two brothers to Paris
- US ambassador, together with 250 US expatriates are evacuated
- April 14 1994 -** End of Amaryllis Operation
- April 21 1994 -** The U.N. cuts its forces from 2,500 to 250 following the death of the ten Belgian soldiers
- May 17 1994 -** U.N. agrees to send 6,800 troops and policemen to Rwanda with powers to defend civilians. A Security Council resolution says "acts of genocide may have been committed."
- An arms embargo on the country is voted by the UN
- June 22 1994 -** The Security Council authorizes the deployment of French forces in south-west Rwanda. Beginning of the *Operation Turquoise* by the French: They create a "safe area" (*Zone Humanitaire Sure - ZHS*) in territory controlled by the government. Killings of Tutsis continue in the ZHS.
- The United States government eventually uses the word "genocide."
- July 1994 -** The RPF captures Kigali
- Massive exodus of Hutus to neighboring Zaire, massacre of Tutsis are still taking place in the ZHS
- The RPF sets up an interim government of national unity in Kigali, naming Pasteur Bizimungu as president and Faustin Twagiramungu as prime minister
- Announcement of the cholera epidemic amongst the Rwandan refugees in Zaire – 13,000 to 14,000 refugees die

August 21 1994 - French troops leave the ZHS – end of Operation Turquoise

New Rwandan government agrees to trials before an international tribunal established by the U.N. Security Council

1997 - Rwanda's first genocide trial under the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) opens in Arusha - Four prominent Rwandans accused of genocide appear in court for the first time.

Timeline compiled from: *'Un Genocide Secret d'état'* of Jean-Paul Gouteux (1998), PBS and CBC websites and *'Rwanda: contre enquete sur le genocide'* of Bernard Lugan (2007).

The international intervention

The international intervention in the Rwandan genocide will be best explained through three different parts: the French, the United States and the United Nations intervention.

The French intervention

Not only did France fail to prevent the Rwandan genocide when it could have done so, but it actually participated in it.

It seems that the relationship between France and Rwanda merely comes down to the fact that Rwanda is a French speaking country. As aforementioned, Rwanda being part of the francophone world (the French do consider French speaking countries as a whole different, if not superior, world of its own) it was automatically considered under French protection. Sadly enough, the French implication (because it is here considered implication, as opposed to intervention) in the Rwandan genocide is quite clear through the above timeline and associated explanations. This implication can be illustrated through the two operations that the French undertook on the Rwandan soil during the massacres: the Amaryllis and Turquoise Operations.

The Amaryllis operation takes place in April 1994 soon after Habyarimana's plane is shot down. The operation consisted of evacuating all French expatriates of the country, together with Rwandan government leaders and officials in order to ensure their safety (Gouteux, 1998). Madame Agathe, queen of her *akazu*, Hutu extremist and one of the leaders responsible for the mass killings was one of them (see above). Tutsis were being slaughtered; genocide was clearly happening; and yet, French expatriates, close friends to the Habyarimana regime as aforementioned, were evacuating the country under the surveillance of French soldiers, leaving Rwandans to their fate (Gouteux, 1998). And they were taking with them the persons responsible for the slaughter – what the French considered as another 'interethnic' conflict (Gouteux, 1998). France was saving the killers. Moreover, the planes of the Amaryllis Operation arrived full of arms intended for the RAF breaching Resolution 918 of the UN Security Council concerning the arm embargo on Rwanda (Gouteux, 1998).

The second operation emphasizing the devastating role of France in the genocide is the Turquoise Operation which comes about as mentioned above from June to August 1994. As the massacre grew, the French offered to 'intervene' by creating a ZHS (Zone Humanitaire Sure – Safe Humanitarian Zone) in the south west region of Rwanda. The offer is approved by the UN security council on the 22nd of June 1994 (as mentioned above). *Operation Turquoise* was designed:

'[...] more for military purposes than for 'humanitarian' use. It consisted of 2,500 troops, including commando units and Special Forces, heavy mortars, one hundred armored vehicles, ten helicopters, four ground-attack planes and four reconnaissance jet planes. Military officers in Paris talked openly about 'breaking the back of the RPF' [...] Maps were produced delineating a zone of French control that included most of western Rwanda and parts of the city of Kigali still held by the 'interim government'' (Meredith, 2006).

Through the setting up of a safe zone, the French created a haven for the Rwandan Armed Forces to hide, using 'a million refugees as a human shield' (Gouteux, 1998). The perpetrators of the genocide had, at this time, been recognized by the UN Security Council (Gouteux, 1998). Murders of Tutsis were still taking place in the ZHS which was far from being demilitarized, and *Radio Mille Collines* was still airing its hatred messages against Tutsis during the French occupation (Gouteux, 1998). The Turquoise Operation was presented as a necessary humanitarian intervention by the French government.

It is needless to conclude that France's role in the genocide was disastrous. The French government was not only an accomplice of the genocide but one of its perpetrators by providing arms and safety to the Habyarimana government in order to protect their national interest and power over the *Françafrique*, the French speaking and ex-French colonies of Africa.

The United States intervention

It is quite ironic to refer to the United States' implication in the Rwandan genocide as an 'intervention'. It seems that throughout the whole time of the massacre, the United States have done everything in their power to avoid using the word 'genocide' or to even acknowledge the mass killings taking place in Rwanda in order not to be bound to intervene (Meredith, 2006). The US's inactivity in the Rwandan genocide can be understood through the operation they undertook, one year before Rwanda, in Somalia. The intervention was only supposed to be a 'low-risk humanitarian intervention' (Power, 2001) but ended up as a disaster for the US forces: 'Somali militia killed eighteen Americans, wounded seventy-three, and captured one Black Hawk helicopter pilot. Somali television broadcast both a video interview with the trembling, disoriented pilot and a gory procession in which the corpse of a U.S. Ranger was dragged through a Mogadishu street' (Power, 2001). The United States therefore lost any will for humanitarian intervention and this loss greatly influenced the decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council as the US was advising not to intervene (Meredith, 2006). The United States opposed the idea of reinforcing UN troops in Rwanda after the mass killings began (Power, 2001), Somalia had taken any will away to intervene in this new 'ethnic conflict'.

No pressure was put on the American government to act (Power, 2001). Intervening in Rwanda would have meant high peacekeeping costs (Meredith, 2006) and there were no interests at stake for the United States (Power, 2001). There was no will from the government to intervene.

The United Nations' intervention

According to the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the three documents forming the foundation of the United Nations), genocide is the worst punishable crime against humanity and the worst breach of those documents (Lebor, 2006). And yet the United Nations miserably failed to prevent the Rwandan genocide although they were present on the field - through their peacekeeping forces: UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda). UNAMIR was set up on the 5th of October 1993 in order to help implement the Arusha

Peace Accords in Rwanda at his head was Romeo Dallaire (UN website). The United States, keen on saving money on humanitarian purposes, proposed that UANMIR forces should be restricted to 500 men, whereas Dallaire was asking for 4 500 men – finally the UN agreed to a 2 548 men peacekeeping force restricted to Kigali and not the rest of the country (Meredith, 2006). Dallaire was struggling with UN administration: his men were ill equipped and poorly trained: ‘Dallaire was short of vehicles, fuel, ammunition, radios, barbed wire, medical support and even petty cash’ (Meredith, 2006). Dallaire, quickly aware that the mandate of UNAMIR was far too restricted, asked the UN to ‘empower UNAMIR to use ‘all available means’ to stop ‘ethnically or politically motivated crimes’, such as executions or attacks on refugees’; the reply never came and instead, UNAMIR was advised by the UN headquarters to stay out of the way ‘when the time came’(Lebor, 2006).

Dallaire was not only lacking manpower and basic supplies but also intelligence data. The troops were far too uninformed about the situation in Rwanda (Meredith, 2006). However, through an anonymous informer from the Hutu militia (the *Interahamwe*) known as ‘Jean-Pierre’, Dallaire was informed that lists of Tutsis victims were being drawn and that a massive extermination could quickly take place (Power, 2001). Jean-Pierre also claimed that he knew the location of an arm stockpile at the MRND headquarters (Meredith, 2006). Dallaire reacted to the threat as fast as possible, planning to seize the arms from the given location in less than thirty six hours – the UN harshly refused, arguing that arms seizures were not part of UNAMIR’s mandate (Meredith, 2006). Dallaire kept hammering the threat of an upcoming genocide to the UN administration but was constantly unheard and ignored; and the killings began. Fourteen days after the slaughter of the ten Belgian soldiers, it was decided that UNAMIR should be downsized to 250 men (see chronology). For fourteen days the Security Council had argued whether or not to withdraw their troops and therefore abandon Rwanda, reinforce UNAMIR or downsize it (Lebor, 2006). Choosing the option of downsizing the troops made it seem as if the UN was still on the ground, not totally retrieving all of its troops. However, what impact could 250 men have in a country flowing with blood and constant killings? The Hutus inevitably interpreted the downsizing of UNAMIR as the signal that the genocide could go on – no one was going to stop them (Lebor, 2006). The UN did not or could not act for the main reason that there was no political will from any of the major powers that could have made a difference (the United States being the best example). The UN was therefore lacking crucial resources and UNAMIR’s mission, as a result of this lack of political commitment, did not represent a priority to the headquarters. During the whole time of the massacre, the UN seemed to have been more concerned by its neutrality and the debate over whether or not genocide was truly happening than by saving civilians lives – it is clear that the

genocide could have been stopped or at least, slowed down: by reinforcing UNAMIR, providing them with proper intelligence data and basic utilities, but that point will be analyzed further on.

The international community miserably failed to prevent a genocide that made up to 800 000 civilian victims, ‘a rate of slaughter comparable to the Nazi Holocaust’ (Lebor, 2006). A now famous quote from one survivor of the genocide illustrates well enough the international community’s moral cowardice and failure: ‘When I came out there were no birds. There was sunshine and the stench of death’ (DesForges, 1999). In the next part it will be debated that genocide can be prevented, firstly through a clear understanding of the process.

Preventing Genocide

Many suggestions have been given by scholars all around the globe in order to better prevent genocide. The point here is not to understand why prevention does not happen when it could, but to narrow down the effective steps of genocide based on the example of Rwanda and how prevention *should* happen in the future. Prevention will be analyzed on two levels: long term prevention and short term prevention. Long term prevention implies the strengthening of institutions, political leaders, democratic values and the civil society in countries likely to see potential threats of genocide or mass atrocities. Short term prevention involves military actions, fast prevention to protect civilian populations and steps to halt genocide and mass atrocities threats. In the last part of this chapter, the concepts of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and ‘human security’ will be discussed in the context of genocide prevention.

Long term prevention

Long term prevention is the most ‘complicated’ option of prevention. Long term prevention implies supporting ‘failing states to build a lasting peace and promote development’ (McConnell, 2009). It is therefore a ‘complicated’ option in the sense that it requires strong political will and leadership: ‘When high-level officials are actively engaged, progress is usually possible. Our research and our personal experience have shown this to be true for genocide prevention’ (Albright & Cohen, 2008). Therefore political will needs not only to be there but also to emanate from the highest ranks of the government.

Moreover, long term prevention requires funding. In order to create ‘lasting peace and promote development’, failing states would first need ‘the basics in place if it is to function: a legal framework to enforce the rule of law, a taxation system to raise revenue, and a professional, trusted, security system to control the use of force [...] basic public services such as education, and health. It must encourage business growth so that people can earn a living beyond subsistence level. And it must ensure sound governance, through participation and accountability’ (McConnell, 2009). Funding, if not sufficient, is at least available: the World Bank’s ‘State and Peace Building Fund’ seeks to ‘develop conditions, values, and behaviors that foster and sustain social and economic development that is peaceful, stable, and sustainable [as well as] to strengthen, build, or rebuild institutions of governance’ (World Bank, 2008). Since the beginning of 2009, the World Bank has allocated more than 11 million USD to fragile states in order to promote sustainable development (State and Peace Building Grant database). The Africa Conflict Prevention Programme (ACPP) is a part of the bigger Conflict

Prevention Pool (CPP), an initiative of the UK government. The CPP has a total budget of £112 million for the financial year 2008/2009 and the ACP's share for that year is of £62.8 million (UK government). The UN Peace Building Fund was founded in 2006 in order to support post conflicts states to 'stabilize and strengthen government institutions in order to sustain the peace process' (UNPBF portal); in 2008, the UNPBF allocated 73 million USD to fragile states and in 2009, the allocations went up to 122 million USD (UNPBF portal).

Those examples prove that with will and leadership, help and support can be provided to failing states. Helping to secure states that are most likely to become a conflict zone is the essence of long term prevention. Albright & Cohen, in their report, urge the US president to double US's support to the United Nations and the African Union, to work closely together with other actors such as those institutions, other governments and NGO's because 'efforts to prevent genocide should begin well before a crisis has erupted' (2008). This is what is called here 'long term prevention.'

Do States have any interest in long term prevention? Under the responsibility to protect principle they should; but this will be debated in an upcoming part. Additionally, states should come to the realization that there are greater costs if there is no prevention: feeding and offering shelter to millions of refugees, managing regional crisis and having world leaders' credibility compromised (Albright & Cohen, 2008). 'Every £1 spent on preventing violent conflict saves the international community £4 it would otherwise spend on dealing with that conflict later' (McConnell, 2009).

There are therefore important interests at stake for states to support failing ones. It is argued here that long term or early prevention is the best form of prevention. As demonstrated in the second part of this essay, individuals are most likely to commit acts of genocide and atrocities in failing states where their basic needs are not met. If genocide is understood as a result of the different factors aforementioned, it is then preventable. By helping failing states to ensure lasting peace and sustainable development, number of conflicts around the globe will automatically decrease: 'Prevention works' (McConnell, 2009).

Short term prevention

Short term prevention occurs when genocide is being strategically planned by the political elite. For each of the eight steps of genocide mentioned in the second part of this essay there is an available way of prevention. If genocide is an understandable process as shown above, there are ways to prevent it at each step of its organization. This part is based on the work of Stanton, to demonstrate how prevention is possible.

Classification: At this point, as Stanton mentions, the main preventive measure is to develop institutions that promote tolerance and understanding (1998). It is argued here that in the case of Rwanda, when the Belgians introduced the racial identity card, the international community should have forbidden it as it created ground for future discrimination between Hutus and Tutsis. It is also argued that at this point, institutions such as the Catholic Church in Rwanda should promote and teach peacemaking as a way to intervene non-violently.

Symbolization: Symbolization 'can be outlawed' (1998), just like the racial identity card in Rwanda could have been outlawed.

Dehumanization: At this stage, the ability to dehumanize the 'other' has to be sustained by important hate propaganda. In Rwanda, Radio Mille Collines, main catalyst to the propaganda, should have been shut down; hate speeches should have been banned and in order to incite those leaders to do so, the international community should have banned them from international travels and have their foreign finances frozen (Stanton, 1998).

Organization: At this stage, the UN should impose arm embargoes, and the international community should refuse visas to leaders of extremist militias (Stanton, 1998). It is also argued that the UN should seize arms within the country if there is an important threat of genocide as General Dallaire was refused to do so before the killings in Rwanda. Furthermore, the UN should implement a committee that would check if the embargo is respected: in the case of Rwanda, France could have been sanctioned by the UN for maintaining its support to the Habyarimana regime. Additionally, at this stage, the UN should have provided adequate material for Dallaire and the UNAMIR forces.

Polarization: Prevention for this stage may mean ‘security protection for moderate leaders or assistance to human rights groups’ (Stanton, 1998). If it is not done yet, hate propaganda should be importantly sanctioned by the international community (seizing of assets, denial of visas...).

Preparation: At this point it becomes clear that genocide will happen if there is no military intervention from the international community. Stanton mentions armed military intervention of the international community should be prepared (1998). In addition to preparing armed intervention, the country likely to commit genocide at this point should be heavily warned and aware of that preparation to halt the massacre.

Extermination: ‘At this stage, only rapid and overwhelming armed intervention can stop genocide’ (Stanton, 1998). Safe humanitarian zones should also be created for the protection of civilians and ‘If strong nations will not provide troops to intervene directly, they should provide the airlift, equipment, and financial means necessary for regional states to intervene’ (Stanton, 1998).

Denial: After the mass killings, the only option is ‘punishment by an international tribunal or national courts’ (Stanton, 1998) just like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It is important at this stage for the international community to show its will to arrest, and bring to court perpetrators of genocide as this is an important part of prevention for future genocide.

It is therefore possible to prevent genocide, understanding the process as a logical one is the first step to prevention. Then, by building strong states that will be less likely to be victims of genocide, but also by halting it, step by step, as shown above. In the following part, the responsibility to protect (R2P) civilians from mass atrocities will be discussed as it is believed that this R2P ‘concept’ will play an important role in future prevention of genocide.

The responsibility to protect

The world is facing growing international issues that know no borders: economical crises, pandemics (SARS, avian flu, swine flu...), global warming and environmental catastrophes (tsunamis, earthquakes, storms...). It is therefore necessary to go beyond the idea of sovereignty and to work in close cooperation to overcome those overwhelming and worrying issues. It is believed here that in this

context, the concept of the responsibility to protect enforced by the 2005 World Summit can have a strong and considerable impact on the effective prevention of genocide.

The ways to prevention mentioned above only represent ‘options’ for policy makers. They still possess the choice to decide for their intervention in conflicts. However, it is argued here that under the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), states will shift from a *right to intervene* notion to the more important one of the *responsibility to protect*. Therefore prevention is no longer an option, it becomes a moral obligation. R2P is concerned with human security; and the ‘sovereignty of the individual is at the heart of human security’ (Bajpai, 2000).

The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit outlines the agenda of policy makers regarding prevention of genocide and includes the R2P concept as a policy framework: ‘Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means’ (Art. 138). Prevention is not an option. It is now an obligation.

NATO calls for the necessity of ‘effective multilateralism’ in order to protect human security and commits itself to the implementation of the UN R2P agenda in its Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security. In this document, NATO also puts the concept of human security at the core of its operations.

As Stanton mentions, there should also be the creation of a worldwide movement to end genocide (2003). Indeed it is believed that under strong public pressure, governments will act.

Therefore, under the R2P principle it is believed that states, which are already shifting from the traditional notion of state sovereignty to the importance of human security, have the ability to effectively prevent genocide and mass atrocities. The will of states needs still to be strengthened and this is the most important change that has still to come. However, it is believed that under the R2P principle, the growing global issues that the international community is facing regardless of borders and sovereignty and the rising awareness of the importance of human security, states seem *on the good way* to effectively prevent future conflict and genocide.

Conclusion

Was it therefore possible to prevent the Rwandan genocide of 1994? Is it possible to understand genocide? Is it possible to prevent mass atrocities? As shown throughout this essay, all those questions find a positive answer. It was possible to prevent the Rwandan genocide and mainly this prevention could have occurred through a clear understanding of the process of genocide. Yes, ‘prevention works’ (McConnell, 2009)

Understanding genocide is the crucial step to effective prevention. Genocide should no longer be considered as an ethnic conflict that cannot be resolved through international intervention. Genocide as demonstrated above is sparked by many understandable and preventable instigators. Genocide is an organized policy option and follows clear steps and stages. There are therefore clear ways for the international community to prevent those mass atrocities. Sovereignty entails power; but it also entails great responsibilities. Those responsibilities should have the protection of civilians and human security at their core.

As seen in the last part, it is believed that the responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, mass murders and atrocities will be the essence of future prevention. The traditional notion of sovereignty will be wiped out by the more crucial notion of the responsibility to provide and sustain safety and well being to individuals. It is not argued here that states will act responsibly tomorrow but that, no matter how long it takes, this is the way the international community will go in order to better prevent genocide and sustain human security throughout the world.

‘The entire country had been laid to waste. Hospitals and schools had been destroyed or ransacked, government offices looted; there were no police; the treasury was empty; public utilities such as electricity, water and phone services had collapsed; a year’s harvest had been lost. Everywhere there were ditches filled with rotting bodies. Nearly 2 million people inside the country were refugees, uprooted from their homes. According to the World Bank, the genocide had left Rwanda the poorest country on earth.’ (Meredith, 2006)

Prevention can no longer remain an option. It is a necessity and an obligation. And, most importantly, prevention is possible.

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