


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Reinterpreting the Sino-Japanese Political Relations through History

A Social Constructivist Analysis



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The Executive Summary

The 3rd of September, 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Despite 70 years of peace in the Asia-Pacific, the memories of World War II are still the most evident obstruction in the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Moreover, other issues, such as the dispute regarding the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and the overlapping Air Identification Defence Zone (AIDZ) of both countries contribute to the negative tension in the Sino-Japanese relations. The Asia-Pacific is becoming increasingly more volatile, and in case of military conflicts, the United States is legally obligated to assist Japan due to the Japan-US security treaty. Therefore, it can potentially turn into an international conflict. To provide an in-depth explanation, the following research question is used: *How can the political relations between China and Japan be explained through the International Relations' theory Social Constructivism, within a time frame from the 11th century towards the contemporary relations?*

In order to verify Social Constructivism's credibility, the literature review compared a variety of theories that were either derived from Social Constructivism, or constituted the opposite. In turn, this established this dissertation's theoretical framework. Social Constructivism maintained the core of the framework, in which the concepts of Realist theories, the Social evolutionary learning approach, Culture, Identity, and Power acted as complementary concepts. Moreover, based on the Social Constructivist concepts of history, social interaction, beliefs, ideals, and culture, the choice was made to conduct research within a time frame from the 11th century to the contemporary relations. However, only the key events that affected the Sino-Japanese relations are examined. The methods that were used consisted of desk research only due to the value of Constructivist papers being in theoretical interpretation (Finnemore & Sicking, 2001). Furthermore, three approaches were applied: the comparative approach, the descriptive approach, and the exploratory approach.

Research indicated that Chinese learning as result of social interaction between the 11th century and the 16th century was pivotal for Japan's cultural development. Moreover, striking similarities were found between China's domestic Confucianism political structure and the structure of the international political system until mid-19th century. The result of social interaction was that in the tributary international system, China's neighbouring states also adhered to Confucianism principles, which would confirm the impact of ideational forces guiding state behaviour. However, as argued by the Social evolutionary learning Approach, material factors such a geographical location, ought to be taken into account. This explains why Japan did not fully assimilate into China's sphere of influence, since the country was disconnected from the mainland. In turn, it allowed Japan to be prone for ideational changes that resulted from interaction with the West/Europe. In turn, Western concepts of power that emphasized wealth and military prowess replaced the Asian concept of power, which was formerly defined as cultural knowledge and civilizational splendour according to Confucianism norms. Consequently, after 1868, Meiji Japan behaved accordingly to Western/European standards, thus

justifying imperialist behaviour during World War I and World War II. Nevertheless, faced with Western/European Racism, Japan's identity was neither that of a great power nor that of an Asian state. This brought the impetus of an ideational war against the West, albeit through Westernized imperialist behaviour by Japan. China remained ideationally resilient throughout history, impeding its modernization. Even in the contemporary relations, the social framework of *guanxi* emphasized reciprocity by downplaying conflicts in return for favours by the other. However, if conflicts are not resolved in the *guanxi* framework, conflicts can potential withstands the test of time in a past-oriented China.

Thus, research concluded that Social Constructivism alone cannot fully explain the Sino-Japanese relations. It fails to take into account the effects of material forces, such as military defeats, conceptions of power, geographical location, and the domestic political structures. However, with the help of this dissertation's theoretical framework, it can be concluded that due to centuries of Sino-Japanese interaction, Japan developed as a future-oriented nation, while China remained past-oriented. For China, history will therefore always be of important, which will associate Japan with its identity of WWII-aggressor, despite Japan pacifistic attitude now.

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Introduction

When Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe finally spoke the long desired words 'Japanese aggression', 'Colonial rule', and 'heartfelt apology', one might think of it as an appropriate apology (Tiezzi, 2015). However, for China, officially called the People's Republic of China (PRC), it was far more a mockery of the past rather than a 'heartfelt apology'. Many referred to Abe's play of words, such as referring to the Western colonial rule, as well as the Japan-Russia war of 1905 setting the normalization of colonization, thus placing the blame elsewhere but with Japan (Tiezzi, 2015). Also one of the more recent disputes revolved around the Yasukuni War Shrine. The Yasukuni shrine is a Japanese peace monument for honouring the fallen soldiers during World War Two, in which Japan makes no distinction between criminals and regular soldiers. Japan's indistinctiveness in honouring fallen soldiers, criminals or not, resulted in the shrine being perceived by the PRC as a memento of Japan's military prowess and imperialism during World War Two. Consequently, in response to Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to the Shrine 2006, Qin Gang, spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry commented that such an act posed an obstacle in the improvement of bilateral relations between the countries (Wingfield-Hayes, 2013). Also, in 2015, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying argued that Japan should 'Face-up' to its military past, indicating that it had not done that since the war, or at least not in a manner worthy of China's acknowledgement (Soble, 2015). China explicitly stressed that this would disregard the impact of history as political bases on the Sino-Japanese relations.

History in particular appears to weigh heavily in the Sino-Japanese relations, especially on the Chinese side. For instance, when the United States' President Barack Obama visited Japan to show his empathy for the US' past nuclear bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that while Hiroshima deserves attention, the massacre of Nanjing deserves more and must not be forgotten (Johnson, 2016). China appears to take advantage of every opportunity it gets to shame Japan in the light of history, or perhaps use the past in Chinese diplomatic matters. However, fear for war is still deeply embedded. When Japan passed a bill on letting military forces fight abroad, China stated that doing so would threaten the regional security of Asia (Gan, 2015).

Apart from history and the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the 2013 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island conflict regarding the ownership of the islands is also a conflict that affects the contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. In response to Japan's claim of the islands, China expanded its Air-Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), meaning that the Chinese military will respond to any aircraft that does not comply with its rules, in which the areas around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is also covered (Grammaticas, 2013). Japan perceived this as a deliberate provocative measure, as it would mean that the ADIZ of Japan and China would overlap (Feng, 2015). As to why China behaved in such a manner, Yang Yujun, a defense ministry spokesman, stated that China did so "with the aim of safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial land and air security, and maintaining flight order" (Grammaticas, 2013). However, these

were not the only problems. In 2014, Chinese ships entered Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and engaged in red coral poaching, a commodity highly valued in China (Yōji, 2015). Naturally, Japan was displeased; however, in resolving both the maritime disputes of the coral poaching in Japan's EEZ, as well as the islands disputes, diplomatic talks were interrupted by China's military parade on the 3rd of September, 2015, to celebrate China's victory over Fascism (Yan, 2015).

Thus, a variety of factors are affecting the Sino-Japanese relations, in which some are intertwined. Active Japanese military engagement sparked security issues in remembrance of Japan's World War Two (WWII) aggression, but was also seen as strategy against China's (Gan, 2015). Be it history, or simply the need for more power or security, the contemporary Sino-Japanese relations are in peril. Moreover, with Japan and China as the two biggest forces in Asia, and with the US legally obligated to defend Japan in case of war due to the Japan-US Security treaty, any escalation of conflicts into a military confrontation could result in an international conflict (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, n.d). It is therefore important, that the Sino-Japanese relations are re-examined to gain a better comprehension of why the relations are the way they are. What could be the cause for the contemporary tension? Compared to the European Union, Germany's relations are based on positive development with its surrounding countries. Where did the positive development of the Sino-Japanese relations go wrong?

Research Questions and Objectives

To reveal the deeper laying causes of the Sino-Japanese relations, the following question serves as main research question:

How can the political relations between China and Japan be explained through the International Relations' theory Social Constructivism, within a time frame from the 11th century towards the contemporary relations?

To adequate answer the main question, the following sub question ought to be answered:

- What is Social Constructivism?
- (how) Did social interaction affect the ideational world of Japan and China between the 11th and 19th century?
- To what extent did identity creation determine the behaviour displayed by Japan and China?
- How did the Second World War affect the Sino-Japanese relations from the year 1978 and on?
- How does the history still play a part in the foreign policies in the Sino-Japanese relations?

In order to answer all questions, four objectives have been set that will provide a more clarified perspective on will be done throughout this dissertation. These objectives are:

- 1) To establish a theoretical framework unique to the Sino-Japanese relations based on Social Constructivism whilst drawing from other theories.

- 2) Present the key events that affected the Sino-Japanese relations
- 3) Analyze the key events by using this dissertation's theoretical framework, and reveal why the Sino-Japanese relations are the way they are.
- 4) Conclude the credibility of Social Constructivism.

Research Structure

Firstly, in the literature review the theoretical framework will be established, using the International Relations' Social Constructivism theory as the core theory, whilst reviewing Realism, the impact of identity perception, and social evolutionary learning. Secondly, the methodology will outline the scope of this research, as well as explain the reasoning behind the choice for applying a historical analysis and the use of Social Constructivism. Thirdly, the results will discuss the (social) interaction between China and Japan starting in the 11th century. Also, the concept of power in the Asia-Pacific world order that existed between the 11th and the 19th century will be discussed. Furthermore, the impact of Western/European influences on both China and Japan are reviewed, but also how they dealt with it. The last section of the results will revolve around the Sino-Japanese relations from end 19th century to the post-war/contemporary relations. Fourthly, the analysis will analyse the research results by applying the theoretical framework. Lastly, the conclusion will summarize the report, and provide answers to the research question mentioned in the introduction and executive summary.

Literature Review

The dissertation aims to indicate how the cultural components and historical social interaction served as a causal factor in derailing the chances on contemporary positive relations between China and Japan. Several theoretical frameworks could provide an explanation, yet Social Constructivism takes the central position in this dissertation. Important to note is that aside from the Sino-Japanese relations, this dissertation does not intend to explore China's nor Japan's behaviour regarding the foreign relations with other states. However, there is the exception of countries directly affecting the Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, in this dissertation the Sino-Japanese relation is the main focus of study, and is regarded as the product of prolonged interaction between the two states. Despite of social Constructivism being the pivotal theory in this dissertation, the idea of power by Hans Morgenthau (1904-1979), a political scientist and professor at the Chicago University, as well as the ideas regarding offensive and defensive Realism ought to be discussed as well.

Firstly, the motive for highlighting Realism and power is because this dissertation regards those concepts as outcomes of behaviour that are displayed in the current Sino-Japanese relations. However, more elaboration on this approach will be given in the last section of the theory review. Secondly, after discussing Realism and power, Social Constructivism will be discussed to highlight its contrast to Realism, as well as to indicate its significance to the Sino-Japanese relations. Thirdly, the concept of social evolutionary learning will be explained, which is based on the work of Tang Shiping, an international relations professor at the Fudan University in China. The theory derives its importance from its potential to indicate a converging process between Realism and Social Constructivism. The fourth theoretical base is Uemura's Cultural Constructivism. Uemura Takeshi, a research associate at Waseda University Japan, made an attempt in explaining the Sino-Japanese relations through a Cultural Constructivist perspective. His theoretical interpretation adds another layer of causal factors in terms of cultural behaviour, and ideational culture. In addition, two definitions of culture are analysed in order to understand to what degree it influences behaviour. The first definition is defined by Max Weber (1864-1920), a German sociologist renowned for his analysis regarding the drivers that influence human behaviour, in which culture played an imperative role. The second definition is derived from the work of Geert Hofstede, a Dutch psychologist who conducted several studies regarding the impact of national culture and cultural dimensions on international cooperation, economics and more. The sixth concept refers to identity and its power to attach social meaning to actions and establish predictability. Lastly, the combined approach will be explained, and also how these concepts inter-relate with each other.

The Concept of Power

Although Social Constructivism does not emphasize power since it refers to material forces, it still plays an important role in foreign policies. This also applies to China and Japan; therefore it is important to establish what power is, and how it can be used. According to Morgenthau, the definite

aim of international politics is to maintain or to increase one's power (Morgenthau, 1948). Mearsheimer contributes to this definition, as he argues that states pursue power to ensure one's own survival by devising strategies aimed at maintaining territorial autonomy as well as the autonomy of domestic politics. However, strategies aimed to increase one's power rather than to preserve it, are also means of ensuring survival, albeit perhaps a preventative measure. States may do so mainly due to the high degree of uncertainty regarding the motives of other states, states that all possess military forces capable of harming one another, which could result in (Mearsheimer, 2006) (Morgenthau, 1948). Additionally, power struggles between states can also occur indirectly if two competing states aim to dominate a third state to outweigh the other's power, which is what happened in case of Korea during the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) (Mearsheimer, 2006).¹ In a similar way, survival through preserving or increasing power applies to alliances as well, for example to counter imperialistic policies from another state and to preserve their independency (Morgenthau, 1948). Inevitably, the conquest of ensuring one's survival will affect the international system, which is by nature an anarchic system, thus free of arbitrary judgements and without central leadership. Consequently, such pursuits of power stimulate changes in the international system, resulting in shifts to a hierarchical system based on the states' power, or to a balance of powers, known as the equilibrium of autonomous powers (Mearsheimer, 2006). The former is likely undesirable, as hierarchy implies accepting the superiority of another state.

The conquest for power has various forms, for example power can be pursued through the religious, social, and economic sphere, as well through the philosophical/ideational sphere. Morgenthau argues that in terms of power, the eventual aim of a state's policy is to affect another state's behaviour, or to change the status quo by gaining more power (1948). Morgenthau discusses three forms of pursuing power. The first and perhaps the most historically evident form of power is imperialism. In simple terms, it refers to increasing one's own power often by reducing that of others. This is visible in the Sino-Japanese history, where Japan in particular displayed imperialistic behaviour during the first Chinese-Japanese war (1894-1895), as well as in the second Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945). The second scenario focusses on preserving the status quo, resulting in strategic policy choices that are not aggressive towards other states, which is similar to defensive Realism (Morgenthau, 1948) (Shiping, 2008). The last scenario aligns with the idea of deterrence, where the display of power is done through a demonstration. The latter usually includes militaristic displays, such as parades. Albeit it seemingly an aggressive form of display, militaristic ventures can be present in all three scenarios, thus preserving the status quo, increasing power, or using power as form of deterrence.

¹ A power struggle is played out when State A aims at the domination of State B, in which State B will respond with policies that either aim to exert power over State A to defend itself, or to preserve the status quo prior to State A's aggression (Mearsheimer, 2006).

Another important aspect in this dissertation with regards to imperialism is how the use of power is perceived differently per state. As argued by Morgenthau, in some cases the foreign security policies of one state can be unjustifiably perceived as imperialistic by other states (Morgenthau, 1948). This often correlates with a particular discontent from one state to another, which in turn could make this notion an important aspect for the Sino-Japanese relations, especially considering that their history has been tainted by conflicts.

Offensive & Defensive Realism

Shiping's work offers valuable insights in terms of the behaviour displayed by states when it comes to security in terms of Realism. This dissertation will incorporate Realism to its theoretical framework based on the assumption that Realist behavioural patterns are a product of the causal drivers found in Social Constructivism. Therefore, his distinction between offensive and defensive Realism is of importance, and such responses might be the result from social, cultural, or historical constructs from within China or Japan. The difference between the two strands of Realism is, that offensive Realist policies are aligned with decreasing another states' power, which simultaneously increases one's own security (Shiping, 2008). In contrast to offensive Realism, defensive Realism emphasized the possibility of reconciliation of conflict in the international arena, whereas alliances are pivotal (Shiping, 2008). Nonetheless, offensive Realism rejects the reconciliation of conflict, and refers to conflict as inevitable and perceives alliances as a temporary means to an end in achieving self-interest (Mearsheimer, 2006).

Social Constructivism

As mentioned earlier, the core theory in analysing the Sino-Japanese relations will be Social Constructivism. Due to the ambiguous nature of the Constructivist theory, a clear-cut definition is not yet established. However, the definition this dissertation aims to take is the one that draws heavily from the work of Alexander Wendt, a German-American political scientist, influential in the field of Social Constructivism. This approach of Constructivism in international politics aims to explain inter-state conflict by analysing behavioural patterns based on ideals, beliefs, social interaction between states, and norms. While the original form of Constructivism first arose within a philosophical strain of thought, in-depth analysis would be redundant as its attributes are already incorporated in a more appropriate strain of Constructivism, namely Social Constructivism. Within the Constructivist strain, the original philosophical theory is fine-tuned to international politics and named Social Constructivism. In terms of its fine-tuning to international politics, it incorporates its own interpretation of the world, in which the world itself is divided in two constitute a separate 'entities' that affect one another: the social world and the material world (Jackson & Sørensen, 2006).

The material world consists of factors such as power and military force; however, it is the social world that stands central to the Social Constructivist theory. This specific yet imperative (social)

Constructivist interpretation of the world is defined as the social or ideational world, where ideas, beliefs, and social interactions define the conceptualization of the material world (Jackson & Sørensen, 2006). This would mean that the material world consisting of physical aspects, such as power and military force, is given meaning by aspects such as beliefs, culture, ideals, and social interactions. With regards to the construction of the social world, it is important to know that this dissertation regards it as an ongoing process rather than a structure of some sort. Instead, it is perceived as a process of learning. Moreover, Wendt argues that this 'process' is stimulated by social interactions among states, which in turn also relates to the construction of identity (Wendt, 1992). Identity and its magnitude in this dissertation will be discussed later on. Opposed to the Realist claim that identity is a given, Constructivists argue that the identity of how one's self is perceived, and the perception of others, is created by this very process (Jackson & Sørensen, 2006). It is perhaps not surprising that Realists argue that states' identities already exist and are not created through a process of social interaction, as it would be hard to argue that states strive for power if the very concept of what they constitute is subject to change (Wendt, 1992). In terms of China and Japan, both countries spend a majority of their existence within each other's social sphere, and therefore this dissertation applies social Constructivism to structure the causes of their problematic relationship, by indicating how culture, social interaction, and perceptions of each other's identity have played a role.

Social Evolutionary Learning

Shiping's social evolutionary learning approach to states' behaviour is an attempt to incorporate both social Constructivist, as well as Realist aspects into one theoretical framework. In terms of the Chinese-Japanese relation, his approach might explain why Realist behaviour is perceived to be displayed by both states. As Shiping argues in his social evolutionary learning approach, there are two forces that interact with each other and produce certain outcomes. One is again the material world that consists of the state's geographical environment, the state's power, the structure of the international arena, relationships with other states, and lastly the nature of the international system itself (Shiping, 2008). In contrast to the material world, he explains that the ideational world is structured by ideologies, culture, beliefs, memories and habits, similar to Social Constructivism (Shiping, 2008). However, in despite of the differences, Shiping emphasizes that the ideational world is intrinsic to the functioning of the material world and vice versa. From this perspective, he argues that the material world is the ultimate testing ground for ideational forces, as the ideational forces influence the learning processes with regards to the material world, and also determine what ideas can be included in devising a security policy (Shiping, 2008). The relevance of his theory for this dissertation lies with the belief that cultural, ideational, and relational factors unconsciously act as lens that proposes certain patterns of behaviour attuned to those factors. Shiping's idea is of importance as it tries to explain strategic policy choices, by taking into account the correlation between the ideational world and the material world. In terms of the Sino-Japanese relations, this dissertation aims to present physical

events as the result from strategic choices that might therefore be related to cultural, Social relational, historical and ideological aspects (Wendt, 1992) (Shiping, 2008).

Cultural Constructivism

Takeshi Uemura's work also suggested a Social Constructivist approach to explain the Sino-Japanese relations; however, his approach leans more towards a cultural perspective, which is in turn applied to the Sino-Japanese relations. This would make Uemura's work an excellent starting point for this dissertation. According to his work, the overall focus was that the Sino-Japanese relations are heavily affected by one's perception of the other, and that is determined by a particular culturally-tainted pattern of behaviour during a process of social interaction (Uemura, 2013). Uemura argues that if that social interaction occurs, it happens through a cultural lens that causes a specific way of interpretation. Surprisingly, this aligns with Shiping's social evolutionary process. His 'Cultural' Constructivism takes into account the way social interaction is perceived, however, in his work he emphasized the definition of culture as a configuration of human activities, where politics is reflected in particular behaviour (Uemura, 2013). In addition; he avoids the effects of culture's ideational forces. According to Hofstede, ideational cultural forces consist of aspects such as ethnicities, religions and occupation that determine how social practices and interactions are perceived, which in turn allows for certain pattern of behaviour followed by particular actions (Hofstede, n.d). In more simple terms, it allows for behaviour by disregarding behaviour that is not aligned with the cultural forces within the state. Nonetheless, Uemura's focus on the behavioural side of culture still holds meaning. In his claim about behavioural culture he discusses the concept of 'guanxi', the Chinese framework for behaviour and social relations characterized by reciprocal benefits and interests for both parties, which in turn influences the manner in which conflict resolution takes place between States (Uemura, 2013). However, he contributes to his statement of guanxi that this could also deliberately obscure deeper laying conflicts in order to maintain positive relations of 'friendship', which means that Japan's behaviour could continuously harm the Sino-Japanese relations since the deeper cause is never really addressed (Uemura, 2013).

In contrast to his work, this dissertation focuses more on the ideational drivers of culture, which in turn are used to indicate how they set the rules for a certain display of behaviour (Weber, 1949). As mentioned before, Uemura's approach on behavioural culture will be taken into account, mainly because this dissertation perceives behavioural and ideational culture as reciprocal forces to one another. Furthermore, in this dissertation's approach to the Sino-Japanese relations, the ideational culture will be incorporated into the Social Constructivist approach. As Wendt would argue, the social world consists of beliefs, ideas, and social interaction, and it is the social world that attached meaning to material forces (Wendt, 1992). Ideational culture as defined by Weber would strengthen this Social Constructivist's claim on social forces, mainly because he defines it as the factors that determined our understanding, perception of actions and behaviour, as well as the construction of the world (Weber,

1949). The relevance of this merger resides with the impact of culture itself as it could determine how social interaction between China and Japan is perceived. The two countries share a considerable long history, often focussed around cultural exchange. However along the course of social interaction, certain events occurred that, due to cultural perceptions, smeared the relations.

International Identities and Interests

The last component of this dissertation's theoretical framework is the definition of identity and self-interests. Identity from an international relations perspective can be identified on two fronts, one is how a state perceives itself, and the latter refers to how the state is perceived by others. Although both definitions are important, the identity as perceived by others prevails. The theory on identity formation by Ted Hopf, a professor in political science at the Ohio State University of Michigan, is especially relevant with regards to the Chinese-Japanese identity formation. He argues that identity is constructed through social practices, which in turn are the actions and practices of one particular actor that create a certain identity perceived by others, but also give meaning to certain practices based on what identity is associated with (Hopf, 1998). For instance, China might regard present-time military policies by Japan as imperialistic, which might potentially be implication derived from Japan's former imperialist identity during World War Two (WWII). Important to note is, that this particular perceived identity of imperialistic Japan is created through social practices, such as Japan's subjugation of Korea during WWII, and because of this identity any military policy in the present might therefore be regarded as a practice of imperialistic behaviour.

Hopf's idea of identity heavily aligns with Social Constructivism. This is due to his claim that identity consists of a certain set of interests, which in turn are created through social interactions, similar to how Constructivism aims to explain state behaviour. Moreover, his idea of one's own identity versus the perceived identity relates to Uemura's construction of identity through culturally interpreted social interactions, which in turn could also explain why some perceived identities are perhaps wrong in the present times of the Sino-Japanese relations (Uemura, 2013) (Hopf, 1998). The identity problem is imperative throughout the entire lifeline of the Sino-Japanese relations, and also holds a central position in this dissertation. Furthermore, Hopf argues that identities have the power to justify actions, whilst re-establishing a states' identity through those particular actions (Hopf, 1998). This can hold an imperative meaning in dissecting the Sino-Japanese relations. For example, with regards to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute, if Japan were to send military troops to the islands in accordance with a pacifist identity of protecting the islands and its citizen, China might perceive such an act as imperialistic and would re-define Japan's identity as an imperialistic country, similar to Japan's identity during WWII.

Thus, identity plays an important role as it can bring predictability to the field where social practices are practiced. However, turmoil can also be created, if such identities are unjust. With the help of social interaction and cultural interpretation the incongruity between such perceptions may be

discovered, and those findings could provide an answer as to why China and Japan are still generally conflicted with each other's actions, albeit impossible to construct the correct identity.

The Theoretical Framework

Now that all the components of this dissertation's theoretical framework have been discussed, a combined approach can be established. Social Constructivism serves as the core theory in this dissertation's theoretical approach. This is mainly due to the great importance of social interaction in explaining the Sino-Japanese relations, especially since China and Japan have been interacting for a considerable long time. However, this dissertation perceives Social Constructivism as an ongoing process, where future motives for actions in the international political arena are defined. Moreover, social interaction alone might not be enough to determine interests and behavioural patterns. As Uemura pointed out in his example of China's behavioural pattern of 'guanxi', some conflicts might appear innocent on the surface due to China's unconscious automated responses to conflict resolution, yet those seemingly innocent conflicts can continue to smear China's relationship with Japan, leaving old wounds open (Uemura, 2013). Based on his argument, this dissertation incorporated two definitions of culture. One is culture as defined by Hofstede as "the collective programming of the mind" and the second is Weber's definition of culture as "the factors that shape our perceptions and conceptions of the world" (Weber, 1949). Combining these definitions, it should reveal how culture affects China's and Japan's perception of social interactions, but also how it constraints certain patterns of behaviour. Regardless of how cultural lenses filter social interaction, one constant material factor fails to be subject to a different cultural perception, namely war and aggression. Direct aggression of war is likely to be distinguished from being a threat from the victim's perspective, albeit perceived differently from the aggressor's perspective. However, events of war do fall within the process of social interaction as part of the overall historical construct between Japan and China, which in turn affects behaviour in the form of vivid memories.

In simple terms, social interactions consist of forces from the ideational world such as beliefs, ideologies, culture, and historical constructs. Culture itself forms a stand-alone force that directly affects the way social interaction is perceived, as well as how it is displayed in behaviour, which is seen in China's guanxi. However, in the case of Japan, its culture was partially created through social interaction with China, which gives culture a dual meaning in Japan's case. Therefore, cultural behaviour is facilitated by cultural factors that came into existence through social interaction, whereas this ongoing process of social interaction continuous to be simultaneously influenced by the very cultural confinements it created over decades of Chinese-Japanese social interaction. Consequently, the collision of the Chinese and Japanese ideational worlds of culture, social practices, beliefs, and ideologies create a unique pattern of cultural behaviour and interaction, which in turn is reflected in the material world in the form of security policies, foreign policies, and other physical actions. Moreover, the reflection of ideational forces in the material world could lead to identities associated

with offensive Realist behaviour, if the ideational forces that produce such behaviour is not sufficiently examined. In other words, identity depends heavily on the ideational world, as the other's identity can be perceived based on previous social interaction, ways of behaviour, and material factors which in turn could explain Realist behaviour by states. Thus, the theoretical framework is an ongoing process that keeps influencing and affecting itself by previously established norms. This could provide insight concerning particular displays of behaviour that aim to preserve or expand power. More specifically, this dissertation's combined approach aims to provide insight as to why the Sino-Japanese relations are characterized by tension.

Methodology

The research method that is applied for the overall dissertation is the exploratory method, for there is no clear-cut explanation explaining why the Sino-Japanese relations are the way they are today. However, different sections of the report require different approaches, such as the descriptive approach, comparative approach, as well as the interpretive/exploratory approach. The scope of the research will cover a vast amount of history between the 11th century to the contemporary relations. Yet, only the key events will be discussed that affected the Sino-Japanese relations. The reason for doing so lies with the fact that the IR theory of Social Constructivism acts as the base for this dissertation's theoretical framework, and heavily relies on social interaction. Social interaction can be defined as the interaction between two or more populaces of a given country (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, applying a historical approach would provide a more adequate context for the Sino-Japanese social interaction, in which the foundations and the development of the Sino-Japanese relations as well as both countries' ideational forces throughout history can be uncovered.

Research Methods and Approaches

This research relies mainly on desk research. Sources such as history books, international relations readings, journals, newspaper articles and online articles were used to acquire the needed information. No surveys or interviews were conducted due to the fact that gaining an adequate amount of respondents or interviewees with the required expertise would be considerably strenuous if not physically present in the Japan or China. Also, according with the Constructivist guidelines on doing research, it is argued that the value of research relating to Constructivism lies in the theoretical interpretation concerning a particular topic (Finnemore & Sicking, 2001). In addition, also argued is the necessity of including other interpretations when creating a theoretical framework, such as deviating or modified Constructivist perspectives, as well as contradicting theories, for instance Realism (Finnemore & Sicking, 2001). Therefore, desk research seemed the most logical course of action, in which the vast amount of sources can eventually be interpreted from different theoretical perspectives. Moreover, these guidelines fit neatly in creating a theoretical framework suitable for this dissertation, which is also the first research goal. Therefore, a comparative research approach was applied to creating the literature review, as well the theoretical framework. The result is a comparative review of theories, such as Realism, Social Constructivism, but also other theories that were derived from either Realism or Social Constructivism.

Based on the literature review, Social Constructivism indicated that in simple terms, state behaviour is determined through social interaction with one another, in which the impact of historical events is strongly emphasized along with changing identities and beliefs (Wendt, 1992). Being the core for this dissertation's theoretical framework, the Social Constructivist theory greatly influenced the research approach. It provided, along with Realist concepts, variables that were used to filter the vast amount of history to only those events that affected the Sino-Japanese relations or were of

influence to their behaviour in general. The following variables were taken into account: knowledge, beliefs, ideologies, power, social-interaction, culture and identities. Also, impetus for overall choice of applying a historical analysis is that it allows past events to uncover trends and developments that affect the contemporary relations, in which also an interpretative approach is required as well (Wyche, Sengers & Grinter, 2006). Therefore, the choice was made to review the Sino-Japanese relations starting in the 11th century to history, in which the relevant events were found by filtering history based on the mentioned variables. After the filtering was done, a descriptive approach was applied to describe the circumstances of each country regarding given event or conflict affecting the Sino-Japanese relations. However, a comparative approach was applied to gain more perspectives on the accuracy on key historical events, as well as on the quality of the results. The comparative approach was deemed appropriate as it could compare each countries perspective and attitude on particular events in history.

While the result section provided the data on events that affected the Sino-Japanese relations, the linchpin for the analysis is the theoretical framework. In order to explain certain behaviour of Japan and China, an explanatory/interpretative approach is applied in which the theories discussed have been applied to the research. While a descriptive approach only describes the circumstances in both countries surrounding a given event, it does not clarify why the things are why they are. Additionally, even though the comparative approach emphasizes the attitude of both countries' concerning events and conflicts, it cannot provide why Japan or China responded in a particular manner towards a certain event or conflict. Therefore, in order to answer why the Sino-Japanese relations are the way they are today, as well as whether Social Constructivism can be credible in explaining that, an interpretative /exploratory approach is used. This will be the third method in the research design. In this approach, the results are being interpreted from different theoretical perspectives, in which the potential reasons for particular state behaviour are brought to light. Moreover, by applying the various theories, it allows for revealing possible shortcomings of the Social Constructivist theory, whereas this dissertation's theoretical framework should be sufficient.

Results

Chapter 1 – Social Interaction and Ideational Learning

In the first chapter an indication is given on how social interaction can affect the cultural and political structures of Japan within a time frame between the 11th and 15th century, with occasionally addressing events that occurred earlier if deemed necessary. Also, it provides insight on the historical constructs of memories between the countries, as yet another Social Constructivist component.

1.1 Early Observations in the Sino-Japanese Relations

At first, the Sino-Japanese relations revolved mainly around a one-sided exchange of cultural influences from China to Japan, in which those cultural influences affected and cultivated Japan's culture, religion, and political structures (Rose, 1998). Central in this one-sided exchange stood Chinese Confucianism, and remained at the core of China's culture, and China's domestic and foreign politics until late in the 18th century. Regardless of the one-sided exchange, evidence indicates that Japan adapted its acquired knowledge from China rather early. The end of the Heian period (794 – 1185) and Kamakura period (1185 – 1333) were most imperative for Japan. Through a careful selection of what to incorporate in the Japanese culture, Japan was able to transcend from being China's 'apprentice culture', to being a unique Japanese culture at the end of the Kamakura era. The Japanese writing system derived from China is perhaps one of the most evident similarities even today, albeit adapted to simpler forms to suit Japanese needs and pronunciation differences (Meyer, 2009). In turn, it could indicate a certain sense of 'awe' as official literature in Japan was written in Chinese. In the contemporary Japanese writing system, the logographic system called Kanji is derived from the Chinese writing system, whereas the syllabic system consists of Hiragana (simplified Kanji) and Katakana (foreign words).

Furthermore, Japan's religious sphere also experienced an imperative shift that occurred in all its fervour in the Kamakura age, in which various religious streams emerged. However, prior to the influences of Buddhism and Confucianism, the indigenous Japanese faith Shintoism occupied most of the Japan's religious sphere, and continued to remain constant (Higashibaba, 2001). Regardless of the prevalence of Shintoism, the new influences were regarded as complementary rather than intrusive, and were incorporated into Shintoism, mainly to fill the void of moral teachings (Meyer, 2009). Consequently, new streams of Shintoism were born, such as Ryūbu Shintoism, a form of Shintoism complemented by features of Buddhism and Confucianism (Meyer, 2009). Ryūbu Shintoism was considerably more aggressive in showing its familiarity to Buddhism in terms of its visualization of Shinto gods. The overarching principle in general was that the Japanese gods were simply a Japanese manifestation of Buddhist deities, such as perceiving the sun god 'Amaterasu' as a manifestation of Buddha (Meyer, 2009). Another religious stream was Nichiren Shinto, one that in particular showed clear signs of nationalism, as it conveyed to its followers aggressive notions of ethnocentrism, whilst promoting Japan as the land chosen by gods (Gacis, 2000).

Similar to Japan's religious sphere, its political ideas were also heavily shaped by China's influences and in an earlier stage than religion as well. During the Sui/Tang dynasties, Japan dispatched multiple delegates to China aimed at acquiring knowledge about Chinese political structures and institutions (Segal, 2010). Consequently, during the period of 607 until the year 838 Japan hauled in a tremendous amount of Chinese Confucianism writings on politics, but also on medicine, poetry, and cultural manuscripts (Fuqua, 2009) (Meyer, 2009). China's political system was heavily based on Confucianism and promoted a ruler's divine right to rule based on moral example, and emphasized respect and maintenance of the existing linkages between political institutions, the emperor, and families within society's social order. Other key stones were: loyalty expressed in sincerity to one's self and being devoid of selfishness, honesty, kinship, benevolence and harmony within the state, whilst denoting individual interest in politics (Suzuki, 2009) (Pye, 1985) (Morishima, 1982). However, Confucianism was also adapted in Japan, in which the principle of loyalty in particular was perceived differently. This principle in Japan was defined as devotion to one's ruler, thus contradicting the principle of accepting social order. Moreover, as later results will indicate, this misinterpreted principle of loyalty is likely to have supported the civil war era from the 12th century and on, since it allowed clan loyalty to outweigh loyalty to the emperor (Morishima, 1982).

The epitome of such influences occurred when Shotoku in 593-622, then still regent, created the 'seventeen article constitution'. The seventeen article constitution was based entirely on the Chinese Tang dynasty's Confucian ethical system, which promoted centralization of authority and obedience to divine authority in Japan (Meyer, 2009). While in China rulers could be removed due to lack of skills or virtue, Shotoku aimed to ensure succession based on royal lineage. He made nifty adaptations preventing that rulers lacking skill and virtue were replaced (Morishima, 1982). Also, Shotoku's constitution promoted equality of men with the exception of the emperor, but also promoted a paradoxical form of democracy where the emperor had the last say, but was to consult his/her officials (Morishima, 1982). Prince Naka No-Oe (645) succeeded Shotoku, and furthered the transformation of Japanese politics based on Tang dynasty's culture, known as the Taika Reforms (Segal, 2010) (Fuqua, 2009). The reforms were more or less an implementation of the seventeen article constitution, such as centralizing authority around the emperor, whilst providing equal opportunities by separating landlords from the land, albeit with granting them favourable position as administrators in the local/central governments (Meyer, 2009) (Morishima, 1982). Furthermore, during emperor Kanmu's reign (781 – 806), powerful military families started to vie for power and the available resources were pressured by the population's demand (Meyer, 2009). As response to ensure obedience to the law, a bureau of archivists and the imperial police were included, which were unknown to Chinese Tang politics. However, around the year 750, the Tang dynasty's stability slowly started to decline. For example, the Tang dynasty was invaded by Tibet numerous times since 714, and suffered multiple defeats by the Arabs in 751. Also, 50000 soldiers were lost in trying to suppress the newly found state Nangzhou, while simultaneously trying to maintain stability between the Korea-

Manchuria borders (Pletcher, 2011). Consequently, a reason for cancelling the planned trade mission up until 894, as well as for the overall decline of Chinese learning could be China's loss of stability. Arguably, its instability caused a decline in prestige, making Chinese culture lose its allure (Fuqua, 2009) (Benn, 2002).

During the years 1333-1603, the Sino-Japanese relations were renewed via a focus on Chinese trade under the rule of Yoshimitsu of the Ashigaka Shogunate (Meyer, 2009). Cultural traits such as Japanese tea ceremonies and the drama form called 'Noh', were a direct result of how Chinese influences allowed Japan's culture to flourish. However, despite the focus on trade, and import of Chinese cultural traits, Japan entered a long period of political instability. This was partly due to Yoshimitsu's appreciation for China contradicting a growing sense of Japanese superiority among the people, which exacerbated by Yoshimitsu's tribute payment to China (Yamamura, 1990). The tribute payments were part of the Asian tributary system constructed by China, where States offered gifts to China in exchange for trade. When Japan entered the Feudal age in 1184, its government implemented decentralized government system, which divided the land in feudal domains governed by warlords, or so called daimyos (Meyer, 2009). In addition, military power was omitted from the emperor and placed with the Shogun, the highest ranking military commander, who in turn created the 'Bakufu', the military government (Yamamura, 1990). As Shogun Takauji rose to power in 1333, Japan entered the Sengoku Jidai, also known as the 100 years of civil strife, which was born out of succession disputes to the Shogunate throne (Meyer, 2009). Consequently, the political landscape became increasingly competitive, with made the Japanese citizens often prone to changing their support for particular military rulers.

The first real military conflict occurred when Toyotomi Hideyoshi rose to power in Japan. Although he declined the title of Shogun, he exerted his rule under the title of Kampaku, a title formerly appointed to the emperor's advisor during the Heian period (Meyer, 2006). Furthermore, Hideyoshi is often referred to as one of the three unifiers along with Oda Nobunaga, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, where Hideyoshi was known for his foreign policies that were considerably aggressive in nature (Olsen, 2005). Moreover, during Hideyoshi's reign Japan struggled with a political instability due to the decentralized form of governance. In turn, this gave Hideyoshi impetus to expand Japan's power, whilst fostering the sense of nationalism by promoting a feeling of pride and Japanese prowess. Having noticed Japan's expansionist plans to use Korea as access point to China, the Ming dynasty severed its ties with Japan in 1590, and entered into an armed conflict on Korean soil (Yamamura, 2009). Japan's military ventures were halted, as Korea's naval strength exceeded Japanese expectations (Meyer, 2006). Eventually, Hideyoshi engaged in peace talks with the Ming dynasty; in which China answered with an embassy conveying its right to partake in Japanese politics. This infuriated Hideyoshi, who re-declared war until the day he died.

Thus, from the year 800 to roughly 1600, social interaction between China and Japan became increasingly more influenced by perceived identities over time. Moreover, the strife between the Ming

Dynasty and Hideyoshi, the impact of cultural superiority, as well as the imminent fear of appearing weak continued to play a determining role throughout the life line of the Sino-Japanese relations. Altogether, the cultural and historical constructs created until 1600, might also offer insight in explaining the future wars, and struggles between the countries.

Chapter 2 – The Tribute System as International Political Order

An important component of the Social Constructivist context is the environment in which states interact. It is as the international politics professor Zehfuss argued, “Notions of the self and the environment shape interaction and are shaped by interaction” (Zehfuss, 2004). Therefore, in this chapter the international political environment in which social interaction between the two states was conducted will be addressed, as it might clarify how the international environment affected the state’s behaviour and their identities.

2.1 Ideational or Material Power as the Ordering Principle

As mentioned before, the tributary system was constructed by China, and acted as the system in which international politics was played out. It resembles a system of states, which is a system that is maintained by a shared culture, and this was especially evident in the Asia throughout the 13th until the 18th century, characterized by the ideational forces of Sino-Confucianism (Zhang, 2001). While the system of states definition was originally applied to China’s Inter-state system, it could very well explain why the tributary system maintained its dominance until the Western/European intrusion in 1841 (Kang, 2010). When examining the tributary system, two observations can be made. Firstly, the tributary system was hierarchical. Research indicated that states such as Vietnam, Korea, occasionally Japan, and others did indeed pay tribute to China, as an act of respect and as guarantee of trade with China (Kang, 2010) (McKay, 2015). Secondly, China ranked states which determined the right and frequency to pay tribute to China. Surprisingly, Korea and Vietnam were ranked higher than Japan, yet not on strength in which all three states were more or less equal, but on the application of China’s Confucianism virtues (Kang, 2010). Perhaps more importantly, the system was used by secondary states to interact with one another, rather than using it to interact with China alone (Kang, 2010).

As the ranking of countries was not based on power, the concept of power ought to be discussed next. Traditionally, a hierarchical international order would imply differences in power between states, in which one or a group of states hold considerably more power than the other states. Within a Realist context, this should result in power struggles, since states by nature will avoid subjugation by others, thus preventing hierarchy (Morgenthau, 1948) (Mearsheimer, 2006). In the tributary system, it appears that power was almost devoid of material meaning. China’s Ming Dynasty agreed not to exploit lower ranking states, therefore implying no desire to exert its power as hierarch to further its interests (Kang, 2010). However, China was not necessarily the most powerful state in the international order in terms of military power. For example, in 1211-1215, Ghengis Khan invaded China, and established the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) (Pletcher, 2011). Moreover, since the Ming

dynasty from the year 1363, peace largely dominated the Asia-Pacific in the tributary system. According to Kang, only a handful of incidents occurred: The Chinese occupation in Vietnam in 1407-1428, the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592, the Manchu invasions in both China and Korea in the years 1618-1644, the eradication campaigns of the Mongol tribes in 1690-1757, and last were the opium wars in 1839-1849, which will be discussed later (Kang, 2010). In contrast, between the 14th and 18th century in Europe, England entered into 28 wars, France 34, and Spain 36 wars (Tallett, 1992). In addition, the tributary system arguably had a conflict avoiding function. For example, in the years 1728-1858, Russia was allowed to engage in trade without taking part of the tributary rituals (Kim, 2015). Moreover, already during the Han dynasty (206 B.C – 220 A.D) emperors paid tribute and offered gifts, marriages, and more to pacify barbarian tribes, as was the case with the Shanyu barbarian tribe (Zhang, 2001).

While material power was evident to some extent in the tributary system, it was by no means the linchpin of the system. The Chinese concept of power appears to disregard material attachments such as economic prosperity and military prowess, and translates power in more ethical and moral terms (Pye, 1985). Similar to how China's ideal domestic society ought to be, the conviction of harmony, peace, acceptance of one's role in the social order of society, whilst disregarding politics for furthering individual interests, was also expressed in international politics (Pye, 1985). Additionally, Fairbank highlights the correlation between legitimacy in Chinese domestic and foreign politics, by pointing out the significance of ethnocentrism as validating factor of both domestic and international governmental rule of China (Fairbank, 1942). In addition, he explicitly argues that China's power resided in the cultural sphere, emphasizing China's considerably developed culture compared to the various less cultured, or 'barbarian' clans (Fairbank, 1942). Evidence for this claim lies with the Tribute system's code of political conduct, which consisted of Confucianism rituals implying a state's acknowledgement of China's superiority (Kim, 2015). Moreover, according to Kang, for other states to be part of this Sino-Confucianism international order, these practices ought to be adhered to whenever embassies came to Chinese court (Kang, 2010) Also, an official record of the Ming dynasty stated that barbarian tribes sought audience with the emperor, whereas a statement by the Qing dynasty stating that "none dared not to come to court" (Fairbank, 1942).

However, China's Confucianism influence power did differ per state. Ample evidence implies that the neighbouring states, such as Korea and Vietnam, were influenced by China to a greater extent than Japan (Suzuki, 2009). In addition, Korea is by many regarded as the example tributary state, and embraced the Sino-Confucianism political ideas willingly (Kim, 2015) (MacKay, 2015). However, Japan found itself in a more complicated situation. First of all, it is very likely that Japan's geographical position made interaction with China to be of less intensity than China's interaction with Korea or other neighbouring states (Suzuki, 2009). Consequently, the frequency of Japan's tribute payments was only 19 payments, as opposed to Korea's annual payments (Rose, 1998). Secondly, Japan's domestic situation did not allow the government to be structured in a Sino-Confucianism

manner. As mentioned earlier, from 1333 on, Japan was marked by civil war (Sengoku Jidai). However, after Hideyoshi's failed attempt at war with China, his successor Tokugawa unified the country, and implemented his isolation policy (Yamamura, 2009).

Chapter 3 – Identity and Social Interaction with the Western/European States

In this chapter a closer look will be given at the construction of identities, namely that of China's self-perceived identity as superior nation in the eyes of Japan. In addition, the effects of the Western/European intrusion in roughly mid-19th century will be taken into account since they introduced new ideational forces to both China and Japan.

3.1 Development of Identities in the 17th and 18th Century

After Ieyasu Tokugawa rose to power in Japan (1603-1868), he set out to restore Japan's foreign relations by creating a Japanese international order, one in which China's role was severely minimized (Zachmann, 2009). Tokugawa's isolation policy was implemented, which prevented foreigners from entering the country and Japanese from leaving. According to Jansen, the Bakufu (Military Government) attempted formal relations with China; however, participating in the tribute system would contradict the Japanese ideas and conceptions of at least equality to China (Jansen, 1992).² With isolation policy, a more domestic focus was taken, and Tokugawa implemented a dozen of 'Tokugawa laws' that governed taxes, crime, and social matters, and made the agrarian economy flourish (Rose, 2005). However, remnants of the civil war were still ever evident as expressed in a class-society in which lords and families of the Shogunate line (Shinpan) were most important. Second came the lords and the families that were former allies during the decisive battle of Sekigahara for the Shogunate, and least important were the families and lords that were former enemies (Meyer, 2009). Chinese influences were still present, albeit of less impact. For example, trade was still conducted with the Qing dynasty (1636), yet outside the tributary system, and mainly due to Qing's dependency on Japanese copper (Pletcher, 2011). However, many Japanese Confucianisms perceived the Qing rule as a cultural decline compared to the Ming dynasty, and regarded Japan as the new epitome of civilization in Asia (Zachmann, 2009). Numerous books were published arguing the Qing dynasty's inferiority. For instance, samurai Yamaga Soko heavily promoted Japan's superiority, and Hayashi Kaho's book on China's reversal to barbarian status argued that the Manchu's victory over the Ming dynasty meant Japan's succession as superior culture (Elman, 2008). More importantly, in 1618-1682 education started shifting as well. The 'Kimon School' founded by the scholar Yamazaki Ansai, started to become increasingly popular. The lectures and books used in education all emphasized

² In Tokugawa Japan, a division was growing with regards to how China's identity should be perceived. As Ming dynasty China was invaded by the Manchus, the credibility of China as the centre of civilization deteriorated, mainly due to the direct association of China's superiority with the Ming dynasty. Also, it was argued that China's internal rebellions revealed a disconnection between the country and its people, whereas Japan under Tokugawa rule was considerably more united than China (Jansen, 2008).

Japan's cultural superiority, which was the foundation for a spur of growing nationalism in the 19th century (Elman, 2008) (Zachmann, 2009).

The Qing Dynasty (1636-1912) came forth out of the 'Manchu'-people, who were direct descendants of the Jin Dynasty, located in northern China (Pletcher, 2011). Important to note is, that consensus among scholars argues that the Manchu were in fact not considered Chinese, and had a profoundly different culture and language (Waley-Cohen, 2006). The Qing dynasty sought to unite China by conquering the three feudatories/landlords of the provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou, Guangdong, and Fujian in the year 1681. In turn, this called for promoting a heavily militarized national culture with art and literature all themed with military concepts (Wakeman, 1985) (Waley-Cohen, 2006). However, this militarized approach combined with unrest in several sub-Chinese ethnic communities in regions such as Taiwan, the mountain area of Szechwan, the Kwangsi area, and strongholds of aboriginal ethnic groups near the border of the Hunan-Kweichow, were an ingredient for a period of social unrest, later to be followed by war with the British Empire in 1841 (Fairbank, 2008). Similar to Japan, both empires were mainly focussed on domestic matters, rather than on each other. However, the Qing Dynasty did inherit the tributary system, in which its ties with Korea flourished more than Korea's ties with Japan (Kang, 2010). The development of China and Korea growing closer would later turn out to be imperative to the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894.

3.2 Encounters with the European/Western International Society

In the year 1868 Tokugawa's reign forcibly ended through a revolution, in which the so called Meiji government rose to power (Sims, 2001). The Meiji government focused heavily on the restoration of Japan, hence the name 'Meiji' restoration. Western influences were relatively easily incorporated in the Japanese ideational world. Japan already developed an aptitude for learning, evident in Chinese learning and later in Dutch learning called Rangaku. In the year 1720 for example, the island Deshima was appointed as a trade post for the Dutch as exception to the isolation policy, in which Dutch ideas of modernization gradually came to light in the Japanese ideational world (still primarily dominated by Confucianism) (Meyer, 2009). Moreover, Politician Sakuma Shozan even praised Western technology, expressing awe rather than fear (Smith, 1955). However, even though the relations between the Western powers and Japan started off at quite a slow pace, eventually it benefited the West more than it did Japan.³ Already during Tokugawa's rule, the Bakufu was more or less forced into several disproportionate treaties that in turn obstructed Japan's full participation in the Western international order. A likely factor for Tokugawa to break his isolation policy was related to China's defeat and failed resistance against West (Zachmann, 2009).

³ Treaty of Amity in 1854, Treaty of Amity and Commerce in July 1858, Ansei treaties establishing pacts with Holland, Russia, Great-Britain and France, and the Austria-Hungary treaty that was comprised of the same components of the earlier treaties, and known as the definite version of the unequal treaties. All treaties were highly imperialistic in nature, as they derived Japan of its tariff autonomy. Furthermore, the Western Nations acquired the status of Most Favoured Nation, providing them with beneficial trading terms that excluded Japan (Zachman, 2009)(Auslin, 2009).

Also, Japan's unique location as archipelago might have allowed the Western influences to eventually make a gentle transition into the Japanese society (Lockwood, 1956). This is because as opposed to China's neighbouring states, the Japanese culture already consisted of multiple different cultural aspects making it less rigid than China's Confucianism culture. For example, Japan's religious sphere was syncretistic, thus combining differing religious aspects into one, as seen in Japan's Shintoism that incorporated the moral teachings of Buddhism and Confucianism (Higashibaba, 2001). Japan's political structures were also prone to change. For one, as mentioned before, the seventeen article constitution was adjusted to fit Japan's society, only to end up in a decentralized government during the civil war era (Sims, 2001). Moreover, it is not inconceivable that curiosity became intrinsic to the Japanese culture, where such a long isolation might have sparked the country's aptitude for learning once West invaded rather than suppress it (Smith, 1955). Naturally, the incorporation of knowledge derived from faulty Chinese foreign policies in dealing with the Western powers could also give reason to Japan's open stance to Western influences. China's failure to resist the West could therefore also have played an imperative role. Consequently, by opening up to Western influences combined with the later centralized government of the Meiji period in the year 1868, free movement of goods, and a country-wide focus on modernization, Japan managed to modernize at an unprecedented rate (Jansen & Rozman, 1986).

In China's case, the resistance against the West revolved around the opium trade with the British Empire, and was later accompanied by several internal rebellions (Pletcher, 2011). The British Empire pressed China to open up to the opium trade, but as China remained defiant to the British's demands, an attack was initiated on the city of Guangzhou in 1841 (Pletcher, 2011). Likely resulting from previous rebellions, such as the White Lotus Rebellion⁴ from 1796-1806 prior to the Western intrusion, China's financial capabilities were inadequate to withstand the British fleet (Pletcher, 2011) (Fairbank, 2008). Eventually China agreed with the Nanjing treaty in 1842, which allowed the Western powers to establish settlements and commence trade in four additional ports in China instead of only in Guangzhou (Fairbank, 2008). However, China still treated Western foreigners with a derogatory attitude (Fairbank, 2008). Consequently, due to the Sinocentric⁵ treatment of Westerners along with the vivid memories of the earlier military attacks in 1841, xenophobic protests against Western access to the city of Guangzhou (Pletcher, 2011). Later in 1856, the protests exacerbated when the Chinese authorities confiscated the Chinese ship 'arrow' that sailed under the British flag. The result was a combined assault of British, French, Russian, and American forces that eventually occupied Guangzhou in 1858 (Wong, 2002). Additionally, Qing dynasty military oppression of ethnic sub-Chinese groups furthered instability in the region.

⁴ The White Lotus Cult was a religious sect that was active in the area reaching from the provinces of Szechwan to Shantung, and mainly appealed to the lower classes of society, offering hope in times of poverty (Pletcher, 2011) (Fairbank, 2008).

⁵ Sinocentric is the term used to indicate the derogatory treatment of non-Chinese based on a self-perceived Chinese superiority.

In terms of instability, throughout the years 1820-1840, the area around the Kwantung and Kwangsi province were continuously pressured by an ever increasing drug circulation. Also, the growing unemployment rate in the new port of Shanghai diverted most of the trade away from the Canton port (Fairbank, 2008). Moreover, the Kwangsi province in particular became steadily more volatile due to the presence of the criminal Triad Societies, more rebellions, conflicts between migrant and local communities, and almost severe famine in the area (Michael & Chang, 1966)(Fairbank, 2008).⁶ In the end, the accumulation of social unrest in the area of Kwangsi and Kwantung set the stage for the most imperative rebellion, the Taiping rebellion. The Taiping rebellion followed an ideology influenced by Christianity, most probably a result of the Western intrusion. The leader, Hung Hsiu-Quan, sought to purify the land of anyone against him, including supporters of the Qing dynasty, by using religious pretexts as justification. Eventually, successes in the Kwantung and Kwangsi provinces led to the Taiping Empire. The Taiping rebellion eventually captured Nanking, a strategic position close the capital city of Beijing. However, after almost ten years, the Taiping rebellion was eventually suppressed and ended in 1864 (Pletcher, 2011) (Heath & Perry, 1994).

3.4 The Reconstructed Ideational World of Japan

Paramount to the ideational change in the Meiji restoration is the search for Western knowledge. In the year 1871, the emperor's ambassador Iwakura, went on a voyage to America together with the vice ambassadors Okubo Toshimichi, Ito Hirobumi, Kido Takayoshi, and Yamaguchi Masuka. The sole purpose of the voyage was no less than to acquire Western knowledge on national institutions, to favouring the great powers via diplomatic relations, and to negotiate reversal of the unequal treaties (Kazuhiro, 2007). As to why Japan deliberately desired Western knowledge, one could argue that Japan as nation does not ask 'why' the world is the way it is, but rather 'how' it became the way it is (Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003). From this intellectual stance, Japan seeking Western knowledge and applying its virtues to its society might serve material purposes, such as creating prosperity in order to strengthen the nation against potential Western invasions (Ward, 2015). However, the embassy explicitly emphasized that acquiring what Iwakura called, 'the law of nations', or simply the terms and requirements to be regarded as a civilized nation, would ensure a path to the future, void of conflicts and assaults (Kazuhiro, 2007). Supposedly, the idea was to embrace Western technologies without losing the Japanese spirit. However, the extent to which that idea succeeded is debatable. It is true that right after the Meiji government was established, the ministry of religion installed Shintoism as national faith, supported by the school of national learning, and the school of history, who both were nationalistic in nature (Morishima, 1982). Nevertheless, as time went by, the incompatibility between Shintoism and modernization surfaced, resulting in a decline of Shintoism as national religion (Morishima, 1982). However, Confucianism still appears to have played an imperative role. With

⁶ The term Hakka was used as reference for Chinese ethnic migrant groups. As disadvantaged groups in society, many Hakka communities joined the Taiping rebellions (Michael & Chang, 1966).

regards to its military modernization, soldiers were given official injunctions based on the Confucianism principles of loyalty, ceremony, bravery, faith and frugality, principles unseen in both China and Korea (Morishima, 1982). In turn, it deviated from China's Confucianism, which stressed benevolence alongside other concepts (see Chapter I).

What the Iwakura embassy found profoundly deviated from the former Chinese Confucianism conception regarding the purpose of politics ought to be. According to Iwakura's findings, Western politics served the interests of the individuals, in which a nation's independency is achieved when patriotism among the self-autonomous individuals is maintained (Beasley, 1999). In addition, Kume Kunitake of the Iwakura embassy stresses that the assimilation Confucianism morals within Japanese politics restrains that what makes Western politics so successful, namely individual autonomy (Kazuhiro, 2007). Thus, strongly opposing the Confucianism teachings that prevented the self-autonomy of individuals. Therefore, one could argue that the inevitable clash between Western and Confucianism ideational forces resulted in a so called moral or ideational void (Reitan, 2010). If the assumption of ideational void is true, Western more material forces, such as prosperity and power, prevailed in the ideational world of the new Japanese government (Reitan, 2010). However, creating a government according to Western guidelines might again have been a strategy to ensure the country's independence, whilst increasing the country's power (Mearsheimer, 2006) (Vyas, 2011). However, this would not take away the impact of the "White Man's Burden" concept. Best explained in the following quote by Kipling:

"Take up the White Man's burden,
Send forth the best ye breed -
Go bind your sons to exile to
serve your captive's need,
-To wait in heavy harness
On fluttered folk, and wild -
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child" (Bradley, 1974, p.180).

In simple terms, it refers to the ideational justification of British or Western colonization and imperialism, in which the same conviction is evident in Japan's behaviour after the Meiji Restoration until mid-20th century (Paine, 2003) (Bradley, 1974).

3.5 The China's Rigid Ideational World

In China's case, regardless of its defeats in the Opium and Arrow wars, China's self-centred view and derogatory perception of Japan and the West were preserved (Zachmann, 2009). In China's case, its ideational structure remained very rigid to say the least. Albeit logical to think that the military defeats by the West would diminish China's chauvinistic self-perception and derogatory stance towards the world and Japan, yet the opposite was evident. Research indicated that its military defeat only nourished the Chinese sense of superiority, whilst increasing resilience against Western ideational forces (Levi, 1953). Additionally, China emphasized the image of the West to be perceived as a nation of barbarians due to the use of violence and war. Conceivably, that is why a slowly Westernizing Japan failed to impress them, regardless of their developments (Levi, 1953) (Zachmann, 2009). Two

observations can be made regarding China's conservative attitude towards Japan. Firstly, the Confucianism perception of the world that stressed how a society ought to work and how civilization ought to be were defined by Chinese ideational requirements, in which deviating Western ideals were not recognized (Suzuki, 2009). For example, in 1867-77 Grand Councillor Wen Xiang came close to allowing scholars into Western language schools taught by Western teachers. However, in swift fashion, conservative Wo Ren intervened, arguing that Western teaching was in a way linked to Western technology and weapons, and that safety as defined by Chinese virtues such as loyalty of the Chinese people was contradicted (Gray, 2002). Secondly, a strengthening factor to China's Confucianism ideational world is found in its long history of social interaction in Asia through the tribute system (Levi, 1953). It is argued that China experienced cycles of stability and discord, whilst maintaining a Chinese world order until the West interfered (Wright, 1975). In that sense, China's social interaction with the West brought no impetus to incorporate Western notions of politics; history seemed to have proved that Confucianism worked as political direction as part of the cycle of stability and discord (Wright, 1975). In addition, conceivably there was a strong belief that instability was caused by the people who held office, rather than the institutions themselves. For example, after the Taiping rebellion, new officials were installed that upheld the highest standards of Confucianism (Grasso & Kort, 2015). However, considering the strong egotism in Chinese Confucianism, it might therefore serve as a chicanery that justified the desired delusion of superiority as well as China's behaviour for choosing not to modernize (Suzuki, 2009).

Nonetheless, among the Chinese population some were aware of the benefits of Western knowledge, and sought to utilize it. Among them was Li Hongzhong, who strongly advocated the idea of new political institutions and reforms to boost the economy, away from the Confucianism model (Grasso & Kort, 2015). Yet, many government officials detested his ideas of modernization. For example, foreign capital and foreign investment was strongly resisted, as Westerners and their ways were seen as self-serving, devious and a threat to social stability (Gray, 2002). Additionally, most ventures for Western knowledge were cancelled as well, and in 1881 many Chinese students and business men were called back. Moreover, even a Chinese ambassador found himself in peril upon returning from the British Empire, and was threatened numerous times, eventually forcing him to shut down his printing press (Gray, 2002) (Grasso & Kort, 2015). However, Western knowledge was not disregarded in its entirety; many technological innovative ideas were appreciated, however, those ideas related only to practical matters such as railroads, textile industry, and modernized military forces (Levi, 1953) (Grasso & Kort, 2015). Thus, compared to Japan, China's conservative attitude towards modernization, and the belief that China was still superior stood central.

Chapter 4 – Japan's Westernized Behaviour

After the establishment of the Meiji government, Korea refused to acknowledge its legitimacy due to its Westernized image (Paine, 2003). Consequently, the Meiji government became divided between

anti-Korea activist seeking military force, and Meiji reformers seeking more Western-like approaches (Auslin, 2006). However, Japan first sought to establish friendly relations with China, since China still held suzerainty over Korea, meaning it had the last say in Korea's foreign relations (Auslin, 2006). Eventually, Japan dispatched a delegation to establish the treaty of Amity and Trade with China. The treaty was modelled after the unequal 'Ansei treaties' aimed at Japan by the West in 1858 (Auslin, 2006). While the treaty was to favour Japan, the diplomat Li Hongzhang adjusted the treaty to be mutually benefitting, and was signed in 1871 (Li, Teng & Ingalls, 1956) (Zachmann, 2009). As for Korea, China refused to meddle between the Japanese-Korean disputes and referred to Korea's self-autonomous rights (Li, Teng & Ingalls, 1956). This allowed Japan to demonstrate its modernized military naval power, and force Korea into signing the treaty of Amity with Japan, formally known as the Treaty of Kangwha in 1876 (Yi, 1984).

Regarding Japan's interest in Korea, Calman, a scholar specialised in Japanese history, argues that there was no ideological reason; rather, it was nothing more than economic imperialism (Calman, 2005). He does make a point, as Iwakura was aware of Japan's economic weakness, and of Korea's fertile grounds, and especially when the ports of Pusan, Wonson, and Inch'on opened to trade with the Treaty of Kangwha, Korea's economic importance to Japan increased tremendously (Yi, 1984) (Calman, 2005). Also, he acknowledged Japan's lack of military power to venture beyond its border, which could explain Iwakura's indifference towards military conflicts with Korea (Sims, 2001). At the same time, the European powers remained vigil regarding the Sino-Japanese relations. A Sino-Japanese alliance could reinforce both countries against the European powers, and in China's case prevent Japan from allying with European powers (Zachmann, 2009). Despite the Sino-Japanese Amity and Trade treaty, China's contempt with Japan still dominated. According to an unknown German reporter, China perceived Japan inferior, and traitor to Asia, similar to what China stationed military commander William M. Lang, noticed among the Chinese military (Paine, 2003).

China was mainly occupied with fending of Japanese influence in Korea from the year 1876. A peculiar response from China was to call upon Western/European powers to come to an agreement with Korea, despite China's derogatory attitude towards the West/Europe (Zachmann, 2009). With the coup d'état led by Kim Ok-Kiun in 1884 to overthrow the Korean government in favour of Japan, Korea became a sensitive topic among the Japanese population (Li, Teng & Ingalls, 1956). For example, the Kokumin Shimbun newspapers depicted the Japanese-Korean relations as the Teacher-student relationship, where Japan acted as teacher (Paine, 2003). Among the public in Japan in general grew a strong conviction of Japanese superiority (Iriye, 2014). Prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Kanzo Uchimura a later renowned World War Two pacifist published in the Japan Weekly Mail, that a war with China was righteous due to its similarity with the wars in Europe (Miura, 1996). Also, he argued its moral justness since China mocked Japan's friendly approach to Korea, and kept Korea and itself from global progress (Miura, 1996).

Such statements in Japan were perhaps not surprising. Moreover, the Japan Weekly Mail stated that the population yearned for foreign employment (Paine, 2003). At some point, Japanese nationalism even went beyond sinophobia. Naito Konan, sinologist and historian, strongly advocated Japan's superiority over China and West. He stated that Japan was a young modernizing country, with capabilities that could exceed those of the West (Iriye, 2014). The tension between China and Japan exacerbated when Korea annulled the agreement on the Pusan-Nagasaki telegram line with Japan, and agreed on the telegram line between Seoul and Ghanghai-Tjianjin with China. However, the triggering factor to the Sino-Japanese war was the death of Kim Ok-Kiun, who resided in Japan as honourable guest (Paine, 2003). In the end, in 1894 until 1895 Japan fought and won the war against the China and Korea, with considerable ease (Yi, 1984).

After the peace treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, China recognized Korea's independence, ceded Taiwan to Japan, and while Japan coveted the Liaodong Peninsula, the Tripartite intervention (Russia, Germany, and France), allowed Russia to claim the Liaodong peninsula (Meyer, 2009). While the treaty was supposed humiliate China, most of the public felt humiliated instead as Japan gave in to the Tripartite's demands (Zachmann, 2009). Despite the humiliation, nationalism grew. Nakanishi advocated Japan's duty to guide weaker nations, defeat those who oppose, and maintain peace in the world as a global power (Zachmann, 2009). Moreover, sinologist Taoka Reiun justified the war, as it should have made China aware that mending its ways was necessary (Zachmann, 2009). Also, in the light of Russia's trans-Siberian railway in Manchuria, Konoe Atsumaro president of the house of peers (upper house of the imperial bicameral legislature), argued that Japan should claim its rights on the Pacific, Japanese, and Chinese sea (Zachmann, 2009)

In contrast to Japan, China focussed on domestic matters. An attempt to reform the country was made, called '100 days of reform' in 1898, in which ideological change was considered (Pletcher, 2011). Reformer Kang Youwei tried to justify his plea for ideological reform. He argued that Confucianism and Buddhism supposedly promoted change as inevitability and ought to be accepted. In 1898, emperor Guangxu also favoured reform in more radical fashion, albeit to no avail as conservatives replaced him by empress Cixi (Pletcher, 2011). While the reform was no success, aspects such as freedom of speech and thought, and private enterprises became accepted (Pletcher, 2011). Yet Anti-Western/European sentiment dominated in the form of the Boxer rebellion (Bodin & Warner, 1979). The rebellion strove to rid China of Christianity and foreigners. Empress Zhu Xi supported the rebellion by publically announcing that groupings and secret societies should not be confused with those of criminal intent (Bodin & Warner, 1979). While they maintained their presence until 1901, the combined forces of Japan, Russia, England, France, the United States, and Austria-Hungary eventually defeated rebellion (Pletcher, 2011).

Prior to the boxer rebellion, Japan pondered on how to deal with European powers, whilst furthering imperialistic endeavours in China. Politician Konoe Atsumaru, and Okuma Shigenobu, prime minister in 1898, strongly advocated an alliance with other European powers as most beneficial.

However, Journalist Fukuzawa Yukichi, founder of Keio University, advocated an alliance with China against the European powers (Zachmann, 2009). Fukuzawa, argued that European powers could not rule China, simply due to their unfamiliarity with Asian knowledge, traditions and culture, whereas Japan could if provided with an alliance with China. Additionally, Konoe favoured a racial alliance, whereas he perceived the inevitable clash between the White and Yellow race. His statements were largely frowned upon, as he grouped China together with Japan, contradicting the conception of Japan's superiority. In contrast, Okuma stated that race and tradition had no influence in international politics, and the state most likely to achieve victory should be allied with (Zachmann, 2009). Although he praised the West, he also argued that Japan should preserve its culture, as losing it would imply a loss of independency (Wakabayashi, 1998). In the end, Japan agreed on the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, and it meant that Japan could be regarded as a great power in the international society (Jansen, 2000). More importantly, it safeguarded Japan against a Russian allied attack, which proved beneficial in the Russian-Japanese War, and propelled Japan into participating in World War One (WWI).

Chapter 5 – Japan's Identity Discourse and Post War Reconciliation

In the final chapter of the result section, Japan's identity discourse will be addressed prior to World War II (WWII). Moreover, WWII will also be discussed to an extent; however, some historical events, such as Mao Zedong's rise of communism, will be left out, or not discussed in detail, simply due to little relevance to this research. The last section of this chapter will discuss the reconciliation phase up until the contemporary relations.

5.1 The Japanese Identity Discourse

After World War One (WWI), Japan was admitted to the League of Nations as the only 'non-white' member in 1919. Despite its membership Japan was confronted with a growing trend of anti-Japanese sentiments in the West and Europe, which raised the question: Can Japan be identified as 'Asian' or can one assume an identity equivalent to those of the 'Western Great powers'? True, Japan did modernize accordingly to Western standards, incorporating advanced technologies, applying treaty based behaviour in its foreign policies, yet never before was ethnicity taken into the identity equation (Ward, 2015) (Best, 2010). Conceivably, the immigration conflict between Japan and the Western nations were paramount (Shimazu, 1998). For example, Australia stated in derogatory fashion that as the only white populace they were at risk being surrounded by the Yellow race, and most Western countries treated the Japanese the same as any other Asian, thus insulting Japan by grouping the Japanese together with "lesser Asian civilizations" (Shimazu, 1998). The conflict exacerbated in 1922, when the Supreme court of the United States stated that the Japanese were by definition not of Caucasian ethnicity, resulting in the 1924 immigration law prohibiting Japanese eligibility for citizenship, thus implying inferiority based on racial criteria (Shimazu, 1998) (Hirobe, 2001). Consequently, what emerged was Pan-Asianism, an ideology aimed at uniting the Asian races. In turn, Pan-Asianism gave impetus for holding the 'All Asian Race Conference' in 1926, Nagasaki Japan

(Best, 2010). At the conference, China disregarded Japan's supposedly good intent, and distributed pamphlets in Nagasaki advocating that the conference was a Japanese imperialist scheme to justify its earlier invasions, but also concessions that Japan acquired through its '21 demands' deal in 1915 and other gains in 1919⁷ (Shimazu, 1998). Moreover, China's representatives also stated openly that Japan did not qualify to be among the gathering of Asian races, as it stood isolated from the main continent being an Island. Lastly, Legislator Huang stated:

"I am confident that China is the birthplace of culture and has the power to rule the entire world. Asia, in particular, is the center of culture, and China is the greatest country within Asia. ... Asians stand at the center of the world, and everybody knows that China is the center of Asia"
(Best, 2010, p. 83/84).

5.2 Japanese Aggression and the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945

Japan's timing of the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was impeccable. China had suffered from a civil war between the nationalistic Kuomintang political party (KMT), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)⁸ in 1925. As result, China's finances were drained, and by the year 1931 it was in the middle of a military re-organization (Levi, 1953). Japan had ample reason for the invasion. One reason was the idea of 'thought war', ideological war against the West (Kushner, 2006). An anonymous author stated that democracy based on the freedom and equality of all individuals should never act as ideological guideline since it would ignore the importance of family bonds, and could therefore only result in conflict (Kushner, 2006). Consequently, the government deliberately sought to reaffirm Japanese superiority domestically, but also strived to inform neighbouring countries of their Asian superiority and its so-called duty to lead Asia (Kushner, 2006). Also, in the year 1929/1930, many international markets declined, thus emphasizing the importance of Japan's conceded area of Shendong, and Taiwan, but also the coveted area of Manchuria (Best, 2010). Moreover, due to the establishment of China's nationalist government in 1927, the former areas of China became prone to a resurgence of the Chinese identity (Fenby, 2008) (Best, 2010). Likely, a Chinese identity would threaten Japan's ideological idea of unifying Asia. The last incident was the railway explosion in Mukden, the capital of Manchuria. According to Meyer, the incident in Mukden was orchestrated by the Japanese army and used to blame the Chinese as perpetrator (Meyer, 2009). Eventually, in 1937⁹ Japan and China went to war, triggered by an assault on Japanese soldiers in Nanjing. In Addition, new treaties with Germany and Italy propelled Japan into World War II (WWII), as member of the so-called 'Axis-Alliance' (Meyer, 2009).

The Japanese occupation of Nanjing is perhaps one of the most vivid memories smearing the contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. During the invasion of Nanjing, thousands of civilians were murdered and raped. To avoid further rape and aggression by Japanese soldiers, the concept of comfort

⁷ The areas that were target of the 21 demands deal were Taiwan, Liaozhou Bay, parts in Manchuria (Shimazu, 1998).

⁸ The communist party was a direct result of social interaction with Russia, in which Lenin saw China as part of his global revolutionary vision (Fenby, 2008).

⁹ By the year 1937, Japan had left the League of Nations due to heavy criticism regarding the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (Meyer, 2009).

women, or prostitution was normalized (Yoshida, 2006). The problem swiftly exacerbated, for instance military officer Umezo Yoshijiro demanded 8000 Korean comfort women¹⁰ for his troops (Tanaka, 2002). News coverage around the Nanjing massacre was strongly censored in order to romanticize the war, and to maintain the public's support (Yoshida, 2006). For example, the newspaper Tokyo Asahi Shimbun stated that Chinese aggression forced Japan out of its peaceful role in Asia, and that Japan's military action was rectified (Yoshida, 2006).

5.3 Post war and State Reconstruction

Japan was the dominant force in Asia achieving consecutive victories. However, the aerial battle of midway was the turning point, in which the Japanese lost a considerable amount of aircrafts (Meyer, 2009). With the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, Japan waged war with the United States, followed by two nuclear strikes on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in Japan in the year 1945, forcing Japan to surrender (Meyer, 2009). Prior to the Friendship and Peace treaty of 1978, both China and Japan were occupied with rebuilding and recovering from the war. In Japan's case, it was also reconstructing its identity. This was because Japan perceived itself to be the liberator of Asia ever since first Sino-Japanese war of 1894, which was no longer an accepted identity (Togo, 2005). While some among the masses acknowledged the mistakes and evil Japan had wrought upon Asia, others that fought in the war actively tried to defend Japan's World War II behaviour (Togo, 2005). However, avoidance of war to Japan was a dominating thought, strongly deviating from the Japan prior to its defeat in 1945 (Kawashima, 2003). National security became Japan's primary concern. Pacifism in particular gained popularity, arguably most feasible to gain the trust of surrounding countries, in other words deterrence through peace. Naturally, the nuclear bombings were also a factor that made Japan refrain from military activities. Moreover, the bombings are perhaps still a factor for little military activity by Japan today. With regards to the bombings, Obama recently visited Japan to promote a nuclear bomb free world (Liptak & Griffiths, 2016). Interesting is, that a survey of 2015 concluded that 73% of the Japanese respondents felt no apology from the US was needed (Stokes, 2015). The most evident example is article 9 of Japan's newly formed constitution:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state shall not be recognized” (Togo, 2005, p.40).

However, when Japan renounced its use of military force, it sparked the question whether to install self-defence forces or not, and if doing so would incite fear to neighbouring countries. One possible explanation for Japan's pacifism can be appointed to the role of the United States. Similar to Germany in Europe in its post-war reconstruction, the US provided means of security, thus waiving

¹⁰.In 1938, the city of Wuhan alone had more than 20 brothels corresponding with approximately 400 women, the city Jiujiang included 250 women forced into prostitution, of which more than half originated from Korea, and in the cities of Southern China more than 800 women were counted (Tanaka, 2002).

the need for militarism in general (Miyashita, 2007). Although, it seems almost unlikely that Japan, that formerly sought to unite Asia, suddenly reverted its security policy without any intellectuals advocating the latter, namely militarism. From this perspective, a strong point can be made by referring to historical constructs as cause for changes in a country's diplomatic nature, in other words the impact of memories, such as military defeats (Miyashita, 2007). Needless to say, many still desired a self-defence force. From a Realist perspective, the self-defence force should not provoke war or discontent since maintaining the status quo would mean preserving the peace of the international community (Togo, 2005). Nonetheless, that would in itself disregard the meaning of historical constructs, and the memories associated with the Japanese military. Peace was anything but a memory associated with the Japanese military.

An interesting fact to take into account is that Japan was economically weakened during its post war reconstruction. Also, Japan maintained continuous interaction with the United States that desired the economic recovery of Japan (Katzenstein, 2008). Also, towards the 1960s, the Ministry on International Trade and Industry (MITI) overcame an attempt made by the Defence Ministry to reinstall self-defence military security. With its victory over the Defence Ministry, MITI emphasized a prosperous economy, albeit at the expense of the budgets of the Self-Defence Forces (Katzenstein, 2008). Arguably, wealth became Japan's means of security, rather than military power.

As for China, in 1949, Mao Zedong established the communist government in Beijing, the country now being called the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Fenby, 2008). The governing CCP enjoyed great popularity, since they managed to combat inflation and brought relative economic prosperity to China (Pletcher, 2010). Furthermore, China became of considerable interest to the United Nations (UN). The UN perceived the Soviet Union (then officially called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) a threat to the political independence of China, partially due to the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 that allowed the Soviet Union to lend support to the Chinese Communists (Lawrance, 2013). In contrast to China, the United States desired an independent Taiwan, which made the Soviet Union an increasingly attractive ally since China regarded Taiwan as PRC territory (Lawrance, 2013). Another factor was the Korean War, in which China allied with Russia in accordance with the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty, and of course with North Korea. In addition, the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union forced Japan into recognizing the Republic of China (Taiwan) established by the United States, rather than the communist People's Republic of China (Vyas, 2011). Consequently, this restrained Japan's trade policies to countries free from communist influences. The ongoing tension made even the smallest mistake a fatal one in the Sino-Japanese relations. For example, in 1958, private Japanese business associates concluded three trade agreements with China, while the fourth trade agreement never came to fruition. This was due to the flag incident in Nagasaki, where China flag in Nagasaki was taken down, in which China responded by refraining from trade relations for four years due to perceiving it an insult (Hsiao, 1977).

5.4 The Friendship and Peace Treaty and the Problem of History

In the year 1972, an official statement called the Zhou-Tanaka Communique provided the starting ground for the Friendship and Peace Treaty of 1978, and with it the normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations (Wang, 2000). Resulting from the Zhou-Tanaka communique, Japan's peace treaty with Taiwan in 1952 was rendered invalid, Japan's embassy in Taipei closed, Japan was to recognize Taiwan as part of China, and in return Japan did not have to pay war reparations (Wang, 2000). From a Realist perspective, with the agreements, China's aim could have been to bond with Japan in order to safeguard itself against a looming Russian influence, and perhaps also to Western influence applied by the United States in the light of the Cold War (Uemura, 2013). Yet China's renouncement of Japanese war reparations does not correspond with Realism. In contrast to safeguarding itself, the following statement of Zhou-Tanaka Communique placed more emphasis on the mutual recognition of the past:

“...the two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries ... The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damage in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself”(Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1991, p.32).

Also important to note is, that even now the history problem was still treated as a separate problem from war reparations by Japan (Söderberg, 2002). Moreover, in more recent statements, the problem of history is still vivid and noticeable:

“The history question of how to understand and deal with [renshi he duidai] Japanese militarist aggression in China was already a focal point in the 1972 negotiation over the Chinese–Japanese diplomatic normalization. It was clearly spelt out in the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration and Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and has become the political foundation of China–Japan relations. The Chinese side always advocates ‘history not forgotten is a guide to the future’, and is willing to look to the future and develop lasting friendship between the two peoples on the basis of respecting history” (Söderberg, 2002, p.11).

Thus, with history as focal point of the Sino-Japanese relations, more conflicts occurred between the years 1972 and 1978. The conflict over Taiwan in particular, is one that concerns history as well as identity perception. In 1973, China condemned the Tokyo-Taipei CAL (Cargo Air Lines) airline, perceiving Japan did not fully recognize China as the true China (Rose, 1998). Consequently, pro-Taiwan protests that favored economic relations between Taiwan and Japan arose. In turn, these protests were associated by China with a resurgence of War-time Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere¹¹ (Rose, 1998). Arguably, China applied history to favor its diplomatic position, as it combined two separate issues, since Taiwan was invaded by Japan in 1895.

¹¹ The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was an endeavour promoted by Japan to create prosperity in Asia whilst resisting Western/European imperialism, which turned out to be a concept that was just as imperialistic in nature as the Western/European states were (Best, 2010).

After the Friendship and Peace Treaty of 1978, the first obstruction in the positive development of the Sino-Japanese relations was the text book issue in 1982, where Japan changed the wording of history textbooks (Masalski, 2001). The first revision came to attention in the year 1982, in which China stated that such an act was a betrayal of their mutual understanding of the past, as well as of what had been agreed on in the Zhou-Tanaka Communique in 1972 and the Friendship and Peace Treaty of 1978 (Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1991). Chinese newspapers also responded in aggressive fashion with statements as ‘we must bear in mind this short lesson’ by the China’s *People’s Daily*; *the Daogong Bao* in Hong Kong published a report of Tokyo that related to the so-called ‘distortions of history’ (Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1991). Moreover, in China, all historic literature was strongly controlled, and also very patriotic. For instance, academic history publications strongly stressed the Japanese aggression and often included a warning against future Japanese militarism, ensuring the public to anticipate the worst from Japan (Rose, 2005). Moreover, books such as *The China that can say no* made no distinction between Anti-Japan sentiment and Anti-Western sentiment (Rose, 2005). As for Japan, while war responsibility became increasingly important in its literature, topics such as Japan’s cultured civilization and its place in the international scene were also strongly emphasized. Additionally, Japan included the war-themes in entertainment, expressed in Japanese comics (Rose, 2005). However, the very root of the textbook problem revolved around educational material. As mentioned before, China perceived history to be paramount in the Sino-Japanese bilateral relations. Also, as Kathleen Woods Masalski, the author of *Censoring History* argues, education prepares society for the future and therefore affects a country as a whole (Masalski, 2001) (Rose, 2005). Therefore, it is fully comprehensible that the textbook issue was such controversy, considering China’s emphasis on history and its relation as affecting the future. To be exact, what Japan did was changing the wording of history (Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1991). For example, the Ministry of Education in Japan changed sentences such as “Aggression towards China” to “advance into China” (Masalski, 2001). Yet paramount was the description of the Nanking massacre, which was referred to as being caused by resistance by Chinese civilians (Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1991). The Chinese government responded by:

“The textbook affair runs counter to the spirit of the Sino-Japanese joint statement and the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, is detrimental to the consolidation and development of the peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, and will hurt the feelings of the Chinese people; the Chinese government cannot but express the utmost concern” (Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1991, p.34).

Apart from a ‘warrior’ meagre apology, shocking was the statement by Matsuno, the director general of the National Japanese Land Development Agency:

“When Japan ‘advanced’ into another country, the word ‘aggression’ was never used . . . If someone asks us to change ‘advance’ into ‘aggression’, that means ‘interfering in internal affairs’ and ‘distorting facts’. This will lead Japanese children to say that our forefathers had done something evil” (Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1991, p.34).

Arguably, Japan was an ideologically divided nation; whereas some desired a new Japanese identity, others still felt the Japanese spirit strongly embedded. However, Matsuno also emphasized in a later statement that only a handful favored Japan's invasion in China, and therefore Japan as a whole could not be held accountable, yet it does provide opportunities to learn and study, and to prevent something similar from ever happening (Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1991).

5.5 Contemporary Perceptions and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island conflict

Although years have gone by, and some disputes have been resolved, Sino-Japanese discontent always seems to occur at some point. The Island conflict started with the collusion between a Chinese fishing boat and two Japanese patrol ships near the islands in 2010. Camera footage supposedly indicated that the fishing boat deliberately smashed into the Japanese patrol boats (Lee, 2011). The islands itself are not inhabited, but rich in fishing resources, as well as in gas and oil (BBC, 2014). China's primary claim is that the islands have been part of its territory already during the tributary system. In contrast, Japan claimed to have ceded the islands onto Japanese territory during the First Sino-Japanese war of 1895, and when Japan was forced to relinquish its invaded territories after World War II, these islands came under the supervision of the US, in which they would later be placed under Japanese authority (BBC, 2014). From both perspectives, undeniably Japan's claim appears most credible, as official records exist, but also that China's claim reaches far into history. As a response China announced an expansion of its military air space, including coverage of the islands (Harding, 2016).

An interesting development is that rather than Chinese fear for Japan's power, Japan in some way has come to fear China. In a recent report of 2010, China's rapid growth made the Japanese uneasy to some extent (Liquin, 2010). Not unlikely, the Chinese nationalist sentiment feeds the uneasiness Japan experiences when faced with an ever developing China, both economically, as well as militarily (Liquin, 2010). Also, China's aggressive politics claiming the East China Sea raised even more discontent (Bender, 2016). China argued that it used to be theirs during the Han Dynasty and even bears China's name, hence its statement to claim it (Bender, 2016). Moreover, in public opinion polls supervised by the Japanese public opinion institute Genron in collaboration with the newspaper *China Daily*, 93% of the Japanese respondents perceived China with an unfavorable attitude, whereas 86.6% of China perceived Japan unfavorable (The Genron NPO & The China Daily, 2014). Within the discontent on both sides, the history factor is paramount, as is the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island conflict. Furthermore, the survey indicated that 59.6 % of the Chinese respondents perceived Japan with a lack of remorse regarding the invasion of China, whereas other interesting reasons were Japan's strategic play with the United States assumingly aimed at downplaying China on ideological, military and economic fronts, namely by involving the US in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island conflict (The Genron NPO & The China Daily, 2014). As for the Japanese public, discontent was found in China's behavior perceived as not to aligning to international rules (55.1%), China's aggressiveness in acquiring

resources (52.8%), and again the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue (50.4%) (The Genron NPO & The China Daily, 2014).

The question that remains is why does China continue to hold onto the past? One possible explanation can be related to *guanxi* and the relation-oriented Chinese politics. *Guanxi* is the sociological framework in which state behavior and conflicts are played out (Uemura, 2013). As explained in the literature review, *guanxi* focusses on relation building by principle of reciprocity, meaning that if person A downplays a conflict, it should result in positive behavior from person B as gratitude (Uemura, 2013). The concept of *guanxi* bears a strong resemblance to Confucianism virtues. For instance, Confucianism stressed harmony, benevolence, acceptance of social status and hierarchy, kinship, and other principles mentioned in Chapter I. *Guanxi* relies on reciprocity for conflict resolution, in which downplaying conflicts align with the Confucianism principle of harmony (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2004). Also, trust, and relations based on friendship are pivotal to the workings of *guanxi* in the Chinese contemporary society (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2004). Moreover, considering that Confucianism used to be the primary framework for behavior, it is very likely that *guanxi* does indeed provide the same function, thus being a social framework for interaction (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2004). Likewise, downplaying conflicts would reinforce the importance of bilateral state-relations. However, flawed within this framework is the tendency to heavily focus on that which has been downplayed, in China's case its history. Additionally, it includes positive apathy or rather a resistance to change that could follow from conflicts, thus refraining from addressing problems until a particular problem exacerbates (Uemura, 2013).

The Analysis

Section 1: Social Constructivism and Ideational Forces

Via social interaction throughout history, Japan developed a culture close to that of China, with cultural aspects such as tea ceremonies, the stage-play art of Noh, and Confucianism/Buddhist principles incorporated in Japanese religion Shintoism (Meyer, 2009). Moreover, political structures were also derived from China's culture and political system (Meyer, 2009). To answer the research question whether ideational forces, such as ideals, beliefs, culture, and historical memories affected state behaviour, the following variables will be addressed in the first section of the analysis: culture, identity, and power.

As Wendt argues, identity perception strongly influences the nature of social interaction (Jackson & Sørensen, 2006) (Wendt, 1992). As the results point out, Japan's perceived identity of China was that of a culturally superior nation. What were China's virtues that radiated cultural superiority? As indicated in Chapter I, all cultural and political knowledge acquired by Japan was highly Confucianism in nature, making China's claim as example civilization more credible. The Confucianism ideational forces included the principles of loyalty to sincerity, the divine right to rule, honesty and harmony within the state, and a resentment of individual interests in politics (Suzuki, 2009) (Pye, 1985). Interesting to note is that these principles also governed inter-state political conduct. Research concluded that the Asian-Pacific international order was the tributary system, structured by hierarchy (Kang, 2010). The immediate difference between the tributary system and the European world order of that time is that there were considerably fewer conflicts in the tributary system (Kang, 2010). As indicated in Chapter II, between the 14th and 18th century, 98¹² conflicts occurred in Europe, whereas in the Chinese tributary system between the 14th and 19th century a total of five¹³ conflicts occurred, in which one was the Opium Wars with the British empire (Kang, 2010). Therefore, one could assume that China's Confucianism ideational forces of harmony and acceptance of hierarchy dominated throughout the tributary system given the relatively peaceful environment. Nonetheless, war in Europe could be more likely considering it had more independent states that Asia had. More proof for the ideational impact of Chinese Confucianism is that states that interacted with one another also adhered to China's Confucianism principles (Kim, 2015) (Kang, 2010). In other words, the ideational forces of China's Confucianism principles were indeed strong enough to affect state behaviour of the Asian-Pacific environment at large. However, assuming this to be true, it does not explain why China repeatedly paid other states and tribes to pacify them, which would not align with China's superior identity.

¹² In contrast, between the 14th and 18 century in Europe, England entered 28 wars, France 34, and Spain 36 wars (Tallett, 1992).

¹³ The Chinese occupation in Vietnam in 1407-1428, the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592, the Manchu invasions in both China and Korea in the years 1618-1644, the eradication campaigns of the Mongol tribes in 1690-1757, and last were the opium wars in 1839-1849, which will be discussed later (Kang, 2010).

Other interesting findings that could discredit the feasibility of Social Constructivism explaining the Sino-Japanese relations, is the concept of power, which could greatly change the interpretation of why Japan behaved the way it did throughout history. As research indicated, ‘power’ was widely perceived as being similar to the idea of a virtuous Confucianism civilization, rather than material forces such as wealth and military (Pye, 1985). Two characteristics of the tributary system deviate from the Constructivist context of ideals and beliefs guiding state behaviour. First of all, China obligated other states to partake in rituals and ceremonies that aimed at the recognition of China’s superiority (Kim, 2015). Assuming the Constructivist argument that state behaviour was indeed guided by beliefs and ideals, enforcing such rituals should be redundant. This is because the belief of superiority ought to be sufficient, since adhering to Confucianism principles of harmony and acceptance of hierarchy was a requirement for participation (Fairbank, 1942) (Kim, 2015). By enforcing the rituals, it acts as evidence for a Realist context, in which the Confucianism principles can be perceived as tools used to gain recognition, while preserving the status quo. In turn, it aligns with Morgenthau’s cultural imperialism, which does not aim at economic or territorial gain, but at the control of minds (Morgenthau, 1948). This will allow the Confucianism principle of harmony to be interpreted as imperialistic control rather than ideational conformity between the Asian countries. This would suggest an overlapping between Social Constructivist’s concepts of ideational forces with the Realist idea of acquiring power as primary interest. Therefore, with regards to power, could a Realist theory in explaining state behaviour still be feasible with a more ideational concept of power, thus one constructed of beliefs, ideals, and culture? The results regarding Japan’s deviating behaviour compared to other Asian states would argue so.

Section 2: Japan’s and China’s State Behaviour

Research showed that in 1592, 1894, and in 1931 Japan waged war on China (including Korea), whereas other states remained relatively docile to China. The first interpretation is done using Uemura’s concept of cultural Constructivism, based on Hofstede’s idea that culture determines how one perceives changes and interaction (Hofstede, n.d). Derived from Hofstede and Uemura’s theories, one could assume that Japan has cultural traits unique of its own. One assumption is that this cultural trait for Japan is its aptitude to learning and adapting, thus a future-oriented nation. Proof to this claim is found in the adjustment of Chinese knowledge. For example, emperor Kanmu (781 – 806) installed a bureau of archivists and an imperial police force, both unknown to Chinese Tang politics, (Meyer, 2009). As mentioned in the results, the imperial police and bureau of archivist were a response to ensure obedience to the law as many powerful families striving for power arose, and the population pressured the available resources (Meyer, 2009). Moreover, Japan’s approach towards Western/European was relatively similar, as the Iwakura embassy deliberately ventured to acquire Western knowledge on national institutions (Kazuhiro, 2007). In both cases, Japan adapted its behaviour accordingly, from rituals in the tributary system (albeit only the times China allowed

Japan), to a treaty-based approach similar to the Western/European nations. Secondly, Japan's later modernization process is renowned for its swiftness, unlike in any other Asian country. However, the second argument itself is rather weak. More likely is the idea that Japan's geographical location made Japan less prone to full assimilation in the Chinese ideational world order (Lockwood, 1956). Additionally, research also showed that it is believed that Japan as a nation seeks to know how things became the way they are (Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003). While Hofstede's cultural conception does provide input, material factors could matter, as well as domestic factors that shaped perceptions. This will be discussed later on.

For the concept of power, research indicated that the concept of power was defined as recognition of China's civilizational virtues by other states along Confucianism standards (Fairbank, 1942). This would mean acceptance of a state by its hegemon China, if it was deemed an acknowledged civilization based on China's Confucianism guidelines. In that sense, acquiring Chinese virtues would secure Japan, as it would uphold the same virtues as a civilization that was perceived superior in all aspects. As least, that was what China communicated to other states. As a result, Japan's constitution, writing system, art, and religion contained a great number of Chinese similarities (Meyer, 2009). To place this within a Realist context, it is simply a matter of changing the meaning of power. Similar to how military and economic power would strengthen the security of a country, in the tributary system civilizational splendour according to China's guidelines could arguably do the same. In other words, it could act as power. For example, instead of two states engaging in alliance forming where they traded oil for food resources, China and Japan did the same, but with Chinese knowledge in exchange for recognition of superiority. The assumption can then be made, that Chinese learning was a strategic move to survive. In other words, it was a defensive Realist stance, in which the status quo was maintained since no state was embarrassed in the process. Embarrassment would mean not acquiring China's consent to paying tribute, which would imply culture inferiority.

However, identity also plays an imperative role. As China's Qing dynasty rose to power during the 17th century, Japan refrained from Chinese learning, as it had done in the 8th century. For Japan, the former Ming dynasty held the idea of Chinese superiority intact, in which the Qing dynasty smeared China's identity. Thus, as Hopf argues, identity is constructed through social practices, or interaction, and vice versa (Hopf, 1998). China did this effectively during the Ming dynasty, whereas the Qing dynasty failed simply for not being regarded as Chinese, being culturally different. Considering Hopf's theory that identity gives meaning to social practices and vice versa, the assumption can be made that Chinese knowledge, practices, and Chinese civilizational virtues as social practice were defined as power. This is because China was perceived with the identity as superior nation, which in turn was an identity, constructed through social practices in the tributary system. Therefore, when the Manchu Qing dynasty rose to power, this superior identity distorted since the Manchu people were perceived as culturally different and not even considered Chinese (Waley-Cohen, 2006). Therefore, under the banner of the Qing dynasty, China could not be considered a

superior nation, which in turn deteriorated the formerly perceived superior splendour of Chinese virtues and knowledge. In addition, when the Qing dynasty lost to the British Empire, Chinese knowledge and virtues lost its value and were valued less than Japan's recognition, thus an unequal exchange against Japan's interest of security. Instead, Japan eventually perceived more prospects in Western/European knowledge, as practices of the West/Europe, namely defeating the former hegemon, made the West superior and therefore also its knowledge (Mearsheimer, 2006).

Section 3: Materials Factors Affecting Ideational Forces

The third approach moves along the lines of Shiping's social evolutionary approach. In his approach, the ideational world of beliefs, ideals, and history is applied to the material world made of power, geography, the international environment and state relations (Shiping, 2008). What stands out here, is that the states culturally closest to China were neighbouring states, or at least part of the mainland. Japan on the other hand, was as archipelago on the rim of China's ideational sphere of influence (Lockwood, 1956). Moreover, research indicated a clear difference in how the concept of loyalty was perceived. While China interpreted loyalty as sincerity to one's self, Japan interpreted it as loyalty to one's ruler, in Japan's case the warlords (Morishima, 1982). Not only that, even in the late 18th century, the injunction the soldiers were given was also devoid of any benevolence, yet filled with aspects of bravery, faith, loyalty, frugality, and ceremony (Morishima, 1982).

Also, with regards to geographical location, while it could be a coincidence, aspects of bravery and frugality in particular were unknown to both China and Korea. This could point out the emphasis on geographical proximity concerning the quality of social interaction and the understanding of what has been exchanged (Morishima, 1982). Another important factor to take into account is Wendt's emphasis on the environment affecting social interaction (Zehfuss, 2004). Apart from geographical proximity, Japan's domestic environment was extremely competitive. As stated in chapter I and II, from 1333 on Japan was engaged in civil war until Tokugawa's unification (Yamamura, 1990). Considering the Japanese interpretation of the Confucianism principle of loyalty, it is conceivable to assume that Japan developed competitive tendencies in its national culture and identity. For example, Hideyoshi launched an attack on China in 1592, and while the attack itself defies the principle of hierarchy in the Chinese Confucianism settings, it does align with loyalty to one's ruler, as well as with bravery. Nevertheless, that does not explain why Tokugawa refrained from military attacks towards the West, despite Confucianism values bravery, as well as a divided populace similar to the situation during Hideyoshi's rule, in which he used war to spark nationalism. As Levy argues, to implement new ideas and policies, shifts in power are to be taken into account and in Japan's case the social unrest and the divided population between the Shogun and Emperor simply did not allow aggressive competitive behaviour. This might explain why the isolation (Sakoku) policy was implemented in the first place (Levy, 1994).

Section 4: The Correlation between Constructivism, Realism, and Identity

Up until the first Sino-Japanese war (1894), the Social Constructivist and Realist theories can both to an extent be applied. However, material factors also have to be taken into account, providing this dissertation with more interpretations. Combining history with, Social Constructivism and Realism, and applying it to the Post-War era, trends in China's and Japan's behaviour can be found. Research showed that both China and Japan made Realist moves at some point in history. China called upon Western powers in 1876 to fend off Japanese influence in Korea, despite its resentment of the West (Zachmann, 2009). As for Japan, Asian history scholar Calman, argued that prior to the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894 Japan had no ideological reasoning for coveting Korea, since Japan was in need of fertile ground and potential markets that both existed in Korea (Calman, 2005). However, intertwined with these material motives that were undeniably present, was the belief that the West could not rule Asia due to the lack of historical cultural knowledge, whereas Konoe Atsumaru emphasized racial elements, in which the Caucasian was unsuitable, being not Asian (Zachmann, 2009). Also interesting is that the Anti-Western sentiments arose after Japan's concessions (Liaodong peninsula) were placed under Russian authority (Meyer, 2009). A similar trend can be seen after Japan's membership in the League of Nations. Without a doubt, Japan desired to be great, but to its disappointment the League of Nations members did not consider Japan equal, as research show a considerable amount of Racism from Australia and the United States (Best, 2009). The result was the idea of aiming for a united Asia, in a sense similar to Japan's idea of guiding Asia through alliances with China after the Sino-Japanese war in 1898 (Zachmann, 2009). Thus, social practices between the West/Europe and Japan transformed Japan's ideals and beliefs regarding what civilization was, and how it ought to behave. In other words, the ideational base for Japan's behaviour are what determined its interest, meaning Western material interests became part of Japan's ideological base.

Moreover, the idea seems more plausible considering Japan did the same in 1931. In 1931, international markets declined thus increasing the importance of wealth as well as the prosperous area Manchuria, which was soon to be invaded (Best, 2010). At the same time, the media in Japan romanticized the idea of war, but also tried to spread the belief of Japan's superiority to lead Asia (Kushner, 2006). Japan justifying the Sino-Japanese war, as well as the Second Sino-Japanese war of 1937, could therefore be a result of ideational change, which in turn defined its identity as Asian hegemon, thus defining its interest accordingly to Westernized ideals and beliefs resulting from social interaction.

Taking this approach another step further, in its post-war reconstruction, a strong focus on Japanese economic development is seen, where the Japanese Ministry on International Trade and Industry rejected a proposal to reinstall military Self-Defence forces (Katzenstein, 2008). Seen from a social evolutionary learning context, military domination as was perceived to be intrinsic to Western/European civilization was inconsistent with the new principle that dominated the international environment – namely peace. In addition, the primary factor from the material world

would be the US-factor. The United States provided military security, which deemed military forces in a sense meaningless, especially with the pressing lack of finances after the war in Japan (Katzenstein, 2008). Interesting in China's case is that the idea Constructivist forces combined with Social interaction with the West/Europe and Japan leading towards Realist outcomes is less feasible as an approach. For one, as seen in the results, China remained ever resilient to Western/European influences. Also, it maintained its self-perceived superior position. During the Nagasaki Conference of 1926, Chinese officials stated that China was still the cradle of Asian civilization (Best, 2009).

Yet, the social evolutionary approach is here also evident to an extent. In the contemporary relations, while competitiveness does exist, particularly in the recent Senkaku/Diaoyu Island conflict where both countries claimed ownership, China's conviction to be superior does not seem to be a factor. The statements that were made referred to the Islands being a former part of China during the time of tributary system, rather than any arguments referring to superiority. Perhaps the international environment could be a factor, as the world is no longer separate from one another's sphere of influence. However, history is still an important component of the Sino-Japanese relations. As research pointed out, both during the Zhou-Tanaka communique and in the Friendship and Peace Treaty of 1978, China mentioned that history acts as a guide to the future (Söderberg, 2002). In addition, in the Friendship and Peace Treaty Japan was freed of any obligation paying war reparations, if it recognized what it had done (Wang, 2000). Moreover, the survey conducted by Genron and The China Daily showed that more than 59% of the respondents in China felt discontent with Japan regarding history, whereas the history factor in Japan was non-existent in the survey (The Genron NPO & The China Daily, 2014).

A plausible explanation lies with the concept of *guanxi*. Simply put, it is China's framework for building inter-state relations, including particular ways of dealing with conflicts (Uemura, 2013). Key in this framework is reciprocity, referring to downplaying conflicts with the expectation that the other return the favour (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2004). Comparing *guanxi* with the textbook conflict, it would imply that Japan did not adhere to the principle of reciprocity, as it disrupted the promised mutual recognition. Moreover, closely examining *guanxi* and its attribute of reciprocity and friendship, some similarity is found with the Confucianism society of traditional China. Namely, the aspect of sincerity, thus being honest and faithful aligns with China's statement of using history as guide to the past. Being true to one's self would imply acknowledging one's mistakes, hence the discontent China felt with the textbook issue, including the conflict regarding ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (once part of traditional China). Additionally, the Confucianism principle of harmony is also evident in *guanxi*'s aspect of reciprocity, namely that it should prevent conflicts from getting worse (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2004). Moreover, as the survey pointed out many Chinese citizens felt discontented by the WWII history which could be caused by *guanxi*, as downplaying conflicts would mean not addressing them until they could potentially exacerbate. In addition, assuming that the analysis' conclusion of Japan being a future-oriented state, China can be regarded as a past-oriented state, this

would then explain the discrepancies in their relations. Thus, it fits within the Constructivist context as it is an ideational force that determines China's behaviour, although one arguably unique to China. Therefore, Hofstede's argument of culture determining how things are perceived is in fact China's *guanxi*, with the importance of history deeply embedded. Not only does it comply with Constructivist arguments, in terms of Realism it can also define history as China's unique bargaining power.

The Conclusion

Does the Social Constructivist theory suffice as framework?

The answer to the first part of the main question whether Social Constructivism is sufficiently credible to explain the Sino-Japanese relations is no. It can act as an adequate theoretical base, but ought to take into account material forces such as military power, wealth, geographical location and domestic political structures. The analysis revealed that Social Constructivism identified China's prime ideational forces that structured its society as the Confucianism values. Moreover, the concept of social interaction indicated that China's state behaviour with other states was structured similarly as its domestic structure. In addition, states such as Vietnam and Korea behaved accordingly to Confucianism values. Thus, ideational forces and social interaction do indeed guide state behaviour. Also, important in China's case is that the ideational forces of Confucianism are still evident, yet now in the form of *guanxi*. The same could be seen with Japan and the Western/European states. Through interaction with the West/Europe, Japan's concept of civilization changed from China's idea of civilization to that of the West, one where the use of force was justified. However, the theory fails to explain why Japan did not assimilate completely into the Chinese sphere of influence. The Social evolutionary learning approach acted complementary. It stressed the impact of geographical location and domestic political structures. This was found in Japan's case, which interpreted the Confucianism principle of loyalty to sincerity as loyalty to one's ruler, and with a feudal system in place over the decades it embedded competitiveness to its national culture.

An important trend to point out is Japan's use of knowledge. The intensity of Japan's acquisition of Chinese Confucianism knowledge was equally as intense as its search for Western knowledge after the Meiji restoration. Thus, an important claim made in this dissertation is that Social Constructivism fails to see power as concept that is prone to ideational forces. Proof found in the analysis was that China as hierarch of the tributary system only allowed interaction with states if their cultural similarity was sufficient. From the Realist perspective, being a civilization according to the set norms, be it Chinese Confucianism norms or Western/European norms, as long as it provides security it can be deemed power.

The Sino-Japanese relations

The answer to the second part of the main question, whether this research provided a comprehensible explanation to the tension in the Sino-Japanese relations, is yes. As the results and analysis indicated, Japan has always been a very progressive state, whereas China remained rigid. The reason for that is that Japan can be regarded as a future-oriented state, whereas China is a past-oriented state. This can be seen in China's strong resilience towards Western/European knowledge despite military defeats. In contrast, Japan deliberately sought Chinese knowledge and adjusted it accordingly to its own environment. The same was done with Western knowledge after the Meiji restoration. Apart from

these cultural traits being part of this dissertation's framework, the juxtaposition between future –and past orientation is ever visible in the contemporary relations. With *guanxi* as the framework for state interaction, China downplays conflicts, in hope for favourable attitudes. Good examples are found during the Tanaka-Zhou Communique, where in return for waiving Japan from war reparations, it had to acknowledge its war aggression. In turn, this explains why the textbook conflict of 1982 angered China. China downplayed the topic of war reparations in which Japan was to acknowledge its war aggression, which Japan did not do when it revised the wording of its history books. Furthermore, it might now not be such a surprise that China utilized every chance to bring to up history when Japan is involved. Therefore, it is likely that for China history will always be core to the Sino-Japanese relations, whereas Japan as future-oriented nation will likely not express its remorse regarding what happened.

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